Adamson, Robert  (Glasgow 1852-1902 Glasgow) : Philosoph, Professor of Philosophy and Political Economy, Owens College, Manchester ; Professor of Logic and Rhetoric, University of Glasgow

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世紀的智者 : 羅素 [WC]


Bibliographie : erwähnt in


Ayers, Michael = Ayers, Michael Richard (1935-) : Englischer Philosoph, Professor of Philosophy University of Oxford

Bibliographie : Autor


Babbitt, Irving (Dayton, Ohio 1865-1933 Cambridge, Mass.) : Professor of French Literature, Harvard University, Literaturkritiker, Philosoph

Biographie

1891-1933 Irving Babbitt and China : general.
1960 Harry Levin (Professor of Comparative Literature Harvard University) : Babbitt was keenly interested in Christianity, utterly fascinated by Buddhism, and probably most sympathetic to secular creeds of Confucius.
Chang Hsin-hai: Early in his academic career, Babbitt demonstrated the fallacy in the fashionable 'scientific' approach to literature, pointing out that the aim in studying literature was not facts but a well-rounded and meaningful view of life. For this reason, Babbitt had extended his study in India and China, where, he felt sure, the great thinkers must have faced the same perennial questions that have baffled the Western world. He studied Buddhism and Confucianism not from idle curiosity but to find out what answers they had to offer in comparison with Western literature. He found the synthesis he preached and taught at Harvard for the rest of his life. If the young people from the Orient were attracted to Babbitt, Babbitt was certainly also attracted to the Orient. In working out his humanistic view, he felt that he was reinforced at every turn by the basic thoughts of two towering men: Buddha and Confucius.

When more than ever a true understanding between East and West can well mean the survival of the human race, Babbitt's approach is tremendously important for three reasons:
1. It considers the romantic attitude towards the East, fashionable in Western scholarship from the beginning of the nineteenth century, as not only false, but also misleading and dangerous.
2. Babbitt was not interested in regarding the East and West merely as two different spheres of human experience, and, because different, incapable of mutual assistance. He realized the disparity in circumstance under which each had developed, but he found that, in the search for human values, the two sections of mankind had come to much the same conclusions. He believed that basically Christianity and Aristotelianism, on the one side, and Buddhism and Confucianism, on the other, are mutually illuminating and thus indispensable to each other.
3. In his insistence on values, Babbitt showed unusual powers of critical discrimination. Babbitt knew that the East has known as many different types of thought as the West, and he believed that the modern scholar should develop a sense of critical appraisal, and know the areas of argument for formulating a sound view of life. He found a whole trend of Rousseauistic thought in the naturalistic views of Lao-tse and Chuang-tse, which he wholly rejected. In looking at the Eastern landscape, Babbitt did not enjoy the nebulous vision of a Schopenhauer or even of an Emerson. He saw its clear, bold outlines, its mountains as well as its valleys. His fine sense of discrimination is nowhere expressed more clearly.
Babbitt did not perhaps feel as much at home in Confucianism as he did in early Buddhism for the simple reason that, while he knew Pali at first hand, his knowledge of Chinese thought was derived from translations that did not adequately convey the original flavor. The patient labours of James Legge are praiseworthy, but the must have often made Babbitt and others, wonder how so apparently uninspired a doctrine could have held any people for any length of time.

Why is it that, for so long a period, people not only in China, but also in Japan, in Korea, in Vietnam, and in the lands neighbouring China, willingly, without coercion have taken to the so-called 'mundane' ideas of Confucius as ducks to water? Babbitt tried hard to answer this question. Why is it that the people who believe in Confucianism are so widely tolerant?
Hinduism, too, is tolerant, and so, for that matter, is Buddhism. But the fact that Buddhism barely enjoyed a history of 1000 years in the land of its birth, was very disturbing. If weakened by alien ideas, how is that Confucianism managed to remain unassailable through the millennia? Buddhism itself made a mighty assault, only to find that all it succeeded in doing was to produce a Chu Hsi (died 1200), who brought Buddhism within the crucible of Confucianism. If Hegel was right, Babbitt argued, that Western man could find nothing in Confucius that had not been said. The fact was, that Confucius gave central place to an idea 'which is almost entirely absent, not only from Cicero, but also from Aristotle, who may be considered as the most important of occidental humanists – the idea, namely, of humility or of submission to the will of Heaven. For this reason, Babbitt placed Confucius in the same category as Christ, even though 'his kingdom is very much of this world'. Confucius was humble not only to the will of Heaven, Babbitt added, but also in his attitude towards the sages of old, Babbitt relied on the considered judgment of Edouard Chavannes. Babbitt felt he understood the secret of Confucius. For him, as for Confucius, the ultimate test of any sound scholarship or leadership is the character that it produces, and the strength of
that character cannot be achieved without rigid self-discipline, rooted in humility and the law of measure. Babbitt understood the Confucian spirit, unalteringly, and basically. In Buddhism, he found the answer to his deeper yearnings, combining it with Confucianism to produce the humanism he taught and lived with intellectual fervor and spiritual calm.

1974

Hou Chien: Not being a professional sinologist, Babbitt culled the Chinese only for what he could use to support his general philosophical position claimed to be founded upon universal human experience. Practically all the Chinese students who came into contact with Babbitt admired him for his scholarship and moral earnestness. This they did so no doubt also because of his championship of Confucianism.

What Babbitt has to say about China and the Chinese shows that he has read more widely than the references can indicate. In both sweep of treatment and the insights into Chinese history and thinking he remains impressive. His discussion of Chinese history ranged from the time of Confucius down to the twentieth century of a China abject with confusion and subject to imminent peril. He said little about the centuries in between. He is quite correct in thinking that Confucianism is humanistic, that the Taoists are naturalistic, and that Confucianism forms the basic, orthodoxical tradition in China. Babbitt also overlooks the role these naturalists played in shaping the Chinese character. He approvingly quotes Mengzi attack on Mozi and Yang Zhu as 'leading wild beasts to devour men' in their excessive altruism and egotism. His failure to mention the yin-yang and five-element schools and others, which converged into latter-day Confucian philosophy, may be winked at as irrelevant to his argument, but the omission of Xunzi and the legalists growing out of this master, has implications that must be investigated. Since Babbitt usually behaves like an orthodox Confucian while Xunzi is often taken as a heretic, the omission should perhaps be looked upon as the result of preconceived ideas rather than ignorance.

List of Chinese names in Babbitt's writings: The personages named are roughly divisible into those Babbitt approves, those he censures, and those who, as his students, have been able to advise the teacher. Of the first category are besides Confucius, Shun, Mengzi, Zhu Xi and Zeng Guofan Laozi, Zhuangzi, Mozi, Yang Zhu and Li Bo are found in the second group. In the third are Mei Guangdi, Zhang Xinhai and Guo Binhe. Shi Huangdi of Qin and Sima Qian are mentioned without much comment. Two persons are referred to without being names: Yen Hui, Confucius' favorite disciple and Han Yu, who was cited for accusing Buddha to be a barbarian. With Aristotle, Jesus, and Buddha, Confucius forms the fourth column to Babbitt's humanistic edifice.

The legendary Shun is talked of once as an exemplary non-meddler. Mengzi is quoted, in addition to the charges against Mozi and Yang Zhu, on the distinction between mental and manual labor, the relationship between property and civilization, and, with concession, the great man being one who has not lost the heart of a child. Zeng Guofan is reduced to a footnote. Laozi and Zhuangzi are held up as primitivists who could have been forerunners to Rousseau and Wordsworth. The Taoists are considered 'a part of a great stream of naturalistic and primitivistic tendency' that included the pacifist altruism of Mozi and the self-love of Yang Zhu. Li Bo is consigned to the Taoist limbo of Bohemian poets.

Babbitt believes the world has been plunged in confusion with the rise of naturalism. The old world is dead while the new is powerless to be born. For his humanism Babbitt posits two things: the end of all human endeavors and activities is happiness, and the only means to achieve it is character. He does not think much of human nature. Without taking recourse either to the concept of original sin or of the divine in man, but solely as a matter of experience, he sees that human nature is a mixture of the good and the evil.

Babbitt's ideas are the end of life, which is happiness, the importance of character the fulfillment of that end, and the nature of human nature, which necessitates character and its formation.
Aldridge, A. Owen: Irving Babbitt was celebrated for his insistence on the necessity of adhering to philosophical rigor and upholding ethical standards in national culture. Along with his personal quest for knowledge of the most positive statements of these ideals in the history of mankind, he acquired a substantial acquaintance with the religion of Buddha and the morality of Confucius. As a pioneer in the discipline of comparative literature, moreover, he sought and revealed resemblances between the great writings of the West and those of the East. Babbitt's personal connections with Chinese culture fully equaled his purely literary ones. In China, Babbitt's adherence to absolute standards counterbalanced Dewey's pragmatism, essentially the same relationship between the two personalities that was widely recognized in the United States.

Babbitt's vogue among Chinese intellectuals does not fit the pattern of later imitations of Western theory, for it did not derive from a contemporary passing fad but from a personal philosophy in which Chinese students found resemblances to their own cultural traditions and which they felt might serve as a point of reference to their own cultural traditions and which they felt might serve as a point of reference in planning their nation's future. This feeling of an identity of national ideas and aspirations is the basis of Babbitt's appeal rather than any particular intellectual concept or activist program. Babbitt during one of his class sessions drew out from one of his Chinese students an awareness of this ethical-cultural bond or predisposition.

Although Babbitt never visited China, he recognized a cultural bond existing between himself and Chinese civilization. During the early years of Babbitt's marriage, his wife, who had been reared in China, used 'to think him conceited because he professed to understand that country as she did not'. Probably because of his wife's influence, Babbitt's home was adorned with a good deal of Chinoiserie, including dragon designs on lampshades and on various fabrics, and landscape paintings, which he explained were 'not representative of the mountains and the rivers, but of states of mind and feelings'. The recollection of Babbitt's acquaintances are not always reliable. One affirmed that he delighted in the Chinese scrolls on his own walls, but was not known to have visited the treasures of Far Eastern paintings at the Museum of Fine-Arts Boston.

Buddhism was the first aspect of Oriental civilization to attract Babbitt's attention. Although the roots of Buddhism are in India and Babbitt's devotion to this philosophy may, therefore, seem somewhat irrelevant to his association with China. Babbitt revealed that he studied both Sanskrit and Pali. He took up these languages at the Ecole des Hautes-Etudes in Paris in 1891. The influence of Confucius on Babbitt's thought came relatively late in his career. He referred in print to the Chinese sage for the first time in Rousseau and Romanticism in 1919, and subsequently in all of his writings.

Besides Confucius, Babbitt referred in his works to a number of great names of Chinese tradition. Those he approved of were nearly all Confucians and those on the other side Taoists.

Babbitt was still advocating a rapprochement between East and West in one of the latest of his essays, calling for some properly qualified scholar, preferably a Chinese, to compare 'Confucian humanism with Occidental humanism'.

Babbitt gave Confucius a place of eminence in his thought because of the resemblance between the Chinese sage and Aristotle, and also because the former represented an ancient spiritual tradition bordering on religion, but completely devoid of the supernatural.
Bai Liping: Liang Shiqiu saw Babbitt as providing a response to problems in his own country. Among the particular ways in which Babbitt influenced Liang was changing his reading habits. Previously, while studying at Qinghua College, Liang had read widely but unselectively, devoting his attention for the most part to whatever new books, whether original works or translations, happened to come his way and strike his fancy. Later he came to realize that reading should be guided in large part by discriminating judgment and purpose. Not only Liang's reading habits but also the nature of his own writing was influenced by Babbitt. Liang wrote poems and short stories that betrayed a strong attachment to sentimental romanticism. After returning to China from America, he nearly stopped composing poems and short stories. Moreover, his writing from thence forward conveyed a more balanced and historically accurate view of human nature than was characteristic of his earlier writing. Though Babbitt profoundly affected Liang's standards, it cannot be assumed that Liang's literary tastes coincided in all particulars with Babbitt's or that his understanding of Babbitt's ideas was always or in all respects accurate. Many Chinese scholars are today exploring Babbitt's work, which is becoming more widely accessible because of prominently published new translations of his books.

Wu Xuezha: One of the reasons why Babbitt showed great interest in the Orient as well as the Occident was that he looked for the constants of human nature in general as opposed to the peculiarities of time and place. He did not want to have his doctrine called the new humanism. For him, there was no new humanism. There was only the age-old opposition between naturalism (or the monistic merging of God, man, and nature, with its consequent denial of a higher law) and humanism. According to the latter, man has a distinct and unique nature. He is a mysterious being in whom the material and spiritual meet, who is responsible to a law superior to his 'ordinary' self, a law which he must discover, a higher will to which he must learn to attune his inclinations. Babbitt did not quarrel with established religion for interpreting this higher will in special doctrinal ways derived from revelation. On the contrary, he looked to religion for support of humanism. And if, as a philosopher, he felt he could interpret the higher will only as known in actual human experience, as a veto power and sense of higher purpose, he pointed to it as proof of a dualism within the human self without which there can be no genuine religion.
Zhu Shoutong: Babbitt's humanism has great spiritual, moral, and philosophical depth. If properly reintroduced into China, it could have an immense positive impact on the development of Chinese life. Partly because of the misfortunes, Babbitt's humanism has not gained the niche in the temple of Chinese culture that it deserves and may yet achieve. Fortunately, there are substantial signs that a revival of interest in Babbitt is now well underway in China. Writings by and about Babbitt or related to his ideas are appearing widely. A number of prominent Chinese scholars, working in some cases in cooperation with Western counterparts, are preparing the ground for a major and systematic reexamination of Babbitt's work.

Liang Shiqiu's efforts marked the end of the relative obscurity of Babbitt's ideas in China among intellectuals of modernist leanings. But Liang's use of Babbitt's ideas and reputation in his widely followed tit-for-tat struggle with Lu Xun, brought for Babbitt something worse than obscurity – namely, widespread demonization. Xue heng's use of classical Chinese in elucidating Babbitt had impeded the spread of his ideas, and it had also protected Babbitt from criticism. By drawing Babbitt into his own quarrels, Liang, who had been quick to blame the Xu cheng conservatives, inflicted on Babbitt's reputation in China a damage that would prove substantial and enduring. Although Lu Xun criticized Babbitt with biting sarcasm, he was seldom concerned with the latter's actual ideas. Lu Xun complained, that the ideas of Western thinkers such as Babbitt and John Dewey were being filtered through the interpretations of their Chinese advocates and possibly distorted rather than being allowed to stand for themselves in accurate Chinese translation. [Babb26,Babb17,Babb19,Babb23,Babb24,Babb25]

Irving Babbitt acquired a dedicated disciple, Mei Guangdi at Harvard University. In addition to teaching Chinese at Harvard, Mei returned to China to lead a Chinese crusade based on Babbitt's concept of humanism, a movement closely linked with the attempt of the Chinese people to work out a political future during the transition from monarchy to democracy. Mei Guangdi: "[Babbitt] regularly stayed away from the commencement exercises at the University, and when his duty as a father required his presence at his son's graduation, he laughingly announced: 'This is the first commencement I have attended in many years.' Babbitt was a solitary figure in a crowded metropolis of learning."

"Confucius was perhaps the teacher with whom Babbitt had the closest temperamental kinship."

Ong Chang Woei: Mei Guangdi, besides praising Babbitt as a 'teacher of men' following the Chinese tradition, claimed that if Babbitt had been born in China not later than the seventeenth century, he would merit the extraordinary honor of being elevated to membership in the most exclusive of Chinese national institutions, the Temple of Confucius: an honor conferred on only a limited number of great men throughout Chinese history who were believed to have truly transmitted the Confucian way. [Babb22,Babb26,Babb19]

Mercier, J.A. *Mouvement humaniste aux Etats-Unis*. Mercier indicated that Babbitt was steeped in Buddhism, but practiced Confucianism, that his work was known in China, that he had many Orientals among his students, and that he was one of the race of Occidental critics, if not the only one, equipped to compare Europe and America with the Orient. [Babb19]

1917
"The university authorities have arranged for Professor Babbitt to be my adviser – following my request. More is my adviser's close friend, and the two are the greatest scholars in America today."

1919
"Since the first two months this spring, Zhang Xinhai and Lou Guanglai wrote me several letters asking about literature and I gave them much information. They expressed great admiration after they had read books by my adviser Babbitt, and then they decided to transfer to Harvard." [Babb25]

1917-1921 Wu Mi studiert 1917-1918 an der University of Virginia, dann an der Harvard University unter Irving Babbitt. Er promoviert 1921. [Babb8,Fiel1]

1918 Letter from Irving Babbitt to Stuart P. Sherman. (April 1918).
Babbitt wrote that he was 'trying to recover my respect for human nature at present by immersing myself in the sages of the Far East – for the moment Confucius and Mencius. No one ever had a firmer faith in the final triumph of moral causes than these old boys'. [Babb21]

1919 Babbitt, Irving. Rousseau and romanticism [ID D28808].
Introduction
…Now the ethical experience of the Far East may be summed up for practical purposes in the teachings and influence of two men, Confucius and Buddha (I should perhaps say that in the case of Buddha I have been able to consult the original Pali documents. In the case of Confucius and the Chinese I have had to depend on translations). To know the Buddhistic and Confucian teachings in their true spirit is to know what is best and most representative in the ethical experience of about half the human race for over seventy generations. A study of Buddha and Confucius suggests, as does a study of the great teachers of the Occident, that under its bewildering surface variety human experience falls after all into a few main categories. I myself am fond of distinguishing three levels on which a man may experience life — the naturalistic, the humanistic, and the religious. Tested by its fruits Buddhism at its best confirms Christianity. Submitted to the same test Confucianism falls in with the teaching of Aristotle and in general with that of all those who from the Greeks down have proclaimed decorum and the law of measure. This is so obviously true that Confucius has been called the Aristotle of the East. Not only has the Far East had in Buddhism a great religious movement and in Confucianism a great humanistic movement, it has also had in early Taoism a movement that in its attempts to work out naturalistic equivalents of humanistic or religious insight, offers almost starting analogies to the movement I am here studying. Thus both East and West have not only had great religious and humanistic disciplines which when tested by their fruits confirm one another, bearing witness to the element of oneness, the constant element in human experience, but these disciplines have at times been conceived in a very positive spirit. Confucius indeed, though a moral realist, can scarcely be called a positivist; he aimed rather to attach men to the past by links of steel. He reminds us in this as in some other ways of the last of the great Tories in the Occident, Dr. Johnson. Buddha on the other hand was an individualist. He wished men to rest their belief neither on his authority nor on that of tradition…
Appendix

Chinese primitivism

[Quelle : Wieger, Léon. Les pères du système taoïste ID D1861].

Perhaps the closest approach in the past to the movement of which Rousseau is the most important single figure is the early Taoist movement in China. Taoism, especially in its popular aspects, became later something very different, and what I say is meant to apply above all to the period from about 550 to 200 B.C. The material for the Taoism of this period will be found in convenient form in the volume of Léon Wieger (1913) – Les pères du système taoïste (Chinese texts with French translations of Lao-tzu, Lieh-tzu and Chuang-tzu). The Tao Te King of Lao-tzu is a somewhat enigmatical document of only a few thousand words, but plainly primitivistic in its general trend. The phrase that best sums up its general spirit is that of Wordsworth – a 'wise passiveness'. The unity at which it aims is clearly of the pantheistic variety, the unity that is obtained by breaking down discrimination and affirming the 'identity of contradictories', and that encourages a reversion to origins, to the state of nature and the simple life. According to the Taoist the Chinese fell from the simple life into artificiality about the time of the legendary Yellow Emperor, Hoang-ti (27th century B.C.). The individual also should look back to beginnings and seek to be once more like the new-born child or, according to Chuang-tzu, like the new-born calf. It is in Chuang-tzu indeed that the doctrine develops its full naturalistic and primitivistic implications. Few writers in either East or West have set forth more entertainingly what one may term the Bohemian attitude towards life. He heaps ridicule upon Confucius and in the name of spontaneity attacks his doctrine of humanistic imitation. He sings the praises of the unconscious, even when obtained through intoxication, and extols the morality of the beautiful soul. He traces the fall of mankind from nature into artifice in a fashion that anticipates very completely both Rousseau's Discourse on the Arts and Sciences and that on the Origin of Inequality. See also the amusing passage in which the brigand Chi, child of nature and champion of the weak against the oppressions of government, paints a highly Rousseauistic picture of man's fall from his primitive felicity. Among the things that are contrary to nature and purely conventional, according to Chuang-tzu and the Taoists, are, not only the sciences and arts and attempts to discriminate between good and bad taste, but likewise government and statecraft, virtue and moral standards. To the artificial music of the Confucians, the Taoists oppose a natural music that offers startling analogies to the most recent programmatic and descriptive tendencies of Occidental music. See especially Chuang-tzu's programme for a cosmic symphony in three movements — the Pipes of Pan as one is tempted to call it. This music that is supposed to reflect in all its mystery and magic the infinite creative processes of nature is very close to the primitivistic music (L'arbre vu du côté des racines) with which Hugo's satyr strikes panic into the breasts of the Olympians.

The Taoist notion of following nature is closely related, as in other naturalistic movements, to the idea of fate whether in its stoical or epicurean form. From the references in Chuang-tzu and elsewhere to various sects and schools we see that Taoism was only a part of a great stream of naturalistic and primitivistic tendency. China abounded at that time in pacifists in apostles of brotherly love, and as we should say nowadays Tolstoyans. A true opposite to the egoistic Yang-chu was the preacher of pure altruism and indiscriminate sympathy, Mei-ti. Mencius said that if the ideas of either of these extremists prevailed the time would come, not only when wolves would devour men, but men would devour one another. In opposing discrimination and ethical standards to the naturalists, Mencius and the Confucian humanists were fighting for civilization. Unfortunately there is some truth in the Taoist charge that the standards of the Confucians are too literal, that in their defence of the principle of imitation they did not allow sufficiently for the element of flux and relativity and illusion in things — an element for which the Taoists had so keen a sense that they even went to the point of suppressing the difference between sleeping and waking and life and death. To reply properly to the Taoist relativist the Confucians would have needed to work out a sound conception of the role of the imagination — the universal key to human nature — and this they do not seem to have done. One is inclined to ask whether this is the reason for China's failure to achieve a great ethical art like that of the drama and the epic of the Occident at their best. The Taoists
were richly imaginative but along romantic lines. We should not fail to note the Taoist influence upon Li Po and other Bohemian and bibulous poets of the Tang dynasty, or the relation of Taoism to the rise of a great school of landscape painting at about the same time. We should note also the Taoist element in 'Ch'an' Buddhism (the 'Zen' Buddhism of Japan), some knowledge of which is needed for an understanding of whole periods of Japanese and Chinese art.

In these later stages, however, the issues are less clear-cut than in the original struggle between Taoists and Confucians. The total impression one has of early Taoism is that it is a main manifestation of an age of somewhat sophistical individualism. Ancient Chinese individualism ended like that of Greece: at about the same time in disaster. After a period of terrible convulsions (the era of the 'Fighting State'), the inevitable man on horseback appeared from the most barbaric of these states and 'put the lid' on everybody. Shi Hwang-ti, the new emperor, had many of the scholars put to death and issued an edict that the writings of the past, especially the Confucian writings, should be destroyed (213 B.C.). Though the emperor behaved like a man who took literally the Taoist views as to the blessings of ignorance, it is not clear from our chief authority, the historian Ssu-ma Ch'ien, that he acted entirely or indeed mainly under Taoist influence.

It is proper to add that though Lao-tzu proclaims that the soft is superior to the hard, a doctrine that should appeal to the Occidental sentimentalist, one does not find in him or in the other Taoists the equivalent of the extreme emotional expansiveness of the Rousseauist. There are passages, especially in Lao-tzu, that in their emphasis on concentration and calm are in line with the ordinary wisdom of the East; and even where the doctrine is unmistakably primitivistic the emotional quality is often different from that of the corresponding movement in the West. [Babb16]

1919-1920 Lin Yutang attended the classes of Irving Babbitt at Harvard University. [Babb21]
Most of the Chinese I meet tell me what China needs is a Renaissance with all that a Renaissance implies in the way of a break with the past. Now the present Renaissance movement owes its inception to the pressure upon China from the Occident, and has developed thus far, so far as it has developed at all, on occidental rather than on Oriental lines. It is perhaps well that I should explain at the outset that it has been my business for many years past, in connection with the teaching I have been doing at Harvard, to study the nature of the European Renaissance or break with the mediaeval past that took place in the sixteenth century and to trace the main currents of European thought and literature from that day to this. I have been giving special attention to what one may term the second great forward push of individualism, or emancipation from traditional standards, that took place in the eighteenth century. The characteristic of this occidental movement, as I see it, has been, from the sixteenth century down, its tremendous expansiveness. It has been, first, an expansion of men's knowledge and control of natural forces in the interests of comfort and utility. This first or utilitarian side of the modern movement already has its prophet in Francis Bacon; you may know its votaries by their pleas for organization and efficiency, and in general by their confidence in machinery. The second side of the great expansive movement puts its main emphasis on emotional expansion and stresses at one time the fraternity that is to be achieved by this emotional expansion, at another time, the self-expression that it encourages. This emotional side of the movement had its prophet in the eighteenth century in Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

To bring together the two sides of the movement, mankind as a whole is to advance constantly in the control of nature to the ends of utility and comfort, and at the same time is to be united increasingly by the spirit of brotherhood conceived as a process of expansive emotion. This movement may be defined in its totality as humanitarianism. At the centre of humanitarianism as a philosophy of life is the idea of progress, which in some form or other is the true religion of our occidental expansionists. The typical man of the nineteenth century conceived that as a result of the combination of scientific discovery and expansive sympathy, he was, in Tennyson's phrase, moving towards a "far-off divine event."

Instead, it has turned out that he was moving towards Armageddon. A revulsion of feeling has ensued and the most interesting development of occidental thought of to-day is the increasing tendency to doubt the idea of progress in the form it has assumed during the past two centuries. (See, for example, Dean Inge's Idea of Progress (Romanes Lecture for 1920).)

Certain persons are inclined to inquire whether some essential element was not omitted in our occidental break with the past, whether in the expressive phrase of the Germans, we have not poured out the baby with the bath water. As a result of this omission, the real issue is seen to be not the struggle between the forces of progress and those of reaction, but between civilization and barbarism. More than fifty thousand copies have recently been sold in Germany of a book by Oswald Spengler with the significant title The Downfall of the Occident. Everyone recognizes that the Occident has been amazingly successful in its pursuit of power, but the question may be asked whether it has not got its power as the expense of wisdom. Now the struggle between new and old that is beginning in China is along lines very familiar to students of occidental tendencies. On the one hand, is what seems to be an effete tradition, on the other are those who are working for a progressive and organized and efficient China. Another type of Chinese progressive is, I am told, for throwing over the Chinese classics, and going in for occidental writers of the extreme Rousseauistic type like Ibsen, and Strindberg, and Bernard Shaw. Now up to a certain point I sympathize with the aims of the Chinese progressives. China needs to become organized and efficient; she needs to acquire to some extent the machinery that has grown up in the Occident if she is to protect herself against the imperialistic aggression of Japan or the powers of Europe. China is likely to see something resembling the European industrial revolution. China also needs to escape from the rut of pseudo-classic formalism into which she had fallen as the result of a too inert traditionalism. At the same time China should not in its eagerness to become progressive imitate the Occident and pour out the baby with the bath water. It should be careful, in short, however much it repudiates the mere formalism, to retain the soul of truth that is contained in
its great traditions. When one examines these great traditions one finds certain striking analogies with our Western traditions that the representatives of the utilitarian-sentimental movement have been so busy discarding. The Western traditions have been partly religious, partly humanistic. The names that sum up these two aspects of tradition most completely are those of Aristotle and Christ, corresponding in a general way to those of Confucius and Buddha in the Far East. A writer in the Revue Philosophique points out that just as Saint Thomas Aquinas combined along scholastic lines Aristotle and Christ in his Sum of Theology, so Chu Hsi was making about the same time in China a scholastic combination of Buddhist and Confucian elements in his great commentary. Let us ask ourselves what is the element of wisdom in these great traditions, losing which the East as well as the West will fall from genuine civilization into a sort of mechanical barbarism. This problem of civilization was never so urgent as to-day. For something without analogy in the past has taken place as the result of the discoveries of physical science: all parts of the world are being brought into physical and economic contact with one another. For instance, as a result of the European war, cotton went to forty cents a pound, the increase in wages that resulted for the colored people of our American South enabled them to buy silk shirts and underwear and this caused in turn a commotion in the market for raw silks at Tokio. The fiery chariots in which the ancient Chinese Taoists dreamt of flying through the heavens are becoming a reality. The trip from New York to Peking, or from New York to Buenos Aires may in no distant future be taken as quickly and with more comfort than the trip from New York to Boston as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century. In view of such inventions as that of the wireless telephone one may say that the whole world is, in a very literal sense, becoming a whispering gallery. Think of the danger if the words that are whispered are to be words of hatred and suspicion, if men are to be bound together in a huge mass of interlocking machinery and at the same time remain spiritually centrifugal! Let us then discuss in a very and critical fashion the question which, as I have just said, is most urgent at the present hour—the question of civilization versus barbarism, considering first the question of civilization in general and then that of Chinese civilization in particular. What strikes one in surveying the past is the tendency of men to look on their own country and its ways of viewing life as civilized and on the men of other countries and their ways of viewing life as barbaric. The Greeks showed a considerable degree of assurance when they deemed themselves alone civilized and dismissed the vast outside world as barbaric. Dr. Johnson showed perhaps a still greater degree of assurance when he said of the Greeks themselves: "Demosthenes, Madam, spoke to an assembly of brutes, a barbarous people;" and also when he remarked: "For anything I see, foreigners are fools." No country, however, is a more extreme example of the tendency in question than the China of the past. China was the civilized world; it was in the Chinese phrase All-under-Heaven (Poo-tien-shia); the rest of the world, if recognized at all, was dismissed as a vague fringe of outer barbarism. Buddhism, to be sure, penetrated into China from without. But a memorial to the throne that was composed by a statesman of the Tang period begins as follows: "This Buddha was a barbarian." Now in a way I sympathize with this confidence of old China in its own civilization if not with the arrogance that led it to dismiss as of slight value the achievements of every other type of civilization, and I am going to state why in my judgement traditional Chinese civilization deserves a high rating, when compared with the civilization of other countries; this reason is first and foremost that, in spite of all its corrupt mandarins and officials of the past and present, China has perhaps more than any other country, planted itself on moral ideas. Joubert, one of the most sagacious of French critics, writes of the Chinese: "Are they in as imperfect a state as is commonly supposed? They have been frequently conquered, we are told. But are we to make the institutions of a country responsible for the chances and incidents of war? And is not long duration a sign of excellence in laws, as utility and clearness are characteristics of truth in philosophical systems? Now what people ever had laws more ancient, which have varied less and which have been more constantly honored, loved, studied?" One may add to what Joubert says about the traditional preoccupation of the
Chinese with moral ideas that this interest has been displayed predominantly on the humanistic level. It has not been primarily naturalistic, like that of the Occident at the present time, nor again mainly religious, like that of ancient, and to some extent, modern India; the chief concern of the Chinese has been rather with the ethical aspects of men's relations to one another in this world. For example, the so-called Sacred Edict of Kang Hsi (early eighteenth century) which is admirable from a purely humanistic point of view, is positively disparaging in its mention of both Buddhism and Christianity.

But the utilitarian-sentimental movement that is now being introduced into China also professes to be civilized and ethical, and in the name of its own conception of civilization and ethics, it will show itself ready, as it has with us, to discard traditional ethical conceptions whether humanistic or religious. I can only express the conviction at the risk of seeming unduly dogmatic because of my failure through lack of time to give all my grounds for this conviction, that the present movement in the Occident is at its very heart not ethical but pseudo-ethical. Let me return for a moment to its notion of progress. There is a sense in which everybody should believe in progress. Confucius showed that he believed in progress when he said of his disciple Yen Yuan: "Ah, what a loss! I used to see him ever progressing and never coming to a standstill." But the utilitarians have fallen into a palpable confusion between moral and material progress.

I am going to quote on this latter point a passage from a young English critic, Mr. John Middleton Murry. In his "Evolution of an Intellectual" (1919), he writes as follows: "There would not be the faintest trouble in reading modern history in such a fashion that the disaster of the war would appear, not a terrible aberration of mankind, but the logical culmination of all that process of complicating and multiplying material satisfactions which began with the Industrial Revolution in England and has usurped the name of civilization. This so-called civilization, it could be clearly shown, has acted merely as a multiplying instrument. It has increased the desires of man, and increased the horror of the method he has always chosen to attain them if unimpeded satisfaction were not permitted. * * Modern civilization is only a complex of material discoveries and it is nothing more. In other words it is not a civilization at all. It is a material condition which has usurped a spiritual title. The excitement of the process of its creation was so great that the peoples involved in it had no time to look about them. The fervor of activity was upon them, and they made, with an ease that now seems to us almost, miraculous, the assumption that their fervor was a moral fervor. * * Words of real moral and spiritual import were, we will not say debased, but transferred from one scheme of values to another. * * The language of morality became the language of materiality. *** There were no adequate spiritual controls. The problem is how to create them."

Disraeli says that the English-speaking peoples have been unable to distinguish between comfort and civilization. The word comfort itself is an interesting example of that tendency of which Mr. Murry speaks to transfer words from one scheme of values to another. "Blessed are they that mourn for they shall be comforted". The American of the present day wishes to get his comfort without any preliminary mourning; and this is a main aspect of what has been termed our criminal optimism. Moreover the utilitarian debasement of general terms is only half the story; the sentimentalist has also tampered with the right meaning of words in his endeavor to prove that it is possible to satisfy the requirements of the moral law by some process of emotional expansion. All other modern revolutions were preceded about the middle of the eighteenth century by a revolution in the dictionary. It was about that time, for example, that the word conscience began to take on its present meaning; instead of being a still small voice, as it had been traditionally, it became a social conscience that operates rather through a megaphone.

Now the way to deal with such confusions and sophistries is not simply by an appeal to the past or to some form of traditional authority. Since the persons who utter these sophistries profess above all to be modern, one should meet them on their own ground and deal with them in a thoroughly modern, that is, in a thoroughly critical spirit. According to Mr. Murry, material progress has been able to pass for spiritual progress only by a twisting and perversion of general terms. This reminds us that Socrates, the first great exponent of the critical spirit in the Occident opposed to the sophists of his time and their uncritical break with the past a
rigorous definition of general terms. We are reminded also of a saying of Confucius. When asked what he would do first of all if the reins of government were put in his hands, he replied that the first thing he would do would be to define his terms and make words correspond to things. The man who wishes to practice the Socratic and Confucian art of making words correspond to things and to discover how far our current theories are in accord with the actual facts of human nature must use the past as his laboratory. One should remind the modernist, who piques himself above all on being experimental, to how great an extent tradition itself is only a convenient summing up of actual experience. Confucian doctrine, for example, can be judged not only by its fruits since the age of Confucius, but reflects a great body of moral experience in the ages that preceded him. I cannot forbear quoting at this point a passage from the late M. Chavannes, Professor at the College de France, and at the time of his death the most accomplished of occidental sinologues: "Confucius was, as it were, five hundred years before our era, the national conscience which gave precision and corroboration to the profound ideas of which the classic books of remote antiquity reveal to us the first outlines. He went about proclaiming the necessity of conforming to the moral ideal that China had slowly conceived in the course of centuries; the men of his time refused to obey him because they found it too difficult to give up their comforts or their interests; they felt nevertheless that his voice had a more than human authority; they were moved and stirred to the depths of their being when they were touched by the potent spirit coming from the distant past which summoned up in them the truths glimpsed by their fathers."

Let us turn then to this Confucian tradition, resting as it does on an enormous mass of concrete experience, for light on the question that I declared to be so urgent at the present moment — the question as to what is the centripetal element in human nature, the element that really brings men together on the spiritual level, and not merely, like our mechanical devices, establishes a material contact between them while leaving them spiritual, by centrifugal. Confucius defines the specifically human element in man, not in terms of expansive emotion like the sentimental humanitarians of to-day, but as a "law of inner control," (I borrowed this rendering of li from "The Sayings of Confucius" translated by Mr. Lionel Giles of the British Museum) and herein he agrees with the best humanists of the Occident from Aristotle and the Greeks down. If a man is to be truly human, he cannot expand freely along the lines of his ordinary self, but must discipline this ordinary self to a sense of measure and proportion. But most people, says Aristotle, do not wish to do anything of the kind; "they would rather live in a disorderly than in a sober manner." So that humanists in both the East and the West oppose to the democratic doctrine of the divine average the doctrine of the saving remnant. A man who accepts a truly humanistic discipline tends to become what Confucius calls a superior man ("True aristocrat" would perhaps be a better rendering. "Superior man" has about it a slight suggestion). (Chun tzu) or what Aristotle calls a highly serious man. Personally I am struck by the central soundness of this Confucian conception. It does not proscribe sympathy; it would merely have sympathy tempered by selection. (The element of sympathy is of course abundantly present in Confucian jen). You no doubt recall that apostles of an indiscriminate fraternity were abroad in ancient China as they are in the Occident to-day. The attacks of Mencius on Mei-ti and his followers who were for suppressing discrimination in favor of brotherhood still hold good against our western sentimentalists, for instance, against Tolstoy and his followers.

If the superior man is a great blessing to the world it is less because he engages in what is now known as social service than because he is setting the world a good example. Plato defines justice as minding one's own business. As a result of our current "uplift" activities the point is rapidly being reached where everybody is minding everybody else's business. The meddler and the busybody has perhaps for the first time in the history of the world got himself taken at his own estimate of himself. We are in fact living in what some one has termed the "meddle ages." It might be well to reflect on what Confucius says of his ideal ruler, Shun. Religiously self-observant, he says, Shun simply sat gravely on his throne and everything was well. Shun was minding his own business in the Platonic sense and the force of his example was such that other people were led to do likewise. Humanistic ideas of the kind I have been describing were maintained in old China by a
system of education. That this education had fallen into a rut of pseudo-classic formalism and that it had from the start grave deficiencies must, I think, be freely granted. But even here you must be careful not to pour out the baby with the bath water. There was, for example, a great idea at the bottom of the old civil service examinations, however imperfectly it was carried out. There was to be selection and severe selection on humanistic lines among those who aspired to serve the state, but the basis of the selection was to be democratic. This combination of the democratic with the aristocratic and selective principle is one that we can scarcely be said to have solved in the Occident. Our democratic development has been won largely at the expense of standards; and yet without leaders who are disciplined to the best humanistic standards the whole democratic experiment is going, in my judgement, to prove impossible. Let me take up almost at random another point in the old Chinese education that has been very severely and to a large extent rightly criticized — namely, the undue emphasis on memory. Since Rousseau and his attack on memory in his "Emile" we have been tending to fall into the opposite extreme in the Occident. We have forgotten the uses of what I would term the selective memory. This type of memory must always play a large role in any genuinely humanistic training. You memorize great poems or the sayings of the sages even though they do not mean much to you at the time. This meaning is illumined by later experience. As it is, when children should be storing up in their memories the winnowed wisdom of the past, they are likely, as a result of our current sentimental prejudice in favor of child's "literature," to be reading some such books as "The Tale of the Flopsy Bunnies" or "Peter Pumpkin in Wonderland."

My own general conviction, then, so far as I may venture to express a conviction on the basis of my imperfect knowledge of China, is that you can get rid of many things on the periphery of your traditional education, you can get rid of much that is scholastic in the Confucian basis of this education, you can modify much that is in the old books themselves; many of the rules of good form for example that are laid down in the "Li Ki" seem to me to be no more of the essence of that decorum or law of inner control which must be at the heart of every true humanism than the fact, which has also been piously handed down, that Confucius ate ginger at every meal. You may, again, enrich your education greatly with elements drawn from the Occident, especially on the scientific and naturalistic side, and so acquire the material efficiency that China lacks. I believe, however, that with all the peripheral changes you need to retain a certain central rightness in the traditional conception. This rightness seems to me to derive from the perception that the maintenance of civilization is due, not primarily to the multitude and to some "general will" in Rousseau's sense that emanates spontaneously from a supposedly divine average, but to a saving remnant or comparatively small number of leaders. The ultimate basis of sound leadership is the type of character that is achieved through self-discipline, and this self-discipline itself has its root in humility or "submission to the will of Heaven." I am inclined to think that Confucius is superior to many of our occidental humanists in his clear recognition of the fact that the law of measure is itself subject to the law of humility. The mention of humility raises the question to what extent distinctively religious elements should enter into your new education; for Confucianism, admirable in its own way, is not, in any complete sense of the word, a religion. This question is too large to be adequately treated in a talk of this kind and I am not planning to discuss it in any detail. I may say, however, in passing, that I have been struck by one thing in my study of Buddhism — and when I was a youth I was at pains to learn both Sanskrit and Pali in order that I might gain some knowledge of Buddhist doctrine at the source, — and that is, that in its original form Buddhism is much nearer to the modern spirit, which I have defined as the positive and critical spirit, than the Mahayana, which is practically the only form of Buddhism you have had in China. A certain number of Chinese should study Pali — some indeed are now doing this in America — not only to understand various aspects of the past in China but to discover how far this ancient faith may still be a living force upon the present. (It is not easy to get an adequate notion of Buddhism through translations. The difficulty is in the rendering of the general terms. Fausboll, for example, has rendered fifteen different Pali words by the one word "desire" in his translation of the Sutta-Nipata; Vol. X. Sacred Books of the East. In his translation of the Dhammapada (ibid.). Max Muller has (ch. XVI) rendered by "love" two
different terms, neither of which properly has that meaning). Judged by its fruits in life and conduct Buddhism at its best is a striking confirmation of Christianity. The conclusion of the whole matter is this: You cannot afford to neglect the ethical side of your Renaissance, nor again can you afford to be pseudoethical, as you may be, if you adopt too uncritically certain notions that are current in the West today. Specifically you will run the danger of losing what is best in your own great and civilized past without acquiring what is really civilized in the Occident. You will merely acquire, if you are too utilitarian, our machinery — our typewriters and telephones and automobiles — and, because the latest machinery is likely to be the best, you are likely to assume the same of our literature, and to run after our Rousseauistic eccentrics. The remedy, it seems to me, is not to lose touch with your own background in the name of a superficial progress, and at the same time to get into closer touch with our background beginning with the Greeks. You will find that the two backgrounds confirm one another especially on the humanistic side, and constitute together what one may term the wisdom of the ages. It seems to me regrettable that there are less than a dozen Chinese students in America today who are making a serious study of our occidental background in art and literature and philosophy. There should be at least a hundred. You should have scholars at all your more important seats of learning who could teach the Confucian Analects in connection with the Ethics of Aristotle. On the other hand, we should have at our important seats of learning scholars, preferably Chinese, who could give courses in Chinese history and moral philosophy. This might prove an important way of promoting a real understanding between the intellectual leaders of Orient and Occident. The tragic failure of the past century has been the failure to work out a sound type of internationalism. Science is in a sense international, but it has been turned to the ends of national aggrandizement. The type of brotherly love that has been preached in connection with the humanitarian movement has proved even more fallacious. Why not work for a humanistic international? An international, one may say, of gentlemen who, without rising necessarily to the sublimities of religion, feel that they can at least unite on a platform of moderation and common sense and common decency. My hope is that, if such a humanistic movement gets started in the West, it will have a response in a neo-Confucian movement in China — a Confucianism that will be disengaged from all the scholastic and formalistic accretions with which it has been overlaid in the course of centuries. In any case the decisive battle between humanists on the one hand, and utilitarians and sentimentalists on the other will be fought in both China and the West in the field of education. [Babb1]
1921-1925


Letters to Wu Mi by Babbitt

(1)
Jaffrey, New Hampshire, 30 June, 1921.

My dear Mr. Wu,—I gather from the letter you wrote my wife on June 24th that it is doubtful whether I am to have the pleasure of seeing you again before your return to China. I left Cambridge to come up here on June 22. I am planning to be in Cambridge again about July 10 and supposed that I should see you at that time. I regret greatly that this is not possible but have at least the satisfaction of knowing that you have received your A.M. in regular course after all. I am sure that you deserved the degree on your total record.

It has been a great pleasure for me to have you as a student. I feel confident that you are one of those who will work most effectively to save what is admirable and wise in the traditions of your country from unintelligent innovation. Do not fail to write me, not only about your personal fortunes, but about the Chinese situation in general. I am especially interested, as you know, in the problem of Chinese Education. If I can be of help to you in any way do not hesitate to call on me. Please convey my very warm regards to Mr. May. With best wishes for a pleasant journey, in which my wife joins, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

Irving Babbitt

(2)
Dublin, N.H., 17 Sep., 1922

Dear Mr. Wu,—I am one of the poorest and most irregular of correspondents or I should have written you long ago to tell you how much I appreciated your letters of last winter. These, with the letter I have just received, give me a very vivid picture of your personal circumstances as well as of the situation with which you are contending in China. You seem to me to be making a plucky fight personally and have, I am sure, no reason for self-reproach. I hope that the outlook for China is not quite so dark as you seem to think. I do not feel qualified to have an opinion. My impression, such as it is, is that the Chinese are a cheerful, industrious and intelligent folk who have coped with many a serious emergency in the past and may succeed in coping with this one. My special interest, as you know, is in the great Confucian tradition and the elements of admirable humanism that it contains. This tradition needs to be revitalized and adjusted to new conditions but anything approaching a complete break with it would in my judgment be a grave disaster for China itself and ultimately perhaps for the rest of us.

I hear favorable comment from Chinese at Harvard on your new Critical Review [Xue heng]. It seems to me just the kind of thing that is needed. I wonder whether you are going to have difficulty in recruiting a sufficiently large staff of contributors. It would seem desirable under the circumstances to cooperate with every one who shares the general point of view in spite of the difficulties and discouragements that you mentioned in your letters of last winter. Is not Mr. Tang likely to prove a useful auxiliary? I had a talk with him on Chinese philosophy just before he left Cambridge for home. He seemed to me better informed in this field than perhaps any other Chinese I have ever met. Would not his article on Schopenhauer and Buddhism in the Chinese Students Monthly (or the equivalent) be good material for your Critical Review? The article by Mr. K. L. Lou on theories of Laughter struck me as a very distinguished piece of writing and might also be presented profitably to Chinese readers. Mr. Tang and Mr. Lou have not perhaps the kind of aggressiveness that seems needed in China just now, but, when all is said, they are very valuable men. Mr. H. H. Chang is just handing in an extremely able doctoral thesis on the Humanism of Matthew Arnold. The last chapter of this thesis—Matthew Arnold and Confucian humanism—contains material that might, in my opinion, be used to advantage in your review. Mr. Chang strikes me as distinctly aggressive. You may have noticed the articles he has been publishing in the Yale Review, Edinburgh Review, North American Review and (N.Y.) Nation. And he is only twenty-four years-old!—I wish, by the way, you could publish notices of John Dewey's last two volumes of a kind that will expose his superficiality. He has been exercising a bad
influence in this
country, and I suspect also in China. Might not Mr. Tang be of aid to you here?
I have been having a very strenuous year. During the first half year I gave a graduate seminar
at Yale in addition to full work at Harvard and Radcliffe. During the second half of April, I
took a Western trip, travelling about seven thousand miles and giving four lectures at Leland
Stanford Un., one lecture at the Un. of California, one at the Northwestern Un. and one at the
Un. of Chicago. This summer I have been getting visited and working on Democracy and
Imperialism [Democracy and leadership]. It goes forward slowly, but I hope to have it
finished in three or four months. It is the hardest job I have ever undertaken. I have accepted
an invitation to go during the second half of this coming academic year as exchange professor
from Harvard to the Sorbonne. I have not yet decided what courses it is advisable for me to
give at Paris or whether I had better give them in French or English,—I am sending you an
article in La Revue hebdomadaire on my writing that I thought might interest you. Professor
Mercier seems to me to have made a very intelligent summary.
Tell Mr. May that I sent the photograph and two volumes of Mr. More I promised him and
hope that they reached him safely.— Remember that it is always a pleasure for me to hear
from you and that I stand ready to help you in any way in my power.
Sincerely yours,
Irving Babbitt
(3)
6 Kirkland Road, Cambridge, 24 July, 1924
Dear Mr. Wu,—Some time ago I sent you a copy of my new book "Democracy and
Leadership" and trust that it has reached you safely. If not, let me know and I will send you
another copy. I was much interested in your last letter and also greatly appreciated your
kindness in sending me a copy of the Critical Review containing the translation of M.
Mercier's article. The value of this kind of translation is that it may open the way for
coöperation between those who are working for a humanistic movement in China and those
who are interested in starting a similar movement in the Occident. In the meanwhile the West
needs a more adequate interpretation than it has yet received of the Confucian humanism and
this is, as you know, a task that I am fond of urging upon you and other Chinese who know
their own cultural background and have at the same time a good knowledge of English.
I have admired at a distance the pluck and persistency you have displayed in editing the
"Critical Review" in the face of what must have been great difficulties. I fear that the whole
situation has been still further complicated by the upheaval at Nanking of which Mr. H. H. Hu
tells me. I am in no position to form an opinion as to the academic politics involved but I
cannot help feeling much regret at the breaking up of your particular group. I understand that
you are going to the Northeastern University. I hope that this change will not involve too
great a sacrifice. Mr. May, I am told, is to come to Harvard as a teacher of Chinese. I did not
know anything about this appointment until it was actually announced. He will of course be
able to give me very full information about the situation at Nanking.
I recently made a trip to Princeton to visit Mr. P. E. More. He sailed for Europe on July 12.
He is planning to be abroad about a year, spending the latter part of the trip in Greece. He has
been extremely active in a literary way of late. He has published two books this
year—"Hellenistic Philosophies" and "The Christ of the New Testament." I do not like the
trend that appears at the end of this latter book towards dogmatic and revealed religion.
Personally I am more in sympathy with the purely psychological method of dealing with the
religious problem that appears in Buddha and his early disciples.
Have you any recent word of Mr. Chang? When he last wrote to me some months ago, he
spoke appreciatively of the salutary influence that "The Critical Review" has been exercising.
I wonder whether you take a more favorable view of the present situation in China and
whether the young people seem to you to be growing a little less superficial. Give my kind
regards to Mr. Tang and Mr. Lou and also inform them that I have sent them complimentary
copies of "Democracy and Leadership."
Sincerely yours,
Irving Babbitt
Letters to Babbitt from Wu Mi

(1)
Southeastern University, Nanking, China. July 6, 1923.

Dear Professor Babbitt:

Your kind letter of September 17 last year has remained unanswered, and I am very sorry for it. Mr. H. H. Chang has just returned to China from Europe; he was here yesterday and, to our great delight, told us about his meeting with you in Paris and about your lectures at the Sorbonne. Mrs. Babbitt, he told us, was accompanying you in your lecture trip to Europe. I hope both you and Mrs. Babbitt are very well, and Mr. Drew too.

Thank you very much for sending me the copy of La Revue hebdomadaire, which I received in last April. Upon receiving it, I had allowed myself the liberty of translating M. Mercier's article (L'Humanism positiviste de Irving Babbitt) into Chinese, and of having the translation published in the 19th issue of our Critical Review, with your photograph (taken from the original you sent to Mr May) and the picture of Sever Hall (your lecture room) as frontpieces. The volume containing the translation and the pictures will be out in a few days; and I will send you a copy respectfully as soon as it is issued. You may not approve the idea of having your picture as frontpiece; my excuse is that the same liberty had already been taken by the French review, and that our frontpiece is bigger and more distinct than the one in that review. In the later part of May, Mr G. N. Orme, British Magistrate in Hongkong, paid us a special visit (having been introduced by Mr. R. F. Johnston and having seen our Review) here. Mr. Orme's ideas in many respects coincided with yours, and his views (having lived for 20 years and more in this part of the world) on Chinese affairs and especially on Chinese education agreed with our own. We had a very good talk with him and asked him [to] lecture to our students. Then I wrote a letter of introduction for him (he was returning to England by way of America), and he said, if circumstances allowing, he would certainly go to pay you a visit at Cambridge. I hope he could have fulfilled his promise.

Mr. H. H. Hu is one of our best friends and one of the few men working most earnestly and persistently for the Critical Review, and has written as much as any one since its publication. He was also the man who translated your article in The Chinese Students' Monthly (Humanistic Education in China and the West) into Chinese for an earlier number of the Review (which I remember I sent you). Mr. Hu is a student of Botany and had studied in the University of California for some years. Since then he has been professor of Botany in this University; and now he is coming to Harvard to make special studies in Arnold’s Arboratum. He is to sail in two weeks, and will stay for two years at Harvard. Although he has never seen you, he is, I may say, as good as one of your personal pupils. He has read all the books written by you, and Mr More, and Mr Sherman. He has a very competent knowledge of Chinese literature and a superficial acquaintance with Western literature. What I am trying to say is that he is coming to pay his respects to you, and wishes to receive frequent advices and inspiration from you. I did not give him a formal letter of introduction, but I beg to state the case in detail here. Moreover, he will be better able to tell you about the conditions in China and about ourselves than I could inform you in a short letter.

The conditions in China went from bad to worse in the last two years since my return. The country is just now facing an extremely serious political crisis, both internal and foreign. I cannot but be grieved to think that the Chinese people has decidedly degenerated, so that the observations on our national character drawn from history and our past excellencies do not at all fit with the Chinese of today. And I believe, unless the mind and moral character of the Chinese people be completely reformed (by a miracle or a Herculean effort), there is no hope even for a political and financial regeneration in the future. Of course we must work to make a better China; but if no success, then the history of China since 1890 will remain one of the most instructive and interesting pages in the history of the world, with reference to national decadence.

In the midst of such circumstances, our private lives have been very happy. Messrs May & Tang and I have been teaching here peacefully. My salary has been increased from $160 to
$200 this year, and will be $220 next year, counting monthly. (The purchasing power of money is much greater in China than in America). Apart from my teaching work, all my time is devoted to the work of the Critical Review which has been coming out steadily every month. The effect of the Review is faint but encouraging; for if we could get many able hands to write, the consequence will be decidedly felt and will be for good. At present I am still trying to seek for contributors. Mr May wrote only one article in the last twelve months. Mr. Tschen in Berlin did not respond to our call. But Mr. Tang has been doing good service; and Mr. K. L. Lou is to arrive from Europe in a week or so, and we hope to retain him in this school and make use of his cooperation. Mr. H. H. Chang is going to teach at the National University of Peking, which has been the headquarters of that movement the effect of which we are trying to oppose and remedy. Thank you for your kind intentions. You can help us in one way which means most to us. That is, if any new book is published by you (like "Democracy and Imperialism") or by Mr More (like "Greek Tradition" Vol. II) or by Mr S. P. Sherman, or if you happen to see any new book (in English or French or German) that you think is expressing ideas similar to yours and therefore very useful for our cause, please drop a note to Mr H. H. Hu at Arnold's Arboratum or to me, only suggesting the name and the publisher of the book, then Mr Hu or I will be able to get the book ourselves. That book will serve as material for translation or digested account in our Review.

Although we are no longer in your classes, we are still deriving constant inspiration and precept from you. With humble personal regards to you and Mrs. Babbitt,

Yours pupil

Mi Wu

P. S. M. Sylvain Levi had been in China, & was lecturing in the University of Peking in last April; we tried but failed to get him to come down to Nanking & lecture in our school.

Southeastern University, Nanking, China. July 4, 1924

My dear Master:

We are exceedingly grateful to you for having sent to each of us a copy of your long expected book "Democracy and Leadership." Please be assured that, though we are now in another hemisphere, we have constantly been reviewing your ideas in our minds and reading your books (both old and new) with much more seriousness and attention than when we were sitting in your classroom in Sever Hall. Whatever we do and wherever we go, you will always be our guide and teacher in more than ordinary sense of the word. I especially will strive to make more and more Chinese students in their home land benefited by your ideas and indirect inspiration.

On receiving your book "Democracy and Leadership", I immediately set to reading it, and then at once translated its "Introduction", with a summary of the whole book, and had these published in the 32nd Number of The Critical Review. That Number will appear in August, and I will send you a copy upon its publication. I trust that the 19th Number of The Critical Review, which contains your picture and Mr. Mercier's French article in Chinese translation, had safely reached you in last August.

Lately there have been many changes in the life and work of your pupils in China. Mr. K. T. May is coming to Harvard as Instructor in Chinese Language; he is sailing on August 22; and upon his arrival, he will tell you of our experience in detail. Briefly, Mr. K. L. Low was appointed Head of English Department in this university last September. The bad teachers of the Department organized a mean and petty opposition against him (for the only reason that he is the acquaintance of Mr. May). In November, the Vice-President (who is the only important man here who can appreciate literature and like us) died. Since then things changed fast. In April of this year, Mr. Low was obliged to declare his resignation, and to accept the offer of Nankai College, Tientsin, (where Mr. May taught in 1919-1920) as head of English Department. In May, Mr. May, apprehensive of coming disaster, resigned and accepted the offer from Harvard. Three days
later, the University illegally incorporated the Department of Western Literature (of which Mr. May was Head and I a member) into the English Department—and thus practically killed the latter. The leader of the above-mentioned opposition to Mr. Low, a rascal, was to be the Head of the incorporated Department. I was therefore forced to go. I am going to be teacher of English at Northeastern University, Mukden, Manchuria; and will be there by the 10th of August. The Southeastern University is rather glad that Low, May and I are all gone. Of the teachers (old and new) for the incorporated Department, Mr. C. S. Hwang, I think, is the only one fitted to be a teacher. Mr. Hwang had been in your "English Literary Criticism" class at the Sorbonne in 1923, and he wishes me to convey to you his respectful remembrances.

Please pardon me for repeating to you that we are living at a crisis of a great decadence in the history of China. Everything in China is corrupt to the last degree. Personal disappointment and misfortune are nothing compared to the national disaster and universal darkness.

Of the group of your Chinese pupils, Mr. H. H. Chang (at the University of Peking) seems to be the only one who is successful, bright, and happy. Mr. K. L. Low is serene and aloof; people all respect him; and he is not unduly enthusiastic about anything. Mr. K. T. May is generally recognized as an Epicurean with a refined taste, and a genius full of whims and temperamental indulgences. (My dissatisfaction with him is that he did not at all work hard—for example, he has not written a single article for The Critical Review for the last 22 months). Mr. Y. T. Tang (Head of the Department of Philosophy here) is similar to Mr. Low, but much more tactful and popular, and comparatively successful. My own life is inglorious and painful. I have been working, with very little cooperation and assistance, to maintain the Critical Review (which appeared in every month); the work is very labourious, though the result is far from satisfactory. For this and other work, I have sacrificed my rest, contentment, and the kind of social intercourse which is necessary in China in order to keep a man in his position.

So I am going to Mukden, from which place I shall write to you my next letter.

I have already ordered from the booksellers Mr. More's "Greek Tradition II: Hellenistic Philosophy". I had bought last year Mr. Sherman's "The Americans". Kindly send me a brief list of the most excellent books that have appeared recently which you think I must do well to read.

With best wishes to you and Mrs. Babbitt and Mr. Drew,
Your humble pupil
Mi Wu

(3)
TSING HUA COLLEGE
PEKING August, 2, 1925.
Dear Professor Babbitt:
I remember to have written you a letter on the 4th of July, 1924, when the group of friends in Nanking was breaking up & just before I started for Mukden. Arriving in Mukden in early August, I read with great pleasure and gratitude your letter that was forwarded to me. Sometime in November, I sent you two volumes of the Critical Review (being Nos. 32 & 34), containing the Chinese translation of your writings (the Introduction of "Democracy and Imperialism", and Chapter I of "Literature & the American College"). Aside from those, though I was trying always to write you, I have not done it. I hope you and Mrs. Babbitt, & old Mr. Drew, also Mr. More and Sherman, are in good health and spirit, and you will readily pardon my negligence.

As I always try to look up to you for inspiration and example in all my work and conduct, I feel I must render you the account, at least once in a year, of what I have been doing & what has been happening to me. Of course, you know well our experience in Nanking from your frequent conversation with Messrs. K. T. May & H. H. Hu; & of the conditions in China in general. So I need not dwell upon those aspects. For my own part, I went to Mukden, to Northeastern University, to teach English (very elementary) in August 1924. My feeling was very much like Esther Waters (Excuse the vulgar comparison) who, being a woman servant,
went about from one family to another and worked hard, in order to feed and to bring up her beloved child. To be sure I have no right to claim the "Critical Review" as my own child; but I mean that the circumstances under which I worked to maintain the Critical Review, were made much more difficult and unfavorable by my reluctant transfer from Nanking to Mukden. With our old friends & associates dispersing in the four winds, and with contributions always lacking & insufficient, I had to turn out a volume of 67000 words each month, amidst the journey, the household preparations and disposals, the family demands and problems in the hot month of July (and again in the bleak January). And the Chung Hua Book Co. several times threatened to discontinue and end the publication of the Review; and it was only after much wrangle of words and even with the promise of financial compensation to them in the future, that they consented to carry on the publication for another year.

Mukden however turned out to be much better than I had expected. Though the atmosphere in Mukden is unduly conservative and somewhat provincial, it was the only place in China, where educational work was taken up seriously and honestly; where the students attended classes regularly and studied their lessons faithfully; where the influence of the so-called "New Culture Movement" was not allowed to creep in, and where those (like myself) who dare to oppose to Dr. Hu Shih etc. might find a refuge and haven. The Dean of the Northeastern University was in sympathy with our movement; and through our friendship, I have recommended more than one of the members of the Critical Review (notably Mr. Lew the old man) to teach there; and I can say, our thought and ideas do actually prevail in that part of China, more than in any other place. In October 1924, I was invited by the Japanese to go to the port of Dairen and Port Arthur for a lecture. I chose to speak (in English) on the "Humanism of Prof. Babbitt" to the groups of Japanese & Chinese educators & teachers, giving them a digest and summary of the ideas in your books. One brilliant young Japanese gentleman, Mr. Shimonoski, served as my interpreter; he was very much taken up with your ideas, he became my friend and thereupon I presented him two volumes of your works.

In early January 1925, I went down to Shanghai, to see my parents, and to manage my younger sister’s wedding. In early February, I came to Peking, and since then I have been serving in Tsing Hua College (my alma mater) as the Organizing Secretary of the Research Institute, also teaching one course on Translation. Beginning with September 1, when the organizing part will come to an end and when the work of Research Institute will actually be started, I shall be Dean of the Research Institute. My work is entirely administrative in nature, and I am not expected to teach anything but the Translation course for the College students. And there is a great deal of social intercourse and obligations, both inside and outside of the College, which I must attend and fulfill in my present capacity—which is an unpleasant necessity, rather than a useful pastime. Compared with my past life in Nanking & Mukden, I am now having more physical comfort and material indulgence; and, as I have to run about a great deal and see people, I am now having much less time for reading and writing. This is what grieves me: the quiet and simple and studious life I had had in Nanking and Mukden has already seemed to me a golden age to which I desire but never can return!

What had made me forsake Mukden and come to Peking and to Tsing Hua College, was neither the usual attractions of the Capital (opportunities for a political career; beautiful girls of elevated station; first class restaurants and book-shops; etc.) nor the material compensation and physical comfort which Tsing Hua College could better afford, but those points of convenience and advantage which can help me to work better and more efficiently for the Critical Review. I mean, for example, a very good Library; an able assistant paid by the College, but willing to work for the Critical Review in spare time out of mere zeal and friendship; the chances for meeting like-minded people, especially men of letters, and thereby to secure contributions and articles for the Critical Review. Upon the work of the Review, my thoughts and my energy are concentrated; and [for] those things I really care.

The research work to be done in the Institute will entirely be confined to the Chinese field—the various branches of Chinese studies. Perhaps it will be devoted, more to searching after facts, than to the discussion of living ideas. And as there is much school politics and as my chief concern is for the Critical Review, I have to take a rather conciliatory and wise
course in regard to affairs and direction of the Research Institute. The 4 Professors appointed for the Research Institute are as follows: (1) Mr. Wang Kuo-Wei (excellent scholar, whose name you perhaps have seen in the "Tong Pao"); (2) Mr. Liang Chi-Chao, famous politically; (3) Mr. Yinkoh Tschen, whom I did my best to recommend and who, after much reluctance, had consented to come in next February (the rest are all here); (4) Dr. Yuen-Ren Chao, who taught Chinese at Harvard before Mr. K. T. May. Besides, we have as Special Lecturer Dr. Chi Li, also a Harvard man. The actual progress of the work I will report to you later on. I humbly beg to have your constant instruction and advice, both in regard to the work of the Research Institute and to that of the Critical Review. Your words are always to me a great source of encouragement and good influence. I have carefully read your books to the last page of "Democracy & Leadership", and Mr. More's books to the end of "Christ of the New Testament." Please suggest to me, from time to time, the books (either old or new) which you think I should read or I should translate for the pages of the Critical Review. (For the Review has been founded but to propagate your ideas and the ideas of Confucius).

Allow me to make an apology for having translated your books by extracts. I have considered it the sacred duty of mine (as well as of Mr. K. T. May etc.) to translate your works as much as possible for the Chinese people whom I am sure you must love as much as your own countrymen. I lay in bed with pain for not having administered enough (since 1921) the cup of wisdom from your angelic fountain to the Chinese people who, besides neglecting their own national tradition, are now being ruined by the allied evils of the so-called "New Culture Movement" and Bolshevism. I do these things with almost religious zeal. Even if you should blame me and beat me for making such translations, I am willing to receive your chastisement; but I must do it, so that I can in future die with clear conscience. O, my dear Master, will you understand and pardon me? However, let me give you full assurance of these 3 facts: (1) Whenever I have made any translation from your books, I never fail in sending you the translation in print. (No translation is made without you being informed). (2) All such translations are made by myself, and with greatest mount of care and prudence possible. (See, for example, "Europe & Asia" in No. 38, or "Introduction" to Democracy and Leadership, in No. 32, of "Critical Review"). Even if it should go under the name of another translator, the work was in fact made under my direction and with my own revision so complete that it may be actually regarded as my work. (See, for example, Chapt. I of Literature and American College", in No. 34 of C. R.). (3) In China, besides Messrs K. T. May, H. H. Hu, & myself, no one will think of translating your books. No one will do it, even if they are paid. Few will even accept your ideas. Only some faithful adherents to the direct teaching of Confucius are willing to be taught and guided by you. O, my dear Master, this is a sad revelation. If there are others in China interested in translating your books (how poor the translation may be), China would never have fallen into the present abyss of material and spiritual decadence! I have never seen any discussion of your ideas, the appearance of your name, outside of the columns of the Critical Review. No, absolutely none. Please be not afraid of people mis-translating you. (Even if such a thing should happen, you can count on at least one of your disciples in China to take up the pen for your defense and correction before you know of it). The rumor you had heard must be from some Chinese student who perhaps had caught a glimpse of my translation in the Review and had gone to speak to you without uch indicating the source of his discovery. But because of such rumor, I beg to state the case very fully for giving you assurance; and once more I ask for your pardon in this & other affairs.

The greatest pain I always have felt in all my work and attempt, comes from the lack of co-operation among our friends, and the lack of the trait of aggressiveness among good & intelligent people. I cannot describe the case in full. But we expect first of all good writing from Mr. K. T. May. Will you kindly help us by constantly urging Mr. May to send me his writings or translations for the Critical Review?

Of our friends, (1) Mr. K. L. Low has just gone to America, to serve as Secretary in Chinese Legation at Washington, (2) Dr. H. H. Chang is teaching at National University, Peking. He admires John Morley, and is a close associate and friend of Dr. Hu Shih. We saw each other
rarely. (3) Mr. Y. T. Tang is to teach in Nankai University, Tientsin.

With best regards, & humblest assurances, I am, as always,

Yours respectfully, Mi Wu [Babb24]

1921-1933 Wu Mi returned to China, kept in touch with Irving Babbitt through correspondence and by regularly sending him copies of Xue heng.

Wu Mi was fascinated by Babbitt's ideas, which were known as the New Humanism, and by Babbitt's respect for ancient Eastern philosophy, including Buddhism and Confucianism. According to Wu Mi, the New Cultural Movement's one-sided promotion of naturalism was introducing into China a system of thought that Babbitt and other distinguished scholars had already shown to have been the source of calamities in the West. Babbitt adhered to the old tradition of dualism with respect to human nature. Inspired by Babbitt, Wu Mi also assumed a dualistic standpoint on this subject. He refused those who regarded human nature as solely evil or solely good. Wu Mi shared Babbitt's view that 'in the long run democracy will be judged, no less than other forms of government, by the quality of its leaders, a quality that will depend in turn on the quality of their vision'. [Babb8,Babb15]


In the editor's preface, Wu Mi tried to make Babbitt (known to his Chinese readers as Baibide) relevant to 1920s China. He ignored Babbitt's role in the American debate on higher education; instead, he depicted him as a foreign expert who had answers to Chinese questions. First, he stressed that despite Babbitt's inability to read Chinese, he was well informed regarding the recent development in China. He told his readers, that Mr. Baibide 'is particularly concerned with the affairs of our country, and he reads all the published works on our country'. Second he pointed out that as 'a leading literary critic in America', Mr. Baibide offered a vision of society fundamentally different from that of other Western thinkers. While other Western thinkers stressed the benefits of scientism and materialism in producing more consumer goods, Mr. Baibide focused on the role of religion and morality in shaping an individual's spiritual life. As other Western thinkers saw modern Europe as the apex of human development, Mr. Baibide combined the learning of 'East and West, and past and present'. Wu told his readers that from Babbitt's perspective, there was an oneness in the teachings of Plato and Aristotle in the West, and those of Siddhartha Guatama and Confucius in the East. [Babb8]

1922 Mei, Guangdi. Xian jin xi yang ren wen zhu yi [ID D28806].

Mei Guangdi discussed New Humanism as a 'valuable doctrine' with direct relevance to contemporary China. He praised Irving Babbitt for his attempt to counter populism by stressing the need for discipline, restraint, and leadership. Mei turned Babbitt into 'Baibide', a foreign expert who offered answers to Chinese questions. Inspired by a reading of Babbitt's writings, Mei found that although political discussions in China often claimed to include the masses into the political process, few people had paid attention to the danger of equating quantity with quality. While he admitted that populism was indeed part of 'the global current' (shi jie chao liu), he remained his traders that only the well-educated elites could appreciate the 'permanent truth' (jiu yuan zhi zhen li) of humanity. [Babb8]


Hou Chien : From his student days at Harvard University, Wu Mi has been a faithful propagandist of the Babbittian ideal. His diatribe against the Movement for a New Literature that culminated in the May fourth movement, and especially his self-expository essay antedating Irving Babbitt's stand, show clearly the direction of his mental efforts. At Wu Mi's program for achieving a virtuous life we find it to contain three items. 1( self-discipline and resort to rituals (li), 2) practicing loyalty (or good faith, zhong) and sympathetic magnanimity (or extensions of one's feelings to others, shu), and 3) maintenance of the golden mean (zhong yong). The first has been used by Li Ji in summarizing Babbitt's teachings. All of them are found in Confucius. [Babb26]
The editor's note attached to the translation echoed Irving Babbitt in condemning Rousseau for being responsible for 'the evils of society', adding that the blame for 'the social disorder today goes partly to Rousseau' and that Rousseau 'was the virus of civilization'. [Babb25]

Irving Babbitt. *Democracy and leadership* [ID D28813].

… In speaking, however, of Asia it is even more important than in speaking of Europe to make clear that one has in mind primarily civilized Asia, and civilized Asia at the top of its achievement… The great Wall of China is a sort of visible symbol of the separation between the two Asias. On the one hand is the Asia of Attila and Tamerlane and Genghis Khan; on the other, the Asia of Christ and Buddha and Confucius.

The mention of Christ and Buddha (of Confucius as a typical Asiatic I shall have more to say presently) is hardly necessary to remind us that it is the distinction of Asia as compared with Europe and other parts of the world to have been the mother of religious; so that if one were to work out a crucial and experimental definition of religion (and my method requires nothing less), one might be put on the track of what is specifically Asiatic in the Asiatic attitude towards life…

At first sight Confucius seems very unlike other great Asiatic teachers. His interests, as I have already said, are humanistic rather than religious. The points of contact between his doctrine and that of Aristotle, the most important Occidental humanist, are numerous and striking. One is tempted to say, indeed, that, if there is such a thing as the wisdom of the ages, a central core of normal human experience, this wisdom is, on the religious level, found in Buddha and Christ and, on the humanistic level, in Confucius and Aristotle. These teachers may be regarded both in themselves and in their influence as the four outstanding figures in the spiritual history of mankind. Not only the experience of the world since their time, but much of its previous experience may be properly associated with them. One may note as an interesting analogy that just as Saint Thomas Aquinas sought to combine the wisdom of Aristotle with that of Christ in his Sum of Theology, so about the same time Chu Hsi mingled Buddhist with Confucian elements in his great commentary.

Though Aristotle and Confucius come together in their doctrine of the mean, one should hasten to add that in their total attitude towards life they reveal the characteristic difference between the European and the Asiatic temper… It is perhaps not easy to combine such a far-ranging intellectual curiosity as that of Aristotle with the humility so emphasized by Confucius and other Oriental teachers… One does not need to be a Confucian to feel that a temple of Confucius would not be similarly incongruous. He was not, like Aristotle, a master of the them that 'know', but a master of them that 'will'. He was strong at the point where every man knows in the secret of his heart that he is weak. The decorum or principle of inner control that he would impose upon the expansive desires is plainly a quality of will. He is no obscurantist, yet the rôle of reason in its relation to will is, as he views it, secondary and instrumental…

While no sensible person would claim for the Far East a general ethical superiority over the West, the Far East has at least enjoyed a comparative immunity from that great disease of Occidental culture – the warfare between reason and faith. Buddha and Confucius both managed to combine humility with self-reliance and a cultivation of the critical spirit. They may, therefore, be of help to those who wish to restore to their lives on modern lines the element for which Asia has stood in the past, who believe that without such restoration the Occident is in danger of going mad with the lust of speed and power. In describing the element of peace as the Asiatic element, I do not mean to set up any geographic or other fatalism. China, for example, may under pressure from the Occident have an industrial revolution (Hankow is already taking on the aspect of an Oriental Pittsburgh) and this revolution is likely to be accompanied by a more or less rapid crumbling of her traditional ethos with the attendant danger of a lapse into sheer moral chaos. The Occident, on the other hand, may not only reaffirm these truths in some appropriately modern way and with an emphasis distinctly different from anything that has been seen in the Orient… [Babb20]
[Babbitt, Irving]. *Baibide lun min zhi yu ling xiu*. Wu Mi yi. [ID D28801].

Introduction by Wu Mi.

[What makes Mr. Irving Babbitt] differ from Christ and Confucius is that, although he emphasizes action (xing), he does not neglect intellect (zhi); what makes him differ from the humanists of the West is that he uses imagination to complete the intellect, and he does not regard intellect as all powerful. Given his equal emphasis on action and intellect, it seems that his teaching is closest to that of Buddha. [His idea about] the contrast of reality and illusion is also influenced by Buddhism. However, Mr. Babbitt does not involve himself with religion, does not establish precepts, does not obtain [anything from] mythology, does not concern himself with metaphysical theories, all these have made his ideas different from those of Buddhism. All in all, Mr. Babbitt actually adopts concurrently the teachings of these four sages, namely Buddha, Christ, Confucius and Aristotle, and achieves an embodiment of their great consummation. We can also say that he, with the heart of Buddha and Christ, is doing what Confucius and Aristotle were doing. Will those who hear my words think that these are flattering remarks by a disciple?

Ong Chang Woei: Wu Mi viewed Babbitt's New Humanism as an antidote for the chaos caused by the New Cultural Movement. For Wu Mi, the sages of history all had had their strengths and limitations, and Babbitt, from his perspective, was the only person with the ability to combine their strengths and avoid their weaknesses. As such a person, Babbitt assumed the role of a 'sage' who stood at the peak of the civilization of mankind, and the 'West' as represented by Babbitt was viewed as the highest achievement of mankind. [Babb22]

1924

Xu, Zhimo. *Xin yue de tai du*. In: *Xin yue*; vol. 1, no 1 (1928). [The attitude of the Crescent Moon].


Out of the thirteen, at least more than half could be identified with the leftists. On the other hand, it espoused the ideals of 'sanity and dignity' as antidotes to those deleterious trends and advised that ‘we must view life as a whole’. The ideals conformed to Irving Babbitt's idea of the function of literature as a formative agent, and the advice smacked of Matthew Arnold. [Babb27]

1924

Liu Yizheng wrote an essay to say goodbye to Wu Mi, when Wu Mi left Nanjing for Shenyang in 1924. In: *Yu seng shi wen ji*. (Shanghai 1934).

From the last years of the Qing dynasty, schools have sprouted up and there have been many students going abroad to learn some craft and be useful to their country. But many there have not been who are able to delve deep into the profundities of Western learning and institutions, nor to find all that is in accord with the teachings and objectives of our sages with the purpose of benefiting the people and purifying the customs. Mr. Mei Guangdi of Xuanzheng has been the first to espouse the lessons of the American scholar Irving Babbitt to show where the truth is. Mr. Wu Mi joins him and goes further by tracing back to the literature, arts, and philosophy of ancient Greece. Only then have students been made to know that the literature and institutions of Europe and America have their sources, and to realize that those who try to overwhelm the public with new-fangled nonsense have actually gained little from their opportunities in the West. Messrs. Mei and Wu cofounded the Xue heng (Critical review) to awaken the world. When their writings first came out, they were attacked by many a shallow scholar. As time goes on, what the two have had to say becomes more and more persuasive and confirmed. Mr. Mei has since gone to the United States to propagate Chinese learning. Mr. Wu is now leaving for Shenyang. While they travel to different places, their purposes are identical. Scholars in the United States having long had the teaching of Babbitt will be enlightened by Mr. Mei's Chinese knowledge. Scholarship in Shenyang has barely begun. Mr. Wu will be going there to start a new Greece. He is therefore the Babbitt of China. [Babb26]
1924-1925 Liang Shiqiu took Irving Babbitt's course on 'Literary criticism after the sixteenth century'. Liang decided to take the course not because he admired the renowned teacher but because he intended to challenge him. At first Liang found Babbitt's opinions hard to accept as they were completely different from his own, but after reading Babbitt's books and attending his lectures, Liang's opinions changed dramatically. 'From and extreme romanticist', he later recalls (1957), 'I changed to a stance which is more or less close to classicism'. [Babb23]

1924-1925 Mei Guangdi is Instructor of Chinese at Harvard University.
After reading Irving Babbitt's works, Mei came to think of Babbitt as a modern saint, and this fired his determination to become one of Babbitt's students. [Babb23]

1926 Liang, Shiqiu. *Luosu lun nü zi jiao yu* [ID D28832].
Irving Babbitt devoted much effort to criticizing Rousseau, viewing him as the precursor of an excessive form of romanticism. After embracing much of Babbitt's thought, Liang Shiqiu began a reassessment of Rousseau, whom he previously had admired greatly. Liang held that the preponderance of Rousseau's influence was pernicious. The only aspect of Rousseau's writings in which Liang saw any merit at all was Book V of *Emile* [ID D20472]. Liang argued that 'there was nothing correct in the part in which Rousseau talked about the education of boys, but his discussion on women's education was surely accurate. According to Liang, Book V was thorough, but more importantly, in acknowledging differences between men and women, it reflected the profound differences between men and women, it reflected the profound differences that exist among human beings in general, not only between the two sexes but also among different men and among different women. Since the interests and aptitudes of individuals and groups very, Liang held, it is a fitting reflection of human character that differences among those to be taught be accommodated by differing forms of education. [Babb23]

1926 Liang, Shiqiu. *Xian dai Zhongguo wen xue zhi lang man de qu shi* [ID D28851].
"The most obvious way in which China is invaded by foreign literature is through the translation of foreign works. Translation is a mainstay of the New literature movement. But the translated literature always exhibits romantic characteristics – translators do not adopt a rational and discriminating attitude towards foreign works to be translated, and their selection is not guided by principle or by a certain purpose but by whim. They try to translate whatever strikes their fancy, and as a result foreign works of the third or fourth rank have been introduced into China and cherished as a most valuable treasure and have been imitated enthusiastically."
Liang applied key insights of Irving Babbitt's to an analysis of the prevalent direction of early twentieth-century Chinese literature. Expressing views that are plainly traceable to Babbitt, Liang took sharp issue with certain romantic tendencies that had come to the fore in China as part of the 'New literature movement', among them an impressionism that called for a 'return to nature' and an uncritical extolling of foreignness and originality for their own sage. In what would become one of his most persistent themes, Liang stressed that, rather than self-indulgence, great literature should express what he termed 'universal human nature'. [Babb23]

1927 Lu, Xun. *Luosu he wei kou* [ID D28835].
Lu Xun admitted that he had not read Irving Babbitt in the original and knew of Babbitt only from scanning Japanese material. He criticized Babbitt only as a means of undermining the reputation of Liang Shiqiu and others, who 'chewed over Babbitt somewhere in Shanghai' for the purpose of manifesting their special taste. It was Lu Xun's intention to ruin any preference for their 'taste'. He had the audacity of giving snorts of contempt for Babbitt without reading his works, and even went to the extreme of classifying Babbitt as a member of the New Moon Society. [Babb25]
Irving Babbitt's influence upon the Chinese literary world is a thing we all know: there are for example Mei Guangdi, Wu Mi, Liang Shiqiu and so on, some of whom are personal friends of mine. But the belief of a conscience is a matter of freedom of the individual. Babbitt (feels) that, exalted as religion is, it is not within the reach of ordinary humanity, and so he advocates a man-only-ism. (Mr. Babbitt uses the word humanism in a different sense than the humanism that informed the new culture movement of the Renaissance). In its opposition to religion on the one hand and naturalism on the other, his humanism bears close resemblance to the nature-principle philosophy (i.e. Neo-Confucianism) of the Song dynasty. This is why Babbitt esteems our not-know-life-how-know-death Master Confucius, and the Confucian disciples also esteem Mr. Babbitt. [Babb26]

1935 Lin, Yutang. My country and my people [ID D13801].
Lin Yutang turned Irving Babbitt's name into an adjective 'Babbittian' to describe his intellectual system, an early and perhaps first usage of the word. In doing so, he once again compared Babbitt with Confucius. He observed the common sense of Confucius 'dismisses supernaturalism as the realm of the unknowable and expends extremely little time on it' and that Confucianism is 'equally emphatic in the assertion of the superiority of the human mind over nature and in the denial of nature's way of life, or naturalism, as the human way'. The Confucian conception that 'heaven, earth and man' comprise 'the three geniuses of the univer's' Lin then compares to 'the Babbittian threefold distinction of supernaturalism, humanism and naturalism'. [Babb21]

1936 Babbitt, Irving. Buddha and the Occident [ID D28811].
… The chief obstacle to a better understanding between East and West in particular is a certain type of Occidental who is wont to assume almost unconsciously that the East has everything to learn from the West and little or nothing to give in return. One may distinguish three main forms of this assumption of superiority on the part of the Occidental: first, the assumption of racial superiority, and almost mystical faith in the pre-eminent virtues of the white peoples (especially Nordic blonds) as compared with the brown or yellow races; secondly, the assumption of superiority based on the achievements of physical science and the type of 'progress' it has promoted, a tendency to regard as a general inferiority the inferiority of the Oriental in material efficiency; thirdly, the assumption of religious superiority, less marked now than formerly, the tendency to dismiss non-Christian Asiatics 'en masse' as 'heathen', notably in Buddhism, only in so far as they conform to the pattern set by Christianity. Asiatics for their part are ready enough to turn to account the discoveries of Western science, but they are even less disposed than they were before the Great War to admit the moral superiority of the West…
No country, again, not even ancient Greece, has been more firmly convinced than China that it alone was civilized. A statesman of the Tang period addressed to the throne a memorial against Buddhism which begins as follows: "This Buddha was a barbarian". One of the traditional names of China, "All-under-Heaven" (Poo-Tien-shia), is itself sufficiently eloquent…
The problems that arise today in connection with the relations of East and West are far more complex than they were in Graeco-Roman times. The East now means not merely the Near East, but even more the Far East. Moreover, the East, both Near and Far, is showing itself less inclined than formerly to bow before the imperialistic aggression of the Occident 'in patient deep disdain'… The comparative absence of dogma in the humanism of Confucius and the religion of Buddha can scarcely be regarded as an inferiority…
On the basis of evidence both psychological and historical one must conclude that if the Far East has been comparatively free from casuistry, obscurantism, and intolerance, the credit is due in no small measure to Buddha. It is so difficult to have a deep conviction and at the same time to be tolerant that many have deemed the feat impossible… [Babb18]
1957  
Liang, Shiqiu. *Guan yu Baibide xian sheng ji qi*. [ID D28821].

"The often celebrated idea of 'élan vital' (vital impulse) in Bergson's philosophy is, according to Irving Babbitt, not worth mentioning. 'Elan vital' should give way to 'frein vital (vital control). To do a thing would require strength, but to refrain oneself from doing something would require greater strength. This kind of attitude seems very compatible with what Confucians called 'Refrain oneself and return to the ritual' (ge ji fu li)."

"Though Babbitt has been said not to have shed his puritan thinking, I must say that he retained a great deal of elements of stoicism. I translated Marcus Aurelius' Meditations a few years ago because, inspired by Babbitt's implicit instruction, I wished to express my infinite respect for this great stoic philosopher."

"When Xue heng was started, I was still a university student, one who was swept up in the wave of so-called modern thought. At that time I had a negative reaction after reading Xue heng, in which the classical Chinese characters scrawled all over the paper kept people from further probing into its content. In this way, Babbitt and his thought were cold-shouldered in China."

"Those people like Lu Xun had never read Babbitt, Lu Xun could never understand Babbitt. Hou Chien: Starting out as a romantic and nationalist, Liang Shiqiu recalls that he went to Babbitt's class with an ax to grind. He went as a challenger but came out a convert to Babbittian classicism. He said nothing at all about Babbitt's Chinese scholarship, though in a private communication. Liang thinks that, in his respect for and promotion of classicism, and in his emphasis on reason, Babbitt shows an affinity of Confucian thinking. Liang does point out, though that Babbitt, in his insistence on the dualistic view of human nature, is inclined to say nothing about the Confucian creed of a human nature innately good.

Bai Liping: Liang wrote about Babbitt's conception of three possible levels of human life: naturalistic, humanistic, and religious. Liang argued that the naturalistic life, though in a sense inevitable, should be subject to balance and restraint; the life maintaining truly human nature is what we should always try to attain; the religious way of life is, of course, the most sublime, but, being also the most difficult and beyond the realistic capability of most people, should not serve as an excuse for the latter to live life less than fully at the humanistic level. Liang remarked that Babbitt's New humanism was considered by many Americans to be 'reactionary, foeyish, and impractical' and to have had a limited influence during his lifetime. [Babb22,Babb26,Babb23,Babb25]

1961  
[Babbitt, Irving]. *[Luosu yu lang man zhu yi]*. Liang Shiqiu yi. [ID D28849].

In his preface Liang wrote: "When thirty years ago, as a student of Mr. Babbitt, the translator read this book, he could only form a general idea of it and could not understand it fully. Today, after translating this section of the book, I admire his extensive knowledge and profound scholarship even more. The original is trenchant and well documented. It is a pity that the translator is not sufficiently capable to convey all this." [Babb23]

"In Harvard, I registered for the School of Comparative Literature. My professors were Bliss Perry, Irving Babbitt, Von Yagerman (Gothic), Kittredge (Shakespeare) and another professor for Italian. Prof. Irving Babbitt raised a storm in literary criticism. He was for maintaining a critical standard, as against the school of J.L. Spingarn, later in the New School of Social Research New York. Babbitt was the only professor who was only an M.A. by degree. Backed by prodigious learning, he used to read from Sainte-Beuve's *Port Royal* and eighteenth-century French authors and quoted the modern Brunetière. He devoted a whole course, Rousseau and Romanticism, tracing the disappearance of all standards to the influence of J.J. Rousseau. It was a course in the development of the expansive appreciative criticism in Madame de Staël and other early Romantics, Tieck, Novalis etc. His influence on Chinese was far-reaching. Lou Kuang-lai and Wu Mi carried his ideas to China. Shaped like a monk, Wu Mi's love affair with his girl would make a novel… I refused to accept Babbitt's criteria and one took up the cudgels for Spingarn and eventually was in complete agreement with Croce with regard to the genesis of all criticism as 'expression'… The traditional theorists are headed by Paul Elmer More, a non-academic scholar. Others, such as Sherman and Irving Babbitt have also expressed their individual opinions. Professor Babbitt in particular has had an extensive influence on the Chinese literary world, which almost everyone is acquainted with. His students such as Mei Kuang-te, Wu Mi, and Leung Shih-chin, just to mention a few, are my personal friends. Obviously individual belief is private and depends on personal freedom. Babbitt is widely admired for his knowledge and incisive rhetoric, which is similar to Brunetière's. His basic theories also have considerable resemblance to those of Brunetière, both in essence going back to classical humanism, which regarded as the ultimate goal the appreciation of art and the ideal life. For this reason Brunetière in his old age turned toward Catholicism, but Babbitt was wiser. Although Babbitt respected religion, he did not turn in that direction, but instead toward humanism. Babbitt's humanism, however, is different from that of the Renaissance, opposed as it is to religion, on one hand, and to naturalism., on the other, something like the theories of the Sung dynasty. Babbitt, therefore, respected our saint, Confucius, and our contemporary disciples of Confucius respect him in turn. I am not saying this to make fun of Babbitt, for I myself admire him personally. He did not travel around to find an official job, nor did he offer comfort to those who failed… The conflict between the liberators of literature and the literary conformists exists in both the East and the West. Conformity is associated in Chine with writing style, sentence structure, and paragraphing and in the West with discipline or standards. This is the focal point of the controversy between the modern American humanism of Professor Babbitt of Harvard and his opponents. Professor Babbitt's contagious ideas have been imported into China by his disciples, and the notion of discipline is now arrayed against individualism as incompatible extremes."

Aldridge, A. Owen: Lin Yutang’s subsequent comparison between Babbitt and Confucius is intentionally humorous but not disrespectful of either one. To the contrary, it shows Lin's admiration of the Chinese sage's political independence and of Babbitt's steadfast adherence to principle. [Babb21]

1983 Meeting of the British Comparative Literature Association

The president Zhang Zhouhan reacted to a paper on Irving Babbitt's esthetic standards. He instantly recognized the link between Babbitt's insistence on standards and the resistance at the present time to the extremes of contemporary literary theory as this resistance has been expressed by adherents to conventional literary scholarship. [Babb19]

1985 Liang, Shiqiu. *Ying xiang wo de ji ben shu* [ID D28850].

Liang writes: "Irving Babbitt does not sermonize, he does not have dogmas, but only sticks to one attitude – that of sanity and dignity". [Babb23]

Liang Shiqiu schreibt im Vorwort: "I have been greatly influenced by Irving Babbitt. He led me to the road of harmony and prudence". [Babb23]


"The influence that Irving Babbitt exerts on modern Chinese literary criticism has been profound and swift." [Babb25]


"Professor [Iving] Babbitt and Professor [Paul Elmer] More have had the greatest influence upon me, and I have read all of their works." [Babb23]

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卢梭与浪漫主义 [Babb23]


關於白璧德大師

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**Bacon Francis** = Bacon, Francis, Viscount Saint Albas (London 1561-1626 Highgate bei London): Philosoph, Jurist, Historiker, Schriftsteller, Politiker

**Biographie**

1605 Bacon, Francis. *The two bookes of Francis Bacon: Of the proficience and aduancement of learning: diuine and humane* [ID D26974]. Er schreibt: "The organ of tradition is either speech or writing: and we see the commerce of barbarous people, that understand not one another's language, and in the practice of divers that are dumb and deaf, that men's minds are expressed in gestures. And we understand that it is the use of China to write in characters which express neither letters nor words but things or notions; insomuch as provinces, which understand not one another's language, can nevertheless read one another's writings; and therefore they have a vast multitude of characters, as many, I suppose, as radical words." [Baco3]

1620 Bacon, Francis. *Novum organon* = *The new organon* [ID D26975]. Chinese inventions of printing, gunpowder, and the mariner's compass were brought to Europe by Arab traders during the Renaissance and Reformation. Francis Bacon was unaware of the origins of these inventions but deeply impressed by their significance when he wrote: "It is well to observe the force and virtue and consequence of discoveries. These are to be seen nowhere more clearly than those three which were unknown to the ancients [the Greeks], and of which the origin, though recent, is obscure and inglorious; namely printing, gunpowder, and the magnet. For these three have changed the whole face and stage of things throughout the world, the first in literature, the second in warfare, the third in navigation; whence have followed innumerable changes; insomuch that no empire, no sect, no star, seems to have exerted greater power and influence in human affairs than these three mechanical discoveries."

"At length then, we have come to an instance of the fingerpost in this case, and it is this. If we find for certain that when there is a flood on the opposite coasts of Florida and Spain in the Atlantic, there is also a flood on the coasts of Peru and the back of China in the South Sea…"
"Again, if you observe the refinement of the liberal arts, or even that which relates to the mechanical preparation of natural substances, and take notice of such things as the discovery in astronomy of the motions of the heavens, of harmony in music, of the letters of the alphabet (to this day not in use among the Chinese) in grammar..."

"And such it seems may be found by exposing bodies on steeples in sharp frosts; by laying them in subterranean caverns; by surrounding them with snow and ice in deep pits dug for the purpose; by letting them down into wells; by burying them in quicksilver and metals; by plunging them into waters which petrify wood; by burying them in the earth, as the Chinese are said to do in the making of porcelain, where masses made for the purpose are left, we are told, underground for forty or fifty years, and transmitted to heirs, as a kind of artificial minerals; and by similar processes." [Baco4]

1623 Bacon, Francis. *Francisci Baronis de Verulamio, Vice-Comitis Sancti Albani, Historia vitae & mortis* [ID D26976].
Er schreibt: "The Japanese likewise live longer than the Chinese, though the latter have a mania for long life. And in this there is no wonder, seeing the sea-breeze warms and cherishes in cold countries, and cools in hot." [Baco1]

1625 Bacon, Francis. *Of Vicissitude of Things* [ID D26977].
Er schreibt:
"The changes and vicissitude in wars are many; but chiefly in three things; in the seats or stages of the war; in the weapons; and in the manner of the conduct. Wars, in ancient time, seemed more to move from east to west; for the Persians, Assyrians, Arabians, Tartars (which were the invaders) were all eastern people."

"As for the weapons, it hardly falleth under rule and observation; yet we see even they have returns and vicissitudes. For certain it is, that ordnance was known in the city of the Oxidrakes in India; and was that which the Macedonians called thunder and lightning, and magic. And it is well known that the use of ordnance hath been in China above two thousand years. The conditions of weapons, and their improvement, are; First, the fetching afar off; for that outruns the danger; as it is seen in ordnance and muskets." [Baco5]

1626 Bacon, Francis. *New Atlantis* [ID D26978]. [Enthält Eintragungen über China].
Mögliche Quellen:
[Polo, Marco]. The most noble and famous trauels of Marcus Paulus [ID D26973].
Gonzáles de Mendoza, Juan. Historia de las cosas más notables, ritos y costumbres del gran reyeno de la China [ID D1627].
"We sailed from Peru, where we had continued by the space of one whole year, for China and Japan, by the South Sea, taking with us victuals for twelve months; and had good winds from the east, though soft and weak, for five months' space and more."

"Toward the east the shipping of Egypt and of Palestine was likewise great. China also, and the great Atlantis, (that you call America,) which have now but junks and canoes, abounded then in tall ships. This island, (as appeareth by faithful registers of those times,) had then fifteen hundred strong ships, of great content. Of all this, there is with you sparing memory, or none; but we have large knowledge thereof. At that time, this land was known and frequented by the ships and vessels of all the nations before named. And (as it cometh to pass) they had many times men of other countries, that were no sailors, that came with them; as Persians, Chaldeans, Arabians; so as almost all nations of might and fame resorted hither; of whom we have some stirps, and little tribes with us at this day. And for our own ships, they went sundry voyages, as well to your straits, which you call the Pillars of Hercules, as to other parts in the Atlantic and Mediterrane Seas; as to Paguin, (which is the same with Cambaline,) and Quinzy, upon the Oriental Seas, as far as to the borders of the East Tartary."

"It is true, the like law against the admission of strangers without license is an ancient law in the Kingdom of China, and yet continued in use. But there it is a poor thing; and hath made them a curious, ignorant, fearful, foolish nation. But our lawgiver made his law of another temper." 

"Now for our travelling from hence into parts abroad, our lawgiver thought fit altogether to restrain it. So is it not in China. For the Chinese sail where they will, or can; which showeth, that their law of keeping out strangers is a law of pusillanimity and fear. But this restraint of ours hath one only exception, which is admirable; preserving the good which cometh by communicating with strangers, and avoiding the hurt: and I will now open it to you."

"We have burials in several earths, where we put divers cements, as the Chinese do their porcelain. But we have them in greater variety, and some of them more fine. We also have great variety of composts and soils, for the making of the earth fruitful."
Gwee, Li Sui. Westward to the Orient : the specter of scientific China in Francis Bacon's New Atlantis [ID D26972].

Chinese longevity was the basis for Bacon's fantasy of an enduring cultural alternative aligned with the West and reframed his adventure 'beyond both the old world and the new' as more than a metaphor in its desire to encroach upon the known sphere of Chinese socioeconomic influence. By depicting China as still polarized three thousand years ago between Quinzy and cambaline, or Manzian Hangchow and Tartar Peking, Bacon's grossest error was hardly his depiction of Peking as a sea-port, a notion possibly derived from John Mandeville's Voyages de Johan de Mandeville chevalier [ID D10209]. Rather, he revealed that the only Middle Kingdom he cared about was either recent or unchanging since Bensalem's age-old familiarity with China did not translate into a knowledge of its contours prior to the Yuan or Mongol dynasty of the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. His siting of Cathay and China as one and the same terrain further did away with a geographical indeterminacy that could not have been resolved before the clarifications of Jesuits Matteo Ricci and Bento de Gois, around the turn of the seventeenth century. These points fix the span of what Bacon knew about China firmly within the circulated narratives from Marco Polo's visit to the Orient.

Although the Spanish threat was real, immediate, and textually noticeable, Bacon's greater instinct lay in his recognition of China's more enduring rivalry, this clarifying his actual contribution as an international socioeconomic outlook. His depictions of Spain and China bore tellingly distinct shapes of cultural Otherness : unlike Spanish dominance, Chinese superiority was not so much vilified, opposed, and negated as admired on all terms except those with regard to morality and an unframed scientific diversity. Bacon's use of fiction to secure a vantage point that could obscure the West's real limitations, weaken its cultural inertia, and shift the epicenter of its engagements stressed not just his individual originality but also the factor of neurosis arising from his anxiety over a truly inassimilable Other that seemed to undermine or overwhelm it. This ironic creative reliance on an agon challenges the common assumption that Bacon chose the mode of travel-writing for its inherent empirical rigor and highlights his likelier understanding that the leading travelogues then tended to, in the words of Robert Parke's printer, 'extoll their owne actions, even to the setting forth of many vntruthes and incredible things'. [Baco2,Baco6]

Bacon, Francis. Sylua syluarum [ID D26979].

Er schreibt :

“And to help the matter, the alchemists call in likewise many vanities out of astrology, natural magic, superstitious interpretation of Scriptures, auricular traditions, feigned testimonies of ancient authors, and the like. It is true, on the other side, they have brought to light not a few profitable experiments, and thereby made the world some amends. But we, when we shall come to handle the version and transmutation of bodies, and the experiments concerning metals and minerals, will lay open the true ways and passages of nature, which may lead to this great effect. And we comment the wit of the Chinese, who despair of making of gold, but are mad upon the making of silver : for certain it is, that it is more difficult to make gold, which is the most ponderous and materiate amongst metals, of other metals less ponderous and less materiate, than via versa, to make silver of lead or quicksilver…”

“It differeth much in greatness ; the samlllest being fit for thatching of houses, and stopping the chinks of ships, better than glue or pitch. The second bigness is used for anglerods and staves ; and in China for beating of offenders upon the thigs.”

“And we understand farther, that it is the use of China, and the kingdoms of the high Levant, to write in 'Characters Real', which express neither letters nor words in gross, but things or notions ; insomuch as countries and provinces, which understand not one another's language, can nevertheless read one another's writings, because the characters are accepted more generally than the languages do extend ; and therefore they have a vast multitude of characters, as many, I suppose, as radical words.”
Sekundärliteratur

Saussy, Haun. Great walls of discourse and other adventures in cultural China [ID D22144]. In classifying Chinese writing as 'ideographic', nineteenth-century grammatologists repeated Francis Bacon's view of Chinese 'Characters Real', which is to say, they repeated Aristotle. In 1605 Bacon observed of the Chinese character: For the organ of tradition, it is either Speech or Writing; and Aristotle saith well, 'Words are the images of cogitations, and letters are the images of words'.

For Bacon, Chinese writing brought the possibility of eliminating one of the levels of mediation through which the 'De Interpretatione' had constructed its picture of mind, language, and world. If indeed words symbolized affections in the soul and phonetic writing symbolized words, then a writing that symbolized affections in the soul would symbolize things themselfed, since both things and affections were 'the same for all'.

Bacon divided such 'notes of cogitations' into 'two sorts: the one when the note hath some similitude or congruity with the notion; the other 'ad placitum', having force only by contract or acceptation', and he put Chinese characters into the latter category— as indeed did most European writers on China before Fenollosa. For Bacon, at least, ideogrammatism does not imply resemblance.

The fortunes of the 'Chinese model' of writing promoted by Bacon— the direct notation of reality, through conventional characters, without the interference of spoken words. Bacon, with debts to Aristotle, initiates a nonphonetic and potentially wholly conventional model of writing, for which Chinese script serves as the chief ethnographic example, seconded by gesture and numbers. Bacon supposed that a universal character might, but need not necessarily, express some 'similitude or congruity' with the things signified. For a rival understanding of universal conceptual writing in Bacon's period and afterwards, convention was inadequate, because no set of conventional marks could ever equal the power of a language grounded in a prior kinship between signified and signifiers. [Baco7,SauH4]

1856


Er schreibt: "Shakespeare was a well-know public figure in the Elizabethan age. His brilliant works represent both beauty and virtue. No one has outshone him so far". [Shak:S. 13,Shak25,Shak16:S. 99]

1917

Chen, Duxiu. Wen xue ge ming lun [ID11258]:

Chen schreibt: "Die europäische Kultur hat freilich viel der Politik und der Wissenschaft zu verdanken, doch auch nicht weniger der Literatur. Ich habe das Frankreich von Rousseau und Pasteur lieb, aber noch mehr das von Goethe und Hauptmann; ich liebe das England von Bacon und Darwin, aber noch mehr das von Dickens und Wilde. Ist unter unseren heldenhaften Literaten jemand da, der den Mut hat, ein Hugo oder Zola, ein Goethe oder Hauptmann, ein Dickens oder Wilde zu werden?" = "European culture has benefited considerably from the many contributions of political thinkers and scientists, but the contribution of writers has not been small either. I love the France of Hugo and Zola; I love the Germany of Kant and Hegel, but I love especially the Germany of Goethe and Hauptmann; I love the England of Bacon and Darwin, but I love especially the England of Dickens and Wilde. Is there some outstanding writer in our own national literature who will take on the role of China's Hugo, Zola, Goethe, Hauptmann, Dickens or Wilde? Is there anyone bold enough to make a public challenge to the 'eighteen demons', ignoring the criticism of reactionary scholars? If so, I am willing to drag out the cannon to from his vanguard."

[Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Louis Pasteur, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Gerhart Hauptmann, Francis Bacon, Charles Galton Darwin, Victor Hugo, Charles Dickens, Oscar Wilde, Emile Zola].
Bonnie S. McDougall: Chen meant no more than a literature in which the material world is shown to affect people's lives, and in which concern is shown particularly for the sufferings of the poor. The demand for 'freshness' should be taken in the context of 'stale classicism'; Chen was not opposed to rich and elaborate descriptions of scenery or emotions as such, he only rejected the euphuistic and allusive language typical of a great deal of classical Chinese poetry and essays. His final aim, to create a simple and popular literature to replace obscure scholarly or eremitic literature, shows the most obvious reason for classing Wilde among the literary giants. [WilO7,YanW1:S. 29]

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新工具 [WC]


新工具 [WC]


學問之增進 [WC]


崇學論 [WC]


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人類知識原理 [WC]


人类知识原理 [WC]


近代理想主義

[Enthält]:
Berkeley, George. *Three dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*.
Hegel, G.W.F. *Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*.
Bradley, F[rancis] H[erbert]. *Ethical studies*.
Royce, Josiah. *The sources of religious insight*. [WC]


西利斯 [WC]

*Bibliographie : erwähnt in*


杜里舒講演錄. 第1期


洛克, 巴克萊, 休謨 [WC]


英國經驗哲學 [WC]


柏克萊 [WC]


心靈之夜 : 柏克萊 [WC]


### Berlin, Isaiah, Sir (Riga 1909-1997 Oxford) : Englisch-russischer Philosoph

**Bibliographie : Autor**


**Bibliographie : erwähnt in**

Berman, David (um 1999) : Professor Department of Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin

Bibliographie : Autor


Bolingbroke, Henry St. John = St. John, Henry (Battersea, London 1678-1751 Battersea, London) : Politiker, Philosoph

Biographie

1754 Bolingbroke, Henry St. John. The philosophical works [ID D20007].
A. Owen Aldridge : Lord Bolingbroke presented China as "a country, into the antiquities of which we look further back than into those of any other, and where we may find examples of... the effects of natural religion, unmixed and uncorrupted, with those of artificial theology and superstition". Bolingbroke claimed, moreover, that natural religion, the deist's name for their ideological system based on reason rather than revelation, "seems to have been preserved more pure and unmixed in this country than in any other, and for a longer time from that when it was first inhabited, and government was first established". According to Bolingbroke, "this people enjoyed, under their two first imperial families, which continued eleven hundred years, all the blessings of public and private virtue, that humanity is capable of enjoying. So we must understand the descriptions of this golden age". [Vol5:S. 27]

Bibliographie : Autor


Bradley, Francis Herbert (Clapham, Surrey 1846-1924 Oxford) : Philosoph

Bibliographie : Autor

1964 Xi fang xian dai zi chan jie ji zhe xue lun zhu xuan ji. Hong Qian zhu bian. (Beijing : Shang wu yin shu guan, 1964).
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Zhang, Dongsun. *Xian dai lun li xue.* (Shanghai: Xin yue shu dian, 1932). (Xian dai wen hua cong shu). [La philosophie morale moderne].

**Browne, Thomas** = Browne, Thomas Sir (London 1605-1682 Norwich) : Philosoph, Dichter, Schriftsteller, Arzt

**Biographie**

1644-1682  
Browne, Thomas. Quellen.

Gonzáles de Mendoza, Juan. *Historia de las cosas más notables* [ID D1627].

Martini, Martino. *Sinicae historiae decas prima* [ID D1703].

Ramusio, Giovanni Battista. *Delle navigationi et viaggi* [ID D1618].

Linschoten, Jan Huygen van. *Itinerario, voyage ofte schipvaert* [ID D1632]. [BroT1]
We are not thoroughly resolved concerning porcelain or china dishes, that according to common belief they are made of earth, which lieth in preparation about an hundred years under ground; for the relations thereof are not only diverse but contrary, and authors agree not herein. Guido Pancirollus will have them made of egg-shells, lobster-shells, and gypsum laid up in the earth the space of eighty years: of the same affirmation is Scaliger, and the common opinion of most. Ramuzius, in his Navigations, is of a contrary assertion; that they are made out of earth, not laid under ground, but hardened in the sun and wind, the space of forty years. But Gonzales de Mendoza, a man employed into China from Philip the second, king of Spain, upon enquiry and ocular experience, delivered a way different from all these. For enquiring into the artifice thereof, he found they were made of a chalky earth; which, beaten and steeped in water, affordeth a cream or fatness on the top, and a gross subsidence at the bottom; our of the cream or superfluitance, the finest dishes, saith he, are made; out of the residence thereof, the coarser; which being formed, they gild or paint, and, not after an hundred years, but presently, commit unto the furnace. This, saith he, is known by experience, and more probable than what Odoardus Barbosa hath delivered, that they are made of shells, and buried under earth an hundred years. And answerable in all points hereto, is the relation of Linschotten, a diligent enquirer, in his Oriental Navigations. Later confirmation may be had from Alvarez the Jesuit, who lived long in those parts, in his relations of China: that porcelain vessels were made but in one town of the province of Chiamsi; that the earth was brought out of other provinces, but, for the advantage of water, which makes them more polite and perspicuous, they were only made in this; that they were wrought and fashioned like those of other countries, whereof some were tinted blue, some red, others yellow, of which colour only they presented unto the king.

The latest account hereof may be found in the voyage of the Dutch ambassador, sent from Batavia unto the emperor of China, printed in French, 1665; which plainly informeth, that the earth, whereof porcelain dishes are made, is brought from the mountains of Hoang, and being formed into square loaves, is brought by water, and marked with the emperor's seal; and that it is prepared and fashioned after the same manner which the Italians observe in the fine earthen vessels of Faventia or Fuenca…

Vol. 2 : S. 36, Fussnote 2 : Of those three great inventions in Germany, there are two which are not without their incommodities. Those two, he means, are printing and gunpowder, which are commonly taken to be German inventions; but artillery was in China above 1500 years since, and printing long before it was in Germany, if we may believe Juan Gonzales Mendoza, in his History of China, lib. III, cap. 15, 16.
Vol. 3.
For, to speak strictly, there is no East and West in nature, nor are those absolute and
invariable, but respective and mutable points, according unto different longitudes, or distant
parts of habitation, whereby they suffer many and considerable variations. For first, unto
some, the same part will be East or West in respect of one another, that is, unto such as
inhabit the same parallel, or differently dwell from East to West. Thus as unto Spain, Italy
lyeth East, unto Italy Greece, unto Greece Persia, and unto Persia China; so again unto the
Country of China, Persia lyeth West, unto Persia Greece, unto Greece Italy, and unto Italy
Spain. So that the same Countrey is sometimes East and sometimes West; and Persia though
East unto Greece, yet is it West unto China…
For the Sea lay West unto that Country, and the winds brought rain from that quarter; but this
consideration cannot be transferred unto India or China, which have a vast Sea Eastward: and
a vaster Continent toward the West. So likewise when it is said in the vulgar Translation,
Gold cometh out of the North; it is no reasonable inducement unto us and many other
Countries, from some particular mines septentrional unto his situation, to search after that
metal in cold and Northern regions, which we most plentifully discover in hot and Southern
habitations. ..
So the city of Rome is magnified by the Latins to be the greatest of the earth ; but time and
geography inform us that Cairo is bigger, and Quinsay, in China, far exceedeth both…
Thus have the Chinese little feet, most Negroes great lips and flat noeses ; and thus many
Spaniards, and Mediterranean inhabitants, which are of the race of Barbary Moors (although
after frequent commixture), have not worn out the Camoys nose unto this day…
And though the best of China dishes, and such as the emperor doth use, be thought by some of
infallible virtue unto this effect, yet will they not, I fear, be able to elude the mischief of such
intentions… [BroT1]

1664-1681  Browne, Thomas. Journal / Correspondence 1657-1681.
Thomas Browne’s works ; including his life and correspondence. Ed. By Simon Wilkin.
Journal.
Jan. 14 1664.
There are one million of soelgers to guard the great wall
of China, which extends from east to west three hundred
leagues : author, Belli Tartarici Martin Martinius.
Correspondence 1657-1681.
John Evelyn, Esq. to Dr. Browne 1657-1658
In Turkey, the East, and other parts.—The grand Signor's
in the Serraglio, the garden at Tunis, and old Carthage ; the garden
at Cairo, at Fez, the pensal garden at Pequin in China, also
at Timplan and Porassen ; St. Thomas's garden in the island neere
M. Hecla, perpetually verdant.
Dr. Browne to his son Edward. 1668.
I wish you would bring ouer some of the red marking stone
for drawinge, if any very good. One told mee hee read in
the French gazette, that the Duch had discovered the northeast
passage to China round about Tartaric I do not care
whether you go into Zeland, but if you should, Flushing and
Middleburgh are only worth the seeing.
Dr. Browne to his son Edward. 1679.
You did well to observe Ginseng. All exotick
rarities, and especially of the east, the East India trade
having encreased, are brought in England, and the best
profitt made thereof. Of this plant Kircherus writeth in his
China illustrata, pag. 178, cap. " De Exoticis Chinee plantis,"

Dr. Browne to his son Edward. 1681.
The East India trade hath been great of late, butt how lone it will bee so is uncertaine, for the commoditie of China silks and gownes, and the like, is not like to hold allwayes, with a mutable and changing people; and how the trade will bee interrupted I knowe not, when the French growe powerfull and buisie in the Indies. [BroT1]

1683
The Chinoys, who live at the bounds of the Earth, who have admitted little communication, and suffered successive incursions from one Nation, may possibly give account of a very ancient Language; but consisting of many Nations and Tongues; confusion, admixtion and corruption in length of time might probably so have crept in as without the virtue of a common Character, and lasting Letter of things, they could never probably make out those strange memorials which they pretend, while they still make use of the Works of their great Confutius many hundred years before Christ, and in a series ascend as high as Poncuus, who is conceived our Noah. [BroT1]

1683
When New England shall trouble New Spain.
When Jamaica shall be Lady of the Isles and the Main.
When Spain shall be in America hid,
And Mexico shall prove a Madrid.
When Mahomet’s Ships on the Baltick shall ride,
And Turks shall labour to have Ports on that side,
When Africa shall no more sell out their Blacks
To make Slaves and Drudges to the American Tracts.
When Batavia the Old shall be contemn’d by the New.
When a new Drove of Tartars shall China subdue.
When America shall cease to send out its Treasure,
But employ it at home in American Pleasure.
When the new World shall the old invade,
Nor count them Lords but their fellows in Trade.
When Men shall almost pass to Venice by Land,
Not in deep Water but from Sand to Sand.
When Nova Zembla shall be no stay
Unto those who pass to or from Cathay.
Then think strange things are come to light,
Where but few have had a foresight.

The exposition of the prophecy.
That is, When Spain, either by unexpected disasters, or continued emissions of people into America, which have already thinned the Country, shall be farther exhausted at home: or when, in process of time, their Colonies shall grow by many accessions more than their Originals, then Mexico may become a Madrid, and as considerable in people, wealth and splendour; wherein that place is already so well advanced, that accounts scarce credible are given of it. And it is so advantageously seated, that, by Acapulco and other Ports on the South Sea, they may maintain a communication and commerce with the Indian Isles and Territories, and with China and Japan, and on this side, by Porto Belo and others, hold correspondence with Europe and Africa.
And a new Drove of Tartars shall China subdue.
Which is no strange thing if we consult the Histories of China, and successive Inundations
made by Tartarian Nations. For when the Invaders, in process of time, have degenerated into
the effeminacy and softness of the Chineses, then they themselves have suffered a new
Tartarian Conquest and Inundation. And this hath happened from time beyond our Histories:
for, according to their account, the famous Wall of China, built against the irruptions of the
Tartars, was begun above a hundred years before the Incarnation.
When Nova Zembla shall be no stay
Unto those who pass to or from Cathay.
That is, When ever that often sought for Northeast passage unto China and Japan shall be
discovered, the hindrance whereof was imputed to Nova Zembla; for this was conceived to be
an excursion of Land shooting out directly, and so far Northward into the Sea that it
discouraged from all Navigation about it. And therefore Adventurers took in at the Southern
part at a strait by Waygatz next the Tartarian Shore; and sailing forward they found that Sea
frozen and full of Ice, and so gave over the attempt. But of late years, by the diligent enquiry
of some Moscovites, a better discovery is made of these parts, and a Map or Chart made of
them. Thereby Nova Zembla is found to be no Island extending very far Northward; but,
winding Eastward, it joineth to the Tartarian Continent, and so makes a Peninsula: and the
Sea between it which they entred at Waygatz, is found to be but a large Bay, apt to be frozen
by reason of the great River of Oby, and other fresh Waters, entring into it: whereas the main
Sea doth not freez upon the North of Zembla except near unto Shores; so that if the
Moscovites were skilfull Navigators they might, with less difficulties, discover this passage
unto China: but however the English, Dutch and Danes are now like to attempt it
again. [BroT1]

Browne, Thomas. *Museum clausum, or, Bibliotheca abscondita: containing some remarkable
books, antiquities, pictures, and rarities or several kinds, scarce or never seen by any man
now living*. Tract XIII. Vol. 4.
Rare and generally unknown Books. 1684.

15. The works of Confutius, the famous philosopher of China, translated into Spanish.
Antiquities and rarities of several sorts.
2. Some ancient ivory and copper crosses found with many others in China; conceived to
have been brought and left there by the Greek soldiers who served under Tamerlane in his
expedition and conquest of that country. [BroT1]

Bibliographie : Autor

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Vol. 1: Journal of Mr. E. Browne. Correspondence.
http://www.archive.org/details/sirthomasbrownes01brow. [WC]

1644).
Pseudodoxia epidemica: or, Enquiries into very many received tenents, and commonly
presumed truths. By Thomas Browvne Dr. of Physick. (London: Printed for Tho. Harper for
Edvvard Dod, 1646).
http://ia600307.us.archive.org/4/items/certainmiscellan00browrich/certainmiscellan00browrich.pdf.


Burke, Edmund (Dublin 1729-1797 Beaconsfield) : Schriftsteller, Staatsphilosoph, Politiker

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1920 Cai, Yuanpei. Mei xue de jin hua [ID D1741].

Bibliographie : Autor


Bibliographie : erwähnt in


**Butler, Joseph** (Wantage 1692-1752 Bath) : Anglikanischer Bischof, Theologe, Philosoph

**Bibliographie : Autor**


**Caird, Edward** (Greenock, Schottland 1835-1908 Oxford) : Master Balliol College Oxford University, Professor of Moral Philosophy University of Glasgow, Theologe

**Bibliographie : Autor**

Callicott, J. Baird (1941-) : Professor of Philosophy and Religion Studies, Institute of Applied Sciences, University of North Texas

Bibliographie : Autor

1989

Carr, Herbert Wildon (1857-1931) : Englischer Philosoph, Professor of Philosophy, King's College, London

Bibliographie : Autor

1923

1924

Carus, Paul (Ilsenburg 1852-1919 La Salle, Ill.) : Deutsch-Amerikanischer Philosoph, Buddhologe, Schriftsteller

Bibliographie : Autor

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1895

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https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100620829.

1906

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**Chandler, Marthe A.** (1941-) : Professor of Philosophy, Philosophy Department, DePaw University, Greencastle, Ind.

*Bibliographie : Autor*

2008  

**Chinn, Ewing Y.** (Guangzhou ???) : Professor Philosophy Department, Trinity University ; Senior Lecturer Department of Philosophy and Classics, The University of Texas, San Antonio

*Bibliographie : Autor*

2005  

**Chomsky, Noam** (Philadelphia, Penn. 1928-) : Professor für Linguistik und Philosophie, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge Mass.

*Bibliographie : Autor*

1966  

1986  


*Bibliographie : erwähnt in*


Clarke, Samuel (Norwich, Norfolk 1675-1729 Leicestershire) : Theologe, Philosoph

Bibliographie : Autor


Cohen, Robert S. = Cohen, Robert Sonné (1924-) : Amerikanischer Philosoph, Wissenschaftler, Historiker

Bibliographie : Autor


Coleman, Earle = Coleman, Earle Jerome (um 1978) : Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Virginia Commonwealth University

Bibliographie : Autor


Collingwood, R.G. = Collingwood, Robin George (Cartmel Fell, Lancashire 1889-1943 Coniston) : Philosoph, Historiker, Archäologe
Bibliographie : Autor

2004


Cook, Daniel J. = Cook, Daniel Joseph (um 1990) : Professor of Philosophy, Brooklyn College, City University of New York

Bibliographie : Autor

1977


1994


**Copleston, Frederick Charles** (Taunton, Somerset 1907-1994 London) : Philosophie Historiker, jesuitischer Priester, Dozent Heythrop College, University of London

*Bibliographie : Autor*


**Cottingham, John** (1943-) : Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Reading

*Bibliographie : Autor*


**Cropsey, Joseph** (New York, N.Y. 1919-2012 Washington, D.C.) : Philosoph, Professor of Political science, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago

*Bibliographie : Autor*


**Cua, Antonio S.** = Cua, A.S. (Manila, Philippinen 1932-2007 Bethesda, Md.) : Professor of Philosophy, Catholic University of America, Washington D.C.

*Biographie*

1952 Antonio S. Cua erhält den B.A. in Philosophy und Psychology der Far Eastern University, Manila. [Cua1]

1953-1958 Antonio S. Cua studiert an der University of California, Berkeley. [Cua1]

1954 Antonio S. Cua erhält den M.A. der University of California, Berkeley. [Cua1]

1958 Antonio S. Cua promoviert in Philosophy an der University of California, Berkeley. [Cua1]

1958-1961 Antonio S. Cua ist Instructor in Philosophy an der Ohio University, Athens. [Cua1]

1961-1962 Antonio S. Cua ist Assistant Professor of Philosophy an der Ohio University, Athens. [Cua1]

1962-1969 Antonio S. Cua ist Professor of Philosophy und Vorsteher des Department of Philosophy am College at Oswego der State University of New York. [Cua1]

1969-1995 Antonio S. Cua ist Professor of Philosophy an der School of Philosophy der Catholic University of America, Washington D.C. [Cua1]
1978-1979 Antonio S. Cua ist Präsident der Association for Asian Studies. [Cua1]
1978-1980 Antonio S. Cua ist Präsident der Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy. [Cua1]
1978-1981 Antonio S. Cua ist Mitglied des Board of Directors der International Society for Chinese Philosophy. [Cua1]
1984-1985 Antonio S. Cua ist Präsident der International Society for Chinese Philosophy. [Cua1]
2001-2007 Antonio S. Cua ist Berater der International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy. [Cua1]

Bibliographie : Autor


Bibliographie : erwähnt in


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論藝術的本質：名家精選集

[Enthält]:

Vol. 3. *Yi shu ji zai xian zi ran* : Aboti. = Art as representing nature : Leon Battista Alberti
Vol. 4. *Yi shu ji pin wei de dui xiang* : Xiumo. = Art as object of taste : David Hume.
Vol. 11. *Yi shu ji you yi han de xing shi* : Beier. = Art as significant form : Clive Bell.
Vol. 29. *Dao lun.* = About the authors. [WC]

**Darwin, Charles Robert** (Shrewsbury, Shropshire 1809-1882 Down bei Beckenham = London) : Naturforscher

**Biographie**

1903 The journal *Hu bei xue sheng jie*, no 2 (1903) emphasized that ‘only if we continue to explore the ideas and teachings of scholars such as Rousseau, Montesquieu, Darwin, and Spencer can China hope to have a student population, an academia that is in step with the tides of change, so that it may seek and find a new plan for national salvation and avoid being mired forever in darkness’. [Mon28]

1917 Chen, Duxiu. *Wen xue ge ming lun* [ID11258]: Chen schreibt: "Die europäische Kultur hat freilich viel der Politik und der Wissenschaft zu verdanken, doch auch nicht weniger der Literatur. Ich habe das Frankreich von Rousseau und Pasteur lieb, aber noch mehr das von Goethe und Hauptmann ; ich liebe das England von Bacon und Darwin, aber noch mehr das von Dickens und Wilde. Ist unter unseren heldenhaften Literaten jemand da, der den Mut hat, ein Hugo oder Zola, ein Goethe oder Hauptmann, ein Dickens oder Wilde zu werden ?" = "European culture has benefited considerably from the many contributions of political thinkers and scientists, but the contribution of writers has not been small either. I love the France of Hugo and Zola ; I love the Germany of Kant and Hegel, but I love especially the Germany of Goethe and Hauptmann ; I love the England of Bacon and Darwin, but I love especially the England of Dickens and Wilde. Is there some outstanding writer in our own national literature who will take on the role of China's Hugo, Zola, Goethe, Hauptmann, Dickens or Wilde ? Is there anyone bold enough to make a public challenge to the 'eighteen demons', ignoring the criticism of reactionary scholars ? If so, I am willing to drag out the cannon to from his vanguard."

Bonnie S. McDougall: Chen meant no more than a literature in which the material world is shown to affect people's lives, and in which concern is shown particularly for the sufferings of the poor. The demand for 'freshness' should be taken in the context of 'stale classicism' ; Chen was not opposed to rich and elaborate descriptions of scenery or emotions as such, he only rejected the euphuistic and allusive language typical of a great deal of classical Chinese poetry and essays. His final aim, to create a simple and popular literature to replace obscure scholarly or eremitic literature, shows the most obvious reason for classing Wilde among the literary giants. [WilO7,YanW1:S. 29]

1919 Guo, Moruo. *Fei tu song* [ID D18296]. Guo Moruo schreibt:

Kopernikus, du böser Geist, Kürer des Sonnensystems, der du dich von den Dogmen der Überlieferung befreit hast !

Darwin, du Schweinehund, Kürer der gemeinsamen Abkunft von Mensch und Affe, der du die Lehren der Vorväter Lügen gestraft hast !

Nietzsche, du Wahnsinniger, Kürer der Philosophie des Übermenschen, der du Götzbilder zerwalmt und Heilige vernichtet hast !

Wo und wann immer ihr gewirkt habt, ihr alle seid Banditen und philosophische Revolutionäre ! Lebet hoch ! lebet hoch ! lebet Hoch !

Raoul David Findeisen: Mit dem Titel des Gedichtes spielt Guo Moruo darauf an, dass die Aktivisten der 4. Mai-Bewegung von der japanischen Presse als 'Studentenbanditen' tituliert worden sind. [Find2:S. 34-35]

1919.2 Guo, Moruo. *Fei tu*. [Hymne an die Banditen]. Among the 'bandits' just alluded to, he also ranked Cromwell, Washington and José Rizal as political revolutionaries. Buddha, Mozi and Luther as religious revolutionaries. Copernicus, Darwin and Nietzsche as revolutionaries in the realm of science and scholarship. Rodin, Whitman and Tolstoy as revolutionaries in the field of art and literature. Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Tagore as revolutionaries in the domain of pedagogy. [WhiW56]
Bibliographie : Autor


Bibliographie : erwähnt in


1982  

1999  

Davidson, Donald = Davidson, Donald Herbert (Springfield, Mass. 1917-2003 Berkeley, Calif.) : Philosoph

*Bibliographie : Autor*

1993  

Dennett, Daniel = Dennett, Daniel Clement (Boston 1942-) : Philosoph, Professor für Philosophie Tufts University

*Bibliographie : Autor*

1988  

Derfer, George E. = Derfer, George Edward (1933-2009) : Professor of Philosophy, Cal Poly, Pomona

*Bibliographie : Autor*

Pt. I. Engagements: can process thought and Chinese thought be fused?
1. Copp, John B. Is Whitehead relevant in China today?
2. Griffin, David R. Whitehead, China, postmodern politics, and global democracy
8. Ziporyn, Brook. Whitehead and Tiantai: eternal objects and the "twofold three thousand".

Pt. II. Perspectives: process thought in Chinese minds.
11. Huo, Guihuan. Can Whiteheadian process philosophy challenge western philosophy?
13. Han, Zhen. The value of adventures in Whiteheadian thought.


Biographie

Michael, Franz H.; Taylor, George E.: John Dewey's message was that democracy could be achieved only through a slow process and that social objectives were relative. He was particularly interested in the scientific approach which he described as the search 'for concrete methods to meet concrete problems according to the exigencies of time and place'. In contrast to the apparent indefiniteness of his general social philosophy, the Communist theory provided the Chinese intellectuals with a system which also claimed to be scientific and to be based on a materialistic and antimetaphysical interpretation of human life... The pragmatists helped to prepare the way for the spread of materialism in the next decades. By joining in the attack against Confucianism they discredited the traditional value system, but themselves offered no system of values. They proposed solutions to the problems of the day according to what Dewey called 'exigencies of time and place'. Because the pragmatists themselves tend toward a materialistic and utilitarian interpretation they offered little resistance to communist doctrine.

1960 Thomas Berry: Dewey's influence in the philosophical order might be described as a further development of the positivism that began to dominate the intellectual life of China after Yan Fu published his translation of Thomas Huxley's 'Evolution and ethics' in 1898. We can follow the later development of this positivism, especially in the years just preceding Dewey's arrival, in the pages of the periodical Xin qing nian.

Hu Shi from his earliest years as a student was responsive to the attraction of Western materialist philosophy. He saw in science and technology something more spiritual than material. He developed the religious enthusiasm for Dewey's pragmatism. Hu was in close contact with the intellectual life of China during the critical years of its transition. Through him the new conception of the human mind as the instrument of pragmatic adaption to reality was transplanted to China. Hu sought especially to relate Chinese philosophical systems to their historical and social setting.

In the field of philosophy, other traditions have been stronger than that of Dewey and Hu Shi. As a special school of philosophy pragmatism was vigorous for only a few years. Since the middle 1920's, pragmatism as a system has been overshadowed by other Western philosophies. Pragmatists, including Hu, turned their attention to educational reform, social reconstruction and political revolution. The philosophical arena was taken over by neo-Realism, rationalistic and idealistic neo-Confucianism, and finally by Marxism. The Marxist challenge to Dewey proved to be more effective than the Confucian or the idealist. Marxism began to awaken in the Chinese a response of very great depth and enthusiasm. Positivism and Hegelian idealism, with their insistence on the progressive stages of development in the mind of man, had prepared the way. Neither Dewey nor his followers realized how powerful and influence Marxist-Leninist Communism would become. During the two years of his venture in China, Dewey made the greatest single effort ever made to bring China into the new age of Western liberalism in political life, of radical empiricism in philosophy, and of progressivism in education. Most important was the philosophical weakness of his position. It offered no satisfactory alternative to the traditional humanism that in former centuries had fashioned the Confucian virtues in the individual person and which had given inner vitality to the social structure. His educational program contained some excellent ideas which could be most beneficial in the training of the young, but only within a more adequate philosophical and religious context which his philosophy could not supply. His cause was in trouble from the lack of strength in the existing Chinese government. Liberalism can grow and develop only within an ordered society. Liberalism supposes order, it does not create order. His cause was in trouble from the existing antagonism toward the West rising from resentment against the colonial systems that had been imposed on so many Asian peoples.

The greatest influence of Dewey in China has been in the field of education. An ideal situation existed for his work as educator, a situation much more favorable, than the situation in America, for Chinese students had a sense of political and social involvement lacking
among students in America. Detached intellectual speculation was as impossible and as undesirable for them as for Dewey. 'Education for living' had a welcome meaning to students anxious to make their contribution to the welfare of their society. Dewey constantly encouraged the Chinese to take the initiative in bringing their nation into its proper place in the modern world. Dewey's confidence in the power of the human mind to find its own way and his opposition to indoctrination of thought upon the mind of other persons were embodied in his insistence that the Chinese should administer their own affairs. The achievement of Dewey was to strengthen the bonds of American-Chinese association. After his visit, other professors from America, particularly educators, were invited to China to assist in establishing training centers for teachers and to develop research programs to guide and promote the new effort at the universal education of the Chinese people in accord with modern standards.

Three achievements of Dewey should be balanced against a consideration of the detrimental effects of his influence: 1) In accenting the positivistic approach in communication between China and America, Dewey created further difficulties in spiritual communication between the two countries. 2) In encouraging the Chinese people to an immediate and thorough adaptation to the modern age, he helped to turn them further dependence on the West. 3) In fostering a closer association between China and America on the philosophical basis of pragmatism, he helped to alienate the more humanistic forces of China and thereby created an area of antagonism as well as an area of agreement.

1960
Chow notes on John Dewey: When Dewey classified in his lectures all social problems into three categories – economic, political, and intellectual – Dewey pointed out that economic problems were the most important, because, as he said, 'economic life is the foundation of all social life'. But the significant economic problem discussed by Dewey did not attract enough attention from his Chinese students and friends and other Chinese liberals. Chinese liberals at this time were preoccupied with educational reform, academic research, and the reevaluation of national classics. Few of them considered seriously the problem of the application of democracy in China in terms of economic organization and practice. This was undoubtedly one of the major causes of their waning influence on the public following their dramatic role in attacking the traditional ideology and institutions.

1972
Ou Tsui-chen: For China, Dewey suggests some practical measures to realize the ideal of democracy. He does not think it necessary to follow the Western pattern to go through self-seeking individualism and then employ the power of state to equalize society. She may, he thinks, amalgamate these two steps at one stroke. Since in China political individualism has not made headway, traditional paternalism can be turned into the protection of its citizens by a democratic government. In dealing with cultural problems, Dewey proposes to attach great importance to the authority of science instead of the authority of tradition. He pleads for free thinking and free expression of thought. In addition to a prosperous material life, he advocates a free intellectual life. To fulfill this ideal, he stresses the importance of using education as an efficient tool.

As the lectures were delivered shortly after the New Culture Movement had begun in Beijing and Chinese traditional morality was under severe criticism, Dewey's lectures often refer to the Movement and particularly to Chinese morality. Contrary to what might be expected, Dewey never advances any extreme view with regard to the then prevailing moral revolution. He takes a middle-of-the-road position vis-à-vis the conflict between the moralities old and new. At the end of his lectures, Dewey makes an excellent comparison between Eastern and Western ethical thought. He first states that morality is a function of the environment and varies with it. So it is difficult to judge which morality has more value than another. There is no doubt whatsoever that of all Western educators Dewey most influence the course of Chinese education, while his influence on Chinese thought, politics, and society in general is a controversial question difficult to resolve.
A number of educational reforms and practices were introduced in China which reflected Dewey's influence: 1) Chinese educational aims were reconsidered in the light of Dewey's thought. 2) The national school system was reformed according to the American pattern. 3) Child-centered education was faced in the revision of the curriculum. 4) The new method of teaching according to the pragmatic theory was promoted. 5) Experimental schools were multiplied. 6) Student government as a mode of school discipline was promoted. 7) Literary reform and the adoption of textbooks for elementary schools written in the spoken Chinese language were encouraged.

1973
Robert W. Clopton; Tsuin-chen Ou: Dewey's stay in China was one of the most significant and influential events in recent Chinese cultural history, but the Chinese have been so familiar with Dewey's influence that they have not bothered to analyze it, nor even to write extensively about it. Americans, on the other hand are largely unfamiliar with Dewey's impact on Chinese thought. In view of the reputation he established throughout the world, it is scarcely surprising that special attention to Dewey's Chinese sojourn should have been delayed. Yet there can be no doubt that China was the one foreign country on which Dewey exercised his greatest influence, particularly in the field of education.

When we consider Dewey's impact on Chinese thought and education, we think first of the warmth of his reception in China. All who met him were impressed by his personality, his intellectual honesty, his enthusiasm, his simplicity of nature, his friendliness, and his sympathetic understanding of the Chinese people and their problems. All these characteristics contributed to his popularity both among the intellectuals and among the common people. On one occasion Cai Yuanpei, chancellor of National Beijing University, even likened him to Confucius. Another factor which contributed to Dewey's popularity among the Chinese was that, as an American, he represented the one great nation friendly to China and opposed to its partition by the great powers.

Two important institutions were the main centers of Dewey's influence in China, both during his stay and after his departure. These were the National Beijing University and the National Nanjing Teachers College. Both had at their head men who had been Dewey's student: Chiang Monlin in Beijing and P.W. Kuo in Nanjing. Hu Shi involved Dewey in the New Culture movement. The other important institutions of higher learning helped to extend Dewey's influence throughout China: Beijing Teachers College of which Li Jianxun was president, and Nankai University in Tianjin, of which Zhang Boling was president.

Dewey's impact was primarily on political and social trends. In his lectures he advocated democracy – social, political, and economic. He opposed both laissez-faire individualism and Marxist Communism. While he proposed a general ideal, he refused to advocate any all-embracing ism or any concrete program for action. His principle of the primacy of method also dominated his social and political thinking. Dewey took an unequivocally anti-Communist position, severely criticizing and pointedly repudiating Marxism. In a speech delivered in Fujian he blamed the Communists for neglecting critical thought and for their blind obedience.

Dewey most influenced the course of Chinese education, both in theory and practice. His philosophy of education dominated the teaching of educational theory in all teachers colleges and in university departments of education for many years. His textbook 'Democracy and education' was used everywhere, either as a text or as a work of reference. Dewey's disciples Dao Jixing and Chen Heqin (1892-1982) were the most responsible for spreading his influence in China. They developed her own system, taking Dewey's educational theory as her starting point.

Dewey's influence in Chinese thought and education was dominant from 1919 until 1920. His influence first began to diminish after the May 30 incident in Shanghai in 1925. After the Nationalists came to power in 1927, Dewey's influence was seriously undermined. After 1949, the Chinese communists followed Soviet authorities and educators in their denunciation of Dewey and his followers.

1977
Barry Keenan: The most characteristic aspect of Dewey's lectures in China was his insistence
that the fields of philosophy, education, and political theory incorporate modern science. He meant in particular the methodological importance of testing hypotheses with verifying evidence, and the implications of the Darwinian theory of evolution. The democratizing of society was linked by Dewey directly to the scientific revolution. His audiences in China were introduced to democracy and the philosophy of experimentalism, with both portrayed as related developments in the history of Western thought. Dewey's explanation of the role of the development of modern science in the West emphasized some points that were particularly designed for his Chinese audiences. One of these was the effect of science on human values and temperament. Dewey felt that the two or three hundred years in which the West had materialistically and morally undergone the effects of science accounted for the most evident differences between the East and West.

Dewey's discussion of values extended to some criticism of the way ethics was taught in Chinese schools. In China the school system provided set course on 'ethical education' at the primary and secondary levels. Dewey attacked the theory behind such course, namely, that morality could be presented as a body of facts and knowledge.

In his China lectures, Dewey felt it important to emphasize the child-centered curriculum – a turning away from classroom emphasis on subject matter to emphasis on the growth of the child. He dedicated one of his first lectures in Beijing to a discussion of the natural instincts and inherent dispositions of a child, which he considered 'the natural foundation of education'. Child-centered education should be a priority for China, Dewey felt, as a departure from the stratified society or authoritarian tradition that tended to promote the 'pouring in' of accepted subject matter as education. In the democratic society Dewey was told China was trying to create, there had to be equal opportunity for each child to develop his potentialities and become a participating citizen. It was important during a period of rapid social change, Dewey noted, that the younger generation be able to adapt to new conditions.

Dewey's comments on reform in China were undoubtedly guided by his coaches and spokesmen, Hu Shi and Chiang Menglin. Many references appear in his lectures relating his educational ideas to social change and 'modernization' in China. Socialization of the child should not only give him or her a critical attitude toward tradition, but also develop his or her critical judgment about contemporary social and political conditions.

Dewey and his followers in China felt that the school should be the basic unit in the reconstruction of China. Other institutions of social reform and betterment such as law and political parties, lacked the power of education to carry out deep and lasting change.

The experience of going to school gave a child his first daily contact with an environment broader than the family. Dewey pointed out that it was the role of the school to present the world of human knowledge in order to extend the limits of the child's environment.

Dewey's discussion of the nature of democracy in his China lectures were a kind of final equilateral component in the triangular connection of democracy, the experimental method, and the democratic education. The democratization of knowledge by science had led historically to an increase in the role of the common people in society, as Dewey saw it, and the connection between scientific knowledge and democracy remained close. As he said soon after arriving in Beijing: 'A person in a democratic country must have the power of independent judgment, the power to think freely, and the actual opportunity to experiment. He must be able to use his own ability to choose the direction of his ideas and his behavior.'

In the process of formulating a pragmatic philosophy of politics Dewey discussed rugged individualism, Marxism, and socialism. He warned China to avoid the dangers of rugged individualism. Throughout his lectures he endorsed the idea that individuals should be able to develop themselves to their full potential. The dangers of uncontrolled individualism were emphasized by Dewey because he feared China, in the throes of liberating itself from the authority of the state and the family system, would be prone to fall into its opposite extreme of radical individualism.

Dewey was critical of Marxism in his lectures. He pointed out that Marxian theory had failed on two counts: 1) although capital squeezed out competition as predicted, the workers came to fare better and better- the poor did not become poorer and poorer; 2) the prediction regarding industrial nations being the first to change to socialism was erroneous and shed
doubt on the rest of the theory. The question of labor discontent was taken very seriously by Dewey, but he addressed himself critically to Marx's theory of alienation. Dewey was not so critical of some non-Marxian types of socialism. Guild socialism in particular had several points Dewey thought appropriate to China's needs. The existence of guilds in China – for railroads, mines, forests, and roads – provided a natural organizational unit which could be useful in China's transformation from a handicraft to an industrial economy.

Dewey called for Chinese reformers to retain a direct connection between the past and change. Dewey's views called for a re-evaluation of traditional customs and institutions, but not for their rejection. Intensive study of the past were encouraged, so that the indigenous cultural traits and institutions relevant to contemporary needs could be discovered and conserved.

Dewey's lectures gave many liberal Chinese reformers an unusual opportunity to study and apply an extremely up-to-date and philosophically reliable formulation of the modern democracy. What Dewey said in these lectures, was his own first-draft attempt to see how well pragmatism might be applied to politics.

1995
Su Zhixin : Deweyan experimentalism – as a way of thinking, as a way of acting politically, and as a component of democratic education – offered no strategy Dewey's followers could use to affect political power. Without such a strategy, failure was the main consequence of his followers' pragmatic reform efforts. Their reformism was paralyzed by dilemma. Dewey himself recognized this failure after his visit to China, writing, "The difficulties in the way of a practical extension and regeneration of Chinese education are all but insuperable. Discussion often ends in an impasse: no political reform of China without education; but no development of schools as long as military men and corrupt officials divert funds and oppose schools from motives of self-interest. Here are the materials of tragedy of the first magnitude". The experimentalist philosophy, conceiving in a rich, literature, industrial, and relatively serene America and propagated by well-intentioned, but somewhat sheltered, Chinese intellectuals, was finally not appropriate for a huge, varied, agricultural, particularistic country. Maybe this is an important reason for Dewey's silence about his historic visit to China, and his views on educational development in China in his later years. The American scholars conduct their evaluation in a purely academic manner, and they are not personally affected by the consequences of what they say or write because they are far detached from the Chinese reality. The Chinese scholars, on the other hand, have to pay attention to the political climate while conducting their evaluation of Western influence because what they say will directly affect their academic careers and personal lives – being 'politically incorrect' in academic discourse could result in the loss of jobs and alienation of families. In general, the Chinese do not differ from their American counterparts in their acknowledgment of the strong and widespread influence of Dewey's ideas on Chinese educational theory and practice. While the Americans do not question Dewey's sincerity in promoting the development of a democratic society or the worthiness of Dewey's ideas for Chinese schools and society; some praise him as a saint, while others condemn him as an enemy. In many ways, it has been an ideological struggle between Dewey's pragmatism and experimentalism and Marxist-Leninist Communism.

Deng Xiaoping's political and economic pragmatism paved the way for Chinese intellectuals to become infatuated once again with Western pragmatism. Under these circumstances, a serious reevaluation of Dewey's influence on Chinese education has begun to emerge among Dewey scholars and concerned educators in China. Some critics suggest that the worthiness of certain elements in Dewey's educational philosophy and its status in the history of philosophy should be reevaluated. They recommend that instead of totally denying Dewey, the Chinese should critically borrow and make use of Dewey's ideas in Chinese educational practices.

1999
David L. Hall ; Roger T. Ames : The New Culture Movement was initially anti-Confucian, and Dewey's thought was seen to be in radical opposition to traditional Confucian ideas. When Sun Yat-sen and the Guomindang promoted a return to many of the traditional Chinese values and institutions, Dewey's thought was deemed unacceptable due to its foreign origin.
When the communists came to power, Dewey's thought was roundly condemned as an expression of Western imperialism. After the establishment of the People's Republic, a purge of Deweyan pragmatism was begun. Literally millions of words were written refuting Dewey's works.

The reasons for Dewey's failure finally to influence China were largely associated with his refusal to take a wholesale approach to social problems. Always warning the Chinese against the uncritical importation of Western ideas, as well as the uncritical rejection of traditional Chinese values, Dewey, in spite of his radical reconstruction of the popular democratic ideal, was simply too moderate for a China in search of revolution. It was practically inevitable, that Marxism's wholesale ideology would replace Dewey's decidedly retail philosophy.

Dewey's educational reforms, badly misunderstood and only partially applied from the beginning, have long since been effectively abandoned. His understanding of democracy was never altogether in the mainstream. In many ways, the opportunity to introduce a reconstructed idea of democracy seems to have been lost as surely in America as it was in China.

1999


Deweys Pragmatismus hat es als einzige westliche philosophische Strömung unternommen, Reformvorschläge für die Behebung der chinesischen Kulturkrise in der Zeit nach dem ersten
Weltkrieg auszuarbeiten.
In zeitlicher Parallelität zur Rezeption und der Interpretation der Ideen Deweys durch die chinesischen Pragmatisten verlief die gesamte Reformbewegung, wobei der Themenkreis die Kritik an den traditionellen Wertmaßstäben, Gebräuchen und Institutionen, die Ordnung des nationalen Erbes durch kritische Interpretation der überlieferten Geschichte, Literaturkritik und die Sprachreform umfasste. Hinsichtlich des Versuches der Schüler Deweys, seine politischen Ideen in die Praxis umzusetzen, muss gesagt werden, dass es bei dem Versuch geblieben ist. Im Sommer 1919 brach eine zeitliche Parallelität zur Rezeption und der Interpretation der Ideen Deweys durch die chinesischen Pragmatisten verlief die gesamte Reformbewegung, wobei der Themenkreis die 'Debatte über Probleme und Ismen' bzw. 'Reform und Revolution' auf, die für die folgenden 30 Jahre der politischen Entwicklung Chinas von Bedeutung war, weil sie in der Öffentlichkeit eine intellektuelle Spaltung der Liberalen und Linken hervorrief, die nicht rückgängig gemacht wurde. Während Li Dazhao, Gründer der KPCh, die marxistische Theorie als Alternative zur grundlegenden Lösung für alle gesellschaftlichen Probleme befürwortete, lehnte Hu Shi einen allumfassenden Ismus oder ein konkretes Programm für Aktionen ab und plädierte nachdrücklich für die Reformidee des Pragmatismus, der wegen seiner kritischen Potenz und des Fehlens dogmatischer Züge von einer anderen Qualität ist: die gesellschaftliche und politische Erneuerung durch schrittweise Progressivität, den einzigen in seiner Sicht gangbaren Weg.

2001

2002
Jay Martin : After his trips to Japan and China, Dewey had become a changed person, an evolving person. His educational vision and his political understanding had broadened beyond American boundaries to include the world. Dewey was indeed transformed by his trip to the
Far East from U.S. philosopher to a transnational philosopher. In addition, after his visit to China, Dewey maintained his noninterventionist approach to international politics. Dewey's visit to China and his efforts to help modernize China's schools, which were widely reported and recognized, led to many invitations from other foreign governments to inspect their education systems.

2003-2004
Sor-hoon Tan: Hu Shi was promoting Dewey's philosophy while he was still developing it. Hu's pragmatist work in China, his promotion of vernacular literature, was an important contribution because it made possible 'the means of communication and publicity required for democracy'. Dewey's views on the process of thought were extremely important in the development of Hu's intellectual method. And much of Hu's life was devoted to the social inquiry that Dewey argued has to be at the center of democratic life, even though the inquiry was necessarily imperfect given the circumstances, and Hu was inclined to a more individualistic view of inquiry than was warranted by Dewey's conception of democracy.

Hu Shi, explaining Dewey's views on thinking, singles out 'the cultivation of creative intelligence' as 'the greatest aim of Dewey's philosophy; it is creative intelligence that will enable human beings to respond satisfactorily to their environments, both physical and social.' In his own way, Hu tried to realize Dewey's scientific method as intelligent practice, to transform his own experience and his country's. Hu believed that science could solve moral and political problems. These sentiments echo those in Dewey's 'Reconstruction of philosophy'. Dewey also believed that philosophy has much to learn from modern science, and that the lesson would improve philosophy's ability to handle what should be its central task, solving the problems of humanity, especially moral and social problems.

Hu Shi was not misreading or misapplying Dewey when he defended the relevance of science to life, including its moral and political aspects; but he was less sensitive than Dewey to the dangers of worshiping the achievements of the physical sciences, because he believed that China's backwardness rendered it much more in need of the benefits of science than at risk from science's evils. This does not mean that he would not have agreed with Dewey's clarification that there are important differences between physical sciences and social sciences.

Hu's interpretation of pragmatism as method has considerable support from Dewey's writings, he sometimes exaggerated Dewey's own emphasis on method. Referring to Dewey's 1907 'What pragmatism means by practical', he claimed that 'Dewey, from beginning to end, only recognized pragmatism as a method'. Hu borrowed from Dewey much more than the mere formulation of an intellectual methodology. While he pointed out that Dewey's visit to China gave his Chinese audience 'no specific proposals such as communism, anarchism, or free love [but] a philosophical method which enabled [them], through its use, to solve [their] own special problems'.

In Dewey's theory and practice, politics and education are integrated in the endeavor to bring about democracy. Dewey endorsed Hu Shi's strategic exclusion of political involvement only to the extent that the politics in question was of a variety that sill awaited reconstruction if it was to contribute to democratization.

While Hu and Dewey were not against radical changes, they did not believe in 'revolutionary changes' that break completely with the past. The misplaced denial of the inherent continuity of experience even in the midst of the most drastic discontinuities would only lead to the destruction of not only obsolete customs and institutions but also the values those customs and institutions were originally intended to serve, values that may still be relevant to the new situation.

What Dewey's experimentalism led Hu Shi to reject was an undemocratic power struggle that might ensure short-term political victory only at the cost of the eventual defeat of democracy. Hu's attempt to realize Dewey's pragmatism in China may not have succeeded in bringing about democracy, but we should not overlook the democratic significance and far-reaching effect of certain aspects of the education and cultural reforms he and other initiated.

If Hu Shi seems a little selective in his presentation and interpretation of pragmatism, we must remember that he was promoting Dewey's philosophy even as Dewey was still developing it.
Moreover, from a pragmatist perspective, his mentor's views are not absolute truths; they are tools to be used appropriately in the circumstances.

2007

Jessica Wang: Many know that Dewey went to China to teach, but few know that he went because he wanted to learn. Dewey taught the Chinese a lot about the West and learned a great deal about China. Even though he may have had some exposure to Chinese culture through his Chinese students at Columbia University, it was not enough to prepare him to be a China expert. Most of Dewey's writings about China are the result of his own observations, assisted by his conversations with various people—his own students and translators, travel guides, missionary friends, academic acquaintances, and institutional hosts—and, most important, by his own study of Chinese history. In his sojourn, Dewey learned about the Chinese social psychology and philosophy of life. At the same time, he also came to understand the West and to question its Eurocentric worldviews. His presence in China opened his eyes to the dark realities of international politics, it also sheltered him from criticism for his idealistic support for the war.

Coinciding with the well-known May fourth movement, Dewey's two-year visit demarcated a significant episode in the history of intellectual exchange between China and the United States.

One of the most important episodes in the history of intellectual exchange was to grow out of the effort of the U.S. government to promote the education of China's young elites. The encounter between Dewey and China in the 1920s was characterized by ambivalences, uncertainties, and changes on both sides. Faced with challenges from the West, Chinese intellectuals had initially sought to acquire Western technology and implement Western institutions. Later, they realized that they had to study the ideas that inform Western development and practice. During the two years of his stay, Dewey came into contact with these contending ideologies. Although Chinese intellectuals had ambivalent attitudes toward the West, Dewey had his doubts about how the United States should respond to China, or rather, how the United States could help China. Dewey was trying to understand China and its precarious position in the international world, while Chinese intellectuals were trying to understand Dewey and his position in their ideological battles.

In the 1920s, Chinese opinions of Dewey reflected their own vexed interests in liberalism, neo-traditionalism, and Marxism. In the 1930s and 1940s, as China underwent a series of domestic and international wars, a natural eclipse of interest in Dewey occurred. Since the establishment of the Communist regime in 1949, the dialogue between Dewey and China took a drastic turn. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese Communist government launched a large-scale campaign to purge the pragmatic influences of Hu Shi and Dewey. During this period, pragmatism was eschewed as an evil influence of Western imperialism and capitalism. In the 1980s, due to the reform and open door policy of China, the dialogue about Dewey was revived. Since then, Chinese scholars have started to reevaluate Dewey and pragmatism.

Dewey's experimental theory of inquiry made him qualified as 'Mr. Science'. His promotion of democratic ideals earned him the legitimate title of 'Mr. Democracy'. His concerns for the education of the masses contributed to his reputation as the common people's educator. The three topics on science, democracy, and education are chosen for many reasons. First, they constitute the major themes of Dewey's lectures; second, they reflected the interests and concerns of his Chinese hosts; and third, they evoked considerable responses and criticisms from his audience.

Dewey knew that in their attempt to emulate Western technology, the Chinese tended to espouse a one-sided, mechanistic view of science, paying attention merely to the products, not the process of science. Therefore in his lectures, Dewey stressed science as a method of thinking, knowing, and acting that has a positive impact on morals and values.

During his visit, Dewey was often asked about ways China could avoid the pitfalls of Western materialistic culture. He admitted that love of money, cruelty in military battles, and contention between capital and labor accompanied material progress in the West. He hoped that the Chinese would come to appreciate science as a method of intelligence for coping with problems and difficulties in ordinary life, rather than as a collection of objective truth.
Knowing that such a view of science was not even widely shared in the West, he somehow hoped that the Chinese would consider his suggestions, particularly when they planned for education reform.

Dewey was aware of the increasing trend toward individualism in China and was wary of its concomitant problems. He advised the Chinese not to follow the same path Western nations had taken – namely, going through a stage of self-seeking individualism to the next stage in which state power had to be used to ensure social equality. He believed that Chinese culture was endowed with democratic elements that would enable her to carry out the transition to industrialism more creatively and effectively than the West had done.

Even though Dewey had great sympathy for the struggles of the Chinese and admired many unique qualities of Chinese culture, he was not uncritical of their weaknesses – their passivity and reliance on authority. Therefore, in his lectures, he often stressed the importance of spontaneity, creativity, and initiative, reminding his audience that they needed to reconcile partisan disputes and undertake practical tasks that demands large-scale organization and cooperation. Knowing that the Chinese had learned to organize themselves to operate on a national level, Dewey suggested that schools should cultivate a sense of public spirit extending beyond the students' immediate environments.

Dewey's political activism often runs a sharp contrast to Hu Shi's conservatism. Dewey exerted little influence in Hu's pragmatist experiment in China, even though Dewey was also a participant. Dewey was aware that Hu's reform approach was not very practical, that intellectual, attitudinal changes still depended on concrete changes in economic and social conditions, but Dewey was in no position to intervene. Dewey acknowledged the New Culture group Hu led and was willing to 'give face' to their liberal ideals.


2007

Ding Zijiang: Dewey's philosophy was very attractive to Chinese intellectuals because he seemed to give them an 'easygoing' and also 'efficient' way to deal with many current issues. He taught the Chinese people (1) to pay more attention to practical effectiveness rather than man's knowledge of transmaterial being or all former illusions about transcendent truths; (2) to concern themselves with those immediate problems of individual and social life rather than the past heritage of culture, which had limited the country's development, and any abstract and all-embracing 'ism' which was not urgent for today's actual life, and (3) to consider intelligence as an instrument for meeting and mastering the new social environment.

Dewey's pragmatism was suitable for a certain aspect of Chinese thought patterns. Dewey's pragmatism as a method is congenial to the practical mentality and disposition of the Chinese people, and it is also a factor of fundamental importance among those that contributed to Dewey's popularity. The Chinese tradition, unlike the Greek one, has never exalted knowledge for its own sake, but rather for its usefulness to morality, society, politics, and culture. For this reason, leading Chinese intellectuals used Dewey Dewey's pragmatism was suitable for a certain aspect of Chinese thought patterns. Dewey's pragmatism as a method is congenial to the practical mentality and disposition of the Chinese people, and it is also a factor of fundamental importance among those that contributed to Dewey's popularity. Dewey's pragmatic experimentalism with telling effect as a weapon with which to criticize Chinese culture and the traditional value system.

One of the reasons for Dewey's influence on China is the 'holistic' nature of his thought, which was thoroughly in tune with a similar position found in Chinese thought. For example, Chen Duxiu's totalistic attack on Confucianism resulted, among other factors, from his conception of the Confucian tradition as fundamentally a holism that rigidly directed all later developments of Confucianism.

Dewey's real success in China was his educational thought. Dewey emphasized that there was nothing which one heard so often from the lips of representatives of Young China today as that education was the sole means of reconstructing China. Dewey's theories, such as the 'own experience-centered principle', the 'teaching-learning-doing combination principle', the 'school as a society principle', and the 'education for living principle' were extended and advances by his Chinese disciples, such as Tao Xingzhi, one of the most influential Chinese educators. For the new Chinese intellectuals, Dewey's leading principle was that education is an instrument
of social change and development. Accordingly, students who have grown politically aware under the new educational regime can be considered as a force, who will in the future make politics of a different sort.

The most important aspect of 'Deweyanization' is education. Dewey was a teacher of teachers. Teaching people how to live and think in the new age of science, technology, democracy, and social development was his mission. His School of education (1889) and Democracy and education (1916) were well known by Chinese educators and intellectuals. Hu Shi accepted Dewey's idea that education is life and school is society. Importantly, political reform can only be achieved after a social and cultural transformation, which must be promoted by way of education. Dewey himself systematically explained the same views as Hu Shi's in his articles on China. As he correctly pointed out, since 'democracy was a matter of beliefs, of outlook upon life, of habits of mind, and not merely a matter of forms of government', it demanded 'universal education', and the first step towards achieving universal education was to establish the spoken language as a written literary language.

In the 1920s, with Dewey's visit, the entire American educational system was transferred to China, and American aims, methods, and materials became dominant. Deweyanized experimental schools and training programs were popularized. Even the purpose of Chinese education was redefined according to Dewey's progressivism, such as learning by doing, developing abilities by capacities, and students themselves running schools.

Dewey's educational influence on China: (1) Chinese educational aims were reconsidered in light of Dewey's thought; (2) the national school system was reformed according to the American pattern; (3) child-centered education predominated in the revision of the curriculum; (4) new methods of teaching in accordance with Dewey's pragmatic theory were initiated; (5) experimental schools were expanded; (6) student government, about which Dewey made a number of speeches, was widely extended as a mode of school discipline; (7) literary reform was encouraged, and elementary school textbooks written in the vernacular were adopted. [Russ43,DewJ5,DewJ186,DewJ74,Kee3:S. 37-51, 130,DewJ205,Ames20:S. 141-143,DewJ175:S. 93-96, 313,DewJ2:S. 1, 3, 8-9, 14-16, 20, 25, 38-39, 65, 8485,DewJ134,DewJ146]
1918  Meeting about elementary education in Tianjin.  
Cai Yuanpei recommended John Dewey and his educational philosophy. [DewJ185]

1919  Shu, Xincheng.  *Jin dai Zhongguo jiao yu shi liao* [ID D28674].
"Chinese educational aims were reconsidered in the light of Dewey's thought. The first Conference for Educational Investigation, held in April 1919, was attended by sixty outstanding education leaders, including Cai Yuanpei and Chiang Monlin [Jiang Menglin], all of whom were appointed by the Ministry of Education. Dissatisfied with the old educational aims which had been promulgated in 1912, and which had emphasized military education, the conference suggested that the aim and spirit of American education should be adopted. The new aim was to be 'the cultivation of perfect personality and the development of democratic spirit. The fifth annual meeting of the Federation of Educational Associations endorsed the new educational direction in the same year, and even went a step further in following literally Dewey's admonition that 'education has no ends beyond itself'; it is its own end', by advocating the abolition of all educational aims, and their replacements by a statement of the nature of education instead." [DewJ5]

1919  While lecturing at the Imperial University in Tokyo, John Dewey received a joint invitation from five Chinese academic institutions to lecture in Beijing, Nanjing, and other cities in China. This invitation was prompted by three of his former students: Hu Shi, P.W. Kuo (President of the National Nanjing Teachers College) and Chiang Monlin [Jiang Menlin] (Ed. of New Education magazine). [DewJ5]
Hu Shi zitiert John Dewey in leicht gekürzter Form in fünf Punkten: 1) Die Vertreter der früheren Strömungen gehen davon aus, dass Erfahrung durch und durch Erkennen ist. 2) Früher vertrat man die Meinung, dass die Erfahrung etwas Psychisches und völlig 'Subjektives' sei. 3) Früher erkannte man über die gegenwärtige Situation hinaus nur eine Vergangenheit an und vertrat die Position, dass die Erfahrung letztlich aus Erinnertem besteht. 4) Die Erfahrung in ihrer früheren Form war partikular. 5) Traditionell betrachtete man die Erfahrung und das Denken als absolute Gegensätze.


Das Denken, von dem Dewey spricht, hat die Funktion, ausgehend von bereits Bekanntem auf andere Dinge, Angelegenheiten oder Wahrheiten zu schliessen. Diese Funktion wird in der Logik 'Schlussfolgerung' (inference) genannt. Schlussfolgerung bedeutet lediglich von bereits Bekanntem auf noch Unbekanntes schliessen..."

Hu Shi folgt in der Darstellung der fünf Stufen des 'analytischen Denkens bei Dewey den Vorgaben seines Lehrers:

a) Als Ausgangspunkt benötigt man eine verwirrende, schwierige Situation. b) Durch Überlegen und Sondieren versucht man neue Dinge oder neue Erkenntnisse herauszufinden, um diese verwirrende Schwierigkeit zu lösen.

Hu Shi concretely analyzed and explained the five steps in the ideological methodology of John Dewey: 1) knotty circumstances; 2) pointing out exactly where the knotty points are; 3) imagining the methods for resolving various knotty points; 4) imagining the results of each such method to see which one can resolve the difficulties; 5) proving this kind of solution is believable, or proving this kind of solution is wrong and unbelievable. [DewJ175:S. 108, 113-119, DewJ180]
1919.03 Suzanne P. Ogden: The immediate stimulus leading to the invitation to Bertrand Russell for a visit in China may have been the series of lectures given by John Dewey in Beijing in March 1919 on *The three great philosophers of our day, James, Bergson, and Russell.* [Russ10]

1919.03 Conference held by the Ministry of Education. Hu Shi made a detailed introduction to John Dewey's pragmatism. Such publicity and introduction has created a 'Dewey craze' even before Dewey came to China, and the far and wide spread of his educational philosophy could be predicted. Hu Shi found the 'practical philosophy' he was looking for in Dewey's pragmatism. His 1919 lecture introducing pragmatism, Hu refers approvingly to Dewey's comment that 'philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men'. [DewJ184,DewJ185]

1919.03-04 John Dewey: Lecture 'The relation between democracy and education' at the Jiangsu Educational Association Building, Shanghai. = Ping min zhu yi, ping min zhu yi di jiao yu, ping min jiao yu zhu yi di ban fa. Jiang Menglin interpreter; Pan Gongzhan recorder. In: Xue deng; May 8-9 (1919) / In: Chen bao fu kan; May 9 (1919).
Zhou Youjin: Dewey's speeches were so popular that there was barely enough room for the audience. The speeches have already been published in both Chinese and English newspapers to that those who were not able to attend the speeches for various reasons could learn about Dewey's ideas. [DewJ200,Kee3]

1919.04.15 April 15, 1919
Professor John Dewey c/o The Government University Peking
My dear Professor Dewey
On the basis of the following telegram President Butler cabled to the Chancellor that you had been granted leave of absence in order to accept the suggestion that you lecture at the Government University Peking.
President Butler Columbia University
Professor Dewey consents lecture one year at Chinese Government University pending your concurrence. Kindly cable.
Thaiyuenpei [Cai Yuanpei] Chancellor Government University
President Butler is delighted that you will have the opportunity and is sure you can accomplish much of lasting good by work at this institution.
Trusting that all is going well with you, I beg to remain
Faithfully yours Frank D. Fackenthal [DewJ3]

1919.04.15 John Dewey received the notification from Columbia University that his leave of absence to China was approved. He did not promise to stay a year in China until he arrived there in person. [DewJ2:S. 3]
Dear Sabino, You have probably heard more than we have that Lucy is coming sailing May 20, and Mr Barry too. The latter was great surprise. As soon as we heard we decided to leave for China right away so as to get back sooner; we sail from Kobe the 27th, next Sunday. It takes one day to go thru the Inland Sea, between the Japanese Islands and about three more I think to cross to Shanghai. My former Chinese students seem to be making as elaborate plans for our reception as we have enjoyed here. The only trouble is that I shall have to lecture all the time to help even up. I don’t know the program exactly, but I know it calls for lectures in Shanghai, Nanking and Peking and I presume other places. You look up your geography and you will see how far apart the places are. When the Chinamen were here I got the impression Nanking was a kind of suburb of Shanghai, they talked so about running over there, but I see from the time table it takes five hours or more. I hope we can go up the Yangtze River to Hankow, by boat, but that doesn’t seem to be on my paid schedule, and it may be better to postpone it till next fall if should stay over. I have had a letter from the President of a missionary college in Nanking, [Rev. Arthur John] Bowen by name, inviting us to stay at their house while we are there. I don’t know whether he is of the Bowen family well known in the Islands. Mama has written Lucy full particulars if only she gets the letter before she leaves. Anyway she understands about going to the Nitobes. We have written them so that they [in ink w. caret] will be on the lookout for her, if we are not back. We have also written her about the possibility of stopping over one steamer in Honolulu. Of course we don’t know how much will fit in with circumstances including Mr Barry’s plans, and so we don’t urge it except if she wants to and it is convenient all around…

Tell Lucy to be sure to mail a letter postcard to us, care Dr Suh Hu [Hu Shi] Government University, Peking, to come [ink del.] by the Korea steamer, in case she stops over and a letter to mail in Yokahama when she leaves the steamer if she doesn’t. In fact if she comes right thru she better cable us after she has got her mail at the Nitobes unless we write something different…

Dad

Professor Hu [Shi] is going to run down from Peking to Shanghai about a thousand miles to meet us when we arrive… [DewJ3]

John Dewey arrived in Shanghai.
Letter from John Dewey : Shanghai, May 1 [1919]. "We have slept one night in China…"
[A lot of people say, that he arrived on May 1]. [DewJ5,Kee3,DewJ1]

John Dewey : Lectures 'The real meaning of education in a democracy' at the Beijing National Academy of Fine Arts.
1) 'The natural foundations of education'.
2) 'The new attitude toward knowledge'.
3) 'The socialization of education'. [DewJ5]

2) 'The natural foundations of education'
3) 'The new attitude toward knowledge'
4) 'The socialization of education' [DewJ5,Kee3]
1919.05.01  Dewey, John ; Dewey, Alice Chipman. *Letters from China and Japan.*
Shanghai, May 1. [1.5.1919].

We have slept one night in China, but we haven't any first impressions, because China hasn't revealed itself to our eyes as yet. We compared Shanghai to Detroit, Michigan, and except that there is less coal smoke, the description hits it off. This is said to be literally an international city, but I haven't learned yet just what the technique is; every country seems to have its own post office though, and its own front-door yard, and when we were given a little auto ride yesterday, we found that the car couldn't go into Chinatown because it had no license for that district.

I shall be interested to find out whether in this really old country they talk about 'ages eternal' as freely as they do in Japan; the authentic history of the latter begins about 500 A.D., their mythical history 500 B.C., but still it is a country which has endured during myriads of ages. In spite of the fact that they kept the emperors shut up for a thousand years, and killed them off and changed them about with great ease and complacency, the children are all taught, and they repeat in books for foreigners, that the rule of Japan has been absolutely unbroken. Of course, they get to believing these things themselves, not exactly intellectually but emotionally and practically, and it would be worth any teacher’s position for him to question any of their patriotic legends in print. However, they say that in their oral lectures, the professors of history of the universities criticise these legends. In the higher elementary school we visited in Osaka, we saw five classes in history and ethics, in each of which the Emperor was under discussion—sometimes the Emperor and what he had done for the country, and sometimes an Emperor in particular. Apparently this religion has been somewhat of a necessity, as the country was so divided and split up, they had practically nothing else to unite on—the Emperor became a kind of symbol of united and modern Japan. But this worship is going to be an Old Man of the Sea on their backs. They say the elementary school teachers are about the most fanatical patriots of the country. More than one has been burned or allowed the children to be burned while he rescued the portrait of the Emperor when there was a fire. They must take it out in patriotism in lieu of salary; they don't get a living wage, now that the cost of living has gone up. [DewJ1]

1919.05.01  Shen bao published a brief note: "Dr. Dewey arrives in Shanghai". [He arrived on April 30]. [DewJ185]
1919.05.01,02 Letter from John & Alice Chipman Dewey to Dewey children
May first Shanghai [1919]

Dear children,

We have slept one night in China, but we haven’t any first impressions of China, because China hasn’t revealed itself to our eyes as yet. Mamma compares it to Detroit Mich, and except that there is less coal smoke, the description hits it off, also like the suburban districts of London in the villa districts, where there is lots of land about every house. Certainly some foreigners have succeeded in making money out of China. This is said to be literally an international city, but I haven’t learned yet just what the technique is; every country seems to have its own postoffice tho, and its own front door yeard, and when we were given a little auto ride yesterday, we found that the car couldn’t go into Chinatown because it had no license, for that district. We are haunted by a suspicion that the young men who have us in charge have more enthusiasm than wordly wisdom or official pull—in other words they belong to the younger generation who are trying to reform the established order, and are as popular as such people generally are. However we have little to go on so far. Altho the Univ of Peking cabled Butler three weeks ago, they haven’t had a reply yet, so we don’t as yet know any more about our future than we did in Japan I lecture here twice, saturday and sunday; monday we go to Hangchow which is said to be scenically one of the most beautiful places in China, and was I believe the capital during some one of the numerous dynasties that have ruled over China…

May 2

Now we have seen something of China, so far as Shanghai is China at all, and to day we are to see more, going to Chinatown. Our reception committee here consists of Suh Hu [Hu Shi], who took a thirty six hour trip from Peking to meet us, a man from Nanking Teachers College, and a local Shanghai teacher, named Chinang who took his Ph D at T C a year or so ago. The "returned student" is a definite category here, and if and when China gets on its feet, the American university will have a fair share of the glory to its credit, and T C its due share in the pie. They came with a fronds auto and took us to a Chinese newspaper office where we inspected the building and type-setting as per usual, tea and cake as per ditto, photo the same, then were taken to the biggest printing house in the east, prints most of the textbooks and everything else, including money for the Republic, then to the house of Mr Nieh, the man who lent the care aforesaid, a big house with a big garden, full of people, his mother and sisters being brought and introduced, the mother evidently a character who can’t speak English, but who is the daughter of the greatest statesman, so we are told, of the last dynasty, and who has ten children or more, on being at Columbia now, and forty grandchildren. She has recently offered a prize for the best essay on the method of abolishing concubinage, in reply to which eight hundred were sent in. More tea and a funny Chinese dish, called meat pie, then we go to the cotton spinning and weaving factory owned by theirs family—who are Christians. There is not even the pretence at labor laws here there is in Japan, some children six years old, not many that, and wages of the operatives mainly women in the spinning dept 3o cents a day at the highest, 32 cwns Mex, while in the weaving dept they have piece wrok and get up to 40 cents.

This is Papas and I cant take it out so I will tell you something of what we had to eat in one small afternoon. First lunch of all courses here at the hotel. Then we went to the Newspaper where we had tea and cake about four. From there to the h[o]use of the daughter of the leading statesman of the Manchus, she being the lady of the small feet and of the ten children who has offered a prize for the best essay on the method to stop concubinage, which they call the whole system of plural marriage. They say it is quite unchanged among the rich There we were given a tea or rare sort, unknown in our experience. Two kinds of meat pies which are made in the form of little cakes and quite peculiar in taste, delicious, also cake. Then after the factory we went to the restaurant where we were to have dinner. First we got into the wrong hotel and there while we were waiting they gave us tea. We were struck by the fact that they asked for nothing when we elft and thanked us for coming to the wrong place Then we went to the right hotel across the street from the first. They called it the corner of Broadway and 42nd st and it is that. There is a big roof garden besides the hotels and they are both run by the
Department stores which have their places underneath. The Chinese are as crazy about dept stores as Jap. It may be a sad commentary on the human character that one can eat more than he can remember, but that is what we did last night. First of all when we went into the room which was all Chinese furniture, very small round table in the middle and the rows of stools along one side for the singing girls who do not dance here. These stools we did not use as all those young Chinese are ashamed of that institution and want to get rid of it. On a side table were almonds shelled, nice little ones different from ours and very sweet. and beside them dried watermelon seeds which I could not crack so I did not taste. All the Chinese nibbled them with relish. Two ladies came, both of them had been in N.Y. to study. All these people speak and understand English in earnest. On the table were little pieces of sliced ham, the famous preserved eggs which taste like hard boiled eggs and look like dark colored jelly, and little dishes of sweets shrimps etc. To these we helped ourselves with the chop sticks tho they insisted on Giving Pa and me little plates on which they spooned out some of each. Then followed such a feast as we had never experienced the boys taking off one dish after another and replacing them with others in the center of the table to which we helped ourselves. There was no special attempt at display of fine dishes such as you might have expected with such cooking and such expense and such as would have happened in Japan. We had chicken and duck and pigeon and veal and pigeon eggs in soup and fish and little oysters that grow in the ground, very delicious and delicate, and nice little vegetables and bamboo sprouts mixed in with the others, and we had shrimps cooked and sharks fin and birds nest and this has no taste at all by itself but is cooked in Chicken broth to give it some and is a sort of very delicate soup but costs a fortune and that is its real reason for being. It is gelatine which almost all dissolves in the cooking We had many more things than these and the boy in a rather dirty white coat and an old cap on his head passing round the hot perfumed wet towels every few courses and for desert we had little cakes made of bean paste filled up with almond paste and other sweets, all very elaborated made and works of are to look at but with too little taste to appeal much to us, then we had fruits bananas and apples and pears cut up in pieces each with a tooth pick in it so it can be eaten easily. Then we had a soup made of fishes stomach, or air sac. Then we had a pudding of the most delicious sort imaginable made of a mould of rice filled in with eight different symbolic things that I dont know any thing about, but they dont cut much part in the taste. In serving this dish we were first given a little bowl half full of a sauce thickened and looking like a milk sauce. It was really made of powdered almonds. Into this you put the pudding and it is so good that I regretted all that had gone before and I am going to learn how to make it. They say all the ladies in China learn how to cook and it is their business to look after the cooking We had to ask questions and to know how to do it themselves and to do parts of it. They still have many children. We saw two little ones yesterday besides several bigger ones scampering out of sight. One little daughter of Mrs Chang of two and a half with a costume of crimson brocade made just like the suit of the small boy of four. We thought she was a boy as her hair was cut tight to her head. Also a baby of five months with the most wonderful costume of cap and shoes, slippers and socks, and some little trousers made with wide split in the middle, of a dark red plaid cotton. The baby was fat and cunning as could be and was already jumping on her feet. Well the little things that make up the interest here are endless. A Daughter

Friday May 3rd. [2nd]

This is pap again, and as I dont know about the daughter, I will return briefly to the factory. Mamma remarked that the manager was the only person in a factory who had ever told the truth in answering questions, and Hu [Shi] replied that lying showed that a moral consciousness had begun to dawn, while here there was not even a consciousness of anything wrong yet. He and his friends have given up politics I judge as a bad job, and are devoting themselves to what they call a literary revolution, which isn't as purely literary as it sounds, since it means using the spoken current language for writing, and without this modern questions cannot really be discussed... We are going to see more of the dangerous daring side of life here I predict We are very obviously in the hands of young China. What it will do with us makes us laugh to anticipate— Evidently they are having the time of their lives and evidently they do not see what it is exactly best to do. But nothing worries us. We are not
getting rich, but we are to have our expenses and we ought to have a very good time. Here in Shanghai we are in the hands of some educational association of this whole region or districts or whatever they call it. There is a normal school in Hangchow but chiefly sightseeing they say. We saw big men with queues, they said they are from the north and every one scrambling and fighting for a job like N.Y. Quite unlike any thing in Japan. And a sp[?]al streets also smae. Our men are coming. [John Dewey] [DewJ3]
1919.05.02  Dewey, John ; Dewey, Alice Chipman. *Letters from China and Japan.*
Shanghai, May 2. [2.5.1919].

We have been taken in hand by a reception committee of several Chinese gentlemen, mostly returned American students. The ‘returned student’ is a definite category here, and if and when China gets on its feet, the American university will have a fair share of the glory to its credit. They took us to see a Chinese cotton spinning and weaving factory. There is not even the pretense at labor laws here that there is in Japan. Children six years of age are employed, not many though, and the wages of the operatives in the spinning department, mainly women, is thirty cents a day, at the highest thirty-two cents Mex. In the weaving department they have piece work and get up to forty cents.

I will tell you something of what we had to eat in one small afternoon. First, lunch of all courses here at the hotel. Then we went to the newspaper where we had tea and cake at about four. From there to the house of the daughter of a leading statesman of the Manchus, she being a lady of small feet and ten children, who has offered a prize for the best essay on the ways to stop concubinage, which they call the whole system of plural marriage. They say it is quite unchanged among the rich. There we were given a tea of a rare sort, unknown in our experience. Two kinds of meat pies which are made in the form of little cakes and quite peculiar in taste, delicious; also cake. Then after we went to the restaurant where we were to have dinner. First we got into the wrong hotel and there, while we were waiting, they gave us tea. We were struck by the fact that they asked for nothing when we left, and thanked us for coming to the wrong place. Then we went to the right hotel across the street from the first. They called it the corner of Broadway and 42nd Street, and it is that. There is a big roof garden besides the hotels, and they are both run by the Department stores which have their places underneath. It may be a sad commentary on the human character that one can eat more than one can remember, but that is what we did last night. First of all we went into the room which was all Chinese furniture; very small round table in the middle and the rows of stools alongside for the singing girls, who do not dance here. Those stools were not used, as all the young Chinese are ashamed of that institution and want to get rid of it. On a side table were almonds shelled, nice little ones, different from ours and very sweet. Beside them were dried watermelon seeds which were hard to crack and so I did not taste them. All the Chinese nibbled them with relish. Two ladies came, both of them had been in New York to study. All these people speak and understand English in earnest. On the table were little pieces of sliced ham, the famous preserved eggs which taste like hard-boiled eggs and look like dark-colored jelly, and little dishes of sweets, shrimps, etc. To these we helped ourselves with the chop sticks, though they insisted on giving us little plates on which they spooned out some of each. Then followed such a feast as we had never experienced, the boys taking off one dish after another and replacing them with others in the center of the table, to which we helped ourselves. There was no special attempt at display of fine dishes such as you might have expected with such cooking and such expense, and such as would have happened in Japan. We had chicken and duck and pigeon and veal and pigeon eggs and soup and fish and little oysters that grow in the ground (very delicious and delicate) and nice little vegetables and bamboo sprouts mixed in with the others, and we had shrimps cooked, and shark's fin and bird's nest (this has no taste at all and is a sort of very delicate soup, but costs a fortune and that is its real reason for being). It is gelatine which almost all dissolves in the cooking. We had many more things than these, and the boy in a dirty white coat and an old cap on his head passing round the hot perfumed wet towels every few courses, and for dessert we had little cakes made of bean paste filled up with almond paste and other sweets, all very elaborately made, and works of art to look at, but with too little taste to appeal much to us; then we had fruits, bananas and apples and pears, cut up in pieces, each with a toothpick in it so it can be eaten easily. Then we had a soup made of fish’s stomach, or air sac. Then we had a pudding of the most delicious sort imaginable, made of a mold of rice filled in with eight different symbolic things that I don't know anything about, but they don't cut much part in the taste. In serving this dish we were first given a little bowl half full of a sauce thickened and looking like a milk sauce. It was really made of powdered almonds. Into this you put the pudding, and it is so good that I regretted all that had gone before, and I am going to learn how to make
Some one told us when we were on the boat that the Japanese cared everything for what people thought of them, and the Chinese cared nothing. Making comparisons is a favorite, if dangerous, indoor sport. The Chinese are noisy, not to say boisterous, easy-going and dirty—and quite human in general effect. They are much bigger than the Japanese, and frequently very handsome from any point of view. The most surprising thing is the number of those who look not merely intelligent but intellectual among the laborers, such as some of the hotel waiters and attendants. Our waiter is a rather feminine, ultra refined type, and might be a poet. I noticed quite a number of the same Latin quarter Paris type of artists among the teachers whom I addressed to-day. The Japanese impressions are gradually sinking into perspective with distance, and it is easy to see that the same qualities that make them admirable are also the ones that irritate you. That they should have made what they have out of that little and mountainous island is one of the wonders of the world, but everything in themselves is a little overmade, there seems to be a rule for everything, and admiring their artistic effects one also sees how near art and the artificial are together. So it is something of a relaxation to get among the easy-going once more. Their slouchiness, however, will in the end get on one's nerves quite as much as the 'eternal' attention of the Japanese. One more generalization borrowed from one of our Chinese friends here, and I'm done. 'The East economizes space and the West time'—that also is much truer than most epigrams.

Letter from John Dewey to Nicholas Murray Butler
Shanghai, May 3 '19
President Nicholas Murray Butler, My dear Mr Butler,
I wrote Dean Woodbridge from Japan speaking among other things of the possibility of my being invited to remain in China for educational work next year, and my desire to do so, if it could be arranged. Later Dr Suh Hu [Hu Shi] cabled you, after writing me to secure my consent. On my arrival here I was met by him from Peking as well as by educators from here and Nanking. They all feel that the present is quite a critical time in the educational and intellectual development of China, and that a representative of Western and especially American thought can be more useful now than at any other time for a long period. As for myself, I prize highly the unusual opportunity to get some acquaintance with Oriental thought and conditions. I hope therefore that it will be possible to grant the official request which I understand the Minister of Education is about to make of you and the Columbia authorities. I shall be more useful in the future to Columbia because of this experience, and incidentally I hope my presence here will have the effect of increasing the number of students from Japan and China who go to Columbia. Of course you must hear frequently of the present great influence of Columbia in China particularly. There are is a Columbia Alumni Association here of about forty. Many persons have assured me that the present influence of Columbia men in China is greater than that of the graduates of any other American or European University.
In my visit here now I am giving lectures to the public schools teachers of Hangchow, Nanking, [ink comma] and Peking besides this city. In Japan beside giving philosophical lectures in the Imperial Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto, I spoke to teachers in Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe.
Sincerely yours, | John Dewey.
Permanent address Care Yokahama Specie Bank Tokyo; Till June 15th, Care Government University, Peking.
1919.05.04  
Dewey, John; Dewey, Alice Chipman. *Letters from China and Japan*.  
Shanghai, May 4. [4.5.1919].

I have seen a Chinese lady, small feet and all. We took dinner with her. She did not come into the room until after dinner was over, having been in the kitchen cooking it while the servant brought things in. She has one of those placid faces which are round and plump and quite beautiful in a way, a pretty complexion, and of course a slow, rocking, hobbling way of walking. Yesterday after the lecture we went there again and she showed us all over her flat. It is well kept, with not many conveniences from our point of view, but I think it is regarded as quite modern here. It has a staircase, and a little roof where they dry clothes or sit. The bath is a tin tub, warmed by carrying water from the little stove like our little laundry stoves. It has an outlet pipe to the ground, no sewers as usual in the Orient. The kitchen has a little stove of iron set up on boxes and they burn small pieces of wood. It has three compartments, two big shallow iron pots for roasting and boiling and a deep one in the middle for keeping the hot water for tea. Only two fires are needed as the heat from the two end fires does for the water in the middle.

There is no doubt that the Chinese are a sociable people if given a chance. Of course, men like the husband of our hostess are the extreme of ability and advanced ideas here. But it is remarkable that he shows us things as they are. When we visited schools he did not arrange in advance because he did not want us to see a fixed up program. When we went out to lunch he took us to a Chinese place where no foreigners ever go.

Yesterday we went to a department store to buy some gloves and garters. Gloves were Keyser's, imported, so were the stockings, so were the garters and suspenders, etc. The gloves were from $1 to $1.60 and the suspenders were a dollar. I bought some silk, sixteen inches wide, for fifty cents a yard. The store was messy and the floors dirty, but it is a popular place for the Chinese. We paid three dollars for a book marked 1sh. 6p. in England, and everything here is like that. Gloves and stockings are made in Japan, and good and cheap there; fine silken stockings $1.60 a pair. But still the Chinese do not buy of them, but from America. We have visited a cotton mill. The Chinese cotton and silk are now inferior, owing to lack of scientific production and of proper care of seed. In weaving, they sometimes mix their cotton with ours. [DewJ1]

1919.05.04  
4. Mai Bewegung = May fourth movement: John Dewey was as sympathetic to the workers as he was to the students. His Chicago colleagues' disapproval of the strike correlated with Hu Shi's negative opinion about the student revolt. Hu insisted that the students should devote themselves to their studies rather than to politics; Dewey endorsed the student's revolt as a gesture of righteous indignation. Dewey was glad for young China because it now realized, that it did not need to be saved from without. Nonetheless, Dewey knew that merely resorting to protests and rebellions would not bring about constructive change.

In the new press, all kinds of Western social and political theories were translated and discussed, including anarchism, liberalism, socialism, Marxism and Dewey's own pragmatism. Even though Dewey questioned the students' interest in Marxism, he acknowledged their overall intellectual enthusiasm.

Even though Dewey recognized the importance of cultural reform, he had doubts about such a single-minded approach. Unlike the Chinese intellectuals, he did not establish an arbitrary dualism between cultural and political reform. He acknowledged the importance of Western learning and sensed a more pressing need for China to develop her industry. He thought that Chinese intellectuals were too preoccupied with absorbing new thoughts and new theories to accomplish any effective political or practical change.

Dewey's dream for a true political revolution following the May fourth student demonstration did not materialize. He understood that the salvation of China depended not so much on the few intellectuals in the cities as on the ordinary men and women throughout China. [DewJ2:S. 67-69]

1919.05.05  
1919.05.07 John Dewey : Lecture 'The real meaning of education in a democracy' at the Zhejiang Education Association in Hangzhou. = Ping min jiao yu zhi zhen di. Zheng Zonghai interpreter ; Zhu Yukui recorder. In : Jiao yu chao ; vol. 1, no 2 (June 1919). [Kee3]

1919.05.08 Alice Chipman Dewey : Lecture 'A new interpretation of women's education' in Hangzhou. Zhang Tianzuo interpreter. [DewJ200]

1919.05.08-09 John Dewey : Lecture 'The relation between democracy and education' at the Jiangsu Educational Association Building, Shanghai. = Ping min zhu yi, ping min zhu yi di jiao yu, ping min jiao yu zhu yi di ban fa. Jiang Menglin interpreter ; Pan Gongzhan recorder. In : Xue deng ; May 8-9 (1919) / In : Chen bao fu kan ; May 9 (1919).
Zhou Youjin : Dewey's speeches were so popular that there was barely enough room for the audience. The speeches have already been published in both Chinese and English newspapers to that those who were not able to attend the speeches for various reasons could learn about Dewey's ideas. [Kee3,DewJ200]
1919.05.09 Letter from John Dewey to Dewey children

May 9 [1919]

Dear children, I'm writing from Hangchow, a city some four or five hours south from Shanghai, and the thermometer at half past four p.m stands in the house at 94, and I don't know that it has been much below this day or night for three days. Mamma is now speaking to the girls of various schools in the big hall here, and she hasn't slept much the aforesaid three nights I'm afraid she will be too used up. We came here Sunday and this p.m is about the first free time I've had; I use this paper because I haven't any other and because you may learn something from what's on the other side, and we are staying with the Barnetts, he being the Y M C A secy who wrote the appeal. Japan was rather baffling and tantalizing. China is overpowering, and the size of the difficulties and obstacles to be overcome, in modernizing China and even in maintaining its continued existence as an independent nation are I think depressing to most, the educated Chinese who realize the situation included. One could write more easily in Japan, because in spite of the reserve over everything, the unlifted screen, things are more or less tied up in packages and ticketed, while here one only catches separate glimpses of a vast panoramic kaleidoscope. I doubt if the Chinese are personally as much as sealed mystery as reported sometimes, but the country is so vast, and the parts of it so different, and the accumulations from the past so enormous, and one would have to live here so long to begin to get hold of even the most important which are needed to understand things, that it is easy to see how and where the idea of China as an impenetrable mystery came from. Here is one incident which personally concerns us, and also seems typical. The other day the Peking univ students started a parade in protest of the Paris Peace Conference action in turning the German interests in China over to the Japanese. Being interfered with by the police they got more unruly and beat up the Chinese minister to Japan who negotiated the treaties that sold China out, he having been bribed; they burned the house where he was staying, and he went to the hospital, in fact was reported dead. Well, in one sense this was a kind of Halloween students spree with a somewhat serious political purpose attached. In another sense, it may be—tho probably not—the beginning of an important active political movement, out of which anything may grow. All the educated Japanese regard the beating not as lynching but as just expression of social disapprobation; they are sorry the man wasn't killed. Some twenty students were arrested; practically every organization in China is sending telegrams to the government requesting that they be not punished. If they should be, there may be a kind of revolution directed against the present government in form and the Japanese in reality. This way of going at things seems typical of the way China acts, and it is equally typical that no one will guess which way things are going to turn whether this is a temporary excitement or the beginning of the new political movement China needs. And the most typical thing is that the Chinese have known the facts for some years, they have done nothing—except hate the Japanese and hope that America and Japan would get into war and the U S lick Japan. In fact during this time they have allowed things to go from bad to worse so far as internal division and disorganization are concerned, and so far as wholesale graft by the political authorities—not quite all—is concerned. The only reason for not believing the stories along this line you hear of is because they come so far short of the facts. In fact if anyone put down the things that are alluded to in passing and taken as a matter of course no one in America would believe them; he would think we had been gullible by some one—Governors [G in ink] who in the last few years who have got title to all the mines in their provinces as big and rich in coal as perhaps Penn—others who own onenth of the land in a province bigger than NY and so on. Well, they stood by and allowed all this to go on, including the selling out to Japan, and did nothing—but the students row may set them off. If you can figure this out, you will understand the country better than I do. I am pretty sure however that China is the country of pure original human nature, just as Japan is the highly cultivated, trained, over-trained, country. Well, where it affects us is this. According to etiquette here, the Chancellor of the University is "responsible" for the students action. If the government punishes them he will doubtless reign on the ground that he is the one really to blame. He is a liberal, and if he goes I think our invitation to the University will doubtless be lost and
forgotten. They were planning a conference of the chief educational officials in Peking for the last two weeks in June, and this will probably be called off to, if the liberals lose out. In that case we shall be back in Tokyo or Japan as according to recent letters, whereas according to this other plan, developed I think since we wrote last, we should be back two weeks longer than we expected. Our guide and friend who wrote had charge of us in Sh and who piloted us down here and was to have interpreted here, left suddenly for Sh on receipt of the Peking news to see what had happened, and how it was going to affect the plans made for us. We have been to two dinner parties here, and two lunch parties since we came Monday—nor Friday, almost all Chinese guests. There are fewer American returned students here, mostly the authorities here having been educated in Japan—which they hate, and whose educational system they have slavishly copied, in because of the hate, because they havent seen anything else and because they have an idea that it was Japan' system that has enabled Japan to put it over on them. But the scheme is as unfitted for big sprawling go as you please China as it is fitted for compact and obeyful Japan. The impressive thing about their hatred for Japan is that it isnt loud and boisterous; it is just as much a matter of fact as the weather, and it is combined with great moral contempt. There was a rumor in Sh sunday that Wilson was assassinated, Every Chinaman who spoke of it said the Japanese had started the story. When asked why, the answer was always because that is the way they do everything—the point being that here assassination is resorted to only when a man has become an object of universal detestation and only then.

Hangchow is a city of six or seven hundred thousand and the centre of both the best tea—which is much like the best green tea of Japan near Kyoto and of the best silks. We have been to a big silk filature,9 quite modernized and run by Chinese and also a silk school where mamma was delighted by seeing absolutely everything in the line of worms, coconns the care of them—this is just the tail end of the season, and we had been told before we shouldn't see them feeding. But they had em, including the wild kind that makes the Pongee silk, brought from another district for experimentation. They live not on oak trees but on what seemed to be a kind of chestnut. They are experimenting crossing with japanese, french and Italian breeds. It is said the quality of their own cocoons has deteriorated. In the factory we say the treads drawn the cocoons—girls in charge and very skilful.

Thank the Lord a rain has set in since we I began and perhaps the weather will change before we give up the ghost. Hangchow is on a Lake known as West Lake, one of the most spots in China, scenically and historically, quite beautiful though not over three or four feet deep anywhere, hills and mts about. We have been taken out and around on it some three times, once to visit a missionary American college on the hills overlooking the big Hangchow river, the situation is wonderful when you get to it like Pacific Heights in Honolulu as mamma pointed out after I had feebly compared it to the outlook from Berkeley hills. We go back to Shanghai sunday, then in a day or two to Nanking where we stay two weeks, unless everything is upset. I have given but one lecture to about eight or nine hundred, and had a conference with about fifty—called a conference, in fact a series of brief lectures on various topics—and another conference tomorrow. In many ways they are pathetic, so genuinely openminded and anxious to learn many of them, and yet so up against conditions, that it seems hopeless to make suggestions and preach theories. It is significant that they thing they respond to most is the idea of making the child rather the lesson the centre. In Japan in spite of the uniform love of children, I doubt if they could grasp the idea.

[John Dewey] [DewJ3]
The Peking tempest seems to have subsided for the present, the Chancellor still holding the fort, and the students being released. The subsidized press said this was due in part to the request of the Japanese that the school-boy pranks be looked upon indulgently. According to the papers, the Japanese boycott is spreading, but the ones we see doubt if the people will hold out long enough—meanwhile Japanese money is refused here.

The East is an example of what masculine civilization can be and do. The trouble I should say is that the discussions have been confined to the subjection of the women as if that were a thing affecting the women only. It is my conviction that not merely the domestic and educational backwardness of China, but the increasing physical degeneration and the universal political corruption and lack of public spirit, which make China such an easy mark, is the result of the condition of women. There is the same corruption in Japan only it is organized; there seems to be an alliance between two groups of big capitalists and the two leading political 'parties'. There the very great public spirit is nationalistic rather than social, that is, it is patriotism rather than public spirit as we understand it. So while Japan is strong where China is weak, there are corresponding defects there because of the submission of women—and the time will come when the hidden weakness will break Japan down. Here are two items from the Chinese side. A missionary spoke to Christian Chinese about spending the time Sunday, making chiefly the point that it was a good time for family reunions and family readings, conversation and the like. One of them said that they would be bored to death if they had to spend the whole day with their wives. Then we are told that the rich women—who have of course much less liberty in getting out than the poorer class women—spend their time among themselves gambling. It is universally believed that the attempt to support a number of wives extravagantly is one of the chief sources of political corruption. On the other hand, at one of the political protest meetings in Peking a committee of twelve was appointed to go to the officials and four of them were women. In Japan women are forbidden to attend any meetings where politics are discussed, and the law is strictly enforced. There are many more Chinese women studying in America than there are Japanese—in part, perhaps, because of the lack of higher schools for girls here, but also because they don't have to give up marriage here when they get an education—in fact we are told they are in especial demand not only among the men who have studied abroad, but among the millionaires. Certainly the educated ones here are much more advanced on the woman question than in Japan.

'You never can tell' is the coat of arms of China. The Chancellor of the University was forced out on the evening of the eighth by the cabinet, practically under threat of assassination; also soldiers (bandits) were brought into the city and the University surrounded, so to save the University rather than himself, he left—nobody knows where. The release of the students was sent out by telegraph, but they refused to allow this to become known. It seems this Chancellor was more the intellectual leader of the liberals than I had realized, and the government had become really afraid of him. He has only been there two years, and before that the students had never demonstrated politically and now they are the leaders of the new movement. So of course the government will put in a reactionary, and the students will leave and all the honest teachers resign. Perhaps the students will go on strike all over China. But you never can tell. [DewJ1]
1919.05.13  Dewey, John; Dewey, Alice Chipman. *Letters from China and Japan.*

Tuesday A.M. [13.5.1919].

Ex-President Sun Yat Sen is a philosopher, as I found out last night during dinner with him. He has written a book, to be published soon, saying that the weakness of the Chinese is due to their acceptance of the statement of an old philosopher, 'To know is easy, to act is difficult'. Consequently they did not like to act and thought it was possible to get a complete theoretical understanding, while the strength of the Japanese was that they acted even in ignorance and went ahead and learned by their mistakes; the Chinese were paralyzed by fear of making a mistake in action. So he has written a book to prove to his people that action is really easier than knowledge.

The American sentiment here hopes that the Senate will reject the treaty because it virtually completes the turning over of China to Japan. I will only mention two things said in the conversation. Japan already has more troops, namely twenty-three divisions, under arms in China than she has in Japan, Japanese officered Chinese, and her possession of Manchurian China is already complete. They have lent China two hundred millions to be used in developing this army and extending it. They offered China, according to the conversation at dinner, to lend her two million a month for twenty years for military purposes. Japan figured the war would last till '21 or '22, and had proposed an offensive and defensive alliance to Germany. Japan to supply its trained Chinese army, and Germany to turn over to Japan the Allies' concessions and colonies in China. As an evidence of good faith, Germany had already offered to Japan its own Chinese territory, and it was the communication of this fact to Great Britain which induced the latter to sign the secret pact agreeing to turn over German possessions to Japan, when the peace was made. These men are not jingoists; they think they know what they are talking about, and they have good sources of knowledge. Some of these statements are known facts—like the size of the army and the two hundred million loan—but of course I can't guarantee them. But I'm coming to the opinion that it might be well worth while to reject the treaty on the ground that it involved the recognition of secret treaties and secret diplomacy. On the other hand, a genuine League of Nations—one with some vigor—is the only salvation I can see of the whole Eastern situation, and it is infinitely more serious than we realize at home. If things drift on five or ten years more, the world will have a China under Japanese military domination—barring two things—Japan will collapse in the meantime under the strain, or Asia will be completely Bolshevikized, which I think is about fifty-fifty with a Japanized-Militarized China. European diplomacy here, which of course dominates America, is completely futile. England does everything with reference to India, and they all temporize and drift and take what are called optimistic long-run views and quarrel among themselves, and Japan alone knows what it wants and comes after it. I still believe in the genuineness of the Japanese liberal movement there, but they lack moral courage. They, the intellectual liberals, are almost as ignorant of the true facts as we are, and enough aware of them to wish to keep themselves in ignorance. Then there is the great patriotism, which of course easily justifies, by the predatory example of the Europeans, the idea that this is all in self-defense. [DewJ1]
1919.05.13 Dewey, John ; Dewey, Alice Chipman. *Letters from China and Japan.*
Shanghai, May 13. [13.5.1919].

I closed up abruptly because there seemed a possibility of mail going out and now it is a day after and more to tell, with a prospect of little time to tell it. China is full of unused resources and there are too many people. The factories begin to work at six or earlier in the morning, with not enough for the poor to do, and they have the habit of not wanting to work much. Two shifts work in factories for the twenty-four hours. They get about twenty to thirty cents a day and the little children get from nothing up to nine cents, or even eleven cents after they get older. Iron mines are idle, coal and oil undeveloped, and they cannot get railroads. They burn their wood everywhere and the country is withering away because it is deforested. They made the porcelain industry for the world and they buy their table dishes from Japan. They raise a deteriorated cotton and buy cotton cloth from Japan. They buy any quantity of small useful articles from Japan. Japanese are in every town across China like a network closing in on fishes.

All the mineral resources of China are the prey of the Japanese, and they have secured 80 per cent of them by bribery of the Peking government. Talk to a Chinese and he will tell you that China cannot develop because she has no transportation facilities. Talk to him about building railroads and he tells you China ought to have railroads but she cannot build them because she cannot get the material. Talk to him about fuel when you see all the weeds being gathered from the roadsides for burning in the cook stoves, and he tells you China cannot use her mines because of the government's interference. There are large coal mines within ten miles of this city with the coal lying near the surface and only the Japanese are using them, though they are right on the bank of the Yangste River. The iron mines referred to are near the river, a whole mountain of iron being worked by the Japanese, who bring the ocean ships up the river, load them directly from the mines, the ore being carried down the hill, and take these ships directly to Japan, and they pay four dollars a ton to the Chinese company which carries on all the work.

The last hope of China for an effective government passed away with the closing of the Peace Conference, which has been working hard here for weeks. It seems the delegates from the south could act with plenary power. The delegates from the north had to refer everything to the military ministers from Peking, and so at last they gave up. Despair is deeper than ever, and they all say that nothing can be done. We have gone round recommending many ways of getting at the wrong impressions that prevail in our country about them, such as propaganda, an insistence upon the explanation of the differences between the people and the government. But the reply is, 'We can do nothing, we have no money'. Certainly the Chinese pride has been grounded now. An American official here says there is no hope for China except through the protection of the great powers, in which Japan must join. Without that she is the prey of Japan. Japanese are buying best bits of land in this city for business, and in other cities. Japan borrows money from other nations and then loans it to China on bleeding terms. The cession of Shantung has, of course, precipitated the whole mess and some Chinese think that is their last hope to so reduce them to the last extremity that rage will bring them to act. The boycott of Japanese goods and money has begun, but many say it will not be persistently carried out. The need for food and clothes in China keeps everybody bound by the struggle for a livelihood, and everything else has to be forgotten in the long run.

The protests of the Faculty on behalf of the students seem to have been received by the government in good part. Students here are in trouble also to some extent and there is a probability of a strike of students in all the colleges and middle schools of the country. The story at St. John's here is very interesting. It is the Episcopalian mission school, and one of the best. Students walked to Shanghai, ten miles, on the hottest day to parade, then ten miles back. Some of them fell by the way with sunstroke. On their return in the evening they found some of the younger students going in to a concert. The day was a holiday, called the Day of Humiliation. It is the anniversary of the date of the twenty-one demands of Japan, and is observed by all the schools. It is a day of general meetings and speechmaking for China. These students stood outside of the door where the concert was to be held and their principal came out and told them they must go to the concert. They replied that they were praying
there, as it was not a time for celebrating by a concert on the Day of Humiliation. Then they were ordered to go in first by this principal and afterwards by the President of the whole college. Considerable excitement was the result. Students said they were watching there for the sake of China as the apostles prayed at the death of Christ and this anniversary was like the anniversary of the death of Christ. The President told them if they did not go in then he would shut them out of the college. This he did. They stood there till morning and then one of them who lived nearby took them into his house. Therefore St. John's College is closed and the President has not given in.

I fancy the Chinese would be almost ready to treat the Japanese as they did the treacherous minister if it were not for the reaction it would have on the world at large. They do hate them and the Americans we have met all seem to feel with them. Certainly the apparent lie of the Japanese when they made their splurge in promising before the sitting of the Peace Conference to give back the German concessions to China is something America ought not to forget. All these, and the extreme poverty of China is what I had no idea of before coming here.

A wonderfully solemn and intent old pedlar has made his appearance most every day, and much the same ceremonies are gone through. For instance, there was a bead necklace—the light hollowed silver enamel—he wanted fourteen dollars for; he seemed rather glad finally to sell it for four, though you can't say he seemed glad; on the contrary, he seemed preternaturally gloomy and remarked that he and not we would eat bitterness because of this purchase. The funniest thing was once when, after getting sick of bargaining, we put the whole thing down and started to walk away. His movements and gestures would have made an actor celebrated—they are indescribable, but they said in effect, 'Rather than have any misunderstanding come between me and my close personal friends I would give you free anything in my possession'. The blood rushed to his face and a smile of heavenly benignity came over it as he handed us the things at the price we had offered him.

The students' committees met yesterday and voted to inform the government by telegraph that they would strike next Monday if their four famous demands were not granted—or else five—including of course refusal to sign the peace treaty, punishment of traitors who made the secret treaties with Japan because they were bribed, etc. But the committee seemed to me more conservative than the students, for the rumor this A.M. is that they are going to strike to-day anyway. They are especially angered because the police have forbidden them to hold open-air meetings—that's now the subject of one of their demands—and because the provincial legislature, after promising to help on education, raised their own salaries and took the money to do it with out of the small educational fund. In another district the students rioted and rough-housed the legislative hall when this happened. Here there was a protest committee, but the students are mad and want action. Some of the teachers, so far as I can judge, quite sympathize with the boys, not only in their ends but in their methods; some think it their moral duty to urge deliberate action and try to make the students as organized and systematic as possible, and some take the good old Chinese ground that there is no certainty that any good will come of it. To the outsider it looks as if the babes and sucklings who have no experience and no precedents would have to save China—if. And it's an awful if. It's not surprising that the Japanese with their energy and positiveness feel that they are predestined to govern China.

I didn't ever expect to be a jingo, but either the United States ought to wash its hands entirely of the Eastern question, and say 'it's none of our business, fix it up yourself any way you like', or else it ought to be as positive and aggressive in calling Japan to account for every aggressive move she makes, as Japan is in doing them. It is sickening that we allow Japan to keep us on the defensive and the explanatory, and talk about the open door, when Japan has locked most of the doors in China already and got the keys in her pocket. I understand and believe what all Americans say here—the military party that controls Japan's foreign policy in China regards everything but positive action, prepared to back itself by force, as fear and weakness, and is only emboldened to go still further. Met by force, she would back down. I don't mean military force, but definite positive statements about what she couldn't do that she knew meant business. At the present time the Japanese are trying to stir up anti-foreign
feeling and make the Chinese believe the Americans and English are responsible for China not getting Shantung back, and also talking race discrimination for the same purpose. I don't know what effect their emissaries are having among the ignorant, but the merchant class has about got to the point of asking foreign intervention to straighten things out—first to loosen the clutch of Japan, and then, or at the same time, for it's the two sides of the same thing, overthrow the corrupt military clique that now governs China and sells it out. It's a wonderful job for a League of Nations—if only by any chance there is a league, which looks most dubious at this distance.

The question which is asked oftenest by the students is in effect this: 'All of our hopes of permanent peace and internationalism having been disappointed at Paris, which has shown that might still makes right, and that the strong nations get what they want at the expense of the weak, should not China adopt militarism as part of her educational system?' [DewJ1]

1919.05.15 Letter from John Dewey to K. J. Koo
Nanking, May 15, 1919.
My dear Mr. Koo:
I enjoyed my visit to the office yesterday very much, and am grateful to you for your great kindness. I was much impressed by the very beautiful character of the work your Press is doing. I do not know any country where such fine stone color reproductions are made. I saw my American friends last evening and advised them to go at once to the office and see the pictures. I shall continue to speak of your work, and shall feel I am doing Americans a great favor in calling their attention to the fact that artistic reproductions are available. I have long been a great admirer of Chinese painting, and I cannot tell you what a great pleasure it is to know that the masterpieces are available in reproductions. I do not know whether you have an American market or an American agent, but if I can be of any use to you when I return to New York, I hope you will let me know.

Again, please let me and Mrs. Dewey thank you for your very thoughtful suggestion and your great kindness in carrying it out. We appreciate your generosity very highly and shall esteem the pictures for their intrinsic beauty and as a souvenir of our visit to Shanghai.

Sincerely yours, John Dewey [DewJ3]
Nanking, May 18. [18.5.1919].

There is no doubt we are in China. Hangchow, we are told, was one of the most prosperous of the strictly Chinese cities, and after seeing this town we can believe it. It has a big wall around it, said to be 21 miles and also 33—my guess is the latter; nonetheless there are hundreds of acres of farm within it. This afternoon we were taken up on the wall; it varies from 15 to 79 feet in height, according to the lay of the ground, and from 12 to 30 feet or so wide; hard baked brick, about as large as three of ours. They always had a smaller walled city inside the big one, variously called the Imperial and Manchu city. But since the revolution they are tearing down these inner walls, partly I suppose to show their contempt for the Manchus, and partly to use the brick. These are sold for three or four cents apiece and carted all around on the big Chinese wheelbarrow, by man power, of course. The compound wall of this house is made of them, and they have several thousand of them stored at the University grounds. They scrape them off by hand; you can get some idea of the relative value of material and human beings. I started out to speak of the view—typical China, deforested hills close by, all pockmarked at the bottom with graves, like animal burrows and golf bunkers; peasants' stone houses with thatched roofs, looking like Ireland or France; orchards of pomegranates with lovely scarlet blossoms and other fruits; some rice fields already growing, others being set out, ten or a dozen people at work in one patch; garden patches, largely melons; in the distance the wall stretching out for miles, a hill with a pagoda, a lotus lake, and in the far distance the blue mountains—also the city, not so much of which was visible, however. One of the interesting things in moving about is the fact that only once in a while do I see a face typically Chinese. I forget they are Chinese a great deal of the time. They just seem like dirty, poor miserable people anywhere. They are cheerful but not playful. I should like to give a few millions for playgrounds and toys and play leaders. I can't but think that a great deal of the lack of initiative and the let-George-do-it, which is the curse of China, is connected with the fact that the children are grown up so soon. There are less than a hundred schools for children in this city of a third of a million, and the schools only have a few hundred—two or three at most. The children on the street are always just looking and watching, wise, human looking, and reasonably cheerful, but old and serious beyond bearing. Of course many are working at the loom, or when they are younger at reeling. This is a good deal of a silk place, and we visited one government factory with several hundred people at work; this one at least makes out to be self-supporting. There isn't a power reeler or loom in the town, nor yet a loom of the Jacquard type. Sometimes a boy sits up top and shifts things, sometimes they have six or eight foot treads. A lot of the reeling isn't even foot power—just hand, though their hand reeler is much more ingenious than the Japanese one. There seem so many places to take hold and improve things and yet all of these are so tied together, and change is so hard that it isn't much wonder everybody who stays here gets more or less Chinafied and takes it out in liking the Chinese personally for their amiable qualities.

Just now the students are forming a patriotic league because of the present political situation, Japanese boycott, etc. But the teachers of the Nanking University here say that instead of contenting themselves with the two or three things they might well do, they are laying out an ambitious scheme covering everything, and their energy will be exhausted when they get their elaborate constitution formed, or they will meet so many difficulties that they will get discouraged even with the things they might do. I don't know whether I told you about the clerk in the tailor shop in Shanghai; after taking the usual fatalistic attitude that nothing could be done with the present situation, he said the boycott was a good thing but 'Chinaman he got weak mind; pretty soon he forget'.

In various places there are lots of straw hats hung up painted in Chinese characters where they have stopped passersby and taken their hats away because they were Japanese made. It is all good natured and nobody objects. There are policemen in front of Japanese stores, and they allow no one to enter; they are 'protecting' the Japanese. This is characteristic of China. The policemen all carry guns with bayonets attached; they are very numerous and slouch around looking bored to death. The only other class as bored looking is the dogs, which are even more numerous, and lie stretched out at full length, never curled up, and never by any chance
doing anything.
We visited the old examination halls which are now being torn down. These are the cells, about 25,000 in number, where the candidates for degrees used to be shut up during the examination period. Said cells are built in long rows, under a lean-to roof, mostly opening face to face on an open corridor, which is uncovered. Some of them face against a wall which is the back of the next row of cells. Cells are two and one-half feet wide by four long. In them are two ridges along the wall on each side, one at the height of a seat, the other at the height of a table. On these they laid two boards, two and a half feet long, and this was their furniture. They sat and wrote and cooked and ate and slept in these cells. In case it did not rain, their feet could stick out into the corridor so they might stretch out on the hard floor. The exams lasted eight days, divided into three divisions. They went in on the eighth day of the eighth moon in the evening. They wrote the first subject until the afternoon of the tenth. Then they left for the night. On the afternoon of the eleventh they came in for the second subject and wrote till the afternoon of the thirteenth, when there was another day off. On the evening of the fourteenth they re-entered the cell for the third period and that ended on the evening of the sixteenth. They had free communication with each other in the corridors, which were closed and locked. No one could approach them from the outside for any reason. Often they died. But if they could only get put into a corridor with a friend who knew, the biggest fool in China could get his paper written for him, and he could pass and become an M.A., or something corresponding to that degree. Thus were the famous literati of China produced. Preparation for the exam was not the affair of the government, and might be acquired in any possible way. The houses of the examiners are still in good condition and might be made into a school very easily. But do you think they will do that? Not at all. The government has not ordered a school there, and so they will be torn down or else used for some official work. You can have no conception of how far the officialism goes till you see it. We also visited a Confucian Temple, big and used twice each year. It is like all temples in that it is covered with the dust of many years' accumulation. If you were to be dropped in any Chinese temple you would think you had landed in a deserted and forgotten ruin out of reach of man. We went to the Temple of Hell on Sunday, and the gentleman who accompanied us suggested to the priest that the images ought to be dusted off. 'Yes', said the priest, 'it would be better if they were'. [DewJ1]
The trouble among the students is daily getting worse, and even the most sympathetic among the faculties are getting more and more anxious. The governor of this province, capital here, is thought most liberal, and he has promised to support these advanced measures in education. Last Friday the assembly passed a bill cutting down the educational appropriation and raising their own salaries. Therefore the students here are now all stirred up and the faculties are afraid they cannot be kept in control until they are well enough organized to make a strike effective. At the same time our friends are kept busy running up to the assembly and the governor. The latter has promised to veto the bill when it is sent to him from the senate. But the students are getting anxious to go to the senate themselves. Our friends say it costs so much for these men to get elected that they have to get it all back after they get into office. A missionary says: ‘Let’s go out and shoot them all, they are just as bad as Peking, and if they had the same chance they would sell out the whole country to Japan or to anyone else’. Certainly China needs education all along the line, but they never will get it as long as they try in little bits. So maybe they will have to be pushed to the very bottom before they will be ready to go the whole hog or none.

Yesterday a Chinese lady had a tea for me and asked the Taitai, as the wives of the officials are called, corresponding to the court ladies of previous times. As a function this was interesting, for every woman brought her servant and most of her children. Some appeared to have two servants, one big-footed maid for herself and one bound-footed as a nurse for the children. Her own servant hands her the cup of tea. All the children are fed at the same time as the grown-ups, and after their superiors the servants get something in the kitchen. I don't know yet what that something is, but probably an inferior tea. The tea we drank is that famous jasmine tea from Hangchow. It costs something like fifteen dollars a pound here. It is very good, with a peculiar spicy flavor, almost musky and smoky, from the jasmine combined with the tea flavor, which is strong. It is a delicious brown tea, but I do not like to drink it so well as I like the best green tea.

Well, I wish you could see the Taitai. The wife of the governor is about twenty-five, or may be a little more. She is a substantial young person, with full-grown feet, a pale blue dress of skirt and coat scalloped on the edges and bound with black satin, her nice hair parted to one side on the right and pinned above her left ear with a white artificial rose. Her maid had black coat and trousers. She had some bracelets on, but her jewels were less beautiful than those of the other women. One very pretty woman had buttons on her coat of emeralds surrounded with pearls, and on her arm a lovely bracelet of pearls. After tea, the great ladies went into an inner room, with the exception of two. One of these two had a very sad face. I watched her and finally had a chance to ask her how many children she had. She said she had none, but she would like to have a daughter. I was told after that her husband was a Christian pastor and she was trying to be Christian. The other one who stayed was the pretty one with the emerald buttons. I finally decided the ladies had left us to play their cards and asked if I might go and see them. They were not playing cards, but had just gone off to gossip among themselves, probably about the foreigners. One of the ladies said she would take me some day to see their card games. It is said they play in the morning and in the afternoon and all the night till the next morning when they go to bed. It is commonly said this is all they do, and the losses are very disastrous sometimes.

But they were not playing then and came back, some of them with their children, and sat in the rows of chairs, sixteen of them, and some amahs around the room, while I talked to them. I told stories about what the American women did in the war and they stared with amazement. I had to explain what a gas mask is, but they knew what killing is and what high class is. Their giggles were quite encouraging to intercourse. A nice young lady from the college interpreted, and when I stopped I asked them to tell me something about their lives. So the governor's wife was at last persuaded to give an account of how she brought up her children. They are all free from self-consciousness, and though they have little manners in our sense of the word, they have a self-possession and gentleness combined which gives a very graceful appearance. The governor's wife says she has two little boys, the eldest six years of age. In the
morning he has a Chinese tutor. After dinner, she teaches him music, of which she is very fond. After that he plays till five-thirty, has supper, plays again a little while before going to bed, and then bed. At thirteen the boy will be sent away to school. I asked her what about girls, and she said that her little niece was the first one in her family to be sent to school, but this ten-year-old one is in Tientsin at a boarding school. [DewJ1]

1919.05.20  John Dewey visits Zhenjiang. [DewJ8]

1919.05.22  Dewey, John ; Dewey, Alice Chipman. Letters from China and Japan. Nanking, Thursday, May 22. [22.5.1919].

The returned students from Japan hate Japan, but they are all at loggerheads with the returned students from America, and their separate organizations cannot get together. Many returned students have no jobs, apparently because they will not go into business or begin at the bottom anywhere, and there is strong hostility against them on the part of the officials. As a sample of the way business is done here, we have just had an express letter from Shanghai which took four days to arrive. It should arrive in twelve hours. People use express letters rather than the telegraph because they are quicker. You may spend as much time as you like or don’t like, wondering why your express letter did not reach you on time; you do it at your own risk and expense. The Chinese do not juggle with foreigners as the Japanese do, in the conscious sense, they simply drift, they juggle with themselves and with each other all the time.

This house is four miles from the railroad station. There is no street car here; there are many 'rickshas, a few carriages, still fewer autos. There are no sedan chairs, at least I don't remember seeing any, but at Chienkiang, where we went the other day, the streets are so narrow that chairs are the main means of conveyance. The 'ricksha men here pay forty cents a day to the city for their vehicles, which are all alike and very poor ones. They make a little more than that sum for themselves. In Shanghai they pay ninety cents a day for their right to work, and earn from one dollar to a possible dollar and a half for themselves.

I said to a young professor, the other day, that China was still supporting three idle classes of people. He looked surprised, though a student and critic of social conditions, and asked me who they were. When I asked him if that couldn't be said of the officials, the priests, and the army, he said yes, it could. Thus far and no further, seems to be their motto, both in thinking and acting, especially in acting. [DewJ1]

I don't believe anybody knows what the political prospects are; this students' movement has introduced a new and uncalculable factor—and all in the three weeks we have been here. You heard nothing but gloom about political China at first, corrupt and traitorous officials, soldiers only paid banditti, the officers getting the money from Japan to pay them with, no organizing power or cohesion among the Chinese; and then the students take things into their hands, and there is animation and a sudden buzz. There are a hundred students being coached here to go out and make speeches, they will have a hundred different stations scattered through the city. It is also said the soldiers are responding to the patriotic propaganda; a man told us that the soldiers wept when some students talked to them about the troubles of China, and the soldiers of Shantung, the province turned over to Japan, have taken the lead in telegraphing the soldiers in the other provinces to resist the corrupt traitors. Of course, what they all are afraid of is that this is a flash in the pan, but they are already planning to make the student movement permanent and to find something for them to do after this is settled. Their idea here is to reorganize them for popular propaganda for education, more schools, teaching adults, social service, etc.

It is very interesting to compare the men who have been abroad with those who haven't—I mean students and teachers. Those who haven't are sort of helpless, practically; the height of literary and academic minds. Those who have studied abroad, even in Japan, have much more go to them. Certainly the classicists in education have a noble example here in China of what their style of education can do if only kept up long enough. On the other hand, there must be something esthetically very fine in the old Chinese literature; even many of the modern young men have a sentimental attachment to it, precisely like that which they have to the fine writing of their characters. They talk about them with all the art jargon: 'Notice the strength of this down stroke, and the spirituality of the cross stroke and elegant rhythm of the composition'. When we visited a temple the other day, one of the chief Buddhist shrines in China, we were presented with a rubbing of the writing of the man who is said to be the finest writer ever known in China—these characters were engraved in the rock from his writing some centuries ago—I don't know how many. It is very easy to see how cultivated people take refuge in art and spirituality when politics are corrupt and the general state of social life is discouraging; you see it here, and how in the end it increases the decadence.

I think we wrote you from Shanghai that we had been introduced to all the mysteries of China, ancient eggs, sharks' fins, birds' nests, pigeon eggs, the eight precious treasures, rice pudding, and so on. We continue to have Chinese meals; yesterday lunch in the home of an adviser to a military official. He is very outspoken, doesn't trim in politics, and gives you a more hopeful feeling about China. The most depressing thing is hearing it said, 'When we get a stable government, we can do so and so, but there is no use at present'. But this man's attitude is rather, 'Damn the government and go ahead and do something'. He is very proud of having a 'happy, Christian home' and doesn't cover up his Christianity as most of the official and wealthy class seem to do. He expects to have his daughters educated in America, one in medicine and one in home affairs, and to have help in a campaign for changing the character of the Chinese home—from these big aggregates of fifty people or so living together, married children, servants, etc., where he says the waste is enormous, to say nothing of bickerings and jealousies. In the old type of well-to-do home, breakfast would begin for someone about seven, and someone would have cooking done for him to eat till noon; then about two, visitors would come, and the servants would be ordered to cook something for each caller—absolutely no organization or planning in anything, according to him. [DewJ1]

John Dewey and his group began their trip to Tianjin and Beijing. [DewJ200]

We met a young man here from an interior province who is trying to get money for teachers
who haven’t received their pay for a long time. Meantime over sixty per cent of the entire
national expenses is going to the military, and the army is worse than useless. In many
provinces it is composed of brigands and everywhere is practically under the control of the
tuchuns or military governors, who are corrupt and use the pay roll to increase their graft and
the army to increase their power of local oppression, while the head military man is openly
pro-Japanese.

There is a lull in our affairs just now. We agreed yesterday that never in our lives had we
begun to learn as much as in the last four months. And the last month particularly, there has
been almost too much food to be digestible. Talk about the secretive and wily East.

Yesterday we went to the Western Hills where are the things you see in the pictures, including
the stone boat, the base of which is really marble and as fine as the pictures. But all the rest of
it is just theatrical fake, more or less peeling off at that. However, it is as wonderful as it is
cracked up to be, and in some ways more systematic than Versailles, which is what you
naturally compare it to. The finest thing architecturally is a Buddhist temple with big tiles,
each of which has a Buddha on—for further details see movie or something. We walked
somewhat higher than Russian Hill, including a journey through the caves in an artificial
mountain such as the Chinese delight in, clear up to this temple. The Manchu family seems to
own the thing yet, and charge a big sum, or rather several sums, a la Niagara Falls, to get
about—another evidence that China needs another revolution, or rather a revolution, the first
one having got rid of a dynasty and left, as per my previous letters, a lot of corrupt governors
in charge of chaos. The only thing that I can see that keeps things together at all is that while a
lot of these generals and governors would like to grab more for their individual selves, they
are all afraid the whole thing would come down round their ears if anyone made a definite
move. Status quo is China's middle name, mostly status and a little quo. I have one more
national motto to add to 'You Never Can Tell' and 'Let George Do It.' It is, 'That is very bad.'

Instead of concealing things, they expose all their weak and bad points very freely, and after
setting them forth most calmly and objectively, say 'That is very bad.' I don't know whether it
is possible for a people to be too reasonable, but it is certainly too possible to take it out in
being reasonable—and that's them. However, it makes them wonderful companions. You can
hardly blame the Japanese for wanting to run them and supply the necessary pep when they
decline to run themselves. You certainly see the other side of the famous one-track mind of
Japan over here, as well as of other things. If you keep doing something all the time, I don't
know whether you need even a single track mind. All you have to do is to keep going where
you started for, while others keep wobbling or never get started.

Well, this morning we went to the famous museum, and there is one thing where China is still
ahead. It is housed in some of the old palaces and audience halls of the inner, or purple,
forbidden City. With the yellow porcelain roofs, and the blue and green and gold, and the red
walls, it is really the barbaric splendor you read about, and about the first thing that comes up
to the conventional idea of what is Oriental. The Hindoo influence is much stronger here than
anywhere else we have been, or else really Thibetan, I suppose, and many things remind one
of the Moorish. The city of Peking was a thousand years building, and was laid out on a plan
when the capitals of Europe were purely haphazard, so there is no doubt they have organizing
power all right if they care to use it. The museum is literally one of treasures, porcelains,
bronzes, jade, etc., not an historic or antiquated museum. It costs ten cents to get into the park
here and much more into the museum, a dollar or more, I guess, and we got the impression
that it was fear of the crowd and the populace rather than the money which controls; the rate
is too high for revenue purposes. [DewJ1]
We have just seen a few hundred girls march away from the American Board Mission school to go to see the President to ask him to release the boy students who are in prison for making speeches on the street. To say that life in China is exciting is to put it fairly. We are witnessing the birth of a nation, and birth always comes hard. I may as well begin at the right end and tell you what has happened while things have been moving so fast I could not get time to write. Yesterday we went to see the temples of Western Hills, conducted by one of the members of the Ministry of Education. As we were running along the big street that passes the city wall we saw students speaking to groups of people. This was the first time the students had appeared for several days. We asked the official if they would not be arrested, and he said, 'No, not if they keep within the law and do not make any trouble among the people'. This morning when we got the paper it was full of nothing else. The worst thing is that the University has been turned into a prison with military tents all around it and a notice on the outside that this is a prison for students who disturb the peace by making speeches. As this is all illegal, it amounts to a military seizure of the University and therefore all the faculty will have to resign. They are to have a meeting this afternoon to discuss the matter. After that is over, we will probably know what has happened again. The other thing we heard was that in addition to the two hundred students locked up in the Law Building, two students were taken to the Police rooms and flogged on the back. Those two students were making a speech and were arrested and taken before the officers of the gendarmerie. Instead of shutting up as they were expected to do, the boys asked some questions of these officers that were embarrassing to answer. The officers then had them flogged on the back. Thus far no one has been able to see any of the officers. If the officers denied the accusation then the reporters would ask to see the two prisoners on the principle that the officers could have no reason for refusing that request unless the story were true. We saw students making speeches this morning about eleven, when we started to look for houses, and heard later that they had been arrested, that they carried tooth brushes and towels in their pockets. Some stories say that not two hundred but a thousand have been arrested. There are about ten thousand striking in Peking alone. The marching out of these girls was evidently a shock to their teachers and many mothers were there to see them off. The girls were going to walk to the palace of the President, which is some long distance from the school. If he does not see them, they will remain standing outside all night and they will stay there till he does see them. I fancy people will take them food. We heard the imprisoned students got bedding at four this morning but no food till after that time. There is water in the building and there is room for them to lie on the floor. They are cleaner than they would be in jail, and of course much happier for being together. [DewJ1]
1919.06.02  Dewey, John; Dewey, Alice Chipman. _Letters from China and Japan._ Peking, June 2. [2.6.1919].

Maybe you would like to know a little about how we look this morning and how we are living. In the first place, this is a big hotel with a bath in each room. On a big street opposite to us is the wall of the legation quarter, which has trees in it and big roofs which represent all that China ought to have and has not. The weather is like our hot July, except that it is drier than the August drought on Long Island. The streets of Peking are the widest in the world, I guess, and ours leads by the red walls of the Chinese city with the wonderful gates of which you see pictures. It is macadamized in the middle, but on each side of it run wider roads, which are used for the traffic. Thank your stars there are good horses in Peking; men do not pull all the heavy loads. The two side roads are worn down in deep ruts and these ruts are filled with dust like finest ashes, and all thrown up into the air whenever a man steps on it or a cart moves through. Our room faces the south on this road. All day long the sun pours through the bamboo shades and the hot air brings in that gray dust, and everything you touch, including your own skin, is gritty and has a queer dry feeling that makes you think you ought to run for water. I am learning to shut the windows and inner blinds afternoons. Isn't it strange that in the latitude of New York this drought should be expected every spring? In spite of all this the fields have crops growing, thinly, to be sure, on the hard gray fields. There are very few trees, and they are not of the biggest. The grain is already about fit to cut, and the onions are ripe. After a while it will rain and rain much and then new crops will be put in. The flowers are almost gone and I am sorry that we did not see the famous peonies. You will be interested to know that they keep the peonies small; even the tree kind are cut down till they are the size of those little ones of mine. The tuber peonies are transplanted each year or in some way kept small and the blossoms are lovely and little. I have seen white rose peonies and at first thought they were roses. The buds look almost like the buds of our big white roses and they are very fragrant. The peony beds are laid out in terraces held in place by brick walls, usually oblong or oval, something like a huge pudding mold on a table. Other times they are planted on the flat and surrounded by bamboo fences of fancy design and geometrical pattern, usually with a square form to include each division. The inner city has many peony beds of that sort, both the tree and tuber kind, but they have only leaves to show now.

Yesterday we went to the summer palace and to-day we are going to the museum. That is really inside the Forbidden City, so at last we shall set foot on the sacred ground. The summer palace is really wonderful, but sad now, like all things made on too ambitious a scale to fit into the uses of life. There is a mile of loggia ornamented with the green and blue and red paintings which you see imitated. Through a window we had a peek at the famous portrait of old Tsu Hsu and she looks just as she did when I saw it exhibited in New York. The strange thing about it is that it is still owned by the Hsu family. Huge rolls of costly rugs and curtains lie in piles round the room and everything is covered with this fine dust so thick that it is not possible to tell the color of a table top. Cloissonné vases, or rather images of the famous blue ware stand under the old lady's portrait, and everything is going to rack and ruin. Meantime we wandered around, planning how it could be made over into use when the revolution comes. Get rid of the idea that China has had a revolution and is a republic; that point is just where we have been deceived in the United States. China is at present the rotten crumbling remnant of the old bureaucracy that surrounded the corruption of the Manchus and that made them possible. The little Emperor is living here in his palace surrounded by his eunuchs and his tutors and his two mothers. He is fourteen and it is really funny to think that they have just left him Emperor, but as he has not money except what the republic votes him from year to year, nobody worries about him, unless it is the Japanese, who want the imperial government restored until they get ready to take it themselves. It looks as if they might be ready now except for the nudge which has just been given to the peace conference. You had better read a book about this situation, for it is the most surprising affair in a lifetime.

Yesterday we went to see a friend's house. It is interesting and I should like to live in one like it. There is no water except what the water man brings every day. This little house has eighteen rooms around a court. It means four separate roofs and going outdoors to get from one to another. When the mercury is at twenty below zero it would mean that just the same.
All the ground floors have stone floors. We did not see all the rooms; there are paper windows in some and glass windows in some. In summer they put on a temporary roof of mats over the court. It is higher than the roofs and so allows ventilation and gives good shade. [DewJ1]

1919.06.02 John Dewey has dinner with the Minister of Education at the Oriental Hotel in Beijing. [DewJ8]
June 5. [5.6.1919].

This is Thursday morning, and last night we heard that about one thousand students were arrested the day before. Yesterday afternoon a friend got a pass which permitted him to enter the building where the students were confined. They have filled up the building of Law, and have begun on the Science building, in consequence of which the faculty have to go to the Missionary buildings to-day to hold their faculty meeting. At four yesterday afternoon, the prisoners who had been put in that day at ten had had no food. One of our friends went out and got the University to appropriate some money and they ordered a carload of bread sent in. This bread means some little biscuit sometimes called raised biscuit at home. I think carload means one of the carts in which they are delivered. At any rate, the boys had some food, though not at the expense of the police. On the whole, the checkmate of the police seems surely impending. They will soon have the buildings full, as the students are getting more and more in earnest, and the most incredible part of it is that the police are surprised. They really thought the arrests would frighten the others from going on. So everybody is getting an education. This morning one of our friends here is going to take us up to the University to see the military encampment, and I hope he will take us inside also, though I hardly think he will do the latter.

As near as I can find out, the Chinese have reached that interesting stage of development when they must do something for women and do as little as they can, but in case they must have a girls’ school they find that a convenient place to unload an antiquated official who really can’t be endured any longer by real folks.

No one can tell to-day what the students’ strike will bring next; it may bring a revolution, it may do anything surprising to the police, who seem to be as lacking in imagination as police are famous for being. Everyone here is getting ready to flee for the summer, which is very hot during July. On the whole, the heat is perhaps less hard to endure than the heat of New York, as it is so dry. But the dryness has its own effect and when those hard winds blow up the dust storms it gets on the nerves. Dust heaps up inside the house, and cuts the skin both inside and outside of the body. This is a lucky day, being cloudy and a little damp as if it might rain.

The Western Hill was an experience to remember. Stepping from a Ford limousine to a chair carried by four men and an outwalker alongside, we were thus taken by fifteen men to the temples, your father, an officer from the Department of Education, and I. The men walked over the paths in the dust and on stones which no one thinks of picking up. It was so astounding to call it a pleasure resort that we could only stare and remain dumb. We saw three temples and one royal garden. Five hundred Buddhas in one building, and all the buildings tumble-down and dirty. On top of one hill is a huge building which cost a million or more to build about four hundred years ago by someone for his tomb. Then he did something wrong, probably stole from the wrong person, and was not allowed to be buried there. Round the temple places the trees remain and give a refreshing oasis, and there are some beautiful springs. All the time we kept saying, ‘Trees ought to be planted’. ’Yes, but they take so long to grow,’ or, ’Yes, but they will not grow, it is so dry,’ etc. Sometimes they would say, ’Yes, we must plant some trees,’ or more likely, ’Yes, I think we may plant some trees sometime, but we have an Arbor Day and the people cut down the trees or else they did.’ We would show that the trees would grow because they were there round the temples, and besides grass was growing and trees would grow where grass would grow in such dry weather, and they would say the same things over. It made the little forestry station in Nanking seem like a monumental advance, while that fearful sun was beating up the dust under the stones as the men gave us the Swedish massage in the motion of the chairs. Fifty men and more stood around as we got in and out of the car and five men apiece stood and waited for us as we walked round the temple and ate our lunch and spent the time sipping tea, and yet they cannot plant trees, and that is China.

The whole country is covered every inch with stones. Nature has supplied them, and falling walls are everywhere. We saw one great thing, however. They are building a new school house and orphanage for the children of that village. Many of the children are naked everywhere hereabouts and they stand with sunburned heads, their backs covered only with
coats of dirt, eating their bean food in the street. Everywhere the food is laid out on tables by the roadside ready to eat. In one temple, a certain official here has promised to rebuild a small shrine which houses the laughing Buddha, who is made of bronze and was once covered with lacquer, which is now mostly split off. At present the only shade the god has is a roof of mats which they have braced up on the pile of ruins that once made a roof. The President of the Republic has built a lovely big gate like the old ones, because it is propitious and would bring him good fortune. But he has decided it was not propitious, something went wrong with the gods, I did not learn what it was; anyway, he is now tearing down one of the big buttresses on one side of it to see if fate will treat him more kindly then. Just what he wants of fate I did not learn either, but perhaps it is that fate should make him Emperor, as that seems to be their idea of curing poverty and political evils. I forgot to say that they never remove ruins; everything is left to lie as it falls or is falling, so one gets a good idea of how gods are constructed. Most of them were of clay, a sort of concrete built up on a wood frame, and badly as they need wood I have never seen a sign of piling up the fallen beams of a temple. Instead of that, you risk your life by walking under these falling roofs unless you have the sense to look after your own safety. In most of these Peking temples they do sweep the floors and even some of the statues look as if they had some time been dusted, though this last I am not certain about. [DewJ1]
Peking, June 5. [5.6.1919].

As has been remarked before, you never can tell. The students were stirred up by orders dissolving their associations, and by the 'mandates' criticising the Japanese boycott and telling what valuable services the two men whose dismissal was demanded had rendered the country. So they got busy—the students. They were also angered because the industrial departments of two schools were ordered closed by the police. In these departments the students had set about seeing what things of Japanese importation could be replaced by hand labor without waiting for capital. After they worked it out in the school they went out to the shops and taught the people how to make them, and then peddled them about, making speeches at the same time. Well, yesterday when we went about we noticed that the students were speaking more than usual, and while the streets were full of soldiers the students were not interfered with; in the afternoon a procession of about a thousand students was even escorted by the police. Then in the evening a telephone came from the University that the tents around the University buildings where the students were imprisoned had been struck and the soldiers were all leaving. Then the students inside held a meeting and passed a resolution asking the government whether they were guaranteed freedom of speech, because if they were not, they would not leave the building merely to be arrested again, as they planned to go on speaking. So they embarrassed the government by remaining in 'jail' all night. We haven't heard to-day what has happened, but the streets are free of soldiers, and there were no students talking anywhere we went, so I fancy a truce has been arranged while they try and fix things up. The government's ignominious surrender was partly due to the fact that the places of detention were getting full and about twice as many students spoke yesterday as the day before, when they arrested a thousand, and the government for the first time realized that they couldn't bulldoze the students; it was also partly due to the fact that the merchants in Shanghai struck the day before yesterday, and there is talk that the Peking merchants are organizing for the same purpose. This is, once more, a strange country; the so-called republic is a joke; all it has meant so far is that instead of the Emperor having a steady job, the job of ruling and looting is passed around to the clique that grabs power. One of the leading militarist party generals invited his dearest enemy to breakfast a while ago—within the last few months—in Peking, and then lined his guest against the wall and had him shot. Did this affect his status? He is still doing business at the old stand. But in some ways there is more democracy than we have; leaving out the women, there is complete social equality, and while the legislature is a perfect farce, public opinion, when it does express itself, as at the present time, has remarkable influence. Some think the worst officials will now resign and get out, others that the militarists will attempt a coup d'état and seize still more power rather than back down. Fortunately, the latter seem to be divided at the present time. But all of the student (and teacher) crowd are much afraid that even if the present gang is thrown out, it will be only to replace them by another set just as bad, so they are refraining from appealing to the army for help.

Later.—The students have now asked that the chief of police come personally to escort them out and make an apology. In many ways, it seems like an opéra bouffe, but there is no doubt that up to date they have shown more shrewdness and policy than the government, and are getting the latter where it is a laughing stock, which is fatal in China. But the government isn't inactive; they have appointed a new Minister of Education and a new Chancellor of the University, both respectable men, with no records and colorless characters. It is likely the Faculty will decline to receive the new Chancellor unless he makes a satisfactory declaration—which he obviously can't, and thus the row will begin all over again, with the Faculty involved. If the government dared, it would dissolve the University, but the scholar has a sacred reputation in China. [DewJ1]
The whole story of the students is funny and not the least funny part is that last Friday the students were speaking and parading with banners and cheers and the police standing near them like guardian angels, no one being arrested or molested. We heard that one student pouring out hot eloquence was respectfully requested to move his audience along a little for the reason that they were so numerous in statu quo as to impede traffic, and the policeman would not like to be held responsible for interfering with the traffic. Meantime, Saturday the government sent an apology to the students who were still in prison of their own free will waiting for the government to apologize and to give them the assurance of free speech, etc. The students are said to have left the building yesterday morning, though we have no accurate information. The Faculty of the University met and refused to recognize or accept the new Chancellor. They sent a committee to the government to tell them that, and one to the Chancellor to tell him also and to ask him to resign. It seems the newly-appointed Chancellor used to be at the head of the engineering school of the University, but he was kicked out in the political struggle. He is an official of the Yuan Shi Kai school and has become a rich rubber merchant in Malay, and anyway they do not want a mere rubber merchant as President of the University, and they think they may so explain that to the new Chancellor that he will not look upon the office as so attractive as he thought it was.

There is complete segregation in this city in all public gatherings, the women at the theaters are put off in one of those real galleries such as we think used to be and are not now. The place for the women in the hall of the Board of Education is good enough and on one side facing the hall so that all the men can look at them freely and so protect that famous modesty which I have heard more of in China than for many years previously.

Gasoline is one dollar a gallon here and a Ford car costs $1900. Ivory soap five for one dollar. Clean your dress for $2.50. Tooth paste one dollar a tube, vaseline 50 cents a small bottle. Washing three cents each, including dresses and men's coats and shirts; fine cook ten dollars a month. They have a very good one here, and I am going right on getting fat on delicious Chinese food. The new Rockefeller Institute, called the Union Medical College, is very near here, and they are making beautiful buildings in the old Chinese style, to say nothing of their Hygiene. They have just decided to open it to women, but I am rather suspicious the requirements will prevent the women’s using it at first.

Peking is still much of a capital city and is divided into the diplomats and the missionaries. It seems there is not much lacking except the old Dowager Empress to make up the old Peking. [DewJ1]
1919.06.10  Dewey, John ; Dewey, Alice Chipman. *Letters from China and Japan.*

Peking, June 10. [10.6.1919].

The students have taken the trick and won the game at the present moment—I decline to predict the morrow when it comes to China. Sunday morning I lectured at the auditorium of the Board of Education and at that time the officials there didn't know what had happened. But the government sent what is called a pacification delegate to the self-imprisoned students to say that the government recognized that it had made a mistake and apologized. Consequently the students marched triumphantly out, and yesterday their street meetings were bigger and more enthusiastic than ever. The day before they had hooted at four unofficial delegates who had asked them to please come out of jail, but who hadn't apologized. But the biggest victory is that it is now reported that the government will to-day issue a mandate dismissing the three men who are always called traitors—yesterday they had got to the point of offering to dismiss one, the one whose house was attacked by the students on the fourth of May, but they were told that that wouldn't be enough, so now they have surrendered still more. Whether this will satisfy the striking merchants or whether they will make further demands, having won the first round, doesn't yet appear. There are lots of rumors, of course. One is that the backdown is not only due to the strike of merchants, but to a fear that the soldiers could no longer be counted upon. There was even a rumor that a regiment at Western Hills was going to start for Peking to side with the students. Rumors are one of China's strong suits. When you realize that we have been here less than six weeks, you will have to admit that we have been seeing life. For a country that is regarded at home as stagnant and unchanging, there is certainly something doing. This is the world's greatest kaleidoscope.

Wilson's Decoration Day Address has just been published; perhaps it sounds academic at home, but over here Chinese at least regard it as very practical—as, in fact, a definite threat. On the other hand, we continue to get tales of how the Washington State Department has declined to take the reports sent from here as authentic. Lately they have had a number of special agents over here, more or less secret, to get independent information.

In talking about democratic developments in America, whenever I make a remark such as the Americans do not depend upon the government to do things for them, but go ahead and do things for themselves, the response is immediate and emphatic. The Chinese are socially a very democratic people and their centralized government bores them. [DewJ1]

1919.06.14  John Dewey visits the Qinghua College in Beijing. [DewJ8]

1919.06.16  Dewey, John ; Dewey, Alice Chipman. *Letters from China and Japan.*

June 16. [16.6.1919].

Chinesewise speaking, we are now having another lull. The three 'traitors' have had their resignations accepted, the cabinet is undergoing reconstruction, the strike has been called off, both of students and merchants (the railwaymen striking was the last straw), and the mystery is what will happen next. There are evidences that the extreme militarists are spitting on their hands to take hold in spite of their defeat, and also that the President, who is said to be a moderate and skillful politician, is nursing things along to get matters more and more into his own hands. Although he issued a mandate against the students and commending the traitors, the students' victory seems to have strengthened him. I can't figure it out, but it is part of the general beginning to read at the back of the book. The idea seems to be that he has demonstrated the weakness of the militarists in the country, while in sticking in form by them he has given them no excuse for attacking him. They are attacking most everybody else in anonymous circulars. One was got out signed 'Thirteen hundred and fifty-eight students', but giving no names, saying that the sole object of the strike was to regain Tsingtao, but that a few men had tried to turn the movement to their own ends, one wishing to be Chancellor of the University. [DewJ1]
1919.06.20  
Dewey, John; Dewey, Alice Chipman. *Letters from China and Japan*.  
Peking, June 20. [20.6.1919].

Some time ago I had decided to tell you that here I had found the human duplication of the bee colony in actual working order. China is it, and in all particulars lives up to the perfect socialization of the race. Nobody can do anything alone, nobody can do anything in a hurry. The hunt of the bee for her cell goes on before one's eyes all the time. When found, lo, the discovery that the cell was there all the time. Let me give you an example.

We go to the art school for lectures, enter by a door at the end of a long hall. Behind that hall is another large room and in back of the second room somewhere is a place where the men make the tea. Near the front door where we enter is the table where we are always asked to sit down before and after the lecture, whereat we sit down to partake of tea and other beverages, such as soda. Well, the teacups are kept in a cabinet at the front end of the first room right near the entrance door. Comes a grown man from the rear somewhere; silently and with stately tread he walks across the long room to the cabinet, takes one teacup in each hand and retreads the space towards the back. After sufficient time he returns bearing in his two hands these cups filled with hot tea. He puts these down on the table for us and then he takes two more cups from the cabinet, and retires once more, returning later as before. When bottles are opened they are brought near the table, because otherwise the soda would be spoiled in carrying open, never to save steps.

The Chinese kitchen is always several feet from the dining room, under a separate roof. Often you must cross a court in the open to get from one to another. As it has not rained since we have been here, I do not know what happens to the soup under the umbrella. But remember, the beehive is the thing in China, and it is the old-fashioned beehive in the barrel. When you look at the men who are doing it all they have the air of strong, quiet beings who might do almost anything, but when you get acquainted with them, how they do almost nothing is a marvelous achievement. At Ching Hua College, said being the famous Boxer Indemnity College, the houses are new and built by American initiative, and the kitchen is forty feet from the dining room door in those. I will not describe the kitchens, but when you see the clay stoves crumbling in places, no sink, and one window on one side of the rather dark room, a little room where the cook sleeps on a board and where both the men eat their own frugal meals, it is all the Middle Ages undisturbed. [DewJ1]
1919.06.20 Dewey, John; Dewey, Alice Chipman. *Letters from China and Japan.*

Peking, June 20. [20.6.1919].

Last weekend we went out about ten miles to Ching Hua College; this is the institution started with the returned Boxer Indemnity Fund; it's a high school with about two years college work; they have just graduated sixty or seventy who are going to America next year to finish up. They go all around, largely to small colleges and the Middle West state institutions, a good many to Tech and a number to Stevens, though none go to Columbia, because it is in a big city; just what improvement Hoboken is I don't know. China is full of Columbia men, but they went there for graduate work. No doubt it is wise keeping them away from a big city at first. Except for the instruction in Chinese, the teaching is all done in English, and the boys seem to speak English quite well already. It's a shame the way they will be treated, the insults they will have to put up with in America before they get really adjusted. And then when they get back here they have even a worse time getting readjusted. They have been idealizing their native land at the same time that they have got Americanized without knowing it, and they have a hard time to get a job to make a living. They have been told that they are the future saviors of their country and then their country doesn't want them for anything at all—and they can't help making comparisons and realizing the backwardness of China and its awful problems. At the same time at the bottom of his heart probably every Chinese is convinced of the superiority of Chinese civilization—and maybe they are right—three thousand years is quite a spell to hold on.

You may come over here some time in your life, so it will do no harm to learn about the money—about it, nobody but the Chinese bankers ever learn it. There are eleven dimes in a dollar and six twenty-cent pieces, and while there are only eleven coppers in a dime, there are one hundred and thirty-eight in a dollar. Consequently the thrifty always carry a pound or two of big coppers with them to pay 'ricksha men with. Then there are various kinds of paper money. We are going to Western Hills tomorrow night, and under instructions I bought some dollars at sixty-five cents apiece which are good for a whole dollar on this railway and apparently nowhere else. On the contrary, the foreigners are done all the time at the hotels; there they only give you five twenty-cent pieces in change for a dollar, and so on—but they are run by foreigners, and not by the wily Chinese. One thing you will be glad to know is that Peking is Americanized to the extent that we have ice cream at least once a day, two big helpings. This helps.

A word to the wise. Never ask a Chinese whether it is going to rain, or any other question about the coming weather. The turtle is supposed to be a weather prophet, and as the turtle is regarded as the vilest creature on earth, you can see what an insult such a question is. One of their subtle compliments to the Japanese during the late campaign was to take a straw hat, of Japanese make, which they had removed from a passerby's head, and cut it into the likeness of a turtle and then nail it up on a telephone post.

I find, by the way, that I didn't do the students justice when I compared their first demonstration here to a college boys' roughhouse; the whole thing was planned carefully, it seems, and was even pulled off earlier than would otherwise have been the case, because one of the political parties was going to demonstrate soon, and they were afraid their movement (coming at the same time) would make it look as if they were an agency of the political faction, and they wanted to act independently as students. To think of kids in our country from fourteen on, taking the lead in starting a big cleanup reform politics movement and shaming merchants and professional men into joining them. This is sure some country. [DewJ1]

Last night we had a lovely dinner at the house of a Chinese official. All the guests were men except me and the fourteen-year-old daughter of the house. She was educated in an English school here and speaks beautiful English, besides being a talented and interesting girl. Chinese girls at her age seem older than ours. The family consists of five children and two wives. I found the reason the daughter was hostess was that it was embarrassing to choose between the two wives for hostess and they didn’t want to give us a bad impression, so no wife appeared. We were given to understand that the reason for the non-appearance was that mother was sick. There is a new little baby six weeks old. The father is a delicate, refined little man, very proud of his children and fond of them, and they were all brought out to see us, even the six weeks older, who was very hot in a little red dress. Our host is the leader of a party of liberal progressives, and also an art collector. We had hopes he would show us his collection of things. He did not, except for the lovely porcelain that was on the table. The house is big and behind the wall of the Purple City, as they call the old Forbidden City, and it looks on the famous old pagoda, so it was interesting. We sat in the court for coffee and there seemed to be many more courts leading on one behind another as they do here, sometimes fourteen or more, with chains of houses around each one.

As for the dinner, I forgot to say that the cook is a remarkable man, Fukien, who gave us the most delicious Chinese cookery with French names attached on the menu. Cooking is apt to be named geographically here. Most everyone in Peking came from somewhere else, just as should be in a capital city. But they seem to keep the cooks and cook in accordance with the predilections of the old home province. They have adopted ice cream, showing the natural sense of the race, but the daughter of our host told me that they do not give it to the sick, as they still have the idea that the sick should have nothing cold. They are now thrashing the wheat in this locality. That consists of cutting it with the sickle and having the women and children glean. The main crop is scattered on the floor, as it is called, being a hard piece of ground near the house, and then the wheat is treader out by a pair of donkeys attached to a roller about as big as our garden roller. After it is out of the husk, it is winnowed by being tossed in the breeze, which takes the time of a number of people and leaves in a share of the mother earth. The crops are very thin round this region and they say that they are thinner than usual, as this is a drier year than usual. Corn is small, but there is some growing between here and the hills where we went, always in the little pieces of ground, of course. Peanuts and sweet potatoes are planted now, and they seem to be growing well in the dust, which has been wet by the recent day of rain. [DewJ1]
The depression that bore China down after the Paris decision to hand Shantung over to Japan was fraught with as much pessimism as bitterness. China knew her weakness as against any other large Power of the world. She knew that her political division, with a civil war not yet officially closed, her industrial backwardness, her financial chaos, put her in a position where she could not say a decisive No to any country bent on exploiting her. Accordingly, she hung pathetically and tremblingly upon the deliberations of the peace conference. Morning and night she kept up her hopes by repeating the assurances given by the Allied statesmen of the creation of a new international order and of the future protection of weak nations against the rapacity of the strong. And her hopes needed support, for they were mingled with fears. Better than western nations she knew how far Japan was prepared to go, for twice during the war she had yielded to Japan's barely disguised threat of war. She also knew more about the secret treaties and understandings than did the western nations. Hence it was that the Paris decision created despair rather than the bitter antagonism to America and the other Allies which might have been expected. The outcome just proved that Force still ruled; that Might still made Right in international affairs; that China was hopelessly weak and Japan threateningly strong. On May 4th a thrill stirred this hopelessness. Somebody had done something. Students of the Peking University had demonstrated, and in the course of their demonstration had deliberately attacked and beaten up two of the three Chinese statesmen who are popularly known as traitors because of their part in negotiating various secret treaties and loans with Japan. A stir moved vitally through the national apathy. The weakness, possibly the corruption of Chinese officials, had had a responsible share in the Shantung decision (it is always the Shantung and never the Tsingtau question in China). If China could not count upon other nations, she might at least do something to put in order her own house. The students' act was received not as a chance act of lawless lynching, but as a gesture of righteous indignation. The air was again tense with expectation. Was the Peking event anything more than a passing gesture? Events followed quickly. The government arrested a number of students. Then their fellows protested; troops were thrown about the University buildings. The city was practically under martial law. The provinces were rife with rumors of the readiness of the Chinese militarist clique to go to any extreme in the way of slaughter to put down opposition; rife even with rumors of an impending coup d'état to fix irretrievably the hold upon the government of the militarist and pro-Japanese party. The Chancellor of the University, whom the militarists hated as the intellectual leader of the liberal elements, resigned and disappeared, because, according to report, not only his life but those of hundreds of students were threatened. Then came the news that all of the students in Peking in institutions above the rank of the elementary school had struck in protest against the action of the government. They had not only struck, but they had made definite demands (of which more below); and they had organized into bands of ten, who were everywhere making open-air speeches, defying the military police to arrest them, and trying to organize the public that listened to them into similar bands of ten to carry on propaganda.

This time the thrill throughout the country was electric. The seventh of May is the day kept as the Day of National Shame. Even the primary schools have banners in them, 'Remember the seventh day of the fifth month'. This day of national humiliation is the anniversary of the Japanese twenty-one demands. The coincidence of dates had a powerful effect. Students from the Peking University rapidly dispersed through the country, addressing themselves primarily to students in all the large centres. The latter became restless; then they struck; middle (high) school students, normal and technical schools; again everything above the elementary grade. Everywhere the bands of ten were organized, speakers were drilled in what to say and how to say it, and the Popular propaganda spread through the provinces. And the multitude heard it gladly.

The unorganized hostility to Japan took form in a boycott. That was one of the themes of the boy and girl orators. They did not content themselves with general exhortations. Lists of Japanese goods were printed and mimeographed by the thousand; classified lists of all Japanese products sold in China. Similar lists of substitute native goods were circulated. In some of the schools the industrial department set to work to discover what Japanese goods
could be made in existing shops without additional capital. As soon as models were constructed they were taken to small shops and their mode of manufacture explained. Then, to create a market, other students took these goods and hawked them through the streets, lecturing, exhorting, explaining the political situation at the same time. And as the vacation period comes on these students are dispersing all over China peddling goods and speaking, speaking, speaking . . .

Meantime the government was not idle. Political speeches were forbidden, students’ meetings were forcibly broken up, many scores of students in different parts of China were sorely injured, a few were killed. It is not difficult to foresee the future memorial meetings in honor of these martyrs of patriotism, or even the shrines wherein their memory will be reverenced. Then the government at Peking took more drastic measures. Mandates were issued condemning the students, ordering them under penalty of dissolution of schools to return to their studies, to disband their unions, and to cease concerning themselves with what was none of their business, praising by name the men popularly regarded as traitors, warning against the boycott, and in general saying that foreign affairs should be left in the hands of the government. Coincidently several hundred students were arrested in Peking for speaking. With the fatuity which affects militarists in China as well as elsewhere, it was promised that this would put an end to the students’ agitation. The next day the number of students speaking on the streets was more than doubled, and the arrests ran to above a thousand. The students planned to go on till every man was in jail. Girl students formed a procession (some of them had to break down gates to get out) to wait upon the President and request the freeing of students; they said they would remain praying for justice all night if he did not hear them. The jails could not hold the arrested students. These were shut up in the University buildings and left with little food and less water, with cordons of troops around them. The faculty met; protested against this military invasion; against the degradation of using halls of learning as jails; against the abuse of patriotic students; and they telegraphed their protest widespread.

Events had been moving outside of Peking. This last arbitrary action was the beginning of the end. Merchants in Shanghai went on strike; shops were closed, including those selling food; the merchants in Tientsin and Nanking joined; those in Peking and other cities prepared to join. There was plenty of evidence that the students had practically succeeded in converting the merchants to their side; that they no longer stood alone, but had effected an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the powerful mercantile guilds. There was talk of a strike against paying taxes. The government capitulated suddenly if not gracefully. Troops were withdrawn from the University grounds and the students invited to come out. They declined, and announced that they would stay in till the students everywhere were guaranteed the right of free speech and until the government officially apologized to them. Two days more saw the end. The government sent delegates to make the required apology; a new mandate was issued saying that the country realized that the students were actuated by patriotic motives, and should not be interfered with if they kept within the law. The 'resignations' of the three men called traitors were accepted. Undoubtedly the spread of the strike to the merchants, and the fear of its further extension, were the actuating motives in the inglorious surrender. But the students had managed to get their propaganda into the army. Rumors were afloat that the armies could not be counted upon for further suppressions—especially as pay was far in arrears. After their triumphant march from out their self-made prison, students were heard to lament that the government changed the guards so often they had not been able to convert more than half their jailers.

The original demands made upon the government were few and simple. The students arrested for engaging in the beating-up enterprise must be freed and given immunity from prosecution; the Chancellor who was so obnoxious to the militarist clique must be reinstated. By the time the government was ready to meet these first demands (in outward form, at least), the demands had greatly increased. Instructions must be given to delegates in Paris not to sign the treaty except with reservations as to Shantung, all 'traitors' must be dismissed, all secret understandings with Japan abrogated, freedom of speech guaranteed. Within about a month the Student Movement had won all its points except the third and first; and with respect to the first the government had promised to do all that the international situation permitted; and fell
back vaguely upon advice received from Great Britain, France and President Wilson to sign, with hopes of later readjustment. Yet there is no evidence that the students are deceived as to the amount of success they have achieved. The military clique is still in full command; the places of the three dismissed men will probably be filled by other men of the same pro-Japanese affiliations. Externally things are much as they were before. No successful revolution in government or in foreign affairs justifies giving this amount of space to the Student Movement. But the prestige of the militarist faction has received its first great blow—and prestige is the primary feature of Oriental politics. A negative boycott, sure to fail in the end, has been changed into a constructive movement for development of home industry—a movement still in its infancy but capable of effective development. The possibilities of organization independent of government, but capable in the end of controlling government, have been demonstrated. It is hard to estimate the significance of the fact that the new movement was initiated by the student body. Reverence for the scholar is traditional in China. It still holds over from the rank accorded the literati in former days. From the western standpoint it amounts to superstitious regard. Yet this is the first time that students have taken any organized part in politics. Beyond what their speaking and writing have done in organizing public opinion at the present emergency is the abiding effect for the future. Most of the outward signs of the movement—aside from hawking goods and teaching patriotism at the same time—have now subsided. But a National Students' Union has been formed and definite plans have been made for the future. Already attempts are making to unite the people of the divided north and south in a way that will cut under the militarists of both sides. It would be highly surprising if a new constitutionalist movement were not set going. The combination of students and merchants that has proved so effective will hardly be allowed to become a mere memory. Already in some cities it has been extended into a Four Group Union, and efforts are making to extend this larger organization throughout the country. Probably a foreign observer would count as the most precious fruit of the movement the awakening of China from a state of passive waiting. A sharp blow has been given the idea that China itself is helpless and must be saved from without. In spite of the charges of which the Japanese newspapers are full that the movement was instigated, and even financed, by foreigners, especially Americans, it was a strictly native movement, showing what educated China can do, and will do, in the future. The spell of pessimism seems broken. An act has been done, a deed performed. Perhaps there is now a healthier, better organized, movement from within China itself for China's own salvation than at any time since the Revolution. Even if nothing more were to come of the movement, it would be worth observation and record as an exhibition of the way in which China is really governed—when it is governed at all. American children are taught the list of 'modern' inventions that originated in China. They are not taught, however, that China invented the boycott, the general strike and guild organization as means of controlling public affairs. In no other civilized country of the present day (leaving Russia out of account now as an exception to all rules) is brute force such a factor in official government as in China. But in no other country could moral and intellectual force accomplish so quickly and peaceably what was effected in China in the last five or six weeks. This formulates the standing paradox of China. But in the past the moral forces which fundamentally control have been organized only for protest and rebellion. When the emergency is past, the forces have again dissolved into their elements. If the present organization persists and is patiently employed for constructive purposes, then the fourth of May, nineteen hundred and nineteen, will be marked as the dawn of a new day. This is a large If. But just now the future of China so far as it depends upon China hangs on that If. [DewJ13]
Simple facts for home consumption. All boards in China are sawed by hand—two men and a
saw, like a cross-cut buck-saw. At the new Hotel de Peking, a big building, instead of
carrying window casings ready to put in, they are carrying big logs cut the proper length for a
casing. Spitting is a common accomplishment. When a school girl wants excuse to leave her
seat she walks across the room and spits vigorously in the spittoon. Little melons are now
ready to eat. They come like ripe cucumbers, small, rather sweet. Coolies and boys eat them,
skins and all, on the street. Children eat small green apples. Peaches are expensive, but those
who can get the green hard ones eat them raw. The potted pomegranates are now in bloom
and also in fruit in the pots. The color is a wonderful scarlet. The lotus ponds are in
bloom—wonderful color in a deep rose. When the buds are nearly ready to open they look as
if they were about to explode and fill the air with their intense color. The huge leaves are
brilliant and lovely—light green and delicately veined. But the lotus was never made for art,
and only religion could have made it acceptable to art. The sacred ponds are well kept and are
in the old moats of the Purple City—Forbidden. There are twice as many men in Peking as
women.

Sunday we went to a Chinese wedding. It was at the Naval Club—no difference in appearance
from our ceremony. Bride and groom both in the conventional foreign dress. They had a ring.
At the supper there were six tables full of men, and three partly full of women and children.
Women take their children and their amahs everywhere in China—I mean wherever they go
and provided they want to; it is the custom. None of the men spoke to the women at the
wedding—except rare returned students. Eggs cost $1.00 for 120—we get all we want in our
boarding house. Men take birds out for walks—either in cages or with one leg tied to a string
attached to a stick on which the bird perches. [DewJ1]
1919.06.27  Dewey, John; Dewey, Alice Chipman. *Letters from China and Japan*. Peking, June 27. [27.6.1919].

It's a wonder we were ever let out of Japan at all. It's fatal; I could now tell after reading ten lines of the writings of any traveler whether he ever journeyed beyond a certain point. You have to hand it to the Japanese. Their country is beautiful, their treatment of visitors is beautiful, and they have the most artistic knack of making the visible side of everything beautiful, or at least attractive. Deliberate deceit couldn't be one-tenth as effective; it's a real gift of art. They are the greatest manipulators of the outside of things that ever lived. I realized when I was there that they were a nation of specialists, but I didn't realize that foreign affairs and diplomacy were also such a specialized art.

The new acting Minister of Education has invited us to dinner soon. This man doesn't appear to have any past educational record, but he has pursued a conciliatory course; the other one resigned and disappeared when he found he couldn't control things. The really liberal element does not appear to be strong enough at present to influence politics practically. The struggle is between the extreme militarists, who are said to be under Japanese influence, and the group of somewhat colorless moderates headed by the President. As he gets a chance he appears to be putting his men in. The immediate gain seems to be negative in keeping the other crowd out instead of positive, but they are at least honest and will probably respond when there is enough organized liberal pressure brought to bear upon them.

It cannot be denied that it is hot here. Yesterday we went out in 'rickshas about the middle of the day and I don't believe I ever felt such heat. It is like the Yosemite, only considerably more intense as well as for longer periods of time. The only consolation one gets from noting that it isn't humid is that if it were, one couldn't live at all. But the desert sands aren't moist either. Your mother asked the coolie why he didn't wear a hat, and he said because it was too hot. Think of pulling a person at the rate of five or six miles an hour in the sun of a hundred and twenty or thirty with your head exposed. Most of the coolies who work in the sun have nothing on their heads. It's either survival of the fittest or inheritance of acquired characteristics. Their adaptation to every kind of physical discomfort is certainly one of the wonders of the world. You ought to see the places where they lie down to go to sleep. They have it all over Napoleon. This is also the country of itinerant domesticity. I doubt if lots of the 'ricksha men have any places to sleep except in their carts. And a large part of the population must buy their food of the street pedlars, who sell every conceivable cooked thing; then there are lots of cooked food stores besides the street men. [DewJ1]


The article was directly based on John Dewey's pragmatic method of thinking. "All valuable thinking starts with this or that concrete problem. To study the many facts connected with our many-sided problems, to look for the specific ills, is the first step in thinking. And then, to propose different methods of solution, which are based on our accumulated life experiences and knowledge, to suggest the many ways of healing the illness, is the second step in thinking. Afterwards, to infer the results of every kind of possible solutions, as well as whether these results will really solve our present difficulties and problems, and to choose, on the basis of this inference, a hypothetic solution, and consider it to be my opinion, is the third step in thinking. All valuable thinking has to pass through these three steps.

Here in China a number of people have asked me, 'Where should we start in reforming our society ?' My answer is that we must start by reforming the component institutions of the society. Families, schools, local governments, the central government – all these must be reformed, but they must be reformed by people who constitute them, working as individuals – in collaboration with other individuals, of course, but still as individuals, each accepting his own responsibility. And claim of the total reconstruction of a society is almost certain to be misleading. Social progress is neither an accident nor a miracle; it is the sum of efforts made by individuals whose actions are guided by intelligence." [DewJ188]
1919.07.02 Dewey, John ; Dewey, Alice Chipman. *Letters from China and Japan*. 
Peking, July 2. [2.7.1919].
The rainy season has set in, and now we have floods and also coolness, the temperature having fallen from the late nineties to the early seventies, and life seems more worth living again.
This is a great country for pictures, and I am most anxious for one of a middle-aged Chinese, inclining to be fat, with a broad-brimmed straw hat, sitting on the back of a very small and placid cream colored donkey. He is fanning himself as the donkey moves imperceptibly along the highway, is satisfied with himself and at ease with the world, and everything in the world, whatever happens. This would be a good frontispiece for a book on China—and the joke wouldn’t all be on the Chinese either.
To-day the report is that the Chinese delegates refused to sign the Paris treaty; the news seems too good to be true, but nobody can learn the facts. There are also rumors that the governmental military party, having got everything almost out of Japan that is coming to them and finding themselves on the unpopular side, are about to forget that they ever knew the Japanese and to come out very patriotic. This is also unconfirmed, but I suppose the only reason they would stay bought in any case is that there are no other bidders in the market. [DewJ1]

1919.07.02 Dewey, John ; Dewey, Alice Chipman. *Letters from China and Japan*. 
Peking, Wednesday, July 2. [2.7.1919].
The anxiety here is tense. The report is that the delegates did not sign, but so vaguely worded as to leave conjectures and no confirmation. Meanwhile the students' organizations, etc., have begun another attack against the government by demanding the dissolution of Parliament. Meantime there is no cabinet and the President can get no one to form one, and half those inside seem to be also on the strike because the other half are there. [DewJ1]
Peking, July 4, [4.7.1919].
We are going out to the Higher Normal this morning. The students are erecting three new school buildings this summer—they made the plans, designs, details, and are supervising the erection as well as doing the routine carpenter work. The head of the industrial department, who acted as our guide and host, has been organizing the 'national industry' activity in connection with the students' agitation. He is now, among other things, trying to organize apprentice schools under guild control. The idea is to take the brightest apprentice available in each 'factory'—really, of course, just a household group—and give them two hours' schooling a day with a view to introducing new methods and new products into the industry. They are going to take metal working here. Then he hopes it will spread all over China. You cannot imagine the industrial backwardness here, not only as compared with us but with Japan. Consequently their markets here are flooded with cheap flimsy Japan-made stuff, which they buy because it's cheap, the line of least resistance. But perhaps the Shantung business will be worth its cost. The cotton guild is very anxious to co-operate and they will supply capital if the schools can guarantee skilled workmen, especially superintendents. Now they sell four million worth of cotton to Japan, where it is spun, and then buy back the same cotton in thread for fourteen million—which they weave. This is beside the large amount of woven cotton goods they import.
I find in reading books that the Awakening of China has been announced a dozen or more times by foreign travelers in the last ten years, so I hesitate to announce it again, but I think this is the first time the merchants and guilds have really been actively stirred to try to improve industrial methods. And if so, it is a real awakening—that and the combination with the students. I read the translations from Japanese every few days, and it would be very interesting to know whether their ignorance is real or assumed. Probably some of both—it is inconceivable that they should be as poor judges of Chinese psychology as the articles indicate. But at the same time they have to keep up a certain tone of belief among the people at home—namely, that the Chinese really prefer the Japanese to all other foreigners; for they realize their dependence upon them, and if they do not make common cause with them it is because foreigners, chiefly Americans, instigate it all from mercenary and political motives. As a matter of fact, I doubt if history knows of any such complete case of national dislike and distrust; it sometimes seems as if there hadn't been a single thing that the Japanese might have done to alienate the Chinese that they haven't tried. The Chinese would feel pretty sore at America for inviting them into the war and then leaving them in the lurch, if the Japanese papers and politicians hadn't spent all their time the last three months abusing America—then their sweet speeches in America. It will be interesting to watch and see just what particular string they trip on finally.

It's getting to the end of an Imperfect Day. We saw the school as per program and I find I made a mistake. The boys made the plans of the three buildings and are supervising their erection, but not doing the building. They are staying in school all summer, however—those in the woodworking class—and have taken a contract for making all the desks for the new buildings—the school gives them room and board (food and its preparation costs about five dollars per month), and they practically give their time. All the metal-working boys are staying in Peking and working in the shops to improve and diversify the products. Remember these are boys, eighteen to twenty, and that they are carrying on their propaganda for their country; that the summer averages one hundred in the shade in Peking, and you'll admit there is some stuff here.
This P.M. we went to a piece of the celebration. The piece we saw wasn't so very Fourth of Julyish, but it was interesting—Chinese sleight of hand. Their long robe is an advantage, but none the less it can't be so very easy to move about with a very large sized punch bowl filled to the brim with water, or with five glass bowls each with a gold fish in it, ready to bring out. It seems that sometimes the artist turns a somersault just as he brings out the big bowl of water, but we didn't get that. None of the tricks were complicated, but they were the neatest I ever saw. There is a home-made minstrel show to-night, but it rained, and as the show (and dance later) are in the open, we aren't going, as we intended.
You can't imagine what it means here for China not to have signed. The entire government has been for it—the President up to ten days before the signing said it was necessary. It was a victory for public opinion, and all set going by these little schoolboys and girls. Certainly the United States ought to be ashamed when China can do a thing of this sort. [DewJ1]

Sunday, July 7. [7.7.1919].
We had quite another ride yesterday, sixty or seventy miles altogether. The reason for the macadam road is worth telling. When Yuan Shi Kai was planning to be Emperor his son broke his leg, and he heard the hot springs would be good for him. So one of the officials made a road to it. Some of the present day officials, including an ex-official who was recently forced to resign after being beaten up, now own the springs and hotel, so the road will continue to be taken care of. On the way we went through the village of the White Snake and also of the One Hundred Virtues.
Y. M. C. A.'s and Red Crossers are still coming from Siberia on their way home. I don't know whether they will talk freely when they get home. It is one mess, and the stories they will tell won't improve our foreign relations any. The Bolsheviki aren't the only ones that shoot up villages and take the loot—so far the Americans haven't done it. [DewJ1]
1919.07.08 Dewey, John ; Dewey, Alice Chipman. *Letters from China and Japan.*

Peking, July 8, [8.7.1919].

This morning the papers here reported the denial of Japan that she had made a secret treaty with Germany. The opinion here seems to be that they did not, but merely that preliminaries had begun with reference to such a treaty. We heard at dinner the other day from responsible American officials here that, after America had completed the last of the arrangements for China to go into the war, the Japanese arranged to get a concession from Russia for the delivery on the part of the Japanese of China into the war on the side of the Allies.

Well, the Japanese are still at it with the cat out of the bag. It looks now as if they are getting ready to break up the present government in Japan. This is interpreted to mean that that breakup will be made to look as if it were in disapproval of the present mistakes in diplomacy and of the price of rice; and then they can put in a worse one there and the world will not know the difference, but will be made to think that Japan is reforming. Speaking of constitutionality in Japan, I ceased to worry about that as soon as I learned the older statesmen never troubled at all about who was elected, but just let the elections go through, as their business was so assured in other ways that the elections made no difference anyway, and that the same principle worked equally well in the matter of passing bills. No bill can ever come up without the approval of the powers that be and they know how it is coming out in spite of all discussions. No wonder change comes slowly and maybe it will have to come all at once in the form of a revolution if it comes in reality. It is now reported that Tsai, the Chancellor of the University here, has said he will come back on condition that the students do not move in any political matter without his consent, and I am not able to guess whether that is a concession or a clever way of seeming to agree with both sides at once. The announcement of Tsai’s return means that things will soon be back in normal shape and ready for another upheaval.

We seem to be utterly stumped by the house situation. All the members of the Rockefeller Foundation get nice new houses built for them, and the houses are nice new Chinese ones but free from the poor qualities of those to be rented here. All the houses in Peking are built like our woodsheds, directly on the ground, raised a few inches from actual contact with the earth by a stone floor. The courts fill with water when the rains are hard and then they are moist for days, maybe weeks, and about two feet of wet seeps up the side of the walls. Yesterday we called on one of our Chinese friends here, and the whole place was in that state, but he did not seem to notice it. If he wants baths in the house it doubles the cost he pays the water wagon, and then after all the trouble of heating and carrying the water there is no way to dispose of the waste, except to get a man to come and carry it away in buckets. You would have endless occupation here just looking on to see how this bee colony can find so many ways of making life hard for itself. A gentleman at the Foundation has just been telling us how the coolies steal every little piece of metal, leftovers or screwed on, that they can get at. The privation of life sets up an entirely new set of standards for morals. No one, it appears, can be convicted for stealing food in China. [DewJ1]
1919.07.08  Dewey, John ; Dewey, Alice Chipman. *Letters from China and Japan.*
Peking, July 8. [8.7.1919].
The Rockefeller buildings are lovely samples of what money can do. In the midst of this worn and weak city they stand out like illuminating monuments of the splendor of the past in proper combination with the modern idea. They are in the finest old style of Chinese architecture; green roofs instead of yellow, with three stories instead of one. One wonders how long it will take China to catch up and know what they are doing. It is said the Chinese are not at all inclined to go to their hospital for fear of the ultra foreign methods which they do not yet understand. On the other hand, there is no disposition on the part of the Institution to meet them half way as the missionaries have always done. There are a number of Chinese among the doctors and they have now opened all the work to the women. There is a great need for women doctors now in China, but evidently it will take a generation yet before this work will begin to be understood and will take its natural place in Chinese affairs. It is rather amusing that this splendid set of buildings quite surrounds and overshadows the biggest Japanese hospital and school that is in Peking, and they say the fact has quite humiliated the Japanese. At present the buildings are nearing completion, but all the old rubbishy structures of former times will have to be pulled down before these new ones can be seen in all their beauty. Among other things, they have built thirty-five houses also in Chinese style but with all the modern comforts, in which to house their faculty, and in addition to those there are a good many buildings which were taken over from the old medical missionary College, besides, perhaps, some that will be left from the palace of the Prince whose property they bought. Two fine old lions are an addition from the Prince, but no foreign family would stand the inconveniences and discomforts of the ancient Prince, in spite of all his wives. [DewJ1]
Everybody knows that before the war the territory and resources of China were the scene of contention among five great Powers. During the war the situation completely altered. Russia and Germany ceased to exist as influential factors. Great Britain and France had their energy, attention and capital mortgaged in a life and death struggle. This left Japan mistress of the field. In accordance with the rules of established international diplomacy, she took full advantage of the unique opportunity to improve her national position. It is hardly sportsmanlike of other nations who have been engaged in the same game to whine about her success. Anyway, they have been her accomplices. Something like an offensive and defensive alliance between Japan and Russia was consummated while the latter seemed to be still a Power. Great Britain and France made secret arrangements with her. In every case, the consideration given Japan was at the expense of China. Until the circumstantial reports of the activities of Ota in Stockholm are confirmed or refuted, the question remains whether Germany, the fifth contender, had not also already entered into negotiations with Japan, also at the expense of China but this time with Russia also as a prospective victim.

Apparently Japan had the field to herself. Yet for over two years a duel has been in progress, a duel which concerns both China's internal policy and her international relationships. The duel concerns the ideas and ideals which are to control China's internal political development. Is it to become a genuine democracy or is it to continue in the traditions of autocratic government?—whether under the name of a republic or an empire being a secondary consideration. Internationally, the question is whether China's integrity can be regained and maintained under some sort of temporary international supervision, or whether China is to follow the course which in the past has made Japan the only Asiatic nation capable of protecting herself against European encroachments and sure of the effective respect of western nations. A duel between ideas and ideals needs, however, to be embodied. The United States and Japan are the bodies through which the duel of ideals is carried on. Force of circumstances, not conscious choice, has determined the figures of the duel.

In details, Japan may perhaps have been a peculiarly adept pupil in the way of secret diplomacy practiced by the western Powers. But she has a right to claim that her ultimate object, controlling every particular step, has never been concealed. Her announced aim has been to free Asia, at least eastern Asia, from foreign, that is, European control. The Monroe Doctrine for Asia, Asia for the Asiatics, is a doctrine as public as it is sweeping. Any Japanese is entitled to claim that if the foreigner has ever taken Japanese guarantees of the territorial integrity of China in other sense than as against the European intruder, the foreigner has only his own stupidity to blame. Japan would still hold that she has kept her guarantees of the territorial integrity of Korea—kept them by the only means which under the conditions are effective. In other words, the standing minor premise of the conclusion of the recovery of China by China is the protectorate of weak, unorganized and unprogressive China by organized, militarized Japan—Japan which has adopted western methods in science, industry, education and arms in order to turn them against the West and to preserve the culture and territory of the East, of Asia, intact. Behind every word of the twenty-one demands and of the other negotiations of Japan with China lies the clamorous and luminous unuttered word: Put yourself under the complete protection of Japan, and you shall be guaranteed the same international prestige, the same immunity from projects of partition, concessions, spheres of influence and economic servitudes that Japan enjoys. In no other way can you secure integrity, freedom and respect.

Incidentally of course, great material and industrial advantages would accrue to Japan, to say nothing of the military advantage of command of unnumbered man power. But only the blindness of extreme national prejudice will fail to see that the grandiose scheme has as many ideal aspects as those which have ever clothed the plans of any western Power to fulfill its national destiny and mission. As between Japanese and European domination of Asia, a disinterested and cynical American, barring an eventual menace to his own country, might easily remain a neutral spectator. As it now stands, Japan has won official and governmental China—at least that of the internationally recognized government of the North. This does not mean that assent has been given to the basic idea, or that the very officials who are now
playing the game of China do not hope that some time or other something will happen which will loosen the hold of Japan over China. But they do accept the particular acts by which Japan is making her approaches to the realization of her goal, even though they protest vigorously, as in the case of the twenty-one demands, when the pace is too much forced. Patriotism aside, all the interests of their own pockets and of their own local power and prestige require that each specific step forward should be met with obstructions and resistance until Japan is ready to pay the specific price exacted.

The extent to which Japan has won over the officially governing clique of China is evidenced in the circumstances surrounding the refusal of the Chinese peace delegates to sign the peace treaty. With all the concessions which the government made to the students' movement, it never agreed to instruct the delegates to refuse to sign, until a semi-promise was made to an insistent incursion from Shantung to Peking; and instructions in accord with this vague promise did not reach Paris till after the delegates, on their own responsibility and with the moral backing of the country set over against their official instructions, had refused to sign. The government is now putting the best face possible upon the matter and trying to get popular credit on the one hand while it placates Japan upon the other. Quite likely it is still urging the Paris delegates to make a belated signature. But the militarist, imperialist pro-Japanese group has had an almost deadly blow dealt to its moral authority, and it is even conceivable that a signature forced at this time would be a signal for a popular revolution.

In short, the grandiose scheme of Japan failed to reckon with the most essential factor in the situation—the Chinese people. The extent of this failure may be calculated from the fact that Japanese propagandists in the United States sometimes compare their mission in China to that which they benevolently assign to the United States in Mexico. China with her four hundred million population and the author of the civilization of Japan does not see herself as a Mexico waiting for salvation from Japan. Call it pride or ignorance or national conceit or self-respect or a true sense of comparative national values on the part of China, call it what you will, the fact remains that Japan has so misjudged the psychology of China that she has made an implacable enemy of the people while she has been winning over the officials. One thing, and one thing only, can throw China back into the hands of Japan. Let there be a resumption of the old diplomacy of the western nations with respect to China, and it is conceivable that bitter as would be the dose, China would accept the domination of Japan as the lesser of two evils. And it is not enough that the western nations should have good intentions. They must avoid even the appearance of evil, for ingenious propaganda is always at hand to explain to the Chinese how westerners are trying to exploit them. Even avoiding the appearance of evil is not enough. No task more difficult can be found than the discovery and institution of ways and means by which China can be given the assistance which she imperatively needs, which must be given from outside herself without arousing her national jealousies, suspicions, fears, antagonisms and opposition and thus inviting the aid of Japan against the foreigner.

This brings us naturally to the other figure in the duel of ideas and moral influence—the United States. In the main of course it is the logic and especially the psychology of the situation that has put the United States into this position, not anything she has actually done. If the American idea has for the moment won the people as effectually as the Japanese practice has imposed upon the most influential official clique, it is by way of rebound. Idealization is most active when contrasting emotions are deeply stirred. Fear of Japan has bred trust in the United States; dislike of Japan a pathetic affection for America. It is no wonder that Japan with her poor reading of national psychology is bewildered by the present pro-American outburst of China, and can find in it only proof of superhuman ability in intrigue and of the expenditure of countless millions in propaganda. But in fact the situation has made itself. China in her despair has created an image of a powerful democratic, peace-loving America, devoted to securing international right and justice, especially for weak nations. The heroic legend that unified the United States for the war she still accepts, and she has added paragraphs and chapters of her own.

How trustingly naive is the faith in the United States may be gathered from various addresses of congratulation which were proffered to representatives of the United States on the Fourth of July. Shanghai was the real centre of the patriotic students' movement, and the following
are extracts from some of the Shanghai addresses: "Your great nation is now introducing into
the international relations of the world those principles of justice and right which have always
been the guiding lights of its own national life. This is Platonic enough, but the concrete
meaning appears a few sentences further on: "We look forward to the day when China and the
United States shall both be in a position to maintain the peace of the Pacific as your country
together with that of Great Britain have maintained the peace of the Atlantic." The Canton
Guild congratulated the United States upon her leadership of the cause of human rights in the
Councils of the Nations, and left no doubt as to its understanding of the character of this
leadership by saying "China and America must have the same ideals. China and America
must maintain the peace of Asia. We look to America to help in our battle for justice."
Another address (this time from women and girls) is even more specific. After remarking that
the American navy has never been used to wrest liberty from any people, it goes on to say that
"if ever the day comes when China will have to drive the aggressor from its soil, the
American navy will throw its influence in the cause of right." The Commercial Federation
sounded the same note in a different key: "On this day of independence we call upon the
American people to assist us to be independent, to develop our railways, our waterways, our
resources, to join with the capital of China to make us free from the commercial bondage
under which we have been living."
Of course through all these lines runs the hope of actual assistance against the country
believed by the people to be bent upon dominating China under the pretext of helping her. But
while the desire for material aid, naval, military, diplomatic, financial, is plainly there, the
spirit behind these addresses is something more than national self-interest. The international
appeal is bound up with national aspiration for a truly democratic China— an aspiration up to
the present tragically frustrated. For the same situation which has given Japan the role of a
despoiler and assigned to America the role of a rescuer, has also made Japan the symbol of
autocratic and militaristic government in China itself, while the United States symbolizes the
free democracy that progressive China would be and is not. No one can understand the
present idealization of the United States by China who does not see in it the projection of
China's democratic hopes for herself. I cannot quote again at length but each of the addresses
to which reference has been made contains a touching reference to the fact that America's
Fourth of July signalizes an accomplished fact, while the nation that offers the congratulations
has for eight years fought a battle for a republic and has not yet won her victory. Deceived by
the traditional officialism of the ruling clique, Japan has so far failed to see the enormous gulf
that exists between her own centralized autocracy and the democratic modes of life of the
Chinese masses. This perhaps is no wonder when representatives of western nations have so
frequently misconceived China's essential democracy and have longed for some strong ruler
to bring her the blessings of peace and order. Although this democracy is articulately held
only by a comparative handful who have been educated, yet these few know and the dumb
masses feel that it alone accords with the historic spirit of the Chinese race. And this fact has
done for the United States what she could never have done for herself in making her the
popular counterfoil to the bureaucratic and autocratic government of Japan.
The situation is one that imposes humility rather than self-glorification upon Americans. Our
country will have a hard time living up to the role for which she has been cast. The difficulties
are intellectual and moral as well as matters of practical judgment and tact in action. Have we
the required fibre and virility? Or shall we once more fall between a clever commercialism on
the one hand and a futile phrase-making idealism on the other? Above all it demands stamina
and endurance of intelligence to think out a consistent and workable plan and to adhere to it.
So far as the Far East is concerned, the whole question of the attitude of the United States to
the peace settlement, including the League of Nations, is how America's action is going to
affect her freedom and force of action in behalf of the international democratic ideals she has
professed. In China at least there is fear lest America in making the world safe for democracy
be herself compromised by too close association with nations who in international matters are
not as yet moved by democratic ideals. If the United States in working with the Allies was
obliged to surrender at Paris her own convictions on the Shantung question, China prefers to
trust a United States which is free from such commitments and entanglements. After all,
democracy in international relations is not a matter of agencies but of aims and consequences. Under certain conditions, a United States which was going it alone would, so far as the Far East is concerned, be a much more effective instrument of true internationalism than a United States in a League the other members of which had no belief in American ideals. But League or no League, the task of the United States in the problems of the Far East is not an easy one. The first requisite is a definite and open policy, openly arrived at by discussion at home and made known to all the world. Then we need to be prepared to back it up in action. Idealism without intelligence and without forceful willingness to act will soon make us negligible in the Far East—and surrender its destinies to a militaristic imperialism. We can't, to take one minor illustration, go on loaning money freely to France if France is at the same time supporting the policies of Japan regarding the composition and functions of an International Consortium. This perhaps is but a hypothetical illustration. But it may well be questioned whether the United States has as yet awakened to the enormous power which is now in her hands. That which most impresses a visitor to the Far East is the extent of this power—accompanied by a query whether this same power is not largely being thrown away by reason of stupidity and ignorance. [DewJ14]

They have the best melons here you ever saw. Their watermelons, which are sold on the street in such quantities as to put even the southern negroes to shame, are just like yellow ice cream in color, but they aren't as juicy as ours. Their musk melons aren't spicy like the ones at home at all, but are shaped like pears, only bigger and have an acid taste; in fact they are more like a cucumber with a little acid pep in them, only the seeds are all in the center like our melons. When you get macaroons and little cakes here in straight Chinese houses you realize that neither we nor the Europeans were the first to begin eating. They either boil or steam their bread—they eat wheat instead of rice in this part of the country—or fry it, and I have no doubt that doughnuts were brought home to grandma by some old seafaring captain. These things are all the stranger because, except for sponge cake, no such things are indigenous to Japan. So when you first get here you can hardly resist the impression that these things have been brought to China from America or Europe. Read a book called 'Two Heroes of Cathay', by Luella Miner, and see how our country has treated some of these people in the past, and then you see them so fond of America and of Americans and you realize that in some ways they are ahead of us in what used to be known as Christianity before the war. I guess we wrote you from Hangchow about seeing the monument and shrine to two Chinese officials who were torn in pieces at the time of the Boxer rebellion because they changed a telegram to the provincial officers 'Kill all foreigners' to read 'Protect all foreigners'. The shrine is kept up, of course, by the Chinese, and very few foreigners in China even know of the incident. Their art is really childlike and all the new kinds of artists in America who think being queer is being primitive ought to come over here and study the Chinese in their native abodes. A great love of bright colors and a wonderful knowledge of how to combine them, a comparatively few patterns used over and over in all kinds of ways, and a preference for designs that illustrate some story or idea or that appeal to their sense of the funny—it's a good deal more childlike than what passes in Greenwich Village for the childlike in art. [DewJ1]
A young Korean arrived here in the evening and he was met here on our porch by a Chinese citizen who is also Korean. The newly arrived could speak very little English and by means of a triangle we were able to arrive at his story. It seems there is quite a leakage of Korean students over the Chinese border all the time. To become a Chinese student requires six years of residence, or else it was three; anyway enough to postpone the idea of going to America to study till rather late in case one wants to resort to that way of escape from Japanese oppression. The elder and the one who has become a Chinese citizen seemed a good deal excited; I fancy they are dramatic by nature, and made many gestures. He urged on me the importance of our going to Korea and he is going to bring us some pictures to look at. Well, it all set me thinking, and so I have been reading the Korean guide book and reflecting on the wonderful climate there and wondering if we can get a reasonable place to stay. My first discovery of the real seriousness of the Korean situation came across me in Japan early in March, when we had a holiday on account of the funeral of the Korean prince, for the reason that after the funeral and gradually in connection with it the 'Japanese Advertiser' said it was rumored that the old Korean prince had committed suicide. Doubtless you may know the story there, and then again you may not. However, the facts have leaked one way and another and now it is known that the old man did commit suicide in order to prevent the marriage of the young prince, who has been brought up in Japan, to the Japanese princess. By etiquette his death, taking place three days or so before the date set for the wedding, prevented the marriage from taking place for two years, and it is hoped by the Koreans that before two years they could weaken the Japanese grip on Korea. We all know they have made a beginning since last March and the suicide did something to help that along. Now that Japan is advertising political reforms in Korea she would probably count on that reputation again to cover her real activities and intentions with the world at large for some time to come. The Japanese are like the Italian Padrones or other skillful newly rich; they have learned the western efficiency and in that they are at least a generation ahead of their neighbors. New knowledge to take advantage of the old experience which she has moved away from and understands so well, to make that experience contribute all it has towards building up and strengthening the new riches of herself. The excuse is the one of the short and easy road to success though in the long run it is destructive in its bearings. But a certain physical efficiency is what Japan surely has and she has made that go a little further than it really can go. It is just one more evidence of the failure of the Peace Conference to comprehend the excuses that Wilson is making for the concessions he has granted to the practical needs, as he calls them. We are now getting the first echoes from his speeches here. When I reflect on the changed aspect of our minds and on the facts that we have become accustomed to gradually since coming here I realize we have much to explain to you which now seems a matter of course over here. We discovered from reading an old back number somewhere that an American traveler had been given the order of the Royal Treasure in Japan when he was there. This order is said to be bestowed on the Japanese alone. Before he received it he had made a public speech to the effect that as China was down and out and needed some protector it was natural that Japan should be that, as by all historical reasons she was fitted to be. It appears to be true that the Militarists here who are causing the trouble for China and who are able to hold the government on account of foreign support have that idea so far as the 'natural' goes. The great man of China to-day is Hsu, commonly known as Little Hsu, which is a good nickname in English, Little Shoe. He has never been in the western hemisphere and he thinks it is better for China to give a part of her territory to the Japanese who will help them, than to hope for anything from the other foreigners, who only want to exploit them, and if once China can get a stable government with the aid of the Japanese militarists, then after that she can build herself into a nation. Meantime Little Shoe has gained by a sad fluke in the legislature the appointment of Military Dictator of Mongolia, and this means he is given full power to use his army for agricultural and any other enterprises he may choose. It means, in short, that he is absolute dictator of all Mongolia which is retained by China and which is bordered by Eastern Inner Mongolia which Japan controls under the
twenty-one Demands by a ninety-nine-year lease under the same absolute conditions. These last few days since that act was consummated, nothing is happening so far as the public knows, and according to friends the government can go on indefinitely here with no cabinet and no responsibility to react to the public demands. The bulk of the nation is against this state of affairs, but with the support of foreigners and the lack of organization there is nothing to do but stand it and see the nation sold out to Japan and other grabbers. If you can get at 'Millard’s Review', look at it and read especially the recent act of the Foreign Council which licensed the press—I mean they passed an Act to do so. Fortunately the Act is not legal and will not be ratified by the Chinese Council at Shanghai. 

To this house come the officers of the Y.M.C.A. who are on the way home from Siberia and other places. The stories one hears here are full of horror and always the same. Our men are too few to accomplish anything and the whole affair is not any of our business anyway. Anyway the Canadians have a sense of virtue in getting out of it and going home, and well they may, say I. The Japanese have had 70,000 there at least and they may have shipped many more than that, for they have such a command of the railroads that there is no way of keeping track of them. I believe the conviction is they are taking in men according to their own judgment of the case all the time. Everybody agrees that the Japanese soldiers are hated by all the others and have generally proved themselves disagreeable, the Chinese being thoroughly liked. Meantime the dissatisfaction in Japan over rice in particular and food in general is quite evidently becoming more and more acute. And it is interesting to read the interviews with Count Ishii which all end up in the same way, that the fear of bomb-throwers in the United States is becoming a very serious alarm among all. The Anti-American agitation was hard for us to understand while we were there, but its meaning is less obscure now. Will it be effective? Is another world war already preparing? It is said here that the students were very successful during the strike in converting soldiers to their ideas. The boys at the High Normal said they were disappointed when they were let out of jail at the University because they had not converted more than half the soldiers. The guards around those boys were changed every four hours. 

It is raining most of the time and it is typical of the Chinese character that my teacher did not come because of the rain. You have to remember he never takes a 'ricksha, though he might have looked at it that it was better to pay a man than to lose the lesson. The mud in the roads here is much like the old days on Long Island before the gravel was put there, only it is softer and more slippery here, and the water stands. [DewJ1]

Peking, July 17. [17.7.1919].

We are pleased to learn that the Japanese censor hasn't detained all our letters, though since you call them incoherent there must be some gaps. I'm sure we never write anything incoherent if you get it all. The course of events has been a trifle incoherent if you don't sit up and hold its hands all the time. Since China didn't sign the peace treaty things have quite settled down here, however, and the lack of excitement after living on aerated news for a couple of months is quite a letdown. However, we live in hopes of revolution or a coup d’état or some other little incident to liven up the dog days.

You will be pleased to know that the University Chancellor—see letters of early May—has finally announced that he will return to the University. It is supposed that the Government has assented to his conditions, among which is that the police won't interfere with the students, but will leave discipline to the University authorities. To resign and run away in order to be coaxed back is an art. It's too bad Wilson never studied it. The Chinese peace delegates reported back here that Lloyd George inquired what the twenty-one Demands were, as he had never heard of them. However, the Chinese hold Balfour as most responsible. In order to avoid any incoherence I will add that a Chinese servant informed a small boy in the household of one of our friends here that the Chinese are much more cleanly than the foreigners, for they have people come to them to clean their ears and said cleaners go way down in. This is an unanswerable argument.

I hear your mother downstairs engaged on the fascinating task of trying to make Chinese tones. I may tell you that there are only four hundred spoken words in Chinese, all monosyllables. But each one of these is spoken in a different tone, there being four tones in this part of the country and increasing as you go south till in Canton there are twelve or more. In writing there are only 214 radicals, which are then combined and mixed up in all sorts of ways. My last name here is Du, my given name is Wei. The Du is made up of two characters, one of which means tree and the other earth. They are written separately. Then Wei is made up of some more characters mixed up together, one character for woman and one for dart, and I don't know what else. Don't ask me how they decided that earth and tree put together made Du, for I can't tell. [DewJ1]
I met the tutor, the English tutor, of the young Manchu Emperor, the other day—he has three Chinese tutors besides. He teaches him Math., Sciences, etc., besides English, which he has been doing for three months. It is characteristic of the Chinese that they not only didn't kill any of the royal family, but they left them one of the palaces in the Imperial City and an income of four million dollars Mex. a year, and within this palace the kid who is now thirteen is still Emperor, is called that, and is waited upon by the eunuch attendants who crawl before him on their hands and knees. At the same time he is, of course, practically a prisoner, being allowed to see his father and his younger brother once a month. Otherwise he has no children to play with at all. There is some romance left in China after all if you want to let your imagination play about this scene. The tutors don't kneel, although they address him as Your Majesty, or whatever it is in Chinese, and they walk in and he remains standing until the tutor is seated. This is the old custom, which shows the reverence in which even the old Tartars must have held education and learning. He has a Chinese garden in which to walk, but no place to ride or for sports. The tutor is trying to get the authorities to send him to the country, let him have playmates and sports, and also abolish the eunuch—but he seems to think they will more likely abolish him. The kid is quite bright, reads all the newspapers and is much interested in politics, keeps track of the Paris Conference, knows about the politicians in all the countries, and in short knows a good deal more about world politics than most boys of his age; also he is a good classical Chinese scholar. The Chinese don't seem to worry at all about the boy's becoming the center of intrigue and plots, but I imagine they sort of keep him in reserve with the idea that unless the people want monarchy back he never can do anything, while if they do let him back it will be the will of heaven.

I am afraid I haven't sufficiently impressed it upon you that this is the rainy season. It was impressed upon us yesterday afternoon, when the side street upon which we live was a flowing river a foot and a half deep. The main street on which the Y.M.C.A. building is situated was a solid lake from housewall to housewall, though not more than six inches or so. But the street is considerably wider than Broadway, so it was something of a sight. Peking has for many hundred years had sewers big enough for a man to stand up in, but they don't carry fast enough. Probably about this time you will be reading cables from some part of China about floods and the number of homeless. The Yellow River is known as the curse of China, so much damage is done. We were told that when the missionaries went down to do flood relief work a year or so ago, they were so busy that they didn't have time to preach, and they did so much good that when they were through they had to put up the bars to keep the Chinese from joining the churches en masse. We haven't heard, however, that they took the hint as to the best way of doing business. These floods go back largely if not wholly to the policy of the Chinese in stripping the forests. If you were to see the big coffins they are buried in and realize the large part of China's scant forests that must go into coffins you would favor a law that no man could die until he had planted a tree for his coffin and one extra.

One of our new friends here is quite an important politician, though quite out of it just now. He told a story last night which tickled the Chinese greatly. The Japanese minister here haunted the President and Prime Minister while the peace negotiations were on, and every day on the strength of what they told him cabled the Tokyo government that the Chinese delegates were surely going to sign. Now he is in a somewhat uncomfortable position making explanations to the home government. He sent a representative after they didn't sign to the above-mentioned friend to ask him whether the government had been fooling him all the time. He replied No, but that the Japanese should remember that there was one power greater than the government, namely, the people, and that the delegates had obeyed the people. The Japanese will never be able to make up their minds though whether they were being deliberately deceived or not. The worst of the whole thing, however, is that even intelligent Chinese are relying upon war between the United States and Japan, and when they find out that the United States won't go to war just on China's account, there will be some kind of a revulsion. But if the United States had used its power when the war closed to compel disarmament and get some kind of a just settlement, there would be no limit to its influence...
over here. As it is, they infer that the moral is that Might Controls, and that adds enormously to the moral power of Japan as against the United States. It is even plainer here than at home that if the United States wasn't going to see its 'ideals' through, it shouldn't have professed any, but if it did profess them it ought to have made good on 'em even if we had to fight the whole world. However, our financial pressure, and the threat of withholding food and raw materials would have enabled Wilson to put anything over.

Another little incident is connected with the Chancellor of the University. Although he is not a politician at all, the Militarist party holds him responsible for their recent trials and the student outbreaks. So, although it announced that the Chancellor is coming back, the Anfu Club, the parliamentary organization of the militarists, is still trying to keep him out. The other night they gave a banquet to some University students and bribed them to start something. At the end they gave each one dollar extra for 'ricksha hire the next day, so there would be no excuse for not going to the meeting at the University. Fifteen turned up, but the spies on the other side heard something was going on and they rang the bell, collected about a hundred and locked the bribees in. Then they kept them in till they confessed the whole story (and put their names to a written confession) and turned over their resolutions and mimeographed papers which had been prepared for them in which they said they were really the majority of the students and did not want the Chancellor back, and that a noisy minority had imposed on the public, etc. The next day the Anfu papers told about an awful riot at the University, and how a certain person had instigated and led it, although he hadn't been at the University at all that day. [DewJ1]

We expect to go to Manchuria, probably in September, and in October to Shansi, which is quite celebrated now because they have a civil governor who properly devotes himself to his job, and they are said to have sixty per cent or more of the children in school and to be prepared for compulsory education in 1920. It is the ease with which the Chinese do these things without any foreign assistance which makes you feel so hopeful for China on the one hand, and so disgusted on the other that they put up so patiently with inefficiency and graft most of the time. There seems to be a general impression that the present situation cannot continue indefinitely, but must take a turn one way or another. The student agitation has died down as an active political thing but continues intellectually. In Tientsin, for example, they publish several daily newspapers which sell for a copper apiece. A number of students have been arrested in Shantung lately by the Japanese, so I suppose the students are actively busy there. I fancy that when vacation began there was quite an exodus in that direction.

I am told that X——, our Japanese friend, is much disgusted with the Chinese about the Shantung business—that Japan has promised to return Shantung, etc., and that Japan can’t do it until China gets a stable government to take care of things, because their present governments are so weak that China would simply give away her territory to some other power, and that the Chinese instead of attacking the Japanese ought to mind their own business and set their own house in order. There is enough truth in this so that it isn’t surprising that so intelligent and liberal a person as X—— is taken in by it. But what such Japanese as he cannot realize, because the truth is never told to them, is how responsible the Japanese government is for fostering a weak and unrepresentative government here, and what a temptation to it a weak and divided China will continue to be, for it will serve indefinitely as an excuse for postponing the return of Shantung—as well as for interfering elsewhere.

Anyone who knows the least thing about not only general disturbances in China but special causes of friction between China and Japan, can foresee that there will continue to be a series of plausible excuses for postponing the return promised—and anyway, as a matter of fact, what she has actually promised to return compared with the rights she would keep in her possession amount to little or nothing. Just this last week there was a clash in Manchuria and fifteen or twenty Japanese soldiers are reported killed by Chinese—there will always be incidents of that kind which will have to be settled first. If the other countries would only surrender their special concessions to the keeping of an international guarantee, they could force the hand of Japan, but I can’t see Great Britain giving up Hong Kong. On the whole, however, Great Britain, next to us, and barring the opium business, has been the most decent of all the great powers in dealing with China. I started out with a prejudice to the contrary, and have been surprised to learn how little grabbing England has actually done here. Of course, India is the only thing she really cares about and her whole policy here is controlled by that consideration, with such incidental trade advantages as she can pick up. [DewJ1]

1919.07.25 John Dewey attended an educational conference in Beijing. [Kee3]


I think I wrote a while back about a little kid five years old or so who walked up the middle aisle at one of my lectures and stood for about fifteen minutes quite close to me, gazing at me most seriously and also wholly unembarrassed. Night before last we went to a Chinese restaurant for dinner, under the guardianship of a friend here. A little boy came into our coop and began most earnestly addressing me in Chinese. Out friend found out that he was asking me if I knew his third uncle. He was the kid of the lecture who had recognized me as the lecturer, and whose third uncle is now studying at Columbia. If you meet Mr. T—— congratulate him for me on his third nephew. The boy made us several calls during the evening, all equally serious and unconstrained. At one he asked me for my card, which he carefully wrapped up in ceremonial paper. The restaurant is near a lotus pond and they are now in their fullest bloom. I won’t describe them beyond saying that the lotus is the lotus and advising you to come out next summer and see them. [DewJ1]
"The effect of the decision of the Allies at the Peace Conference to guarantee the claims of Japan strengthens the hold of the militarist party upon the Chinese government and also increases the hold which a neighboring militarist country has upon the determination of Chinese policies." This sentence, with slight verbal changes, can be found over and over again in every liberal paper in China. It comes with a shock to an American who has learned to identify China with inveterate pacifism, and who, under the tutelage of Mr. Roosevelt, believes that Chinafication and supine pacifism are synonymous. China a militarist country? Impossible!

A few statistics may be cited. At the present time, the Chinese government is supporting an army of a million and three hundred thousand at the lowest estimate. And China does not have conscription. This is a paid, standing, professional army. And China sent no troops to Europe and trained no troops to go there. The nearest approach to the war zone was connected with the propaganda for intervention in Siberia after the Russian debacle. Nor is the civil war in China anything more than nominal at present, and in any case the great mass of soldiers never had part in it. From the standpoint of the size of its standing army, then, China is not "Chinafied."

The budget of China tells the same story. The central government spent for ordinary military purposes last year two hundred and ten millions of dollars and for 'extraordinary' purposes thirty millions more. Percentages are even more eloquent. This amount is fifty per cent of the entire annual expenditures of the government. And since the total income of the nation, barring loans, is but three hundred and seventy millions, this means that sixty-five per cent of the total state income goes to the army. Figuring still another way, leaving payments for interest on the national debt out of account, China spent almost twice as much for military purposes as for all other ends put together, fifty times as much as she spent, from the side of the central government, for schools and six times as much as the central government and all the provinces together spent for public education. Moreover China is now spending, in the eighth year of the republic, much more than twice as much on the army as was spent in the last year of the Manchu dynasty. These facts do not point to undue addiction to pacifism. Still, something more than large military expenses are needed to justify calling a government militaristic. For the term implies a subordination of civil to military control in political affairs generally. This is a matter which cannot be settled by statistics; but it is this matter even more than the size and expense of the army which is referred to in the sentence quoted at the beginning of the article. This militarism goes back to the earlier days of the republic, especially to the ambitions of Yuan Shih-kai. It is hardly a coincidence that the leaders in present Chinese policies are former lieutenants and disciples of the 'strong man' who attempted to convert the fruits of the revolution into a family perquisite of a new imperial dynasty. But in its present form it dates actively from two years ago, and particularly from conditions connected with China's declaration of war against Germany. Quite likely the full history of this episode cannot as yet be written by any one. But even a tyro in Chinese history like the present writer may report certain facts which could not be stated and which were not stated in the West—and in the Far East only under the breath—when the war was still on. And the outstanding fact with respect to the growth of militarism is that its present swollen fortunes date from the circumstances under which China entered the war on the side of the Allies. And if this fact is not brought out in books dealing with the recent years of Chinese history it is partly because the writers were so interested in the righteous cause of the Allies that they hardly allowed themselves to perceive the fact, and partly because to have dwelt upon this fact while the war was still going on would have been pro-German in effect, to say nothing of subjecting writers to the charge of promoting German intrigue.

One does not have to go far to find explanations for the opposition in China to entering the war. There existed every reason that operated to bring about the delay on the part of the United States—except the presence of a large population of German descent—and there was in addition a genuine fear of German victory and subsequent German reprisals of whose nature China had already had sufficient warning. Moreover the German nationals in China were upon the whole more popular personally than those of any other country unless perhaps...
those of the United States. For however arrogant Germany was as a nation, Germans taken
individually were sufficiently bent on successful business to be unassuming, friendly, and
attentive to native wishes and customs. Against all the reasons for not declaring war against
Germany there were in fact but two intrinsic reasons for so doing. A portion of the genuinely
liberal and republican sentiment of China was truly convinced after the United States entered
the war that the war was between democracy and autocracy; between a new, just, international
order which would guarantee the rights of weak nations, and the old, rapacious, nationalistic
imperialism. Thus the historic humanitarian idealism of China actually urged liberal China
into the war. Self-interest pointed in the same direction, for participation in the war would
give China representation at the peace board, permit her to present her claims for the
restoration of Shantung, and in general enable her to start even as a partner in the new
international ordering of diplomacy which so many, besides the Chinese, ardently believed in,
only two years ago. Immediately after the United States broke off diplomatic relations with
Germany, China followed, the Cabinet and Parliament acting in unison. This was done in
direct response to the invitation of President Wilson and China was the first nation to make a
favorable response.

Then followed weeks and months of intrigue before China on August 14th finally declared
war against Germany. What took place during those months was, first, the displacement of the
American auspices evident in a severance of relations early in February by Japanese auspices;
and, secondly, the struggle between the Premier, Tuan Chi-jui, and Parliament—a struggle
ending in the forced dissolution of Parliament and in the outbreak of the still unhealed civil
strife between the North and the South. The extent of the diplomatic defeat of the United
States by Japan is seen in the fact that on June 7th a warning was communicated to China
from the United States that the entrance of China into war was a 'secondary consideration'
compared with the reestablishment of a tranquil and united China, while on June 12th a
mandate was issued at the dictation of military leaders and with the approval of the Japanese
legal adviser dissolving Parliament. The immediate outcome was the farcical restoration for
ten days of the Manchu boy Emperor. The final outcome was the ousting of President Li, and
the defeat, through the coerced dissolution of Parliament, of Constitutionalism, and the
beginnings of a civil war which in turn played into the hands of the militaristic cliques.
For the Premier was then, as he is still though now out of political office, the head of the
militarist, anti-constitutional and anti-parliamentary faction. The liberal Parliament, which,
whatever its defects, was still devoted to republican constitutionalism, grew more and more
lukewarm in the cause of breaking irreparably with Germany. Ready to follow promptly in
the wake of the United States when American and democratic prestige seemed to be
uppermost, it hesitated when diplomatic leadership went over to the Japanese, and when it
came to believe that the Cabinet was not thinking so much of the defeat of Germany as of an
excuse for building up an army and a military regime which would insure their own continued
power.

By one of the ironies of fate, the militarist and anti-democratic factions became the professed
spokesmen of the Allies, and a constitutionally inclined Parliament was put in the position of
being pro-German. The wheat and the tares were so mixed that even the liberally minded
foreign press, tired of the delay and intriguing, welcomed the 'strong' action of Tuan Chi-jui in
dissolving Parliament simply because it hastened the day when China was officially arrayed
with the Allies and when German commercial interests would get a hard if not fatal blow in
the Far East. When one sees how wrong was foreign liberal sentiment— with a few notable
exceptions—in the case of the Yuan Shih-kai adventure in imperialism and again how wrong
it was in the inception of the regime they are now all cursing, in spite in both cases of the
warnings of liberal native Chinese thought, one receives a marked lesson in the extent to
which Chinese events have been interpreted to the world in the light of supposed foreign
interests, and how little consideration has been given to the actual effect of the events in
question upon the development and destiny of China itself. One sometimes wonders that the
Chinese have retained any faith in the political intelligence of the foreign interpreter of her
contemporary history.

At present the militaristic faction whose power was confirmed by the happenings of the
summer of 1917 is still in control of the government. There is no doubt that all its members are patriotic enough to have welcomed the restoration of Shantung. But still human nature is human nature, and they have also welcomed the demonstration offered at Paris that might still makes right in the case of weak nations, so that in a strange and subtle way the diplomatic victory of Japan in particular and of imperialism in general has been a vindication of their own anti-democratic and militaristic policy. If the humanitarian international and democratic ideals profusely proclaimed in the war had been realized at Paris, no observer in China doubts that a vast domestic political realignment would already have taken place. The demonstration that national self-interest was on the side of the democracies of the world would have had an irresistible reflex effect upon domestic policies. And few doubt that the realization of this fact was, in addition to the concrete economic advantages at stake in Shantung, one of the reasons why Japan was so insistent at Paris. While her newspapers exaggerated in saying that her national existence was involved in securing a diplomatic victory, the exaggeration covered the fact that her diplomatic defeat, following upon the collapse of autocratic Germany, would have ended for the time being the prestige of militarism in the Far East, and compelled a reconsideration of home policies in China and of foreign policy in Japan. This moral reverberation seems to have been completely ignored at Paris and it may be doubted whether it is receiving the attention it deserves in Washington.

The specific signs of the continuance of the militarist regime in China are many. In the provinces the Tuchuns, military governors, still override civil governors and interests and sacrifice the crying need for education and better transportation to the pelf and power that go with command of a large number of troops. In remote provinces they encourage the growth of opium either for direct revenue or for levying hardly disguised blackmail. They discourage the development of natural resources in mines and manufacturing because their cohorts give them an effective power to demand a large interest in the business. In spite of the universal desire for reconciliation between the North and South, the militarists on both sides (and it would be a great mistake to think they are confined to the North) block all final settlement. The last few weeks have seen the beginnings of a mysterious adventure in Mongolia and an attempt of a Tuchun to obtain a virtual dictatorship of the three Manchurian provinces. But, especially, it is militarist control which keeps China in a condition that invites and rewards foreign intrigue and secret unacknowledged interventions.

No observer thinks that the present condition can last a great while longer. The equilibrium is too uncertain. No sensible person attempts to prophesy what the nature of the change will be when it comes. But if the reader will return to the statistics given early in the article he will note that at present the expenses of China exceed its available income by one hundred and ten millions a year. This means, of course, borrowing money—and when China borrows money she borrows it from some foreign nation by pledging some definite asset. In other words, cut down the army one-half and China's accounts balance. Continue the present army, and the responsibility lies with some foreign nation or group of nations through the loans it—or they—are willing to make for an army which is not and will not be a source of strength to China abroad, and which is eating up China at home. In the case of the continuation of China's militarism, the economic interpretation of history is more than ordinarily obvious. Hence it is hardly prophecy to say that what happens next in China will be determined by financial considerations, and that the decision is in the hands of those who have the power to control the making of loans. As long, however, as some one nation can serve its own interests by making loans, the situation cannot be adequately met on the part of other nations by merely a laissez-faire policy of declining to make loans. Something positive is needed.

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1919.07.28 John Dewey attends a conference of heads of higher schools to consider reopening schools in Tianjin. [DewJ8]

In: Xin jiao yu; vol. 1, no 5 (Aug. 1919). Translation of a speech delivered at Tokyo Imperial University. [DewJ189]
Letter from John Dewey to Wendell T. Bush
Care Y M C A Peking China Aug 1 '19

Dear Mr Bush,

Your letter of early June came two or three days ago. Mails are uncertain here, especially as the technique of the Bank in Tokyo is of a primitively casual type. I am glad to have a permanent address here, for while we cannot stay where we are longer than a few weeks more (we are with a Princeton man, a Y M C A secy, whose family has gone to the seashore) mails will be recd. You are owed many apologies rega[r]ding all the troubles you had about our staying over. Yet it wouldnt be easy to tell from whom the apologies should come, unless it was the young Chinese men who saw us in Tokyo and said they would see Dean Woodbridge. They would have explained that it was not expected that Columbia would bear any expense unless a regular exchange was arranged. Other wise the difficulties were due to the upset in the university, and we had no idea till your last cablegram to Suh Hu [Hu Shi] came that there was any trouble except in the delay of the cables, as we didnt know that any return inquiry [in ink w. caret] had been recd. But there is no reason in the world why the cablegram should have come out of your pocket, and if you will only allow a reimbursement Im asking Evelyn to pay you for it. I wrote an article on the Students Movement for the N R which you may [in ink w. caret] have seen if they published it. It couldnt give the color of the thing however nor what it meant to the boys and girls, or even to the people of China. An after echo took place the other day. The militarists in present control of things here form what they call the Anfu Club, which has a majority in Parliament. They hate the Chancellor of the University whom they regard as morally responsible for the students taking an interest in politics—altho he himself is no politician—in fact is own interest is in esthetics and literature—Paris educated. So last week they bribed a few students, some ex-students and a few more who were just applying for admission to demonstrate agt the Chancellor. They got together about fifteen, when the other students heard of it and to the number of about a hundred attacked them, locked them up, and made them sign a written confession. Then a few days ago, some of the attacking students were arrested charged with assualt and battery. Now the interesting thing about the matter from our standpoint is that public opinion is entirely against this "interference" by the police. The matter is wholly one between students, not one for the courts. It wasnt at all sporty for the beaten (quite literally I think) party to appeal to the law. So some of the students who were dismissed by the trial judge as quite innovent decline to leave jail. They are staying there as a protest! [ink exclamation mark] This place [in ink w. caret] is really upside down on the globe as you can see, and it makes life very amusing not to say interesting. The other strange thing is the number of foreigners who get converted to the Chinese standpoint. Except in Shanghai and some of the other outports where many foreigners especially British pride themselves on having been in China twenty five years and never set foot in Chinese town—tho I cant quite see what good it does them as eighty to ninety percent of the population in the foreign settlements is Chinese. To go back to the student strike. I was invited last the first of the week to a conference of heads of higher schools in this province to consider the reopening of schools. The great majority of heads are very conservative and strongly opposed to the strike and to the students having any part in politics. So as the students have been saving the country all summer, and are probably somewaht cocky and unruly, there is much nervousness about what will happen when the schools reopen. The action of the peace conference as regards Shantung has done ^one^ thing that probably wasnt intended—it has stimulated in one summer [w. caret] the development of national consciousness in China as more than otherwise might have happened in ten years. Nationalistic consciousness in its early stages is apt to be rather blind, but tho the Japanese have tried to make out on one hand that the movement isnt national but instigated by American traders money, [ink comma] and on the other hand have tried to change it into a general anti-foreign movement, it has so far been quite restrained. Except that the illiterate and common people have got it in their heads that the Japanese are carrying on a food poisoning campaign, and when you recal how many Americans believed in the groundglass stores etc, it is easy to see that there may still be violent outbreaks, if the rumors keep up. It still isnt certain under just what auspices my lectures will be given, some of them under
certain Chinese Societies for promoting modern learning, as they have guaranteed me a salary in case the University situation doesn’t stay cleared up. We shall be here into March and then move southwards, to Nanking etc. It is very hard to get living accommodations; the Rockefeller Foundation which is putting in the big medical plant has had to build over thirty houses for its staff already. We are on the trail of the flat, almost the only one in Peking which is given up in Sept by a bank man ordered to the Phillipines, but have had to cable to the U S to the man from whom he subleases and are still waiting for a reply as cables are reported ten days behind. Lucy came a week ago, after a very pleasant month in Japan and we are living in earnest hopes that Evelyn will condescend to join us during the year.

She brought over with her the mss. of my University lectures there, which I had left for translation into Japanese. I’m glad you liked the outline, and I hope you will like the lectures when they come out. I am going over the copy again and shall then send it on to Holt. I can’t afford to waste so much good typewriting. I think it has one merit; it is reasonably free from philosophic partisanship, being an attempt to evaluate the modern spirit in general in contrast with that of classic philosophies. I am changing the order of some of the earlier lectures.

Suh Hu is very influential here; the weekly magazine he edits has a circulation of five thousand which is large for this country, and would be in ours for an intellectual organ. The vernacular speech movement which he and some others started is taking widely. The students started twenty or thirty journals this summer, all printed in the spoken language, and there are now many other less ephemeral organs that use it. His history of Chinese philosophy is the first written on modern historic lines. He chafes under the conditions which divert so much of his time from scholarship; he wants to study and write more. If Columbia wanted to offer him the Chinese professorship—if it still vacant—I think he would take it at least for a specified time. I don’t see how China can spare him, but it is rather pathetic to see how many of the old students here long for life in the U S. It is a hard proposition they are up against.

Many of the things that make it interesting to a mere visitor make it trying for them. I was glad to get a little gossip about university matters. Did [Roberts Bishop] Owen come back? I had heard Coss was not to, and was glad to know he did. I hope you will have a good time in France. Do you spend the whole year there? We also hope you and Mrs Bush are having a good summer. Please accept the best regards of both of us to both of you. Two years is making a large hole in our New York life and at times we get quite homesick, but after all it is a wonderful experience, and we wish you were here to share it and talk it over with us. It was some comfort to know that some of our friends miss us. When I recall the pace at which New York moves I sometimes wonder whether anybody will remember us when we get back. We get the New York papers in the Club reading room after they are a month old, and in that respect can follow matters better than we did formerly. Again with affectionate regards,

Sincerely yours, John Dewey [DewJ3]
I went to Tientsin to an educational conference for two days last week. It was called by the Commissioner of this Province for all the principals of the higher schools to discuss the questions connected with the opening of the schools in the fall. Most of the heads of schools are very conservative and were much opposed to the students’ strikes, and also to the students’ participation in politics. They are very nervous and timorous about the opening of the schools, for they think that the students after engaging in politics all summer won't lend themselves readily to school discipline—their high schools, etc., are all boarding schools—and will want to run the schools after having run the government for several months. The liberal minority, while they want the students to settle down to school work, think that the students’ experiences will have been of great educational value and that they will come back with a new social viewpoint, and the teaching ought to be changed—and also the methods of school discipline—to meet the new situation.

I had a wonderful Chinese lunch at a private high school one day there. The school was started about fifteen years ago in a private house with six pupils; now they have twenty acres of land, eleven hundred pupils, and are putting up a first college building to open a freshman class of a hundred this fall—it's of high school grade now, all Chinese support and management, and non-missionary or Christian, although the principal is an active Christian and thinks Christ's teachings the only salvation for China. The chief patron is a non-English speaking, non-Christian scholar of the old type—but with modern ideas. The principal said that when three of them two years ago went around the world on an educational trip, this old scholar among them, the United States Government gave them a special secret service detective from New York to San Francisco, and this man was so impressed with the old Chinese gentleman that he said: 'What kind of education can produce such a man as that, the finest gentleman I ever saw. You western educated gentlemen are spoiled in comparison with him'. They certainly have the world beat in courtesy of manners—as much politeness as the Japanese but with much less manner, so it seems more natural. However, this type is not very common. I asked the principal what the effect of the missionary teaching was on the Chinese passivity and non-resistance. He said it differed very much as between Americans and English and among Americans between the older and the younger lot. The latter, especially the Y.M.C.A., have given up the non-interventionalist point of view and take the ground that Christianity ought to change social conditions. The Y.M.C.A. is, he says, a group of social workers rather than of missionaries in the old-fashioned sense—all of which is quite encouraging. Perhaps the Chinese will be the ones to rejuvenate Christianity by dropping its rot, wet and dry, and changing it into a social religion. The principal is a Teachers College man and one of the most influential educators in China. He speaks largely in picturesque metaphor, and I'm sorry I can't remember what he said. Among other things, in speaking of the energy of the Japanese and the inertia of the Chinese, he said the former were mercury, affected by every change about them, and the latter cotton wool that the heat didn’t warm and cold didn't freeze. He confirmed my growing idea, however, that the conservatism of the Chinese was much more intellectual and deliberate, and less mere routine clinging to custom, than I used to suppose. Consequently, when their ideas do change, the people will change more thoroughly, more all the way through, than the Japanese.

It seems that the present acting Minister of Education was allowed to take office under three conditions—that he should dissolve the University, prevent the Chancellor from returning, and dismiss all the present heads of the higher schools here. He hasn't been able, of course, to accomplish one, and the Anfu Club is correspondingly sore. He is said to be a slick politician, and when he has been at dinner with our liberal friends he tells them how even he is calumniated—people say that he is a member of the Anfu Club.

I struck another side of China on my way home from Tientsin. I was introduced to an ex-Minister of Finance as my traveling companion. He is a Ph.D. in higher math. from America, and is a most intelligent man. But his theme of conversation was the need of a scientific investigation of spirits and spirit possession and divination, etc., in order to decide scientifically the existence of the soul and an overruling mind. Incidentally he told a fine lot
of Chinese ghost stories. Aside from the coloring of the tales I don't know that there was anything especially Chinese about them. He certainly is much more intelligent about it than some of our American spiritualists. But the ghosts were certainly Chinese all right—spirit possession mostly. I suppose you know that the walls that stand in front of the better-to-do Chinese houses are there to keep spirits out—the spirits can't turn a corner, so when the wall is squarely in front of the location of the front door the house is safe. Otherwise they come in and take possession of somebody—if they aren't comfortable as they are. It seems there is quite a group of ex-politicians in Tientsin who are much interested in psychical research. Considering that China is the aboriginal home of ghosts, I can't see why the western investigators don't start their research here. These educated Chinese aren't credulous, so there is nothing crude about their ghost stories. [DewJ1]

1919.08.04  John Dewey attended the Educators's meeting in Tianjin. [Kee3]


1919.08.21, Letter from Alice Chipman Dewey to Jane Dewey
Peking, August 21st. [1919]
Dearest Jane.

... Butter costs $1.20 a pound and it is bad, in a can. Every one Chinese carries home the cutest little round gobs of meat and things done up in a lotus leaf hanging by the stem which makes an excellent handle. When there are no more leaves for wrapping things they will go back to little sheets of brown paper still made up into little round gobs and the paper hand made.

We have seen them making paper, each sheet handled and spread on a board to dry and it is of course precious. They use all the old news papers for wrapping and people live by going about the streets to pick up the tine bits either to burn on the temple alters or to sell them for rags to make more paper. No wood is available for paper.

Begging is so common here as to make life very uncomfortable. But people get to know one in this city very quickly and the beggars hang on less than they did when we were strangers to them for now they know we shall give them nothing. The Chinese do not believe in it, it is against the law and the beggars are fat with nursing children hanging to them if they are women, but, in spite, the Chinese will finally give them the minutest cash. It takes twenty cash, at the least, to make a penny. Counting money here is an occupation for a banker. If you change big money in a shop you are sure to get small money back. In the foreign shops I mean for the Chinese are more honest. It takes 138 coppers in small money to make a big dollar. Some day I am going to make the reckless experient which is so easy to work here. Take a dollar and go from one place to another changing it till I have nothing left. What fun, lacking the movies...... We have one afternoon dissipation her and it is going to the Y.M.C.A. building next to us to eat icecream. We might go to the club for tea instead and to day I think I shall do that, to day or tomorrow. As yet I have not put foot inside the club. Mrs Smith brings me books from there. It is not hot at night any more but by day it still is. At night I sleep comfortably under a sheet and even feel a slight chill from the breeze towards morning, There is nothing one longs for more than that chill. The heat is really fierce you just ooze all the time and bath as many times a day as you have time for. It is wonderful how the the coolies stand it. Once I asked my ricsa man why he did not wear a hat and he said it was too hot. If we had any thing active to do we should not stand it long in the sun. At the club they say the mercury has been 108 on the piazza, and it stay pretty even, juntil this last week when the evenisg have lowered some what. No sun strokes among the Chinese...

Love, Mother. [DewJ3]
1919.08.25 Letter from John Dewey to Dewey children
Y M C A Peking Aug 25 [1919]

Dearest children,

… Lucy didn't want to go to a hotel, not that any of us did, and I'm sure that the bother of a
house would have been an irritating burden to mamma, as the housekeeping would have come
on her and the conveniences aren't exactly modern. It was amusing to see a notice of Miss
LaMotte's book in an American magazine in which it told how cheap houses were in
Peking—we pay 80, aside from furniture, for this five small room apt. Another one with six
large rooms rents for 200 a month. Equally amusing was her account of the fear of robbers
here, and the walls with broken glass and the fierce Mongolian dogs. Peking is one of the best
policed cities in the world; I'd much rather take my chances here than in Harlem. She wrote in
the hotel I think with a Japanese curier for authority. We have to leave here Sept fourth and
the Deerings leave Sept fourth, so it seems quite providential. Mr [Paul S.] Reinsch as you
have probably seen is leaving. Nobody knows the reason here, if there is any aside from his
wanting to go back. He isn't very popular, or Mrs R with the foreign community here, but is
very well liked by the Chinese which speaks well for his official performanes. Judging from
what we hear a man of the type of Morris in Tokyo, with more business experience and, one
executive pep will be useful from now on anyway. There ought to be about a half dozen of the
ablest men in the country here to handle thees situation. It is the growing opinion that if the U
S backs down on either the Shantung issue or the Japanese consortium for reservation of
Manchuria and Mongolia, it means the going back to the old policy of the partition of China,
as China can't hold its own alone. People here can't understand why the U S doesn't use its
financial power and the Europena need of American assistance to compel GT Britain and
France to side with us rather than with Japan in handling the whole Eastern question. Maybe
it isn't necessary but there is a feeling here that deals for further concessions and spheres are
cconcerned going on, besides behind the scenes, in case the U S policy fails, and that the
[other] countries aren't giving any active aid to the U S in making it succeed. If so, its a
suicidal policy in the end; for the European countries. Japan will get the concessions and
spheres in the end; their only way is to help China get on her own feet, which is the obviously
policy of the U S, and which is the only thing Japan is afraid of.

We haven't a word from Sabino for almost a month, soon after he went to Kuai; we shall be
relieved when we hear something. Its rather late to be giving Jane advice on her year, but I
hope she is doing what she wants to do and not what she thinks she ought to do or what she
thinks some one else thinks she ought to do. If she wants to give up college entirely and go to
sculpting or something, she ought to do it, if she can get a good sculpt to teach her. We were
glad to hear that Evelyn's services were getting better peuniary recognition, but hope it doesn't
mean that she is going to keep at it so long over there she won't get away to make us a visit, us
includes China incidentally.

We are wondering whether there will be a ruction again. Over thrity students including four
girls, tried to call on the president about Shantung and especially to ask for the removal of the
military governor who torured and killed some merchants and bambooded some students for
anto-Japanese agitation and who (the delegation) instead of seeing the president were
arrested by the police. If there isn't another students strike etc. it will probably prove not that
they have laid down on the job but they are waiting till they get things better organized, and
next time expect to make a thorough job of it. On the surface the militarists have had their
own way the last month even more than before the success of the students movement—but
something must be going on behind the scenes, and I think it is the effort of organize the
guilds which are powerful but which have never taken any hand in politics. They got in thru
the boycott and will probably have to go further now they are in.

P M Visiting hours are from noon to seven After I had written I began to be afraid that maybe
I'd been too hopeful but Lucy's temp got to normal last night and was only 99 at ten oclock
and also the doctor grins broadly and says the patient is a credit. The Club has a library and
we're giving Lucy a course in O Henry. I have just done a foolish thing. The curio dealers tie
up some miscellaneous pieces in two blue calico bundles that balance and then invade the
house, if they are allowed. We had one entertain us at lunch We had a painting on silk that he
asked ten dollars for. If I had a friend I wanted to cure of gambling Id set him to buying curios in China; there's no difference—which is the true principle of all cures. You always want to see how much they'll come down. So I offered him two, as the picture isn't actually offensive, and before he left the house I had bought it for three. Now I appeal to Evelyn to know what am I going to do with it? His smile was so ingratiating when he said "Lose money. How much?" that it cost me a dollar. "Very old. Ming. Number one".
Love Dad

1919.08.26  Letter from John Macrae to Alice Chipman Dewey
August 26, 1919.
Mrs. John Dewey, c/o Y. M. C. A., Pekin, China.
My dear Mrs. Dewey,
I have just been informed by Prof. Tilly, of Columbia University, that you are interesting yourself in the introduction in China of the phonetic method of teaching English, and I am at once sending you, with our compliments, a copy of Rippmann's "The Sounds of Spoken English and Specimens of English", and Daniel Jones' "English Pronouncing Dictionary", both of which Prof. Tilly informs me you will find useful. It is my understanding that Miss Evelyn Dewey communicated with Prof. Tilly before he consulted with us.
It is a matter of great interest, and, to my mind, of wide importance, that you are taking up this problem during your stay in China. I recently read an editorial in the "World's Work" magazine which, without attempting to analyse the situation technically, dwelt significantly upon the tremendous and world wide importance of introducing some efficient system of phonetics to the Chinese people. Under your leadership and far-seeing initiative, I feel that much may develop from your personal attention to this work. And if there is anything we may do to co-operate with you, it will be a pleasure to do so.
Please extend my kindest personal regards to Prof. Dewey. You may be interested to know that Miss Evelyn Dewey's "New Schools for Old" is receiving prompt and enthusiastic recognition, and shows promise of becoming a very widely used book before the year is out.
With my very best hopes for the success of your work, I am,
Very sincerely, [John Macrae]
JM-JKT


1919.09.01  Mao, Zedong. Statutes of the Problem Study Society.
Mao listed seventeen educational problems including "the problem of how to implement [John] Dewey's educational doctrine, seventeen women's problems, fifteen labor problems, eight industrial problems, seven transportation problems, nine public financial problems, five economic problems, and more than sixty other international and general human problems". [DewJ181]
The average American probably regards the past course of the United States in China with complacency, and imagines that we have won a like admiration from the Chinese. Even the casual newspaper reader knows of the return of the Boxer indemnity, and supposes in a hazy way that our declaration in behalf of the Open Door in China succeeded in arresting the partitioning of China. The better informed reader takes pride in the consistently enlightened diplomacy of the United States exemplified in Cushing, Burlingame and Hay, and the insistence upon comparatively mild measures after the Boxer revolt had been put down. Our entire course, we readily fancy, is one that has secured for us the grateful confidence and respect of the Chinese. Our treatment of Chinese immigrants on the Pacific coast and our exclusion act may occur to us, but we quickly put such disagreeable thoughts out of mind as so much past history.

It is worth while to ask how far our notion of the Chinese attitude towards us corresponds with the facts. Or if this way of putting the matter implies a false assumption regarding the universality of public opinion in China, then what is the attitude of an influential section of public men, and what are the grounds upon which it is based? The result of the inquiry even if unflattering will be a necessary preliminary to the conception of a proper policy for the future.

To give the uncomplimentary answer in a few words, our prior behavior has left with many Chinese, especially those who have not been in the United States, the impression that we are not, in our foreign dealings, a very practical people; that we lack alertness, quickness of decision in emergencies, promptness of action, and especially persistence. And all this even where our own interests are at stake. We are thought of as, upon the whole, a well disposed people, but somewhat ineffectual in action. Even gratitude for our refusal to enter into the game of grabbing China is colored by a suspicion that perhaps we lacked the energy and skill to engage successfully in the game. The immediate background of this feeling is connected with the contest of Japan and the United States in the past two and a half years for prestige and moral authority, a rather passive contest, to be sure, as far as the United States is concerned. Some parts of the record have a definite bearing on the obstacles that are in the way of a successful American policy in the Far East. The expressed objectives and ideals of the United States in entering the war and the vigor with which we went in aroused the greatest enthusiasm in a certain section of Chinese public men. For a time it looked as if there were to be a powerful liberal party with pro-Americanism for one of the most important planks in its platform. Enthusiasm for the Allied cause ran high. Even the militarists who are now in control were anti-Japanese in the early months of 1917. Eloquent testimony is given by the fact that diplomatic relations were broken off with Germany without consultation with any of the Japanese representatives. In fact the Japanese minister being out of China at that time, Japan did not know of the event until it was an accomplished fact. There was then much zeal for an active participation of Chinese troops on the western front. The militarists wanted it because of the training that the army would get; the liberals because they were pro-Ally and pro-democracy; all because they saw the advantage for China of a share in the international negotiations at the end of the war. Plans were made to use the seized interned German ships for transporting troops. But the Allies were short of shipping and parcelled out the ships themselves. If American diplomacy made any effort to help the Chinese carry out their own plans, it was either defeated or no knowledge of the effort came to the ears of the Chinese.

Then China needed money, and needed it badly. She needed money not only for internal reorganization but for active participation in the war. The United States was making regular advances to the other Allies. China wanted a loan and got nothing. The Japanese overwhelmed her with financial proffers. Current gossip insists that more or less of the funds stuck in the pockets corrupt Chinese officials. But in the larger sense the accuracy of this allegation is negligible. The outstanding fact is that Japan came forward when the United States did not. From this time dates the hold of Japan upon Chinese official circles. Another fact cooled the ardor of even the military people for an active share in the war.

After August of 1917, the military fortunes of the Allies sank to their lowest. Many Japanese leaders became convinced that German victory was either inevitable or that the war would end in a deadlock which would be almost equivalent to German victory. Responsible
statesmen, men who had been prime ministers and heads of the foreign office, publicly stated that while Japan would be faithful to her allies throughout the war, an international realignment was almost certain after the war. Japan had already undertaken the necessary rapprochement with Russia, obviously undertaken in part with a view to resisting the growth of American influence in the Far East. Where would China be after the war in the case of an alliance offensive and defensive between Japan and Russia and Germany? It was obvious prudence for her to tread softly and give no offence to the powers which in the near future were likely to dominate the Far East. It is, I am convinced, impossible to exaggerate the influence of this factor in determining the present position of forces. For while the forecast did not come out according to specifications, in the meantime a situation was created which was pro-Japanese and indifferent to America. Even recently the man who is credited with being the head of the pro-Japanese military party in the government circles (and who is known as an incorruptible man) said that China had to be pro-Japanese, because Japan was so powerful in army and navy and also so nearby. 'If the Pacific shrinks to a pond we shall be pro-American'.

This is the concrete background upon which to project more general considerations regarding Chinese opinion of American policy. While Americans commence their account with, say, the benevolent return of the Boxer indemnity, the Chinese are likely to recall that as a positive force the United States opened its Far Eastern career with proposals for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways, and then met a defeat at the hands of Russia and Japan. This in itself was nothing very important. All countries receive diplomatic checks. But as it looks to the Chinese, after proposing a large scheme and meeting initial rebuffs, the American government neither made use of its check to secure a compensating advance elsewhere, nor did it try other means to maintain the principle it had laid down. The affair of the Hankow-Peking railway strikes them also as an example of the tendency of the American government to conceive rather grandiose schemes and then fall down or withdraw when resistance is encountered. Through the American Red Cross valuable flood relief work was done. But there was also a large engineering plan for the regulation of the water-ways. After an original flourish, that too dissolved. The Siems-Carey railway projects may not be a case in point, for they may be in a state of suspended animation rather than of death. But the fact remains that the United States is the only great power that has nothing to show in China in achievement on a large scale. Or rather our one decided achievement is in the educational line where confessedly we are far ahead. But this success is not of a kind to be impressive when it comes to determination of international affairs. The cases given must stand as samples of the facts that have led educated and influential Chinese to feel that America could not be seriously counted upon. The Chinese have not, like some other nations, set us down as bluffers. But the cases mentioned, together with our failure to do much except utter words in behalf of the 'Open Door', have led to the feeling that we readily emit large and good schemes, but are ineffectual when it comes to the test of action. The Chinese do not carry sentiment into practical matters. They judge by results not by intentions. In contrast with ourselves, they have found the Japanese constantly on the job, never allowing anything to get by, taking advantage of every opening, stimulated by obstacles only to renewed or redirected effort, quick, patient, persistent, unremitting. If Japan had not blundered hugely in estimating Chinese national sentiment, China might already have put its foreign policies mainly into the hands of Japan. For if China has to depend upon some outside power, there was much to say for relying, even at great cost to itself, upon a nation that was acute, vigorous, vigilant, and that never abandoned a plan after it started to realize it. To the Americans, Baron Shibusawa's Proposal for Japanese-American cooperation in China, the United States to furnish the money and Japan the brains, did not seem together tactful in form of expression. But it is not likely that the great Japanese financier-philanthropist meant to imply that universally speaking Japanese intelligence is superior. He spoke rather on the basis of the fact that the Japanese have used their brains actively and persistently in pushing their policies in China, and Americans have not.

Now, of course, the reply to all this from an American standpoint is easy. We have never had large enough interests in the Far East to make it worth while to keep our attention and energy
concentrated. We have never, beyond the Monroe Doctrine, gone in for a continuous foreign policy, as have other great powers. We have had so many other profitable ways of investing capital that it paid better to switch off to any other scheme than to bother too long in putting through a railway or other plan in the face of constant irritating and delaying obstacles. And in addition it is to our credit that we have never had the close alliance of business enterprise and governmental action which has characterized the policy of every other great power in dealing with economically backward countries and with China. From the American standpoint, excuses, and good ones, are as plenty as blackberries. But after all, as has been indicated, justifications and reasons do not concern the Chinese when it comes to their formulation of policy in foreign relations. They are interested in past results, in the actual outcome, as a means of forecasting the probable course of the future.

The war has now conclusively demonstrated that the United States can act promptly, efficiently and on a large scale in its foreign affairs. Unfortunately the contrast between President Wilson's words and the concrete results of the Peace Conference—a contrast that circumstances make glaringly conspicuous in China—tends to restore the older idea about the United States. Yet not wholly; there is a new interest and a new expectation on the part of important leaders while the masses of people look pathetically toward us for their redemption. The historic friendliness of sentiment toward the United States is so reinforced that it is an asset of great potentiality. The problem is the practical one of turning it to account by a constructive policy in action. It cannot be said that there is any single specific political act which is absolutely indispensable. But there is a line of action which would be fatal, at least for a considerable time. After so much talk about Shantung, to allow matters to go by default, or to permit them to drift, would be to confirm the worst opinions about the instability and futility of our policies. Some kind of definite course, persistently followed up, is a necessity unless China is to fall into practical vassalage to another nation. For help from without China must have. While the peace settlement has made the political international issue most acute for the moment, the financial and industrial question is the important one in the long run. Here lies the great chance of the United States. The introduction of a unified comprehensive currency system, a unified comprehensive railway system, improved modern harbors and terminal facilities, the reconstruction of the inland water-way system to improve transportation and avoid destructive floods—these are samples of the important tasks that must be undertaken. At the present time the United States is the only country that combines the requisite capital, engineering ability and executive talent.

The important thing is that by undertaking big things on a large scale the United States will get around much of the competition that breeds irritation and suspicion. If the scale is big enough, there will be no competition. Japan is not prepared to take hold of these matters on a large scale. A negative policy that can be interpreted as putting obstacles in the way of the legitimate development of Japan is fraught with dangers. To concentrate upon big enterprises in a constructive way will leave Japan plenty of opportunities, while it will once and for all avert the possibility of rendering China a virtual subject of Japan—a danger which the best friends of Japan must admit to be real as long as the militaristic-bureaucratic element continues to dominate her policies. The serious source of evil in the present situation is the likelihood that the United States will have sufficient interest in the Far East to talk a great deal, to act in minor ways but upon the whole in ways which can be construed with more or less justice as having for their main object to thwart the ambitions of other countries, especially Japan. It is not necessary to say that the next few years are crucial. In China as elsewhere reconstruction is imminent, but for the time being things are in solution. Distance has its disadvantages in all the lesser relations. But it can be made an advantage if the Mention of America is fixed on large scale undertakings. A considerable part of past friction in accomplishing things under foreign direction in China is due to failure to secure the administrate cooperation of the Chinese. American enterprise should be reasonably free from the temptation to fill such positions with economic carpet-baggers. The Chinese students who have studied and who are studying in America supply a definite nucleus for administrative cooperation. If there are not enough such trained persons among the Chinese then business plans should include an extension of educational facilities to train the required number. The
great stumbling-block of the past, the lack of active alliance between business interests and political governmental authority, can also be converted into a positive asset. The Chinese, like the Americans, have the tradition of industrial self-help; they are constitutionally averse to governmental activities. To get around the government, with its almost unbreakable traditions of procrastination, obstruction and corruption is an advance step. And this can largely be effected by enlisting the cooperation of Chinese voluntaryism. It cannot be done however by sending subordinates to carry out plans made without Chinese consultation. Leaders must come whom Chinese leaders recognize as their equals and who are intellectually prepared to deal with Chinese leaders as equals. And the plans must be on such a scale that it is evident while ample security and reasonable profit are given foreign investors the outcome will be to make China the mistress of her own economic destinies. When this is accomplished, she will have no difficulty in looking out for herself politically. Just because the controlling factor in the policies of other nations has been to cultivate the economic subjection of China, the United States has an unparalleled opportunity to pursue the opposite course. Has it the imagination and the energy? [DewJ16]
1919.09.15  Letter from John Dewey to Albert C. Barnes
135 Morrison St Peking China, Sept 15 [1919]
Dear Barnes,
I didn't get your letter of the end of July till about three or four days ago. We have recently
moved into this small apartment, which we were fortunate enough to hit upon, mostly
furnished, after some months of vain hunting and the unwelcome expectation of having to go
to a hotel. We inherited the servants with the place, and as the old story goes it is wonderful
how much comfort dam heathen can bring into a Christian—(so alleged—) home. When we
think of what we are going back to, the exclusion law seems a huge mistake. Lucy celebrated
her arrival by coming down in a few weeks with typhoid, but it was a mild case and she has
been back from the—very good—hospital a week now. I told Evelyn to send you back the
five hundred you were kind enough to let me have. We have been very well taken care of,
both in Japan and China, and didn't need the funds as it turned out, but the accommodation on
your part was just the same.
My general reactions to the situation here I am putting in articles—some of them are coming
out in the N R. and others will come in Asia as I had a cable from them to send them six
articles on the general political and social psychology of the Chinese as affecting the present
situation. Taking the word with psychology with a good deal of allowance, I'm trying to do
this. Its an absurdly pretentious performance in one way, with my short stay here and no
knowledge of the language. But it will be just as good as most of the stuff travellers put out for
the American reader, and a little better than some for it will give some attempt at
interpretation from the Chinese standpoint. It is almost to easy to get up a sympathetic
admiration for them, not coming in direct contact to speak of with the disagreeable phases of
their life. I have sent more stuff on Japan to the Dial. I don't think it will be as dull as the other
one. The atmosphere of Japan has a peculiar restrictive and constrictive influence which it
would be hard to analyze or explain. But I'm sure almost everyone there suffers from it, the
Americans and other foreigners get so used to it that they don't know what they suffer from; I
didn't when I was there, very body was so friendly and in most ways so open. But there is
a hush in the air. I don't know anything just like it. I think it is the reason that so much of
writing about Japan is laudatory or eulogistic—that is the only open vent, and seems to be
exacted some how, waited for by the Japanese, or else just wholesale condemnation in
reaction from the irritation of supere subconscious suppressions. In spite of the backwardness
of China, there is much more openness and outspokenness here which is one of things that one
makes one believe the future is with China—but why, of why, don't they get busy and bring in
that future. That's what makes so much despair and disgust about China among foreigners.
The puzzle of their contrasting strong and weak sides is one of the most fascinating things I've
ever experienced, and keeps one always on the alert to see what is coming next. Just now there
is a lull with the most activity on the side of the militarists who are strengthening their fences
and fortifications, because they got scared by the student movement. But now they have things
more in hand than ever. But the Chinese principle seems to be to give everybody rope enough
to hang himself with—the greater the oppression the greater the ultimate resistance and
overthrow. Its a fascinating game to watch, but hard to repress one's desire for a bit more
direct western energy to tackle things before they get to the toppling over point.
My lectures begin regularly this week, Scattered about—one day a week at the Boxer
Indemnity College, two lectures a week at the University, tho one of them is a public rather
than a students course, and one at the Board of Education Ministry. We shall be here till about
the first of March.
I thought Walter Weyl's article on Wilson was a keen analysis, the best thing of Weyl's I have
read. The N R has more pep since Lippman is back.
Please remember me to Mrs Barnes.
Sincerely yours, John Dewey. [DewJ3]
'Social and political philosophy' in Beijing, sponsored by the National Beijing University, the Ministry of Education, the Aspiration Society and the New Learning Association. = She hui zhe xue yu zheng zhi zhe xue. Hu Shi interpreter, Wu Wang, Fu Lu recorder. In : Xue deng ; Sept. 24 ; Oct. 1, 8, 22 ; Nov. 5, 6, 22, 25, 30 ; Dec. 14, 15, 22, 23 (1919). Jan. 24, 26, Febr. 3, 4, 26, 27 ; March 3, 4, 8, 9 ; April 1, 2 (1920).

'The function of theory'

"This extreme radical statement was followed by the conservative theories of Aristotle, who in his 'Politics', his 'Ethics', and his other books, set forth theoretical bases for the perpetuation of the social and political schemes of his time. The same thing was true in China: the radical theories of Lao-tze were followed by the conservative theories of Confucius."

'Science and social philosophy'

"Here in China a number of people have asked me, 'Where should we start in reforming our society?' My answer is that we must start by reforming the component institutions of the society. Families, schools, local governments, the central government – all these must be reformed, but they must be reformed by the people who constitute them, working as individuals – in collaboration with other individuals, of course, but still as individuals, each accepting his own responsibility. Any claim of the total reconstruction of a society is almost certain to be misleading. The institutions which make up the society are not 'right' or 'wrong', but each is susceptible to some degree of improvement. Social progress is neither an accident nor a miracle; it is the sum of efforts made by individuals whose actions are guided by intelligence… I imagine that most of you in the audience today are students; and as students, you must be peculiarly aware of the truth of what I have been saying."

'Social reform'

'Critieria for judging system of thought'

'Communication and associated living'

"Or take the history of China: transition from one dynasty to another was always attended by political and social disruption – disorder which continued until the appearance on the scene of some person forceful and powerful enough to subject contending factions to his control."

"Workers are much better off in America than in China. Their wages are better, and are still increasing; their working hours are shorter."

"In the history of China, for example, we note that the first emperor of the dynasty was always a strong leader, gifted with imagination and initiative, capable of accomplishing needed reforms, and interested in the people over whom he ruled."

'Economics and social philosophy'

'Classical individualism and free enterprise'

"All in all, what was good for economic development would at the same time and to the same degree be good for the spiritual elements in the social process. This outlook must obviously have considerable appeal her in China, where there has traditionally been so much interference both by the state and by the family elders. There seems to be a rapidly growing trend nowadays to reject the authority of the head of the clan, to have members of the family work more independently and responsibly, and to object to arbitrary interference in personal affairs by officers of the state."

"We have been speaking of the situation in Europe and America, but the issue between laissez faire and government regulation of industry should be of real concern to China, too, particularly at a time when the country is beginning to industrialize so rapidly. Problems of limiting hours of work, of regulating the conditions under which labor operates, of controlling the employment of women and children – these and other related problems must be planned for before the situation becomes serious."

'Socialism'

"There are today in China commercial guilds which, it seems to me, could be exceedingly useful during this period when China is undergoing the transition between cottage industry and full-scale industrial production. It is important for us to determine which aspects of the guild system ought to be preserved, and to discover ways in which we may cultivate professional self-respect by promoting more effective communication among people who are
engaged in the same or similar trades... Chinese scholars should engage in research on the
guild system, to the end that those aspects of it which can effectively contribute to progress
can be conserved."

'The state'
'Government'

"In a book I read a few days ago, the author advances the thesis that Western political systems
impose restrictions on government because of the assumption that human nature is inherently
evil, while the older political system of China was based on the assumption that human nature
is inherently good."

'Political liberalism'
'The rights of individuals'

"But both socialism and individualism have many ramifications. No matter what one's
political orientation, he must grant that this is a basic problem. I see it as being of
fundamental importance both in the West and in China. But the problem, as it concerns China,
has facets which are different from those we see when we look at the same problem as it
confronts the West. The problem as it exists in China can be stated as follows: assuming that
we agree that our ultimate goal is the fullest possible development of individuals, should
China, as the West did, first go through an age of self-seeking individualism, and then employ
the power of the state to equalize society as the West has had to do; or should it amalgamate
these two steps and achieve social equality at one stroke? It seems to me that there are
grounds for hoping that China can achieve social equality in one operation. There are three
reasons why I say this:

1) The first basis for hope that China can achieve social equality without repeating the
sequence of events followed in the West, amalgating two steps into one, is that she already
enjoys the traditional concept of the state's obligation to protect its people, as this was
propounded by Mencius. Political individualism has not made headway in China, so that the
tradition of the state's obligation to protect its people, which may be likened to the parents'
obligation to protect their children, or the emperor's protect his subjects, can readily be
modified into the concept of the protection of its citizens by a democratic government.

2) Modern China can achieve equality of opportunity for her people by popularizing
education. Popular education is not intended to satisfy the self-seeking urges of individuals,
but to provide all men with equal opportunities for self-development. Education in the West
became universal long after the beginning of the industrial revolution. But the
industrialization of China is just now beginning; there is thus the chance for China to
universalize education now, so that by the time it reaches full-scale industrialization it will
also have achieved social equality.

3) Another basis for hope is that there is still time for Chinese scholars and scientists to
pursue specialized knowledge and devote their research activities to special problems. One of
the shortcomings of political individualism in the West lies in the fact that it tends to
depreciate specialization, and to hold that any reasonably well-educated person can pretty well
take care of himself. It ignores the extreme complexities of modern society and politics, and
fails to see that even in a small district the problems of education, taxation, and government as
well as those of industry, can be dealt with effectively only by those who have mastered a
great deal of highly specialized knowledge. If China can begin now to develop appropriate
degrees of specialization, her rewards in the future will assuredly be great.

These remarks about China are no more than a few random suggestions of my own. The
problem, though, is one of extreme importance, and worthy of the most careful study.
Although at the moment China is confronted with particular and exacerbating problems, these
are temporary. China is certain to be faced with more lasting and more fundamental problems
in the near future, and the two which are of the most far-reaching import are the inevitability
of industrialization, and its concomitant problem of self-seeking individualism. The problem
thus becomes one of conserving the positive aspects of individualism while at the same time
avoiding its negative aspects, which are certain to introduce disorder into your society."

'Nationalism and internationalism'
'The authority of science'
'Intellectual freedom'

Barry Keenan: Dewey began the lectures 'Social and political philosophy' with an instrumental definition of theory, and of politics, than he discussed the characteristics of experimental politics. Political theories, like any theories, he noted, arose to account for and alleviate some difficulty that developed in the operation of established social habits and institutions. Thinking was a response to problems, and so was theoretical thinking. The specific conditions of the original habits and institutions, were primary, and the theories of how they operate derivative.

Thomas Berry: The lecture 'Social philosophy and political philosophy' must be considered of special significance. It made a deep impression upon Chen Duxiu, who had already become interested in Marxism. Dewey's presentation of the democratic idea 'delayed by a strong counter-influence' the movement of Chen toward the Marxist-Leninist position. The main idea of this lecture was that democracy in any true sense of the word must begin on the local level and rise from there through successively wider application to the higher realms of political authority. The influence of Dewey on Chen did not succeed in bringing his intellectual and political abilities into the service of liberal or social democracy of a European or American style, for in 1921 Chen joined with Li Dazhao to found the Communist Party, the dynamic center of a movement that would first be the opponent and later the conqueror of all other political forces and doctrines in China. As a distinct political party, the democratic movement envisaged by Dewey was never successful in China. As an ideal it has remained a constant influence there and has seriously affected the political life of the country. [Kee3:S. 45, DewJ186, DewJ5]
The philosophy of education

The misuse of subject matter

Work and play in education

The need for a philosophy of education

Creative dramatics and work

The cultural heritage and social reconstruction

"The spirit of the new education is a complete reversal of this old concept. Once when I was lecturing in the United States on the subject of education, I said that in China pupils are required by their teachers to recite in unison and in a loud voice. I told my audience that even though this wasn't an ideal method of education, it at least allowed the pupils to have a modicum of physical movement, while in the West pupils are required to sit quietly and are not allowed to make the least noise."

"Properly prepared, young women of China can apply Froebel's theories here, and create a new kind of kindergarten, with activities based in Chinese customs and using Chinese subject matter."

"When I first went to Nanking in May, the children in the Nanking Teachers College Kindergarten were raising silkworms. They started by collecting silkworm eggs and arranging for their protection; then, when the eggs hatched, the children fed the tiny worms with mulberry leaves. This continued until the silkworms spun their cocoons. At the time I was there, the children were unreeling the silk from the cocoons. At first glance one might think that this business of raising silkworms in the schoolroom might fascinate the children (and it did, of course), but that there wasn't anything to it other than the mere fact of fascination. But as the situation was actually being handled, the children were also gaining knowledge. They watched the eggs hatch into larvae, the larvae become chrysalises, and then a few days later, they watched the mature moths emerge from their cocoons. In their first-hand experience with the development of the silkworms, the children were laying a basis for understanding many of the facts and principles of biology. Even in the area of industrial production the experience was profitable; the children learned about the selection and collection of eggs; they had experience in distinguishing good silk from poor; and they took the first steps toward an appreciation of the whole process of silk production. Silk is a major product of this part of southern China, so the child who has a basic understanding and appreciation of some of the chief factors in silk production has, by this token, a better understanding of the society in which he lives. Wouldn't you agree that this sounds like and effective way to pursue knowledge?"

Creative dramatics and work

The cultural heritage and social reconstruction

"I was pleased to read in the newspaper the other day that the Chinese National Education Conference has passed a resolution favoring the adoption of textbooks written in the spoken language of China. Although I am not as familiar with conditions in China as I should like to be, I believe that the use of the spoken language of the people in textbooks should prove to be one of the greatest steps forward that you could take."

"This is why I say that the broadening of the child's environment is a matter of greater urgency now than it has been in the past. Of course it is not just in China that there is such a need; it exists everywhere. But I do believe that China faces an unprecedented and unparalleled opportunity to do this sort of thing in her schools. It is perhaps true that up to now contact with the West has brought China more disadvantages than advantages, more ill than good. But it is also true that the chaos and confusion in morality and economy have reached a point in China at which it would be ill advised, if not fatal, for China to isolate herself from the influences of Western culture. The only method by which China can remedy the present sad state of affairs is to speed up cultural exchange between East and West, and to
select from Western culture for adaptation to Chinese conditions those aspects which give promise of compensating for the disadvantages which accrued from earlier contacts. This is a task which calls for men and women of wide knowledge and creative ability. The men and women who will do this are now children in our schools, and this is why the matter of broadening the child's environment is of such great urgency in China today."

'Discipline for associated living'
'The future and the present'
'The development of modern science'
"Although I do not know a great deal about the history of the development of Chinese culture, I do know that traditional Chinese culture was more concerned with a philosophy of life than with the natural sciences, so that science never developed enough to be incorporated into the general pattern of politics, religion, and other aspects of social life. Since this is true, there could not be the same reaction in China against the introduction of new thought that there was in the West. The introduction of modern science caused deep-seated conflict in the West, conflict which lasted hundreds of years; but when the same ways of thinking were introduced into China, Chinese society did not see them as revolutionary at all."

'Science and the moral life'
"With the development of modern science the relative amount of attention devoted to the humanities has been reduced, and greater emphasis is devoted to the objective world in which we live. The tendency has been to abandon dogmatic methods of instruction, such as indoctrination in old beliefs and traditions and memorization of the Chinese classics."
"Since I arrived in China many people have asked me how China can import Western material civilization to develop her economy, and at the same time forestall the difficulties which material developments have brought in their wake in the West. It is true that in the Western world the development of material civilization has been accompanied by negative outcomes such as acquisitiveness and cruelty, contention between capital and labor, and strikes and lockouts. Today, however, we will explore the positive influences of the development of modern science, and identify those aspects of development which can help us overcome the difficulties with which we are confronted."

'Science and knowing'
"I have been told that there is a Chinese proverb to the effect that 'to know is easy, to act is difficult'. This is just the opposite of the experimental method, for in this method it is only after we have acted upon a theory that we really understand it. There can be no true knowledge without doing."

'Science and education'
"The other way would be for the Chinese people to start now to prepare themselves to cope with the situation which is going to emerge in the next fifty years. The Chinese can popularize education in science, and make scientific knowledge and scientific method available to all people, to that everybody can benefit equally from the development of science."

'Elementary and secondary education'
'Geography and history'
'Vocational education'
"The problem of labor unrest is a serious one throughout the world; I'm sure you are all aware of this. The problem is not by any means solely one of hours and wages; a fundamental source of trouble is that so many workers have no interest in their work, and this is true because they have no opportunity to make use of their knowledge and their intelligence. Workers will not be satisfied with material rewards alone. This is a particularly important problem in present-day China, as she enters into a period of rapid industrial development. The intellectuals in the universities understand the importance of the problem; they must plan for social reconstruction in such a way that workers in the future will have full opportunity for intellectual development. If you can do this, China may not have to contend with the labor problems which trouble European countries and the United States. Lawyers, teachers, and other professionals are interested in their work because they have the opportunity for intellectual development. It is only the workers – and not even all of them – who have no interest in their work. The new leaders of China must direct their attention to this
problem."
'Moral education: the individual aspect'
'Moral education: the social aspects' [DewJ5,Kee3]
The beginning of the modern age in China dates from that bloody episode, the Boxer
Convulsion. Its outbreak signalized the supreme endeavor of old China to have done once for
all with the unwelcome intruder, so that it might return untroubled to its self-sufficiency. Its
close marked the recognition that the old China was doomed, and that henceforth China must
live its life in the presence of the forces of western life, forces intellectual, moral, economic,
financial, political. With its usual patience China set out to adapt itself to the inevitable. But
in this case, something more than a patient passivity was necessary. China learned in 1900
that she had to adjust herself to the requirements imposed by the activities of western peoples.
Every year since then she has been learning that this adjustment can be effected only by a
readjustment of her own age-long customs, that she has to change her historic mind and not
merely a few of her practices. Twenty years have passed and the drama does not seem to be
advancing. China seems to be marking time. As with the drama of the Chinese stage, the main
story is apparently lost in a mass of changing incidents and excitements that lack movement,
climax and plot.
But the foreign interpreter comes to the scene with a mind adapted to the quick tempo of the
West. He expects to see a drama unfold after the pattern of the movie. He is not used to
history enacted on the scale of that of China. When he hastily concludes that nothing is doing,
or rather that although something new and unexpected happens every day, everything is
moving in an aimless circle, he forgets that twenty years is but a passing moment in a history
that has already occupied its four thousand years. How can a civilization that has taken four
thousand years to evolve, that has crept about and absorbed every obstacle hitherto
encountered, that has countless inner folds of accumulated experience within itself, quickly
find itself in new courses? We talk glibly about the importance of the problem of the Pacific,
and even the school boy can quote Seward, Hay and Taft. But what do we suppose this
problem to be? One that concerns a superficial waste of mobile waters? No, the real problem
of the Pacific is the problem of the transformation of the mind of China, of the capacity of the
oldest and most complicated civilization of the globe to remake itself into the new forms
required by the impact of immense alien forces.
Analogies, especially when they are obvious, are as deceptive in the field of political thinking
as they long ago proved in natural science. The tempting comparison of the future of China, in
its reaction to western ideas and institutions, to the record of Japan is misleading. The
difference of scale between a small island and a vast continental territory makes the
 correspon dence impossible. China emerged from feudalism two thousand years ago, but
without at the same time becoming a national state in the sense familiar to us. Japan's
emergence coincided with its opening to the West, so that its internal condition and the
external pressure from other nations enabled it to take the form of an absolute state (with
certain constitutional trimmings) externally similar to states produced in the evolution out of
feudalism of modern Europe. The development of a strong centralized state, with unified
administration and militaristic protection, was as easy for Japan as it is difficult for China.
More fundamental is the difference in national psychology. Something over a thousand years
ago Japan took on Chinese civilization via Korea and yet remained essentially Japanese. For
the past sixty years it has been taking on western civilization. Yet the writers and thinkers
most characteristically Japanese tell you that Japan is not westernized in heart or mind.
Though it borrows wholesale western technique in science, industry, administration, war and
diplomacy, it borrows them with the deliberate intention of thereby strengthening the resisting
power of its own traditional policies. It acknowledges without reserve the superiority of
western methods, but these superior methods are to be used to maintain eastern ideals
intrinsically superior to the foreign. This may seem to the foreigner an evidence of the conceit
often associated with Japan, but the retort is easy: Is the European complacent conviction of
superiority anything more than the conceit of prejudice? At all events, this doubleness of
Japanese life, its combination of traditional aims and moral ways with the externals of foreign
skill and specialized knowledge, accounts for the impression of duplicity which so many carry
away from contact with contemporary Japan.
It is to be doubted whether such a dualism, such inconsistency of inner and outer life, can be
long kept up. Yet its successful achievement marks the record of Japan in its relations to
western civilization. And it is precisely this sort of thing which cannot happen in China. She
has evolved, not borrowed, her civilization. She has no great knack at successful borrowing.
Her problem is one of transformation, of making over from within. Educated Chinese will
already tell you that if you wish intact survivals of old China, you must go to Japan—and
Japanese tell you much the same thing, though with quite a different accent and import. The
visitor is struck by the fact that it is in the public buildings and schools of Japan, not of China,
that the eye everywhere sees the old Confucianist mottoes, especially those of the reactionary
and authoritative type. China with all its backwardness and its confusion and weakness is
more permeated today with western contemporary thought than is Japan. There is some
significance in the fact that while the circulation of President Wilson's war speeches was
legally forbidden in Japan, they have furnished for the past two years China's best seller.
There will be many to say that Japan's retention of the ideas that she took from China in the
best days of the latter's history, and then protected against deterioration, is the cause of Japan's
strength, and that China's decay is precisely because she has permitted the infiltration of
ideals and ideas that are foreign and consequently destructive. This may be true. I am not here
concerned to deny it. In any case, it illustrates our proposition: China must run a course
radically different from that of Japan.

There will either be decay and disintegration, or thoroughgoing inner transformation. There
will not be adoption of western external methods for immediate practical ends, because the
Chinese genius does not lie in that direction.

Japan's influence upon China has been enormous. The westerner who has not studied the
situation is quite unaware of the extent to which China after the Russo-Japanese war in
particular took over Japanese administrative and educational methods. But it is already
obvious that they are not working here as they worked in Japan. A large part of the present
intellectual and moral crisis in China is due to reaction against this factor in Chinese life.

Doubtless it is artificially strengthened just now by immediate political causes. But beneath
this surface there is a general intellectual ferment, and a belief that China must resort not to
Japanese copies of western forms, but to the original sources of western moral and intellectual
inspiration. And the recourse is not for the sake of getting models to pattern herself after, but
to get ideas, intellectual capital, with which to renovate her own institutions.

National conceit, national vanity, is a sealed book to the outsider. We are sure that our own is
only just pride and self-respect, and that the foreigner's is either ridiculous or a mark of
offensive contempt and dangerous hostility to our own cherished ways of life. But dubious as
is generalization on such matters, one is struck by certain differences in the group
self-consciousness of Japan and China. Its quality is perhaps suggested in certain comments
which they pass not infrequently upon each other. A Japanese will tell you that the Chinese do
not care what other persons think of them. A Chinese says that Japan has no sense of its 'face'.
The two criticisms are enough alike to be intriguing. But it may be suggested in explanation
that Chinese complacency is the deeper seated and hence is not so acute. It is fundamental and
taken for granted. It does not need to be asserted in special instances. As long as the Chinese
retain unimpaired their own judgment of themselves, their own reputation with themselves,
their face is saved, and what others think is negligible. On the other hand, it is humiliating to
them to borrow as Japan does. It would be a confession of absence of inner resources. When
Japan engages foreign experts, she is interested in results, and so gives them a free hand till
she has learned what they have to give. China engages the foreign expert—and then
courteously shelves him. The difference is typical of a difference in attitude toward western
life. It is a large part of the cause of Japan's rapid progress and of China's backwardness. The
Japanese naturally places himself in the stead of the western spectator and is acutely
conscious of the criticisms the beholder might pass upon what he sees. He tries to make over
the spectacle to satisfy the demands of the western onlooker. He reserves his deeper pride for
his national ideals. The Chinese scarcely cares what the foreigner may think of what he sees.
He even brings the skeletons in his closet cheerfully forward for the visitor to gaze at. The
complacency or conceit involved in this attitude has enormously retarded the advance of
China. It has made for a conservative hugging of old traditions, and a belief in the inherent
superiority of Chinese civilization in all respects to that of foreign barbarians. But it has also engendered a power of objective criticism and self-analysis which is rarely met in Japan. The educated Chinese who dissect the institutions and customs of his own country does it with a calm objectivity which is unsurpassable. And the basic reason, I think, is the same national pride. His institutions may not stand the criticism very well, but the people who produced these institutions are intrinsically invulnerable. They produced them, and when they get around to it they will create some new ones better adapted to the conditions of present life. The faith of the Chinese in the final outcome of their country, no matter what the despair about the current state of things, reminds an American of a similar faith abounding in his own country.

We are brought around to our main contention. China's slackness with respect to borrowing the technique of the West in civil administration, public sanitation, taxation, education, manufacturing, etc., is quite compatible with an effort on her part to bring about a thoroughgoing transformation of her institutions through contact with western civilization. In this remaking she will appropriate rather than borrow. She will attempt to penetrate to the principles, the ideas, the intelligence, from which western progress has emanated, and to work out her own salvation through the use of her own renewed and quickened national mind. The task is an enormous one. Time is of the essence of the performance. Just because the task is to effect an inner modification rather than an outward adjustment, its execution will take a long time. Will the forces that are playing upon China from without, forces that have contemplated its territorial disintegration, that are desirous of dominating its policies and exploiting in their own behalf its natural resources, permit a normal evolution? Will they stand by to assist, or will they invade and irritate and deflect and thwart till there is a final climax of no one knows what tragic catastrophe? These are some of the elements in the great drama now enacting.

The baffling and 'mysterious' character of China to the West is genuine enough. But it does not seem to be due to any peculiarly dark and subtle psychology. Human nature as one meets it in China seems to be unusually human, if one may say so. There is more of it in quantity and it is open to view, not secreted. But the social mind, the political mind, has been subjected for centuries to institutions which are not only foreign to present western customs, but which have no historic precedent. Neither our political science nor our history supplies any system of classification for understanding the most characteristic phenomena of Chinese institutions. This is the fact which makes the workings of the Chinese mind inscrutable to the uninitiated foreigner, and which makes it necessary to describe so many things in contradictory linguistic terms. The civilization itself is not contradictory, but in its own self-consistency it includes things which in western life have been sharply opposed. Then there are intermediate forms, political missing links, which to our grasp must prove elusive; they are vague because we have no comparable forms by which to define and interpret them. Yet the Chinese mind thinks, of course, as naturally in terms of its customs and conventions as we think in ours. We merely forget that we think in terms of customs and traditions which habituation has engrained; we fancy that we think in terms of mind, pure and simple. Taking our mental habits as the norm of mind, we find the ways of thinking that do not conform to it abnormal, mysterious and tricky. We can get the key to mental operations only by studying social antecedents and environment, and this truth holds pre-eminendy in an old civilization like the Chinese. We have to understand beliefs and traditions to understand acts, and we have to understand historic institutions to understand beliefs.

It is clear enough that the Korean question is quite pivotal in many of the most urgent external political questions of Asia. Yet Mr. Holcombe has told how the question was complicated in earlier days by the misconceptions which formed the basis of dealing with it by western nations. They knew that there was something of a relation of dependency of Korea upon China. They assumed the kind of relationship with which the West was acquainted, that of suzerain and vassal. When China declined to bear the responsibility of enforcing certain demands upon Korea as being out of her authority, the western nations thought that China was either insincere or else disclaimed all political jurisdiction. That there should be a genuine relationship of dependency, but of an advisory, homiletic, grandfatherly type, was beyond the scope of western precedent and understanding. The early relations of western diplomacy with
the Imperial Court at Peking are a record of similar misunderstandings. There were all the insignia of royalty over China, extending even to despotic power. In relation to happenings in the provinces, therefore, it was natural to endow the 'Government' at Peking with all the attributes of sovereignty as that is constituted in Europe. That the central government (beyond certain well-established relations of taxation and appointment of civil service) sustained mainly a ceremonial and hortatory connection with a large part of China was beyond conception. These grosser misunderstandings could be multiplied in considering almost every detail of Chinese institutional life. It has to be understood in terms of itself, not translated over into the classifications of an alien political morphology.

The story of the difficulties that had to be overcome in the introduction of railways into China is perhaps the best known of Chinese incidents. But it bears retelling because it affords a typical illustration of the fact that the chief obstacle in the effective contact of West and East is intellectual and moral. Opposition to railways was not a matter of routine conservatism, blind sluggish opposition to the new just because it was new. The Chinese have the normal amount of curiosity, and perhaps even more than the normal amount of practical sense of the advantage to be gained by a novelty which does not conflict with traditional beliefs. A difficulty presented itself in getting a clear right of way for railways, on account of the graves, which, from the western standpoint, are scattered at random. But from the Chinese standpoint, they are located with the utmost science, and to disturb them is to throw out of balance the whole system of environmental influences that affect health and good crops. Moreover, the graves are the centre of the system of ancestral worship, and that is the centre of civic organization. The tale might have been invented to show how completely the forces to be reckoned with are intellectual and moral, and how completely they are bound up with the structure of life. Without a change of national mind it is hopeless to suppose that China can go forward prosperously because of intercourse with the West.

It is a rash enterprise to form a generalization about the factors of the Chinese popular psychology that count most, whether positively or negatively, in the task of regenerating China. But the strong points of a people, as of individual character, lie close to its weak ones. So perhaps it is safe to say that the promise of China's rebirth into full membership in the modern world is found in its democratic habits of life and thought, provided we add to the statement another: the peculiar quality of this democracy also forms the strongest obstacle to the making over of China in its confrontation by a waiting, restless and greedy world. For while China is morally and intellectually a democracy of a paternalistic type, she lacks the specific organs by which alone a democracy can effectively sustain itself either internally or internationally. China is in a dilemma whose seriousness can hardly be exaggerated. Her habitual decentralization, her centrifugal localisms, operate against her becoming a nationalistic entity with the institutions of public revenue, unitary public order, defence, legislation and diplomacy that are imperatively needed. Yet her deepest traditions, her most established ways of feeling and thinking, her essential democracy, cluster about the local units, the village and its neighbors. The superimposition of a national state, without corresponding transformation of local institutions (or better without an evolution of the spirit of local democracies into national scope) gives us just what we now have in China: A nominal republic governed by a military clique, maintained in part by foreign loans made in response to a bartering away of national property and power, and in part by bargainings with provincial leaders whose power rests upon their control of an army and the ability this control gives them to levy on industry and wealth. In fact, we have a state which, if it were taken statically, if it were frozen, would reproduce the evils of the old despotism with new ones added, and which can be saved only because it has released popular forces that make for something better. But it remains to organize these popular forces, to give them play, to build for them regular channels of operation.

Up to the present western thought has confined itself to the more obvious, the more structural, factors of the problem. These are naturally the problems most familiar in occidental political life. They are such things as the adjustment of the power and authority of the central government to that of local and regional governments; the problem of the relations of the executive and legislative forces in the government; the revision of legal procedure and law to
eliminate arbitrariness and personal discretion. But after all, such matters are symptoms, effects. To try to reorganize China by beginning with them is like solving an engineering problem by skilful juggling. The real problem is how the democratic spirit historically manifest in the absence of classes, the prevalence of social and civil equality, the control of individuals and groups by moral rather than physical force—that is, by instruction, advice and public opinion rather than definitive legal methods—can find an organized expression of itself. And the problem, I repeat, is unusually difficult because traditionally, in the habits of beliefs as well as of action, these forces out of which the transformation of China must grow are opposed to organization on a nation-wide scale. Take a conspicuous example. To maintain itself as a nation among other nations of the contemporary world, China needs a system of national finance, of national taxation and revenues. But the effort to institute such a system does not merely meet a void. It has to meet deeply entrenched local customs, so firmly established that to interfere with them may mean the overthrow of all central government. To put another system of taxation into force requires the operation of the very national organs which depend upon a national system of public revenues. This is a fair example of the vicious circles that circumscribe all short-cut systems of reform in China. It is another evidence that the development must be a transforming growth from within, rather than either an external superimposition or a borrowing from foreign sources.

There are many, including a rather surprising number of Chinese as well as foreigners, who think that China can get set on her feet and become able to move for herself only by undergoing a period of foreign guardianship or trusteeship. The feeling is sedulously fostered by some persons in a neighboring island, and there is some undoubted response in China, though much less than there would be had the point of view not been unduly identified with the point of a bayonet. There are others who look to some western democracy or to the League of Nations to exercise the needed guardianship. We may waive the question whether at the present time there exists in the world a sufficient amount of disinterested intelligence to perform such a job of trusteeship. We stay on safe ground if we confine ourselves to saying that to be successful such a guardian would have to confine his efforts to stimulating, encouraging and expediting the democratic forces acting from within. And since such a task is almost entirely intellectual and moral, the guardianship is not necessary provided that China can be guaranteed time of growth protected from external attempts at disintegration. All that is necessary is a sufficient international decency and sufficient enlightened selfishness to give China the ad interim protection. She may have to sink deeper yet into the slough of confusion before she can get upon firm ground and move about freely. There is only harm in underestimating the seriousness of the task.

The evolution of Japan, as I have already said, offers no fair precedent. The problem is even more perplexing than that of the change of feudal into modern Europe. For medieval Europe was not civilized in the sense in which old China is civilized. There was not the inertia and weight of institutions wrapped up in the deepest feelings and most profound thoughts of the people that is found in China. Moreover, the European transition could take its own time to work itself out. That of China has to be accomplished in the face of the impatient, mobile western world, which, if it brings aid, also brings a voracious appetite. To the outward eye roaming in search of the romantic and picturesque, China is likely to prove a disappointment. To the eye of the mind it presents the most enthralling drama now anywhere enacting. [DewJ4]
Is it possible for a Westerner to understand Chinese political psychology? Certainly not without a prior knowledge of the historic customs and institutions of China, for the institutions have shaped the mental habits, not the mind the social habits. The West approaches all political questions with ideas composed on the pattern of a national state, with its sovereignty and definite organs, political, judicial, executive and administrative, to perform specific functions. We have even made history over to fit into this pattern. We have taken European political development as a necessary standard of normal political evolution. We have made ourselves believe that all development from savagery to civilization must follow a like course and pass through similar stages. When we find societies that do not agree with this standard we blandly dismiss them as abnormalities, as survivals of backward states, or as manifestations of lack of political capacity. Approached with such preconceptions, Chinese institutions and ideas are often given up as a bad job and as a case of arrested development. In actual fact, they mark an extraordinary development in a particular direction, only one so unfamiliar to us that we dispose of them as a mass of hopeless political confusion and corruption, or a striking object of what happens when there happens to be even a high code of ethics without the blessings of a divine revelation. The attempt to read Chinese institutions in terms of western ideas has resulted in failures of understanding and of action from the very beginnings of our contact. For example, in the early days of intercourse there was ground of complaint of the treatment received by western shipwrecked sailors on Korean coasts. The Foreign Offices knew that there existed some tributary relation between Korea and China. They interpreted this relation of dependence, as Mr. Holcombe has pointed out, in the way familiar to them. They thought of the connection as that of feudal suzerain and vassal. Hence they demanded that China make its dependent behave. When China disclaimed authority, they thought that this was either equivalent to a renunciation of all relationship, or else a wilful piece of deceit in a characteristic endeavor to evade just responsibility. They had no precedent for a relationship which, while one of genuine dependence, was moral and advisory in nature. The whole early history of the dealings of western nations with the Court at Peking is full of similar misconceptions. There was an undoubted monarch. The monarchy was even of the despotic kind; there were none of the checks of constitutional and representative institutions familiar to the western mind. Hence all the attributes of political sovereignty, external and internal, were attributed to the Court. Here again there was no precedent for conceiving of a dynastic rule which was a combination of a primitive tribute-levying empire and an authority of a moralistic, homiletic, hortatory kind. And as we go from such external aspects to deeper conditions we find that China can be understood only in terms of the institutions and ideas which have been worked out in its own historical evolution. The central factor in the Chinese historic political psychology is its profound indifference to everything that we associate with the state, with government. One inclines to wonder sometimes why the anarchists of the pacifist and philosophic type have not seized upon China as a working exemplification of their theories. Probably the reason is that being preoccupied with the problem of active abolition of government, they have not been able to conceive of anarchy which should be only a profound apathy towards government. Or else they, too, have been misled by the popular association of anarchy with extreme freedom and mobility, and could not imagine it in connection with the stagnation attributed to China.

According to literary records, the following verse is the oldest poem in the language—a song put into the mouth of a farmer: Dig your well and drink its water; Plow your fields and eat the harvest; What has the Emperor's might to do with me? China is still agricultural, as it was in the bygone centuries. Its farmers still go about their own business of tilling and eating, marrying and giving in marriage, begetting and dying. As of old, they attend to their own affairs, and the power of Emperor or President concerns them not. Governors come and go, and fuss about their petty intrigues of glory and greed. But they do not govern the farmers, who are the mass of the population. The only governance known to them is that of nature, the rules of the immemorial change of seasons, the fateful laws of birth and death, of seed-corn and harvest, of flood and pestilence. In the words of perhaps their oftenest quoted proverb, 'Heaven is high and the Emperor far away'. The implication is that earth is close and intimate,
the family and village nearby. M. Hue tells an incident that dates from 1851; it might, however, have happened at any period in the long history of China. After the recent death of the Emperor, he endeavored without success to engage his fellow guests at a roadside tavern in a discussion of political prospects and possibilities. There was no response, though he exhausted his ingenuity. Finally one of the Chinese replied: 'Listen to me, my friend. Why should you trouble your heart and fatigue your head with all these vain surmises? The Mandarins have to attend to affairs of state; they are paid for it. Let them then earn their money. But we should be great fools to torment ourselves about what does not concern us. We should be great fools to want to do political business for nothing.' And the anecdote continues: 'That is very conformable to reason,' cried the rest of the company. Whereupon they pointed out to us that our tea was getting cold and our pipes were out. 'The state, the government, was a special business or trade, less interesting and less important for the mass of the people than ordinary affairs. It was, however, lucrative to those who specialized in it; let them carry its burdens. Meanwhile not merely the wedding and funeral, the sowing and reaping, concerned intimately the life of the people, but even the social consolations of the teacup and the tobacco-pipe were of more importance than affairs of state. If the people were indifferent to government, the government, which in our western terminology we have to call the state, reciprocated. In theory it was the representative of Heaven, and consequently owned the earth, namely, the soil, and was the symbolic cause of its fertility, exercising a beneficial paternal influence upon the prosperity of the country. In fact, like Heaven itself, the government was high above. In earlier days Heaven may have directly intervened in the affairs of earth, but for outnumbered centuries in later days it had remained discreetly aloof, satisfied with relations long ago established and interrupting the affairs of earth only at great crises. Except for a few purposes well understood by custom, the central government was irrelevant to the life of the people. It was a Court, and its dignity, prestige, ceremony and pleasures had to be maintained. The material side of this life required material supplies and money. The ideal life, the glory and supremacy of the reigning dynasty, could be satisfied symbolically and ceremonially, as the spirits had learned to be satisfied with symbolic money and imitations of servants, animals and food. The primary material function of government was then to receive a tribute from the products of the earth, partly in kind, partly in money. The amount was not onerous, and long custom had converted the tax into part of the regular order of nature, though, like the crops and other phenomena of nature, it was subject to unexpected ups and downs. The moral and ceremonial sovereignty was incarnated in the officialdom of viceroys, governors, heralds and other functionaries, who represented the Imperial Court, and who communicated to the people its mandates and exhortations, composed in the best literary style and manifesting the continuous benevolent solicitude of the representative of Heaven for their morals. These morals were, in turn, the source of the prosperity of the country and of the stability of the Empire. These officials also had to lead a life of a certain symbolic grandeur and glory which cost money, but taxation was kept within limits prescribed by custom, and as a rule the burden was not heavy. Pains were taken that it should fall upon the well-to-do as far as possible, thus serving the double end of keeping down the power of possible rivals and of not arousing the disfavor of the masses. It is possible to trace in the old Chinese theory of politics the survivals of an original theocracy. But in China, even more than in Europe in its most deistic days, God, or Heaven, was remote, contenting itself with a general benevolent oversight. Its lordship was of an absentee nature. And the Court which represented Heaven was contented to imitate the latter’s non-interference with the details and customs of life. The result was that for all practical purposes each province was an independent state, composed, in turn, of a large number of petty republics called villages. In 1900 an English writer, made competent by long residence and intimate experience, wrote: 'Each of China’s eighteen provinces is a complete state in itself. Each province has its own army, navy, system of taxation and its own social customs. In connection only with the salt trade and the navy certain concessions have to be made to one another under a certain modicum of imperial control.' These independent units are traditionally called provinces. But, as the quotation shows, they might have been called principalities, save that they had no orderly lineage of princes. China was not even a
confederation, much less a national state or an imperial state, in the sense which history has given those terms in the West. Again we have no precedents by which to interpret and understand such a situation. We are acquainted with empires that left local customs undisturbed and that contented themselves with levying tribute and exacting booty. But they were military powers, and always existed in unstable equilibrium. They never became so interwoven with local custom as to be a part of the established order of nature and able to dispense with military support. But China has worked out a scheme of remarkable static equilibrium—the most stable known to history. The political life of China went on essentially undisturbed, even though rebellions overthrew dynasties. Such rebellions were themselves as much a part of the established order of Heaven or Nature as was an occasional flood or plague. All such crises had their natural causes and were proper and normal, however uncomfortable or destructive they might be. The texture of life was unchanged; it continued to exhibit the same patterns. The equilibrium was a human and internal one, a moral one, not one maintained by external pressure or military force. The actual government of China was a system of nicely calculated personal and group pressures and pulls, exactions and 'squeezes', neatly balanced against one another, of assertions and yieldings, of experiments to see how far a certain demand could be forced, and of yielding when the exorbitance of the demand called out an equal counter-pressure. Long before the time of Sir Isaac Newton, China worked out a demonstration in the field of politics, of the law that action and reaction are equal and in opposite directions. It exemplified the working of the principle in every aspect of human association. Such a social system implies a high state of civilization. It produces civilized persons almost automatically. For the essence of civility, or of civilization, is the ability to live consciously along with others, aware of their expectations, demands and rights, of the pressure they can put upon one, while also conscious of just how far one can go in response in exerting pressure upon others. The Chinese, as long as they were left undisturbed by other peoples, had all the complex elements of the social equation figured out with unparalleled exactness. Their social calculus, integral and differential, exceeded anything elsewhere in existence. This fact, and this fact only, accounts for the endurance of China for almost four thousand years of recorded history. Then there came the eruption of forces from the outside which were radically new, which were unprecedented, for which the social calculus provided no rules. They were not, strictly speaking, human; they were physical forces of a strange and incalculable kind—battleships, artillery, railways, strange machines and chemicals. At first China was complacent. It remembered the numerous eruptions and invasions which had broken into its system in the past, and recalled how they had been subdued by ab-sorption, how they had been gradually worked into the patterns of adjustments, demands, concessions, compromises and intercourses which constitute China. But gradually it became evident that old formulae would not apply, that a radically new force had been introduced. And it gradually became apparent that the new physical agencies and forces which were so irresistible were themselves the tools and designs of an unaccustomed social and political order. China, a civilization, was confronted by a civilization which was organized as China was not, into national states. The consequences of this contact are written in every problem, internal as well as external, that occupies China today. There is a story of an intelligent Chinese who asked a foreigner to explain to him the nature and amount of the indemnity exacted from China by Japan after the successful war waged by the latter about the Korean question. After hearing the explanation he reflected a while to take in the full force of the matter, and then remarked in a contented way, 'Well, that is the Manchus' affair; it doesn't concern us. They will have to pay, not we.' The remark appears to indicate not merely the extraordinary indifference to politics already spoken of, but an equally extraordinary political stupidity. But it is stupidity only to the mind built after the pattern of western political institutions. From the standpoint of Chinese customs the remark was intelligent. Relations with foreign states were the business of the Imperial Court. And any expenses consequent upon such relations had to be met out of the purse of that Court. In the established system of taxation and revenues, the funds accruing from the tariff on imports from foreign countries belonged to the Imperial Treasury. It was nobody's business what the Court did with them. It was a logical conclusion that any debit item was also the exclusive affair of the ruling
dynasty. The logic was good. But it was based upon the past, upon premises that no longer hold good. The Japanese Indemnity was followed by the Boxer Indemnity. The whole revenue system was thrown out of balance. The long-established Imperial balance of expenditures and receipts was destroyed. Yet any radical change in the established system of taxation was practically out of the question, entirely out of the question in any immediate or abrupt way such as the situation required. It would have wrenched the whole social system out of order. Even such changes as had to be introduced had a large part to play in the dissatisfaction with the Manchu dynasty, which led to its overthrow. There was not merely the ordinary opposition felt anywhere to a marked increase in taxation. There was not merely the interference with custom which for immemorial ages had set limits in the game of exactions and resistance. There was an indissoluble association of taxation with the peculiar prerogatives of the Imperial Court, none too popular at best. There was an equally fixed association of increased taxes with 'squeezes' on the part of officialdom, with corruption which was not exactly corruption if kept within certain limits of percentages, but which was intolerable when it surpassed them. The internal system of taxation, adequate to all internal emergencies, was not elastic in the face of the externally induced crisis. Foreign loans had to be resorted to. The remedy increased the disease. It gave the opportunity for more and more intervention from without; it invited a multiplication of precisely those dependencies upon foreign power which were the original root of the difficulty. And gradually the entire internal equilibrium has been upset in consequence of the contact with foreign powers. It cannot be regained without a radical transformation of China's historic political system. It has to nationalize itself in some fashion in order to meet the conditions imposed by its intercourse with other peoples who are organized into national states. What is true of the matter of taxation and revenues is true of almost every phase of Chinese life. Public finance but gives a typical example. There has been discussion of whether the Chinese have national loyalty, whether they have patriotism. Here also our words in their accustomed meanings betray us. In its literal sense the word 'nation' is connected in derivation with the word for birth. In the sense of community thus implied, the Chinese are certainly a nation. But in its acquired historical meaning, nation means a people with a certain political organization, a people claiming or possessing sovereignty of a centralized sort over a certain territory. And this is what the Chinese have not, but have to acquire in the face of sharp demands from foreign nations. It is contrary to their own social inertia and momentum, which has been acquired in minute and complicated ways through centuries of adjustments. Patriotism means love of country. In the sense of love of their earth, their native soil, the Chinese are perhaps the most patriotic of all existing peoples. The love may not be acute as with the Japanese, as ardent as with the Poles, but it is inter-woven with every detail of life. It is not so much a sentiment, a fact of consciousness, as an unbreakable habit of life. Attachment to soil and birthplace is quite a different thing from an effectively organized allegiance to the state, that political entity which is constituted by political means rather than by matter-of-course habits of daily life and intercourse. It is customary to try to escape from the dilemma of a spontaneous, pervasive and unquestioned love of country that exists without the familiar manifestations of public spirit and political nationalism, by saying that the Chinese have a strong sense and pride of race which does for them what patriotism does for western peoples. Literally, this will hardly work. The Chinese regard themselves as five races, not one, as their flag testifies. In a certain genuine sense the Chinese are profoundly indifferent to race and racial distinctions. They have not been infected as have the Europeans and Japanese with the ethnological virus. While the Revolution was expedited by the fact that the Manchu dynasty was foreign, yet this ground of objection had had no effect for over two hundred years. It became significant only after western contact had aroused nationalistic feeling. What the Chinese abundantly possess is community of life, a sense of unity of civilization, of immemorial continuity of customs and ideals. The consciousness of a unity of pattern woven through the whole fabric of their existence never leaves them. To be a Chinese is not to be of a certain race nor to yield allegiance to a certain national state. It is to share with countless millions of others in certain ways of feeling and thinking, fraught with innumerable memories and expectations because of long-established modes of adjustment and intercourse. This consciousness becomes loyalty,
patriotism, in our sense in just the degree in which it gets transferred to the idea of a national state made after the model familiar to us, a state with an army and navy, a system of regular taxation and public revenue, an organized system of legislation, judiciary and administration, a subordination of all local powers to a central power, and all the other paraphernalia of sovereignty which we take for granted. It is not easy to transform a traditional feeling into nationalism, and then attach it to an object which is largely non-existent, an object of faith rather than of sight. For this reason nationalistic sentiment has tended to take an anti-foreign color among the Chinese. In spite of the Boxer outbreak and other violent demonstrations against aliens, it may be doubted whether there has been a strong hostility against the foreigner as such. The Chinese, one surmises, are rather unusually tolerant. Their amiable live-and-let-live policy is applied all around. Their normal attitude is that of indifferece to strangers rather than of aggressive antagonism. But conditions were such that about the only way in which they could show their devotion to their own civilization was negative. It was the outsider who was disturbing it. The Chinese lacked the positive organs of national life through which to resist foreign encroachments. Their loyalty to their own customs was therefore bound, one might say, to take the irregular and disorderly form of attack upon foreign residents. There are few who think that the Boxer days are likely to recur. The Chinese are intelligent, and they learned the hopelessness of holding their own by such methods. But it is still true that their national feeling can be aroused and concentrated more readily for purposes of resistance and opposition to foreign nations than for constructive purposes. There are fine illustrations of this fact in recent Chinese international relations. There can be little doubt that the Government had officially instructed its delegates to the Peace Conference in Versailles to sign the treaty, recognizing though it did the Japanese appropriation of German rights in Shantung. National sentiment was, however, tremendously aroused. If Japan had set out to instigate a new national spirit which should overwhelm the old local provincialisms, she could not have proceeded in a more effectual way to accomplish the purpose. The people took the matter out of the hands of the Government. By cablegrams to Paris, by telegraph to Peking, by mass-meetings and agitations, finally by a strike of students and then of the mercantile guilds in the larger cities, they made it clear that national sentiment would regard as traitors all those who should take part in signing the treaty. It was an extraordinarily impressive exhibition of the existence and the power of national feeling in China. It was all the more impressive because it had to work without organized governmental agencies, and, indeed, against the resistance of deeply-intrenched pro-Japanese officialdom. If there still remained anywhere those who doubted the strength and pervasiveness of Chinese patriotism, the demonstration was a final and convincing lesson. But it took a great crisis of foreign menace to focus the feeling; Japan in the last two years has done for China what otherwise might have taken a generation more. But when the immediate task of preventing the signing of the treaty that gave away Chinese rights was performed, the feeling lapsed. Perhaps it remains equally intense, but it has lost in sureness of direction. The outward means and the established habits of thought required for positive determination of constructive national policies are still inchoate. Everyone knows that the chief instrumentality of foreign encroachment in China has been finance. Russia first conceived the policy of conquest by bank and railway, and other nations joined in. Japan, with her usual alertness, saw the point, and with her usual energy acted upon her perception. The question of finance remains pivotal in any positive national policy for China. Even if China had the capital to take care of her own developments, and she certainly has more than she has used, the denationalized customs work against loaning it to the Government. And lack of trust in the competency and honesty of the officials reinforces the other influences that tell against extending domestic credit for public needs. Clearly, an international financial consortium which should loan money to China in bulk without assigning in return special concessions and spheres of influence to any particular nation is the obvious solution. But it is extremely difficult to arouse any popular interest in this matter. It is, so to speak, too positive and too specialized. On the contrary, it is comparatively easy for interested parties to stir up opposition. They have only to keep saying that this is a move on the part of foreign powers to get complete subjugation of China, and national feeling is excited in the negative direction. The alternative, namely, foreign loans
from separate powers, in fact, Japan claiming specific rights and privileges in return, is not faced except by the more enlightened. The masses trust to a laissez-faire, happy-go-lucky policy of meeting each stringency as it arises, rather than of committing the country to some comprehensive scheme which, because of the organization involved in it, makes the fact of foreign influence obvious. Habituated to dealing with obstacles and dangers in a piecemeal way, playing off one force against another with great skill, the natural dread that all feel towards the unknown is felt towards organization on a large scale. And the fact that the organization is one on the part of foreign nationalism makes it appear particularly dreadful. And who can blame China in view of its past experiences with foreign influence? There is even now a small section which quite sincerely argues that it would be better to let Japan have Tsing-tao than to make it an international settlement. The situation is critical. The fear of coming against an organization of foreign nations was sufficient recently to defeat, at least for the time being, the proposition to unify the railways of China. Ultimately it would mean the development of a large national system under exclusive Chinese control. But for the time being it involved a certain amount of international control. Foreign nations interested in maintaining separate spheres were naturally hostile. But their easiest way of working was not to offer public opposition, but to play secretly, through domestic agencies profiting by the existing state of affairs, upon the national fears of China. The same forces are already at work attacking the proposed international consortium and may wreck it. In fact, they will almost certainly succeed in delaying it until it becomes a matter of dire necessity. Yet it seems almost axiomatic that as long as China is dependent upon foreign loans it is much better for her to be dependent upon a combination of powers that have agreed to forgo special privileges, and who will have to use their funds to build up China as a whole, than upon single separate powers that loan money only in response for special concessions and command of strategic points. These points are strategic not only economically, but in a political and military way. It seems at first sight very unreasonable that China should prefer to continue a system, or lack of system, which has brought her to the present pass. And it is unreasonable. But we need to understand that China has now reached a point of intense national feeling and a position where she can act with assurance as a nation. Feeling is feeling. It is comparatively easy to arouse national aspiration and national fears. It is not so easy to secure a national understanding of and agreement of any comprehensive or constructive plan of operations. And the reason is obvious, for there are no national institutions, no national organs, to supply the material of understanding and afford the basis of enduring faith and confidence. This union of intense national sentiment, with absence or lack of channels and organs of national action, describes the dilemma in which China finds itself today, both internally and externally. It is especially important that the United States should sympathetically comprehend the situation. Just now there is a warm wave of pro-American feelings, especially outside of the governmental circles, which have become involved in Japanese intrigues. It is genuine. Yet it is largely a rebound from the prevalent anti-Japanese feelings. It is in any case a national feeling, not a national idea. It will be subjected in the future to the forces which always operate to make feeling, as distinct from thought, a fluctuating affair. Because of past history and because of economic interests, the United States stands against the policy of partitioning China, whether overtly or by means of spheres of influence and special interests. That is all to the good with respect to China's feeling towards us. She also stands, as in the case of unifying railways and combined financial aid, for organized international assistance. With an ordinary amount of decency and good will, this policy should build up China rapidly and get her to the point where she can dispense with foreign control. But for reasons just explained, China will hesitate and object and postpone. She may conceivably completely balk, and prefer to continue the policy of playing one nation off against another, in spite of the fact that that will mean for the time being an increase of Japanese control. It is most important that America should understand the causes of this attitude and should be patient and persistent in its policy, instead of being swayed by an emotional gust of revulsion at ' ingratitude'. Revulsion and withdrawal of active interest on our part, because our advances and plans do not meet with an immediate and hearty approval, will only play into the hands of those countries who desire special and selfish rights in China, and who for this reason, and because of lack of faith in the
political capacity of the Chinese, always carry in the back of their heads a scheme of ultimate partition and subjection. We need to realize that it is just because the Chinese have great political capacity that the problem of national redirection is difficult and slow. For this capacity has been committed to definite lines which are contrary to those that fit into the present situation. It will help an intelligent sympathy to remember that China has not advanced on the path of modern political nationalism to the point where national feeling is warm and intense, but where definite organs of national thought and action are only in the early stage of formation. [DewJ18]

1919.10 John Dewey: Lecture 'Student self-government' at the Beijing Teachers College. [DewJ5]

Dear Folks.

Evelyns letter of Sept 1 came this morning just as we had about given up hope for this boat. Evelyn neednt worry about my getting buried in the past. I spend my mornings running a sewing woman, seeing about getting a horse and riding habit, knotting a bed quilt, and reading the magazines in the library. My afternoons are devoted to calls, curio rumaging, and bullying Mamma into helping me plan dinner parties. Its a gay life. The horse I have on shares with another girl, I dont know just how it is going to work out, I havent riden yet as there is no habit. I hope to be able to start when we get back from Taiyuanfu. Its perfect riding weather now, couldnt be nicer. The quilt is gradually getting done so I wouldnt be able to spend the rainy mornings that way much longer. The "first" calls are gradually getting done, it certainly is a chore, the new people are supposed to call on the old, we arent attempting to do them all, just the people at our legation, the more important Rockefeller and a few of the mishs. Mrs Price, one of the legation, has just come back from America and the afternoon she called on us she said she had made fourteen that afternoon.

Numerous things have happened since I last wrote. Tuesday afternoon we went to the dress rehearsal of the Confucian sacrifice. The temple is a beautiful one with courtyards full of wonderful old Lebanon cedars. It is in very good condition, an unusual thing in Chinese temples, as it was restored by Yuan Shi-kai when he was getting ready to be emperor. We got there early and saw them making the preparations. They had all sorts of musical instruments set out, huge stringed things that we decided must be like the biblical psalteries enormous drums, and frames of bells and triangles. They had a chorus of boys who chanted and went thru formal posturing known as dancing. There were dignified old parties in black satin trimmed with gold who ran around and kowtowed every now and then. They didnt have any animal there that day. It all finished off with the dignified old parties marching off with a speech to Confucius and what would be pieces of the animal. It was interesting and very impressive but we didnt understand it much. Most of the high officials were there, tho not the great president. Little Hsu, the power behind the throne, was there, but the Chinese we were with remarked in a casual way, "There goes little Hsu" when he had got all by and all we saw was his back in the distance. Thursday we rose at four in the morning and waited for the president to go by the house He almost never goes on the street as all the streets have to be cleared for him. We had received a police order telling us that no one was to leave the house after three until he had gone by. The soldiers were stationed about fifteen feet apart along the street, there were two or three in every door way, one came up stairs and turned on the light in the hall out side our door. They evidently didnt propose to have any one rush out and bomb the old gent. They had the street strewn with yellow sand in the old imperial way. After much waiting eighteen automobiles went tearing by, going about forty miles an hour The pres was in the last one, a closed car with four men on each running board. What I dont understand is how he got home, as all the soldiers and everything departed after him.

Thursday night the Smiths [Possibly William Roy Smith and Marion Parris Smith] came for a farewell dinner. Miss Carl came too She painted the old Empress Dowagers picture, lived in the palace for a year. She has the most interesting stories to tell and is a most entertaining person generally. The Smiths had to leave early to get their train. We are going to miss them very much.

Yesterday the rain came down in sheets and the streets were large rivers This morning was clear and lovely but its all clouded up again now and is cold as Greenland.

We are completely overcome at Evelyns style in living on West 56 street. As she didnt say anything about her plans we dont know when she will move in so I wont take any chances on this letter. We had a nice letter from Mrs Coleman and one from Miss Cross yesterday. Also I got one from Charles today.

Im slowly freezing to death so will sally forth for some exercise. Lots of love to you all.  
Lucy [DewJ3]
Of the millions who associate opium and China probably only few know, beyond a vague impression of England's part in an 'Opium War', that from the very beginning, the responsibility for the introduction and spread of the use of narcotics lies with foreign nations. Few know how repeated and consistent have been the struggles of responsible Chinese authorities to prevent the importation of the drug, nor the obstacles that officials of other nations have thrown in their way. Even when poppy growing became general throughout the Empire (and there is no denying that it did), fairness compels the acknowledgment that the Chinese had reached the conclusion that since it was impossible to prevent the introduction of opium from India, they might as well have a share in the profits themselves. In 1906 began the last great campaign against the growing of poppies and for the total eradication of the drug habit, cooperation of Great Britain regarding the importation of opium from India being secured. Even the foreigners who are most pessimistic regarding the capacity of the Chinese to carry through any general reform make an exception of the anti-opium fight. The vigor with which it was conducted was equalled by the ingenuity and skill with which offenders were detected and dealt with. What was accomplished in five years speaks wonders for the capacity of Chinese administration when it is in earnest, and for the adaptability of the Chinese people. There are few instances in history where such a sweeping reform was carried through so rapidly and thoroughly.

Belatedly and under the pressure of criticism and in opposition to the protest of business against 'sentimentalism', other countries agreed to cooperate with China. They forbade the exportation of opium save under strict regulations to secure legitimacy of use. China enforced as well as made these restrictions. Since 1905 only about forty ounces a year have passed through the Chinese customs. This amount is taken accordingly as the standard of proper medical use by physicians, hospitals and chemists. It is hard, however, for law and morals to keep up with the advance of science and business. The above figure cannot be taken to measure the state of the drug-using habit in China.

As the importation and use of opium decreased, science provided substitutes in the way of derivatives, especially morphia, heroin and codein, while cocaine was added from a new source. And the use of these forms of 'dope' is spreading so fast that they are likely to outdo the ravages of opium at its worst. Opium-smoking is expensive. It is an indulgence now confined to the wealthy. The use of the syringe is as cheap as that of the pipe is dear. Injections can be had for three coppers a 'shot' and the profit to the dealer at that rate is over a thousand per cent. Opium-smoking was an aristocratic vice; the needle reaches the coolies. It was not difficult to discover the opium-users. The dweller in any large city of the United States does not need to be told how difficult it is to detect the seller of forms of modem dope. Ingenuity when profits are at stake is not less in China than in America. On every hand one hears of the tricks employed in smuggling and distributing morphia and heroin. The sale is made easier because the Chinese are great takers of medicines, and the licensed practitioner in our sense hardly exists. Opium derivates are sold in all kinds of pills, and itinerant pedlars introduce pills and injections without the ignorant victim knowing what he is getting until after the habit is well fixed. And the weight of evidence is that the effects of morphia, cocaine and heroin are more completely demoralizing to the body, mind and character of the average dope user than were those of opium-smoking. Add the comparative minuteness of the dose for injections,—a single case of detected smuggling in Shanghai lately yielded enough for over twelve million 'shots'—and it is easy to see that the new menace is worse than the old. Since, however, the drugs now reach China only by the medium of smugglers, it might be thought that there is no longer national responsibility for forcing this evil on China—that it is now simply a matter of the individual wickedness of the smuggler and dealer. Unfortunately for the good repute of the western nations, such is not the case. Putting it mildly, carelessness and neglect in drawing and enforcing regulations regarding manufacture, transportation and exportation of opium products are such as to make the nations accomplices in guilt. In 1912 an international convention forbade the further exportation of morphia into China. Before this time the exportation from Great Britain into Japan was 30,000 ounces a year. This was a large enough amount in all conscience, and the most of it undoubtedly found its way to China. By
1917 it had jumped twenty-fold—to 600,000 ounces. Over fifty tons got from Scotland to Japan in four years, these figures being official custom statistics. It does not have to be pointed out that both the British and the Japanese governments knew that this amount was infinitely above legitimate needs—or that its destination was China, to which country exportation was nominally prohibited. But division of moral responsibility was at work. The British were far from the retail trade and the ultimate consumer. Their profits were in Indian revenue where the opium was raised, in Edinburgh the manufacturing centre, and in the shipping trade. The Japanese did not have (at that time) the responsibility for producing and exporting; they merely served as intermediaries. It is easy in such circumstances to pass on blame, and difficult to make an effective appeal to conscience. Only international cooperation would work. The Hague passed excellent resolutions—and Great Britain, the offender at the source, declared that she would put them into force when every other nation did. In 1917, however, the appeal to the conscience of the British government was sufficiently strong, so that regulations were put into effect by which opium derivatives could be shipped into Japan and its leased territory in Manchuria (the latter being one of the chief centres whence morphia reached the Chinese) only when licenses were given to the exporter. And these licenses were to be given only after receipt of a certificate from Japanese officials that the morphia was for medical use only, and was destined for consumption in Japan itself or its leased territory. The latter proviso made Japan an underwriter that the goods should not reach China. The next year there was a great falling off. Still in view of the fact that Japan was by this time manufacturing more than enough to supply its own medical needs, it is disconcerting to find that one hundred and fifty thousand ounces were imported into Japan. The fact argues an easy conscience somewhere. But this statement does not cover the ground. In the first place, Great Britain exacts no such license for exportation by means of parcel post—and a single postal package can easily carry stuff for a hundred thousand injections. British subjects in China accuse their home government of wilful omission and evasion. In the next place, the British authorities in both Hong Kong and Singapore farm out the opium product business, receiving in each place two millions of revenue annually for the concession. Now there are well established facts proving that the concessionaire can make his business pay only by getting contraband into China proper. It is obvious that no one would pay two millions a year for the privilege of making opium to be sold only in the city of Hong Kong. So many facilities are given to the concessionaire for smuggling into China that there are those who say that the British licensing regulations for the Japanese trade were adopted not for moral reasons but to protect the 'opium farmers' who were having difficulty in meeting Japanese competition in contraband and who appealed to the British government for protection in their rights. So much for Great Britain's share. As to Japan. Leaving out of the question the neglect of the government in Japan in issuing licenses, and the charges that advantage was taken of the lessened British trade to encourage poppy growing in Japan and Korea, there is the fact that for Japanese territory on Chinese soil, namely in the leased territory of “Dairen and vicinity” and in Tsingtao, licenses are issued by minor officials and irresponsible officials. In a single year there were imported 'for medical use only' in 'Dairen and vicinity' sixty-six thousand ounces of morphia. The figures are conclusive that the Japanese administration was an accomplice to making its Manchurian territory a point of departure for sending contraband into China. In general Japanese control of the retail and distributing trade has of late years become so complete that they have gradually come to be regarded as the chief if not the only sinners. One cause of present anti-Japanese feeling is found in the fact that Shantung has now become a centre for distributing dope. Now enters the American participation in the crime of poisoning China. The British require no license for exportation to the United States. Our laws are such that when the stuff arrives at one of our ports it is only necessary to put the goods into bond for transhipment to avoid payment of duty. And while the morphia could not be directly exported under our own laws into China, our laws regarding transhipment make no inquiry into the nature of the goods. They need only be described in a general way. All the morphia now manufactured in Scotland could readily pass through the United States into Japan thence to reach China illicitly if
labelled 'pharmaceutical products'. Remember they could not go direct to Japan from Great Britain. If this is allowed to continue after the attention of our custom officials and of Congress has been called to it, we share with Great Britain and Japan the burden of sinning against China.

But not all our guilt is indirect. The morphia seized in the recent smuggling case in Shanghai was all manufactured in Philadelphia—a fact verified in open court by a lawyer of the International Anti-Opium Association. It would be a criminal offense to ship this direct to China. But there is no law against shipment to Japan. American traffic through the two channels of British goods in bond and our own products has reached vast proportions already. The official statistics show that for the first five months of the current year, twenty-five thousand ounces of morphia reached the port of Kobe from American ports. But the Japan Chronicle, published in Kobe, is responsible for the statement that the manifestos of ships arriving in Kobe during the same period show about ninety thousand more ounces not appearing in the custom house returns. The conclusion is certain. This amount was transhipped in Kobe harbor to be smuggled into China. That this shows gross connivance on the part of Kobe port officials may be argued. But the primary responsibility is with the laws and administration of the United States. We have become a large partner in the contemptible business of drugging China at the time when China is making heroic efforts to emancipate herself from the narcotic evil.

Our holier than thou attitude towards Great Britain and Japan must be abandoned. We have as yet no vested industrial and commercial interest possessing great political influence. It requires only a slight amount of interest in the evils of the traffic and a slight amount of energy to frame laws and administrative regulations that will compel adequate registration of all opium products reaching American ports, and make it a criminal offense to transport such goods for re-export. We can easily take steps that will make it impossible for morphia and heroin of American production to be exported to Japan thence to reach China. We can see to it that our post-office at Shanghai cannot be employed for sending narcotics into China by parcel-post (as we do not do at the present, thus making ourselves criminal accomplices in the breaking of Chinese laws and the poisoning of the Chinese people).

The International Anti-Opium Society has worked out plans which if adopted would effectually control the whole nefarious traffic not only for China but for the world. These plans start from the fact that control from the side of retail distribution and the ultimate consumer are so difficult as to be almost hopeless. But control at the source is simple. The growth of poppies can be put under supervision, and every grain of raw opium that leaves them be accounted for and traced. It is possible to determine the amount of narcotics that is required for legitimate medical use. The manufacture of this necessary amount should be put under government licensing and constant inspection. Then by serial numbering of uniform packages and records of sale all distribution could be traced. No opium products are to be shipped anywhere to the Far East except upon receipt of a requisition from the importing country certifying to the intended use, and upon prior notification to that country of the nature and date of the shipment meeting the order.

Our own interest is not a purely altruistic one, nor is it confined to doing our obvious duty by China. We have the drug evil with us, and its growth in our country is one of the most disconcerting of present events. We cannot insure ourselves against this evil till we take the measures that will guarantee China against it. The laws and regulations for the control of importation, transhipment, exportation, manufacture and wholesale merchandizing that are needed to protect China from our partnership in the crime of undermining her life are the exact means of safeguarding our own health and morals. Until we have cleaned our own house we cannot take the part that we should take in urging upon other nations, especially Great Britain and Japan, effective international action. The Paris Conference promised China that the League of Nations would take up the opium and morphia traffic. Shall the United States continue its partnership in crime until forced by outside action to abandon it? Shall it enter the deliberations of the League of Nations Assembly with unclean hands? [DewJ17]
It will be recalled that the decision of the Versailles Conference as to Japan's claims in China was announced at the end of April. A few weeks after this time, when I was giving some lectures in one of the chief educational centres of China, the teachers and students were asked to hand in questions in writing. They responded in large numbers. The question asked most frequently, repeated over and over again in different terms, ran about as follows: 'During the war we were led to believe that with the defeat of Germany there would be established a new international order based on justice to all; that might would not henceforth make right in deciding questions between nations; that weak nations would get the same treatment as powerful ones—that, indeed, the war was fought to establish the equal rights of all nations, independently of their size or armed power. Since the decision of the peace conference shows that between nations might still makes right, that the strong nation gets its own way against a weak nation, is it not necessary for China to take steps to develop military power, and for this purpose should not military training be made a regular part of its educational system?' At every educational gathering since, this question has been uppermost.

The matter is not referred to here for discussion in connection with China. China can become a strong nation only through industrial and economic development. Any military efforts, apart from this development, would only prolong the present chaos, and at most create an hallucination as to national power. The implications, however, of the question come home to every one who favored the participation of the United States in the war on what are termed idealistic grounds. It comes with especial force to those who, strongly opposed to war in general, broke with the pacifists because they saw in this war a means of realizing pacific ideals—the practical reduction of armaments, the abolition of secret and oligarchic diplomacy and of special alliances, the substitution of inquiry and discussion for intrigue and threats, the founding, through the destruction of the most powerful autocracy, of a democratically ordered international government, and the consequent beginning of the end of war. Once having taken sides, vanity is enlisted. As President Wilson is moved to 'make the best' of the actual outcome, so all those who favored America's action in the war from idealistic reasons are tempted to make the best of its outcome. And 'making the best of it' means blurring over disagreeable features so as to salve vanity. Consequently the pacifists who were converted to war are obliged to undertake an unusually searching inquiry into the actual results in their relation to their earlier professions and beliefs. Were not those right who held that it was self-contradictory to try to further the permanent ideals of peace by recourse to war? Was not he who thought they might thus be promoted one of the gullible throng who swallowed the cant of idealism as a sugar coating for the bitter core of violence and greed? Is the pacifist a outrance, the absolutist of peace, the only one who can make a valid claim to untarnished idealism? Have the ideals of humanity, of self-determination, justice to the weak, been hopelessly discredited through being inscribed?

The defeat of idealistic aims has been, without exaggeration, enormous. The consistent pacifist has much to urge now in his own justification; he is entitled to his flourish of private triumphings. Superficially, his opponent—I mean the one who placed himself also on idealistic ground—has not much to urge except the scant though true plea that things would have been much worse if Germany had won, as she would have done without the participation of the United States. The defeat, however, is the defeat which will always come to idealism that is not backed up by intelligence and by force—or, better, by an intelligent use of force. It may seem like a petty attempt to get back at the pacifist to say that the present defeat of the war ideals of the United States is due to the fact that America's use of 'Force to the uttermost, Force without stint,' still suffered from the taint of complacent and emotional pacifism. But it may fairly be argued that the real cause of the defeat is the failure to use force adequately and intelligently. The ideals of the United States have been defeated in the settlement because we took into the war our sentimentalism, our attachment to moral sentiments as efficacious powers, our pious optimism as to the inevitable victory of the 'right', our childish belief that physical energy can do the work that only intelligence can do, our evangelical hypocrisy that morals and 'ideals' have a self-propelling and self-executing capacity. If the principle of force to the limit had been in operation in behalf of our ideals, complete
information would have been had at an early date regarding the secret agreements that were outstanding, and our share in the war would have been made to depend upon a clearing of the decks. This would have shown distrust of our Allies, and an ungenerous wish to take advantage of the hour of their critical need of our help? There speaks our inveterate sentimentalism, our unwillingness to use the force at hand in support of our ideals. Either we and our Allies were fighting for the same ends or we were not. There was no moral generosity in putting them in a position of willingness to use our help for professed democratic ends when in reality they were to use it for imperialistic ends. On our side, if we had had a tenth of the faith in concrete intelligence used at the right juncture that we had in fine phrases, many of the obstacles to securing at the end a peace in accord with our idealism would have been swept away in the earlier months of 1917. It is exceedingly silly to regard as a failure of idealism what ought rather to be charged against our own lack of common sense. Past history would have shown what any knowledge of the present situation confirms—that the type of man brought forward by war is not the type needed to make peace. The urgencies of war bring to the front the kind of man who can make quick decisions in the face of immediate pressure of circumstance. Such statesmen are bound to be of the aggressive and quasi-gambling type. At best they represent the government of war, not the pursuits of normal peace with its long-time interests and consequences. Mr. Norman Angell and a few others, but Mr. Angell especially, taught all during the war the indispensable necessity of provision for popular representation at the peace conference. Everybody who heard him was impressed with the reasonableness of the proposition. But nothing was done. Was this an intelligent use of the force at our command?

President Wilson as a peace-maker is the exception that proves the rule. Owing to the accidents of our electoral and party system, he was the one figure in the Councils who had not been given his place and influence by the exigencies of war. He represented and upon the whole with more than ordinary representative capacity the normal interests of men and governments in times of peace. Yet in essentials he was overruled. Why? Because it was thought that, by some magic, dumb millions could be given effective voice through him. He seems to have thought that, contrary to all experience of representative government, he could 'represent' the unrepresented interests of the common people whose main concern is with peace, not war. It would be difficult to imagine any greater travesty on the use of force to the uttermost than the idea that one man could secure a just decision by appealing a la improvisatore over the heads of diplomats to the unorganized, scattered and unenlightened peoples of the earth. When he became inclined to act in this way the diplomats had only to point out to him that he would thereby decrease the waning power of governmental authority, increase popular unrest, and run the risk of plunging Europe into the chaos of political revolutions. After that, he could not even speak effectually for himself, to say nothing of 'representing' the unrepresented peoples of the earth. He made his popular appeal in the case of Fiume, indeed, but its chief tangible effect was to strengthen Imperial Japan in its encroachments upon the people of China. There is another force, an immense force, which might have been used in behalf of the war ideals of the United States, a force which might still be employed though less effectually. There is the economic and financial force of the United States. It may be doubted whether the world has ever seen such a spectacle as that of the last few years. The United States has extended money and credit almost 'without stint' to governments of Europe irrespective of whether they were supporting the announced policies of the United States, nay, even when those governments were doing what they could to undermine American ends. And doubtless the average American has taken pride in this fact. We are so generous, so disinterested, that we do not bargain or impose conditions. In short we are so childishly immature, so careless of our professed ideals, that we prefer a reputation for doing the grand seigneur act to the realization of our national aims. This is the acme of our sentimentalism. Can we blame the European statesmen if to put it with blank vulgarity they play us for suckers?

Such considerations as these, which might be indefinitely multiplied, show that not idealism but our idealism is discredited, an idealism of vague sentiments and good intentions, isolated from judgment as to the effective use of the force in our hands. It may be said that this is not
our fault, but President Wilson's. There are a few who are entitled to the benefit of this plea, but only a few. President Wilson is a scape-goat convenient to save our vanity. But he successfully appealed to the American people and led them. If they—if we—had been different, he would have had to use different methods to get results. History will probably record that his idealistic speeches corresponded to the spirit of the American people; and that the blame which belongs to him is not that of betraying the American spirit but of embodying its weaknesses too faithfully. Take one example. The use of force in behalf of our professed ideals would certainly have involved the use of all the thinking, speaking and writing of the liberals and radicals who in the end could alone give sympathetic and intelligent support to the aims eloquently set forth by President Wilson. Instead, we had a policy of suppression of free speech, of espionage, and of encouragement of the violent unrestraint characteristic of the reactionary. It is easy to blame for this Mr. Wilson's personal desire to play the part of Atlas supporting alone the universe of free ideals. An accomplice his conceit assuredly was, but the American people who revelled in emotionalism and who grovelled in sacrifice of its liberties is the responsible cause. Immaturity and inexperience in international affairs consequent upon our isolation mitigate the blame. But they would not have taken the form they took were it not for our traditional evangelical trust in morals apart from intelligence, and in ideals apart from executive and engineering force. Our Christianity has become identified with vague feeling and with an optimism which we think is a sign of a pious faith in Providence but which in reality is a trust in luck, a deification of the feeling of success regardless of any intelligent discrimination of the nature of success. It may be that the words idealism and ideals will have to go—that they are hopelessly discredited. It may be that they will become synonyms for romanticism, for blind sentimentalism, for faith in mere good intentions, or that they will come to be regarded as decorative verbal screens behind which to conduct sinister plans. But the issue is real, not verbal. There remains a difference between narrow and partial ends and full and far reaching ends; between the success of the few for the moment and the happiness of the many for an enduring time; a difference between identifying happiness with the elements of a meagre and hard life and those of a varied and free life. This is the only difference between materialism and idealism that counts. And until we act persistently upon the fact that the difference depends upon the use of force and that force can be directed only by intelligence, we shall continue to dwell in a world where the difference between materialism and idealism will be thought to be a matter of opinion, argument and personal taste. To go on opposing ideals and force to each other is to perpetuate this regime. The issue is not that of indulging in ideals versus using force in a realistic way. As long as we make this opposition we render our ideals impotent, and we play into the hands of those who conceive force as primarily military. Our idealism will never prosper until it rests upon the organization and resolute use of the greater forces of modern life: industry, commerce, finance, scientific inquiry and discussion and the actualities of human companionship. [DewJ12]

1919.10.10 John Dewey : Lecture on 'Cultivation of character as the ultimate aim of education' delivered at Shanxi University. = Pin ge zhi yang cheng wei jiao yu bei shang mu di. Hu Shi interpreter ; Deng Chumin recorder. In :Xin Zhongguo ; vol. 1, no 7 (Nov. 15, 1919). [Kee3]

1919.10.10-15 John Dewey : Lectures in Taiyuan to universities and to the annual meeting of the Chinese Federation of Educational Associations. [Kee3]

1919.10.18-1920.03.05


1. 'The nature of the discussion'.
2. 'The constant and the changing elements in morality'.
3. 'Morality and human nature'.
4. 'The role of emotion in morality'.
5. 'Social emotion'.
6. 'Selfishness'.
7.-8. 'Self-regard and regard for others'.
9.-10. 'Virtue and vice'.
11. 'A comparison of Eastern thought and Western thought'.
12. 'Desire and happiness'.
13. 'Desire and temptation'.
14. 'Desire and its relationship to customs and institutions'.
15. 'The essence of a democratic institution'. [DewJ5, Kee3]

1919.10.19

Banquet to celebrate John Dewey's sixtieth birthday in Beijing.

Cai, Yuanpei. Zai Duwei bo shi 60 zhi sheng ri wan yang hui shang zhi yan shuo [ID D28515].

At the banquet, Cai Yuanpei seized on this special opportunity to portray Dewey as a modern-day Confucius. "Confucius said respect the emperor (wang), the learned doctor (bo shi) [Dewey] advocates democracy; Confucius said females are a problem to raise, the learned doctor [Dewey] advocates equal rights for men and women; Confucius said transmit not create, the learned doctor [Dewey] advocates creativity".

In his brief speech, Cai emphasized underlying similarities between Dewey and Confucius despite their differences: one embodies the spirit of modern West, and the other represents the wisdom of ancient China; one values democracy, equality, and creativity, and the other privileges monarchy, hierarchy, and tradition. According to Cai, Dewey and Confucius were both educators of the common people, shared the same faith in education as a vehicle for social change, and insisted on the unity of thought and action. Cai believed that these commonalities pointed to the possibility of 'a merger between Eastern and Western cultures'. [Kee3:S. 10, DewJ2:S. 14]

Dr. John Dewey has recently completed two series of lectures in Peking, one on “Social and Political Philosophy,” the other on “A Philosophy of Education.” Dr. Dewey’s philosophy of education is so well known that no introduction to it is required; but I do wish to make a few remarks about his lectures on “Social and Political Philosophy.”

The philosophy of pragmatism, with which Dr. Dewey’s name is identified, has been the subject of a number of systematic statements, among them the work of William James in psychology, the work of Dewey himself and of Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller in logic, the work of Dewey and James Hayden Tufts in ethics, and, of course, Dewey’s own monumental work in education.

Only in the field of political philosophy has there not yet appeared any single systematic work which treats the subject from the viewpoint of pragmatism. It is true that the political theory of Graham Wallas and Harold Laski in England, and of Walter Lippmann in the United States of America, strongly reflects the influence of pragmatism; but, until now, a formal, coherent statement of a pragmatic philosophy of politics has been lacking.

It was for this reason that I suggested to Dr. Dewey, earlier this year when he and I were discussing his forthcoming lecture series in China, that this might be an appropriate opportunity for him to formulate a coherent statement of a social and political philosophy based in pragmatism, elements of which have been suggested in his writings increasingly during the last decade.

Dr. Dewey thought that my suggestion was a good one, and the result is this series of sixteen lectures. I hope that those who were in the audiences when these lectures were delivered, as well as the readers of the printed version of the lectures herewith presented, are cognizant of their rare good fortune in sharing in Dr. Dewey’s initial formal statement of his social and political philosophy.

As Dr. Dewey delivered his lectures in English I interpreted them sentence by sentence into Chinese for the benefit of members of his audiences who did not understand English. My Chinese interpretation was recorded by my friend, I-han Kao. Dr. Dewey intends to revise and expand his original lecture notes for publication in book form. When his manuscript is complete, I hope to translate it into Chinese, so that both English and Chinese versions can be published at the same time.

It is inevitable that in material so complex as these lectures on-the-spot oral interpretation and simultaneous recording should result in certain inaccuracies and inadequacies. For such errors and omissions Professor I-han Kao and I offer our apologies, both to Dr. Dewey and to the reading public.

1919.11.02 Letter from John Dewey to Evelyn Dewey [November 2, 1919]
Dear Evelyn…

Last night we went to another dinner at the hotel and during the dancing Ed Thomas of Chicago recognized me and astonished me by telling me who he was. He is down here from Chitato spend a month and take the Consular examinations. He thinks a change for the better is approaching in Russia and he wants to be ready for business when that time comes. He is coming to lunch today and I asked him to stay in this apt while we are away, but that may not prove to be convenient he will decide when he comes. This afternoon we go to Mr Wans wedding at the naval club and tonight at eight we start for Mukden. We are to stay at the Japanese hotel so we shall probably send no letters from there. We expect to stay there not more than four days…

[John Dewey] [DewJ3]

1919.11.02-11.10 John Dewey departs at 20 hour to Mukden = Shenyang and stays about a week. [DewJ3]
1. Aristotle's concept of species.
2. Characteristics of Aristotle's thought.
3. Descartes: extension and motion.
5. John Locke: sensation and reflection.
7. Experimentalism, answer to the conflict between empiricism and rationalism.
8. Characteristics of experimentalist thought. [DewJ5, Kee3]


1919.11.15 (publ.) John Dewey: Lecture on 'Cultivation of character as the ultimate aim of education' delivered at Shanxi University. = Pin ge zhi yang cheng wei jiao yu shi wu shang mu di. Hu Shi interpreter; Deng Chumin recorder. In: Xin Zhongguo; vol. 1, no 7 (Nov. 15, 1919). [Kee3]

1. Aristotle's concept of species.
2. Characteristics of Aristotle's thought.
3. Descartes: extension and motion.
5. John Locke: sensation and reflection.
7. Experimentalism, answer to the conflict between empiricism and rationalism.
8. Characteristics of experimentalist thought. [DewJ5, Kee3]

1919.11.27 John Dewey visits the Qinghua University for Thanksgiving. [DewJ8]
Chen Duxiu was highly interested in John Dewey's lecture on 'Democratic developments in America'. Chen began his essay by acknowledging Dewey's broad delineation of democracy in terms of political constitution, civil rights, social equality, and economic justice. Chen remarked that all socialists would share Dewey's belief about social and economic democracy. He endorsed Dewey's claim that the realization of democracy should not be limited to the political sphere. The elevation of social life should be the primary goal. Chen did not accept everything Dewey said. He actually suggested that Dewey blend the four dimensions into two: the political and the socioeconomic. Chen did not trust what Dewey said about political democracy: that individual liberties can be protected by the constitution and that public opinion can be secured by a republican government. In light of the total failure of China's republican government, Chen argued that a mere system of representation and constitutionalism would not ensure the realization of political democracy. He said that the best system was 'direct legislation', which would lead to 'the breaking down of the distinction between those who govern and those who were governed'. Chen was especially inspired by Dewey's historical account of the United States' grassroots democracy, which was developed from self-governing villages and towns rather than imposed by the legislation of the federal government.

Chen's critique of Dewey's conception of democracy reflected his own concern with socio-economic questions as well as his limited understanding of democratic procedure and institutions. In his proposal, Chen took Dewey's advice to use China's traditional guild system to build a grassroots foundation. He believed that China could 'develop democracy using England and America as a model. He quoted from Dewey's lecture to emphasize democracy as the best possible society 'because democracy means education'.


John Dewey: Lecture in Jinan at the Hall of the Provincial Assembly. [DewJ8]

John Dewey stays in Tianjin. [DewJ8]

John Dewey: Lectures at Nanjing Teachers' College in Nanjing. Tao Zhixing [Tao Xingzhi]: Interpreter. [Kee3]
Preface

John Dewey, Professor of Philosophy in Columbia University, and his wife, Alice C. Dewey, who wrote the letters reproduced in this book, left the United States early in 1919 for a trip to Japan. The trip was eagerly embarked on, as they had desired for many years to see at least something of the Eastern Hemisphere. The journey was to be solely for pleasure, but just before their departure from San Francisco, Professor Dewey was invited, by cable, to lecture at the Imperial University at Tokyo, and later at a number of other points in the Japanese Empire. They traveled and visited in Japan for some three to four months and in May, after a most happy experience, made doubly so by the unexpected courtesies extended them, they decided to go on to China, at least for a few weeks, before returning to the United States. The fascination of the struggle going on in China for a unified and independent democracy caused them to alter their plan to return to the United States in the summer of 1919. Professor Dewey applied to Columbia University for a year’s leave of absence, which was granted, and with Mrs. Dewey, is still in China. Both are lecturing and conferring, endeavoring to take some of the story of a Western Democracy to an Ancient Empire, and in turn are enjoying an experience, which, as the letters indicate, they value as a great enrichment of their own lives. The letters were written to their children in America, without thought of their ever appearing in print.

Evelyn Dewey. [DewJ1]

1920 Gründung der Xiangtan Society for the Promotion of Education durch Mao Zedong [et al.].

Mao explained his newspaper 'Xiang Jiang ping lun': "This paper is concerned purely with academic theories and with social criticism. We do not meddle at all in practical politics.”

In the 'Declaration' of the society Mao wrote: “Education is an instrument for promoting the progress of society; an educator is a person who utilizes this instrument… Dr. [John] Dewey of America has come to the East. His new theory of education is well worth studying". [DewJ181]


Hu Shi: "Dr. Dewey intends to revise and expand his original lecture notes for publication in book form. When his manuscript is complete, I hope to translate it into Chinese, so that both English and Chinese versions can be published at the same time."

Robert W. Clopton: Unfortunately this intention was not carried out. Dewey's lectures were published in Chinese, many of them in the Bulletin of the Ministry of Education. Dewey referred in his lecture on ethics to Sun Yat-sen's theory: 'To practice means to seek knowledge. A theory must be tested before it becomes accurate. I fully agreed with the great Chinese statesman Dr. Sun Yat-sen, when he said the old saying, 'to know is easy; to act is difficult' has contributed a great deal to the backwardness of China, because under the influence of the saying people have become lazy and hesitant to do anything. It is true that we cannot always anticipate with accuracy the consequences of what we do. But this is no warrant for us to sit idle. The more we try doing something, the more experience we have and therefore the more knowledge we can get. The attempt to get knowledge apart from doing and applying it in a practical situation never will succeed.

Jessica Wang: Hu Shi’s translations seem highly problematic – mostly in style and tone and occasionally in content. Hu's eloquent, pompous, and proselytizing style marked a dramatic difference from Dewey's usually unassuming and unimposing style. I do not mean to suggest that Hu Shi intended to distort Dewey's lectures, nor do I mean to imply that the records of Dewey's lectures in China were largely fabricated and unreliable. Nonetheless, we may reasonably believe that Hu may have occasionally altered the meanings of what Dewey said to highlight a particular point or to promote a certain agenda. Even though these occasional anomalies may seem minor, they eventually affected the way Chinese intellectuals responded to Dewey. [DewJ5, DewJ74, DewJ2:S. 31]
While doing his Ph.D. work under Dewey, Hu Shi argued in this article, that 'wenyan' was no longer compatible with the Chinese modern experience and that 'baihua' – the vernacular – should be used to revitalize Chinese language and literature.
Dewey's presence in China's intellectual scene provided that dimension of understanding. That is, the use of 'baihua' was both a means and an end. To argue that 'baihua' is a tool for expressing ideas was correct, but partial, for language is not only a tool: language means communication and by communication we live and an associative life is formed. Dewey gave high regards to the New Culture Movement occasioned by language reform. He accepted Hu Shi's thesis that the 'Baihua' Movement embraced Chinese enlightenment.
Dewey began to see the fundamental problem in China in the matter of poor and ineffective communication, which in turn would explain many of China's social problems. 'Communication' therefore offered a unique perspective for Dewey to analyze situations in China, and this approach differentiated Dewey fundamentally from many of his Chinese followers and Western thinkers. To discredit the Confucian family system as a defective system of language and communication became the starting point in Dewey's construction of a new Chinese mind. The 'Baihua' Movement was introduced because 'baihua' could facilitate the expression of new ideas. [DewJ179]

1920
John Dewey attends a tea party with the Young China Association in the garden of the Gentry Club. [DewJ8]

1920
John Dewey: Dinner at the Chamber of Commerce in Qingdao. [DewJ8]

1920-1921
Zhao Yuanren is interpreter for Bertrand Russell and John Dewey in China. [Zhao10]
Letter from John Dewey to Dewey children
Tientsin Jan 1 1920

We have got as far as this, both in time and space. We didn't go to the tomb of Confucius after all, as the connections were bad. Slow trains we knew, and when the guides found out they were only third class, they rather withdrew the idea, and mamma hadn't wanted to go anytime, thinking the absent pilgrims and not the tomb the sight to see; while as for me I would willingly have been a present pilgrim if the only one. But we are now deluding ourselves with the prospect of going next spring when we not only see the pilgrims but also climb the sacred mountain. Aise from the exitement of not going and not lecturing, we had a luncheon and exhibition of old Chinese physical exercises with and by General Ma Liang. He is a story by himself even more so than the Mohammadan meal and the show he gave us, too long to be tucked in, so Ill let it go now, save that the exercises are the original of the Japanese Jiu jitsu, which like everything else Japanese seems to have come from China. However Im bound to say they have improved on the original a good deal, tho what we saw was well done, including the sickening conclusion, when eight or ten bricks were laid on a mans head and smahed with another brick, and a big paving stone at least four inches think, nearer six, was smashed with a big sledge hammer on the chest of one of the athletes, in fact two in succession one on the east chest and one on the west. He was stripped to the waist with a temperature of about 15 F, and the stone was fairly covered with the thick frost you see on the under side of the stones when they are frozen into the ground. The sight of the rough cold thing on a mans vare skin was almost enough for me, to say nothing of having it broken into four pieces on me. We were also taken to a show, thatre four or five plays acted by school boys of between twelve and sixteen, wh poor boys who are taught regular lessons half a day and plyacting the ot[h]er half, supported by the public, and shows are free. It was more interesting than the professional acting we saw at first, we havent been to a professional in Peking. The first was a moral play with a spoken moral at the end, namely not to take a concubine. Good advice of course, but probably not so much needed by these poor boys as by the millionaire officials. The queerness of the method of teaching the moral to little boys didn't seem to strike anybody. The play began with in a brothel, with the old man coming in to look over the girls, to pick out the one he wanted to buy—four or five were paraded before him. Of course she has a lover who is an habitue of the brothel and who is smuggled into the buyers house as her brother, and for whose sake the lady concubine attempts to poison him [in ink] her husband, [in ink] and a general suicide etc at the end—that is, next to the end, just before the Moral. The others were scenes adapted from the old historic folklore, and one were more interesting, especially as one twelve year old boy has real talent. He could make a lot of money on the vaudeville stage in U S; its funny how similar methods are, barring the ftone they sing in.

Jan 2, still '20.

Yesterday we had a day off. Except that in the morning we had a visit from a delegation of students representatives of the Students Unions. They and not the officials invited us here. There were four boys and three girls, the latter all from the Anglo-Chinese School, methodist. They all spoke some english, the girls very good, and they were very chatty, more conversational and less selfconscious Lucy says than any of the Peking girls she has seen. It was quite extraordinary—this joint delegation. Suh Hu says that the afternoon before he visite[d] the Union headquarters ad found in each room a committee composed of boys and girls working togerther, quite free from any consciousness, a sight which he says is the most encouraging he has yet seen in China. Only here and in Shanghia are such things possible. Why we also heard so much about Turkish women and so little about Chinese orietnalism, unless it was the sightseer's eye for the picturesque veil.

Yesterday morning's paper said that the Minister of Interior Chancellor Tsai had resigned, owing to the failure of mediation negotiations. Suh Hu [Hu Shi] came in late last night, had spent part of the day with others hunting for Tsai who had disappeared from Peking, presumably to Tientsin; that all the principals of the schools from elementary up had resigned and that educational chaos reigned supreme; also that one reason General Wu, the government mediator offered for the teachers going back to work was the impending attempt to restore the
monarchy. Hu was quite excited last night, as yesterday was the day set according to rumors, but this morning paper hadn't a word about it. Just what is going to happen to my lectures now I don't know, but I hope some way will be found to resume them without waiting an endless time which will mean I will never finish and earn my salary in Peking.

This afternoon mamma and I both speak at the same meeting, which is also the first time for that arrangement. It is the difference between the younger generation and the old. At a recent meeting, Xn, in Shanghai, the Chinese proposed and amalgamation of the Y M C A and Y W C A—it would be interesting to see the fluttering in the male dovecotes. But it is one of many signs that the younger generation of Chinese is ready to go further than the alleged liberal westerner, who has his obsessions as to what the Chinese will and will not stand for—to say nothing of their own inner feelings as to what they will stand for themselves. In the past from combined timidity and politeness the Chinese have hesitated to tell their Xn confreres just what they thought and wanted, but the nationalist feeling is growing so rapidly that that wont last much longer. Its only fair to say that some of the missionary element would gladly abdicate when they saw the Chinese disposed to take responsibility, while the Y M C A is already organized with the Chinese in at least nominal control, and with all the facilities for actual control.

Peking Home, Jan 4

When we get back here and find all the rented things gone and our own here and to be chased after, we realize that few millionaires have anything on us in the way of furnished houses, what with our palace at 2880, our country mansion at Huntington, our spring residence on Russian Hill and our winter resort here. Whether mamma will be able to find another to furnish before we leave China I don't know…

Dad [DewJ3]
1920.01.04  Letter from Lucy Dewey to Dewey children
135 Morrison Street, Sunday, Jan 4 [1920]
Dear Folks,
Its been perfect ages since I have written but I have inumerable alibis. In the first place when we first decided to furnish the flat ourselves I went with Mamma to furniture street to look for stuff. I got so cold running around their old stone houses that I was laid up in bed with tonsilitis for two days. I rose from my bed of pain to go to Mrs Hortons dance and it quite cured me. Also I had a very nice time. There are a lot of Italian officers here arranging for D'Annunzios Rome Tokyo flight. They are like Italian officers every where and most amusing. Also Admiral Gleaves and all his staff were there, much gold lace and uniforms. The next day was spent in frantic packing, moving, and buying furniture and a tea dance in the afternoon by way of a rest. I see Dad has writ[ten] numerous letters and told about Shantung. We had an interesting time there and in some ways quite entertaining. You should have seen us chummig with the savage Ma Liang. I sat next him at the Governors dinner and as he is a Mohamedan he couldn't eat anything. I couldn't converse with him very well and neither did the man on the other side so he amused himself by brushing his mustache with a cunning little brush he carries in his pocket. He has the best manners and seems the most amiable of any of those people we have met except Tuchun Yen of Shansi. He may put his old family doctor to death by torture but he doesn't act that way in public.
We stopped for three days in Tientsin, got there New Years Eve with our trunk delayed and so were exiled to a remote place outside the dining room for dinner. There are street cars in Tientsin and we were so thrilled by the sight that we promptly jumped on one and rode. There isn't a great deal there in the way of sights, just the concessions, like any small town, and the Chinese city.
It was very interesting, the first place in China where the Chinese women get out-and-do things that I've seen. They say Tientsin and Shanghai are the only two. They men and women students work together on committees and in a small audience of about thirty that Suh Hu [Hu Shih] spoke to they sat together. The girls that came to receive us were the nicest and most interesting that I have met in China. They can talk, which is a great relief, start conversations of their own accord and not have things pulled out by questions all the time. And they talk about everything that a girl at home talks about. Two of them, cunning little mites of things, are going to America next year to prepare for college and are planning to go about the same time we do, so we may come home with them under our arms. I hope so.
Poor Mamma has been out all morning buying dishpans and things so we can have something to eat without sponging off the neighbors.
6.30 p.m.
Mother and I have been in the house about half an hour now after a wild afternoon hunting for a parlor table and a few cooking things. The rickshaw man has just come up to say that the soldiers are looting out the Chinese city and all the shops are shut. We seem to have got in just in time that is where we were. It all looked peaceful enough then. There have been rumors of an attempt to restore the boy emperor and we are wondering if this is the first act. I have just been out in the kitchen to tell the boy to go down and see what he could find out from the people in the street and the cook informed me Liu go down side. So as soon as Liu go top side again I shall continue this and tell you what he has found out.
Ha says that last night the soldiers roobeed a Chinese bank and tonight are robbing more. They Belong to Feng Kuo Chang an ec-president now deceased. He died a few days ago and omitted to pay the soldiers before so doing. They haven't been paid in four months and now apparently they are collecting. This afternoon when Mamma and I first went out we passed a lot of soldiers taking a huge gun along the streets and this explains it. There may be no end of trouble now as the whole administration is in a mess from the teachers strike. Chancellor Tsai has resigned and disappeared again and it looks as tho the whole educational system had gone kersmash. Now the rest may go too. The soldiers are recruited from the brigands and the brigands from the ex-soldiers, so there isn't much choice. On the whole the soldiers behave pretty well when they are paid, but nobody in China has been paid now for several months. This mornings paper had an awful story about the soldiers in Tsinanfu, which we seem to
have left just in time. There they enteres a theater where the studenys were celebrating New Years with some plays they gave themselves. The soldiers boke in and attacked the students, beating them down, two were injured so badly that they may die. The girls were attacked and robbed, some even of their clothes. The military police finally came to the rescue and drove out the police and recovered some of the stolen property. The city is under martial law, I never saw so many soldiers standing around with their bayonets fixed in my life and hope I never do again. It gives you creepy feeling, not at all pleasant to come on a large bunch of bayonets every time you go round a corner.

Well, I must finish this and get it off or it will hang on forever. We found a lot of mail waiting for us and it sure was welcome. Loads of love to all and I hope Elizabeth had a nice birthday. [Lucy Dewey] [DewJ3]
1920.01.13  Letter from John Dewey to John Jacob Coss
135 Morrison St Peking Jan 13 ‘20
Dear Coss,
Our letters crossed each other, so I hope mine, with the statement of courses, reached you in season. The day it yours came one of my Chinese friends brought up the question of my staying another year I am anxious to get home, and yet age has crept upon me enough so that the ease of living here, to say nothing of more intrinsic values, is tempting, especially as letters are full of the high cost of living, the difficulty of getting "help" etc. In a small and modest flat, with a family of three we have three servants for less than one would cost at home in wages—and they feed themselves, except of course for squeeze on us, and we pay the highest going rate. Doubtless one smart man could do the work of these three, but the large population of China has to be kept alive and going somehow, and everything in China, tempo of work and the sobiability of numbers as well as the rate of pay is adapted to that fact. Well I started out to say that the question of our remaining another year had been tentatively raised. It will take a month or six weeks to have anything definite come of the suggestion, but I’m mentioning it now so if a cablegram comes from me you will have some word. It has been a worth while experience, not so much for things specifically learned as for the entirely new perspective and horizon in general. Nothing western looks quite the same any more, and this is as near to a renewal of youth as can be hoped for in this world. From this distance our sectrain differences in philosoph[y] look as technical and unreal as our similar differences in religion. Whether I am accomplishing anything as well as getting a great deal is another matter. China remains a massive blank and impenetrable wall, when it comes to judgment. My guess is that what is accomplished is mostly by way of “giving face” to the younger liberal element. Its a sort of outside reinforcement in spite of its vagueness. Other times I think Chinese civilization is so thick and selfcentred that no foreign influence presented via a foreigner even scratches the surface. However some of the younger Chinese, among whom our Suh Hu [Hu Shi] is a marked leader are keeping things stirred up. At present the war is on on the old family system, with a demand for the emancipation of women—which doesn’t mean the vote which amounts to nothing as yet for the men, but breaking down the truly Oriental seclusion and subjection. Most foreigners here are more conservative here than the liberal Chinese. A large part of the missionary elecent, especially the older ones, have compensated for their temerity in introducing new religious ideas and rites by outdoing the Chinese in social conservatism. in other lines. Some of the younger men are marked exceptions. The Rockefeller medical foundation here has coeducation and its head Roger Greene (not a physician but administrative head) is urging coeducation on all the missionary colleges.
I was much interested in your college news which is the first I’ve had, especially of course in the new course which sounds most promising, also on the salary matter. The younger married men must have been in an awful condition with the high cost of living. If there is anything printed about the mental test etc matter I wish you would have it sent me. I hope go out to the Boxer indemnity college once a week, Tsing Hua and can use it there. The “college” has in reality but about a year’s college work; many of the men are disconcerted because some American colleges give two and even three years college credit, except in engineering lines where but the one year is given. This is producing internal friction in the institution as the engineering, or rather scientific men, think they are discriminated against, not in America but at home. The problem of sending students to America and what to do with they return def[inite] and exact idea of the problem. I wish [Adam Leroy] Jones could get a meeting of the some of the representative at Chinese students there, especially those with a Tsing Hua background, and get their ideas of the problem and of the defects in the present method. Illogically perhaps without a clear idea of the elements of the problem I have come to a conclusion about one element in its solution—that Tsing Hua should become a four year college and send to America a smaller number, but more mature and advanced, for specialed graduate work. One of the great questions is the demand for technical studies at the expense of students getting much real idea of western civilization. Looked at from this end, it wouldn’t be a bad idea to have all Chinese students (and Japanese too) required to take your new
frshman course, even the graduate and technical students. This is meant seriously. I dont believe the problem of Oriental students can be dealt with satisfactorily till some especial arrangements are made for them in spite of its upsetting uniformity of administration. Over here they would probably strike before they would go back into a freshman course, but the losing face element wouldn't be so strong there…

Sincerely yours, John Dewey. [DewJ3]
Dear Barnes,… On account of the interpretation I have to write my articles lecture notes out much more fully than ever before, several a week, and when I have written home and the articles I contracted for with N R and Asia, I have am more than satiated with writing. However that doesn't apply the last few weeks, for I've been on strike—don't let [A. (Alexander) Mitchell] Palmer know or I'll be deported. The Peking teacher went on strike late in Dec because they were behind in pay three months and were getting paid fifty percent in depreciated notes, worth fifty on the dollar at that. The minister of Education with a truly American fatuity of officials instead of least appearing to sympathize with them rather ridiculed him so they demanded his scalp too. Then he tried to set the students against the teachers and the former then demanded his scalp also. Up to this time many of the teachers had been quite conservative and opposed to the student movement. Now they are rather solidified. The teachers got this week everything they were after except the dismissal of the minister. That would have brought the whole cabinet tumbling down. My strike was rather an enforces sympathetic, as I have no grievances at all, but it makes a good story just the same. All countries are alike tho the level differs. Here any liberal sentiment at all, say as much so as the platitudines of the N Y Times on the liberalism of the past that has become orthodox, [pencil comma] is regarded as out and out Bolshevism, I see from the cables that the latest form of propaganda is that Japan must again intervene in Siberia in order to prevent the Bolshevising of China. Land is divided here and the farmers are the real country and factory industry is in its infancy. There is as much danger of Bolshevizing China as there is of the farmers of Berks Co turning Bols. But everything goes when it comes to propaganda. The only question left is the depths of human gullibility. If the Japanese try to hold Siberia, it is the beginning of the end in my opinion and there is that [in pencil w. caret] much reason for hoping the propaganda will succeed. There is one danger. Gt Britain and France may promise J something and get tied up to back her. It is disgusting by the way what a pawnbroking business the big nations do over here—making China loans of a few millions dollars conditioned often on her buying something she doesn't want at a big discount [high rate of interest, and with a view to getting a mortgage on something in the future. Then, while the western powers wouldn't dream of doing such things nearer home where there is publicity, the Chinese naturally conclude this is the general western standard.

I was interested in your suggestion about a seminar in esthetics. But I can't rise to my part in it. I have always eschewed esthetics, just why I don't know, but I think it is because I wanted to reserve one region from a somewhat devastating analysis, one part of experience where I didn't think more than I did anything else. And now I have a pretty fixed repulsion against all esthetic discussion. I feel about it precisely as the average intelligent man feels about all philosophical discussion, including the branches that excite me very much...

I rec'd a letter the other day asking me to join the Leage for Oppressed Peoples. I'm thinking of writing back and saying I will when they include the U S among the oppressed peoples—its shameful that about the only U S news we get here is raids, deportations, semi-officials lynchings, strikes etc.

China is in many respects the Europe of the 17th century. The rest of the world won't give her two centuries in which to develop in her own way. Meanwhile the Asia of Russia, China and India is a tremendous fact. At bottom the situation is much like two locomotives plunging at each other—the distance between them is great but they are both getting momentum—or rather the smallest one has great momentum and the big one is beginning to get it. This sounds pessimistic. Meantime, China is a most interesting spot to live in and also, compared with reports of hcl and lack of service in America a delightfully easy one. I wrote somebody the other day it had the nearest effect to a renewal of youth conceivable. It places everything in a new perspective so nothing looks alike as it did before. The other day we had the opportunity to see some of the best old Chinese paintings still remaining in China, Sung dynasty and in perfect conditions. Sorry you weren't along. To my surprise, in the best the technique was so wonderful that it seemed to get ahead of the feeling. But I think that is because from lack of background and of [in pencil w. caret] sufficiently long acquaintance...
with the pictures, [in pencil w. caret] it is easier to get the technique than the feeling. However there is no doubt the Chinese are virtuosos all right, the cultivated ones. Their devotion to handwriting, to characters shows that. Lots of them devote an hour or two a day to it, just making the characters for practise, and it is my impression they regard it as a higher art than painting or anything directly representative in art. For handling of strokes—that word seems better than lines—both in themselves and in spacing, [pencil comma] I dont believe the world has anything finer to show than two or three of these paintings we saw—men whose names I didnt recognize—which is fairly typical of our general provincialism with respect to Asia. We have engaged passage home for next August. Evelyn is now on her way to Vancouver and will join us in about a month. Please give our regards to Mrs Barnes, and with the same to you,
Sincerely yours, John Dewey [DewJ3]


1920.02.08 Letter from Alice Chipman Dewey to Evelyn Dewey
Peking Feb 8th [1920] Sunday.
Dearest Evelyn…
Pa and I have just been to an exhibition of Mr Liens pictures. They are said to be the best collection in China, tho not large they are all perfect… There is nothing to tell you except that we are jumping out of boots now that we have heard from you and shall continue to jump till you get here which will be soon. I wish I could be in the Sontag Hotel when you get there. But the thought of all that travel is enough to take away the taste for a trip just to come right back. Peking weather is delightful again tho colder than at any time before… The students are going to work again tomorrow to keep the govt from shutting up the schools and also to fix the blame on the gvt where it belongs. The govt here is behaving as badly as the Japanese themeselves] Now this must go if it gets to you on time. Loads of love till we meet. Mama. [DewJ3]
Dearest children,

We are expecting Ev to arrive here a week from tomorrow, so says a telegram we rec'd from Tokyo; she gets to Seoul in Korea in two days... I feel free to mention the fact that Suh Hu [Hu Shi] asked us about staying over another year, to work on the educational dept of the university. Ev included, because I dont think there is anything in it, tho we havent given any answer yet, waiting for Evs arrival. There is only one good reason for staying and that's on mother's account, that is to say housekeeping. When things are so easy here it looks hard on her to subject her to the strains of the hcl and servants in NY. But I think personally I've got about all I can get from a stay here now. Id rather come back and go home by India or Russia a few years from now. Also I want to see the family, and not lose all track of my country—tho Suh Hu [Hu Shi] says I would get deported if I went back now. Fred seemed to be worrying about my connection with the new school, so I wrote them to announce my course there in such a way that it wouldn't seem as if I had given up there Columbia...

We are still waiting to hear what will happen when my work finishes here next month. Presumably I go to the Yangste valley in general and Nanking in particular to lecture, but whether for one month or three I don't know. If for one three we shant get south to Foochow and Canton till summer very hot weather, and little time in Japan on our return, earlier tho still hot enough, and have some weeks in Japan to complete our sightseeing there, Nikko etc. When we find out and Ev gets here we shall have to decide what the rest of the family will do when I go to Nanking—they wont want three mos there as it is not exciting. Another thing agt staying over another year is the uncertainty of this situation. Things have been badly broken up, no lectures last two weeks. No actual strike, but no regular classes either. They are meeting everyday to decide upon whether to strike, the more responsible ones trying to prevent it, the hot heads wanting to to as a protest agt beating up of students and arests of students, and dissolution of union at demand of J govt; also the pro-oficial spies among them are urging a strike, as the govt would like to have them do it, to close schools, get students out of Peking and give them free hand to open direct negotiations with J about Shntung. The situation was very tense this last week, with the arrests and the police and lmilitary here and in Tientsin taking the overt action agt the students. Its pretty clear that the first chapter in the movement is now ended, and what will happen next its too much to say. J has felt the boycott very much, and one hand is ready to make some concessions and on the other is forcing the Chinese military party to direct suppression by use of force of the boycott. They have taken Tientsin as the place of for an object lesson, Even if they break it, it wll be a long time before J wholly recovers, The movement toward native production especially in cotton has taken a big leap forward, tho there is great difficulty in importing machinery.

Tomorrow is another of the endless holidays here—this time the anniversary of the abdication of the Manchu dynsaty in 1912—tho it might as well be Lincolns birthday here as there. Thursday has been my Tsing Hua day and all the holidays have thoughtfully come on that day. Ev arrives here on Thursday tho, and Im hoping there will be a holiday next week as the 20th is the New Year day, and many schools have a three day holiday.

Lots of love to you all Dad. [DewJ3]
Peking Feb 13th. [1920]

Dearest children, Fred, Bino and Elizabeth.

It seems by the records I have been making a very bad account in writing home lately. Things go the same here as elsewhere tho I have not the same excuse of hard work and being tired, but we get domestic and nothing of new importance happens and I allow myself to get busy with the passing incidents and with talking to people. Today is a great day, for Evelyn is landing or has landed on the continent of Asia if she has carried out the plans she wired to us from Tokyo. It seems to put the freshness and the sensation back into the strange appearances that have now become familiar. You know she will get here the day before New years and if she is not tired or sick we ought to have a great time for ten days seeing the markets and the exhibitions. The weather here is sunny and not too cold, tho it is the coldest of the year. We may still have snow and then it will be hard work standing on the stone floors, looking. But it is all a matter of clothing and the Chinese know how to adapt themselves. The food I have already talked about, but the clothes ought to be seen to be understood. Lately I have been relieving my own distress as well as mitigating the pains of others a little by putting some little children in K.G. for the rest of this year. Lucy has one particular favorite and the first day this child went she was like a stuffed ball in appearance, her arms stuck out like the wadded dolls and were not much more movable. If the children fall down here there is nothing to worry about. The shoes are the most convincing of our vanities for they are made of felt with thick soles and wadded linings, no heels. The college girl here would not pass on the Smith or Brynmawr campus. All her clothes are made of cotton cloth like the ones I sent home, only in general the good old colors have gone. They wear fur lined coats, both small and over coats made of a dirty brown color and sometimes a long wool overcoat like a very narrow mans ulster with a cheap fur collar. In the house they all wear the thin silk skirts of black put on over several pairs of trousers, and at least four coats one on top of the other, one or two of them being lined with fur. I think they tell the truth when they say they are never cold, no cellars, stone floor, no rug if a little stove with fire they often open their door to get air.

I have just read a note from Joanna, came on the Russia I think, tho we are to get another mail today—if we do. I believe a cotton coat is about as costly for a girl here as a plain silk one would be. When they go out for company they wear the lovely brocade satins. We had a call from a bride yesterday afternoon, She was dressed all in splendid white brocade. This is the second white brocade suit we have seen on an afternoon caller. As for food, let me suggest this dish to you. Put into your chafing dish enough broth for your soup. Put on the table beside it vegetables either cooked or partly so, and thin sliced meat and fish of as many kinds as you wish, very thin, drop these slices into the boiling broth and take them out with your chopsticks and put them into your mouth. After you get enough of this, put all you have into the broth and then put the whol into your soup plates and finish with rice or without. We are having it alone for tiffin [luncheon] today. Chinese have it for the last course at a dinner. They always have their sweet in the middle of the dinner. We have today broth well flavored, cabbage which is cut up and boiled first, thin sliced potatoes, lamb and I dont know what else for the cook always surprises us with things we know not…

As for politics here things move on in the same direction so far as I can see Japan and the interests that go with her seem to calmly press the heel harder all the time on the necks of the majority who are struggling to get loose. The students are doing very little work tho they are not striking nominally. The whole excitement has been very upsetting to them and they still feel they have work more important than studies, and the idle ones take advantage to be more lazy than ever, Mrs [Lois Miles] Zucker teaches English Lit in the govt University. She says she had three boys in one class this week and that is the largest number, Those three told her they came because they were sick and could not go out to speak. Yesterday we were about the town but saw no one speaking, It is said they are speaking on the shops. Meantime the Minister of Foreign affairs has left and his Vice minister has gone with him and there is chaos in the foreign office. It is a time when I shou[ld like to see Mr [Bertram Lenox] Simpson and hear his view. He is in general hopeful but advisers in general have not much
influence tho he is said to be listened to by the foreign office. Perhaps that is the reason they are out, I dont know. He is writing articles for the Leader showing how China may keep her advantages if she will and the students are following the lines of the information he gives them. In general no one dares to move and so every thing is outwardly calm, tho that is an atmosphere that suits Japan.

We are sending lanterns for New Years presents to our friends the children. They are the very most interesting cheap decorations I have ever seen, all the insects, fishes, birds, vegetables and some quadrupeds are wonderfully reproduced You put a light inside them, their legs and arms move in the air, they are colored, and they cost 25 cents each. The colors are varnished on so they are very durable. The deer is a sacred animal, brining good luck I saw a fawn life size standing on its feet. There are lovely ones of painted silk which are more expensive. We had a gift of lovely paintings, panels two by six inches The one I like best of our lanterns is a red peach with a scarlet butterfly resting on the leaf. I wish E.A. could have some of them, but if she did they would have to be made in the U.S. for they would not travel well. Some time may be we will bring the lantern makers to us but their works will be much more expensive than they are here, like all art…

Our lillies are in full bloom and I fear will not make a good show when Ev arrives tho they were bought to celebrate her arrival. The Chinese are wonderful in forcing things and the flowers tho sparcce and very dear are delicious They take two or more lily bulbs and bind them together in a straight line by running a splint of rattan thru them so you have a lovely flower bed out of two bulbs. I have one such with nine spikes of heavy bloom on it and the three bulb combinations have sometimes 15 others have 12. They produce very fots. and not such big leaves as when we put them in a lot of water, Change water every day and keep but little in bowl. They are sold for 2½ cts per bloom so there is never any doubt. When you buy the buds are just ready to bloom and the leaves three inches long. Later they get tall, at least I cant prevent that.

Tomorrow morning at seven o'clock I am going to the silk and fur market. So far during the cold I have not had the nerve to do it. I think I shall buy a fur coat for next winter of grey squirrel. The cost about one sixth of the prices I see in the papers from N.Y. Furnishing the flat has so tken up my intesst that we have not bought much to take home. mean time the price of rugs has so soared since last summer that I am mad at not having made investments in them.

Peking is full of conventions, Methodist, Missionary, and Medical…

Lots of love, Mama. [DewJ3]
Letter from Alice Chipman Dewey to Frederick A. Dewey
Dear Fred...
I had my breakfast before the others and went to the fur market and I nearly bought a fur coat to make over for E.A. The little Am. children wear them here either made of spotted cat which is very pretty or striped cat, or of grey squirrel. If you had only been near to ask if you wanted that expense, they cost about fifteen dollars all made up. I am going to buy another and better for me, and some others, and I think Elizabeth might want one too, but I don't dare to go too far in a ting so perishable as some of them are. let me know I hd lovely sable coats offered to me for 250 and 400 depending on the size. One long coat coming to the feet may be had for 1000 or 1500 and they cost 4000 or more in the U.S. I am not thinkig of those but I like the grey squirrel ones. What I think I shall buy is oe made of fox legs which look like sable and wear a long long time cost about 75. The variety of fur here is greater than with us as they are fond of sew[n]g little bits together to make handsome designs like the fox legs which are small but dark and handsome. There is one kind made of pieces less than an inch square. Well, so much for fur. Silk is sold at that morning market too, and as for pigs all in parts I necer saw so many in my life. You can buy furniture there and cotton clth and brasses and dishes and spectacles and vegetables znd ol junk made of iron and all the rest besides the Chinese people. Since I wrote you yesterday there is more evidence that China is just drifti[n]g into the maw of Japan. The teachers and the Students Unions were suppressed day before yesterday and the fact is published today. The tendency has been steady, in spite of all the remonstrances of the people. It is curious to us to see what these people seem to depend upon in making up their minds, or not making them up, as you see it. Since reading more of their history I can see they have always been in a stae much like this. The Japanese have held parts of their coast in the past and then been forced to get out after century or more. They have always pirated the coast and for the Manchu rule, and its downfall the effect of that seems to be to make the Chinese take things as they come trusting that after 300 years or so they will again drive out the Japs. They seem to rest on this great lazy fact that the Chinese nation is too big and too unwilling to be absorbed in any other; and as for this interference, why we have to stand about so much that is disagreeabl any way and it is very disagreeeable to fight the Japs and to hate them as we do but Govt is always bad any way, -like ours, - and we may as well make the best of it. A man named Que [Kuo] Tai Chi is here from Canton. He has just come back from Paris with the peace delegates and he is said to be saying strong tnings to the legations and to the Govt regarding Canton. No one can be surprised if the south breaks entirely with the north in case this govt does make the concessions direct to Japan in Shantung. There is also a strong probability that the whole of the intriguing is just to overthrow this present govt. That downfall happens to be a thing that the republicans want of course, as well as the Anfu Club since they too can not control it. There is not telling from day to day.
I have a charming little satin coat for E.A. which I think I can send over by Mrs Frame, and I shall try. She goes in about one week. The embroidery on it is quite rare, and shows the garment once belonged to a child of the highest rank, next to the imperial.
Pa has just come in from his lecture. Hu [Shi]says, suppression of the Unions is like the threat to close the schools, largely a threat to induce the students to make trouble. What the govt really wants is an excuse to close the schools and their spies keep coming to the students to urge them to bring legal action agnst the metropolitan police. They really know that the students idea has influen[ce] and agrees with the public sentiment and they want to close the schools for the next four months so as to be able to quietly get things back into their own hands. But the students are on to their tricks and have settled upon a quite policy which does not mean giving up. They mean to continue classes and to outwit the govt by nonresistance. The procalmation of Marial law will not alter anything. Meantime Peking look as if it were under martial law already so many guards every [w]here. Japanese goods have been put out for sale again and some shops which had only native goods have been closed by the police on the ground that they were supporting the boycott. Did you every hear of a contry punishing patriotism to such a degree...
Travel is dear here, and especially when we go with the Chinese who think it necessary to have the highest priced things everywhere…
Lucy is feeling better today and Papa worse, That is to say he has the worst cold he has had for on the whole he has thrown off beginnings of colds easily and his lecturing has not been troublesome. Today however he is lying down tho he has no symptoms of fever or other extreme discomfort. It is quite wonderful how he adapts to all the changes without being upset and I hope this cold means nothing to worry about. There is the usual amount of contagious disease in the city among children. Our good friend and still better friend of Chinese education Mr Sam Dean has quite broken down. He is in bed, not allowed to see people and it is feared the trouble is tuberculosis. He has not been well all winter and has gone on breaking all the laws of hygiene and now every body is mourning him. He is to go home soon any way and now it is a struggle to get him build up to travel. If he does not come back the loss to China will be immeasurable…
With lots of love to you and to all, Mama. [DewJ3]
Dearest family, 

The J govt has stood in Korea in the way of persecution and propagand by missionaries etc—and as the lying missionaries of China she would never forgive them for hating Japan. That last is a good mor war moral, hate is so hateful you must be very careful to hate the right ones. The morning paper says Tom Lamont is on way over here—tho it didnt call him Tom, just like that. Some of the business people here say it wasnt true that the Morgans are going in with Japanese capital in Manchuria and Siberia, and think the Japanese gentlemen in Sf just announced it from nerve because it was piqued because the other crowd had just announced its cooperation with Chinese capital. Internal politics here are too much for me—I hae to admit it. The popular objection to Sha entering into direct negotiations with Japn about her return of Shantung is universal. Its so strong that it would seem unreasonable if it didnt give a measure of the existing distrust both of Japan and of their own officials. But the officials have gone straight ahead. No public decision has been announced but it is generally believed that the govt has decided to go ahead. In fact it is generally believed that private negotiation[s] have been going on thu the medium of some big Japanese financiers here, and that when it is announced that negotiations will be begun it will mean verything is settled. One well posted Chinese said that he thought that after it was fixed Japan would simply announce the terms, saying she would not insist upon direct negotiations in view of the opposition of the people. The terms in general will involve considerable concessions but will be quite general and the details will be fixed by private treaties including some generous "loans". Domestic politics is also miced up, the premier while a militaryist is a rival of little Hsu the head of the Anfu club, which controls the govt except him, and it is said they are playing for his scalp and to get complete control. The best evidence of something going ions is the campaign of the last few weeks against the students Adter suppressing the movement in Tientsin, they have stopped it here, really stoped it so far as external manifestations are concerned. They tried every possibe way to provoke the students to strike. At first the students fell in the trap, but and voted a strike, but they got wise and voted not to. Then the govt to provoke the more, dissolved both the teachers and students unions by main force, police. Still they keep quiet What the govt will do next to provoke them, I dont know. The govt wants to get an excuse to close up all the schools and send the students home. The supposition is that it wants them out of the way when direct negotiations with Japan are announced. Thats probably a part of it, but demands from Japan and money are probably a factor too. The students really won a moral victory over themselves in not striking. Their fellow students had bee[n] arrested and physically abused, over forty are in hospitals here, from beatings up by soldiers and about as many more leaders in prison, no one knows where, and their sense of honor was that they should all strike for their comrades sake. But other managed to persuade them that the Shantung issue was the important thing, and they reserve themselves for that, and their fellow students in prison were more interested in the cause than in themselves. Finally the vote not to strike was unanimous—you cant imagine what it means for them to change about, becuase this would be loss of face for those who had been in favor a strike. Then they also sent telegrams to all the other towns where they had sent emissaries to start strikes telling them not to, to wait. Reports from the Shanghai valley are that probably the southern vaprovinces will break loose and start a revolution off the Peking govt begins direct negotiations Probably the Japanese discount this. If they can get control of the northern govt, it would give them Manchuria positive and Shantung and this province Chili, and they could get the north and south to fighting one another, without their having to use their own money and blood. However the revolution if it occurs wont be confined to the south. The suppression of organizations will lead to direct action by individuals. There is no doubt Bolshevism is growing very rapidly in China—not technical Svovietism, but a belief in revolution as the cure of both Japan and their won govt, and making use of the Russian revolutionary aid to bring it on—there is too much land owned by individualistic peasants for a real Russian Bolshevism and factory industry too undeveloped. But the militarists who have used command of the army to extort money have been put[ting] their money into banks, stores (that is the chief thing the boycott is up agt) and
industrial enterprises, and in that way an economic question is growing up, and class feeling which has never existed before as class feeling. Its no use trying to prophesy about China, but anywhere else in the world, if things go in the present direction, it would be safe to predict an era of terrorism, assassinations etc, and efforts at revolution. Mentime the Chinese have got pessimistic agin, as much so as when we landed last May. A large part of them predict complete Japanese control—they are so many of them fatalists at bottom. On the other hand they think in the long run fate is on their side and that after they have had fifty years off a century of Japan—a century or two more or less is nothing here—Japan will be completely destroyed. They have evolved so far next to no capacity for selfgovernment. As I've probably said before if I were a historian of ancient times, anytime up to eighteenth century Id study China and see the thing before my eyes. And the financial mess is the worst, and the foreign govt and diplomats are primarily responsible for that. The govt exists from month to month simply by the favor of foreign loans. It is now borrowing twentyfive million—that is five million pounds, which by the time exchange is reckoned and the premium to baker paisd will net China ten million dollars. The reason for our govt going in is thaa toherwise Japan alone will laon the money. But verything is handled in this piecemeal pawnbroking style. They have paper assurane that some of the money will be paid used to pay off loans soldiers and disband the army, and that there will be foreign supervision of expenditures—but Lord. Well there doesn't seem to be anything but politics to write about—the lanterns of fishes and fruits and bugs and grasshoppers that we get for twenty five cents, oiled paper, for new years are much more interesting—New Years is in three days, but how much we are going to see except the special markets and bazzaars I dont know. When Ev gets here there is to be another big banquet given us, a kind of farewell departure I think.

Lots of love Dad

Ill try to send this by Shanghai and Empress mail. Plese direct the next letters to me | Care Teachers College | Nanking. | Where the family will be I dont know, but try some of your letters direct to me there, and some to rest of family here. [DewJ3]
Letter from John Dewey to Dewey children

Feb 20 [1920] Peking, the same being the first day of the lunar new year.

Dearest family,

We lived and dozed thru a night that on the whole has 4th of July beaten for noise; there were no explosions quite so rude as our big dynamite crackers, and thank God the tin horns were not. For uninterrupted cracking however the night was a sucess. This morning the boys have all been in and made their boys bows. Spite of age, they are all boys when you see how happy the New Years Day made them. I wish I knew enough Chinese to ask them why it made them so happy; I dont think it was entirely the cumshaws, sctho they seemed pleased and perhaps surprised at the amount they got; perhpas they had thought we were tightwads. It hardly seems possible as if a people as old and disillusioned as the Chinese could think New Years was going to make the world turn over a new leaf and behave decently for a change, but if [pencil del.] every [in pencil w. caret] day ought to be New Years if it can make people happy so easily. If you ever see Mr [possibly George] Hopkins (and I hope you do sometimes) tell him that tho China doesnt seem idyllic, I sympathize with his feeling about it. Mr Barry has taken to sending the Call lately. The red headlines and screaming type and break up into millions of unrelated paragraphs most of which cant have any interest except to the epople who in them are killed divorced and sued for breach of promise or knocked out, [pencil comma] brought back a picture Id about that had almost lapsesd [d in pencil] from consciousness. I had forgotten anyone could be so crazy, and yet I know very well before I've been back two weeks it will seem to represent the normal curse of life (I started to write course of life, but I bow to the superior wisdom of the Typewriter)…

Suh Hu [Hu Shi] in suggesting to me that we stay over next year, said it probably wouldnt be safe for me to go home, as I would be deported. This wasnt all a joke on his part. It represents the impression our present doings in America make on an intelligent foreigner as they they get reported. Of course we are rich enough and big enough, to say nothing of being crazy enough, to care nothing for any what any dam fool foreigner cares about us, but I wonder how much of a headache we'll have when we wake up the morning after. After several million unskilled laborers take the advice of those who are telling them if you dont like this country go back to where you came from, and the labor market is cornered by the unions, and the prize boobs of the universe, the middle class has reaped the full reward of its asininity and servility, we shall certainly have some country. This sounds dyspeptic, but Im only too fate, and all that ails me physically is a bad cold. But Mr Hunt told last night about going back to his old home town in the country in Ill and the respectable of the village were brought out to do him honor, the hardware merchant, the lawyer and doctor and preacher and banker, and he said there wasnt one of them who wasnt ready to fight and die for for Mr [Elbert Henry] Gary. I only started out to say that he has begun to tell the facts about Siberia as practically everybody here knows them, but which have been systematically distorted by the propaganda press and the state dept along with the rest of the diplomatists. About one thing he differs from the others Ive heard talk who have been there. He says America isnt hated, that 90 per cent of our soldiers became sympathetic with the revolutionaries, and that the Russian common people know it, as our soldier[s] generally let the revolutionaries escape as fast as the Kolchak people captured them—the train that went to Vladivostock tand back to dem and the surrender of the latter city to the revolutionaries went under an escort of armed American soliders. Mr Morris ofur minister in Tokyo understod the whole situation he says which bears out the impression I got in Tokyo, but felt bound to be loyal to the state dept which had instructed him to find reasons for recognizing Kolchak. I didnt dare ask Mr Hunt how much Russian he speaks, for as he tells about his experiences it seems to make a little difference whether he is telling literal facts, or whether he is an artists and facts meet him more than half way. I suspect something of the latter. Anyway I had him here at dinner last night to meet the man who probably knows the most about the student movement from within, as the Chinese student is at least as much entitled as the Siberian peasant to figure picturesquely in the American newspapers. There is a certain kind of lie which only predicts the future in such a way as to help it come true, and if Hunt lies, which Im not at all sure of, it's [pencil apostrophe] that kind. Anyway he has brains and is an artist. He must also be a newspaper
man, for I think he is the man who got the Peace treaty for the Chicago Tribune when the Senate couldnt get it. Mama and Ev must be together by this time; they are supposed to come back here next tuesday but I hae my doots. I just started out to wish you another Happy New Years, under the influence of the spontaneous happiness of our servants, moved especially by Fred's letter of Jan 176 [6 in pencil] || which looks as if mails were to be more regular agin. If it were of any use Id tell him not to work so hard, but nobody ever takes that advice But wall street isnt unlike other places and in taking everything a man will give even if uses himself up doing it, and then saying afterwards what a fool he was to let himself be used…

Laotze over here in China was another one Be [in pencil w. caret] a useful citizen and somebody will use you; be worthless and useless, and youll do something, [pencil comma] because you will be let alone and have a chance. This isnt advice, merely a net quotation from Mr Laotze who is the real philosopher of China as Confucius is of the ruling class…

Here are two or three little glimpses of China—draw your own morals. There is perfect and complete censorship here. Students unions and teachers suppressed. The last number of the students union paper comes out with an article advising the soldiers to turn on their officers and divide the property of the latter among themselves. The soldiers ran into alot of inoffensive soldiers with the butts of their guns and sent about forty to hospitals and as many more to jail. The soldiers who guard the students in jail go in and listen to them talk in jail ad then when they are relieved of guard duty carry the letters back and forth from [pencil del.] between [in pencil w. caret] the prioners and the friends—nor for money either. The premier who of China had a talk wthe other day with some men from Shantung province who told him about the actual treaty nd legal status of Shantung. He got very hot and said he had never known the facts before—his subordinates had misrepresented and suppressed them. However the last is not distinctively Chinese—probably every important political decision of the last few years has been made in just this way. So maybe the other things arent distinctly Chinese either.

Anyway love to all, and a very Happy lunar new year— I think Ill transfer my allegiance from sun to moon and see if it wont be as cheering as with the Chinese.

Dad [DewJ3]
1920.02.25 Dewey, John. The sequel of the student revolt [ID D28475].

As I write, in late November, the Sino-Japanese fracas in Foochow (in which several Chinese students lost their lives and in consequence of which the Japanese landed marines who have stationed themselves in the Chinese city as well as in the foreign concession), is inflaming public feeling in China as it has not been stirred since last May. The students are again engaging in public demonstrations, and are joining with Chinese Chambers of Commerce in demanding that the people cease all social and economic intercourse with the Japanese until the latter change their course. The waning boycott is revived. It is demanded that the government declare a policy of economic non-intercourse and an embargo on imports and exports, until Japan has radically altered its policies. It is impossible to forecast the outcome. Pessimists declare that Japan is taking advantage of the situation to bring Fukien directly within her sphere of influence—an intention expressed in the Twenty-one Demands, but temporarily held in abeyance.

There are no optimists in China in the extreme sense, but the more hopeful assert that in the present state of affairs, with the Shantung question unsettled, the Consortium in its bearing upon Manchuria under discussion, and with an acute Siberian trouble on hand, the Japanese government is not looking for more trouble—especially with the eyes of the world in general upon it, and those of the American Senate in particular. Pessimists counter with the remark that it is precisely the growing influence and prestige of the United States in China that has forced the hand of the Japanese militarist expansionists to take an aggressive step, and face the world with a fait accompli; that Japan will make use of the difficulty to demand that the Chinese government put a stop, once for all, to the boycott movement; that Japanese troops, once having obtained a footing, will never be withdrawn, and that Fukien is now to go the way of Manchuria and Shantung.

Perhaps the most sinister feature is the semi-official report from Tokyo that the disturbance was deliberately started by the Chinese in order to force the Japanese to land troops, and thereby increase the prejudice against them now existing throughout the world. Official reports from the American consulate agree with Chinese reports that unarmed Chinese students were attacked by armed Japanese and Formosans under conditions which give an appearance of a planned and organized movement with at least the connivance of local Japanese authorities. Judging from the past, the chief outcome will not be immediately to establish Japan in the Province of Fukien, but to strengthen her hands in other controversies by injecting an element to be reckoned with in making a 'compromise'. Such is Oriental diplomacy. The gathering, as I write, of ten thousand Pekingese students for a demonstration, after a period of quiescence, gives a good opportunity to take stock of what the Student Movement has accomplished in the six months of its existence. As an immediate political movement it has accomplished nothing beyond preventing the signing of the Peace Treaty by China. The reasons for the relative political failure are not hard to see in retrospect, however difficult it was to perceive them in the excitement and stir of last May and June. The youth and inexperience of the students; the fear of some excess which would undo what had been effected; the fear in Peking, where the movement began, that government officials (who regarded the movement not as patriotic but as a pestilential disturbance headed toward Bolshevism) would make demonstrations an excuse for abolishing the University and the Higher Schools that are the centres of liberal thought; the difficulty in maintaining continuous organized cooperation with the mercantile guilds; the natural waning of enthusiasm when the crisis was past—all these things entered in.

But it would be a great mistake to think the movement died. The active current was diverted from breaking against the political and militaristic dam. It was drawn into a multitude of side streams and is now irrigating the intellectual and industrial soil of China. In Canton and Foochow the economic boycott has been active; in Tientsin, the political ferment has retained its vitality. Otherwise the students' organizations have gone into popular education, social and philanthropic service and vigorous intellectual discussion. China has never been anything but apathetic towards governmental questions. The Student Revolt marked a temporary exception only in appearance. The hopelessness of the political muddle, with corrupt officials and provincial military governors in real control, is enough to turn the youth away from direct
politics. In addition a universal feeling operates that the comparative failure of the Revolution
is due to the fact that political change far outran intellectual and moral preparation; that
political revolution was formal and external; that an intellectual revolution is required before
the nominal governmental revolution can be cashed in. Patriotism in China has centered about
the maintenance of the existence of the nation against external aggression. The Student Revolt
holds that national existence can best be secured by building up China from within, by
spreading a democratic education, raising the standard of living, improving industries and
relieving poverty.

The external phase of the movement centres in the creation of new schools supported and
taught by the students, schools for children and adults; popular lectures and direct 'social
service' movements; cooperation with shops to supply technical advice and expert assistance
in improving old processes and introducing new arts. These activities protect the intellectual
movement in getting away from all practical affairs, in getting away from politics, and
guarantee it against becoming a cultural and literary side-show.

What is termed the literary revolution was under way before the Student Revolt. It aimed at a
reform of the language used in books, magazines, newspapers, and public discussion. The
outsider will jump to the conclusion that this means an attempt to encourage a phonetic
substitute for ideographic characters. Not at all. There is a movement to supplement
ideographs with phonetic signs to show their pronunciation, the aim being quite as much to
standardize pronunciation as to make it easier to learn to read. But this movement arouses no
such interest and excitement as the literary revolution. The latter is an attempt to make the
spoken language the standard language for print. Literary Chinese is as far away from the
vernacular as Latin is from English, perhaps further. It is the speech of two thousand years
ago, adorned and frozen. To learn it is to learn another language. The reformers were actuated
by the practical impossibility of making education really universal when in addition to the
difficulties of mastering the ideographs, children in the elementary schools are compelled to
get their education in terms of a foreign language. They are actuated even more by the belief
that it was not possible to develop a literature which shall express the life of today unless the
spoken language, the language of the people, is used. Apart from employing and enriching the
vulgar tongue, it is not possible to develop general discussion of the issues of today, social,
moral, economic.

Fortunately the new movement was 'advertised by its loving enemies'. The literary classicists
saw in it the deathblow to the old moral classics, upon which China was built. They argued
that the history of China is the history of its literary classics. Its unity resides in acceptance of
the moral traditions they embody. To neglect them is to destroy China. The fight merged into
one between conservatives and liberals in general, between the representatives of the old
traditions and the representatives of western ideas and democratic institutions. Young China
rallied as one man to the support of the literary revolution. It is stated that whereas two years
ago there were but one or two tentative journals in the vulgar tongue, today there are over
three hundred. Since last May the students have started score upon score of journals, all in the
spoken tongue and all discussing matters in words that can be understood by the common
man. In the columns of one of the older Chinese dailies in Peking there has lately been a
discussion carried on by voluntary correspondents about a single particle that is used freely in
colloquial speech—a discussion already running into ten thousands of words.

Those who know what the change from a learned language to the vernacular meant for the
transition from medieval to modern Europe will not despise this linguistic sign of social
change. It is more important by far than the adoption of a new constitution. Conservatism in
China is not native or natural. It is largely the product of an inelastic system of memoriter
education. This education has its roots in the use of a dead language as the medium of
instruction. A national education conference held in October last passed a resolution in favor
of having all text-books hereafter composed in the colloquial language. After this course has
been followed for a generation, the judicious historian may see in it an event of greater
importance than the downfall of the Manchu dynasty.

According to published summaries, social questions are uppermost in the new press. Eloquent
testimony to the new-found unity of the world is seen in the amount of discussion devoted to
economics and labor questions, which as yet do not exist in any acute form in China itself. Although Marx is hardly more pertinent to the present industrial situation in China than Plato, he is translated and much discussed. All the new 'isms are discussed. Ideal anarchism has many followers partly because of the historic Chinese contempt for government, partly because of the influence of French returned students who came in contact with communistic ideas in Paris. A friend who made a careful study of some fifty of the students' papers says that their first trait is the question mark, and the second is the demand for complete freedom of speech in order that answers may be found for the questions.

In a country where belief has been both authoritatively dogmatic and complacent, the rage for questioning is the omen of a new epoch. More than westerners realize, the interest of the Orient in the west has centered in the material progress of Europe and America, in machines for industry and war. There was no belief that the west was superior in other respects. Only within the last year or two has the idea become general that western ideas and modes of thought are more important than western battle-ships and steam-engines. This belief is concentrated in the intellectual side of the Student Movement, though it shows itself not in any great zeal for western ideas, as such, but in a desire for such knowledge of them as will facilitate discussion and criticism of typical Chinese creeds and institutions. One incident out of a multitude must suffice to show that the demand for freedom of thought and speech has a definite practical significance. China took over from Japan the law for assemblies which Japan had taken over from Germany. A discussion club applied to the Peking police authorities for a permit, stating that the object was consideration of the newer currents of world thought. The authorities refused the permit on the ground that newer currents must mean Bolshevism, anarchism and communism and that consideration of such topics was dangerous.

As is always the case, official opposition stimulates the movement of ideas. The menace of autocracy from within and without gives edge and fire to the hunger for new ideas. The eagerness grows for knowledge of the thought of liberal western countries in just the degree in which the powers near at hand in Tokyo and Peking seem to symbolize an intellectual creed which the world has outgrown. The more the so-called political revolution exhibits itself as a failure, the more active is the demand for an intellectual revolution which will make some future political revolution a reality. The thing that time makes stand out most in the Student Revolt is its spontaneity. The students met discouragement on all sides. Even their teachers and advisers among the returned students from America were inclined at first to wet-blanket their ardor. Its spontaneity is the proof of its genuine and inevitable nature. When most political in its outward expression, it was not a political movement. It was the manifestation of a new consciousness, an intellectual awakening in the young men and young women who through their schooling had been aroused to the necessity of a new order of belief, a new method of thinking. The movement is secure no matter how much its outward forms may alter or crumble. [DewJ19]

1920.02.25-27 John Dewey attends the Annual meeting of Zhili-Shanxi Educational Association in Beijing. [DewJ8]
American apologists for that part of the Peace Treaty which relates to China have the advantage of the illusions of distance. Most of the arguments seem strange to anyone who lives in China even for a few months. He finds the Japanese on the spot using the old saying about territory consecrated by treasure spent and blood shed. He reads in Japanese papers and hears from moderately liberal Japanese that Japan must protect China as well as Japan, against herself, against her own weak or corrupt government, by keeping control of Shantung to prevent China from again alienating that territory to some other power. The history of European aggression in China gives this argument great force among the Japanese, who for the most part know nothing more about what actually goes on in China than they used to know about Korean conditions. These considerations, together with the immense expectations raised among the Japanese during the war concerning their coming domination of the Far East and the unwavering demand of excited public opinion in Japan during the Versailles Conference for the settlement that actually resulted, give an ironic turn to the statement so often made that Japan may be trusted to carry out her promises. Yes, one is often tempted to say, that is precisely what China fears, that Japan will carry out her promises, for then China is doomed. To one who knows the history of foreign aggression in China, especially the technique of conquest by railway and finance, the irony of promising to keep economic rights while returning sovereignty lies so on the surface that it is hardly irony. China might as well be offered Kant's Critique of Pure Reason on a silver platter as sovereignty under such conditions. The latter is equally metaphysical.

A visit to Shantung and a short residence in its capital city, Tsinan, made the conclusions, which so far as I know every foreigner in China has arrived at, a living thing. It gave a vivid picture of the many and intimate ways in which economic and political rights are inextricably entangled together. It made one realize afresh that only a President who kept himself innocent of any knowledge of secret treaties during the war, could be naive enough to believe that the promise to return complete sovereignty retaining only economic rights is a satisfactory solution. It threw fresh light upon the contention that at most and at worst Japan had only taken over German rights, and that since we had acquiesced in the latter’s arrogations we had no call to make a fuss about Japan. It revealed the hollowness of the claim that pro-Chinese propaganda had wilfully misled Americans into confusing the few hundred square miles around the port of Tsing-tao with the Province of Shantung with its thirty millions of Chinese population.

As for the comparison of Germany and Japan one might suppose that the objects for which America nominally entered the war had made, in any case, a difference. But aside from this consideration, the Germans exclusively employed Chinese in the railway shops and for all the minor positions on the railway itself. The railway guards (the difference between police and soldiers is nominal in China) were all Chinese, the Germans merely training them. As soon as Japan invaded Shantung and took over the railway, Chinese workmen and Chinese military guards were at once dismissed and Japanese imported to take their places. Tsinan-fu, the inland terminus of the ex-German railway, is over two hundred miles from Tsing-tao. When the Japanese took over the German railway business office, they at once built barracks, and today there are several hundred soldiers still there—where Germany kept none. Since the armistice even, Japan has erected a powerful military wireless within the grounds of the garrison, against of course the unavailing protest of Chinese authorities. No foreigner can be found who will state that Germany used her ownership of port and railway to discriminate against other nations. No Chinese can be found who will claim that this ownership was used to force the Chinese out of business, or to extend German economic rights beyond those definitely assigned her by treaty. Common sense should also teach even the highest paid propagandist in America that there is, from the standpoint of China, an immense distinction between a national menace located half way around the globe, and one within two days’ sail over an inland sea absolutely controlled by a foreign navy, especially as the remote nation has no other foothold and the nearby one already dominates additional territory of enormous strategic and economic value—namely, Manchuria.
These facts bear upon the shadowy distinction between the Tsing-tao and the Shantung claim, as well as upon the solid distinction between German and Japanese occupancy. If there still seemed to be a thin wall between Japanese possession of the port of Tsing-tao and usurpation of Shantung, it was enough to stop off the train in Tsinan-fu to see the wall crumble. For the Japanese wireless and the barracks of the army of occupation are the first things that greet your eyes. Within a few hundred feet of the railway that connects Shanghai, via the important centre of Tientsin, with the capital, Peking, you see Japanese soldiers on the nominally Chinese street, guarding their barracks. Then you learn that if you travel upon the ex-German railway towards Tsing-tao, you are ordered to show your passport as if you were entering a foreign country. And as you travel along the road (remembering that you are over two hundred miles from Tsing-tao) you find Japanese soldiers at every station, and several garrisons and barracks at important towns on the line. Then you realize that at the shortest possible notice, Japan could cut all communications between southern China (together with the rich Yangtze region) and the capital, and with the aid of the Southern Manchurian Railway at the north of the capital, hold the entire coast and descend at its good pleasure upon Peking.

You are then prepared to learn from eye-witnesses that when Japan made its Twenty-one Demands upon China, machine guns were actually in position at strategic points, throughout Shantung, with trenches dug and sandbags placed. You know that the Japanese liberal spoke the truth, who told you, after a visit to China and return to protest against the action of his government, that the Japanese already had such a military hold upon China that they could control the country within a week, after a minimum of fighting, if war should arise. You also realize the efficiency of official control of information and domestic propaganda as you recall that he also told you that these things were true at the time of his visit, under the Terauchi cabinet, but had been completely reversed by the present Hara ministry. For I have yet to find a single foreigner or Chinese who is conscious of any difference of policy, save as the end of the war has forced the necessity of more caution, since other nations can now look Chinawards as they could not during the war.

An American can get an idea of the realities of the present situation if he imagines a foreign garrison and military wireless in Wilmington, with a railway from that point to a fortified seaport controlled by the foreign power, at which the foreign nation can land, without resistance, troops as fast as they can be transported, and with bases of supply, munitions, food, uniforms, etc., already located at Wilmington, at the sea-port and several places along the line. Reverse the directions from south to north, and Wilmington will stand for Tsinan-fu, Shanghai for New York, Nanking for Philadelphia with Peking standing for the seat of government at Washington, and Tientsin for Baltimore. Suppose in addition that the Pennsylvania road is the sole means of communication between Washington and the chief commercial and industrial centres, and you have the framework of the Shantung picture as it presents itself daily to the inhabitants of China. Upon second thought, however, the parallel is not quite accurate. You have to add that the same foreign nation controls also all coast communications from, say, Raleigh southwards, with railway lines both to the nearby coast and to New Orleans. For (still reversing directions) this corresponds to the position of Imperial Japan in Manchuria with its railways to Dairen and through Korea to a port twelve hours sail from a great military centre in Japan proper. These are not remote possibilities nor vague prognostications. They are accomplished facts.

Yet the facts give only the framework of the picture. What is actually going on within Shantung? One of the demands of the 'postponed' group of the Twenty-one Demands was that Japan should supply military and police advisers to China. They are not so much postponed but that Japan enforced specific concessions from China during the war by diplomatic threats to reintroduce their discussion, or so postponed that Japanese advisers are not already installed in the police headquarters of the city of Tsinan, the capital city of Shantung of three hundred thousand population where the Provincial Assembly meets and all the Provincial officials reside. Within recent months the Japanese consul has taken a company of armed soldiers with him when he visited the Provincial Governor to make certain demands upon him, the visit being punctuated by an ostentatious surrounding of the Governor’s yamen by
these troops. Within the past few weeks, two hundred cavalry came to Tsinan and remained there while Japanese officials demanded of the Governor drastic measures to sup-press the boycott, while it was threatened to send Japanese troops to police the foreign settlement if the demand was not heeded.

A former consul was indiscreet enough to put into writing that if the Chinese Governor did not stop the boycott and the students’ movement by force if need be, he would take matters into his own hands. The chief tangible charge he brought against the Chinese as a basis of his demand for 'protection' was that Chinese store-keepers actually refused to accept Japanese money in payment for goods, not ordinary Japanese money at that, but the military notes with which, so as to save drain upon the bullion reserves, the army of occupation is paid. And all this, be it remem-bered, is more than two hundred miles from Tsing-tao and from eight to twelve months after the armistice. Today's paper reports a visit of Japanese to the Governor to inform him that unless he should prevent a private theatrical performance from being given in Tsinan by the students, they would send their own forces into the settlement to protect themselves. And the utmost they might need protection from, was that the students were to give some plays designed to foster the boycott!

Japanese troops overran the Province before they made any serious attempt to capture Tsing-tao. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that they 'took' the Chinese Tsinan before they took the German Tsing-tao. Propaganda in America has justified this act on the ground that a German railway to the rear of Japanese forces would have been a menace. As there were no troops but only legal and diplomatic papers with which to attack the Japanese, it is a fair inference that the 'menace' was located in Versailles rather than in Shantung, and concerned the danger of Chinese control of their own territory. Chinese have been arrested by Japanese gendarmes in Tsinan and subjected to a torturing third degree of the kind that Korea has made sickeningly familiar. The Japanese claim that the injuries were received while the men were resisting arrest. Considering that there was no more legal ground for arrest than there would be if Japanese police arrested Americans in New York, almost anybody but the pacifist Chinese certainly would have resisted. But official hospital reports testify to bayonet wounds and the marks of flogging. In the interior where the Japanese had been disconcerted by the student propaganda they RAIDed a High School, seized a school boy at random, and took him to a distant point and kept him locked up several days. When the Japanese consul at Tsinan was visited by Chinese officials in protest against these illegal arrests, the consul disclaimed all jurisdiction. The matter, he said, was wholly in the hands of the military authorities in Tsing-tao. His disclaimer was emphasized by the fact that some of the kidnapped Chinese were taken to Tsing-tao for 'trial'.

The matter of economic rights in relation to political domination will be discussed in part two of this article. It is no pleasure for one with many warm friends in Japan, who has a great admiration for the Japanese people as distinct from the ruling military and bureaucratic class, to report such facts as have been stated. One might almost say, one might positively say from the standpoint of Japan itself, that the worst thing that can be charged against the policy of Japan in China for the last six years is its immeasurable stupidity. No nation has ever misjudged the national psychology of another people as Japan has that of China. The alienation of China is widespread, deep, bitter. Even the most pessimistic of the Chinese who think that China is to undergo a complete economic and political domination by Japan do not think it can possibly last, even without outside intervention, more than half a century at most. Today, at the beginning of a new year (1920), the boycott is much more complete and efficient than in the most tense days of last summer. Unfortunately, the Japanese policy seems to be under a truly Greek fate which drives it on. Concessions that would have produced a revulsion of feeling in favor of Japan a year ago will now merely salve the surface of the wound. What would have been welcomed even eight months ago would now be received with contempt. There is but one way in which Japan can now restore herself. It is nothing less than complete withdrawal from Shantung, with possibly a strictly commercial concession at Tsing-tao and a real, not a Manchurian, Open Door.

According to the Japanese-owned newspapers published in Tsinan, the Japanese military commander in Tsing-tao recently made a speech to visiting journalists from Tokyo in which
he said: The suspicions of China cannot now be allayed merely by repeating that we have no territorial ambitions in China. We must attain complete economic domination of the Far East. But if Sino-Japanese relations do not improve, some third party will reap the benefit. Japanese residing in China incur the hatred of the Chinese. For they regard themselves as the proud citizens of a conquering country. When the Japanese go into partnership with the Chinese they manage in the greater number of cases to have the profits accrue to themselves. If friendship between China and Japan is to depend wholly upon the government it will come to nothing. Diplomatists, soldiers, merchants, journalists should repent the past. The change must be complete. But it will not be complete until the Japanese withdraw from Shantung leaving their nationals there upon the footing of other foreigners in China.

II

In discussing the return to China by Japan of a metaphysical sovereignty while economic rights are retained, I shall not repeat the details of German treaty rights as to the railway and the mines. The reader is assumed to be familiar with those facts. The German seizure was outrageous. It was a flagrant case of Might making Right. As von Buelow cynically but frankly told the Reichstag, while Germany did not intend to partition China, she also did not intend to be the passenger left behind in the station when the train started. Germany had the excuse of prior European aggressions, and in turn her usurpation was the precedent for further foreign rape. If judgments are made on a comparative basis, Japan is entitled to all of the white-washing that can be derived from the provocations of European imperialistic powers, including those that in domestic policy are democratic. And every fairminded person will recognize that, leaving China out of the reckoning, Japan’s proximity to China gives her aggressions the color of self-defence in a way that cannot be urged in behalf of any European power.

It is possible to look at European aggressions in, say, Africa as incidents of a colonization movement. But no foreign policy in Asia can shelter itself behind any colonization plea. For continental Asia is, for practical purposes, India and China, representing two of the oldest civilizations of the globe and presenting two of its densest populations. If there is any such thing in truth as a philosophy of history with its own inner and inevitable logic, one may well shudder to think of what the closing acts of the drama of the intercourse of the West and East are to be. In any case, and with whatever comfort may be derived from the fact that the American continents have not taken part in the aggression and hence may act as a mediator to avert the final tragedy, residence in China forces upon one the realization that Asia is, after all, a large figure in the future reckoning of history. In any case, and with whatever comfort may be derived from the fact that the American continents have not taken part in the aggression and hence may act as a mediator to avert the final tragedy, residence in China forces upon one the realization that Asia is, after all, a large figure in the future reckoning of history. Asia is really here after all. It is not simply a symbol in western algebraic balances of trade. And in the future, so to speak, it is going to be even more here, with its awakened national consciousness of about half the population of the whole globe.

Let the agreements of France and Great Britain made with Japan during the war stand for the measure of western consciousness of the reality of a small part of Asia, a consciousness generated by the patriotism of Japan backed by its powerful army and navy. The same agreement measures western unconsciousness of the reality of that part of Asia which lies within the confines of China. An even better measure of western unconsciousness may be found perhaps in such a trifling incident as this:—An English friend long resident in Shantung told me of writing indignantly home concerning the British part in the Shantung settlement. The reply came, complacently stating that Japanese ships did so much in the war that the Allies could not properly refuse to recognize Japan's claims. The secret agreements themselves hardly speak as eloquently for the absence of China from the average western consciousness. In saying that China and Asia are to be enormously significant figures in future reckonings, the spectre of a military Yellow Peril is not meant nor even the more credible spectre of an industrial Yellow Peril. But Asia has come to consciousness, and her consciousness of herself will soon be such a massive and persistent thing that it will force itself upon the reluctant consciousness of the west, and lie heavily upon its conscience. And for this fact, China and the western world are indebted to Japan.

These remarks are more relevant to a consideration of the relationship of economic and political rights in Shantung than they perhaps seem. For a moment’s reflection will call to
mind that all political foreign aggression in China has been carried out for commercial and financial ends, and usually upon some economic pretext. As to the immediate part played by Japan in bringing about a consciousness which will from the present time completely change the relations of the western powers to China, let one little story testify. Some representatives of an English missionary board were making a tour of inspection through China. They went into an interior town in Shantung. They were received with extraordinary cordiality by the entire population. Some time afterwards some of their accompanying friends returned to the village and were received with equally surprising coldness. It came out upon inquiry that the inhabitants had first been moved by the rumor that these people were sent by the British government to secure the removal of the Japanese. Later they were moved by indignation that they had been disappointed.

It takes no forcing to see a symbol in this incident. Part of it stands for the almost incredible ignorance which has rendered China so impotent nationally speaking. The other part of it stands for the new spirit which has been aroused even among the common people in remote districts. Those who fear, or who pretend to fear, a new Boxer movement, or a definite general anti-foreign movement, are, I think, mistaken. The new consciousness goes much deeper. Foreign policies that fail to take it into account and that think that relations with China can be conducted upon the old basis will find this new consciousness obtruding in the most unexpected and perplexing ways.

One might fairly say, still speaking comparatively, that it is part of the bad luck of Japan that her proximity to China, and the opportunity the war gave her to outdo the aggressions of European powers, have made her the first victim of this disconcerting change. Whatever the motives of the American Senators in completely disassociating the United States from the peace settlement as regards China, their action is a permanent asset to China, not only in respect to Japan but with respect to all Chinese foreign relations. Just before our visit to Tsinan, the Shantung Provincial Assembly had passed a resolution of thanks to the American Senate. More significant is the fact that they passed another resolution to be cabled to the English Parliament, calling attention to the action of the American Senate and inviting similar action. China in general and Shantung in particular feels the reinforcement of an external approval. With this duplication, its national consciousness has as it were solidified. Japan is simply the first object to be affected.

The concrete working out of economic rights in Shantung will be illustrated by a single case which will have to stand as typical. Po-shan is an interior mining village. The mines were not part of the German booty; they were Chinese owned. The Germans, whatever their ulterior aims, had made no attempt at dispossessing the Chinese. The mines, however, are at the end of a branch line of the new Japanese owned railway—owned by the government, not by a private corporation, and guarded by Japanese soldiers. Of the forty mines, the Japanese have worked their way, in only four years, into all but four. Different methods are used. The simplest is, of course, discrimination in the use of the railway for shipping. Downright refusal to furnish cars while competitors who accepted Japanese partners got them, is one method. Another more elaborate method is to send but one car when a large number is asked for, and then when it is too late to use cars, send the whole number asked for or even more, and then charge a large sum for demurrage in spite of the fact the mine no longer wants them or has cancelled the order. Redress there is none.

Tsinan has no special foreign concessions. It is, however, a 'treaty port' where nationals of all friendly powers can do business. But Po-shan is not even a treaty port. Legally speaking no foreigner can lease land or carry on any business there. Yet the Japanese have forced a settlement as large in area as the entire foreign settlement in the much larger town of Tsinan. A Chinese refused to lease land where the Japanese wished to relocate their railway station. Nothing happened to him directly. But merchants could not get shipping space, or receive goods by rail. Some of them were beaten up by thugs. After a time, they used their influence with their compatriot to lease his land. Immediately the persecutions ceased. Not all the land has been secured by threats or coercion; some has been leased directly by Chinese moved by high prices, in spite of the absence of any legal sanction. In addition, the Japanese have obtained control of the electric light works and some pottery factories, etc.
Now even admitting that this is typical of the methods by which the Japanese plant
themselves, a natural American reaction would be to say that, after all, the country is built up
industrially by these enterprises, and that though the rights of some individuals may have
been violated, there is nothing to make a national, much less an international fuss about. More
or less unconsciously we translate foreign incidents into terms of our own experience and
environment, and thus miss the entire point. Since America was largely developed by foreign
capital to our own economic benefit and without political encroachments, we lazily suppose
some such separation of the economic and political to be possible in China. But it must be
remembered that China is not an open country. Foreigners can lease land, carry on business,
and manufacture only in accord with express treaty agreements. There are no such agreements
in the cases typified by the Po-shan incident. We may profoundly disagree with the closed
economic policy of China, or we may believe that under existing circumstances it represents
the part of prudence for her. That makes no difference. Given the frequent occurrence of such
economic invasions, with the backing of soldiers of the Imperial Army, with the overt aid of
the Imperial Railway, and with the refusal of Imperial officials to intervene, there is clear
evidence of the attitude and intention of the Japanese government in Shantung.
Because the population of Shantung is directly confronted with an immense amount of just
such evidence, it cannot take seriously the professions of vague diplomatic utterances. What
foreign nation is going to intervene to enforce Chinese rights in such a case as Po-shan?
Which one is going effectively to call the attention of Japan to such evidences of its failure to
carry out its promise? Yet the accumulation of precisely such seemingly petty incidents, and
not any single dramatic great wrong, will secure Japan’s economic and political domination of
Shantung. It is for this reason that foreigners resident in Shantung, no matter in what part, say
that they see no sign whatever that Japan is going to get out; that, on the contrary, everything
points to a determination to consolidate her position. How long ago was the Portsmouth
Treaty signed, and what were its nominal pledges about evacuation of Manchurian territory?
Not a month will pass without something happening which will give a pretext for delay, and
for making the surrender of Shantung conditional upon this, that and the other thing.
Meantime the penetration of Shantung by means of railway discrimination, railway military
guards, continual nibblings here and there, will be going on. It would make the chapter too
long to speak of the part played by manipulation of finance in achieving this process of
attrition of sovereignty. Two incidents must suffice. During the war, Japanese traders with the
connivance of their government gathered up immense amounts of copper cash from Shantung
and shipped it to Japan against the protests of the Chinese government. What does
sovereignty amount to when a country cannot control even its own currency system? In
Manchuria the Japanese have forced the introduction of several hundred million dollars of
paper currency, nominally, of course, based on a gold reserve. These notes are redeemable,
however, only in Japan proper. And there is a law in Japan forbidding the exportation of gold.
And there you are.
Japan itself has recently afforded an object lesson in the actual connection of economic and
political rights in China. It is so beautifully complete a demonstration that it was surely
unconscious. Within the last two weeks, Mr. Obata, the Japanese minister in Peking, has
waited upon the government with a memorandum saying that the Foochow incident was the
culminating result of the boycott; that if the boycott continues, a series of such incidents is to
be apprehended, saying that the situation has become 'intolerable' for Japan, and disadvowing
all responsibility for further consequences unless the government makes a serious effort to
stop the boycott. Japan then immediately makes certain specific demands. China must stop
the circulation of handbills, the holding of meetings to urge the boycott, the destruction of
Japanese goods that have become Chinese property—none have been destroyed that are
Japanese owned. Volumes could not say more as to the real conception of Japan of the
connection between the economic and the political relations of the two countries. Surely the
pale ghost of 'Sovereignty' smiled ironically as he read this official note. President Wilson
after having made in the case of Shantung a sharp and complete separation of economic and
political rights, also said that a nation boycotted is within sight of surrunders. Disassociation
of words from acts has gone so far in his case that he will hardly be able to see the meaning of
Mr. Obata's communication. The American sense of humor and fairplay may however be counted upon to get its point. [DewJ20]

"The night before last, Mr. Dewey talked about Bertrand Russell as a despairing pessimist. In fact, Russell stands for ethical neutrality (lun li zhong li). Russell stands beyond judgement in all categories of thought. Furthermore, Dewey is thoroughly mistaken when he describes Russell's philosophy as elitist. This leads us to think of him as somehow anti-democratic. In fact, Russell is a thorough realist who upholds logical atomism (duo li yuan zi lun) and the principle of absolute pluralism (duo yuan lun). Russell's philosophical method is to dissect all categories of thought, be they political, scientific or philosophical. To make this clear I have translated his piece on Dreams and facts which appeared first in the January issue of Athenaeum and was reprinted again in the February, 1920 issue of Dial." [Russ8]

1920.03.28 Letter from John Dewey to Albert C. Barnes
135 Morrison St, March 28 [1920] Peking
My dear Barnes, …
Im leaving here this week to go to Nanking which will be my headquarters for the three spring months, care Higher Normal School. Nanking isn't very thrilling per se. It has been the battle ground between the [north] and south and was almost destroyed at the Taiping rebellion, in [the] middle of the last century. However, I shant be there all the time, as it will be the headquarters offor various journeys to other towns, especially on the Yangste. The family will stay in Peking three or four mor weeks longer before coming down, [a]s this is of course the most interesting single place and Evelyn hasnt exhausted it yet.
Im afraid I have neither the time nor the technical skill to get a line on Chinese paintings, that would enable me to turn the semitic trick. People who are here for years, some of them, become experts. But the fake market is as large here as anywhere, and a westerner is at a great disadvantage. A Chinese expert knows the the details of silk, of color as well as the details of style and the countless other things. Westerners generally begin by buying poorer things and gradually educate themselves thru experience in buying and discarding. They also get a reputation established so that pictures come to them. The best for sale never get into the open market. Old families that have to dispose of pictures put the matter in the hands of the go-betweens who seek out the twenty or thrity or so good buyers there are in China. We saw another good collection a few days ago, that of General Munthe, a Norwegian collector who has been the military trainer of Peking police. He has pictures and porcelain both. Many of the collectors never show their collections not even in private, they are so afraid of risks. Also the secretive spirit seems to be imbibed from the Chinese collectors who are generally averse to having it known they have collections, as they may then be looted at some opportune moment.
The University has asked me to stay over another year, but I find it hard deciding. They have asked Evelyn to give some courses next year also, but she feels as if teaching werent her line and by staying over s[o] long she might cut herself out of some things at home.
With regards to Mrs Barnes and yourself from us all,
Sincerely yours, John Dewey [DewJ3]

1920.03.31 Farewell dinner for John Dewey with Cai Yuanpei. [DewJ8]
1920.03.8-19,22-27 (publ.) John Dewey : Lectures 'Three contemporary philosophers ' in Beijing. = Xian dai di san ge zhe xue jia. Hu Shi interpreter ; Fu Lu recorder. In : Chen bao fu kan ; March 8-19, 22-27 (1920).
1.-2. 'William James'
3.-4. 'Henri Bergson'
5.-6. 'Bertrand Russell' [DewJ5,Kee3]

To the student of political and social development, China presents a most exciting intellectual situation. He has read in books the account of the slow evolution of law and orderly governmental institutions. He finds in China an object lesson in what he has read. We take for granted the existence of government as an agency for enforcing justice between men and for protecting personal rights. We depend upon regular and orderly legal and judicial procedure to settle disputes as we take for granted the atmosphere we breathe. In China life goes on practically without such support and guarantees. And yet in the ordinary life of the people peace and order reign.

If you read the books written about China, you find the Chinese often spoken of as the 'most law-abiding people in the world'. Struck by this fact, the traveler often neglects to go behind it. He fails to note that this law-abidingness constantly shows itself in contempt for everything that we in the West associate with law, that it goes on largely without courts, without legal and judicial forms and officers; that, in fact, the Chinese regularly do what the West regards as the essence of lawlessness—enforce the law through private agencies and arrangements. In many things the one who is regarded as breaking the real law, the controlling custom, is the one who appeals to the 'law'—that is, to governmental agencies and officers. A few incidents of recent history may illustrate the point.

The Peking Government University students started the agitation last May which grew into that organized movement which in the end compelled the dismissal of some pro-Japanese members of the cabinet and forced the refusal to sign the peace treaty. The movement started with a procession. The parade passed by the house of an offensive member who was ordinarily referred to as 'traitor'. And the Chinese equivalent of the word traitor literally means thief-who-sells-his-country. In a fit of absent-mindedness the policeman on guard opened the gate into the compound. The leading students took this as a hint or an invitation. They rushed in. During the following scrimmage, the offender was beaten severely and his house was set afire.

This incident is now ancient history. What is not so well known is that public opinion compelled the release of the students who were arrested. To have tried and condemned them for crime would have had more serious consequences than the government dared face. The heads of the schools gave assurance the students would not engage in further disorder; and they were let go, nominally subject to summons later. But when in the autumn the government, having recovered its nerve somewhat, made a demand upon the heads of the schools to submit the students for trial, their action was regarded as a breach of faith. When the school officials replied that the students had not returned to their respective schools, nothing further happened. There was a general feeling that the summons for trial did not represent the real wish of the officials, but was taken because of pressure exercised by some vengeful person.

To western eyes, accustomed to the forms of regular hearings and trials, such a method seems lawless. In China, however, the moral sense of the community would have been shocked by a purely legal treatment. What in western law is compounded felony is frequently a virtue in China. The incident also illustrates the principle of corporate solidarity and responsibility which plays such a large part in Chinese consciousness. The school group to which the students belonged assumed liability for their future conduct, and gave guarantees for their proper behavior.

As the Peking students were the authors of the movement, they were regarded as its chief abettors. It was desirable for the militaristic reactionaries to discredit them. A meeting of a few actual students, together with some old students and some who intended entering the University, was planned. Resolutions had been prepared which stated that a few noisy, self-seeking students, anxious for notoriety, had fostered the whole movement, coercing their weaker fellows. The resolutions declared, in the alleged name of a thousand students, that the real student body was opposed to the whole agitation. The liberal students got wind of this meeting, entered with a rush, took the thirty dissenters prisoner, obtained from them a written statement of the instigation of the meeting by the reactionary clique, and then locked them up as a punishment. When they were released from confinement by the police, warrants were
sworn out and the ringleaders of the invading liberal students were arrested. Great indignation was aroused by this act, which was regarded as highly unsportsmanlike—not playing the game. An educational leader, a returned student, said to me that officials had no business interfering in a matter that concerned only the students.

Yet this seeming absence of public law—this apparent lack of concern for the public interest in peace and orderly procedure—does not mean that opinion would support any individual in starting out to redress his own wrongs. It means that troubles of importance are regarded as between groups, and to be settled between them and by their own initiative. It is easy to imagine the denunciation of lawlessness that a report of such acts may excite in clubs and editorial rooms. They are here related, however, neither to condemn nor to approve. They are illustrative incidents, fairly typical. They show that the entire legal and judicial background which we take for granted in the West is rudimentary in China. Law and justice, as they should be, are not deliberately challenged in such episodes. There is merely a recurrence to traditional methods of settling disputes. The incidents are also instructive because they suggest the underlying cause. There is no confidence in government, no trust in the honesty, impartiality or intelligence of the officials of the state. Families, villages, clans, guilds—every organized group—has more confidence in the willingness of an opposed group to come to some sort of reasonable settlement than it has in the good faith or the wisdom of the official group.

The following incident illustrates one reason for the lack of confidence in the government. One of the new liberal weeklies in Peking was a thorn in the side of the reactionary officials. Not that it was a political journal, but it was an organ of free discussion; it was connected through its editorial staff with the intellectual element in the Government University which the reactionaries feared, and it was serving as a model for starting similar Journals all over the country. The gendarmerie in Shanghai complained to the Provincial Military Governor in Nanking that the journal was creating unrest. Bolshevism has become the technical term in China as well as elsewhere for any criticism of authority. The Military Governor reported this statement to the Minister of War in Peking, who reported it to his colleague the Minister of Justice, who reported it to the local police, who took possession of the newspaper office and shut down the paper.

Note the official House That Jack Built, and the impossibility of locating responsibility anywhere in any way that would secure the shadow of legal redress. Vagueness, overlapping authority, and consequent evasion and shifting of responsibility are typical of inherited governmental methods. Back of the incident lies, of course, the fact that government in China is still largely personal—a matter of edicts, mandates, decrees, rather than of either common or statute law. If we in the West sometimes suffer from the extreme to which the separation of administrative from legislative and judicial powers has gone, a slight study of oriental methods will reveal the conditions which created the demand for that separation. A few days ago, for example, the Minister of Justice in the Peking Cabinet issued a decree that all printed matter whatsoever must be submitted to the police for censorship before publication. There was no crisis, political or military. There was no legislative enabling act. It suited his personal wishes and his factional plans. The order was calmly received with the comment that it would be obeyed in Peking, because the government controlled the Pekingese police, but no attention would be paid to it in the rest of China. In many cases, the Republic's writ does not run beyond the city walls of the capital.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that the acute problems of Chinese existence and reconstruction are due to the fact that methods which worked well enough in the past are now sharply challenged by the changes that have linked China up to the rest of the world. China faces a world that is differently organized from itself in almost every regard; a world, for example, that prizes the forms of justice even when it neglects its substance; a world in which governmental action is the source and standard of redress of wrongs and protection of rights. The habitual method of China, though it has accomplished a great measure of law-abidingness among the Chinese in their own affairs, appears from without as total absence of law, when foreign relations come under consideration. This is true of China's relations to practically all foreign nations. But Japan lies closest and
has the most numerous and varied contacts, and hence has the most sources of complaint. She has borrowed and improved the technique of other nations in making these causes of friction the basis for demands for all sorts of concessions and encroachments, to the constant bewilderment and growing resentment of China. In enforcing the boycott against Japan, for example, the student unions have frequently taken matters into their own hands. They have raided stores in which Japanese goods are sold, carried the stocks off and burned them. When these things are reported in Japan, there is no scrupulous care taken to say that the goods are always the property of Chinese dealers, and that the Japanese themselves are not interfered with.

A succession of such incidents skillfully handled by the Japanese government through the press has bred among the mass of the Japanese people a sincere belief that the Chinese people are lawless, irresponsible and aggressively bumptious in all their dealings with the Japanese, who, considering their provocations, have acted with great forbearance. Thus the Imperial Government assembles behind it the public opinion that is necessary to support a policy of aggression. The feeling that China is in a general state of lawlessness is used, for example, as a reason for keeping Shantung.

The matter is further complicated by the large measure of autonomy enjoyed by the provinces, which historically are principalities rather than provinces. A well-informed English resident writing shortly before the downfall of the Manchu dynasty said: 'Each of China's eighteen provinces is a complete state in itself. Each province has its own army and navy, its own system of taxation, and its own social customs. Only in connection with the salt trade and the navy do the provinces have to make concessions to one another under a modicum of Imperial control'. In spite of nominal changes, the situation is not essentially different today. The railways and telegraphs have brought about greater unity; but on the other hand the system of military governors, one for each province, has in some respects increased the effective display of States' rights.

During the last few months there have been repeated rumors of the secession of the three Manchurian provinces, of the Southern provinces, and of the Yangtze provinces. These rumors, like the threats of governors here and there to withdraw when matters are not going to suit them, are largely part of the game for political prestige and power. But we know in the United States how our measure of independent action on the part of one state in the Union may complicate foreign relations. Given a greater measure of independence and a weak central state, it is easy to see how many cases of foreign friction may arise which give excuse for an aggressive policy.

Moreover, there is a constant temptation for an unscrupulous foreign power to carry on intrigues and bargains with provincial officials and politicians at the expense of the National State. The recent history of China is largely a history of this sort of foreign intervention, which naturally adds to dissension and confusion and weakens the national government still more. Whether justly or not, the Chinese believe that militaristic Japan has deliberately fomented every movement that would keep China divided. As I write, rumors are current of an attempt to restore the monarchy with Japanese backing.

The bearing of neglect of legal process and judicial forms upon the problem of extra-territoriality is obvious. At present, if commercial and other relations between China and foreign powers are to continue, some kind of extra-territoriality is a necessity, and this involves the existence of 'concessions'. Nevertheless, their existence is galling to national pride. Returned students have brought the idea and the word 'sovereignty' home with them. No word issues more trippingly from the lips.

Yet the existing system has its present advantages for the Chinese themselves. The concessions in Shanghai and Tientsin, which are under foreign jurisdiction, are veritable cities of refuge for Chinese liberals and for political malcontents. As censorship and suppression of newspapers have increased under the present reactionary Ministry of Justice, there is a marked tendency for newspapers to form corporations under nominal foreign ownership and with foreign charters in order to get legal protection. Progressive Chinese business houses flock to the concessions. At present, without the Chinese element they would be mere shells. It is said that 90 per cent of the population of the International Settlement in Shanghai is
Chinese and that Chinese pay 80 per cent of its taxes. Tares proverbially grow with the wheat. Corrupt officials protect their funds from confiscation by keeping them in foreign banks. As you ride through the Tientsin concessions, you have pointed out to you the houses of various provincial governors and officials who have thoughtfully provided a place of safety against the inevitable, though postponed, tide of popular indignation. A Chinese friend said to me that one of the next patriotic movements on the part of the Chinese would be a wholesale exodus from foreign concessions. Except for investors in foreign real estate, it will be amusing to watch when it occurs. The concessions will be left a mere shell. The foreign interest in the maintenance of concessions would completely disappear in this contingency were there some other way of maintaining consular jurisdiction. I would not give the impression that nothing is going to change the legal situation. The contrary is the case. There is a competent law codification bureau, presided over by a Chinese scholar whose works on some aspects of European law are standard texts in foreign law schools. A modern system is building up. An effort is being made to secure well trained judges and to reform and standardize judicial procedure. The desire for the abolition of extra-territoriality is hastening the change. But it is one thing to introduce formal changes and another to change the habits of the people. Contempt for politics and disregard of governmental jurisdiction in adjusting social and commercial disputes will die hard. It is to be doubted whether China will ever make the complete surrender to legalism and formalism that western nations have done. This may be one of the contributions of China to the world. There is little taste even among the advanced elements, for example, for a purely indirect and representative system of legislation and determination of policy. Repeatedly in the last few months popular opinion has taken things into its own hands and, by public assemblies and by circular telegrams, forced the policy of the government in diplomatic matters. The personal touch and the immediate influence of popular will are needed. As compared with the West, the sphere of discretion will always be large in contrast with that of set forms. Western legalism will be short-circuited. Along with apathy on the part of the populace at large to political matters, there is extraordinary readiness to deal with such questions as a large number are interested in, without going through the intermediaries of political formality.

The liberals in the existing national Senate and House of Representatives make no pretense of attending meetings and trying to influence action by discussion and voting. They make a direct appeal to the country. And in effect this means appeal to a great variety of local organizations: provincial educational associations to reach scholars and students, industrial and mercantile guilds, chambers of commerce (whose powers are much larger than those of like bodies in our country), voluntary unions and societies, religious and other. It is not at all impossible that, in its future evolution, China will depart widely from western constitutional and representative models and strike out a system combining direct expression of popular will by local group-organizations and guilds with a large measure of personal discretion in the hands of administrative officials as long as the latter give general satisfaction. Personal government by decrees, mandates and arbitrary seizures and imprisonments will give way. Its place will be taken by personal administration such as already exists in the railway, post office, customs, salt administration, etc., where the nature of the constructive work to be done furnishes standards and tests, rather than by formal legislation.

Roughly speaking, the visitor in China is likely to find himself in three successive stages. The first is impatience with irregularities, incompetence and corruptions, and a demand for immediate and sweeping reforms. Longer stay convinces him of the deep roots of many of the objectionable things, and gives him a new lesson in the meaning of the words 'evolution' and development. Many foreigners get stranded in this stage. Under the guise of favoring natural and slow evolution, they become opponents of all things and of any development. They even oppose the spread of popular education, saying it will rob the Chinese of their traditional contentment, patience and docile industry, rendering them uneasy and insubordinate. In everything they point to the evils that may accompany a transitional stage of development. They throw their weight, for example, against every movement for the emancipation of
women from a servile status. They enlarge upon the dignity and power some women enjoy within the household and expatiate upon the evils that will arise from a relaxation of present taboos, when neither the old code nor that existing in western countries will apply. Many western business men especially deplore the attempts of missionaries to introduce new ideas. But the visitor who does not get arrested in this second stage emerges where he no longer expects immediate sweeping changes, nor carps at the evils of the present in comparison with an idealized picture of the traditional past. Below the surface he sees the signs of an intellectual reawakening. He feels that while now the endeavors for a new life are scattered, yet they are so numerous and so genuine that in time they will accumulate and coalesce. He finds himself in sympathy with Young China. For Young China also passed through a state of optimism and belief in wholesale change; a subsequent stage of disillusionment and pessimism; and, in a third stage, has now settled down to constructive efforts along lines of education, industry and social reorganization.

In politics, Young China aims at the institution of government by and of law. It contemplates the abolition of personal government with its arbitrariness, corruption and incompetence. But it realizes that political development is mainly indirect; that it comes in consequence of the growth of science, industry and commerce, and of the new human relations and responsibilities they produce; that it springs from education, from the enlightenment of the people, and from special training in the knowledge and technical skill required in the administration of a modern state.

The more one sees, the more one is convinced that many of the worst evils of present political China are the result of pure ignorance. One realizes how the delicate and multifarious business of the modern state is dependent upon knowledge and habits of mind that have grown up slowly and that are now counted upon as a matter of course. China is only beginning to acquire this special experience and knowledge. Old officials brought up in the ancient traditions, and new officials brought up in no traditions at all, but who manage to force themselves into power in a period of political break-up, will gradually pass off the scene. At present the older types of scholars, cultivated, experienced in the archaic tradition, are usually hesitant, if not supine. They are largely puppets in the hands of vigorous men who have found their way into politics from the army, or from the ranks of bandits; men without education, who know for a large part no law but that of their own appetite, and who lack both general education and education in the management of the complex affairs of the contemporary state.

But in the schools of the country, in the Student Movement, now grown politically self-conscious, are the forces making for a future politics of a different sort. [DewJ21]
Letter from John Dewey to Dewey children

PEKING APRIL ONE [1920]

Dearest children, This is my first last day here, for the present. I cabled to Columbia the other day asking whether they would give me leave of absence another year, but cables are slow. Lucy is going home anyway and Ev has declined the job they offered her, and will probably go too. China is too slow for the young but it is goes easy on old folks. I often wonder whether it wouldnt be a good thing to leave while the leaving is good. I cant repeat this years success, such as it is, because I have done all the general lecturing I can, said all that can be said of a general sort I mean, and as they have been published all over China—remember the four hundred million. I cant say the same thing over again next year very well. Some people say Ive stirred up considerable interest, but when you are entirely outside the fuss interest, if any, you stir up, its about as exciting to your vanity as pouring hot water on the Arctic ice would be. Its much as if you were told that something you had said had aroused interest in Mars when you had never been in Mars, never expected to be there and had no share of any kind in what is doing there. I dont suppose I convey the idea; its a curious experience, and until youve been thru a similar one you cant get it, for ordinarily one's vanity is a part of the reverberations—if any, and you cant help imagining yourself having something to do with what you are said to accomplish. But there is no more kick to this than there would be if you had a pole which happened to touch something in Marthe moon—to try once more. Its Nanking Im going to. The rest of the family will abide here a few weeks more, we have the flat rented till July one but there is said to be a new medical family anxious to take over, including our furnishings. Tehy want it till Oct one however. Its been weeks and weeks since Ive written, but everything seems to rather flat just now. Perhaps a new place will give me a fresh start…

I am giving a farewell dinner tonight at a Chinese restaurant, chinese food, about twenty people including ourselves, mostly Chinese educators, Chancellor Tsai the chief guest. He gave us a family dinner at the University the other evening with three or four of the Univ profs we know best. Professor Levy Bruhl who has been exchnaging at Harvard was here last week and I went to two dinners given for him, one at the French legation. He seems to have enjoyed his stay in America. Im going home to Nanking the same way we came up, the trip the other way, buy Hankow, having been given up. Partly too much disturbance along the line, partly because Dr Tao [Hsing-chih] of Nanking cam up and is taking me down, Mr Hu not going along. However later on we are to go up the Yangste river as far as Hankow, stopping along at several towns. We wont get up to the gorges tho, takes too long and costs too much and also will be too hot. We havent any summer plans yet, but I shant stay in Peking a[n]other summer whatever happens. Id lonkie to go up to Harbin, and get an impression at least of the Siberian situation. The Soviets are reported to be offering back to China everything in the way of railway and mining etc concessions the old imperial govt stole; the story is they offered this in 18 but the Allies prevented China accepting, I suppose Russia wanted recognition in return. I enclose a copy of letter I wrote flat agents. I dont seem to see any way to fix any limit sum. If there is any chance of subletting if we dont come back at good figure we can pay accordingly. I certainly should hate to go above two, and it seems to me that 24 ought to be above the limit unless you can turn around and rent at good advance…

The next report is that the Japanese Chinese govt doesnt like the terms proposed. The next one will be, if history repeats itself, that Japan having squared itself by going in is now using her influence in China to keep the thing from consummation—not that the rumor will necessarily be true The extract from Mr Onos letter is very interesting, and it wouldnt be well to subject it the logic of consecutive sentences to too much scrutiny. The soldiers etc who are coming back will throw some light on the desire to cooperate in Siberia; China certainly, if American bankers furnish the money, and Japanese manage it, as they will certainly do, unless Americans are more on the job than they ever have been before.

Lots of love to everybody, and send a carbon to Nanking—no, by the time you get this everybody will be there, Care Higher Normal College.

Dad [DewJ3]
1920.04.02 John Dewey leaves Beijing. [DewJ8]

1920.04.03 John Dewey goes up to the Taishan mountain. [DewJ8]

1920.04.04 Letter from John Dewey to Alice Chipman Dewey

Sunday—on train [April 4, 1920]

Dear Alice,

We stopped at Tai-an [Shandong] and went up Taisahn [Tai Shan, Shandong] after all, but not Chu fu. When Mr Tao went to Tientdin Mr Lu was on the train doing to Tsinan, and he said he wanted to go to Taishan and would make arrangements. So he met us at Tsinan. Ill write particulars later, we stayed at Chinese hotel, but got some Tai-an addresses.

Mr H S Leitzel, Methodist Mission
Mr Mauson, Anglican Mission
Mr Connely, Southern Baptist.

Probablt the first is the best to write to. Write long enough in advance to ensure getting in, as they are often crowded. The train gets to Tai an about ten oclock in evening, and you will have the pleasure of a wheelbarrow ride. I couldnt learn of any missionary at Chufu, but the methodist mission has a chinese branch there, and the pastor Liang En Po takes in people sometimes, probably Mr Leitzel would arrange it if you asked him when you write. Be sure and get a letter of intriccion from the ministry of edn. Mr Lu said he would get it if asked, as then you can get in and see the Dukes and the sacred relics. You better stay at Tai an two nights. You will be glad of the rest after the mt trip, and will get to Chu fu about noon instead of after midnight, with six miles in a Peking cart to the city of the temple and tomb. Then you have about a day and a half there The sta[t]ion master will take you in if written to, but you have to bring your bedding, clothes that is. You will save about 16 apiec[e] on second class. But buy a berth ticket, five dollars, one ticket will do for the three I think. You wont use the berth to sleep in, but the accmodations are much better than the regular second class car and you will be sure of seats, a nice neat compartment. You have to buy express tickets from Tientsin on, to Tai-an beside the berth ticket. You can get the latter in Peking. Dont buy your regulr ticket beyond Tai-an unless sure tht second class allows time for stop overs. To make sure of berths from Che fu or Tai an you p[r]obably will have to buy first class from there to Nanking Dont have sunday in Tain an on acct of mi[s]sionary place

Lots of love to all John [DewJ3]
1920.04.04 Letter from Lucy Dewey to Dewey family
Sunday, April 5, [4] 1920
Dear Family
Dad has left and life is somewhat settled down again, tho we still manage to keep fairly busy.
He went on Friday and Mrs Ting then came and took us all off for an automobile ride thru the
Western Hills. We went to the Summer Palace first and then had a picnic lunch and rode
awhile. It was wonderful day and the country is lovely now. The fruit trees are all in bloom
and the magnolias most out, and everything getting green. The palace seemed even finer then
it did last summer when we went out.
Thursday night Dad gave a farewell dinner to Chancellor Tsai and other of the Peking
dignitaries and we had a very nice party. We all played Chinese gambling games and it was
quite hilarious. Yesterday there was howling dust storm again tho not so bad as some I've
seen. It did very well, however and by three oclock the sun was fairly well dimmed and the
sky quite a bright yellow. Last night we went out to dinner, to Mrs Chens and had a wonderful
Chinese meal. They have about the best cook in Pekin that we know of. After dinner some
people came in and we danced until fairly late. The dust had stopped by the time we came
home and it was a wonderful moonlight night and today is a perfect day again.
We are planning to do some milder kinds of batting now. Go for a couple of days to some
temple in the Western Hills, take Evelyn to the Great Wall, and other nice outdoor trips like
that. We are planning to go south about the twentieth and after that our plans depend on what
Dad hears from Columbia.
Evelyn and I are coming home anyway and I think we shall stick to the original plan of sailing
from Yokohama on the twentieth of Aug. We are considering going south from Shanghai just
by ourselves and taking the boat at Hongkong but we havent found out much about that yet. I
think we should have just about time enough for it by leaving Shanghai on the first of July or
soon after. It doesnt cost much more to go to Hongkong than it does to come back to Pekin
and we may be able to work it that way. Mamma rather wants us to postpone our sailing and
come back to Peking and up to Kalgan with her but that is pretty expensive and would
probably mean that we shouldn't get home much before November and it seems more sensible
to get home early in the fall if we are coming at all…
Lucy [DewJ3]
1920.04.04-06 John Dewey: Lectures 'Experimental logic' at Nanjing Teachers College. = Shi yan lun li xue. Liu Boming interpreter; Xia Chengfeng, Cao Chu, Liu Boming, Shen Zhensheng recorder. In Xue deng; April 19, 22, 25; May 21, 29; June 2, 9, 10, 11, 19 (1920).

1. Logic, its nature and its importance.
2. The origins of thought.
3. The five steps of the thinking process.
4. Natural thought and scientific thinking.
5. The deficiencies of natural thought.
6. Deficiencies of natural thought attributable to social psychology.
7. Logic as a control of thinking.
8. Steps in logical thinking.
10. The meaning of facts.
11. Abstraction and generalization.
12. General principles as description.
13. Verification.
16. Types of Judgment.
17. Measurement.

Berry Keenan: In his lectures series on 'Experimental logic', Dewey continued his discussion of the pragmatic re-evaluation of knowledge and human thinking. He discussed the five stages of thought, based on the model of the experimental method of thinking he had formulated in 1910. These stages explain what a simple mechanism human thought is. [Kee3:S. 39, DewJ5]
Dearest family,

On my way here—I arrived yesterday afternoon—I had the nearest approach to an adventure that I have had in China. It began with riding in a wheelbarrow from the station in Tai-an to a Chinese hotel in the village. It was after ten and the clouds were chasing the full moon, and the mountains shone thru the mists. A Chinese wheel barrow is built around a big wheel at the centre and its squeak, and its made to carry a ton and never wear out. There are two theories about the squeak which is more like a symphony minus the music than an ordinary creaking vehicle. One is that the coolies wish to save the expense of oil. The other is that the noise is a sign of good luck. Probably both theories are true, certainly the second is, if the first is. The hotel is less than a mile and the mud was soon so deep and the road so rough we had to get out and walk. But the proprieties had been saved. The town magistrate had been telegraphed to of our arrival, and he had deputed the president of the middle school to await us. We might have slept in the clean German built station but we hadnt brought our roll of bed clothes with us. We hadnt expected to stop when we left Peking but Dr Tao, the Dean of this school, who was bringing me down, met Mr Lu an inspector of the ministry of education on the train who was coming to Tsinan—where we were Christmas time—and arranged the stop to go ou up Tai-sgan the sacred mt of Shantung. The hotel—there is no use putting quotation marks around as they it wouldnt mean anything to you—is built like all Chinese house level with the ground, and our rooms had dirt floors. It had been raining for several days; each room had one small window with paper panes, and the room was decorated with gilt and silvern paper bullion, which the pilgrims take up the mt and burn for sacrifice. Chinese beds are made by taking two saw horses and stretching boards across them. Fortunately mine had kooliang stalks, tall milmillet, a kind of cross between rushes, corn stalks and bamboo, and they put a fur rug over, so by turning over every five minutes I got some sleep. It must be said things were fairly clean. Mr Lu remarked that it was too early in the season for bedbugs, which would seem to disprove the theory of adaptation to environment as March is the season for pilgrims—or perhaps the pilgrims started the adaptation this time. What was a hotel in back was a food shop in front, and so our food was brought from one of the stands such as Ive seen hundreds of—mainly a kind of scrambled eggs, and noodle soups—palatable enough except that the garlic with which it is flavored while innocent enough at first soon takes root and becomes a great tree wherein the birds of the air may roost. Anyway two of the ambitions of my life had been safely realized, to ride in a wheel-barrow and go to a Chinese hotel. About eight next morning the middle school president (who touches his spectacles when he bows to you much as we would our hats) came around with the men & chairs for the ascent. Two coolies to each chair, and one spare man for a change. Leather straps so that each carries over his shoulders fastened to the long handles—one man ahead and one behind on good ground, sideways going up the steps, when they shaft the strap by a kind of hitch without slowing their pace from one shoulder to another; at the level between flights of steps they suddenly whirl about sides so as to change strap from one shoulder to another. The chairs have no bottom except some loose roping over which a rug is thrown, so the seat is very comfortable. Until you have tried it you wouldnt believe oyou could be carried up steps with so little feeling of motion. Shut your eyes and you can hardly tell when you are going up or down one. And the coolies are more surefooted than mules—whic[h] they need to be, if you recall any pictures of the steps. In four years there have been two accidents, neither fatal and both on rainy days—which is no day to go up. It seems there was an artcle in the geog magazine some years ago on Taishan which gives particulars better than I can, but for the benefit of the statisticians Fred and Sabino. Il say that the mountain is over 5000 feet high, straight up from the almost sea level plain, and there are 6600 stone steps—also the mountain is very steep, as geographically this country isnt very old. Toward the end it is almost all steps, and the view from below looking up to a red gate at the top of the gorge is a sight for a life time. In the lower reaches there are cedars along the path and above wonderful pines, some of them like the queer pines in Japan; monasteries at the top where we got our lunch, a Taoist monastery this was not Buddhist, so we had meat. We are were six hours going up, and three down, of
course we walked more or less going up. We started in a fog and not much prospect of a view, but as the day wore along we headed up and by the top we were at the top it was clear but with a soft mist effect over everything. To the east it was mts to the sea—which we couldn't see. Something like the Arizona mts in form, tho without the brilliant colorings, then in the other directions the spread out plains. Hundreds of tablets cut in the rocks all the way up, and at the top—generally "poems"—such as Hear the running water, or the waterfall; or The color of the sky and the sound of water; or Hear the whistling of the pines; Or we are coming to the better places, with a great many references to the sky or heaven. Its easy enough of course to see why mountains became sacred but the steepness must accentuate the feeling that you are going the mountain is going up to meet heaven. Nobody knows when the road and steps were built, the steps all dressed stone, altho there is a Chinese history in twelve volumes of the mountain. Coming down we left the road and went off to some Buddhaist scriptures engraved on flat rocks over 1500 years ago, each character about a foot by a foot and a half. Unfortunately the water comes down there sometimes, and a good deal of the original has been carried off. Near the top is very big inscription of the one of Han Emperors, engraved on a cliff, two thousand years ago. It is impossible to convey any sense of the feeling the Chinese have for characters. Even a greenhorn can see the new ones fall far below the old, they are stiffer and more mechanical The educated Chinese go up to see these characters as we would go to a fine picture gallery. The rush hour of the pilgrim season is over, but we must have seen a thousand or two, mostly peasant people, and many many old women. The pilgrims acquire merit by walking—the poor women with their bound feet stumping up and down these thousand of steps—they sleep at the top, or along the way. Mr Tao counted the beggars—there were 186, not so many as earlier. They are much less professional than the Peking beggars; they cut out the whine about Great master, and confine themselves to Spare one, or Open up and distribute. Many are farmers who have made a few yards of terraced dirt among the rocks, and many lived in caves and straw houts along the road side. Most had hens too. They scrooch in the middle of the road, or leave their baskets there while they go off, and the coolies calmly carry the chair right over them. They had only cash in their baskets, one tenth of a copper, so the pilgrims can acquire merit without great expense. To add a few more statistics. The magistrate having engaged the chair bearers at our expense, they had been hired at the official price—one hundred coppers, about 75 cents for a chair, three men. We gae them money for their food and tips so they got at least a dollar a piece. But think of carrying a man up and down a mountain, six miles at least each way, for a dollar—or officially for 25 cents. They were are as imperturbably cheerful when we got back as when we started, and made their one leg courtesies most gracefully when they got their cumshaws.

On arriving at Nanking we cross the Yangste on a ferry. When we got off there were several score hackmen yelling and crowding with no attempt at order. Mr Tao engaged one, and then another one spied me, an old pirate who drove mama and me around when we here a year ago. We were his plunder and he seized the baggage and put us in his carriage, the other man cursing at top of the voice. We had to stop soon to get my trunk which had come on a day before. The the man who had lost the job rushed up like a wildman and attacked our villain. He put his head down and rushed to butt him; our man dodged and he scraped his head on a brick wall, and soon as they clinched the gore therefrom gave both of them a bluggy look. Finally they were separated, after howling and cursing all the time, neither really the worse for wear, and we drove off leaving them to act it all over out before a policeman, who had a maternal and detached air as he listened to them. The other man on our carriage drove off not even having his seat or spoken to his companion all during the row or its sequel. Why worry? Its astonishing what a difference your own feelings due to the temperature make in the look of a place. Last May it was as hot as hell here, and the town didn't look for thirty cents. Now it is cool and you can really see the lovely first green of the willows, and note that the town is full of them, and see may lovely things about the place. Its too warm for fires here, and too chilly to be warm, but still Im writing by an open window. Im satying almost next door to the Higher Normal compound with a Y M C A secy, a Mr Sweetman. They have two little kids, four and two, and are young and not very YMCAy. Its not their house but that of a missionary
home on a forlough. He has been here 25 years and has a lovely compound, lots of trees, some big old ones, and across the street is the highest hill within the town walls which has been made thru foreign influence into a city park, planted with trees, mostly small yet, but a more attractive part of town than where we were last year—or maybe it's just the effect of temperature differences again. Today is Arbor day; everybody is supposed to plant a tree Mr. Tao is quite disgusted because he says last year the coolies dug all the holes and all the students did was to stick a tree apiece in the ground when the coolie filled it up again. Much love to everybody. While I was slumbering on my Chinese bed I dreamed there were three letters all addressed in Eliz writing. I woke up before I had a chance to read them, but anyway I'll address this letter to her. The delayed Empress mail was just coming when I left Peking, so probably the three will be forwarded to me soon. Love to everybody Dad. [DewJ3]
Dear Fred, Elizabeth, Bino and Jane,

I suppose you want to know what the state of plans are. Just before dad left for Nanking on Friday he cabled to Cloumbia for another leave of absence and he and mama seem to want to stay if that comes all right...

Quite a number of things have been going on lately on account of dads departure, Chancellor Tsai gave a dinner at the u, small with just his particular gang and very good food and dad gave a dinner for all the officials he knows and some of the profs at the u at a Chinese restaurant and Saturday we went to dinner with a very nice young Chinese couple and they had some people in to dance afterwards, about the most human party I have been to here, excepting when I go to see Lucys pet Chinese couple, but they never entertain. Friday after seeing dad off with most of the rest of China we went to the summer palace and the Western Hills, some place, the Western hills means the bottom slope of a mountain range that goes around two sides of Peking, there are no trees, but all sorts of other queer things.

Yesterday mama and I went shopping all day long like two crazy women, tho as usual the result in bulk was not not much, tho she did get a lovely rug with horses all over it and waves and trees, which she found about a month ago and has been bargaining for ever since, and we picked out an enormous fur coat, which we are going to get some one to go and look at with us tomorrow, this one is good, the selection of furs here is very small, but this kind seems quite pretty and durable, then you have to get it made up and comes it the question of style, when they will surely ruin anything you get. The furit trees are all in bloom and the willows out, and the sun it very hot when it gets a chance, on the whole the weather is better than our spring, but there is the same uncomfortable alternation of hot and cold. The sunlight and general appearance of things is like Italy. Peking in a funny dive, life seems very dull and quiet in spite of having a good deal to do, I suppose it is because about 80% of the people we see do not interest us or us them. The regular social life is the dullest round of calling and calling and then calling again, and there is an awful lot of gossip and intrigue and the people are not worth it, I havent even seen anything that was gay yet, but then I havent done my duty, but spent my time batting around seeing things since I wasnt going to stay anyway. The few Chinese we know seem like much more real folks and it is easier to have easy relations with them.

At last I think we will get into a reception of the presendents, as Mr. Plimpton asked us to go to the Y.W.C.A. one on Wednesday, we were going to spend the day on a boat in the canal, alias sewer which flows thru these parts, but I would rather rubber at the pres, I think. Over the week end we are going to a temple in the Western hills, now owned by the Y.M.C.A, at least I trust we are, mama is not a bit anxious, but I guess we can bully her into going. Had the best Chinese dinner, ever Saturday night, the food is simply lush, and I dont mind reaching to the middle of the table and helping myself with chop sticks to a bite at a time, its funny how undisgusting eating out of a common dish seems when everyone does it. You have a little saucer for a plate and if you dont eat all of each course you are lost for the night as you can never get more than a bite of anything that follows without mixing it up with the left overs you dont like. Fortunate there are a couple of courses that always come in clean bowls. All dishes are left on the table and of course using chop sticks and eating soup from the middle of a large table everything dribbles and the whole thing is one mess. You really dont have to eat the soup woth chop sticks ans spoons are supplied…

Eve. [DewJ3]
1920.04.09-06.29 John Dewey: Lectures 'The history of philosophy' at the Nanjing Teachers College. Liu Boming interpreter; Zhe Fan, Tai Shuangqiu, Shao Yulin recorder. In: Chen bao fu kan; April 9-June 29 (1920).

1. The origins of philosophy.
2. Early philosophical problems.
3. The search for a universal principle.
4. Being and becoming.
5. Facts and theories.
6. The sophists.
7. Skepticism and logic.
8. Socrates.
10. Socrates' logic.
11. The Platonic 'real'.
12. The Platonic 'idea'.
13. Plato's epistemology.
14. Plato's educational philosophy.
15. Plato's politics.
16. From Plato to Aristotle.
17. Aristotle's 'potentiality' and 'actuality'.
18. Aristotle's 'individual' and 'species'.
19. Aristotle and the modern world. [Kee3, DewJ5]
Dear Dad,

Well I hope you are not as sorry as I am that the cable came. I see that the Nanking students have joined the strike, does that mean that you are having a vacation.

Mrs. Lamont came to call on me the morning after she got here and has been to lunch to meet Suh Hu [Hu Shi] and has been shopping to look at Mrs. Chens silks, but on the whole seems to be tearing around like a chicken without a head, shopping mostly and getting everyone to bring out there things and look up things for her and then not buying anything, so certainly dont lift your finger about the head dress. She has a most unsympathetic personality and is absorbing everything that lies about.

Liu has been getting very impertinent and strange and mama has just fired him, also the ricksha boy who was spending most of his time in the kitchen, she has acquired a boy whose sole accomplishment is honesty who is coming immediately and Mrs. E. is looking about for a real person, I only hope the cook will stay and be good, but I suppose not. I am all for getting away from here and hope we will by the first, but no bites for the apartment have turned up yet and mama does not seem to enjoy sightseeing so she wants to stay on here. My cold continues to flourish which does not add to my pleasure here. Suh Hu [Hu Shi] told me the other day that he was probably going to teach in summer school in Nanking, if they have an educational department going there why dont I get a job there too, he says it lasts six weeks, will you please enquire a bit and find out what kind of school they have and if they would be much embarressed if I should ask for a job, I would lecture on new and experiential practises in schools at home, and could make it last just about six weeks, then I would put off sailing for a couple of boats and we could all go to Mongolia for a nice trip the end of the summer. I would write direct to Mr. Tao but thot if the prop is utterly absurd I would save them the embarressment of answering. The cook says he must go too he would like to stay but would loose too much face, so there you are. Hu told mama the other day that it was their plan to have you stay a good part of the cold weather next year in Canton, which would be nice. I trust that I am going to get a translator at last from the customs college. We went to a very nice dinner at the Fus the other night very jolly and elaborate food. The men tried to prevent it but the ladies sat at one table and the men at another all except mama and Geogre Wen sat her down between Hu and Tsai. But after dinner the men walked into the room and broke up the ladies party, after which the Chinese speaking group repared in mixed form to the Fu bed room and sat about and roared and had a wonderful time, Miss Bodon-Smith allowed she had never seen anything like it before…

[Evelyn Dewey] [DewJ3]
Dearest family,

I've been here a week and am really seeing a spring in China more so than in Peking I imagine, as there is so much country here, and I live in a large compound with palm and bamboo trees among other things, and near the open country, close to the city wall in fact. I never confided in you how fat I got got, 170 when I tried the scales last some months ago, have never strained them since, and having no ricksha boy here and much time alone and so near open country, I have resolved upon walking daily, climb the hill near the house once or twice daily, and walk on the wonderful wall, 40 feet wide and much higher than the Peking one. Also more variety in the scenery, ponds and marshes, and a nice island like a Chinese picture, green gardens, bamboos and willows, peach trees in bloom, blossoms twice as big as ours, graves being spruced up for the year with twigs stuck into them and little white and red streamers of paper flying, mountains on almost every side, a glimpse of the Yangste from the top of the hill, and in general spring in full blast. They say it doesn't last generally more than ten days, galloping straight into full blown summer. This year it seems to be hanging back as if loath to part with itself. I don't blame it for being fonder of itself than of the summer we saw here last year. I have a nice big room with a corner alcove for the bed, and a good table, what is called home cooking more than before in China, and quite abundant tho not so stylish as some. The missionary who owns the place and is home on furlough must be a character. I wondered for a while if he were a bachelor, and then heard that he ran everything himself; the house is filled with big shining brasses, reminds you of Macy's except four or five bells, temple bells, Id like to take home, and the dining room is lined with a hundred or so blue and white plates, platters and vases, mostly very modern and on the principle of quantity before quality. However they said he had taken down and packed away all of his best pieces. On the bookshelves Mary J Holmes novels are next to The Second Coming of Christ, and the Wild Widow, by the author of Scarlet Kisses, is all mixed up with the hymn books; an Edith Wharton and H G Wells or two have somewhat got mixed in with the funniest collection of religious literature and paper covered trash you ever saw. There is a girls school, orphans, and a boys school, latter closed while he is gone, in the compound, both of which he maintains. He is a practical joker when he isn't missionarying, and one of his refined jovialities was to teach an ugly gate keeper, who had no idea of the meaning of any ChiEnglish words, to go up to callers and say Kiss Me. I suppose this is the way he keeps from going more insane. He wrote back with great glee of telling a tourist on the boat how Li Hung Chng2 [Hung-Chang] lived in the same town and once every year brought his fifty wives over to pay a ceremonial call; also he wrote how angry it made him when the ship landed to see white men tying it to the wharf—this latter wasn't intended as a joke.

I am giving eight regular lectures per week, four evenings on the philosophy of education, two afternoons on Logic, and two afternoons on Greek philosophy. There are only an hour long, interpretation and all however, so its quite light work. Last week moreover there were two holidays, one Arbor Day which is the old spring festival and a ringer for Easter, and one to commemorate the opening of the first or old parliament. I'm sorry I can't tell enough Chinese history and politics to show you the immense humor of this celebration, but its much as if they were to have a national holiday to celebrate Oliver Cromwell's purging of the English parliament. Last monday evening, I think they it was, they had a "reception". I had innocently forgotten the nature of a reception, and only when I got over there did I remember that school reception[n] consists exclusively of speechmaking, one speech of welcome from the faculty and three from the students. They were interpreted however, but I don't think any one repeated the witticism of a farewell speaker in Peking who said I had come to China to do to—or for—her what President Wilson did for France. Once there was much applause, and I was told it was because the speaker said that when the Japanese heard how warmly I was received here they were jealous and sent me over a badge, which I refused. The myth seems well established, but a badge seems innocent enough. This sunday afternoon I spoke to all the Nanking students, theoretically all about fifteen hundred in fact in the open air, delivering my w.k. [well-known] speech on a new conception of life. I am just as popular with the officials
here as elsewhere, and was told that when the subject was printed in the paper, the word "new" was omitted, in order to not give offense. The word is positively inflammatory, which simplifies getting a hearing from an audience. The national executive committee of the students union has sent an ultimatum to the government, demanding that the Govt cancel at once all secret treaties with Japan, and also reject Japan's request for direct negotiations over Shantung. They have given the govt four days to do these stunts in, and have voted a nation wide strike if not granted. The Peking and Nanking students were both opposed to this action, but the majority carried it. It looks rather foolish, and I may be in for another enforced vacation, but as before remarked you never can tell. They, the radical students, were anxious to include two more demands one for dissolving the Anfu Club and another for a bas the militarists. These demands seem to have been reserved for the present. Well one enthusiastic foreigner who has been here twenty five years says that in China the Renaissance, the reformation, the English, French and American revolution are all taking place simultaneously and in the same country. If this is so, a little thing like a general strike is easily explainable. The same gentleman however is unpopular with his students because he insists on the faculty electing the student representatives to the selfgovernment Council so he takes his revolutions in moderation. There is a Young China Association with a branch hand here, and which publishes two journals, one called Young China and one the Young World. I have been trying to get somebody to tell me about the New Culture as they call it, and some of these people are going to make me up a kind of synopsis of the about a hundred periodicals, divided under three heads. The literary or language revolution, the new social ethics (labor and woman question) and education. This Teachers College is going to introduce coeducation, unlike progressive and liberal countries the men students are in favor of it here, mostly instead of opposing. When the committee was arranging the seating for the meeting to day, the student members insisted that the women should not be seated separately but mixed up with the others. They werent so damned mixed up as matter of fact, but they werent all herded in one spot either. I forgot to say that at the Recpetion one student made his welcoming speech in English. He got mixed up and forgot and the students laughed at him. To all appearances he kept up his nerve, but Im told he lost so much face he left school and hasnt been ^seen^ since, no one knows where he is. Its not pleasant that this should be the only visible, or perhaps invisible, result of my lectures. Lots of love to everybody and hope something will be forwarded from you soon Fred has been nobly doing his duty, but Sabino seems to have relapsed, and Jane never did get a fair start.
With love, Dad [DewJ3]
Monday, April 12 [1920]

Dear Alice, Evelyn and Lucy, …

There is another good sized room in the house which they have offered for use when you come. This will be two in a room but I don't think it would be any better by dividing up. They have some single beds, which they will put up so mamma can have her own bed. The grounds are large and nice, and as there is a big two story piazza around the house I think it will be as cool as anywhere. No bathtub with running water, but I don't think there is anywhere except at the Bowens [Arthur J. Bowen]. Food is abundant and nourishing.

The program remains in statu quo, otherwise meaning vague. However this much is definite. They expect six weeks lectures from me here altogether; they have spoken of a week at Shnaghai which may come off barring strike this month. But the interesting trips aren't planned till later. I don't suppose you will mourn missing Shanghai, especially as there will be plenty of chance later if you want. Anyway we mayn't go this month I think they are somewhat embarrassed about the Yangste trip. Two of the provinces, the Educations Associations voted to invite me, according to newspaper reports but they haven't received the official invitations, and I infer, think officials have interfered.

There is a good tennis court here. It would probably be a good idea for you to purchase a racket in Peking, as you will be glad of it here, probably wherever you are this summer. They say there is a fair Chinese made racket can be bought for about five dollars, also bring a few balls. Lots of love and thanks for letters. Shall hope to be able to write you definitely about plans here soon. Evelyn will find in the Sept or Oct no, No 4 of Young China a number of articles by women student[s] giving their ideas. I presume Suh Hu [Hu Shi] won't have got anybody for her unless she had better luck than I did. Better ask George or Chiang [Monlin] when he gets back; I had thought of asking Mr [John Stewart] Burgess if he couldn't find some one, and that might be a good idea.

Love to all John [DewJ3]
1920.04.14 Letter from John Dewey to Alice Chipman, Evelyn, & Lucy Dewey
Nanking, April 14 [1920]

Dear family,

Thanks especially to mamma for full and good letters. You probably know more about the strike than I do; it begins in Shanghai for one week today, here to morrow the students have no enthusiasm for it. There is certainly politics connected with it, more politics than there seemed to be in the Peking movement. The general opinion here is that it is the Shanghai students who are most back of it—that and the fact that having a general conference of delegates from all over, they had to find something to do. As to the politics, so far as I can make out the student leaders think that they can use the 8 Tuchun league to help overthrow the present Anfu club domination—and I dont kno doubt the Tuchuns think they will use the students for their ends. The gossip is that the President [Hsu Shih-chang] is now in favor of the student movement. This sudden turn is said to be that due to the fact that the rivalry with Tuan [Chi-jui] has now reached a pointe where he wants popular support for himself and Ching [Chin Yun-peng]. Quite as likely the whole rumor started in the mere fact that the president received the Ymcas after Tuan had attempted to prevent the convention from meeting—the officials woill now be sure that the strike is a consequence of the Tientsin meeeting. Another rumor said to be influencing the students is that Lamont has promised them financial support if they show they have the courage to do something! He may be interested in this rumor. Of course I cant say how widely circulated or believed these stories are, any more than the one that the students adopted from me the slogan that militarism must go. Its a good sentiment, but I havent the pride of originality about it. Mr Roy Anderson4 called on ment the other day with a Korean rebel conspirator and a local Chinese, and said that Mr Lamont was the first man who had been over here who had been big enough to see and talk to everybody, gave the students in Shanghai half an hour appointment and then talked to them two and a half and once when he asked them what they wanted he should do, one of the students replied "Go home", and Mr L took it goddnaturedly and said he would if he found he couldnt do something of benefit to the people. Also that the officials tried to keep him cornered but he wouldnt be. Nothing was said however about our friend Sokolsky; it would be interesting to know if in his itch for sensationalism he had been stirring up the strike. The Korean was bound for Vladivostok and told with pride about the millions of yen the Koreans were subsrcibing to start patriotic newspapers, and also the number of industrial companies, over 250 which had been started in the last year for encouraging Korean industry. He had been in prison several years so he must be old at the game. Mr Anderson think that if the Allies dont interfere to protect Japan an alliance between Koreans, Chinese and Russians in Siberia and Manchuria which will in time by guerilla warfare drive out Japanese is inevitable. The present reports from Siberia put Mr Ono's remarks about desire for cooperation in Siberia in the unfortunate light which events have a way of placing Japanese propaganda.

I am living in a missionary house under the hill you spoke of, and maybe Mrs Malone is the one you spoke of; she is in America. However I have heard of two others who sometimes do that business and am on their trail. Tuesday afternoon and evening I teaed and dined at Mr Williams, the acting presidents—he is more cultivated than Mr Bowen, but also I think more conservative. He knows lots about Chinese and China tho. In 1900 spent a year in Japan with C T Wang and the Chinese students, of whom there were then 15000—he says that Chinese brought home a lot of new ideas, and evidently thinks that in spite of everything their going to Japan has been a great factor in producing the present new tendencies. Says Chinese were exploited in every possible way; men used to get them into their homes, entangle them with their wives and daughters and then blackmail them. At the tea there were several Chinese women, among them the kindergartner, Mrs Wang and a cunning two year old girl, Mrs Won and the two celebrated boys that came in answer to prayer as a miraculous proof of the truth of Chritianity etc. The boys were about the size of "us boys" in the picture of the four of us, and their clothes were so like ours in the picture, and their hair cut the same way, that it was funny. They have two new semi Chinese buildings about up, the big administravive one rather ugly, the small one for a chapel is going to be quite lovely. At Mr Plimpton' suggestion they
are going to set up a few of the old examination stalls Thursday, the 15th in the campus. Yesterday is my offday for work. Mr Tao and Liu cam around about nine, with a young brother of C T Wang who is on his way back to Shanghai and took me off for the day. We went to the Rain Blossom Hill whence come the pebbles, lots of peddlars, children with the coarser ones, like ours, following you around with baskets and finally offering to sell the whole lide for ega mau [illeg.], up to the aristocratic ones who have their stands and their best species under glass with fancy names attached, the moon in the sea, etc, and prices according—one with a Chinese character like happiness on it for sixteen dollars I came home with some pretty ones; then we went to the examination halls again, to the public gardens, to a lake we didnt go to before, in the tea house the first Ming emperor used to play chess with his prime minister, a Chinese restaurant on the canal opposite the exam halls where we ate in The Flowery Boat on the canal, and to a big buddhist monastery, where we saw the sutra scriptures, 7000 vols, as well as the usual ten thousand buddhas; also we were leaving there was service in the temple, so we waited. At first the music sounded to my ears much like negro chanting; its more hypnotic than catholic mass, more soothing to the nerves; if I were near Id go in everyday.

Our weather is evidently cooler than yours. No hot days, rather chilly on the whole; the weather we had here last May much the hottest of whole summer they say, also hottest ever. Strike begins today, but they say they will go on with my lectures.

There are single beds here for everybody. But bring sheets and pillow cases for your beds also a comforter or quilt apecie. A few towels would probably come in handy, but there arent sheets enough to go around, and bringing your own is part of the recognized scheme of living with missionaries. Also they dont drink coffee which means it is pretty bad; it wouldnt be a bad idea to have a couple of cans accidentally left over and bring em. Sorry to hear about Evelyn; quite likely the damp her and absence of dust will be a good thing for her, tho there isnt much to do here, except that wandering the streets one gets much more insight into life here than in Peking, things more open, and women much more in evidence, keeping shop, working with men etc. Better bring two tennis rackets, one for me as I think Ill have to start playing.

Lots of love to everybody John [DewJ3]
1920.04.19 Letter from John Dewey to Dewey family
Nanking April 19 '20
Dear family, or families, here and there I hope you will forgive me if I mix things all up in a scramble, some for one, some for tother. One negative fact has emerged about the future. Im not going anywhere not even to Shanghai till Ive finished here, which will be the middle of May. After that I am to be in the hands of the National Federation of Chinese Education, headquarters at Shanghai, and I guess something Monlin Chiang got up. I hope they have others reasons for being save managing my tour, but one feature of their activity I strongly suspect is to keep me from falling into the hands of the missionary institutions—at the same time, they'll expect probably to board us with missionaries wherever we go. When I can get at Tao [Hsing-chih] or Kuo [Ping-wen] Ill find out. They alnd practically all the leaders here are Christians, so you get another angle on that question here, tho not free from jealousy of their institutions I think. I dont think youll have any difficulty spending two weeks here pleasantly enough, or more; sight seeing will take more sometime and if any one has energy for picnics and walks, there are lots of places to go. I wander about the streets a good deal; shops are more wide open and domestic than in Peking, nothing exciting going on in them, but you see things fairly wide open. Weather much cooler than Peking so far; season is three weeks late. Evelyn outlined a good article on consortium for the N R and I hope she'll write it, under her own name. Glad mamma liked the sense of my Shantung article if she didnt the sound. I found, re the head dress that a Miss Lyons has a girls school here and wrote to ask when I could call on her, wrote several days ago, but havent had any answer. Have had a chance to get some contact with students here. Tea party yesterday afternoon with the local members of the Young China Association. I had supposed it to be very large, but found the entire representation there, ten in number, about equally divided between Teachers College as they prefer to call the Higher Normal and Nanking University. A man from the latter made quite a little set || speech, telling about the society and its purposes—five branches, one at Peking where it was formed last July, one Chengtu, one here one Tokyo, one Paris. 68 members in all and publishing 2 monthlies and one weekly. Thing of a small no of American college students doing that, say nothing of their object being to create a new civilization for China, and to cooperate with movements in other countries, for general reconstruction. They eschew politics and, are devoted to soicial reform, including educational, and to the spread of scientific method and results. The teachers tell me the group here is quite the elite among the students. Take in ^no^ new members save when they are thoroughly acquainted with them, and have four requirements; purity of character, an economical habit of life, a fighting disposition, and responsibility in carrying thru what they promise—not such a bad list. Judging from their conversation their chief present, in this group at least, is the family and woman question; anxious to know about feminism, strongly in favor of coeducation etc. The Baptist College in Shanhgai is going to introduce it in '21. One young man wanted to know how the psycology was going to be changed, that the men had a certain idea of women in their mind, and the women had the traditional idea of woman and also the mens’ idea od women in their minds and when they met these old ideas came up no matter what their theoretical beliefs were. On thursday afternoon [22 Apr. 1920] the student editors of their educational publication Youth and Society have asked me to meet with them. The meeting yesterday was in the Garden of the Gentry Club, I think thats the place mother and I had the bout with the hard boiled officials last spring. Mrs Thurston isnt here. The acting president Miss Vautrin brings her class in education over every evening to the normal school lecture, eight or ten of them, and the women teachers of the practise school come. Afternoon lectures there are a few scattering women, also, today from the womans normal. Im going to speak at Ginling [Nanjing] wednesday night; to science teachers of TC tomorrow, and spoke at University last Friday [16 Apr.] so am getting these stunts off the program, May 7 and 8 there is to be a Teachers Conference here, educators from outside. There is to be an Athletic Meet here, and this is run in after; I think thats the way they have got around the officials. The strike is supposed to come to an end tomorrow; anyway it doesnt affect me. The students had their first demonstration, parade, speech making this a m But I didnt know it was coming off and missed it. There is less no enthusiasm and unless the demonstration stirred things up, I
dont think it will last. If cook goes too, I dont see why you dont put forward a little your coming down here. Shouldnt think it would pay to start up for two weeks all afresh. Hope you got to the Great Wall, and also hope you will do the Ming toombs, tho if you do you better stay at the hotel and not try it all in one day—go up afternoon before. The summer school here begins about July 15. I think thereir program is all made up, but will see what I can find out. Ev better speak to Suh Hu about it too. Got the other home letters but as a foreign ^mail^ got in the other day am now hoping for more. Lots of love to everybody John, also Dad.
I hope if Mr Lamont decides to go back without doing anything he will speak right out in meeting, as undiplomatically as possible, and tell just why. Not only will it do the Chinese good, but also save American prestige, as the Japanese will give it out for a great American defeat and lots of Chinese will think it is another case where Americans have talked and done nothing. Mr Anderson said the thing to do was to get all territory within three miles on each side of every rail way thrown open to foreign trade; the Japanese go in anyway, and this would enable foreign capital to go in to compete with them, and the Chinese local merchants would rather tie up with American, and that way could also get protection for their investments against their own officials, this was the only way to make the Open door a fact he said. [DewJ3]
1920.04.20-30 Letter from John Dewey to Alice Chipman Dewey  
[April 20-30,1920?]
This is the detailed itinerary. I dont think I have the names of a lot of the places right. The towns before Shanghai all on the rail road between here and there.
Chinkinang, May 17, Yangchow, 18th, Tsing chan 19-20, Changchow, 21 Wusih, 22-23, Soochow, 24-25, Shanghai, 26-31, Nantung, 1-6, Sinkian, 7-14, Hangchow and Wuhu, 7th-14th between them; Wuhu, An King, Kukiang—all up the river from here—rest of June.
Dont know why Hangchow is dropped, lack of time is reason given; maybe, maybe afraid of missionary institutions in Wuchang.
All this is subject to strike being called off before dates given. If it isnt, nobody knows what will happen.
Dont forget towels, sheets, pillow cases.
The cheapest place in Peking to buy typewriting paper is Munyons near gate on Hatamen, 3,50 for 500 hundred sheets. Please bring a box Ill hear your plans soon I suppose. Many inquiries about you.
I have brought up the possibility of Evelyns giving some lectures her[e] this summer and it seemed to be well recd. I doubt oif she wants six weeks hot summer here however. Glad to hear Cook didnt leave, and hope Evyn has been all right again. My approaches to Miss Lyons seem to have been in vain. Its a nunnery, no men on the place etc, and I suppose they are still holding consultations as to how to deal with my suggestion of making a call, Anyway I judge there is no reason from that end for following up the matter.
After a dfew days nice weather ists cold and rainy again.
Love to everybody John
May 17, monday Chinkiang
May 18, tuesday, lecture, Yongchow evening
May 19 wednesday, Yongchow, lecture
May 20 thurs lecture """
May 21 Tsing kiang, travelling to Friday
May 22 saturday Tsingkjiang lecture
May 23 sunday " "
May 24 Travel to Chinkiang Monday
May 25 Tues Changchow, early train lecture
May 26 wednesday " "
May 27 thursady to Shanghai
May 28 friday lecture ""
May 29 Sat Shanghai, Natl assn vocational edb
May 30 sunday, """
[M]ay 31 monday "
till thrusday evening June 3rd.
June 4 Friday Nantung, lecture till June 7 monday, then to Shanghai, leavingev 8
June 8 Tuesday, arrive Shanghai
June 9 wednesday """ to Hangchow
June 10 Tr Hangchow thursday
June 11-12, 13 Hangchow thru sunday
June 14 monday to Shanghai
June 15 tuesday recreation ""
June 16 wednesday Tsuchow
17,18,19 ""
June 20 sunday to Wusih, stay thru saturday the 26th
June 27th Soochow,
Monday tues 28-29 lectures at Soochow
June 30 wednesday reurn to Nanking ||
[not typed by JD]
Time table for Dr Dewey's Lectures.
May 16th Sunday.
May 17th from Nankin to Chingkiang by first train. Travelling for scenery
May 18th Tuesday Lecture. To Yongchau in the evening.
May 19th Wednesday Travelling for scenery or lecture.
May 20 Thursday lecture
May 21st to Tsingkiang. Friday
May 22 Sat arrive at Tsingkiang or lecture.
May 23 Sunday
May 24 Monday To Chingkiang.
May 25th Tuesday To Chang chau by first train. Lecture.
May 26th Wed. Lecture.
May 27th to Shanghai.
" 28th Friday
May 29th Sat. Lecture in the National Association of Vocational Educa
" Sunday same as above.
May 31
June 1st Tuesday and 2nd Wednesday, blank
June 3rd to Nantung in the evening.
June 4th Arrive at Nantung
June 5th travelling for scenery or lecture.
June 6th Sunday lecture, Monday 7th lecture return to Shanghai.
June 8th Arrive at Shanghai.
June 9th to Hangchow. 10th 11th, 12th 13th
June 14th return to Shnaghai. Tuesday 15th recreation.
June 16th Wednesday To Siuchau till
June 20th To Wusih till Sat the 26th four lectures beginning Wednesday
June 27th to Suchow lecture 28th and
June 29th, 30th lecture
June 30th return to Nankin. [DewJ3]

1920.04.21 John Dewey : Lecture 'Science and democracy' at the Science Society of China. [Kee3]
Letter from John Dewey to John Jacob Coss  
Care Nanking Teachers College April 22 '20

Dear Coss,

Well as you know I have decided to stay over here and teach another year. I hesitated very long time; among other things they asked Evelyn to stay and she couldn't make up her mind at once. However altho she declined, I decided for another year of it, partly because being here it seemed the easiest thing to do, especially as reports from America arent especially attractive so far as living is concerned, and partly to try to clinch whatever may have got started this year. My teaching next year will be of a more intensive character, and mainly at the University, tho enough time will be taken off in the winter to go to Canton—which is another reason for staying as we havent been south. A trip was planned for this summer but some Americans advised us agt us very strongly on grounds of health. Suh Hu [Hu Shi] and a few others are very anxious to modernize the university, and to do means not only getting teachers but material in shape. He is anxious to have me give a course in the interpretation of the history of western philosophy, which can become for a while a kind of standard basis for that subject. The largest publishing house in China has recently made arrangements by the way for extensive translations, rather specially in philosophy. Suh Hu [Hu Shi] and Monlin Chiang, a Teachers College man, and Chancellor Tsai of the University are the board of editors. The students are on strike again as a protest agt the Government's dealings with Japan, but they have excepted my lectures. Im lecturing here on philosophy of edn, rather popular, history of Greek philosophy and logic, 8 hours a week altogether, but the interpretation has to come out of the time, so it is rather a lesson in selection, condensation and illustration.

Thanks very much for the material you sent. Im glad to be able to ging information about the tests, and the syllabus the course will be of great practical value to me. Books are scarce and hard to get hold of and that syllabus will take the place of quite a library. I have an account at the University Press Book Store and when you see a book that you think I really ought to read, philosophy or social theory, I wish you would tell them to send it to me—the old Peking address—and charge to my account. I feel Im getting rather stale. I wish by the way you would have [Bertrand] Russells Introduction to Mathematical Theory sent now, send that here, as this will be headquarters till July.

I shall miss my classes and associations very much. And it is some pleasure to know that some will miss me there. I have had to write out my lectures on Social Philosophy—not quite finished yet—for translation into Chinese, and Im wondering whether to get them printed in English. Im afraid however they are too general as I aimed at an outline of the whole field. My book of lectures on philosophical reconstruction, given in Japan, will probably be brought out by Holt shortly, At least I got galley proofs in Jan. I tried to sum up my past in that, and get rid of it for a fresh start.

Please remember me to everybody, Woodbridge and Montague especially and Edman and the younger men who will may be interested. With best wishes,

Sincerely yours, | John Dewey

The family is still In Peking tho Im expecting them shortly. Ive been here most three weeks. After the middle of May Im going on circuit round and about the Yangste provinces. [DewJ3]
Letter from John Dewey to Dewey family
Teachers College April 24 [1920] Nanking
Dearest children,
You will see from the other side of this what sometimes happens when the Chinese get away from their own etiquette and don't succeed in getting over to ours. There are 60 or more returned American students here, about half of them in the T C; the guests were the American community here, at last as many as cane. Pres Kuo after a social occasion of cakes and tea delivered my obituary which I am getting reasonable hardedned to, but he interspersed the more painful parts with a few jokes. The Chinese have an enumerative mind; they like to cover the ground, from one, two, three, four up. Thusly, I am welcomed first because I am an American, secondly, because I am a philosopher, thridly because I am a teacher, and so on till catagories and words are exhausted. There was also music, and some of the Chinese young men did stunts about like college boys at home, including a lesson in learning a new language by the modern motheod, which consisted in a dialogue of all the American slang they could remember, and the giving of various college yells.
The French are sending back some Chinese coolies now. The French lot moslty came from the river provinces, and the big boats come up the river to here, 1100 landing today, and everybody is investigating their door and window locks. Also cussing the French. They just unload them and turn them loose; they may be penniless and a hundred miles or more from home. They give them drafts on France for their back wages, payable not here but in Shanghai, and then only when the Shanghai bank has reced notification from Paris. Some of them have hung around two months, living ion charity or something else waiting for the bank to get authorization from France for the Bank to pay checks these men already have. They have to have identification papers too with thum prints, and between losing them having them stolen, and gambling them away, everything is a mess. When the first lot landed here, there was no one to receive them, or give them advice. The Y M C A now have an organization that takes their checks sends them to Shanghai and collect. Everyone contrasts French management with the British; they sent part of the wages to the mans home here, registered every letter, followed them up, got several postofficers dismissed for dishonesty; send somebody to look after them when they come home, and open a good number of pay offices in the home country of the people. Also the British made it easy for their coolies to save money and the French offered them every facility for spending it as fast as they got it. The students strike is on, indefinitely this time, altho they only struck for five days at first. The students here altho they were oppose[d] sent delegates out to other schools in Yangste towns and induced them to strike and now they cant quit because of these others. Also there is a good deal of disgust with Shanghai students, and I think there is some face-making at expense of Shanghai union; they want the leadership to centre here. Now they are trying to get the inevitable middle man, the peacemaker to intervene. The provincial assembly has telegrapghed to the central govt in favor of the student demands—return of Japanese note andsking for negotiations over Shantung and cancelling of all secret pacts—and they are trying to get some Shanghai organizations to do the same. This will save the face of the students and they can go back to work, saying they struck only because others whose business it was did not take the responsibility and now that the latter have taken it, they will return to their proper business. But the paper says the Peking students have struck and that may complicate things. When mamma wrote about Sokolsky heading the Lamont student delegation I wondered of course whether he had anything to do with the strike. Yesterday I heard from a young Chinese here that a Russian Jew had had a lot of influence with a man who had influence with the students, and had been influential in starting the strike. He seemed to be of the opinion that the fiasco would reduce his future influence. Yesterday I went to the a tea in the Cockcrow temple—the Buddisht temples often have tea houses in connection—given by the student editors of an educational bi-weekly, Youth and Society, they made four very good speeches in English explaining their purposes and work. The neatest one said that their object was to help produce a Social Youth and a Youthful Society—which is an elegant example of Chinese balance. While we were talking three policemen came in. As they made profound bows, I was much flattered thinking they had
come especially to offer their section of honor to the distinguished foreign guest. But there is martial law here, and the priests had reported that a meeting was going on. Having made their bows they promptly went out, and when we left they were still drinking tea in the other room, so they evidently got a holiday out of it. Some of the students talked some. It seems that some professor in Peking University has advocated public rearing of children, on the ground that parents were too ignorant to rear their children, and that the family system was a failure anyway, and family ought to be abolished. I’d like to get a collection of the extreme proposals that are going the rounds. An interesting thing is that they are practically put forth by Chinese who have had no foreign education at all, but who have become disgusted with conditions. Apparently at different times there has been a good deal of radicalism in China in spite of their conservatism. Another problem is that this school has the reputation of turning out radicals educationally and when they get jobs to teach they at once come into conflict with the old line educators, and many of them have to quit—or some quit simply they are sensitive as to their face. This society like the other one seemed to put a good deal of emphasis upon a fighting spirit however. When we were in Peking we had read to us a letter from the Governor of Chekiang province pitching into a school principal there, saying he taught the pupils free love, nationalization of women etc as well as other alleged Bolshevist eccentricities. It turns out that the governor got his information from some of the old teachers in anonymous letters, they disliking their principal because of some of his progressive educational tendencies. The principal is a Chinese scholar of the old type, and his progressiveness is all a matter of the last two or three years. These things throw some light on the struggle to change things. These young editors asked me to suggest topics for their magazine, which has a circulation of 1200, and I suggested a critical discussion of the disadvantages of Face. One of them put the whole political dilemma of China in a sentence when he said considering that an immediate revolution would merely transfer power from one set of officials and militarists to another set, and an educati a revolution that depended upon the proper education of the people so as really to have a democratic government would be too slow and come too late, what where the students to do?

My program is finally made out. We are supposed to leave here May 16th and make six one or two day stands before reaching Shanghai on the 26th where we stay the rest of May. Then two weeks in three cities including Hangchow in the Shanghai region, then back up the Yangste for the last two weeks of June—not getting as far up the river as Hankow however. After the first of July we shall be on our own, I mean a vacation so if we want to go further up the river we can.

You better keep sending mail here till further notice. An empress steamer comes in Shanghai today, so shall hope for late news soon. Lots of love to everybody. Im going to adress to Sabino as a reminder we have missed of late his good letters.

Dad. [DewJ3]


The longer one stays in China, the more the question of what holds China back impresses itself, and the more difficult it becomes to answer. There is 'if' in almost every answer which your Chinese friends give to the question; and the 'if' generally only restates the difficulty. The remark heard most often is perhaps the most superficial of all. 'If we had a stable government we could do this and that'. But why isn't there a stable government? Its absence is much more of an effect than a cause. The country is still divided, both north and south having their own government, and each at loggerheads with the other. Yet every Chinese friend tells you the country is united although the government is divided, and everything you can learn confirms the statement. Why do not the people then enforce their feeling and will? Japanese intrigue and interference is an obvious answer. But again you are given an effect, a symptom, instead of a cause. Others tell you that the source of the difficulty is lack of ability and experience in organization. This answer goes further below the surface. But it still needs explanation. The Chinese have both experience and ability in some kinds of organization, as the long history of the guilds and of village self-government shows. Why should they not show at least as much capacity for organization as the Japanese, who have only recently emerged from feudalism with all the personal suspicions, jealousies and class division that feudalism opposes to organization? And no one who knows the Chinese can believe that the difficulty is intellectual, that the people have not the mental gifts required in successful organization.

To say (as is so often said) that the Chinese do not progress more systematically and rapidly because they are a conservative people is clearly repeating in other words the thing that needs to be explained. Conservative they doubtless are. But nevertheless their history is not a history of stagnation, of fixity, as we are falsely taught, but of social as well as dynastic changes. They have tried many experiments in their day. Centuries ago they had a statesman who induced the emperor to commit the kingdom to something as near to modern socialism as was possible considering the absence of steam and electricity. China has undergone as many barbarian invasions as any country in Europe. Its survival and its absorption of its invaders do not argue conservatism of the inert kind. No country whose conservatism came from sheer routine, from lack of imagination, from mental rigidity, could have maintained and extended its civilization as China has done. And experience shows that the Chinese are supple, pliant, accommodating and adaptive—neither rigid nor dull.

It may strike the western reader as simply funny, but more than one Chinese friend has assured me that it is the Japanese people who are really conservative. And they back up their assertion by evidence other than the way in which Japan has clung, through all historic vicissitudes, to a primitive theocracy. They point out, for example, that a thousand years ago the Japanese borrowed their present style of clothing and of household furnishings, of sitting and sleeping on mats, from China; that China has changed several times, moving constantly in the direction of practical utility, of ingenious adaptation of means to needs. The Chinese cuisine is another argument. It is doubtless the most extensive in the world in the variety of material employed for food, and also the most varied in its combinations. Academic analysis may despise arguments drawn from food, clothing, shelter and furnishings. But when one notes the variety and ingenuity of the processes and appliances used in daily life and in the crafts, one is certain that the Chinese mind is naturally observant and adaptive. But it seems unnecessary to labor the question. Many charges have been brought against the Chinese, but no one has ever accused them of stupidity. Their undoubted conservatism is something to be explained rather than an explanation of anything.

It may well be doubted whether there is any single key to the mystery. Certainly the present observer has no final solution to proffer. But there is one fact which I am quite sure must be taken into the reckoning and which counts for much. It is beyond question that many traits of the Chinese mind are the products of an extraordinary and long-continued density of populations. Psychologists have discovered, or possibly invented, a 'psychology of the crowd' to account for the way men act in masses, as a mob at a lynching bee. They have not inquired as to the effect upon the mind of constant living in close contact with large numbers, of continual living in a crowd. Years ago an enthusiastic American teacher of the Chinese in
Honolulu told me that when the Chinese acquired Anglo-Saxon initiative they would be the greatest people in the world. I wonder whether even the Anglo-Saxons would have developed or retained initiative if they had lived for centuries under conditions that gave them no room to stir about, no relief from the unremitting surveillance of their fellows? Possibly they would then have acquired a habit of thinking of their 'face' before they thought of the thing to be done. Perhaps when they thought of a new thing they would have decided discretion and hesitation to be the better part of invention. If solitude or loneliness exists in China it is only among the monks who have retired into the mountain fastnesses; and until I have ocular evidence to the contrary I shall believe that even monks in China are sociable, agglutinative beings. Until the recent introduction of rapid transportation, very few Chinese ever enjoyed even the possibility of solitude that comes from being in a crowd of strangers. Imagine all elbow-room done away with, imagine millions of men living day by day, year by year, in the presence of the same persons (a very close presence at that), and new light may be shed upon the conservatism of the Chinese people.

An English author, long resident in China, wrote a book which, aside from a wealth of picturesque incident, gossip and rumor, was a long diatribe against Young China—against, that is, the Chinese who favor the introduction of western institutions, inventions, methods. His way of arguing was sufficiently simple. China suffers from an excess of population. Great masses live just on the edge of subsistence. A flood, a disabling pestilence, a season's bad weather, plunges millions over the edge. Equilibrium is then restored. But a long succession of prosperous years produces an over-population which finds vent in rebellion, civil war, a killing off of a very large number, and possibly the overthrow of a dynasty. Chinese history is and must be a succession, a cycle, of such episodes. Meantime Confucian ideas, ancestor worship, family and clan organization, transmit Chinese civilization intact. This, Young China would destroy, robbing China of its moral foundations. Since it cannot alter the basic facts of the struggle for existence, Young China therefore offers nothing of value to the country.

The logic is not close-knit; non sequiturs abound. But it is a good example of the way in which foreigners become infected with a belief that in China things must in the future be about as they have been in the past, and that efforts to make a change only result in making things worse. In my experience, most foreigners who have been long in China and who think at all, acquire this attitude in some degree. You hear solemn warnings on every hand that this and that cannot be done, although next day you learn from some Chinese friend that it is being done and the heavens have not fallen. Many are more Confucianist—in a kind of vague belief that Confucius contributed something without which China cannot endure—than the younger generation of Chinese. After a few years some foreigners find themselves hypnotized by the thickness, the compactness, of a civilization forced upon people living closely crowded together. They acquire the fear that if one strand is touched, the whole will unravel, and the belief that the safe thing is to leave things alone. Young American teachers and social workers, recently over from America, tell me that the older missionaries frequently admonish them against their innovating zeal, and tell them that as they grow older and wiser they will learn conservatism. Most of the older British residents are reported to have no sympathy with the Revolution, to mourn the departed days of monarchy, and to point to many increased present evils as proofs of their belief that as China has been, so she must be.

If China 'gets' so many foreigners who come with the opposed tradition of the initiative of Anglo-Saxons, then what must be the case with those brought up from infancy in thick, dense, inbred civilization? Live and let live is the response to crowded conditions. If things are fairly well off, then let well enough alone. If they are evil, endure them rather than run the risk of making them worse by interference. In western countries, the doctrine of laissez faire has flourished because a policy of hands off was thought to encourage individual energy and enterprise. In China it flourishes because any unusual energy or enterprise on the part of anybody may work untoward results. Not to rock the boat is wisdom the world over. In a crowded country, not organized along the lines of utilization of natural resources, any innovation is likely to disturb the balance of the social boat. The reformer does not even meet sharp, clear-cut resistance. If he did, he might be stimulated
to further effort. He simply is smothered. Stalling has become a fine art. At a recent national educational conference a returned student holding an official position moved that the public middle schools (corresponding to our high schools) be made co-educational. He was inspired by sound consideration. China suffers from lack of educated women. Funds are short. The effective thing is to admit girls to the schools already existing. But the proposition was a radical innovation. Yet it was not opposed. A resolution in favor was duly passed. But at the same time it was made subtly understood that this was done out of courtesy to the mover, and that no steps to carry the resolution into effect need be expected. This is the fate of many proposed social reforms. They are not fought, they are only swallowed. China does not stagnate, it absorbs. It takes up all the slack till there is no rope left with which to pull. The weak points of a people, like those of an individual, are the defects of their qualities. Vices are not far removed from virtues; they are their reverse side. The Chinese believe themselves the politet people on earth. They are probably right in their belief. In comparison even the best of western manners often appear either crude or else overdone, affected. Nothing can exceed the amenity of the Japanese in personal intercourse. But they learned their etiquette as well as so much else from China, and it remains somewhat formal, a cultivated art. In China the ages have toned down and mellowed the forms of intercourse till they no longer seem forms. High and low are so easy and unconstrained in their bearing toward one another, that one is tempted, in spite of scientific authority, to believe in the inheritance by later generations of the manners acquired by previous generations. Cheerfulness and contentment amid the most trying conditions are a part of good manners. Yet there is none of that rigidity, to say nothing of glumness and fanaticism, which we ordinarily associate with stoicism or fatalism. There is no flourish of self-control which betrays that the self-control is maintained with difficulty. Fate is welcomed with a smile, perhaps a jest, not with a frown, nor yet with heroics. Such courtesy and cheerfulness are undoubted products of long-continued close face-to-face crowded existence. The unremitting impact of a thick civilization has impressed the folly of adding to the burdens of life by friction or repining. Politeness and cheerfulness are the lubricants by which the closeness and constancy of personal contacts are made endurable. Circumstances admit of but two alternatives: either ruthless competition, war to the bone, or an easygoing peace. Having chosen the latter way out, the Chinese have carried it to its logical conclusion. Yet personal consideration for others in direct face-to-face intercourse is quite compatible with what in the western world would be regarded as unfeeling cruelty and lack of active aid to others. The other day in Peking a passing carriage knocked down a man in the street, and rolled by unheeding. The man was so badly injured that he was unable to rise. No passer-by made a move; all literally passed by on the other side, until some foreigners came to the rescue. A few months ago Mr. Baillie was set upon by bandits in Manchuria. The other persons present not only offered no aid, but they ran aside and shut their eyes so that they could not be called upon to testify. The further point of this incident lies in the fact that Mr. Baillie had taken poor and miserable persons from the more crowded parts of China to Manchuria where there was plenty of land, and by colonizing them there had greatly improved their conditions. These men who closed their eyes that they might not know what was going on were men whom he had aided; they were personal friends. This does not mean that Chinese habitual politeness is insincere. I have never heard the Chinese accused of hypocrisy, though I have heard of many bitter complaints of their unwillingness to carry things through. I have never seen anyone who did not regard genuine friendliness as one of the chief Chinese traits. But where there is a complete manifestation of the Malthusian theory of population, friendliness develops with great difficulty to the point of active effort to relieve suffering. Where further increase in population means increase in severity of the struggle for subsistence, aggressive benevolence is not likely to assume large proportions. On the contrary, when the cutting off of thousands by plague or flood or famine means more air to breathe and more land to cultivate for those who remain, stoic apathy is not hard to attain. A foreigner interested in the prevention of cruelty to animals after many discouragements approached with some hopefulness a Buddhist monk. He thought that the doctrine of universal pity would have prepared the way for sympathetic reception. But his
message was coldly greeted. He was told that the animals, when they were abused, were justly
suffering for the sins of some ancestor and that it was not for man to interfere. Such
Buddhism only formulates the fatalism which is a general natural response to surroundings.
Most of the oriental traits of lack of active sympathy and relief which missionaries have cited
as due to heathenism seem to have a simpler explanation. On the other hand, western
philanthropy makes a great appeal. Missionaries and Y.M.C.A. workers took a large part of
the burden of recent flood-relief work. The Chinese in the devastated region who had
remained calmly impervious to prior preaching, were so impressed with the exhibition of
kindness that was gratuitous that they flocked into the churches. The latter had to sift and
choose very carefully to keep from being themselves flooded. And this result was not a 'lively
expectation of favors to come'. The population had been deeply touched by the unprecedented
display of sympathy and help. I was told on good authority that the Governor of Shansi, the
most respected provincial governor in China, said that up to the time of the outbreak of
bubonic plague, he had thought that western civilization was good only for battleships and
machinery. But the unpaid devotion of physicians, teachers and missionaries, at the risk of
their own lives, had convinced him that there was another side to western civilization.
The incidents of personal disregard of others have the same spring as the absence of
organized relief. To do anything is to assume a responsibility. To have helped the man
knocked down would have done more than involve a loss of time. Those helping would have
implicated themselves with the authorities. They might be accused of complicity. Mind your
own business, don't interfere, leave things to those whose express business it is to look after
them, is the rule of living. Don't make a nuisance of yourself by meddlesomeness, to say
nothing of getting yourself into incalculable trouble by leaving the beaten track. Practical
in-difference in matters that do not directly concern one is but the obverse side of exquisite
consideration in immediate personal relations. Where the latter are concerned everything
suggests the superior claims of an immediate smoothing over of things rather than an
adjustment on the basis of actual objective consequences. Effect on 'face' is more significant
than consequences upon outer facts. It is contrary to the proprieties, for instance, for a
government school to accept private gifts. It reflects upon the government, which then loses
'face'. The head of a Peking school recently said he would accept gifts, that he was willing to
sacrifice his 'face' to the good of his school and the country. This was a more genuine
sacrifice than westerners might believe.

When people live close together and cannot get away from one another, appearances, that is
to say the impression made upon others, become as important as the realities, if not more so.
The ulterior consequences of, let us say, a diplomatic transaction with a foreign nation seem
of less consequence than the immediate conduct of negotiations in such a way as to avoid
present trouble and graciously to observe all the proprieties. When evasion and delay no
longer suffice, it is better to surrender and to permit the other side to be rude and brusque than
to lose 'face'. The Japanese knowledge of this trait accounts very considerably for
their diplomatic methods with China. It is known as the policy of the strong hand. Concede
anything to the Chinese and they think you are afraid of them, and they at once become
presumptuous and demand more—this is a commonplace in Japanese newspaper discussion
of Chinese affairs. So far as immediate dealings with officials are concerned, the Japanese
seem to have decided wisely as to the methods which give results. What they failed to count
upon was the immense backwash of resentment among the people at large.

In fine, the crowded population has bred those habits of mind, which, as the common saying
goes, make the Chinese individually so companionably agreeable and attractive and
collectively so exasperating to the outsider. Innovation, experimentation, get automatically
discouraged, not from lack of intelligence, but because intelligence is too keenly aware of the
mistakes that may result, the trouble that may arise. 'Keep out of trouble' comes to be the
guiding principle. In an evening pleasantly spent with ex-President Sun Yat-sen, he set forth
his theory as to the slow change of China as compared with the rapid advance of Japan. It
seems some old Chinese sage once said, 'To know is easy; to act is difficult'. The Chinese had
taken this adage to heart, so Mr. Sun explained. They did not act because they were afraid of
making mistakes; they wanted to be guaranteed in advance against any failure or serious
trouble. The Japanese, on the other hand, realized that action was much easier than knowing; they went ahead and did things without minding mistakes and failures, trusting to a net balance on the side of achievement. I am inclined to think the old sage was influential because his teaching was reinforced by effects of the ever-close and ever-thick environment. Only the superficial think that to give the causes of an unfortunate state of affairs is to excuse them. Any state of affairs has to be judged on the basis of the consequences it produces, not on the basis of the causes that explain its existence. But if the causes are those described, they cannot be remedied by expostulation, exhortation and preaching. A change of conditions, an alteration of the environment, is needed. This cannot take place by reducing the population, although part of Young China is now shocking archaic China by preaching birth-control. An introduction of modern industrial methods is the only thing that will profoundly affect the environment. Utilizing energy and resources now untouched will produce an effect that will be the same as an enlargement of the environment. Mining, railways and manufacturing based upon China's wealth of unused resources will give a new outlet for energies that now cannot be used without the risk of causing 'trouble'. The impersonal and indirect effects of modern production and commerce will create habits that will lessen the importance of appearances and 'face', and increase the importance of objective consequences of facts. A way will be discovered with the increase of wealth and of constructive appliances to turn personal friendliness, unfailing amiability and good-humor into general channels of social service.

1920.05.04 John Dewey took a horse-drawn carriage and visited the markets in the Chinese districts and foreign concessions in Shanghai. In the evening he watched a Chinese opera at the Jiumidi New Stage. [DewJ200]

1920.05.05 The director of the Zhejiang Association of Education came to Shanghai and invited John Dewey to Hangzhou. [DewJ200]

1920.05.06 The director of the Zhejiang Association of Education and John Dewey toured to the West Lake in Hangzhou. [DewJ200]

1920.05.07-08 John Dewey : Lectures 'Criteria for social progress', 'The trend of modern education', 'General education', 'The vocation of educators' at the Nanjing Teachers College. Liu Boming interpreter. [DewJ200]

1920.05.09 John Dewey returned to Shanghai. [DewJ200]

1920.05.11 John Dewey : Lecture 'Criteria for social progress'. = She hui jin hua zhi biao zhun. Liu Boming interpreter ; Qiu Yi recorder. In : Xue deng ; May 11 (1920). [Kee3]


1920.05.14 John Dewey and Zheng Zonghai visited Harddon Garden and Cang sheng ming zhi da xue in Shanghai and Dewey gave a speech in its auditorium. [DewJ200]


1920.05.15 John Dewey went to Nanjing. [DewJ200]

1920.05.16 John Dewey : Lecture 'The essence of populist thought' before the Jiangsu provincial parliament in Nanjing. Guo Bingwen, Liu Boming interpreter. [DewJ200]

1920.05.17 John Dewey traveled from Nanjing to Zhenjiang. He stayed at the Jinshan Jiangtian Buddhist temple. [DewJ200]
1920.05.18  John Dewey: Lectures 'The essence of students' self-motivation', 'The vocation of educators' at the Zhenjiang Encouraging Learning Society. After the lecture Dewey was invited to dinner at the Provincial Middle School. After dinner, he went to Yangzhou. [DewJ200]

1920.05.19  John Dewey toured to the Yangzhou Slender West Lake. [DewJ200]

1920.05.20  John Dewey: Speeches 'Education and social progress', 'The essence of self-motivation' at the Yangzhou Grand Theater. Liu Boming interpreter. [DewJ200]


1920.05.20  John Dewey: Lecture 'The real meaning of freedom' in Yangzhou. = Zi you di zhen yi. In: Jue wu; May 25 (1920). [Kee3]

1920.05.21  John Dewey: Lecture 'Vocational education and the labor problem'. = Zhi jiao yu yu lao dong wen ti. In: Jue wu; May 21 (1920). [Kee3]

1920.05.21-23  John Dewey: Stay and lecture in Qingjiang. [DewJ3]

1920.05.23  John Dewey returned to Yangzhou. He went to Zhenjiang in the evening. [DewJ200]


1920.05.24  John Dewey arrived in Zhenjiang and went to Changzhou. [DewJ200]

1920.05.25  John Dewey arrived on the morning at Changzhou. He visited the Youth Society, watched a shadow-puppet drama, and had a Chinese meal. He went sightseeing on the east outskirts of the city and observed the Yuanjie ceremony at Tianning Buddhist Temple. He bought a Chinese landscape painting which was said to have been created in the Ming dynasty. In the afternoon he gave a lecture 'The school and its environment'. Liu Boming interpreter. Shen Yihong: "The lecture attracted an audience larger than that of any other. Present at the lecture were County Magistrate Yao of Wujin, missionary John Hawk, priest Hu Jianong, local education administrative staff, headmasters and teachers of local schools, students from Middle Schools, Normal School and Girls' Normal School." [DewJ200]


1920.05.26  John Dewey: Lectures 'The essence of students' self-motivation', 'The new outlook on life' in Changzhou. There were over 3000 listeners. [DewJ200]


1920.05.27  John Dewey: Speech 'Moral cultivation for the youth' at the Youth Society in Changzhou. Sat noon Dewey returned to Shanghai with his wife, their daughter and Liu Boming. [DewJ200]
1920.05.28 Banquet for John Dewey by the Jiangsu Association of Education, the New Education Co-Progress Association and the Association of Vocational Education at the Yipingxiang Restaurant in Shanghai.

Guo Bingwen gave a high praise for Dewey's positive and huge influence on Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations and China's education: Banquet for John Dewey by the Jiangsu Association of Education, the New Education Co-Progress Association and the Association of Vocational Education at the Yipingxiang Restaurant in Shanghai.

Guo Bingwen gave a high praise for Dewey's positive and huge influence on Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations and China's education: "In terms of Sino-U.S. relations, Dewey has been playing an important role in informing the American people of a real China, which would help strengthen Sino-U.S. ties. As for education in China, ever since Dewey's arrival, it has been enjoying great progress." [DewJ200]

1920.05.29 John Dewey: Lectures 'The vocation of educators', 'The essence of vocational education' for the third annual meeting of the Zhonghua Vocational School at the invitation of the National Association of Vocational Education (Zhong hua zhi ye jiao yu she). Liu Boming interpreter. [Kee3]

1920.05.29 John Dewey: Lecture 'The real meaning of independent action'. = Zi dong zhi zhen yi. Liu Boming interpreter; Chen Changgeng recorder. In: Xue deng; May 29 (1920). [Kee3]
Letter from John Dewey to Albert C. Barnes

Shanghai May 30th [1920]

Dear Barnes, …

I left Peking early in April. For six weeks I was at Nanking, teaching, or rather lecturing, quite different, in the Govt Teachers College there. For the last week two weeks I've been on tour, three interior places and then a week here, and then four or five other places before the first of July. All in this province and in the neighboring one. These are about the most prosperous and progressive provinces in China, but China, barring Shanghai, is still most decidedly China. It is interesting to get these glimpses of interior towns; two places were not treaty towns, and hence had no foreigners in them except doctors and missionaries and mission teachers. Everything in China is a contradiction. China needs foreign influence badly, foreign industrial methods etc, and yet the individual Chinese seem better off, homester and more selfrespecting where foreigners don't go in large nos. In some ways one gets a better impression of missionary work in the smaller towns than in the big centres. The hospital and medical work awakens [awakens] enthusiasm, and they take with them, the missionaries and teachers, a certain social spirit and public interest which is much needed. I stayed at a Chinese Youngs Mens Club at one of these places a useful institution, but it is safe to say that it wouldn't have been started without the example of the Y M C As. Many Chinese say that China is now going thru a period of rather indiscriminate admiration of all things foreign after having had so long a contempt for everything foreign, and is in danger of losing its own best things. I don't know of course. The Chinese seem to be very Chinese, and likely to stay so, tho in my judgment they really assimilate foreign ideas more internally than the Japanese. I have a theory that the situation in China now is much like that in Japan fifty years ago, and that there was a time when Japan might have turned in either direction. The Japanese continue to invade Siberia—and to promise complete withdrawal of all troops "when". They doubtless will when they get all the economic concessions they want—otherwise when the Russians get strong enough to put them out. Mr [Frank A.] Vanderlips party has been drowned in Japanese courtesy and palaver. Only one had strength enough to get up to the surface again and come over to China to see for himself. Mr Lamont at least has force, and isn't deceived. Don't think the consortium is all bad or exploitation. It might even be the salvation of China politically speaking, not only as the means of protecting China from further competitive exploitation which means partition or complete Japanese domination. Without foreign supervision of her finances China will surely go bankrupt and an international supervision is better than a competitive scramble—which is the reason Japan, or one reason, why Japan so opposed the consortium.

I shall get back to Peking early in July I suppose. Mrs. Dewey and the two girls stayed in Peking a month or so after I did but we are now going about together.

Sincerely yours, John Dewey— [DewJ3]

John Dewey : Lecture 'Vocational education and labor issues' at the Association for Vocational Education. [DewJ200]


John Dewey : Lecture 'A social perspective on professional education' at the Tongji School in Wusong and 'Science and people's life' at the Jiangsu Association of Education in Shanghai. Liu Boming interpreter. Following his speech was a talk by Alice Chipmen Dewey on 'Co-education'. Hu Bingxia interpreter. [DewJ200]

1920.06.01 John Dewey : Lecture 'The new outlook of life' at the invitation of the Jiangsu Association of Education, at the Zhonghua Vocational School in Shanghai. There were about 1300 listeners. After this lecture, Dewey went to give a lecture to the Department of Public Relations of the Youth Society. In the evening, lecture 'The relationship between industry and culture' at the Nanyang Public School. [DewJ200]

1920.06.02 John Dewey : Lecture 'Students and the nation' at the University of Shanghai (Hujiang College). In the evening, lecture on 'Social evolution' to the Shanghai Youth Association. [DewJ200]

1920.06.02 (publ.) John Dewey : Lecture 'The question of co-education' at the Jiangsu Education Association (Jiangsu sheng jiao yu hui), Shanghai. = Nan nü tong xue wen ti. Keng Xiang recorder. In : Jue wu ; June 2 (1920). [Kee3]

1920.06.03 John Dewey : Lecture 'Populist education' at Pudong Middle School' in Shanghai. In the afternoon, lecture 'The essence of democracy' at the Jiangsu Association of Education. Alice Chipman Dewey gave a lecture on 'The essence of women's education' at the Qinya Teachers College of Women. Lu Xiuzhen interpreter. [DewJ200]

1920.06.03 (publ.) John Dewey : Lecture 'The social conception of specialized education' : delivered at the Tong Ji School in Shanghai. = Zhan men jiao yu di she hui guan. In : Xue deng ; June 3 (1920). [Kee3]

1920.06.04 John Dewey arrived in Songjiang at the invitation by the Songjiang Encouraging Learning Society, the Education Association of the county, the county library and the Provincial School. Lecture 'The school and society' to the Songjiang Encouraging Learning society with 2000 listeners. Lecture 'General education and vocational education' at the University of Shanghai (Hujiang College). [DewJ200]

1920.06.04 (publ.) John Dewey : Lecture 'Education for citizenship' at the Putong High School near Shanghai. = Gong min jiao yu. In : Jue wu ; June 4 (1920). [Kee3]

1920.06.05 John Dewey arrived in Nantong by the invitation of Zhang Jian to lecture. [DewJ200]

1920.06.05 John Dewey : Lecture 'Responsibilities of educators' at the Nantong Gengsu Theater in Nantong. Liu Boming interpreter with about 2000 listeners, most of them were teachers and students. [DewJ200]

1920.06.05 John Dewey visits the grave of General Frederick Townsend Ward at Songjiang. [DewJ8]

1920.06.05 (publ.) John Dewey : Lecture 'The relationship between elementary education and vocational education : delivered at Shanghai College (Hu jiang da xue). Feng Shuhua recorder. In : Jue wu ; June 5 (1920). [Kee3]

1920.06.07 John Dewey : Lecture 'Social evolution' in Nantong. [DewJ200]

1920.06.07 Letter from Mao Zedong to a friend. "I'm reading three great contemporary philosophers : John Dewey, Bertrand Russell and Henri Bergson." [DewJ181]

1920.06.07 (publ.) John Dewey : Lecture 'Social evolution' : delivered at the YMCA (Young Men's Christian Association) Shanghai. Liu Boming interpreter ; Yao Huian recorder. In : Jue wu ; June 7 (1920). [Kee3]

1920.06.08 John Dewey : Speech 'Industry and education' in Nantong Park. Dewey started for Tangzha, Nantong. [DewJ200]
1920.06.09  John Dewey: Lecture in Tangzha, Nantong. Zhang Jian introduced him to the audience: "Dr. Dewey is among the few foreign experts who have an in-depth understanding of China's current political and educational situations. Since Nantong is geologically isolated from large cities, it is truly a precious opportunity for us to witness the doctor's elegant demeanor and hear his speech. His insights will keep us in pace with the new trend in society. America is the first country to have successfully incorporated philosophy into politics and education in modern times. Its republican system is a good example for China. Today we're honored to have Dr. Dewey to enlighten us with the past and the present of American politics and education."

On the evening Dewey started for Jiaxing. [DewJ200]

1920.06.09  (publ.)  John Dewey: Lecture 'The relationship between culture and technology'. = Gong yi he wenhua di guan xi. Liu Boming interpreter; Zhao Naiqian recorder. In: Xue deng; June 9 (1920). [Kee3]


1920.06.10  John Dewey: Lecture 'The new trend of primary school education' before an audience of over 3000. Zheng Xiaocang interpreter.
Alice Chipman Dewey delivered a speech on 'Education for women'.
They arrived in Hangzhou in the afternoon. [DewJ200]

1920.06.11  John Dewey: Lecture 'Research methods for social problems' at Hangzhou Mapoxiang Public School of Law and Political Science. [DewJ200]

1920.06.12  John Dewey attended a meeting at the Lawyers' Association by the Zhejiang Association of Education in Hangzhou.
Speech: 'The essence of democracy' in the roof garden of the Youth Association. [DewJ200]

1920.06.13  John Dewey: Lecture 'Qualities of democratic members of society' at Hangzhou Normal School. Zheng Zonghai interpreter. [DewJ200]
1920.06.13  

Letter from Alice Chipman Dewey to Dewey family  
[June 13, 1920?]

There are so many things like these that I want to tell you after reading your lively letters that I scarce know where to begin. But anyway I wish you would come to China, I like it more the more I want to see you all and I always wish this were the last day of my stay on the day your letters come. Well here we are. new surprises waited for us this time, Hangchow did not want us to come and was none too glad to see us. Last night they impeached their Gov on six charges and he resigned. Three of the sis were financial, he is a famous gambler and runs lotteries all over town, not to speak of opium, The conservatives have there at present and we are thot Bolshevicks and the students complained because Papas lctures were not intellectual enough, (Think how China has cahnged Pa) and so he gave them as a farewell a lecture on Elementary schools in which he told them it was not theories abkut socialism and free thought and free lve that China needed, it was teaching the people how to improve agriculture and cotton and silk and more especially their own lives. With it all we did not see as much as we wanted to, we were kept busy and out of mischief, but the girls will tell you what they saw and it was so hot we could not sleep much and Ec was getting very tired so we came up with Pa when we might have staid lnger. Lucy goes back to Nankin with Pa tomorrow morning to stay there with Winnifred Miller, but Ev and I are daring the excitement a little lnger. Only we are denying our selves one bird cage for Pa goes way beyond Nankin and then comes clear back south again a ten hours ride to Soochow, Now Soochow is only two hours from here, so we shall stay at this hotel which is cheap being only seven dollars a day and good whereas the Burling is eight and bad, and the others are ten and more fashionable and to them all the people go who dont know any better, The housekeeper here is a real German haus frau and I wanted to embrace her when I saw her swelling bosom and her tight little wisp of hair on the tip of her head and the food is good and real mattresses on the beds. I dont think I ever told you about Chinese beds. They are of woven rattan like our cane seats, or else boards (one of ours in Pekin is just like the seats of chairs,) and over the cane they throw a comfortable and one sheet, and there you are.

[Alice Chipman Dewey] [DewJ3]
Letter from Lucy Dewey to Dewey family
Hangchow, Monday, June 14 [1920]

We left Shanghai for Nantungchow on Friday the fourth. We spent the morning with Mrs Crane in Shanghai and had lunch with her. Thursday night we went to a dinner given for the Cranes by various associations of Shanghai and there had been no arrangement beforehand, so C. T. Wang who had charge of the Cranes, never thought to ask Mrs C and we were the only foreign ladies present. There were several Chinese, including Miss Chen-Mrs Wu. She had her hair up and was looking most grown up and sober. It seems that she was the woman who organized a company of 80 women during the revolution at Nanking, and led them. They carried ammunition to the soldiers and practised every day with rifles. Were school girls, mostly, and when they had got well enough trained to go out and fight the war was over. "We were so disappointed."

Had dinner Friday night with Mr [H.H.] Kung of Shansi, a very nice party. He said that after we left [T]aiyuan last fall he was talking to the gov. The gov said that he had heard we were Bolsheviks and was afraid of the spread of Bolshevik ideas in China. Mr Kung explained what Bolshevism was and how it grew up. Yen said, "Well, under those conditions I don't wonder they became Bolsheviks and of course such a thing is impossible in China" Mr K thinks Yen is really liberal and progressive.

The boat for Nantung left at midnight. We were met by a Mr Ho, French and Belgian returned student who spoke a little English and beautiful French and another man, who promptly disappeared. We sat up and watched the moonlight on the river till about one and then went to bed on some nice Chinese boards. Slept very well, considering. Got to Nantung about nine. Some more people came out in a sampan to greet us before we docked and presented us with elegant purple and gold printed programmes. We were met at the dock by Chang Jr, a company of soldiers, and a brass band. We were taken to the house by the [page torn] arretts and slept till lunch time. After lunch, Mr Lee came and took us sightseeing, we saw lots of things, but didn't get thru the programme, at that. Went to the Changs to dinner. They have a very elegant and hideously furnished foreign house and dress the children in terrible foreign clothes. Had a long and elaborate foreign meal. The next two mornings we went to Dads lectures in the city theater, a fine building. In the afternoon we did sightseeing, went to see the mills and factories. They have a cotton factory, iron founry, where they build small boats and make repair parts for the mills, an oil mill for the cotton seed, etc. In the cotton mill sixty percent of the employees are women and children over ten, they work twelve hours a day, and the factory is paying 250% Nothing done for the children of mothers who work they sit around the mills.

One afternoon we went to Lanshan, where the chickens come from. Saw an institution for the dumb and blind, and an industrial home for beggars, on the way. Climbed the pagoda on the mountain and got a wonderful view of the country. Lots of canals everywhere. One night we went to the theater and saw Oyang [Ou-yang Yu-chien], who is supposed to be the best actor in China, after Mei Lang Fan. He is interested in the revival of the stage and did a modern play with a romantic interest. It was awfully interesting and pretty, with very little banging and noise and he is a very good actor. He has a school for actors which we went to see. Forty boys who are taught Chinese, history, math, Chinese and foreign singing and dancing, playwriting. I asked if they were taught historical costuming but couldn't find out, I think not. It was awfully interesting [to] see what he has done and to see the boys. They were all beauties in one way or another, some with faces like Buddhas. They did their stunts for us. They dance very well indeed. Mr Chnag presented Mamma with a piece of embroidery from the school and Mr Lee gave Evelyn and me each one. We bought some besides. Left Nantung Tuesday night [8 June 1920], quite an experience. Got half way to the dock and Mr Lee discovered there was no boat and we would have to take the English boat which would probably come along about two. We all sat up until after one playing games and then we went and lay down on the board beds. I got a little sleep, nearly an hour, before the boat came, about two thirty. We went out in sampans to the boat. Mr Ho had joined us by that time, he knew what would happen and had wisely spent the time in the town. It was quite ride out to the boat, most exciting. Rough, tho the worst wind had died down, with a little moon, and the
sampan going along rowed by three men. Got settled on the boat about four, all the cabins taken so we had to sit up. Nobody slept much, I did for about fifteen minutes, deck too cold, and the cabin too stuffy. Landed in Shanghai about ten and went to the Kalee hotel. Ran errands frantically all day, and finally got to bed about nine. Nantung an interesting place, very much one man, nobody talks about anything but his excellency. He has done a lot for the place industrially but its all pretty Japanese. Lots of industrial schools but very little expansion of primary and girls ed. Mamma spoke at the girls normal one morning and whom, should she run into but her old friend from the Peking normal that Suh Hu [Hu Shi] had dismisssed. Chang has built roads and runs jitney busses, he is getting more.

Lucy Dewey [DewJ3]

1920.06.14  John Dewey: Speech 'Science and people’s life' at the West Lake Phoenix Theater in Hangzhou on the invitation by the Hangzhou Normal School. Zheng Zonghai interpreter with over 1000 listeners. [DewJ200]

1920.06.15  Letter from Alice Chipman Dewey to Dewey children
GRAND HOTEL KALEE | SHANGHAI, CHINA, June 15th. [1920]
Dearest Children. Here we are back from Hangchow. I dont know why I say back for I have had a bath and am dring my hair. Drying it in the rain, but still happy. And besides you wont know what it means, you never will till you come to China, when I say I have had a bath. It seems such fun to just go here and there and have no trouble and all expenses paid and then you do it and the fun is more than one kind. Chinese hotel at last, and very good food with a wash bowl between us thrown in. But were we allowed to eat that good food, By no means, In stead we were led to say we wanted to go her and there, hither and yon, and in all the places under the sun wherever we wandered there came a third class foreign cook of great reputation in the ancient capital and he came even into our own Chinese hotel from his restaurant, his third class restaurant with his castors and his dirty table cloth and he cooked for us, with starch for sauces and with fried fish for break fast cold and greasy, and with cold storage eggs of some sort out of ctyle in Chinese cooking, and in the normal school or the Law school there was this curried ghost of the paste and we did eat thereof and great was the fall. One hot blistering noon we traveled from our lovely lake side to the red brick R.R. station near by which he spotted his cotton table clothes and there we sat down far from the willow trees and did eat the bitterness of captivity. Only one good Chinese meal of savory taste and fattening flavor did we eat in the ancient capital in our own hotel and one other in a Buddhist temple, vegetarian, and good, very good, given by two lovely spinsters who spend their aristocratic lives running a girls Industrial school A most aesthetic friend from last year gave us fans, the Hangchow fans are the most famous in China and therefore in the world, with his beautiful writing thereupon and pas tell him quite frankly that he is the pole star of China and mine that I am the star of Womans world and the girls that they are the milky way or something near to it, and these we shall keep on the parlor table with translations in sight.

Alice Chipman Dewey [DewJ3]
1920.06.16 Letter from Alice Chipman Dewey to Dewey children

[June 16, 1920]

Dear Children. This is the evening of the 16th and Ev and I are alone in this hotel. Lucy got sick of this job and went to Nankin and Papa is in a town named Tsuchow way off somewhere that he has to come back from. SEv is still short of sleep and we are going to bed early and really waiting here in Shanghai partly for time to pass. We pay dearly for it, but still we must stay some where tho we are both about at the point that Lu had reached. In Nankin she and we all feel at home in a lovely garden and settle into it for a while. But we are none the less looking now towards Peking. I am getting this off for tomorrow the mail gets ready for the Equador. We went out with miss B Blascourt today, she is one I knew in New York and now deals in corios here. We made the acquaintance of the big dealer with whom Mr Simkhovitch deals. He the one from whom S bought his first pictures. His shop is a lovely one and besides his we saw one other. Ev bought a piece of blue and white and I bit at a pretty cracked thing which ought to be expensive but under the circumstances sold for three dollars and I think I can get it as far as Peking at least. It is a big jar like a ginger jar of old five color pictures and I shall be proud to see it on the Peking sideboard and fish a cracker out of it from time to time. I wanted to look at some pictures, but time was too short. Their place is filled with splendid blue and white of all the periods but all too dear for me. and China is selling out all the old stuff pretty fast. Some of the very most horrible photos we have had arrived today from a girls school where we visited and spoke when here before. The passion of this nation for poor photos is quite miraculous. I have been looking at the proof of EA. and think it is hard to make nay thing out of it for a stranger, being a proof only and my not knowing her. I hope I may sometime tho. and shall look for a copy of the photo soon, a small one I mean.

The book of letters has not arrived here and will not but Pa has declined o tkae the trip up the Yngste and we shall be at home soon after July first. Maybe some of us before that time. If I take the lectures in Nankin I think III go and come back. Winnifred Miller has decided not to ait for Ev so she will go alone with the help of crowds of fellow passengers. Probably on "ug 21st too, for the chance of getting anything but blackmail out of the S. S. Co seems very slight. Our conductors this time were different both from the past and from each other, One was dear little Chen of Nankin, he weigs 35 pounds and we love the whole of him. he is sweet and gentle and intelligent and he cant get any thing done except he is very good to talk to and to learn from and he tells you when he doesn't understand what you say so you can say it over again. he is delicate in health and very popular with the chair bearers so we never get into a chair till he tells us which one he is not gong to take and then the bearer resigns himself. What do you think, I have just been called to the phone, wrong number of course, but then what an experience, to speak thru a phone again. our other conductor is a real sport, a lout in plain languagem and how he ever got in on the job we cant guess, but he had his picture taken with Pa alne in the rock garden of the park yesterday and we are going to wait and see what kind of chewing gum prints it. He gave os three heavy pieces of very bad porcelain and we think maybe it is to be a trade mark for that. Since we shall probably bring home the bad porcelain I may as well tell you it is an attempt to revive the most ancient and valuable ware called celadon (or, Japanese, seijji) pale green you know and sometimes very beautiful, These three pieces make up in design for their lack of workmanship, one is a water buffalo, with smooth knees and skin of striped green, another is the Goddess of the three eyes, a foot tall and much heavier than Chen tho we were her bearers, and the third is a dog of short body and long legs smiling jaws and a spread tail and I forgot to find out who worships him, but you will see him later on. All their greens are curiously spread and tinged with a gloomy white on all the high spots where the glaze ran thin in the firing. The whole effect is some like Mr Li himself in that you cannot identify it with any thing in your past. Mr Li spent much time in the hotel when we wasnt running out to get the bad eggs and things and so far as I could see he was equally at home with the coolies down stairs and with the young man Yang who was the third on our list and who writes a complete history of all we do and say in a book which he keeps with him, at least he does this excepting when nature gets the better of him and he cuts a lecture like a normal boy which he is. He had a good chance Sunday [13 June 1920] when he came to mine and sat on the back seat to visit it thru and so escaped going to Papa's.
Yang is from Nankin and he said goodbye at the station so we are alone till we meet someone else who is interested in us, or else gets paid for seeming so. Yang is quite bright and has had several prizes for essays and he belongs with little Chen among the bright group at Nankin. They are putting Coeducation in there this summer, with great scandal of course, and Mr Tao has asked me to give a few lectures on the history of essay etc in U.S. and I think maybe I’ll do it. I find it is quite fun to talk to young men, and they will be more numerous than the girls. Besides I like Nankin and none of the foreign missionaries there will give them any thing but hindrance, they are all Mt Holyoke graduates except two from Mich, but some girls from their college are leaders in the coed movement and one is going to be dean of women this summer. In Hangchow the Govt told them at the Normal if they put in Coed the Assembly would cut off their appropriation so Mr Chang, the President is going to open all the classes to visitors. and by this you will see there are a few daring ones in China where it does the nerve and no mistake to do anything for women, or to change much anywhere. Meantime war has broken out in the province of Honan and we may see more interesting things yet. I hear the American ministry (Mr Crane) has protested to the Govt at the arrest of an editor of a liberal paper, the same paper I told you about last summer Mr [Dwight Woodbridge] Edwards is interested in it and it is in some way under the protection of our legation. I hope that protest will make trouble for the Govt. As for Shanghai, you never saw so much silk in your life as you can paw over in the big shops here and it is the most lovely and never wears out. Tonight Columbia men are giving a dinner to Pa, Mr Tong Shao Yi will preside. Did I tell you how his son followed me from one speech to the other when I was here last week, and the second was at a club for women only. He is a charming boy, speak English as we do and is in a Chinese University here. Think of an American boy of 18 following a grandmother to a woman’s club, I suppose he wanted to report it to the students or something. He did it nicely anyway. Evelyn wants me to get some clothes here but as we have no success in getting a maker. Such lovely stuff and no good foreign dressmakers, isn’t it a pity. I look like a meal bag in all their things…

We met a young agriculturist in Nantung who is sure Cornell is the best place. He is engaged in running the station for the famous Chang Bros who own and run the town. It is as it were a Standard Oil town every thing done well or else Mr Chang knows the reason why and acts promptly and efficiently. Mr Chang is old and his son is young and has taught in New York City College, dept of Commerce. He is 23 and has a wife and three children like all good old fashioned Chinese of that advanced age. We saw them when we dined there, a little girl of three with Chinese trousers a Japanese made American dress with an embroidered ruffle at the edge and a beautiful large jewel hung at her neck made a strange makeup for a pretty little girl who read us some hundred or more characters. She learns four new ones each day, that appears to be the allotment in high class families like that. The house is large with several apartments and many servants, fine old curios and other choice things and the ugliest foreign furniture. In fact the foreign furniture of China is something so hopeless in taste that descriptions would mystify even if I had time to give them. Nothing fits anything else anyway and you gradually learn to pick out the beautiful and costly things from an aggregation that seems at first glance to be a gathering together of a second hand shop. They have a very durable varnish from Ningpo which is most useful and covers all the wood work in China and it gives a red color to it all something like our imitation mahogany. As a background it is ruinous in effect, and yet we saw it even in the fine curio shop where we were today, and to me it swore at us all through. In these big shops they keep the most valuable jades and jewels in the family living rooms so we always get glimpses of the ladies and children and ammahs. The ladies always go on combing their hair before the mirrors with their maids helping them. Combing and dressing that hair is a long process and the powder and jewels take time, to say nothing of the finger nails. Paint is used commonly for the face and jewels in the hair and all the rest of the dress surprisingly plain. In summer the thin black gauze skirts hung loosely over the white trousers give a funny appearance to us. The manners at the hotel in Hangchow were enlightening too. Young married couple next to us. She disappears and then reappears in full white pajamas all ready for bed with hair and jewels and fingernails perfect. Then she with hubby in the same costume except the hair and
jewels sits beside her at the edge of the porch upstairs, looking at the lake and cooling themselves with fans till after we go to bed. Our window was on this piazza and no curtain. Getting any privacy in China is a study. I got a little seclusion for my bath in the wash bowl by putting the screen in front of the window, but the room boy would not be interrupted by that if I forgot to lock the door. Water is obtained from said boy by 1st ringing the bell, then pointing to the dirty water in the bowl. He picks up the bowl and goes out after a while coming back with the bowl full of clean water He brings you hot water (or tea if you wish) in a tea pot and leaves it on the table and he brings you a glass of cold water in the same fashion of bringing in the bowl, and he is always on the jump to unlock your door or to go down stairs a long way off and put you in your ricsha, or to bring up food or to dispense any other more original sort of service you may devise for him and he never seems to sleep but always to smile. If you give him a fortune like a silver dollar he smiles till his ear drums crackle.

This house is foreign in stye and very comfortable in the N.Y, sense of that Sometimes I have a picture of the adirondacs suddenly flash into my mind and smell the clean woods and the pine house and the sweet air and wonder how it has ever happened that mother earth has contrived to keep herself so clean and so green on one side when all the bloom is rubbed off her on the other. After all it is these devilish Japanese that worry one. We now hear that the condition attached to the last loan was a concession from the Pekin Govt of the importation of rice to Japan. If this is so and the Chinese PEOPLE find it out there may be sad trouble ahead for the govt and as for that, we hope for the trouble.

I think Ev and I will go up to Soochow tomorrow and from there to Wusih by ourselves and then just go home without waiting to come back to Soochow with Pa, picking up Lucy in Nankin as we go, perhaps stopping there for a little rest. The heat has come tho nights are still cool here, but anyway we must get started if we are to go to Kalgan and get back to start off Ev for the boat at Kobe on the 21st of August. Until we write to the contrary you may consider this our program and we shall commence writing more often now that we can get a chance to sit down and get up of our own volition…

Sunday [20 June 1920] is the day of the Dragon Boat Festival and we shall be in Soochow to see it on the canals there said to be one of the best places in China and a grand old carouse it is with the flower boats and the singsong girls. As yet I have not seen a flower boat, but they are very ancient homes of vice and pleasure Meantime think of the things you want from China and tell them to us. No shirts have come to us but they may be in Pekin) If we can bring you the things we will so it will do no harm to speak of them Evelyn can of course prompt you when she gets back tho she has not seen Canton.

Now I must stop for I have to finish an article on Coed for the Stud magazine of Nankin.

Love and love from mama [DewJ3]

1920.06.16   John Dewey arrived in Xuzhou. [DewJ200]

1920.06.17   John Dewey : Lecture 'The new trend of education' in Xuzhou. [DewJ200]


1920.06.18   John Dewey : Lecture 'Education management and teaching material reform' in Xuzhou. [DewJ200]

1920.06.21   John Dewey arrived in Wuxi via Nanjing, accompanied by Liu Boming and Wang Boqiu and attended the welcome meeting held for him at Wuxi Normal School. [DewJ200]

1920.06.22   John Dewey : Lecture 'Pragmatism' in Wuxi. [DewJ200]
1920.06.22  John Dewey : Lecture 'The problem of social progress'. = She hui jin hua wen ti. Liu Boming interpreter ; Fei Fanju record. [Kee3]


1920.06.23-25  John Dewey : Lectures 'Students' autonomy', 'The school and society', 'The contemporary world and educational trends' in Wuxi. [DewJ200]

1920.06.26  John Dewey left Wuxi and arrived in Suzhou. [DewJ200]

1920.06.27  John Dewey : Lecture 'Aims of educational administration' at the Association of Education in the Ancient Imperial Palace in Suzhou. Zheng Xiaocang interpreter. [DewJ200]

1920.06.28  John Dewey : Lectures 'Industrial education in the special training schools', 'Educational administration' at St. John's Church in Tianci Zhuang, Suzhou. [DewJ200]

1920.06.29  John Dewey : Lectures 'The school and society', 'Education and industry' at Tianci Zhuang, Suzhou. [DewJ200]
The world has been so satiated with extraordinary events in the last few years, that what would have been a miracle five years ago now hardly attracts attention. What a sensation would once have been created by an announcement that Russia was offering to return to China without compensation all Russian interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway, all mining and timber concessions in Manchuria or other Chinese territory; to renounce all extraterritorial rights as well as all further payments of the Boxer indemnity account! Make all the discount you wish on the ground that the offer comes from the Soviet government; and the transformation is still as extraordinary as if the Germans had without war offered France the voluntary return of Alsace-Lorraine and the return of the war indemnity of 1870. In many respects the proposal is even more sensational than that would have been; more indicative of the incredible levity of history. Twenty years ago no one doubted the intention of Russia to control the entire northern part of China and the Asiatic sea coast at least as far south as Tsingtao; and until Russia’s defeat by Japan few doubted the success of her plans.

Read almost any of the books about China written twenty years ago, and you will find that you have only to substitute Japan for Russia, in order to have a fairly accurate description of the situation of today, so far as its spirit is concerned. Geographical details vary, but the objects and general technique of exploitation are the same. Lord Beresford visited China on a commercial mission in 1898. His report is contained in his book on The Break-up of China. In it he says: 'I hardly ever made a suggestion to any prominent Chinese official which I thought might tend to the security of British trade and commerce, that I was not met with the question, 'But what would Russia say to that?' or words to that effect. The idea is gaining ground all over China that Great Britain is afraid of Russia.”

In the Willy-Nicky letters are found the congratulations of the Kaiser to the Tsar upon having established himself as the dominant power in Peking. In the biography of John Hay there is an account of the denials by Cassini, then Russian minister at Washington, of the report of demands made by Russia upon China which were at the expense of other nations as well as of China. The denials were positive. At the same time Hay, as Secretary of State, was in possession from three different capitals of transcripts of the demands. One might readily imagine that he was reading the diplomatic history of the Twenty-one Demands. Both the wholesale critics of Japan and the wholesale apologists for her would probably change their tone if they realized how closely copied after the Tsarism of Russia is the imperialism of Japan.

The imitative capacity of the Japanese is notorious. Is there anything surprising that Japan should have followed in the wake of Russia in that feature of foreign policy which is most vital to her—the control of China? I have not the slightest doubt that the great part of the militarists and bureaucrats who have dictated her Chinese policy sincerely believe, with the pattern of Russia always before their eyes, that they are conforming strictly to the proper models of western diplomacy. Wholesale bribery, secrecy, force and fraud were regular parts of the Oriental diplomacy of Russia. It is natural for Japanese officials to believe that the outcry from America or England against similar methods on the part of Japan, is purely hypocritical or else itself a part of the regular diplomatic game. The more thoroughly the history of the international relations of China for the last twenty years is studied the more apparent is it that Japan has been the heir of Russian aims and methods as well as of, since the great war, Russian achievements. It was Russia that evolved the technique of conquest by railway and bank. She consolidated if she did not wholly originate the sphere of influence politics with its favoritism and its dog-in-the-manger tactics. Russia discovered the value of police boxes as a means of insinuating semi-military and semi-civil administrative control in territory over which her legitimate claims, stretched to the utmost, were purely economic. Many of the Twenty-one Demands are almost verbatim copies of prior Russian requests, such as the exclusive right to train the army, etc. Russia evolved to the uttermost the doctrine of military occupation as a means of protecting nationals. She posed as the protector of China against ‘western’ Powers, and prided herself (strangely enough with better reason and more success than Japan) upon understanding Chinese psychology, and knowing how to manage the Chinese. In the secret Cassini protocol made at St. Petersburg in
1896 with Li Hung Chang (the prototype of Chinese statesmen bought with foreign money) will be found the magna charta of subsequent Japanese diplomacy. It even includes a conditional provision for the Russian naval and military occupation of Kiaochou Bay. In the earlier period of Chino-Russian-Japanese relations, that is up to the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, Japan could use in good faith the claim of self-defense in her dealings with China. For certainly Russia with her enormous undeveloped territory had much less excuse for aggression in Korea and northern China than had Japan. Moreover, every new aggressive step of Russia in China was followed at once by demands for compensating concessions and spheres by other Powers, especially by Great Britain and France. There is every reason for thinking that Germany's claim to Kiaochou was stimulated by Russia to give a colorable pretext to her claim for Port Arthur and Dalny, while the yielding of China in both these matters was immediately followed by demands from Great Britain in the Yangtze region and from France in the south. This was the period which gave Beresford's book its title of Break-up though he himself was an ardent expositor of the doctrine of the Open Door. And it was this situation which enabled Japan in reasonable good faith to set herself up as the defender of the integrity and sovereignty of China against European aggression. Such feelings and claims have a remarkable historic inertia. There is nothing surprising in the fact that they still persist among the mass of the Japanese people, and supply the conditions which enable Japan to continue a policy of aggressive exploitation of China with popular support and sanction. There was a time when the Japanese had every reason to feel that their future destiny depended upon getting enough power to control China as the only sure way to keep China from falling into European hands. Times have changed; the sentiment of the Japanese people lags behind the change in facts and can still be exploited by the militarist party. And in the meantime (especially after the outbreak of the great war) Japan's own policy became less and less defensive and more and more flagrantly offensive.

If there had been in the United States an adequate knowledge of Russian diplomatic methods in their Oriental aspect and in their bearing upon Japan's fortunes and her Asiatic aims and methods, American gullibility would never have fallen an easy victim to Japan's propaganda for western consumption. As it was, American ignorance secured almost universal approval for the Portsmouth Treaty with its 'supplementary clauses' which in spite of their innocent appearance meant that the settlement was really a truce concluded at the expense of China's rights in Manchuria. One foreign publicist in China is inclined to hold President Roosevelt responsible for China's international ills since 1905. He takes the ground that he ought to have insisted that since the war had been practically fought on Chinese territory, China should have been a party to the settlement, and that the peace conference was the one great opportunity for effective foreign protection of China against both aggressors. As a matter of fact, the actual outcome was certainly to make both Russia and Japan interested in trading with each other at China's expense. If it had not been for Great Britain's navy, it would doubtless have long ago led to a definite Russo-Japanese understanding regarding the division of northern China. But hindsight is proverbially easy, and it must be doubted whether President Roosevelt is to blame for a lack of foresight which no one else possessed at that date. All this matter is by way of merely sketching the background of the next important epoch probable in Chinese foreign relations. It is not likely that China will accept the Soviet's offer in its present form. It is not probable the Allies will permit it even if China wanted to assume the risks of such a course. But none the less the offer symbolizes the opening of a new era. Even if the present Russian government is overthrown, any new government that takes its place will have every reason for coming to some good understanding with China. After all, their territories are contiguous for three thousand miles. Both countries are on a continental scale. Japan, when all is said and done, is an island, and the history of insular conquests on a continent afford no very good augury for Japan's future success in Asia. The Siberian situation is still confused. But to all appearances the Japanese militarist party that favors a forward policy of adventure in Siberia is for the time being dominant. China can again chuckle about the Providence that always seems to come to her rescue when things are at the worst. The Russians are not pacifists; they are still expansive, and they have an enormous
land hunger, due to the agrarian history of Russia. The deeper the Japanese get themselves involved in Siberia, the surer, in Chinese opinion, is her final checkmate, even though for some years she may get virtual possession of Eastern Siberia even up to Lake Baikal. There is much to be said for the belief that China's international future is to be decided in Siberia. The situation shifts rapidly. The idea, already broached privately, of an armed conflict between Japan on one side and Russia, Korea and China on the other, may have nothing in it. But whether Russia returns to monarchy or becomes an established republic, it seems a safe prophecy that China's Russian relations will be the ultimate decisive factor in her international status. The diversion of Japan from China into Siberia probably marks the culmination of her influence in China. It is not improbable that the last five years will soon, as history counts years, be looked back upon as the years of China's nightmare. [DewJ23]

1920.06.30 John Dewey returns to Shanghai. [DewJ200]
1920.07.03 Remer, C.F. John Dewey in China [ID D28542]. The first impression that one gets, who tries to arrive at the Chinese estimate of Dewey, is an impression that has been cleverly connected by a Chinese university professor with the second character that is used to represent Dewey's name in Chinese. The second character means 'awe-inspiring'. One who talks with many Chinese about Professor Dewey long enough to get past the first statements that 'Professor Dewey's thoughts are very deep', soon comes upon this feeling of awe. A whole number of the magazine, 'The new education' [Xin jiao yu], was devoted to the educational and philosophical ideas of Professor Dewey. The writers, who are the most capable of any Chinese in the country to so, undertake no critical analysis of Dewey's teachings. After some search no attempt is discoverable on the part of anyone to make such a critical analysis. No one has attempted to distinguish between the ideas of Professor Dewey that was useful in China today and those that are not useful. No one has raised a voice to say that they may be harmful. But it is perhaps too soon to find any further effect than the first one. The Chinese are too polite to subject the ideas of a guest to critical analysis when he is still a guest.
Professor Dewey, by means of his lectures which are interpreted as they are given, has reached thousands of Chinese. These lectures are translated into Chinese and are published in the leading magazines and newspapers of the country. These printed lectures are carefully studied by many. [Kee3,DewJ84]
1920.07-09 John Dewey stays at Beidaihe beach. [DewJ3]
1920.07.09  John Dewey: Lecture 'The organization of student government'. = Xue sheng zi zhi di zu zhi.
Pan Shenwen, Zheng Xiaozang interpreter; Chen Dan, Shen Binggui recorder. In : Xue deng; July 9 (1920). [Kee3]

1920.07.10  Remer, C.F. John Dewey's responsibility for American opinion [ID D28542].
Dewey's thought [about China] is not of the apologetic sort; it is experimental. This makes him a liberal thinker in the true sense; there is an air of freedom and hope about him. He does not, as many do, pay lip service to liberalism while his mind is set upon the main chance and safety first. Dewey has helped the people of the United States to get a fair and honest appreciation of the activities of the Chinese and should be honored as a true servant of his country and of the people of his time. [DewJ2:S. 82]


1920.07.18  Letter from Evelyn Dewey to Alice Chipman Dewey
Sunday, [July 18, 1920?]
Dear mamma,
Lucy is going to Peitaho to-night after all with the Cranes of course. I think dad would have liked to go along but they did not have room I guess. Rich Chinese are fleeing the city the Wagon Lits is crowded and any one in the quarter can get rich renting rooms. The North East gate is closed and every one has laid in a few extra supplies of food. But of course everything is a peaceful and quiet as can be. The trains to Kalgan are not running to-day, and soldiers and ammunition supposed to be coming from Mukden, we saw some soldiers coming in from Nan Yuan this morning, but there are not many around the streets, there is martial law and everyone is supposed to be home by mid-night. There are 150 sailors at our Legation "on a sight seeing tour". The paper says there will be fighting in Soochow and maybe Nankin, but you probably have your own batch of rumors and news there. Yesterday we went to a temple in the Western hills, but didnt see a thing, the barracks by the summer palace seemed more deserted than usual. We have given up going to Tan Che Sse, partly because the trains arent running there as the station is one of the places where they are concentrating troupes, and partly because if anything is going to be here we wanted to stay and see it. It is hot and Dad seems to mind it, but I dont nearly so much as when it is damp, it is clouding up now and looks like rain again, there is some breeze in the house and we have been able to sleep, but there is no denying that it is very hot, We havs had only one short letter from you., but suppose we will hear shortly. The last letters to Kalgan have not brought any news yet. We had dinner with the Cranes Friday night and they were coming here to night. My ticket home was gotten thru Yokahama which is why there is no record of it in Shanghai. There was no more news from home except Freds letter which we sent you. We are going to send word to Suh Hu to have his wife brought here if trouble should really start, and George has already asked if he can bring Susan [Wan], so we may have a maternity hospital in our own little tenement. Somehow it is quite impossible to belive that anything will happen.
Remember that Richard Smith has gone to Nanking for the summer, and Mr. Crane says a U.S. gun boat will go up the river to take people out if the trains stop or fighting begins. I only hope nithing happens to prevent your getting away when you want to.
Much love Eve [DewJ3]
Dear Fred.

This is your birthday and I am wishing you many happy ones. I wonder if you are celebrating it as seriously as I am. I had hopes of getting off to Peking by the Saturday boat from Shanghai, a slow way but the only now. Co write no room leaf, So I at once sent a letter asking them when I could go and asking for room on the boat which leaves tomorrow. As yet no letter at all. Also wire sent to Peking was not rec there as I know by receiving promptly from them a wire asking for my plans, No leatter has come from them since the stoppage of trains and I have no idea whether on nt my letters have got thru to them. I could tak it all very philosophically if it were not for Evelyn coming leave. I hope they have gone up to Kalgan without me, but it may be they are waiting in an uncertainty equal to mine, Kalgan is so near to Pek I think they will go as I wrote and also wired to them to do. It is two weeks ago yesterday since they left here and if they do not go to Kalgan now Ev will be unable to stay long enough to make it pay. Tko add to my irritation here we have a servant in this house who causes a lot of trouble thru his hopeless stupidity and it was to him I gave the letters to mail last saturday. I think I shall go down to Shanghai which I do not want to see at all in any case this afternoon. It is seven or eight hours depending on the train and I should remain there till I can get place on the boat. I culld stay at the missionary home which is cheap and one gets every possible help about attending to things. A there is no danger now in Shnaghia, but all the old settlers here asay I must not attempt to go to Peking by rail even if the chance comes. Four of these devils of Tuchuns are now fighting over and around and about that road and they think almost any thing might happen to me if I tried it. Then they say go to the consul, and they know the consul would simply repeat that advice. Nankin is perfectly quiet except for the summer school and the constant moving of ammunition. The summer school disturbance is due to the bumptiousness of the boys who are some of them mad becase the 60 girls have been assigned to front seats in the classes and also because they are claiming that right to dictate to their profs which has been preeety common here since the students organized. It seems a kind of frontier bossism. They burnded one man out of his class and some of them ordered the girls out of the seats saying they could not stand up, the idea seemed to be if any one stood it must naturally be the women. There are 63 women and nearly 700 men. N the latest, on account of the tie up Suh Hu and his friend Mr Tao, both of Peking Govt University, have not come down to take thier classes. Su Hu [Hu Shi] is the most popular man in China and about 700 students have elected their course especially on the literary revolution. This forenoon Mr Tao the dean of Summer School here expects a delegaation of student to call on him officially to demand the delivery of these men. Poor Mr Tao is the most active man in China one might say and devoted as active and last night he was about to send a man to Peking to take care of these two families and to drive the men down here I told him not to do that for I could accomplish as much as any such delegate and I would go up today, I mean on tomorrows boat. He has been sending special telegrams and I rather think the men may be ob the way, but on the other hand they may not be, for suh Hu at least is apt to decide things for himself in his own way. Whether they will break up this now-nice summer school in consequence remains to be seen. I do hnot think they will for I think in the end the students will give up. Shu Hu's [Hu Shi] wife is to have a baby about the first of August. He has told me several times the baby was expected in June which did seem impossible and I fancy they have just waked up to the reality of the situation, that is he has. He was not present when the first child was born, but she was at that time with her family. I cant make many guesses tho I know he does not let family affairs interfere with his business so far a I can se in any other matters. It seems that mr Tao's house has been entered by robbers already and Mr Nanking Tao [Tao Hsing-chih] thinks his young wife and baby ought to be put under foreign protection. In all these matters I could be of as much use as any other foreigner and have already written pap to take care of these epople. I fancly the situation there is tense. Tho the legations gave official warning at first that no fighting must occur within ten miles of the walls of Peking, still one can not be sur[e] that all China will not go up in the air again, tho I dont think it will. [page torn] scared and these officials are afraid both of the
people and of the foreigners and I dont think they will try to drive out the foreigners again. If they should yu mght be sure they were helped by the Japanese but I dont think there is any hiding place big enough to conceal even the J in such an attempt. Not that they would hesitate to use the Chinese in that way as well as in others if they felt safe in doing it that they would not be discovered. The union and the sympathy between the Americans and the Chinese can not be doubted and it will count for much in this crisis. Our news is insufficient but keeps up all the time and is perhaps accurate. There is somehing of a check both in the foreign influence and in the fear of the Tuchuns for each other, But there is not one Tuchun in China who has yet waked up to the fact that China is a part of the world. Some of the believe it is the whole thing just as the Mnachus used to and the present Dictator Tuan Jui Jei is one of these ignorant tyrants, who smoke opium and can not think in international terms, to use mr Sweetmans favorite expression. Meantime they just juggle with their country, on money borrowed from Japn and cherish a hope of coming out on top and being made an dictator or Emperor as Yuan Shi Kai was. Thier rule would be even shorter than Yuans if by any throw of the dice they bring that about. For all this all the schools and all the industries in China and most of the 400,000,000 wait and suffer until the spectacle is incredible. If any one of the large influences could be shifted, if the Jps could bt thrown out especially, it would all change, It is easy to see how the Japs are gaining ground minute by minute on this system. China is like a ball in the air and the first one who catches is the best man in the game as it is now.

It is surely maddening to sit here as I am now, tho there has been some compensations in the expra things I have been able to do for the girls in the summer school Having them in the same yard with myself and seeing them often has set up some real connection.

[Alice Chipman Dewey] [DewJ3]
1920.07.19,20 Letter from Alice Chipman Dewey to Dewey family
On the train to Shanghai. | [July 19, 1920]
You see uch funny sights the crooked willows making a fringy background for the dark green lotus fronds and the snow white blossoms and all reflected back in the water and then a lovely ornamented moon bridge over the dragon like pond that wander round thru the rice fields after the rains and what really makes you laugh, the huge water buffalo walking on the earth at the bottom of these muddy rainpools with his back and his nose and his horns which look like the dead branches of trees sticking up and his old grey sides shine like silver when he comes out of the water unwillingly driven by the naked water colored boy on his back all the Yangste color except the lovely green which covers this part of China more than any other. and junks on the canals and it seems funny to see telephon poles set in these rice fields hen off in teh distance bald looking pagodas with all their curls dropped off from age mark the tops of little hills. The men and women are going ut the rows of rice plants with long bamboo handles on the hoes, handles longer than fishpoles and the ends shake as if the wind blew them in the hands of the hoers. The hoes are broader than any you eve saw and they work with them all day standing with thir leges in the deep water of the rice fields, half way up to their knees. There are no passengers except a few Chinese young men and they do what they always do in the heat slouch about in their underclothes with the clean linen or silk coats folded up on the seats and they sleep or eat. Mostly their underclothes are dirty in spite of th beautiful coats, It is second class so we have clean rattan instead of dirty hot plush of the first, and the mercury is somewhere between 90 and 100. All the land is used, every inch, the beans are beginning to yellow at the bottom of the stalks and the cotton is getting up high and taro is very decorative, so are the slender strawstacks tall and straight ad every now and then the unfertile mounds of the graves put the dead in place of life, There are soe cows here mostly led by little girls between the rows of crops to browse. Pigs in China le in the corner of the vegetable gardens and eat the weeds on the oter edge, never showing wheteher they like human food or not. There are many trees even the hills being sometimes covered with small ones. I am trying to fill up with green since I am going to Peking.—if I can.
Shanghia. July 20th [1920]
Room 29 of the missionary home is up under the roof but the breeze blows thru from the long hall and I have had a good sleep. The house is full of missionaries starting home on furlough so there are swarms of children. It is interesting to get up against a bunch of people whose experiences are quite different from our own altho the same. I sat at the table with some Episcopalians, I know from the tone of voice such rolling and such charitable abuse of Wilsons admin was worth coming for. I am very anxious about getting off but I am sitting here instead of in the boat office because Mr Lee of the Y.M.CA. just called me up and insisted that Mr Sweetman had written him last night and he would do the errand for me. I feeel it is probably a mistake to allow of any intervention since no one wants me to get to Peking quite so badly as I do myself adn since Mr sweetman in particular has ideas that he ought to do all this for me 'as if I were his mother' but since I shall not have to wait very long for him I said thank you. If he upsets the whole pie because of what he thinks an old lady ought to do I shall simply have to start over again later. I can go the Consuls office and if I cant get off today there is another boat on another line on Thursday. One difficulty in Nanking was that Sweetman has not been about China as much as I have but he felt it was his duty to give very positive advice. The kindness of epople is very sincere here but it is sometimes emphatic and almost interfereing. I have been reading yesterdays paper and find the fighting is severe near Peking but the whole look of things is hopeful since the worst influences are on the lose and tho the winners are bad they will have to come a little nearer to the people.
I wish you could see the head of this place, picture of the pious spinster tall, and angular with high neck dress and a prim way of talking, one real authority. It is a pleasure to be here in no way for it is real old fashioned housekeeping calen and bare and enough simple good food, so if I have to wait a few days I shall ask to be kept here. Plenty of baths and all at a price which I understand is much less than the regular hotels. The table and the managemnet is like the old fashioned American Boardinghouse.
[Alice Chipman Dewey] [DewJ3]

1920.07.29,30 Letter from Lucy Dewey to Dewey family

Peking, July 29, 1920

Dear Family,

Here I am back in Pekin and a wonderful time I had getting here. I left Peitaiho Sunday night with Mr [John Earl] Baker as I knew that if I ever could get thru it would be with him. I dont know whether I told you that he got thru the only train to Tientsin in days just by talking to the railroad men. Miss Boynton came with me and a giddy journey we had. The train at the junction was three hours late so we finally got on at one thirty a.m. Along about three a poor long suffering English friend of Mr Bakers, who also works for the railroad, found one berth for the two of us, so we each got two hours sleep in that. It was enough to get us thru, tho. When we got to Tientsin the Pekin train was nearly ready to start, all packed full. The cars had been resurrected from the ark, the paint was peeling off and the dirt of ages had settled on them. Mr Baker went ahead on the military train and we tried to persuade him to take us on that with him but had no luck. There were four of us in a compartment designed for two, but fortunately the other two were nice Americans and helped to pass the time very nicely. It took us seven hours to get here. The usual time is three. It was terribly hot and most unintersting. There was nothing along the road to indicate that there had been any excitement there. Even at the stations where there was the most fighting there were no signs of it. The fields werent even trampled over nor nothing. At a couple of stations near Pekin there were troops encamped and we passed a few troop trains. The nearest approach to excitement was when they kept us waiting twenty minutes outside the city wall, but they didnt come thru the train. Fortunately Miss Boynton and I had had lunches given us in Peitaiho and we fed ourselves and three other poor wonderers. We finally got to Pekin about four and it certainly loked good. I dont think I have ever been so hot and dirty in my life before……

Did I tell you I have a wonderful scheme for going home next year? Mr and Mrs Zucker of the Rockefeller are planning to go and I am inviting myself along. The idea is to go to Kalgan and from there on horseback with a caravan to Urga in outer Mongolia. Ive been crazy to see Urga ever since I got over here, its the capital city of Mongolia and Mongolian Lamaism, theres a living Buddha there and all sorts of things. From Urga, also on horse, to Kikaxhta on the Lake of Baikal and thence by the trans-Siberian across Europe and home……

Politics continue complicated, interesting, and uncertain. The US English and French Legations have come to an open break with the Japenes over the question of the right of asylum to the Chinese political offenders. The first three have agreed no to take in any male refugees but the Japs refuse to agree. The natural inference is that they have some one there already and suspicion centers strongly on Little Hsu, the man every one in China is looking for. He disappeared mysteriously off the face of the earth about a week ago and the pass word around Peking now is, Where is Little Hsu? and the answer I wish I knew. The victorious patriots want his head and I dont wonder that he wants to keep himself under cover. I am rapidly melting down into the chair and soon will be so thoroly melded Ill never be able to get up, so I think Ill stop before that sad fact is accomplished.

Lots of love to all. Lucy [DewJ3]
Letter from John Dewey to Dewey family
135 Morrison St Peking Aug 1 [1920]
Dear children,
I dont know whether this will reach you before Evelyn does or not; she is packing up altho her steamer doesnt leave Yokahama till the 20th. Mrs Crane telegraphed that she has found a four room bugalow at Peitaho and we are going there as soon as we can, which hurries Ev packing. But also she has difficulty in getting a boat to Japn, I dont know whether that is ordinary travel or whether it means that political refugees from the defeated party are flocking to Japan. The a"war" seems quite over. Yesterday pictures of little Hsu and others of the Anfu leaders appeared on the streets with rewards for their captures from twenty to fifty thousand each—at the same time the school teachers havent got any pay since May April, including university profs. Two weeks ago today it was that posters—without photos—were up offering rewards for the heads of the men who are now on top, and six weeks ago they seemed entrenched as masters of China—which bears out what was said of olden time, You never can tell. The Chinese awe know are pleased but not elated. They are glad to see one gang overthrown but arent sure the next one wont be about as bad, fthey they think each overthrow brings nearer the time when the people will be sufficiently educated to get control of things. However the present victory they regard as merely negativ except in one respect, the declone of Japnese influence The Japanese trained troops couldn't and wouldn't fight, the japanese shells were duds, and the whole elaborate political structure they had built up collapsed like a childs card house. It isnt very logical to argue from these things to the weakness of the Japanese, but the officials at least had never been intimidated and hypmostized by the belief in the Japanese superman, and now all of a sudden that prestige disappears. This doesnt mean that may not get hold of officialdom again but I dont believe there will be the feeling of their omniscience and omnipotence again. The rhing crumbled too easily. As one military man told me the people were hostile to the Js on acct of Shantung, and now the generals dont believe in them any more. I still believe that we got the right impression before we left Japan that they are badly overextended economically, politcallyy and even militarily to say nothing of diplomatically, and the shrinkage to normal size is bound to come…
Love to everybody Dad [DewJ3]

John Dewey leaves Beijing. [DewJ8]
1920.08.19  Letter from Alice Chipman Dewey to Albert C. Barnes
Pietaho Beach, China, | August 19th, 1920.

Dear Mr Barnes…

We are in a wonderful place here, out of that burning furnace of Peking where all life is just a struggle to breathe during these hot weeks. Mrs Crane gave us this house, wiring to me a few nights after I succeeded in running the gauntlet of Chang Tso Lin's soldiery who were almost blocking the line from Tiensin to Peking. It is was like a cup of water in the desert to get the hope of escaping, for Peitaho is crowded and expensive during these two months, and we came as soon as Evelyn could get her trunks packed. We live on the beach right in the sand and we look night and day, and listen to the white surf rolling from this blue water. The stars and the new moon are the objects of our adoration and our backs are turned to a corn field which is between us and the moving world of foreigners. Among all the strange experiences of China, this American life of luxury and ease and laziness emphasizes all the others.

I am sorry you are so sure you can't come to China. It is thrilling and reconstructive and revolutionary and reorganizing to know of a place where one can get nothing except the confirmation of the vague suppositions we call originality and realize that after all every thing is experience, experience we are feeling for in the newer world. Having that new world become remote, and this the real one, knowing the 'dead past' is not past at all, but simply the base on which we are resting our air castles, moving not so much in space as in time, having a ricksha man pull you two thousand years into that past in half an hour, realizing that one province here has as many people as the whole U.S. and that province no schools except a few elementary ones such as the missionaries have been able to start, and at the same time the province most representative of the most enduring of nations, understanding how wealth depends on poverty and so well knows that dependence, one can go on indefinitely. Perhaps you will be interested to know what we have just found out privately, that the soldiers in the recent struggle left about 800,000 people, destitute in this year of famine, and the government does not even find a way to give them food to keep off starvation, nor seed to plant for next years wheat and the foreigners here are getting money together to feed them immediately. Many of them are under the shelter of rocks in the mountains and most of them have the walls of their mud huts left to them, all their animals are gone to the war, they neither ask for food nor expect it, and the head of the agricultural experiment station who is also head of the Government relief is at present trying without success to borrow money on their land to buy seed for them... All their trees, the most precious things in China are lying on the ground, cut for the trenches of the Wu Pei fu soldiers, After the battle the looting left them not a pot nor a pan nor a bit of bedding, only the clothes on their backs, and this new government cannot even give them food; and the generals reply the animals have already been distributed and could not be returned without too great difficulty. All this is in a region round one city and sixty miles from Peking. Rates of interest at the banks that will take risks on the land, the land being as you know the surest security in China, are sometimes as low as 16% a month, but more often as high as 30% per month. The good farmer has about three mo of land under his control. In good years each mo yields 3½ bushels of wheat and the second crop I don't know about, but it is less than the first in value. For the propagation of poverty the genius of this country can hardly be outdone in India. Meantime, here, in this resort, the great houses of the officials are being built and the officials discuss eugenics and other modern doctrines, while the latest concubine exhibits the newest baby, as happened a few days ago during the call of a foreigner.

The undue length of this letter is result of its being the first one of the morning, but I am sorry you won't come to China with your psychology, for this China is a question for that science. I didn't show your letter to the professor.

With regards, A. C. Dewey [DewJ3]
Letter from John Dewey to Albert C. Barnes
Peitaho Sept 12 [1920]
Dear Barnes, …
We are going back to Peking on the 14th, as the university is opening, and Lucy as well as myself is going to teach this year, or rather she is going to teach and Im going to continue lecturing. The political upheaval has brought into the ministry of edn about the best man that ever held that job, a man who is a great friend of all our friends, and whom I saw considerable of last year. Last I heard however the teachers hadn't been paid since April, and I dont know whether he has succeeded in getting money. The new govt announced that in finances the schools would come first, but that is easier to say than do. In the old, they were a bad last, hardly in the running at all. Last year I was paid by private societies, but this year by the Govt University, so I have a personal interest in govt finance. The societies are getting Bertrand Russell over, I think the same societies that financed me last year. My star such as it was will set. This isn't a modest remark, nor a protective reaction. The students' interest has been broadening out naturally and properly from the intense interest in education which marked them last year to general social questions, and upon the whole B Russells writings are more popular than anybody elses— I don't ubt [w. caret] if Hobson is even known by name. It is said that fifteen thousands of the English edition of Roads to Freedom have been sold in Japan, and he is the great hero of radical thought in China. The whole temper among the younger generation is revolutionary, they are so sick of their old institutions that they assume any change will be for the better—the more extreme and complete the change, the better. And they seem to me to have little idea of the difficulties in the away [ink del.] of any constructive change. Bertrand Russell's somewhat detached and mathematical way of proposing ideal reforms accordingly makes an immense appeal. The students in Peking are getting ready to start a Bertrand Russell magazine. Quite independently of R. and his influence, this is a wonderful chance to study the psychology of revolutionary idealism—if I could only read Chinese. I never realized before the meaning of the background we unconsciously carry around with us as a standard of criticism. Not having any such background as to modern institutions, to the liberals here anything is likely to be as true and valuable as anything else, only provided only it is different. The more extreme, the more likely upon the whole. Since the Chinese family system for example badly needs reform, the family ought to be completely done away with, promiscuous relations between the sexes set up of course they can hardly speak to one another now and all children cared for by public authorities. This is a little extreme instance, but there is a good deal of this sort of thing. Then every official is ex officio an object of fear and dread in China, his main function being to squeeze the people. Hence altho a good central govt is a necessity at present for reasons of internal development of railways, schools etc, as well as for external defense, anarchism is very strong. I see the Japanese indulge in considerable propaganda about the dangers from Bolshevism in China unless Japan makes a bulwark or whatever it is now fashionable to call it. Technical Bolshevism there is no basis for here, either economic certainly not industrial and only to a slight extent agrarian, tho the latter is growing by from the rapacity of the military governors. But psychological Bolshevism is fairly intense in the educated minority, especially if they have not been educated abroad, also among those educated in France. Japanese writers try to attribute the growth of radical thought in China to Russian propaganda, I think sincerely, as the Japanese cannot really imagine any indigenous intellectual movement, especially in despised China. I suppose there is Russian propaganda tho I've run across no signs of any, but it is certainly a negligible factor. Of course the general influence of the fact of the Russian revolution was great, just as was that of the worldwar in general. The in trying to find some good in the outcome of the war, one can at least count to the credit side as a big item the overthrow of Prussian and autocratic prestige. Its effect in the Orient is certainly enormous even if we at home have got more or leess Prussianized. I hope you approved of the psychology of my article on How Reaction Helps. I have thot over that matter a good deal, I shall write about [Laurence L.] Burmeyers article after getting back to Peking. My mind is still to full of the small book Im writing to do justice to it, tho I've read it acoupla times.
Sincerely yours, J Dewey

Dear Sir,

We are very glad to have the greatest social philosopher of world to arrive here in China, so as to salve the Chronic deseases of the thought of Chinese Students. Since 1919, the student's circle seems to be the greatest hope of the future of China; as they are ready to welcome to have revolutionary era in the society of China. In that year, Dr John Dewey had influenced the intellectual class with great success.

But I dare to represent most of the Chinese Students to say a few words to you:

Although Dr Dewey is successful here, but most of our students are not satisfied with his conservative theory. Because most of us want to acquire the knowledge of Anarchism, Syndicalism, Socialism, etc.; in a word, we are anxious to get the knowledge of the social revolutionary philosophy. We are the followers of Mr Kropotkin, and our aim is to have anarchical society in China. We hope you, Sir, to give us fundamentally the thorough Social philosophy, based on Anarchism. Moreover, we want you to recorrect the theory of Dr Dewey, the American Philosopher. We hope you have the absolute freedom in China, not the same as in England. So we hope you to have a greater success than Dr Dewey here.

I myself am old member of the Peking Govt. University, and met you in Shanghai many times, the first time is in 'The Great Oriental Hotel', the first time of your reception here, in the evening.

The motto, you often used, of Lao-Tzu ought to be changed in the first word, as 'Creation without Possession…' is better than the former translative; and it is more correctly according to what you have said 'the creative impulsive and the possessive impulse'. Do you think it is right?

Your Fraternally Comrade Johnson Yuan (Secretary of the Chinese Anarchist-Communist Association). [Russ9]
Even in America we have heard of one Chinese revolution, that which thrust the Manchu dynasty from the throne. The visitor in China gets used to casual references to the second revolution, that which frustrated Yuan Shih-kai's aspirations to be emperor, and the third, the defeat in 1917 of the abortive attempt to put the Manchu boy emperor back into power. And within the last few weeks the (September 1920) fourth upheaval has taken place. It may not be dignified by the name of the fourth revolution, for the head of the state has not been changed by it. But as a manifestation of the forces that shape Chinese political events, for evil and for good, perhaps this last disturbance surpasses the last two 'revolutions' in significance. Chinese politics in detail are highly complicated, a mess of personalities and factions whose oscillations no one can follow who does not know a multitude of personal, family and provincial histories. But occasionally something happens which simplifies the tangle. Definite outlines frame themselves out of the swirling crisscross of strife, intrigue and ambition. So, at present, the complete collapse of the Anfu clique which owned the central government for two years marks the end of that union of internal militarism and Japanese foreign influence which was, for China, the most marked fruit of the war. When China entered the war a 'War Participation' army was formed. It never participated; probably it was never meant to. But its formation threw power wholly into the hands of the military clique, as against the civilian constitutionalists. And in return for concessions, secret agreements relating to Manchuria, Shantung, new railways, etc., Japan supplied money, munitions, instructors for the army and a benevolent supervision of foreign and domestic politics. The war came to an unexpected and untimely end, but by this time the offspring of the marriage of the militarism of Yuan Shih-kai and Japanese money and influence was a lusty youth. Bolshevism was induced to take the place of Germany as a menace requiring the keeping up of the army, and loans and teachers. Mongolia was persuaded to cut her strenuous ties with Russia, to renounce her independence and come again under Chinese sovereignty.

The army and its Japanese support and instruction was, accordingly, continued. In place of the 'War Participation' army appeared the 'Frontier Defense' army. Marshal Tuan, the head of the military party, remained the nominal political power behind the presidential chair, and General Hsu (commonly known as little Hsu, in distinction from old Hsu, the president) was the energetic manager of the Mongolian adventure which, by a happy coincidence, required a bank, land development companies and railway schemes, as well as an army. About this military centre as a nucleus gathered the vultures who fed on the carrion. This flock took the name of the Anfu Club. It did not control the entire cabinet, but to it belonged the Minister of Justice, who manipulated the police and the courts, persecuted the students, suppressed liberal journals and imprisoned inconvenient critics. And the Club owned the ministers of finance and communications, the two cabinet places that dispense revenues, give out jobs and make loans. It also regulated the distribution of intelligence by mail and telegraph. The reign of corruption and despotic inefficiency, tempered only by the student revolt, set in. In two years the Anfu Club got away with two hundred millions of public funds directly, to say nothing of what was wasted by incompetency and upon the army. The Allies had set out to get China into the war. They succeeded in getting Japan into control of Peking and getting China, politically speaking, into a seemingly hopeless state of corruption and confusion. The militaristic or Pei-Yang party was, however, divided into two factions, each called after a province. The Anwhei party gathered about little Hsu and was almost identical with the Anfus. The Chili faction had been obliged, so far as Peking was concerned, to content itself with such leavings as the Anfu Club tossed to it. Apparently it was hopelessly weaker than its rival, although Tuan, who was personally honest and above financial scandal, was supported by both factions and was the head of both. About three months ago there were a few signs that, while the Anfu Club had been entrenching itself in Peking, the rival faction had been quietly establishing itself in the provinces. A league of Eight Tuchuns (military governors of the provinces) came to the assistance of the president against some unusually strong pressure from the Anfu Club. In spite of the fact that the military governor of the three Manchurian provinces, Chang Tso Lin, popularly known as the Emperor of Manchuria, lined up with this league, practically nobody expected anything except some maneuvering to get a larger share...
of the spoils. But late in June the president invited Chang Tso Lin to Peking. The latter saw Tuan, told him that he was surrounded by evil advisers, demanded that he cut loose from little Hsu and the Anfu Club, and declared open war upon little Hsu—the two had long and notoriously been bitter enemies. Even then people had great difficulty in believing that anything would happen except another Chinese compromise. The president was known to be sympathetic upon the whole with the Chili faction, but the president, if not a typical Chinese, is at least typical of a certain kind of Chinese mandarin, non-resistant, compromising, conciliating, procrastinating, covering up, evading issues, face-saving. But finally something happened. A mandate was issued dismissing little Hsu from office, military and civil, dissolving the frontier defense corps as such, and bringing it under the control of the Ministry of War (usually armies in China belong to some general or Tuchun, not to the country). For almost forty-eight hours it was thought that Tuan had consented to sacrifice little Hsu and that the latter would submit, at least temporarily. Then with equally sensational abruptness Tuan brought pressure to bear on the president. The latter was appointed head of a national defense army, and rewards were issued for the heads of the chiefs of the Chili faction, nothing, however, being said about Chang Tso Lin, who had meanwhile returned to Mukden and who still professed allegiance to Tuan. Troops were mobilized; there was a rush of officials and of the wealthy to the concessions of Tientsin and to the hotels of the legation quarter.

This sketch is not meant as history, but simply as an indication of the forces at work. Hence it is enough to say that two weeks after Tuan and little Hsu had intimidated the president and proclaimed themselves the saviors of the Republic, they were in hiding, their enemies of the Chili party were in complete control of Peking, and rewards from fifty thousand dollars down were offered for the arrest of little Hsu, the ex-ministers of justice, finance and communications, and other leaders of the Anfu Club. The political turnover was as complete as it was sensational. The seemingly impregnable masters of China were impotent fugitives. The carefully built up Anfu Club, with its military, financial and foreign support, had crumbled and fallen. No country at any time has ever seen a political upheaval more sudden and more thoroughgoing. It was not so much a defeat as a dissolution like that of death, a total disappearance, an evaporation.

Corruption had worked inward, as it has a way of doing. Japanese-bought munitions would not explode; quartermasters vanished with the funds with which stores were to be bought; troops went without anything to eat for two or three days; large numbers, including the larger part of one division, went over to the enemy en masse; those who did not desert had no heart for fighting and ran away or surrendered on the slightest provocation, saying they were willing to fight for their country but saw no reason why they should fight for a faction, especially a faction that had been selling the country to a foreign nation. In the manner of the defeat of the Anfu clique at the height of its supremacy, rather than in the mere fact of its defeat, lies the credit side of the Chinese political balance sheet. It is a striking exhibition of the oldest and best faith of the Chinese—the power of moral considerations. Public opinion, even that of the coolie on the street, was wholly against the Anfu party. It went down not so much because of the strength of the other side as because of its own rottenness.

So far the results are to all appearances negative. The most marked is the disappearance of Japanese prestige. As one of the leading men in the War Office said: 'For over a year now the people have been strongly opposed to the Japanese government on account of Shantung. But now even the generals do not care for Japan any more'. It is hardly logical to take the easy collapse of the Japanese-supported Anfu party as a proof of the weakness of Japan, but prestige is always a matter of feeling rather than of logic. Many who were intimidated to the point of hypnotism by the idea of the irresistible power of Japan are now freely laughing at the inefficiency of Japanese leadership. It would not be safe to predict that Japan will not come back as a force to be reckoned with in the internal as well as external politics of China, but it is safe to say that never again will Japan figure as superman to China. And such a negation is after all a positive result.

And so in its way is the overthrow of the Anwhei faction of the militarist party. The Chinese liberals do not feel very optimistic about the immediate outcome. They have mostly given up
the idea that the country can be reformed by political means. They are sceptical about the possibility of reforming even politics until a new generation comes on the scene. They are now putting their faith in education and in social changes which will take some years to consummate themselves visibly. The self-styled southern republican constitutional party has not shown itself in much better light than the northern militarist party. In fact, its old leader Sun Yat Sen now cuts one of the most ridiculous figures in China, as shortly before this upheaval he had definitely aligned himself with Tuan and little Hsu. This does not mean, however, that democratic opinion thinks nothing has been gained. The demonstration of the inherent weakness of corrupt militarism will itself prevent the development of any militarism as complete as that of the Anfus. As one Chinese gentleman said to me: 'When Yuan Shih-kai was overthrown, the tiger killed the lion. Now a snake has killed the tiger. No matter how vicious the snake may become, some smaller animal will be able to kill him, and his life will be shorter than that of either lion or tiger'. In short, each successive upheaval brings nearer the day when civilian supremacy will be established. This result will be achieved partly because of the repeated demonstrations of the uncongeniality of military despotism to the Chinese spirit, and partly because with every passing year education will have done its work. Suppressed liberal papers are coming to life, while over twenty Anfu subsidized newspapers and two subsidized news agencies have gone out of being. The soldiers, including many officers in the Anwhei army, clearly show the effects of student propaganda. And it is worth while to note down the name of one of the leaders on the victorious side, the only one whose troops did any particular fighting, and that against great odds in numbers. The name is Wu Pei Fu. He at least has not fought for the Chili faction against the Anwhei faction. He has proclaimed from the first that he was fighting to rid the country of military control of civil government, and against traitors who would sell their country to foreigners. He has come out strongly for a new popular assembly, to form a new constitution and to unite the country. And although Chang Tso Lin has remarked that Wu Pei Fu as a military subordinate could not be expected to intervene in politics, he has not as yet found it convenient to oppose the demand for a popular assembly. Meanwhile the liberals are organizing their forces, hardly expecting to win a victory, but resolved, win or lose, to take advantage of the opportunity to carry further the education of the Chinese people in the meaning of democracy. [DewJ24]

1920.10.17  John Dewey received the Honorary degree, Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Beijing. [DewJ8]

1920.10.22  John Dewey leaves Beijing. [DewJ8]

1920.10.25  John Dewey arrived in Changsha. [DewJ8]
Dearest children,

We left last Friday morning—it’s Tuesday evening now…

Instead of going right thru from Hankow we were taken to a nice clean hotel with bathtub, and stayed there till next afternoon at five when we took a train. There was a funny time there. A delegate as usual came up from here, a French returned student. There was also a delegation of Hankow educators at the train. One of them in behalf as of the French-Chinese society of Hankow invited us to a luncheon at noon. So I accepted. The very next moment he said that would hurry us too much, so they would have the banquet at five. Then the Changsha delegate spoke up and said we might be on the train at that time. Then the H. man said—all in French—it was a sufficiently rare occasion, n’est ce pas, and we would stay over another day. I referred the matter back to our delegate. Next morning he came to the hotel and said the banquet was fixed for five. Your mother and I both thought he didn’t like it to have the trip postponed a day so for the first time since I’ve been in China I butted in and said my time for the trip was limited, and this meant one day less for lecturing, and while I appreciated etc etc. So he said it would hardly do for him to make any objections but if I wrote a note it would be all right of course. So the note was written suggesting the banquet be given on our return when it could be combined with a day for lecturing. Then they got passes for us for the afternoon train, and sent a young American returned student just back from Oberlin and Harvard with us. After we got on the train he said that the Changsha delegate was anxious all the time to stay and have the banquet. Also he was much peeved because an American returned student wasn’t sent, and said the Japanese and French Belgian returned students had combined here against the American, and they ought to have sent some one who could speak English as there were about thirty here. Also that the banquet was for Chancellor Tsai and a French returned professor of biology at Peking Univ who is accompanying the Chancellor to Shanghai to see him off for a trip to Europe. Meantime the delegate from here had to stay anyway because the boat from Shanghai was late, said boat bearing the Honorable B[ertrand] Russell, who was also coming here to lecture. Well this is a long story and doubtless seems quite pointless. But take my word for it that it quite illuminating and you’ll know a lot more about China than we did before it happened. At first we were peeved and thought we had made a mistake, but as they had teachers here from all over the province waiting for the meetings to begin, and I think they were already one day late, I’m glad we butted in. The Hon B[ertrand] R[ussell] came in this noon on the train we came on yesterday with all the rest of the party along. He was supposed to speak every morning till next Monday night, six in all, and I was feverish already. But it seems he has or thinks he has to be in Peking, and has announced he must take the boat back tomorrow or next day. I’m not sure which. Whether he hasn’t been in China long enough to know how little dates count or whether he has some other reason I don’t know. They had a place all picked out for him, I think a missionary who is to lecture on sociology. Mamma has seen more people than I have since the news came out, and all the people, at least foreigners are saying What do you know about these socialists travelling around the world together? Fortunately we don’t know anything. He lectured this afternoon right after I did, on Bolshevism. I was rushed right out of the hall to ‘go and get rested’. I suppose from politeness but it almost looked as if they didn’t want me to hear him. I judge they are about the same as his articles. The only thing I heard him say was that one reason he was opposed to Bolshevism was that the rest of the world wouldn’t accept it voluntarily, they were bound to impose it, and that would mean continued fighting and he considered the situation so precarious that civilization might go under in a prolonged war. The other thing was that they were doing a lot for the children. It’s fortunate for China his reaction was unfavorable as they will stand things from him on account of his radical rep they wouldn’t from anybody else. They rather idealize the Bolshevists here, especially the radical among the students. This place
seems to be a hot bed. As I have written the late civil war began here. The old Tuchun was the rottenest in China, or would have been if there went so many rotten ones, they all the rottenest when you hear the details. The schools have been closed for almost two years, and the students have all the effervescence on tap the rest worked part of off last year. Also Hunan has the rep of being the most independent and revolutionary province in China. I was told that in one school the students had compleed in 21 changes of techers in the last two month. Im not sure that it wasnt one place which had been changed 28 times to meet their desires. They have issued posters that nobody should be called mister or teacher or any other title any longer since all are equal. However they wont admit the teachers are their equals in practise. Also advised that all the unamrried men and women in Changsha be promptly paired off. A Chinese told me he would get me a translation of the whole thing. As matter of fact its probably a dozen students ut of a thousand, but the minority is vigorous enough, the majoritgy will always give in when the minority calls them names.

The new governor has been tgov twice before, once after the rev and was driven out by the name Yuan Shi Kai crowd, and then after the latters downfall only to be driven out by the Anfus. He is said to be one of the most enlightened liberals in China, a younger amn than I thought. When they said he was Hanlin—an old Chinese doctor under the exam system, I supposed he was an old man but he isnt over 45. He must have been a precocious kid and got his degree lalong with his mothers milk. He is certainly what they call democratic. We went to call on him yesterday p m, an he was in conference when we got there. Then he finally came almost running into the room, breathless and apologetic, with no pomp or bodyguard of soldiers. He came to the lecture this p m without any soliders at all, no uniform, and helped introduce me. Most of the governors dont stir out unless they have soldiers several deep to stop all stray bullets. he gives us banquet friday night. We are staying at a Chinese doctors, teacher in the medical college here. Yale farudate, speaks better eblish than I do. His wofe has never studied aborad but speaks enough eng to get along, and they have a foreign house and style, only Chinese food, Im glad to say. Darn good [co]oking at that. This is the seat of the socalled Yale-in-China college Yale grads send funds, and the faculty is largely from there, both American and Chinese. They keep up more social style than any place, weve been outside Peking and Shang. By which I mean evening fdress. Havent got sick of lugging mine around, of course I came without and we are invited out to dinner every night, tho some of them are Chinese affairs. Also invited out to luncheon everyday about, also a few afternoon teas. We are in luck being at these place, as it is Chinese enough to find out things from their point of view and foreign enough to have a bathtub, and good beds. There seem to be rather more cooperation than is usual between Chinese and foreigners here. The gentry give half the money for the College, comes thru govt funds. The only case in China I think. We are only three hundred miles from Canton.anAfter taking from five pm till eleven next day to get there, something less than 250 from Hankow, 300 is far enough howver. There were no sleeping cars, but he had a coop to ourselves and could stretch out some. The soldiers took possession of everything else, tho they are supposed to be the reformed soliders, defenders of the faith. The streets are narrow here, and they say the former northern soliders used to beat a ricksha man or chair coolies if they bumped into them at all, and it was practically impossible not to. Quite middle age style. Also when they anted things from a stor[e] they would take what they wanted. The old Tuchun shipped or allowd a lot of rice to be shipped to Japan and got a big squeeze on every picul, hundred pounds. Made a million, in six weeks alone, also a shortage of rice in China at same ime, and exportation officially forbidden. He still lives, in Shanghai and took his money with him I suppose. And his conks. The young man who came with us and who is interpreting for me in spite of a bad cold, and the first time he ver did for anybody, is a case, a character. Was a revolutionist when he was a school boy of fiteen, and made such a name that when the republic came in they sent him to America to syudy, Hunan province altho he knows no Eng. He is quite critical of Dr Hu [Shi] and the Peking crowd, thinks they are too radical and destructive, but he is really more radical than most of them, tho more prwctical, less theoretical about it. 

Time to go out to dinner

Love to everybody Dad [DewJ3]
1920.10.27 John Dewey attends a banquet hosted by Tan Yankai, the governor of Hunan, in Changsha. He visited Changsha, attended an education conference, and visited Hankou and Jiangxi province. [Kee3]
Oct. 31 [1920]
Dear Lucy, This is Sunday evening and we have just come in from a picnic on the mountain called YoloShan. We saw an ancestral worship, so one more experience has been added to Chinese ones. The place is lovely, trees large and old and not all of them crooked. Live oak and sweet gum and ginko camphor and chestnut, and good roads which are too go to please the old residents who prefer the like the primitive, The temples are in charming spots, It is all little tho compared to the Ssishan and easy to reach, tho they insist I should keep in a chair. Papa had to stop at a school on the way down and make a speech so I am the only one back with Dr Yen himself, Mrs Yen and the two children staid for the ancestral worship as they are friends of that family. A monument, a beautiful new house with every thing comfortable for the worshippers, the flags and other marks of honor, the son greeting the friends who came, the open house and the tea and the sons wife the table set out with a feast over which the flies were crawling, it all did not seem so bad a way to remember the dead as one might think. There was incense burning in place of the flowers on the grave Then we came down a lovely green and moist road like home with a little brook singing alongside and here am I taking the first whack at the machin to tell you about Changsha. There is much to tell, it has been what the books call an eventful week, small event filling up every minute, I spose Pap told you they handed us a program with a banquet every night when we arrived, We have had the lovliest place to stay in all China missionary spots, Dr Yen is the most spirituel of Chinese and Mrs Is good as gold and simple and all that she ought to be, She comes from Shanghai. There are four lovely children It seems to me the Yale Mission intends to dominate all situations, and it is the Chinese members who keep their hands on top, We havent had a breathing spell once, not a moment when we could run away and buy things, Tho I have gathered up a few, Tomorrow morning I am going to the Y.W.C.A. who live in part of a big house, [am]ily named Tso who are selling off old things, and maybe I shall find something for you, We are bringing a leopard skin and some cross stitch. I wish I had kept a record from day to day to send you, You know by this time Mr Russell did not stay long but went on to peking last Tuesday, We leave tomorrow night and I think we have staid quite long enough. They are keeping up too strenuous a pace to last out for long. last night we went to a dull banquet given by eight societies. Tonight the Gentry are giving us one, I shall not go unless Pap gets back here for I think I am the only woman and Dr Yen does not want me to go, In spite of his being so kind he has Chinese ideas about women. The talk here is strong and loud about the Russells, Still I asked them to go and call on you. My advice is to receive the[m] well and not speak of the event, In fact it is better for us all to do as little talking ab[out] it as possible. The day I first lectured in the missionary school they took back an engagement with Miss Black to speak and they told her the reason they could not receive her, I will tell you all about it when we get back. The case is not easy All I wrote you from Hankow turned out to be quite an inc[illeg.] reac reading of Chinese methods and I have decided to never again make an exception to my habit of saying I dont know what they are doing nor how they do it. [T]hings have gone smoothly here and very hapily owing to this charming home where we are staying, The whole thing is better planned and goes off with more snap than in most places The interpreters have been not very good, tho Papa has been settled down to an excellent one now. The Governor has been very civil, he is quite a simple human being, he brought us down the river in his launch when he came back from ns worship of the old hero whose grave we visited. He is going to start at once a model school on the basis of Pas suggestion that there are only two in China, He has asked a Miss Loyan to take charge of it, She has been studying school administration in T.C. for three years besides studying somewhere else three years before that and she came back last September. She seems very stupid, and she certainly does not understand our language very well but we will hope that is not so. If one school is started as a result of these trips there is something to show, There is no doubt this Gov is very much interested in education. It is said here he is rather weak in wishing to offend no one. but do not quote to any one any thing except the agreeable things I say He gave us together with other visitors a dinners on Wednesday night. Tomorrow night we leave on the boat at ten oclock. We go to lunch and to dinner and we each
have to speak twice and I am going to look at the things at the Y.W.C.A. We are expect to stay in Wuchang and Hankow each two days, So we ought to leave Hankow for the north on Saturday the 7th of Nov, Pa will go straight home but I shall stop off at Paotingfu I will let Miss Gumbrell know as you suggest in your letter which I was surely gald to get All you say soulds as if you were enjoying life Miss Stearns lives here she will get me the broadcloth and besides I am buying velvateen for you two dresses.

[Alice Chipman Dewey] [DewJ3]

1920.10.31 John Dewey visits the Yoloshan. [DewJ3]

1920.11.01 John Dewey attends a conference on constitutionalism and self-government in Changsha. [DewJ8]

1920.11.04-06 John Dewey : Six lectures on education and social reform in Wuchang. [DewJ8]

1920.11.05-1921.11.10 John Dewey : Lecture 'Democracy and education' : delivered at the Department of Educational Research, Beijing Teachers College, Fall 1920-Summer 1921. = Ping min zhu yi yu jiao yu. Chang Daozhi interpreter ; Li Jimin, Yang Wenmian, Chang Daozhi recorder. In : Xue deng ; Nov. 5, 10, 12, 17, 18, 19 (1920). In : Ping min zhu yi yu jiao yu ; Nos 26-35, 41-42 ; Dec. 20 (1920), (Jan. 10, 25 ; Febr. 20 ; March 5 ; April 1, 20 ; May 5, 20 ; June 5 ; Nov. 10 (1921). [Kee3]

1920.11.07 John Dewey visits Hankou. [DewJ8]

1920.11.08-13 John Dewey : Lectures at Jiujiang and Nanchang, Jiangxi. [DewJ8]

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Letter from John Dewey to Walter S. Drysdale [military attaché of the American Legation to China in Beijing, 1917-1921].

Bolshevism in China.

Peking, China, December 1, 1920.

My dear Col. Drysdale:

"In reply to your inquiry, I would say that I have seen no direct evidence of Bolshevism in China. I landed in Shanghai the first of May last year. In the year and a half since I have been in nine provinces, including the capitals, though much the greater part of the time has been spent in Peking. I have been in Shanghai four times, however, Hangchow twice, and spent two months in Nanking having been there twice. I feel the surer of my belief that Bolshevism is lacking in China because I have been in close contact with the teachers, writers and students who are sometimes called Bolshevists, and who in fact are quite radical in their social and economic ideas. The student body of the country is in the main much opposed to old institutions and existing political conditions in China. They are especially opposed to their old family system. They are disgusted with politics, and while republican in belief have decided that the Revolution of 1911 was a failure. Hence they think that an intellectual change must come before democracy can be firmly established politically. They have strong and influential leaders among the younger teachers. The great majority of the teachers are still, however, rather conservative in their ideas. The student body in China is proverbially undisciplined, taking an active hand in running the school, striking and demanding dismissal of teachers, etc. This is no new thing and is found in only slightly less degree in Japan, in spite of the great political docility there. All of these things make the students much inclined to new ideas, and to projects of social and economic change. They have little background of experience and are inclined to welcome any idea provided it is new, or is different from what actually exists. They are practically all socialists, and some call themselves communists. Many think the Russian revolution a very fine thing. All this may seem more or less Bolshevistic. But has it not been inspired from Russia at all? I have never been able though I have tried to run down all rumors to hear of Bolshevist propagandists. In the south they are said to be in the north; in the north they are said to be in the south. I do not doubt there are some in China, but I am sure they are not many. And I am absolutely certain they have nothing to do with the general tone and temper of radical thought in the country. A student was arrested two months ago in Peking for circulating "Bolshevist" literature. I investigated and found it was truly anarchistic, advocating the abolition of government and the family, but no Bolshevist. However if the movement were practically dangerous it wouldn't be much matter whether it was inspired or directed from Russia or not. As matter of fact, it is the effervescence of school boys, being intellectual and emotional rather than practical. It is stimulated by the corruption and inefficiency of the government, and by the pro-Japanese character of the former cabinet. It is a symptom of the change of China from old conditions to new. Much of it is rather silly and superficial, but it is a sign that the students have begun to think about social and economic matters, and is a good sign for the future, because it shows that they have awakened to a realization that a mere paper change in constitution and government is not going to help China any. Radical thought has been accentuated in consequence of the war, but it has been an accompaniment of the new movement for twenty years. The first platform of the Chinese revolutionaries, adopted in 1901 or 1902 was socialistic, and so was the program of the Kou Ming Tang, the Sun Yat Sen revolutionary party, till it was dissolved by Yuan Shi Kai. But there is no leverage in the country to bring about a social revolution or anything approaching it. The farmers are still highly conservative, and they form ninety per cent of the population. There are a good many tenant farmers, but there is much more family proprietorship. A country of peasants that will stand the famine the north is passing through now with no rioting or outbreaks of disorder is loss in danger of Bolshevism than any country on the globe. Also industrialism is only just beginning. As yet it is confined to Shanghai and about a half dozen other cities. There isn't outside of these few cities any discontented "proleterist" to appeal to. In these cities unions are forming etc., but the men are mostly interested in their wages. They are not capable of being reached by ideas of great economic changes. In Changsha a few
weeks ago I was invited to attend a meeting to organize a branch of a labor association. There wasn't an actual day laborer at the meeting, mainly merchants with some students. It was much more like some civic welfare or philanthropic organization at home than any labor party, though it had been called by a national organizer sent out from Shanghai. Thus the students have no material to work upon even if they wanted to start a practical movement. Also they are still too theoretical to engage successfully in practical movements. They were quite successful in attacking some of the corrupt Anfuites two years ago, but popular opinion was strongly with them. But at present even their influence in politics where they would have a practical effect if anywhere is very slight. Most foreigners who have any contact with them wish, I think, that they were more active, and more likely to start something than they seem to be.

The sum of the whole matter is that the intellectual class is radical in its beliefs and much interested in all plans of social reform. But it is a small class, practically with little influence, and not concerned to organize itself to get more. The whole social and economic background of Bolshevism as a practical going concern is lacking. Pick ten Chinese who are educated at random and who are outside the official class (which during the Anfu regime tried to block the student movement by calling them Bolshevists) or ten foreigners in contact with the Chinese and you will get the same reply. Many hope that a political revolution is coming to throw out the present class of officials and to get a new start. There may be an upheaval of this sort which those who don't like it will call Bolshevist. But I'm afraid it won't come very soon, and when it does come it will be confined to doing over again the things that were pretended to be done in 1911."


Colonel Walter S. Drysdale forwarded John Dewey's report to the State Department, he added the following:

Your attention is especially called to the following report written for us by Dr. John Dewey, Professor of Philosophy in Columbia University and Exchange Professor in China. Dr. Dewey has made a special study of this subject in China and has had unusual opportunity of getting into touch with this element in China that may be considered as radical. I know of no one any where, better qualified to report on this important matter than Dr. Dewey." [DewJ3]
Letter from John Dewey to Albert C. Barnes
Dec 5, [1920] 135 Morrison St Peking

Dear Barnes,

We had expected to spend the time this year settled down here, except for a possible trip to Canton, which however has been in too unsettled a condition to permit educational meetings to take place. But we had an invitation to go to the central yangste provinces, and spent about four weeks in the capitals of three of them. With the exception of the region about Hankow they are the freest from foreign influence of any places we have been in, also interesting as the centr[e]s of the old porcelain industry, grass cloth and old Chinese cottons with the blue prints, very simple and artistic…

I have written too much about myself in this letter, but the situation here is awful and its a relief to get away from it, and one has to pump up optimisms to keep going. The overthrow of the Anfu crowd makes it impossible to lay all the ills off on Japan any more, but they are much aggravated by the long period of Japanese control. And its impossible to see anyway out. And the gloomy thing is that the ills seems to go back so much to just lack of character. Of course one cant indict a nation, but its exasperating to see so many thoroughly attractive traits, and some much sweet reasonableness, so bound up with plain lack of character. The most consoling thought, and one needs all the consolation he can get, is that after all the social habits which breed these defects are economic at root due to the struggle for existence, and that a new industrial development will in time crowd them out. But meantime its almost certain they will take on many western wvices, and lose many of their old virtues, by carrying love of money, intrigue, mutual suspicion and calumny into the new situation. There is but one end logically to the present political situation, and thats complete international foreign control of finance which means of course practically all governmental administration. Nothing happens logically in China however. On is often inclined to think that would have been better if China had been allowed to go to pot in thits own dway, and no foreigner had ever set foot in it. But 'ifs' that assume the non-existence of steam and electricity dont go far. Perhaps next time I write Ill be quite hopeful—I hope so.

I met Russell first on our trip as he was also giving lectures at Changsha, in Hunan. He then came up to Peking where he is now giving two lectures a wekk, on strictly special subjects, one on analysis of mind and the other problems of phil, along the lines of his little book. He declined to give any lectures on social reconstruction in China until he had studied the subject more, quite sensibley. [y in ink] His criticisms of Bolshevism rather weakened the attachment of students, who are socialists and to whom all socialists look much alike, except that Bolsheviks are to them really carrying it out. He is accompanied with by a young woman, a Miss [Dora] Black, one of his former students. The situation has produced a number of social complications quite naturally, which do not bother him becaue he came to China to see the Chinese not foreigners, but it may be a little hard on her before the year is out as educated and interesting Chinese women are arfew especially in Peking. The Chinese dont bother about the complication which seems to many quite admirable and advanced. but on the other hand many of them have been attacking the existing system in China and clai demanding a monogamous system and they dont quite to know what to make of it. Its rather petty writing personal gossip rather than about his work, but the truth is I havent fgot to any of his lectures yet, and conversations havent yielded much except that he is very amiable and an very interesting conversationalist, but avoiding shop as all the English do. He said that philosophically he had come nearer the pragmatist position than when we met last fsix years ago, but circumstances didnt admit of following the matter up. They have a fund for foreign lecturers one every year and want suggestions. In my opinion they are surfeited with theories, that includes me, and want somebody who can present definite knowledge about specific subjects which have a practical bearing, either on specific educational reforms, administrative measures etc, while being, in order to get a hearing rather radical in his ideas. They seem to want a German next time, and had the carzy idea of inviting Eucken, but I hope theyve dropped that. If you think of anybody mention him. The students are very receptive but rather uncritical, and also too disposed to vague generalities, any Ism as long as its uptodate. Im rather glad Im doing specific class teaching this year, not general lec-||turing, in fact made that
condition of staying last spring. I'm giving two courses, at two institutions, on D & E [Democracy and education] trying to simplify to make it intelligible, a course on Ethics and one on history of western phil; they appear the most interested in that. There is no interpreter and I'm not sure about the English of many of them, and it's hard to get questions and discussion from them. The have good minds but there is a general complaint they don't like to work. I mean the student class generally. A Japanese who was over here gave the students a good talking to, told them some wholesome truths, contrasting their general attitude with the spratan attitude of the Japanese students thirty and forty years ago when J was in a precarious position and advised them to work heard and keep out of political rows. Yet the intelligent ones might have answered that while Japanese students were keeping out of politics, the country had Shintoism and imperialistic militarism put over on them. It's a hard question, and on the whole my sympathies are with a certain amount of superficial study due to outside interests, but they need to be training a good number of leaders in special subjects, and whether enough hard work is done for that is doubtful. However on the whole I don't consider the present situation bad if it isn't kept up too long; it's an almost necessary stage of development that there be a period considerable intellectual fickleness, that is instability and attendant superficiality. Mentime the returned students come in for all kinds of criticisms, the gist being that they are out of touch with China while they haven't really absorbed western culture and science, and also aren't willing to begin at the bottom, but want important jobs from the start. All natural enough too. The chief difficulty I think is that they have gone too young and now now there is a tendency to prepare them better before sending them, and send them for some special work planned in advance. The attitude of our govt in keeping them out of money earning pursuits has had a very bad influence. There's a scheme for sending students who shall also work in factories and railways etc, but I'm told our dept of labor in Washington is holding it up—a very stupid policy from the standpoint of American business interests to say nothing of larger concerns...

Sincerely yours, John Dewey [DewJ3]
Nowhere in the world is the difference between industrious and industrial as great as in China. The industriousness of the Chinese is proverbial. Industrially, they are in the earliest stages of the revolution from domestic to machine production, and from transportation on the necks of men (and women and children) to the freight car. The necks of men:—for while the bulk of goods in central China is doubtless carried by its marvellous system of water-ways, yet whenever winds fail the boats are towed with ropes attached to the shoulders of men—and women and children. On the Grand Canal, you can sometimes count forty persons from ten years up tugging at a rope attached to the mast of some clumsy junk. Even a Ruskin if abruptly placed in strictly mediaeval economic conditions might be forced to admit that there are two sides to the humanity of the steam locomotive. And the indiscriminate admirers of the mediaeval guild might learn something from a study of the workings of its Chinese counterpart.

My last six weeks have been spent in travelling through the Province of Kiangsu. Shanghai is located in this province and it is industrially and commercially the most advanced in China, the one with the most mills, railways and foreign trade. For details and statistics the reader may go to consular reports, trade journals, etc. This article has a humbler task. Its aim is merely to record impressions which seem to me to be indicative of the problems China has to face during the years of its oncoming accelerated industrial transformation.

The fifteen towns visited are scattered from the extreme north to the extreme south of the province; strictly speaking, two of them lie in the Province of Chekiang to the south. The towns fall into four groups. The first contains the treaty ports, where foreign merchants have come in, where foreign capital is concentrated, and where foreign methods, though usually subjected to Chinese conditions in the form of acceptance of the compradore as a middleman, set the pace. For technical commercial purposes, from a statistical point of view, these towns of which Shanghai is the most important, are doubtless the most interesting. From a social point of view they are the least interesting, except as one may want to make a study of the contact of two civilizations meeting with but one common object—the making of money. Otherwise they are chiefly significant as revealing an increasing ability of the Chinese to adopt the joint-stock and managerial system without coming to grief—as did most of the early companies that were exclusively Chinese. The reasons are worth recording, because they affect the entire problem everywhere of the introduction of modern industrialism. The speculative element, the promoter element, was at first most marked. The general psychology was that of gold mine promoting. After an early furore in which most 'investors' lost their money, the bitten became wary, and even legitimate enterprises could not secure attention, except in the case of a very small number of persons who had made a success of their joint-stock mills. In the next place, the Chinese family system with the obligation it puts upon the prosperous member of the family to carry all his relatives who wish to be carried made nepotism so common as to be an impossible burden. And in the third place, most of the earlier enterprises scorned the technique of putting aside reserve funds in a prosperous season, and of writing off for depreciations. A short life and a merry one was the usual motto. Now, however, business methods have developed to the point where many Chinese mills are successfully competing with foreign capital and foreign management. In fact many Chinese think that the latter will soon be at a disadvantage because of the diversion of profits to the compradore, and the lack of personal contact with workmen. But upon this point it is not possible to get facts that can be depended upon.

The second class includes towns at the opposite extreme of development, towns that are not only non-treaty ports but that are only beginning to be touched. The northern part of the province, for example, is almost as primitive as it was five hundred years ago. The building of a railway has created some flour mills, and since the war egg-factories have made a new market. Eggs that used to sell for a third of a cent apiece now bring three times that, and the producer gets most of the increase. In all of the towns and villages, the number of hens any one family can keep is limited by communal action, as otherwise hens would poach. The extraordinary cumulative effect of large numbers so characteristic of China is nowhere better demonstrated than in the hundred thousands of eggs that nevertheless are daily brought by
hand, or rather by neck, to the factories. Such an impression may seem too slight to be recorded. But it is typical of the kind of happening that is still most significant for the larger part of industrial China. Even this fact is increasing the value of land, raising the standard of living so that rural families that had only one bedding now have two, and is changing the attitude toward railways from one of hostility to one of favor.

In these primitive districts one realizes also the immense odds that have to be overcome. There are districts of a million population that a few years ago had no public schools whatever, no public press, no postoffices, and where these facilities are still most scanty. The great positive obstacle is the activity of bandits. Being a robber is a recognized profession like being a merchant. The well-to-do live in constant fear of being looted so that their homes are almost as bare as those of beggars and in fear of being kidnapped for ransom. The professions of soldier and bandit are interchangeable, and upon the whole the peasants prefer the latter. One hears the story of the traveller who met a whole village in flight with their household goods on mules and in wheelbarrows, because the soldiers were coming to protect them from bandits.

It is such facts as these that lead many to assert that any genuine industrial development of China must wait upon the formation of a strong and stabilized government. The significance of the political factor is evidenced in the province of Anwhei which juts into the northern part of Kiangsu. Here is seen the perfect flower of militarism. The military governor recently closed all schools in the province for a year in order to spend the money on his army. He has been getting personal possession of all the mines in the province and recently diverted a river from two cities in order to make a canal to some of his mines. This is only an extreme case of the effect of present political conditions upon the industrial growth of China. Almost everywhere officials use their power, based on control of soldiers, to exact tribute. They levy blackmail on mills and mines; use the control of railways to manipulate the supply of cars until they can force an interest to be given them. Then they reinvest their funds in pawn shops, banks and other agencies of economic domination. Thus a new kind of feudalism is growing up in which militarism is a direct adjunct to capitalism. These men keep their spare millions in foreign banks and have places of refuge in foreign concessions. The control of the Ministries of Communications and of Finance is equivalent to an economic overlordship of China, and the effects ramify everywhere. The station master has to pay several thousands of dollars to get his job, and he recoups by charging fifty or a hundred dollars when a shipper wants a car. Yet industry and commerce are advancing, and there is probably as much reason for thinking that in the end their growth will reform government as that a stabilized government will permit the normal growth of industry.

The third class of towns consists of cities that also represent old China, but the prosperous and cultivated side of old China, cities that are now lazy, luxurious and refined along with extreme poverty and ignorance; towns that are slowly degenerating, for they want none of the new methods while at the same time the new methods are diverting industry and trade from them. To these cities go many retired officials with their stolen funds. As one moves about near the clubhouses and gilded house boats one hears everywhere the click of the gambling dominoes. There is money for dissipation and opium, but little for new industrial developments. Surplus funds are invested in neighboring rice lands; old small owners are crowded out, and a large class of tenant farmers is being created where family ownership has been the rule. Where the northern towns are merely primitive and backward, these once rich cities of the southern part of the province are reactionary and corrupt.

Finally there are industrial towns where foreigners cannot own land or trade, and where the chimneys of cotton and flour mills and silk filatures are as numerous and smoky as in the factory districts of Shanghai—a development mostly of the last ten years, and indeed largely post-war. As it happens, the two most important of these towns present opposite types. In one of them the entire development has been in the hands of a single family, two brothers. And the leading spirit is one of a small group of men who vainly and heroically strove for the reformation of the Manchu dynasty from within. Finding his plans pigeon-holed and his efforts blocked, he retired to his native town and began almost single-handed a course of industrial and economic development. He has in his record the fact that he established the first
strictly Chinese cotton mill in China and also the first normal school. And since both were innovations, since China had never had either of these things, he met with little but opposition and prophecies of disaster to himself and the district. Now the district is known popularly as the model town of China, with its good roads, its motor buses for connecting various villages, its technical schools, its care of blind and deaf, its total absence of beggars. But the method is that of old China at its best, a kind of Confucian paternalism; an exhibition on the small scale of the schemes for the reformation of the country which were rejected on the large scale. The combination of the new in industry and the old in ideas is signalized in the girl and woman labor in the factories, while the magnate finds it 'inconvenient' that boys and girls should be educated together after the age of ten years, with the usual result that most of the girls receive no schooling. The other town represents a go-as-you-please competitive development. There is less symmetry but more vitality. Many deplore the absence of cooperation and organization in developing civic life. But it is characteristic of young China that it regards the greater individualism with all its lack of system as more promising than what it terms the benevolent autocracy of the model town.

But all of the industrial towns have one problem in common, and it is the problem of China. Is the industrial development of China to repeat the history of Great Britain, the United States and Japan until the evils of total laissez faire bring about a labor movement and a class struggle? Or will the experience of other countries be utilized and will the development be humanized? China is the land of problems, of problems so deadlocked and interlocked that one is constantly reminded of the Chinese puzzles of his childhood days. But for China and for the whole world this problem of the direction to be taken by its industrial evolution is the one of chief importance. Outwardly all the signs as yet point to movement in the inhuman direction, to blind repetition of the worst stages of the western industrial revolution. There are no factory laws, and if there were, no government capable of administering and enforcing them. You find silk filatures in which children of eight and ten are working fourteen hours a day for a pittance, and twelve hours is the regular shift in all the mills. And these establishments have many of them for the last few years paid dividends of from fifty to two hundred and fifty per cent a year. Superficially China looks at the outset of its industrial career like the paradise of the socially unrestrained exploiter. The case however is not so simple or so certain. It is still conceivable that the future historian will say that the resistance of China to the introduction of the agencies of modern production and distribution, the resistance which was long cited as the classic instance of stupid conservatism, was in truth the manifestation of a mighty social instinct which led China to wait until the world had reached a point where it was possible for society to control the industrial revolution instead of being its slave. But the tail of an article is no place even to list the conditions and forces which make such a history conceivable, and only conceivable at the best. [DewJ25]
Letter from John Dewey to Albert C. Barnes
135 Morrison St Dec 39 [29, 1920] | Peking

Dear Barnes, …

I don't wonder that you are suspicious of the Consortium, but you can judge of the situation here if I say that so far as I can see it is the best thing in sight for China, in fact the only thing in sight politically. Its very questionable however whether it will ever really function, but its failure will be more due to its good points than its bad ones. There are three great things agt its operation. Its a combination of finance and politics. Politically it is distinctly anti-japanese in the sense of being a measure to check the japanese aggressions which have been going on so uninterruptedly for the last six years. Apart from the Monroe doctrine, China is the only country so far as I can see where the U S has had a continuous foreign policy—the so-called Open Door, no further partitions, no further spheres of influence. The Consortium politically speaking is a tool of this idea But at the same time it is financial ad must give an attractive opening to American money. Its doubtful whether these two things can be made to lie down together; certainly there is something of a campaign agt the C already as being too "idealistic." The second force agt is international jealousies. Of course the Japanese know it will curb their designs, but the France and Gt Britain know also it is in pursuance of the distinctly American policy, John Hay etc, and will add to American prestige and influence in China, and if successful will destroy in the end the whole sphere of influence of partition. Also they are now too hard up to have money to invest and their obvious policy is to stall, and prevent the thing working till they can come back. So they will work together with Japan more or less to put monkey wrenches into the machine. The third reason agt is in-structural. Aside from the natural general fear of foreign control, there is the opposition of corrupt officials to the fact that all expenditures under the loans will be subject to expert foreign auditing, and opposition of Chinese bankers, since by making hand to mouth loans as at present they get from twenty to forty per cent interest—in some extremely corrupt cases even more—but two per cent a month is considered quite legitimate. How the Consortium can survive all these difficulties its hard to see. There is one thing in its favor—the desperate condition of things here. I doubt [a]fter seeing things here the generalizations of fluent radicals about finance being internationalized. Maybe it would be here if there were a common agreement to do it at the expense of China, but as long as the interest of the U S is against a break up of China, finance cant be internationalized here—unless the U S is powerful enough and der emined enough to lay down the law. Probably the Steel trust will control the next administration and that is mainly pro-Japanese, as industrialism is do much further advanced there. The Morgan interests for some reason arent tied up with Japan, At least they havent been, and I suspect T L [financier Thomas Lamont] is somewhat influenced by a little oldfashioned American patriotism which in this case brings him out on the comparatively right side.

Thank you for the c[o]pies of the correspondence you sent. Her letter was too brief for me to get a clear insight, but there were certainly plenty of signs of poetic spirit, and your reply was a rare combination of friendliness and straightforwardness. The journals came with your Cezanne article and we were glad to see it in print.

I was awfully glad about you[r] suggestion of Hobson [probably John A. Hobson] for China; I dont know why his name had escaped me. The Chinese have a fatuous devotion to their old teachers—which accounts for a good deal of my own reception here—and unfortunately there is a man—I never met him—with a good deal of influence who once studied in Germany under Eucken, and they seem bound to invite that mass of flabby decay. ItHe is so dam old maybe he cant come; no one of the men I know take any stock in him, but the man who is booming him has influence with theose who put up the money. Then there is a strong pro german feeling in China, so they want a German. I belive they asked Einstein, but he declined. Intellectually of course he is as respectable as Eucken is the reverse, but he would have been clear over their heads. Russell gave a public lecture on Relativity the other day, and while like everything he does it was a masterpiece of cl[ear]ness yet no one in the audience [ ] except two or three professors of math and physics knew what any of it was about. Hobson is the right combination of theory and practise for them; as I wr[o]te before they are a little
crazy now on the[ory, What is truth? What is religion? What is democracy? these are typical
questions, and then right in the middle will be a fairly specific question like [w]hat is instinct?
and apparently they dont see why one question cant be disposed of as well as another in a
paragraph. I was invited to speak on religion and declined and the secy of the student society
which invited me came around to see me and naively said they wanted to get the question
settled while Russell and I were in the country. Of course it isnt all as bad as this, but in a way
its typical. Russell gave out an interview in which he remarked that in the Western world no
one had any faith any longer in the "wise men" but China was still in the stage where it
believed that a wise man could come along and settle its difficulties and questions. He got ion
to the weak points of the Chinese in much shorter time than I did. He is extremely s[en]sitive,
as his Russian articles show, since he was only there six weeks and had never been before and
didnt know the language. However he is constitutionally in opposition; he could write a
wonde[rf]ul critique on either heaven or hell after a short stay in either. A young Chinese
expressed what I called his mathematical detachment by saying he gave very simple reasons
for very complicated conditions. I fancy thisat is the mathematical psychology—the ability to
ignore contexts and select just what is directly relevant to the point in hand. If you meant that
I envy him this gift you are right, for to my own psychology in spite of my shematic logical
tendencies everything comes complicated end first, and I have to proceed consciously thru a
tot of negations to untangle anything—to him it comes fairly clearly at the beginning I think.
But if you mean that what is nearest my hearts desire it his ability to reach the liberal masses,
why it only shows [ in ink] you dont get the psychology of the specialist. Even Wm James
who is as much greater an artist than R as R is than me, says somewhere that he thinks when
he writes of some twenty men, [ink comma] whose approval he would like—I havent the
exact number but that makes no difference. Russell soon begins a new course on Analysis of
Matter to go with his Analysis of Mind course. He told some one that Einstein had largely
upset his prior phil of matter—that is one wonderful thing about R, he gets in opposition to
himself as easily as to the rest of the world—this doesnt mean he is grouchy personally, on he
contrary, he unusually agreeable. But he has simple intellectual tests and nothing naturally
comes up to themir requirements. The war and Russia have affected such a sensitive mind
naturally. He thinks civilization is doomed to go to sleep like the old Roma world, he gives it
only two centuries more of existence at the outside. Maybe hes right, but I cant see or feel it,
but I can see how differently the world must look to one who seen at first hand the European
debacle. He says Russian civilization which was tenuous and exotic, but still the finest in
quality in the world has been destroyed, he seems to think permanently whoever comes out on
top. He has a kind of dilemma, either aristocracy and injustice and civilization, or equality,
(justice) and no civilization. That carries his simplification a little further than he does. But
apparently he knows what justice is, namely equality, and I cant even fancy anything being as
simple as that…
Sincerely, [John Dewey]
Wytter Bynner the poet has been over here. He is taking back a lot of cheap Chinese
paintings, the kind that can be bought for a few dollars apiece, Mex. I cant imagine he wants
them all for himself, and it made me wonder whther there was a business market for such
things. If there is maybe I would try a venture to help pay expenses For a thousand dollars
Mex I could easiely get two hundred pcitures, none very old, and none by masters of course,
but having a certain Chinese charm and a technique as far as it goes. Do you know whether
such things sell now in U S? The real Sungs are hard to get and up in the thousands. [DewJ3]
Fei, Juetian. *Duwei di she hui yu zheng zhi zhe xue* [ID D28517]. [A critique of John Dewey's social and political philosophy].

Fei Juetian wrote a scathing critique of Dewey's lectures on social and political philosophy. Disagreeing with Dewey's comment about the cause of international conflicts, Fei claimed that conflicts exist not between nations, but between classes. It was unrealistic for Dewey to hope that through the development of industry and education, China could endow individuals with rights while also providing the opportunities to exercise those rights. This could be realized only by carrying out a revolution as the Russians did. Fei further asserted that Dewey's experimental approach to politics based on collective inquiry and continuous reform simply did not make sense. "If I tell the world that we should experiment with socialism and see if it works, people would think that I am crazy and would oppose this experiment. If I proclaim that socialism holds the ultimate truth to solving problems in today's society, that there is no better theory than socialism, people will become interested in its practice and help transform the theory into a reality". Fei rejected Dewey's particularistic approach to solving social problems, claiming that social problems were all interrelated and could not be dissected into this or that particular problem. An educational problem may have been tied to a political or economic problem. Fei also disagreed with Dewey that social theories should be grounded in concrete facts, not on abstract speculations. Fei condemned Dewey for overly relying on contingent social knowledge at the expense of eternal truths, without which, he believed, human civilizations would not advance. He completely denounced Dewey's claim that science could be applied to solving social problems. Fei believed that social problems were not difficult to resolve if only the proletariat were made aware of their oppression by the capitalists and thus united to fight for their right. He concluded that Dewey's experimental approach would not work; only a social revolution, a class war, could provide the antidote to all of China's ills. [DewJ2:S. 50-51]

1921 John Dewey left China and returned to the United States. [DewJ74]

1921 Sun, Fuyuan. *Duwei bo shi jin ri qu le* [ID D28543]. [Dr. Dewey is gone today].

"The Dr. Dewey in your head may be the professor at the podium at Columbia University, or the person who occasionally talked to your or had lunch with you. The Dr. Dewey in someone else's head may not be the Dewey from the podium or the dinner table, because he may never meet Dewey in person. His Dr. Dewey may be the Dewey of the 'Five major lectures series' – the ideational Dewey, not the physical Dewey. Yet another person's Dr. Dewey may not reside in the real person or his works, but in the picture on the first page of that book. Since different people have different 'Deweys' in mind, and since 'Dr. Dewey' is exactly the synthesis of these different conceptions, then how does the physical Dewey that is gone today compare to this 'Dr. Dewey' in our heads?" [DewJ2:S. 46]

There is an oft-quoted saying of Chesterton's that a man's philosophy is the most important thing about him. He illustrates the point by saying that it is more important for a landlady to know the philosophy of life of a would-be lodger than to know his financial status. The latter may decide his ability to pay, but the former decides his willingness to make false or true representations and to carry out his agreements. The late Mr. Morgan aroused much interest when he said at Washington that he attached more importance in banking to the character of the applicants for credit than to the material securities they proffered. The remarks of Chesterton and Morgan testify to the practical importance of what in war-time we learned to call the imponderables—grit, stamina, loyalty, faith—in comparison with things so tangible that they can be counted and measured.

What is true, in this regard, of individuals is true of peoples. The spirit that countries bring to the negotiations going on in Washington, the spirit in which they will proceed to execute the decisions of the Conference, is more important than the letter of the decisions. Those who are cynical about the Conference are so because they do not believe in the underlying good faith of the governments concerned. They assume that negotiations are simply a hypocritical cover for a series of dickerings and maneuvers for special advantage, and that professions of regard for peace, justice and humanity are merely part of the traditional paraphernalia of a secret jockeying to get the better of some one else. They distrust, in short, the underlying philosophy of existing governments.

If we go deeper, we realize that many sources of discord and friction have their root in the fact that different peoples have different philosophies ingrained in their habits. They cannot understand one another and they misunderstand one another. It is fashionable today to assume that the causes of all difficulties between nations are economic. It is useful to fix attention upon these economic causes and to see what can be done in the way of adjustment. But the friction generated by economic competition and conflict would not break out into the flames of war if atmospheric conditions were not favorable. The atmosphere that makes international troubles inflammable is the product of deep-seated misunderstandings that have their origin in different philosophies of life.

If we are to take steps to dampen the atmosphere, to charge it with elements that will fire-proof international relations, we must begin with an attempt at an honest understanding of one another's philosophy of life. The difficulty is greatest between oriental and occidental peoples. There are great differences in the mental dispositions of European and American peoples; the philosophies of life of even the English and the Americans are much more unlike than they are usually assumed to be. But all such differences pale into insignificance as compared with the differences between the civilizations of the West and of Asia—between the philosophies to which these civilizations have given birth. It is proportionately hard to secure mutual understanding and respect and proportionately easy on both sides to create suspicion and fear, which slide over into hatred when the time is ripe.

The common belief at the present time that the Pacific is to be the scene of the next great world catastrophe, the fatalistic belief that conflict between the white and the yellow race is predestined, are really expressions of a sense of a deep, underlying cleft that makes mutual understanding impossible. But instead of trying to lessen the cleft by effort to understand each other, we talk about an irrepressible conflict of forces beyond human control, or else about the competition for control of the natural resources of China and the tropics. I would not minimize the danger in this competition, but it is ridiculous to suppose that it is so great as to make the Pacific the scene of an inevitable war. If we succeed in really understanding each other, some way of cooperation for common ends can be found. If we neglect the part played by fundamental misunderstandings in developing an atmosphere of combustion, any devices that are hit upon for lessening economic friction are likely to turn out so superficial that sooner or later they will break down.

One reason why misunderstanding is so dangerous is that peoples like persons tend to judge one another on the basis of their own habits of thought and feeling. Mr. Wells recently pointed out a specific instance. He said that the Japanese, because of their docility and obedience, tend to overestimate the power of the British government to regulate the
sentiments and acts of the English people, while the English, because of contrary habits, tend to exaggerate the control that Japanese popular sentiment has upon the ruling class in Japan. The practical application he made bears upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Japanese tend to overlook the fact that the Alliance might break down under strain because of pressure of popular sentiment, which would make the government unable to carry it into effect in case of Japanese trouble with the United States. The English, on the other hand, overlook the danger of the Alliance, because they imagine that in a crisis the Japanese governing class would be amenable to an alert and intelligent public opinion.

It would be easy to fill pages with instances of just such misunderstandings due to imputing to another people the motives and aims that we should have if we performed the act that the other people has performed. Japanese diplomacy, for example, is centralized, almost dictated, from Tokyo. Ours is comparatively loose. If, accordingly, an American consul in the Orient does an act—if only making a speech—more or less on his own, it is natural for Japanese to assume that he is deliberately acting upon orders from Washington in pursuance of some national policy. Americans, on the other hand, are likely to overlook the compactness and continuity of Japanese diplomacy. Or, when they become aware of some objectionable result of diplomacy, they regard it as a sudden and treacherous coup instead of the culmination of a series of steps, which from the Japanese point of view have been already accepted and sanctioned, if only tacitly. Then the Japanese are perplexed in their turn.

Such incidents and others that might be mentioned seem trivial, taken one by one. But the total effect is by no means a trivial detail. The net result is mutual distrust, suspicion, dread. Episodes of this kind illustrate the importance of a better understanding by each nation of the psychology of other nations. The physical means of intercourse between nations by means of trade, mails and cables have got far ahead of the agencies of psychological and moral intercourse. After thousands of years of isolation, the East and the West have been thrown into intimate political and commercial contact. During the period of separation each side of the globe has developed its own peculiar ways of thinking and feeling. It is no wonder that under such circumstances the contact of East and West is so largely materialistic, economic. It is an accident, a by-product of the invention of steam and electric machinery, and, like any accident, it may turn out a catastrophe.

There are many questions of a directly practical nature that cannot be understood or properly handled unless the larger background be taken into account. Why are the Chinese so unperturbed by circumstances that appear to a foreigner to menace their country with national extinction? How can they remain so calm when their country is divided within and threatened from without? Is their attitude one of callous indifference, of stupid ignorance? Or is it a sign of faith in deep-seated realities that western peoples neglect in their hurry to get results? So far as diplomatic negotiations, including those of the Washington Conference, are concerned, does the Chinese policy of watchful waiting—with more waiting than watchfulness from a western point of view—imply indifference to their fate or weakness that makes them unable to cope with it? Or is it evidence that they are banking upon the operation of slow-moving forces that in the end will bring things their way? Surely the right answer to such questions is at least of equal importance with the particular decisions of the Conference. In the long run it is more important; for it will control the way in which the decisions work out.

Again there is the question of China's long and obstinate resistance to modern methods of industry, to machinery, railways and large scale production and her disinclination to open up her country except because of pressure from a foreign power. This refusal, taken in connection with the desire of foreign nationals to utilize the natural resources of China and to find markets among her teeming millions, is the source of many of China's most acute difficulties. A natural question arises: Why hasn't China taken the lead in developing her own resources? Why hasn't she gone ahead much as the United States did, borrowing foreign capital, but keeping political and, in the main, economic control in her own hands? Is her course stupid inertia, a dull, obstinate clinging to the old just because it is old? Or does it show something more profound, a wise, even if largely unconscious, aversion to admitting forces that are hostile to the whole spirit of her civilization?

The right answer to these questions makes a great difference in the treatment of many
concrete practical problems. If the course of China is blind and inert, there is much to be said for a combination of nations, a kind of economic-political consortium, which will force modern industrialism upon China, overcoming her obstinacy for her own good, not allowing sentimental considerations to stand too much in the way. But if there is something deeply worth while in Chinese culture, and if industrialism as it exists in the western world is a menace to what is deepest and best in Chinese culture, then the practical answer is quite different. Perhaps there will come a time when historians will say that the course of China gave evidence of a profound instinct. Perhaps they will say it was better for the world and for China that she resisted the introduction of western, machine-made industrialism until the world and she herself were able to control its workings. If so, the entanglements and perplexities into which China has temporarily got will not be too great a price to pay for the result finally attained. Only those who are completely satisfied with the workings of the present capitalistic system can dogmatically deny this possibility.

It is much easier to raise these questions than to answer them. But a knowledge of Chinese civilization and of the philosophy of life expressed in it at least makes the questions more real and more pertinent. Two great philosophies of life are intimately connected with the Chinese attitude toward political and social issues—those of Lao Tze and Confucius. Perhaps a third should be added—that of Buddha. But the latter was not indigenous, and the first two were. Though no one can deny the immense stimulus to Chinese art and thought that came with the introduction of Buddhism from India, yet in the end its influence seems to have been transformed by Taoism and Confucianism.

The teaching of Lao Tze did not become classic and official in the way in which that of the Confucian school did. Yet one obtains a strong impression that fundamentally its influence upon the people is greater than that of Confucianism, since it colored the way in which Confucianism was received. This is no place for a technical exposition of the teaching of Lao Tze, the Old Master. Nor is it important for our purpose. The important thing is the doctrine of the superiority of nature to man, and the conclusion drawn, namely, the doctrine of non-doing. For active doing and striving are likely to be only an interference with nature. The idea of non-doing can hardly be stated and explained; it can only be felt. It is something more than mere inactivity; it is a kind of rule of moral doing, a doctrine of active patience, endurance, persistence while nature has time to do her work. Conquering by yielding is its motto. The workings of nature will in time bring to naught the artificial fussings and fumings of man. Give enough rope to the haughty and ambitious, and in the end they will surely be hung in the artificial entanglements they have themselves evolved.

There is nothing exclusively Chinese in this point of view. But no other people has become so saturated with its consequences. It is at the root of their laissez-faire, contented, tolerant, pacific, humorous and good-humored attitude toward life. It is also at the root of their fatalism. The teachings of Lao Tze have been influential because they expressed something congenial to Chinese temperament and habits of life. China is agrarian, agricultural; everybody knows that fact. But while we know it, we forget how long and how stable is their agriculture. The title of a book by an American agriculturist, Farmers of Forty Centuries, is infinitely significant when we reflect upon it. Other peoples have been farmers. But by their methods they have exhausted the soil and gone down, or they have turned to other occupations, which have supplanted farming in importance. But the Chinese have gone on tilling, tilling, tilling, even, as in north China, against great odds; and their soil is still productive, as productive, probably, as ever it was.

This is an unparalleled human achievement. It helps explain the conservatism of the Chinese, their laissez-faire reverence for nature and their contempt for hurried and artificial devices of man’s contriving. Their minds are as steeped in contact with natural processes as their bodies are apt for agricultural work. They are conservative because for thousands of years they have been conserving the resources of nature, nursing, preserving, patiently, obstinately. While western peoples have attacked, exploited and in the end wasted the soil, they have conserved it. The results are engraved upon both Chinese and western psychologies. The Chinese have learned to wait for the fruition of slow natural processes. They cannot be hustled because in their mode of life nature cannot be hustled. Why be in a hurry when hurry only means
vexation for yourself and either accomplishes nothing in nature or else interferes with its processes and so hinders the natural harvest?

It is not meant that there is nothing but good in this attitude. Virtues and defects, excellencies and weaknesses go together. Western fatalism takes the form of believing that, since what is going to happen will happen, we might in the meantime as well go our own way. It is like the fatalism of soldiers in the trenches. Oriental fatalism is directed upon the present rather than upon the future. Why do anything, why try, why put forth energy to change conditions? Non-doing runs easily into passive submission, conservation into stubborn attachment to habits so fixed as to be 'natural', into dread and dislike of change.

But it is meant that the Chinese philosophy of life embodies a profoundly valuable contribution to human culture and one of which a hurried, impatient, over-busied and anxious West is infinitely in need. It is also meant—and this will appear to be the more 'practical' point—that this philosophy of life is so ingrained in the Chinese people that we cannot understand their way of dealing with political and social problems unless we take it into account. And if we do not understand it, we shall not be able to deal with them, in either politics or business, intelligently and successfully. To attain success, to achieve anything worth while in our relations with the Chinese we have to adopt enough of their own point of view to recognize the importance of time. We must give them time and then more time; we must take time ourselves while we give them time.

The teachings of Laotze spring from the depths of Chinese life and in turn they have influenced that life. Much of the actual effect, as it comes home to the individual farmer, has no connection with the general theory. As a philosophy in the abstract, the farmer would not recognize or understand it. It is associated for him with a mass of superstitions and geomantic practices. Yet even the superstitions are bound up with a general attitude toward nature. The most widely influential custom is that called Feng-shui, literally translated, 'wind-water'. The belief in Feng-shui is a belief in certain mystical influences connected with the land. Upon the propitious working of these forces depends the prosperity of the dead, the ancestral spirits, and of the living family. These forces are easily disturbed and their equilibrium and benign operation interfered with. This belief was an earlier obstacle to the introduction of railways and it is still a mighty obstacle in the way of opening new mines, and, in general, of introducing new industrial forces.

It is easy to dismiss the whole belief as a gross superstition, which is degrading intellectually as well as inimical to progress. But it is also easy to rationalize the doctrine. Then one would see in it a belief that the land and its energies belong to the whole succession of human beings, past generations and future. The present generation is a trustee of the family and race, of ancestry and posterity. The exploitation of the land must therefore be regulated in the interest of the whole succession. This rationalization is as extreme in one direction as the view that the Chinese system of geomancy is a degrading superstition is in the other. But the doctrine of Feng-shui is at least a remarkable exhibition of piety toward nature and it has been a power for conservation as well as for conservatism.

The general point of view of Confucianism is the opposite of that of Taoism. It magnifies the importance of art, of culture, of humanity, of learning and moral effort. Naturally, therefore, this doctrine influenced the scholars and upper classes much as Taoism spread among the people. Yet in many respects the actual effect of Confucianism has been like that of Taoism. In inculcating reverence for the classic literature of the past as the well-spring of wisdom, it supplied intellectual reasons for conservatism. In exalting moral and intellectual, as superior to physical, power, it taught patient disregard for display of military and political force, which is sure, in the end, to be brought to naught by reason.

It created that extraordinary reverence for the teacher, that conviction of his abiding influence upon the life as well as the learning of pupils, which is so remarkable a trait of Chinese life, and which helps to explain the tendency of the Chinese to rely upon pacific reason rather than upon brawling force for settlement of troubles. Is there any other people that has persistently believed that the influence of the teacher is in the end the most powerful of all social forces? What other nations are there whose heroes are moral teachers rather than revealers of supernatural affairs, priests, generals, statesmen?
Though Confucianism has had its especial career among the upper and official classes, yet its net effect has merged with the influence of Laotze to create a definite contempt for politics and an aversion to government as the West understands the term. To the Taoist, government is unnatural, an interference by men with the orderly operations of nature. The emperors, even the alien Tartars and Manchus, had to bow to this conviction. They got around the people by adopting their belief, by giving the emperor a mystic significance. He was the agent of the people in reverencing Heaven.

The emperor did not govern. He ruled by not governing, by not interfering with the real government, the customs of the people, which were so immemorial and so interwoven in agriculture with the operations of nature that they themselves were like the workings of nature. Tribute paid him was not so much political taxation as an expression of loyalty to the natural and moral forces that he embodied. If nature failed to function, if famines and floods recurred, if his demands became extortionate and his officers ceased to be fathers and mothers of the people, these were signs that he no longer represented Heaven. Then the people became, pending the restoration of righteous and benevolent order, the representatives of Heaven. According to Mencius (who emphasized this more democratic side of Confucianism) the people under such circumstances had not only the right but the duty of deposing the ruling house.

In putting down, largely in western terms, these suggestions about the philosophy of the Chinese, one is painfully conscious of their inadequacy. But even so, they show why the Chinese maintain such confidence in the outcome of events, in spite of so much that is discouraging. China has survived many such periods. But after a while the civil power, that is, the moral and intellectual, has reasserted itself, and the stable industry of the people has again become dominant. Even now, in spite of conditions that would throw any western state into chaos, there is steady progress among the people.

In her external relations, China undoubtedly faces a new situation. It is not safe to argue that, because she has always conquered her conquerors before, she is certain to do so this time. Her conquerors before were her inferiors in everything but military power and skill. Now she deals with peoples who are her superiors in natural science and in its applications to industry and commerce. Conquest of China by economic penetration that will reduce her population to a proletariat working for foreign capitalists backed by superior military resources, is a very different thing from direct military subjugation. Yet the reasons for China's historic confidence are still not wholly shaken.

It is a common saying that China manages her international relations on the basis of an old maxim about playing the barbarians off against one another. This fact sometimes inspires a frantic appeal for all foreign nations to get together and impose their unified will upon China. Propagandists for a foreign nation often bid Americans beware of expressions of Chinese regard for the United States. They say these are only another instance of a policy based on the old maxim; and that, if it succeeds, China with a bland smile will retire again into herself and forget her affection for the United States. This argument, taken at its worst, suggests the difficulty in the way of forming a stable combination among the Powers on the basis of material interests. It indicates that the only lasting union of Powers with respect to China must be formed upon a moral basis. A cut-throat union against China will in time bring about a cut-throat policy of the nations in the union toward one another. If the policy is tried, and, as a result of struggle among the nations, China regains her own, she will be entitled to smile at one more proof of the superiority of moral to material forces.

In the end, an understanding of the Chinese philosophy of life is not only essential to an intelligent treatment of Chinese problems, but it is of immense value to other nations. Not China alone but the world is in transition and liquidation. Psychologists talk about 'projection'. Persons who are irritated in themselves are always irritated about others. The principle applies in social psychology. Nations are now 'projecting' their own troubles and uncertainty upon China. The result may easily be rash and inconsiderate action. An adoption of Chinese calm and patience, a willingness to take only the steps, like disarmament and abolition of special privileges, which are immediately necessary, and to wait till time has adjusted the present troubled condition, would have a wonderfully healing effect. For it is not true that Chinese
difficulties have suddenly become a menace to the world's peace and prosperity. It is only true that western nations are in danger of condensing their own troubles and unloading them upon China. The philosophy of the East was never more needed by the West than in the present crisis. [DewJ43]
I, Dewey, John. *Is China a nation?* [ID D28482].

An answer could easily be given to the questions in Mr. Helburn's letter which would be literally correct, and yet almost wholly misleading. China certainly is not a nation as we know nations in Europe. It is sprawling, not compact. It is as diversified as Europe, if not more so, instead of being homogeneous like Switzerland or France. Every one has heard of students from the north and south who talk to one another in English so as to be understood. But there are populous parts of China where a native has to go only a few miles to fail to understand the language of his compatriots. As for political self-consciousness, let the following true story serve. Students went from Shanghai to a neighboring village at the beginning of the anti-Japanese agitation a year and a half ago. The villagers listened patiently to their impassioned pleas for an interest in the policies of Peking dominated by 'traitors', and for a patriotic boycott of Japan. Then they said in effect: 'This is very well for you. You are Chinese. But we are Jonesvillians. These things are not our business'. And this was not in the hinterland but close to the most developed coast city.

Yet if any would argue alone or chiefly to the future from such facts, he would certainly go wrong. Not because they are not massively representative, but because things are in flux. It is not safe to prophesy where they are going. But they are going somewhere, so that a Chinese politician who goes steadily contrary to the interests of China as a nation is sure of overthrow sooner or later. Even a Chinese within China cannot safely base his actions upon the state of things which is correctly represented above. Yet it would be equally unsafe to argue to the existence a persistently influential minority from the fact of the thousands of telegrams sent to Paris in protest against signing a treaty that had within it the Shantung clause, or from the fact that a cabinet dominated by pro-Japanese politicians, and in control of finance and the army, simply did not dare enter into direct negotiations with Japan about Shantung. In a crisis there may be a minority so substantial as to be dominating. But only in a crisis.

Is China a nation? No, not as we estimate nations. But is China becoming a nation, and how long will it take? These are the open questions. Any one who could answer them definitely could read the future of the Far East like a book. But no one can answer them definitely. In this suspense and uncertainty lies the momentous interest of the situation. When did nations begin to be, anyway? How long has France been a compact and homogeneous nation? Italy, Germany? What forces made them nations? And what is going to be the future of the national state outside of China? What is the future of internationalism? Our whole concept of a nation is of such recent origin that it is not surprising that it does not fit in any exact way into Chinese conditions. And possibly the days in which political nationality is most fully established are also the days of its beginning to decline. The last suggestion may be wild. But it suggests that the world as well as China is in flux, and that answers to the questions whether and when China is to be a nation, and what kind of a nation it is to be, cannot be found till we know also what is going to happen in Russia, and Europe generally.

At present, to continue the negative side of the affair, there is little public spirit in China. Family and locality spirit give China its strength for its old traditional ends and its weakness for contemporary conditions and for international relations. Even among the politicians factional spirit is much stronger than public or national spirit—and this is a weakness alike for traditional and new objects. A big army eats up public revenues and makes China increasingly dependent upon foreign loans and subject to foreign spirit interference. It is of no use for national aggression and of next to none for national defense. It is of use for graft, for personal ambitions and factional strife. China has all the disadvantages of both extreme centralization and extreme states' rights, and few of the advantages of either. There is not only a division between north and south, but a cross division in both the north and south, and in addition a multitude of cross currents of provincial isolations and ambitions.

And yet was the United States a nation in the critical years after 1785? Was there not a bitter civil war only sixty years ago, and did not Gladstone announce that Jefferson Davis had created a new nation? Are all questions of national unity and states' rights yet settled? Not many centuries ago European politicians took funds from foreign governments to strengthen the hands of their own factions, and upon occasion foreign interference was invited or welcomed for furtherance of party or religious strife. Hardly today are the respective claims of
state and church fully adjusted, while up till recently a church located outside the nation claimed and secured powers of intervention. And this at least is a complication which China is spared.

I have recently read the words of an intelligent English visitor in America to the effect that the diversity of unfused populations and traditions is such that the United States is one country only in the sense in which the continent of Europe is one. And at about the same time H.G. Wells, using a different criterion, that of freedom and ease of movement and transportation, was saying that the United States was such a complete empire within itself that we could not speak of it and of France as nations in the same sense of the word nation. Such miscellaneous citations warn us that we cannot use the conception of nation in any but a fluid sense, even in western affairs. They indicate the difficulty in making hard and fast statements about Chinese national unity.

When we turn from political to economic affairs, our habitual western ideas are even less applicable. Their irrelevancy makes it impossible intelligently to describe Chinese conditions, or even grasp them intelligently. In the familiar sense of the word, there is no bourgeoisie in China. There used to be a gentry with considerable unwritten power, but for the time being at least it is practically non-existent. The merchant class is traditionally outside of political concerns, and has not as yet developed any political or social class consciousness, though some signs of its beginnings were evidenced in connection with the boycott of 1919. Even in the west one has considerable difficulty in placing the farmers in the bourgeoisie-proletariat terminology (one is tempted to say patter). And how is a class of peasant proprietors who form not merely the vast mass of a people but its economic and moral backbone, who are traditionally and in present esteem, the respectable part of the population, next to the scholars, to be classified under our western notions? Even in the west the point of these distinctions is the product of the industrial revolution. And in China the industrial revolution has still to occur. China is a much better place to study European history of a few centuries ago than to apply the concepts and classifications of present political and economic science. The visitor spends his time learning, if he learns anything about China, not to think of what he sees in terms of the ideas he uses as a matter of course at home. The result is naturally obscurity rather than light. But it may be questioned whether the most enlightening thing he can do for others who are interested in China is not to share with them his discovery that China can be known only in terms of itself, and older European history. Yet one must repeat that China is changing rapidly; and that it is as foolish to go on thinking of it in terms of old dynastic China—as Mr. Bland for example insists we must do—as it is to interpret it by pigeon-holing its facts in western conceptions. China is another world politically and economically speaking, a large and persistent world, and a world bound no one knows just where. It is the combination of these facts that give it its overpowering intellectual interest for an observer of the affairs of humanity.

The question of China's nationhood, as the writer of the letter of inquiry goes on to observe, 'is not an idle one. China is the stock example of survival by submission. If she is a nation in the European or Balkan sense, it is obvious that Japan cannot sit upon her chest forever. If not, the nation that organizes her industries and education may be able to swallow her, for political and economic purposes, more completely than England swallowed India—swallowed, if not digested. Or the old inertia of size and patience may prevail, and the Japanese be swallowed and digested like their predecessors.'

These remarks are pertinent, and they enter into the constant query of the foreign observer in China. And yet he can hardly go further than noting the problem, noting the flux of events, and some of the factors that may turn its direction. It is not safe, for one thing, to argue that because China has absorbed all previous invaders she will end by incorporating into herself future intruders. Her previous conquerors were northern barbarians upon a lower plane of civilization. What would have happened if they had brought with them a superior technique of industry and administration no one knows. Marquis Okuma is reported to have accounted for China's long story of independent existence on the ground that she had no railways. At first sight this may seem to resemble the child's statement that pins save persons' lives, because persons don't swallow them. But it suggests the radically different character of ancient and
modem invasions. The latter centre about exploitation of previously unused economic resources. A country that had possession of China's ports, railways, mines and communications would have China in subjection. The wiser the invading country, the less would she assume the burdens of civil administration beyond necessary policing. She would act as permanent exploiting capitalist using the natural resources and unskilled labor of the country to serve her own ends. In addition she would doubtless try to conscript native man-power for her armies. Generally speaking, the natives would act as coolies, the foreigners as upper-class personages. Under such conditions, success or non-success in cultural assimilation would amount to little.

But as soon as such things are said, the mind at once recalls that improvement of internal communication and transportation has been a chief factor in developing countries into political units, while oppression from without has been the other great factor. The same forces are operating in China and will continue to operate. Nationalistic feeling as it now exists is largely the product of reaction against foreign encroishments. It is strongest on the sea board not merely because industrial development is most advanced there, but because the aggressions of foreigners have been most felt at that point. Effort to take advantage of absence of national unity to subject a country is likely to end in creating a national consciousness. Korea is a striking example. Politically corrupt and divided, with no national political consciousness, less than a generation of alien rule combined with industrial and educational changes designed wholly to subserve the interests of the foreign power, have almost converted Korea into a second Ireland. History seems to show that nations are hardened into being under influences intended to subvert nationality. China is not likely to be an exception. While it is not a nation 'in being', events are probably evoking a nation 'in becoming'. And the process is hastened by efforts to prevent it. At the same time no report is honest which does not state that almost any faction in any part of China, north or south, will surrender national rights to a foreign country in return for factional aid against its internal foes.

One other factor in probable evolution should be mentioned. For a long time, the great Powers, with the exception of the United States, proceeded upon the assumption that China was bound to be disintegrated, and that the policy of each foreign nation was to get its fair share of the spoils. This statement may be too strong. But at least the working assumption was that whenever any disintegration occurred, surrender to one nation must be compensated for, at China's expense, by concessions to others. The world war made conditions such that other nations could not compete with Japan in this game. It is fairly clear now that the disintegration of China would be almost exclusively to Japan's advantage. Hence a great access of benevolent interest on the part of other Powers in China's national integrity. China's historic foreign policy has been to play one Power off against another. Now she is aided by a tendency of all the Powers to give her at least passive assistance against Japanese encroachments. The formation of the consortium with its abolition of distinctive spheres of foreign influence, the question of the re-affirmation or abrogation of the British-Japanese Alliance, the Shantung affair, acquire their meaning in this context. The as yet unsolved question is what Japan can by promise or threat offer by way of compensation to other great Powers to induce them to give her a freer hand in China.

An American educator long resident in central China remarked to me that China was trying to crowd into a half century literary, religious, economic, scientific and political revolutions which it had taken the western world centuries to accomplish. The remark indicates the difficulty in making predictions and in offering definite descriptions. In spite of the inertia and stability that still dominate the vast rural districts, in spite of non-fulfillment of specific past prophecies of changing China, China is in a state of flux. The accumulated effect of thousands of petty changes due to contact with western methods and ideas, has been to create a new mind in the educated class. This fact is at present more important than any single big external change or external failure to change that can be singled out. It will take a long time for this new mind to work itself out in definite achievement or even to trace definitely perceptible lines of progress. But these conditions which make intelligent description to difficult are those which lend China its absorbing interest. [DewJ26]
Letter from John Dewey to Albert C. Barnes

135 Peking Feb 16 [1921]

Dear Barnes,

When I wrote you about your letter concerning my lectures, I omitted my main point—appreciation of your appreciation. I was particularly touched that you found some esthetic pattern and rhythm because that is my weak point and you are a good judge. Intermin came the other day for which more thanks; I haven't had time to get far into it yet.

You wrote once about Chinese pictures, and I wrote back the risk was too great, and as only an expert can tell the date—and the expert collectors are largely at loggerheads with one another, each claiming that the other has got more or less fooled by imitations which have been palmed off on him. Lately I've been buying a few cheap ones, or rather Mrs Dewey has, which do not pretend to be very old but which have some artistic merit besides being typically Chinese—two quite stunning Ming decorations, like florid wall paper or cretonne patterns, flowers and pheasant for a few dollars. We have had the advantage of a the knowledge of a collector who has lived here many years a Dane, and who has himself a fine collection which he generous about showing, most collectors were not And he very generously gave the benefit of his not only his advice but his ability to buy cheap. Mostly flowers and birds, she says landscapes except the old and very expensive ones have no foreign market in case one needs to sell. We also have had an opportunity at some more expensive ones. A friend in the Ministry of Education who is something of a technical expert told us he had been given pictures this year by old officials who had to sell to dispose of them for them. He showed us some nice Ming landscapes, which could be had for from a hundred to two hundred, which he is confident are originals; we didn't get any but sent him to Russell who bought one. He says he has sold Sung's this winter for from a thousand to two thousand—foreigners say that can be done and are suspicious because he sold them so cheap—so only Chinese bought them. I didn't see any of them, but he says when he gets more he will let us see them. Really good pictures are very hard to get at here. The price is Mex dollars which are now only fifty cents gold—which cuts the price in American money in two. I am just beginning to feel a little more confidence in my judgment. Everything is so different that the except for the really fine things the standards one brings won't work. Just both the Chinese and Japanese prize foreign things that are ugly to us. Their own artistic standards won't work and so they are lost, and it is more less so with foreign appreciation of Chinese productions. Sometimes the foreigner is right, as in the case of Japanese color prints. We have been amusing ourselves lately by buying belt buckles, brass and white jade. They haven't been worn since the Revolution, and in general the Chinese don't care for them any more so they are on the market, tho the brass ones are hard to find comparatively. [Charles August] Ficke who made a small fortune on Japanese prints when they were selling for coppers started in buying jade buckles recently, and took a big collection home. Witter Bynner who has just been here and who is a friend of Bynn Fickes has is taking home a still bigger collection together with a copla hundred of the cheaper Chinese paintings. Ours will be just big enough to cost more than we can afford and not big or choice enough to be really valuable. Howver hunting and bargaining is lots of fun; its the chief outdoor amusement going around to stores and markets, and porcelains are now rare and out of reach, even good imitations are high. Otherwise life is calm, nothing going on except famine drives. Chinese are depressed politically and economically, students quiet and discouraged, and generally there is a great lull. Civil war between the chief military leaders of the north is prophesied for this spring, but prophecies are the long suit here. Aside from the fortunes of the Consortium now also a lull. The only other political talk is whether the British are back of the war talk between America and Japan; practically verybody, Chinese Americans and Japanese in Peking believes they are, but it is hard to get proof. Reuters agency which is a British political agency under the name of a news bureau is certainly active in keeping the rumors going. Just why they should stir up this talk when they are hard to going to renew their alliance is hard to see, also when America relations with Germany are still undetermined. One theory is that they want us to buy their alliance with Japan but by remitting her war debt but that seems incredible. Anything how British foreign policy as seen from the Asiatic end is anything but attractive.
Sincerely yours, Dewey [DewJ3]
A Chinese student who is now in this country and who was an active leader in the Students' Revolt in 1918 in Peking, recently remarked to me that the conduct of the Chinese official delegation in Washington had led him to reflect upon Chinese higher education. Or rather, he thought their course was a reflection of Chinese education in certain of its phases. He regarded the delegation as having failed essentially in their task. He recognized that conditions in China and also the exigencies of American politics—or what the American representatives took to be such—had a large share in the failure of China to accomplish her aims. But he said there was another failure for which the Chinese delegates were responsible: there had been at Washington no representative voicing of existent Chinese national sentiment. Certain practical failures might be conceded to be inevitable; but there was only one explanation of the failure to express the active contemporary attitude of the Chinese people, and that was found in unrepresentative qualities in the delegates.

So far his view of the situation is of primary and practical interest to the Chinese. It concerns Americans only as they are sympathetic with China and desirous of seeing her just aspirations properly expressed. But the connection of the fact he cites—if it be a fact—with the state of the higher education of the Chinese touches us closely. All three of the delegates are American educated; two of them studied in missionary institutions conducted by Americans in China before they came to America to study. And these two—the diplomats of the delegation—are those whose methods have been most unsatisfactory to Chinese at home and in this country. The third member, the one who had not come under missionary auspices in his preparatory education in China, is the one who is regarded as most nearly representative of present day China. Now the educational conclusion which the student-leader had drawn was that American missionary education has failed to develop independent, energetic thought and character among even its most distinguished graduates. It has produced rather a subservient intellectual type, one which he characterized as slavish.

The literal correctness of his premises and his conclusions need not be categorically affirmed. It is easy to deny the premises, or to hold that they are too slight to bear the burden of the conclusion. There are not many non-Chinese who know enough to judge the situation and I do not count myself among the few who can judge. But one thing can be positively affirmed. The view in question expresses a belief that is widely and increasingly held in China. It contains elements that are of prime importance. It suggests the attitude of the Young China of today as distinct from that Young China which figures in the writings of men like Mr. J.O.P. Bland, who if not important in himself is important as the spokesman of a definite class of foreigners in China who have been the most influential persons in purveying information and forming foreign opinion about China.

The Young China of which the Bland School speaks consists of a group of foreign educated men, of whom the two diplomats of the official delegation at the Washington Conference are good representatives. Young China viewed from this angle means men who have gone into politics, domestic and diplomatic, with Western, usually American, preconceptions, and who have tried to force Western, usually American, political conceptions and methods upon China. They have failed, failed tragically, it is said, because of the intrinsic unfitness of their conceptions and methods to immemorial traditions and customs and engrained racial traits of the Chinese people—inmemorial, atavistic and racial are the literary slogans of this school of foreign commentators on China. The failure goes back to the well-meaning efforts of missionaries who have bungled because of their ignorant attempts to foist alien ways of thought and of political action upon China. With this condemnation of Young China and its foreign sponsors goes a condemnation of all attempts of China to become republican in government and to transform its culture.

I do not know to what extent this picture ever truly represented a Young China. But events move rapidly in China, and certainly the Young China of today has nothing in common with this picture. Present Young China is bent upon a genuine transformation of Chinese culture—sometimes a revolutionary breaking with the past, but in any case a transformation. It is democratic, but its democracy is social and industrial; there is little faith in political action, and not much interest in governmental changes except as they may naturally reflect
changes in habits of mind. There is in it little sympathy with missionary efforts, not because they represent the West, but because it is believed that they do not represent what China most needs from the West, namely, scientific method and aggressive freedom and independence of inquiry, criticism and action. Hence the remark quoted earlier about the cause of the failure of Chinese diplomacy in Washington and its root in the weakness of the education given by Americans in China.

In wanting a transformation of their country, the Young Chinese have no thought of a Westernized China, a China which repeats and imitates Europe or America. They want Western knowledge and Western methods which they themselves can independently employ to develop and sustain a China which is itself and not a copy of something else. They are touchingly grateful to any foreigner who gives anything which can be construed as aid in this process. They are profoundly resentful of all efforts which condescendingly hold up Western institutions, political, religious, educational, as models to be humbly accepted and submissively repeated. They are acutely aware that the spirit of imitation at the expense of initiative and independence of thought has been the chief cause of China's retrogression, and they do not propose to shift the model; they intend to transform the spirit.

There is nothing which one hears so often from the lips of the representatives of Young China of today as that education is the sole means of reconstructing China. There is no other topic which is so much discussed. There is an enormous interest in making over the traditional family system, in overthrowing militarism, in extension of local self-government, but always the discussion comes back to education, to teachers and students, as the central agency in promoting other reforms. This fact makes the question of the quality and direction of American influence in Chinese education a matter of more than academic concern. The difficulties in the way of a practical extension and regeneration of Chinese education are all but insuperable. Discussion often ends in an impasse: no political reform of China without education; but no development of schools as long as military men and corrupt officials divert funds and oppose schools from motives of self-interest. Here are all the materials of a tragedy of the first magnitude. Apart from this question of education what is done and what is not done in Washington is of secondary moment. It makes vital the matter of American influence. There is a great and growing philanthropic interest in America for China. It shows itself in support of educational schemes and in generous relief funds. It is not motivated to any considerable extent by economic considerations, by expectation of business profits, nor by political expediencies. It is motivated largely by religious considerations. It is well intentioned, but the intentions are not always enlightened in conception nor in execution. It was not a disgruntled foreigner nor a jealous, anti-foreign Chinese who told me that American missionary colleges in China had largely simply transplanted the American college curriculum and American conceptions of 'discipline'; and that instead of turning out graduates who could become leaders in developing the industries of China on an independent Chinese basis, it had turned out men who when they went into industry took subordinate positions in foreign managed industries, because of their training especially in the English language. There is no difference in effect between this statement and that quoted at the beginning of this article about fostering the dependent, the slavish, mind and character. And a missionary actively engaged in educational work was its author.

American influence in Chinese education should have something better to do than to train commercial, political and religious compradores.

Something can be done by encouraging such American managed institutions as are trying to develop a better type of school; by freeing those men who are adapting their curriculum and methods to Chinese conditions against the petty opposition and nagging they now meet from reactionaries. There are a few institutions in China where the Chinese members of the faculty are put on the same plane of salary, of social dignity and administrative importance as the foreigners. Let the philanthropically inclined whose philanthropy is something more than a cloak for fanatic meddlesomeness or selfishness select these institutions for aid. Not many know that at present some American millions of a special fund are being spent in China for converting souls; that they go only to those who have the most dogmatic and reactionary theological views, and that the pressure of these funds is used to repress the liberal element...
and to put liberal institutions in bad repute as well as in financial straits. That is a shameful business from any point of view, and it ought to be met by a generous and wise business. China does not need copies of American colleges, but it does still need colleges supported by foreign funds and in part manned by well trained foreigners who are capable of understanding Chinese needs, alert, agile, sympathetic in their efforts to meet them. But of course the chief work must be done in distinctively Chinese institutions, staffed mainly and managed wholly by Chinese. Instead of carping at missionaries we should remember that they have been almost the only ones in the past with a motive force strong enough to lead them to take an active interest in Chinese education. It would seem as if the time had come when there are some persons of means whose social and human interest, independent of religious considerations, might show itself in upbuilding native schools. Above all else, these schools need modern laboratories and libraries and well trained men of the first rank who can train Chinese on the spot to the use of the best methods in the social arts and the natural and mathematical sciences. Such men could train not only students but younger teachers who are not as yet thoroughly equipped and who too often are suffering from lack of intellectual contact. First class men who go to China in this spirit with nothing to 'put over' except their knowledge, their methods and their skill will meet with a wonderful response. Somewhere in America there must be men of means who can give their money and men of science who can contribute their services in this spirit. Their work will not be done for the sake of the prestige or commerce of the United States but it will be done for the sake of that troubled world of which China and the United States are integral parts. Build up a China of men and women of trained independent thought and character, and there will be no Far Eastern 'problems' such as now vex us; there will be no need of conferences to discuss—and disguise—the 'Problems of the Pacific'. American influence in Chinese education will then be wholly a real good instead of a mixed and dubious blessing. [DewJ44]

1921.03.07  John Dewey : Lecture 'On the Chinese fine arts' at the Fine Arts Club of Beijing Teachers College. = Lun Zhongguo di mei shu. Hu Shi interpreter ; Cao Peiyan, Wang Huibo recorder. In : Chen bao fu kan ; March 7 (1921). [Kee3]
Letter from John Dewey to Albert C. Barnes
135 Morrison St Peking | March 13 '21

Dear Mr Barnes,…

An American business engineer who knows China of old and who has just come over, remarked that the Consortium was more anxious to protect old investments in China than to make new ones at present. I think he struck the nail on the head so far as the financial side is now concerned. Mr [Frederick Waeir] Stevens their present representative is an extraordinarily honest man, almost innocently so. You may imagine that he is so clever that he has duped me, but I know the Chinese secy very well, in fact I recommended him, and he has been with Mr S every day now for many weeks. He is not the kind of man who would be sent if there were an intrigue to be put over, but is the kind who would be sent when a waiting policy was the key-note. Meantime the Chinese govt is on the verge of bankruptcy. The business man to whom I just referred said the same was true when he was here four years, it didnt seem as if it could least another month, and one gets very suspicious of the "verge" after awhile. But no they have pledged the last thing available and pawned things ahead. For some time they have have been borrowing money to pay interest due, and at enormous rates thirty per cent being common. It is possible that before you get this letter cables may have reported a bust-up. What will happen no one can tell. There may be a kind of international receivership; there may be a monarchical restoration; there is no doubt there is wide-spread reaction agt the "Republic"; there may be a civil war between the two military leaders of the faction now in control—Chang Tsolin of Manchuria and and Tsao Kun of this province, fairly likely anyway and Chang is a monarchist—there may be secession of all central and south China, and if a monarchy in the north a virtual tho not an avowed Japanese protectorate, or any combination of some or all of these things. Yet the expected is what almost never happens in China. Id like to saty over another year to see what happens, but nothing ever comes to a head and another year and another, there would still be the waiting to see something definitive happen. The movement for provincial autonomy is the most sure thing. Five southern provinces are now practically independent of any govt outside their own borders, and the movement is spreading north. This is the most healthful sign on the horizon even tho it means a transitional breakup of China, for with locally centred govt it may [b]e possible to secure responsibility and now there is none. The ablest of the young Chinese g[ave] us a half hour conversation the other evening on Chinese history as bearing on present situation. He finds the key in the constant conflict of Chinese civilization limited to a few Central [P]rovinces with outside barbarian tribes. In this struggle, the north has been practically barbarized by the Mongols, Tartars etc, altho socially Chinafied, and to him north China is the weight that holds China back. He makes an analogy with the history of Medieval Europe, except the northern barbarians here are not as promising material. as the northern barbarians of Europe. The extreme south Canton etc w[a]s of course also barbarians but of a different type, less stolid, more adventurous and hence progressive. The Yangste regions are the backbone of China proper. In a few weeks we are going south, to the province of Fukien, Foochow and Amoy. It is likely the schools here may close for lack of funds, and in that case I hope to go to Canton also and to spend more time in the south. Teachers have been paid only up to Nov and at that only under pressure from repeated threats to strike, and the latest rumor is that to save face the govt will move first and close the schools, instead of waiting for the teachers to close them by a strike. One of the beauties of Chinese govt is that each dept has its "own" funds, so that the dept of communications is rolling in wealth, comparatively, while the rest of the govt is bankrupt. Its like each general having his own army. The present govt is a coalition of part of the generals with the financial interest of the dept of communication politicians—or financiers…

Sincerely yours, Dewey— [pencil postscript] Have got sailing from Yokahama Aug 19 [DewJ3]
1921.03.16  Dewey, John. *The Far Eastern deadlock* [ID D28484].

The key to peace in the Far East exists at the present time in America. That much is fairly certain. But it is doubtful whether anyone knows just where the key is to be found and whether anyone knows well enough what it looks like to recognize it if he stumbles upon it. The lock, however, is clear. It is the relations of Japan and America. For at present the relations of the United States to China and Siberia, so far as larger matters are concerned, are not direct but through Japan. There are two keys which are being tried which certainly will not fit; the third key we may call a statesmanlike policy, while admitting this to be the x whose value is to be found. The two courses most in evidence and most talked about, which are bound to result in making affairs worse, are buying Japan off and nagging her.

The policy of keeping peace between Japan and America by bribing Japan or buying her off has had of late a number of eminent representatives—though naturally they have not called their plea by these bald words in public—possibly not within the recesses of their own minds have they named it so frankly. The steps of the argument are these. Japan has a small territory and a large and rapidly increasing population; seven hundred thousand per annum has been the favorite propagandist figure. She also has a shortage of raw materials and of food supplies. An outlet of population is imperatively demanded. The 'white' countries, having land to spare, refuse to admit the Japanese as immigrants. The alternative, necessary to the peace of the world, is expansion upon the continent of Asia and such command of the raw, natural resources of Asia as will enable Japan to develop stable industrialism at home, and increased industry that will take up the slack caused by increase of population. Japan, moreover, is an enterprising, efficient, educated modern nation, with capacity for organization, with respect for law and for government, with a reasonably honest civil service. She is, therefore, admirably suited to take up the Yellow Man's Burden in Siberia and China, countries where government is flouted and corrupt, and which are in no sense as yet fitted to become equal partners in the society of nations in either business or politics. Moreover, as respects China, there is unity of culture, some say of race; the Japanese understand the Orientals of Asia and what is good for them as no white race does—and so on to the end of the chapter.

The moral is clear. The world in general and America in particular should look with a benevolent neutrality upon the efforts of Japan to establish herself on the continent of Asia, whether in Siberia, Manchuria or Shantung. So speeches and articles always end with a vague plea for that desirable something called a sympathetic understanding of Japan and her serious problems, and with an assurance that, having been in Japan, the speaker or writer knows from personal intercourse with the real leaders of Japan that she desires above all things in the world the friendliest relations with the United States, and only waits the word from America to go ahead—upon just what course is not stated. There is usually also a vague intimation that Japan, being 'a proud and sensitive nation', will arm and bring on war with the United States if she is pressed too hard and made desperate by lack of outlet and lack of necessary economic resources. Through the whole argument runs a subtle intimation that we can avoid all trouble with Japan by permitting or encouraging her to divert her energies into Asia. Sometimes there is an incidental suggestion that, as Japan will need foreign capital in her Asiatic expansion, the United States can with no trouble to herself come in also for part of the material rewards of such a course.

This is the policy which I call buying Japan off. Its chief significance is not due to the fact that it is advanced by men of some eminence in America—and also by certain Englishmen. It is significant because it reflects the propaganda so accurately that in reading it one gets to know the mind of official and commercial Japan. The visitor may think he has evolved this policy for himself. But anyone long resident in the Far East can almost guess the names of the persons that have been talked with, and can retrace every step of the confidential disclosures and the hesitant suggestions by which the eminent and much entertained foreign guest has been led to make his 'discovery' of the way to enduring good relations between Japan and America.

The policy is adapted to keeping relations between Japan and America amicable for a time. It gives Japan what she wants, in comparison with which the Californian issue is a rattle for a baby. It relieves the United States of diplomatic anxieties for a time, and enables the stream of
after-dinner speeches to continue in an increasing flood of gush. But from the standpoint of a settlement of the serious problems of the Far East it is a fraud. It represents an aggravation of the problems, the sure road to an ultimate unsettlement which may conceivably involve the whole world. Such matters as the claims of an unrestricted growth of population, due to a low standard of living and artificially stimulated by the government, to rule the fate of a continent may be passed over. So may the fact that the first and only official census taken by Japan shows the gain for the last year to be four instead of the seven hundred thousand always advertised.

We also glide over the fact that Shantung is already over-populated, and that Japanese make poor colonists for settling in undeveloped countries and bearing the hardships of Siberia or even Manchuria. We may even slur over the fact that there is already no obstacle to Japanese immigrants going into the unoccupied parts of Asia, as European immigrants go to Canada or the United States—namely as individuals and not as an advance guard of a foreign empire, emissaries of national aggression.

But we cannot pass over the accompaniments and consequences of this latter fact. The persons who repeat the plea of Japan for a free hand on the Asiatic continent, as a means of maintaining good relations and promoting order, efficiency and progress, overlook the fundamental fact of the situation. Japanese methods on the continent have been such as to arouse the profound distrust and hostility of every people with whom the Japanese have come into contact. This fact cannot be got out of the way by references to the backwardness and inefficiency of the native inhabitants. Admitting the most exaggerated statements made by apologists for Japan's course in regard to the administrative and economic superiority of the Japanese over the Chinese and Siberian Russians, it remains a fact that the operations of the Japanese upon the continent are of the exact nature which all over the world have sowed the seeds of ultimate war.

Americans may sometimes wonder in a perplexed way about the contrary reports and views of travellers in the Far East and conclude that the latter become pro- or anti-Japanese for temperamental or accidental reasons. Here is the explanation. Those who have not gone further than Japan realize Japan as a fact; the continent is still a place on the map, an impersonal factor in an intellectual calculation. Those who with eyes and ears half-open have stayed upon the continent realize the condition which has been created by Japanese methods. Apologists may more or less successfully explain away details one by one, accompanied by vague admissions of wrong deeds in the past committed by wicked militarists. But the vast continental fact remains. One may get himself to a point where his subconscious premise is that China and Russia ought to submit willingly to Japan on account of the latter's superiority. This is going far. But even if they ought, they won't. Because they won't, the peace of the Far East is subject to an explosion which may involve the world.

The other dominant fact in the situation is that the United States has no need of buying Japan off. British statesmen seem to feel differently about the need for the British Empire to become a tacit accomplice of Japan. It is arguable that they are guessing wrong. But, in any case, the United States, though she has the Philippines, has no India and no Hong-Kong. War deliberately entered into by Japan against the United States is unthinkable, as unthinkable as between the United States and Colombia. This extreme statement is made advisedly. Individuals in Japan commit hari-kari, but not the nation, and every intelligent person in Japan knows that for Japan an aggressive war with America would be national suicide. They did not know it before the last war; but then the demonstration was more than Euclidean in its rigor. When one thinks of how the United States was taxed in the last war, in spite of its railways, its financial resources and its raw materials, the idea of Japan, with its few narrow gauge railways, few forests, few mines, relatively few factories and shortage of food supply, waging a successful war with any first class industrial Power is simply silly.

At present, having spent her war gains in enterprises in China which are not yet remunerative, and in Siberia—where they will never be remunerative until Kolchak comes to life and successfully resurrects the Omsk government—and having increased her already burdensome taxation to the stretching point, Japan is on her back financially. If she gets control of the manpower and natural resources of the continent, the case will be different. But, short of that
time, which, of course, is artificially hastened by encouraging Japan to exploit Asia for her own benefit, any war between Japan and America will be the result of a series of accidents due to drifting and not to the deliberate choice of the rulers of Japan. There is at least one exception to every 'never'. The exception in this case is that militarists threatened with downfall at home might try to restore their prestige and power by the last desperate gamble of war.

The fact that in order to save ourselves we do not need to buy Japan off, does not imply that we should treat her truculently or irritatingly. There is some danger of our adopting this policy, which will open no locks. I do not mean that we should ever adopt nagging deliberately as a policy; but failure to work out a clear constructive course may practically amount to it. Drifting and diplomatic opportunism making a separate issue out of every matter which comes up; never facing fundamental issues so as to arrive at an understanding regarding them, comes in the end to an irritating course of mutual pin-prickings and blockings which is the most dangerous of all courses. This seems to be the state of affairs into which we are getting, leaving principles in a twilight of purposeful ambiguity such as now exists about the Open Door and the Lansing-Ishii agreement. Dealing with each case of friction which arises, and which in reality comes under these principles, is the sure way to reduce our international relations to a kind of continuous subdued duel, with all the rancor and misunderstandings thereby generated.

Our true policy I have called x. It is not easily discoverable even as regards a statement in words, to say nothing of practical execution. But it does not lie in smooth and flattering words, which gloss over realities, any more than it does in spite, suspicion and nagging. Now is the time of all times to search for and enter upon a definite policy. Japan is practically isolated among the nations, and, what is more, she is beginning to realize it. She is also experiencing the sobering reaction that comes after a prolonged intoxication. She will be lucky, according to all accounts, if she gets off with her present depression, and does not come a greater smash. There is probably more talk about liberalism than there is effective reality; but there is a promising beginning of sentiment if not of active policy, especially in the younger generation. The talk is a sign of a new sensitiveness to the world’s opinion. Above all, Japan realizes her actual dependence upon the United States, a dependence rarely recognized in the United States because it is so out of all proportion to our dependence upon Japan. The dependence is not exhausted in the statistics of international markets and the fact that we are the customer who keeps her industries going. Japan realizes the extent to which her career in China is connected with the ideas and policies of America. She really needs the moral support of the United States to 'go ahead' in any proper sense of that word.

Let me cite as evidence a fact which may not seem important but which, I am convinced, is of great import. Of late, Japanese liberals and Japanese Christians have made repeated, almost continuous, attempts to approach American missionaries and educators, and native Christians in China. They have insisted upon the reformed intentions of the present Japanese Ministry and have almost begged this element in China to take the lead in acting as mediators, appealing to every sentimental principle of good-will and Christian love. Now it is safe to say—and one does not rely wholly upon internal evidence—that this move is not directed primarily at China. China is still despised as weak, negligible. It is directed toward America. Japanese accusations against missionaries of misleading the Chinese and Koreans and stirring up trouble are mostly trumped up. But Japanese fear of the effects in the United States of the reports sent there by missionaries and Y.M.C.A. workers concerning the state of things in China and Korea, Siberia and Manchuria, is perfectly genuine. They estimate that the change of opinion about Japan which they know has taken place in America, the growing dislike of Japan as militaristic and ruthlessly imperialistic is largely due to this influence. They want, in effect, this body to act as mediators between Japan and the public opinion of the United States, having become seriously troubled by the growing power of the latter in the world in general and in China in particular.

In the search for an x of American policy which will be the key to the lock, there are certain known quantities. One is that every appeal to American sympathy on the ground of the growing liberalism of Japan should meet with neither credulity nor cynicism, but with a
request to know what this liberalism is doing, especially what it is doing about China and Siberia. And we should not be content with generality; we should insist on details. Prominent among the details should be facts regarding what the great industrial and financial interests are actually doing in relation to the government at home and developments in China. What are the Okuras, the Mitsubishi, the Mitsuis, the Yokohama Specie Bank doing? It is all very well to talk about the power of militarism in Japan and the desire of the liberals to curb it; but there is no country in the world where financial interests are more concentrated, more powerful or in closer and more direct connection with the government. Why are these interests not using their power to curb and direct the policy of the government? Is it because, while deploring this policy for foreign consumption, they have striven to profit by it in China and Siberia? One thing more. There are signs that the present Chinese government now recognizes that the Twenty-one Demands and the treaties which grew out of them are more important than the Shantung decision, not because the latter is not important but because it is an effect of the former affair. This government is likely soon to approach the Japanese government with a request for cancellation of these treaties. The attitude of the Japanese government and people toward this request will be an acid test of their professions regarding a change of policy and heart. The public opinion of the United States ought to be thrown openly, unanimously and intelligently in support of the request. There is no possible settlement of the problem of the peace of the Far East till the slate is wiped clean of these treaties. Till they are out of the way, all professions of reform and better relations will only create new suspicions in China, and every act will be seen to be merely a manoeuvring for an improved strategic position. The first move in breaking the existing deadlock is to obliterate the treaties connected with the Twenty-one Demands. Any sincere friend of Japanese liberalism will try to make it clear to his Japanese friends that this is the first step in effective Japanese-American cooperation, because it is the precondition of any act on the part of the United States which would not make us the guilty accomplice of Japan and a partner with Japan in the fear and dislike with which she is now regarded. The cancellation of everything connected with the Twenty-one Demands is the only way to put the relations of Japan and China upon a friendly footing. Securing this friendly relation between these two Oriental countries should be the animating purpose of American opinion and action. Then the lock will begin to give. [DewJ28]
If anyone wants a picture in miniature of the difficulties in the way of a concert of nations or of any kind of cooperative inter-national relations, the Consortium to finance China will satisfy him up to the hilt. No one, prior to experience of it, could have believed that so many contradictory accounts of simple matters could get into circulation or so many cross-currents get into motion. No matter from what angle it is approached—and as time goes by it seems to be nothing but angles—there are opposite statements and opposite fears. Every day, for example, the American group in general and Mr. Lamont and Mr. Stevens in particular, are attacked by hostile interests in China, Chinese and foreign, for maintaining secrecy about its terms. Yet seemingly authentic reports state that the American group, backed by the American State Department, has pressed, from the day when the agreement was signed, for full publicity. This demand was checked first by the Japanese and then by the British. It was lately announced that the American demand had been sufficiently successful so that all the documents had been communicated to the Chinese government and made public. So they subsequently were. 'As might have been expected the terms of the agreement are so technical that its publication, while it blocks one source of hostile criticism, throws no great light upon the aims and methods of the Consortium'. For of course the terms form an agreement of the banking groups among themselves, not an agreement to which the Chinese government is a party. Only when—if ever—some actual agreement is made with the latter will there be adequate data for judgment.

Meantime a statement of the cross-currents will be amusing if not enlightening. Reputable Japanese statesmen, as soon as the agreement was signed, stated that the Manchurian claims of Japan had been recognized by the other nations in the Consortium and her interests there safeguarded. Kokusai, the official Japanese news agency, gave to the press in both Japan and China a speech purporting to be by the leading Japanese banking partner, the President of the Yokohama Specie Bank, which gave a definite and almost circumstantial statement of the reservations secured by Japan. Weeks afterwards, the President of the bank completely repudiated the alleged speech. Kokusai never circulated the repudiation, and no explanation of the discrepancy has ever been made public. Meantime Mr. Lamont for the American group and Sir Charles Addis for the British have explicitly denied the report of assent to Japanese reservations, and have praised the wisdom of Japanese statesmen in yielding. The latter are chary in accepting the praise. Hara, the prime minister, and Uchida, the foreign minister, have both lately repeated, although in more guarded terms, the story of due satisfaction afforded Japan in respect to Manchuria.

Meantime the Consortium is attacked in Japan as a piece of American capitalistic imperialism to circumvent legitimate Japanese aspirations in Asia, and in China it is denounced as a surrender by the United States to Japan. Why, it is asked, did the United States consent to Japan’s becoming a partner at all? Why did she not insist upon excluding Japan wholly? If she did admit Japan, why does she allow Japan to retain her railway rights in Manchuria while also permitting, by means of Consortium loans, the introduction of Japanese money into the interior, where so far Japanese money has not gone?—the reference being to the proposed railway into Szechuan. Thus the same scheme is both a checkmate to further Japanese conquest of China by means of railways and banks, and a means for extending Japanese influence in China with the complicity of the three other signatory Powers. The humor of the popular Chinese attitude of opposition is increased by the fact that the present Japanese hold upon China was secured by Chinese governmental acceptance of loans made by Japan individually, a kind of loan that would become impossible under the Consortium. The weighing of alternatives is not as yet a Chinese political habit.

While some American liberals are denouncing the Consortium as financial imperialism, committing the United States to embark upon a career of foreign financial exploitation, it is attacked in China by business interests, including some American ones, as another piece of Wilsonian idealism, a Utopian scheme to save China from being any longer the happy hunting ground of international concessionaires. For in pledging the banks which enter the Consortium to make loans only through the international combination, and virtually pledging the American government to give its moral and political support only to this group, it restricts
what is euphemistically termed (in China as elsewhere) free competition and private enterprise. In other words, there are some American business interests which have become aware of the willingness of Chinese officials to give away their nation’s assets in return for loans with which to line their own pockets, and who, accordingly, find any scheme idealistic and impracticable which would limit their predatory activities. It is fair to add that their opposition seems to be somewhat ‘accelerated’ by support from Chinese officialdom. Another humor of the situation is that while Chinese officialdom is practically a unit in opposing the Consortium, the press is reporting meetings and processions of Chinese in America opposing the Consortium, on the ground that it is going to make loans to the Chinese government which will be used for political purposes. And this attitude of the Chinese in America, while accentuated by the fact that they are mostly Cantonese and southern sympathizers, reflects the popular attitude in China. The opposition of the officials to the Consortium is easily understood. It has been stated over and over again—and by Mr. Stevens, the representative in China of the American banking group,—that no loans would be made for administrative or political purposes but only for constructive purposes, such as building railways. It has also been made clear that all such loans will be carefully supervised and audited to see that they actually go for the purposes designated. The opposition of the Chinese people is accounted for by the fact that their fear and suspicion of their own government officials is second only to their fear and suspicion of Japan. In passing, it may be remarked that it would have had a happy psychological effect if the Consortium had been called by some other name. For the term Consortium is associated in the Chinese mind with the Consortium which made the so-called Reorganization Loan which was the means of consolidating the power of Yuan Shih Kai. That the United States government refused to permit American bankers to become partners in that Consortium, while it has taken the lead in forming a new one, is of little moment in comparison with the dreaded name, Consortium. Even the more thoughtful Chinese believe in the good intentions of America rather than in her wisdom and skill and freely anticipate that, when it comes to doing business, the other national partners, with their greater experience and their greater political stakes, will put it all over American plans.

Illumination upon the political-financial situation came when the subject of exclusion of Chinese bankers from membership in the Consortium was under discussion. In conversation with representative Chinese I expressed, in common with other Americans, regret for the failure to include native banks. The reply was most enlightening. Liberal Chinese said that such inclusion would be the finishing touch to confirm their fears. For the banking group which would be most naturally included were the ‘political bankers’. Chinese officials long ago learned the way of making one hand wash the other. Money extracted from the government was used to found banks, which then made loans to the government at exorbitant rates, and so on around the circle. In addition, these banks naturally exercised great influence in support of the government. They brought about an alliance between powerful financial influences and the corrupt and semi-militaristic officialdom which is the political curse of China. The rates at which foreign loans are made to the Chinese government often seem unjust. Eight and ten per cent interest with ten to fifteen per cent discount on the face of the loan, hardly seems equitable. But these rates pale by the side of those of domestic loans, where twenty to thirty per cent interest is not uncommon. If, the Chinese liberals added, there was any likelihood that the bankers, known indifferently as the Shanghai or industrial bankers, were to be included, the case would be quite different, but of that there seemed no likelihood in the present condition of affairs.

Space remains for one more touch to the picture. While the opponents of the Consortium have represented it as most anxious to make loans, almost to force loans upon China, its American representatives, ever since Mr. Lamont visited the country, have disclaimed any great desire to do so. They have said that they would await specific proposals from the Chinese government; they have asserted that if China could finance herself, and never call upon the Consortium for funds, the American bankers would be more than satisfied. These statements have been received with incredulity. They have been the occasion of much sarcasm about the unusual and suddenly displayed philanthropy of bankers. Some newspapers supposed to
represent American interests in China have been foremost in these ironical expressions. The statements of American representatives of the Consortium that there was plenty of demand for surplus capital at home, that investments in China at the present time were not particularly attractive, that the banks had no funds of their own to put permanently into China but would have to pass on their investments to the general public, that the American bankers were mainly animated by a desire to get China on its feet industrially as a customer and to put an end to the partition of China through special concessions to special nations, have been received in apathetic silence when they were not met with open derision.

So far, I have confined myself to reporting the way in which the Consortium has been received. I now venture to express my own opinion. I am credulous enough to take these statements at their face value. In fact I believe they give the key to the situation. The Consortium was not initiated by American bankers. It is matter of record that the first move came while the war was still on, from the State Department under Mr. Lansing—who is presumably familiar with the Chinese policy of John Hay and interested in its becoming an actuality, instead of, as is largely the case, a scrap of paper. In short, as far as the American government’s side is concerned, the move is political rather than financial. And the politics involved are not imperialistic but are in behalf of the principle which comes so readily to the lips of all diplomats of all nations: the maintenance of the Open Door and the preservation of the territorial integrity of China. It is evident that the chief opposition to this policy lies in separate nationalistic loans made for ‘administrative purposes’ and leading to concessions which partition China. The fact that Japan, Great Britain, France and England were allies in the war, that Germany and Russia were automatically out of it, gave an opportunity for making the professed policy a reality instead of a pious phrase. Mr. Lansing grasped the opportunity.

In short, the Consortium policy exists between two stools, the political and the financial. It is subject to all the dangers which attend such a position. This fact is well known to Japanese, French and British political and financial interests, even if it is ignored by Chinese sentiment and by American public opinion. The United States is thus playing a lone hand in what is ironically called a Consortium. Its policy meets with active, though generally secret, opposition from the officials of the nation it is intended to benefit and with apathy and suspicion from the people. It is not likely that either France or Great Britain will be able to supply their portion of any loans made by the Consortium. Their share will have to come from the American investor. The American investor has no concealed political ambitions to compensate for unwillingness to make investments that are more or less risky from a strictly economic standpoint. The term of the Consortium is five years. If its operations can be stalled for five years, France and Great Britain will perhaps be in a condition to resume business on their own account.

Meantime our late ‘associate’, Great Britain, is anything but anxious to see American prestige and influence increased in the Far East. If her dislike is not so openly proclaimed to the four heavens as that of Japan, it does not follow that her opposition is less efficacious. Incidentally, there are some signs that a drive will be made upon the new administration, partly from sources professing to speak for the interests of China but really speaking for its officials, and partly from some other nations in the Consortium, to make it modify its terms as part of what will be called a ‘permanent settlement’ of the problem of the Pacific. The renewal of the British-Japanese Alliance promises to be an accomplished fact. Japan has the right to expect something from her ally. If a political, or reorganization, or administrative loan could be arranged, active Chinese opposition would melt away; the people would still be opposed and would cherish resentment against America, but they would doubtless acquiesce as they acquiesce in so many things which they hate. Such a loan could be presented to the American public as a wise and kind concession to Chinese needs, and an improvement upon the hard terms of the present Consortium policy. Incidentally, problems of Manchuria, Shantung and Siberia would come up for discussion, and a plea be made for a magnanimous recognition, in the interests of peace, of Japan’s need for economic expansion.

It will be gathered from what has been said that the prospects for the Consortium are not bright. Its apparent failure, however, may mark a real success, provided the present policy
remains unmodified. If a blockade or embargo can be established for even five years upon predatory foreign loans to China, the Consortium meantime doing nothing, a precedent may be established which will make such loans difficult, if not impossible, in the future. The effect may be to throw China back upon her own resources. The best thing that could happen to China would be for her to be put on a starvation diet for a while and to have to face her own problems with her own capacities. A few weeks ago, a native banking group not composed of political banks made a loan for the purchase of railway rolling stock. It was accompanied by conditions of supervision of expenditures more drastic than a foreign group could exact. It was also accompanied by an open threat of political action against the government if the funds loaned were not used honestly. It is perhaps too much to say that the loan could never have taken this form if the Consortium were not the only alternative in sight. But the existence of the Consortium certainly facilitated the creation of an honest domestic loan. It is an indication of the way the Consortium may succeed even if it fails,—fails, that is, to make a loan. [DewJ27]


1921.04.28-05.09 John Dewey stays in Guangzhou : addresses students in High Normal School and Guangzhou Christian College. [DewJ8]

1921.04.30-05.02 John Dewey : Lecture 'Educators as leaders in society' : delivered at the First Teachers College of Fujian. = Jiao yu zhe wei she hui ling shou. In : Chen bao fu kan ; April 30-May 2 (1921). [Kee3]
There exists on the globe—the real globe, not the papier-mâché one—a country with a population of perhaps one-sixth of this world's inhabitants. The history of this country extends over four thousand years. Nowhere else does the earth show such a record of continuity and stability. Yet the story is not one of monotony or stagnation. Within its continuity there is at least as much variety and change as in the history of Europe for two thousand years preceding the seventeenth century. Invention, industrial art, philosophy, poetry and painting of the first order adorn the civilization of this country. At no other time and in no other place have moral ideas, apart from ecclesiastic reinforcement and theological support, been so widely disseminated. Over a thousand years ago, this country gave morals, literature, art and the elements of culture to a neighbor that now ranks among the 'Great Five' of modern nations. Outside of farming, its social order was never very efficient. With an exceedingly small number of exceptions its rulers were corrupt and incompetent. But it got along somehow; it endured. It maintained itself with so little government, in any modern sense of the word, that it is surprising that anarchists have not taken it as their stock example of what can be done on a no-government basis. But it got along in seclusion. Sea, desert and mountains hemmed it in. It was sufficient unto itself, complacent in a conceit of superiority bred of isolation. But at last the industrial revolution made its barriers of no avail. Steam and electricity eliminated distance. The country found itself confronted with forces with which it was utterly unable to cope. Century-old weaknesses were no longer mere domestic incidents. They were a menace of destruction within and an invitation to imperial wolves from without. Contact with new forces produced flagrant exhibition of all accumulated defects and corruptions while at the same time a new and better organized civilization brought with it strange and irresistible temptations to new evils.

In writing of this country—China—faced as it is with the most difficult problem of reconstruction any civilization has ever known, Mr. J.O.P. Bland selects a small group of individuals as being personally responsible for most of its woes. The group he selects to bear the burden of responsibility he calls "Young China," specifically those men who have experienced the destructive effects of western education. And to meet all evils, Mr. Bland has a panacea. It is international foreign control of governmental finance.

To any one with a slight knowledge of the facts in the situation, combined with the rudiments of a social imagination, this bare statement makes superfluous any detailed reply to Mr. Bland, although it will be necessary to point out in the course of this article some specific misstatements. An independent analysis of the elements of the problem of transition and transformation in China is, however, on its own account, well worth making. Simply as an intellectual spectacle, a scene for study and surmise, for investigation and speculation, there is nothing in the world today—not even Europe in the throes of reconstruction—that equals China. History records no parallel. Can an old, vast, peculiar, exclusive, self-sufficing civilization be born again? Made over it must be, or it cannot endure. Yet it must accomplish the making over in the face of facts and forces profoundly alien to it, physically, politically, industrially, intellectually, spiritually. All of the forces are strange, unprecedented. Many of them—aggressively hostile—are directed by those who seek to batten upon China's decay. Much in her past, in her traditional customs, actually lames her in her effort to cope with new conditions. It puts great obstacles in the way of every endeavor to brace herself to her task, so that one meritorious attempt after another lapses into impotency. There are many good things in the old order, just as there are many in the tentative new one. But there is a social as well as a physical chemistry in accordance with which elements good in themselves give rise to explosive or poisonous compounds.

History may be ransacked to furnish a situation that so stirs interest, that keeps a spectator so wavering between hope and fear and that presents so baffling a face to every attempt to find a solution. One is constantly reminded of the Chinese puzzles of one's childhood, in which the complexity and variety of interlocking parts seemed to defy every attempt to form a coherent whole. There was a clue, a method for those puzzles, and perhaps a way that leads to successful solution of the enormous present puzzle may yet be found. It is no wonder that wherever a few are gathered together in China the favorite indoor sport is 'saving China'. But
after, whether at the same time or on different occasions, the whole gamut from optimism to pessimism has been struck, the honest-minded give it up as a problem far beyond the size of their intellects. 'If this' and 'If that' are the last word. Many have their favorite 'ifs': if there were a strong central government—which there never was, even in the palmiest days of absolutism; if there were honest officials—which harks back to the mythical days of Yao and Shun. And now a new 'if'. If the pestilential returned students would cease from troubling and China's financial administration could be reorganized by new Sir Robert Harts and Sir Richard Danes, all would be well. Model China after the Salt Gabelle and her troubles are ended.

But the task of reorganization, of transformation, of union of old and new, is so vast, so appalling in its complexity, that neither any wholesale forecast of the future nor any simple remedy is worth the paper it is written on. The things that are certain, are few. Either failure or success will entail tremendous consequences for the rest of the world, so that no one can afford to be indifferent. A great number of specific enterprises and experiments, converging to a common end, will have to be undertaken. There is no situation in the world more calculated to justify distrust of panaceas and wholesale remedies. The moves to be made are of all sorts. Many are external, technical, changes in administration, adoption of modern ways of managing affairs. In certain moments of depression, one can picture the enormous benefit that would accrue from a simple regard for arithmetic and for modern systems of accounting and auditing. But unless China is to be rent asunder, even more than its neighbor, Japan, is spiritually rent today, changes of thought, of belief, of outlook on the world must come too. A new mind must be created. And the most important permanent result of all external administrative changes, whether in government or in industry, will be their effect upon the creation of a new mind and a new morale.

Among the external changes needed is one in public finance. Thanks to her own ineptitude, combined with the greed of some foreign nations and the stupidity of others, the government of China is helplessly dependent upon foreign loans, which are accumulating a burden of interest to be met only by new loans. In China there is wealth in some quarters. But the home security is so poor that the merchants will not invest their money unless it be under the protection of foreign governments. And rich officials will not invest because they obtain their riches by investing foreign loans—in their own pockets. International control is necessary not merely as a means of securing Chinese capital for China but also as the only thing that will prevent the further disintegration of China by a system of concessions and spheres of influence and the pawn of natural resources to this nation or that. No unprejudiced observer has any doubt about these facts.

But even superficially there is no sense in regarding this plan to secure international control of finance as antagonistic to the tendencies represented by the student movement in China. On the contrary, the leaders in explaining the plan to their countrymen, provided it is really drawn in the interest of the development of China and not of foreign financiers, must come from this movement. Mr. Lamont, who is probably quite as much interested in the success of the Consortium as is Mr. Bland, found it worth while, when in China, to give many hours to students and their leaders among teachers, for the sake of removing misconceptions and enlisting cooperation. It is common honesty to say that there is still much skepticism in China about the whole scheme. But any fair person will also acknowledge that the prior history of China's financial dealings with foreign bankers is conducive to the Missouri attitude. Mr. Bland's denial of any Japanese influence or bias in his recent writings must be accepted at its full value. But to attribute Chinese opposition to the Consortium to the student movement and to pass over in silence the extraordinary campaign carried on in China by Japanese agencies in league with Chinese venal politicians and newspapers—a campaign still waged in November, 1920—is precisely the sort of thing that awakens suspicion. Mr. Lamont's statement on the nature of the propaganda against the Consortium is too full and explicit to leave any doubt as to where responsibility lies.

Let there be no mistake about one thing. The charges of corruption and intrigue that Mr. Bland brings against Chinese politicians and the statements he makes about the strictly factional character of civil strife in China, the absence of underlying principles, the greed for
place and power—in fact, for money—are the a-b-c’s, the platitudes of the situation. If he had stayed more than a few weeks in his hurried trip through a few of the coast towns, he could have found material for a far blacker and more disheartening picture than he has painted. In official circles, the present situation regarding the terrible famine, for example, is sickening beyond measure. Indifference and apathy joined to squeeze, intrigue for position and prestige combined with profiteering and exploitation of the starving, land-grabbing from honest and industrious peasants by black-hearted officials, refusal, on the ground that worse than useless soldiers must be transported, to provide cars to carry grain supplied by philanthropists—these are some of the outstanding facts. The question is not about the facts, but about their cause and remedy.

In spite of his desire to leave the impression that the situation is somehow due to 'Young China', even Mr. Bland cannot avoid recognizing that all this is in accord with the traditions of Chinese officialdom. Whether things are worse than in the bad days of the Manchus, or only about as bad as things were then, it is impossible to say dogmatically. Many think them worse. Others think the appearance of greater evil is due to the fact that some degree of publicity has invaded China and the stirred cesspool spreads more noisome odors. In many respects, however, modern business conditions give new opportunities, and officialdom is no slower to grasp new chances than it is to take profit from old sources. The fact is that the state of affairs is so bad that it is hard to imagine it any worse.

It constitutes a part, a considerable part, of that problem of reorganization, of transformation from the old to the new, to which reference has been made. It affords a striking example of what can happen when Old China is projected into the situation produced not by any one set of persons in China, but by the new world forces that have taken China unawares and unprepared. Of old, intrigues and corruptions only affected China domestically. Now they imperil her national being—as is evidenced by the record of $200,000,000 borrowed from Japan by venal politicians in two years, without any public value received, and at the loss of immense resources mortgaged in return. But the point is that this evil is due to Old China, not new, Old China wallowing unashamed in the trough of new opportunities. Such statements as Mr. Bland makes about 'Young China' as now in control of the government make one gasp: 'The militarist government is chiefly composed of the Young China of yesterday'; 'In the new game of democratic politics, which developed after the passing of the Dragon Throne, in 1911, it was the supermen of the educated class who made their way to the top. . . . And the real question in China to-day is how to limit the power and rapacity of these Tuchuns'. The fact is that there is not a Tuchun in China today who has the least smattering of western learning. Most of them have none of the old Chinese learning either. The one old scholar who is a governor today has declined to take the title of Tuchun. The nominal head of the Republic is an old mandarin, who served the Manchu dynasty. The western reader will hardly realize how contrary his holding office under the new régime is to the basic ethics of Chinese life, which dictates that the servant should retire absolutely to private life upon the overthrow or withdrawal of the master, provided he does not carry his loyalty to the point of killing himself. Another prominent leader is a former Shantung fish-seller. One Tuchun is a former hostler; another was once a lace-seller; one, upon whom Mr. Bland lavishes his praise as a type of the strong man China needs, is an ex-bandit. Some of these men cannot even read Chinese or write a Chinese character. These Tuchuns are Mr. Bland's educated supermen.

These things are not said in defense of returned students or of 'Young China'—whatever that may be. They are not said in mitigation of the evil of China's present condition. They may make the situation appear even worse than Mr. Bland makes it. They are said because they are facts, and facts that indicate the nature and seriousness of the real problem of China today—that of adapting Old China to new world conditions, of creating what does not as yet exist except in the most fragmentary sense—a Young China. And in this connection it may be not amiss to state the real origin of the term 'Young China'. The Young China party was consciously modeled after Mazzini's Young that strove to create a new Italy, so those who rallied about the cry of 'Young China' asserted, not the existence of Young China, but the necessity of rejuvenating Old China, unless China itself was to disappear. And though they
have not as yet succeeded in their efforts, every passing day makes it clear that they
diagnosed the case aright.
Everything said about the effect of financial maladministration in keeping China back is true.
The loss of public revenues is serious in itself. But this is a mild evil compared with the
courage of selling out or giving away the natural resources of China to foreigners who
have political as well as economic designs on China. And this is what happened under the
direct auspices of the followers, disciples and lieutenants of the late Yuan Shih-kai—that
'strongest, ablest and wisest' of recent Chinese statesmen! It is mild in comparison with the
retardation of legitimate industry, commerce and railway development, due to the levettings of
irresponsible officials in search of still more millions. It is mild in comparison with the spread
of corruption from the official class to the mercantile class, which has dealings with the
government and which is becoming infected with a like greed for money and a like
unchscrupulousness as to how it is got—an evil so serious that it may, if it goes on, empty of
meaning the old saying about the Chinaman's word being as good as his bond. It is mild in
comparison with the development, as an aid in money-getting, of a vast horde of
undisciplined soldiers, forming habits of idleness, engaged in looting, depriving large sections
in the north of needed agricultural labor, spreading venereal disease wherever they go,
changing themselves upon a moment's notice from soldiery to bandits and back again.
No intelligent person in China believes that reform in financial administration is going to
come from within. Some kind of international foreign control of finance is not only a financial
necessity, but a political, industrial and moral necessity. No true liberal in America will, if he
is wise, oppose the scheme per se. But he will, if he is wise, scrutinize its terms most carefully
and insist upon real justice and honesty. A recent minister of finance borrowed money just
before settling-day. Credit was bad enough, heaven knows! But the minister and his friends
instituted banks, from which to borrow money at eighty per cent in order to pay interest on
what they had previously stolen. Then, to make sure the interest would continue to be paid,
they sold the notes to a foreign (not Japanese) bank that has foreign governmental support.
The incident illustrates the need of financial supervision. But it also indicates that foreign
financiers are not proof against taking part in shady transactions when the profit is good. For
the careful reader Mr. Bland answers and refutes himself. Thus, on occasion, when he drops
rhetoric for facts, he says, 'It seems impossible to deny that most of China's present
disabilities and dangers are due to no fault of its own, but to the sudden creation by the
Western Powers of a new condition of things'. In similar fashion his pathetic picture of those
'older and wiser heads', mandarins and merchants, really desiring the imposition of foreign
control of finance, but intimidated by the clamor of the student body from public expression
of their secret desire, is sufficiently taken care of by his true picture of the mandarinate
waxing fat and powerful on the present situation. During the three or four days spent by Mr.
Bland in Peking in making deep-sea Chinese soundings, certain financiers of the so-called
'Old Communications Clique' were out of power. They generally professed in conversation
with foreigners great sympathy with unification of the financial and railway system of China
under international supervision. It was a convenient partisan weapon. Doubtless Mr. Bland
heard them talk. If they had belonged to the student class, he would probably have been
suspicious. Since they belonged to Old China, he took them at their word. Some of them are
now in power and are secretly taking every means to block the measure that they professed to
favor and that is now in danger of being realized at their expense.
All this is said not for the sake of personal controversy with Mr. Bland but because of its
bearing on the practical situation. Nothing would be more fatal to the success of the
Consortium scheme than action based upon the belief that any influential part of existing
officialdom is sincerely in favor of a measure that deprives it of money and power, and that
the intellectual leaders toward a newer China are of necessity opposed to the scheme.
It is significant that the charges that Mr. Bland so freely brings against the student movement
are precisely the reports with which the officials of the Anfu stripe, who were in power during
his visit, made thick the air of Peking. Officialdom knew what it was about. It knew that the
patriotic movement was directed primarily against it. It knew also every resource of the clever
Chinese politician in circulating reports to discredit the potential threat to its corrupt control.
Mr. Bland was not the only foreigner to accept these reports at their face value. In spite of his evident knowledge of their corruption and utter unreliability, he believed them in this instance because they fitted in with his antecedent prejudices. Although this new movement came from students who had never been out of China, Mr. Bland's acquaintance with the situation was so superficial that he identified the new student movement with the returned student movement he had previously known and damned. So he fell an easy victim to the very wiles he so profusely exposes upon other occasions.

His lack of familiarity with the new student movement may be measured by the fact that he says that Young China's 'indignation has never yet been publicly directed against the growing rapacity of the metropolitan and provincial officials'. As a matter of fact, the present student movement began on May 4 last year with precisely a protest against these officials and ended in the dismissal from the cabinet of three of its most corrupt members. It would have gone further if the military force of Peking and other places, provincial as well as metropolitan, had not crowded jails with students, closed their offices with brutal force, spied upon their every activity, filled their ranks with agents provocateurs and bribed freely the weaker among them. The story that Mr. Bland quotes with much relish of $200,000 given by one set of politicians to the Student Union of Tientsin to aid them in their movement against Peking officials at least proves that Mr. Bland knew better when he says the students have never turned upon their own officials. But in truth this is only one of the stories that were circulated by the officials in power to discredit the movement. 'Documentary evidence' to the contrary—which Mr. Bland has seen—was forged by this crowd as part of their game. This does not mean that politicians among the outs did not try to use the movement, or that the students made no mistakes or were wholly free from corrupt elements. But upon the whole, considering the inexperience of those engaged in it, the movement was surprisingly well managed and showed a power of organization that augurs well for the future.

These facts are pertinent to the practical situation. In aid of the Consortium, as well as of other reforms, the students should be enlisted against the resistance, active and (still more dangerous) passive, of officialdom. Their patriotism is easily aroused to take a negative form, especially in view of the predatory career of foreign powers in China in the past. But they are the one self-conscious class in China wholly awake to the ills that flow from the recent system of 'government'. They are the enemies, natural and avowed, of both existing and would-be officials. They have seen Chinese officials before this time take advantage, to the detriment of the country, of the cupidity of foreigners, of their ignorance and their desire for immediate results. They have seen highly disinterested foreign professions in the past used as cloaks for rapacious encroachments upon Chinese resources and sovereignty. They are naturally apprehensive lest any new scheme be manipulated by officials (whose wiles they understand better than any foreigner understands them) into new means of confirming their power and wealth while at the same time increasing the bondage of China.

But they also know how desperate the situation is, and in American leadership they have a faith that they have not in that of other foreign powers. What they fear is that, as in some previous cases, American energy and American intelligence will not, when it comes to execution, be equal to American good intentions. They fear that American leadership will be nominal rather than effectual; that something will be 'put over on' American ideas by the combined efforts of Chinese corrupt officials and non-disinterested foreign finance. It is therefore a most practical feature in the situation that pains be taken, not only that American ideas really rule the Consortium, but that every effort be made to make it clear to the intellectual leaders of public opinion that such is the fact. The evil of such outpourings as those of Mr. Bland is that they obscure this fact, and, by relying upon just the element that cannot be trusted and alienating the only element that can be employed to develop a sympathetic public opinion in China, they prejudice the success of the entire movement. The growing support of public opinion is essential to a reform anything more than superficial and external.

But, though reform of financial administration is indispensable and can be secured only through foreign control over a period of years, it is only one of a multitude of factors in the change of Old China into a China adapted to modern conditions. New China is not a fad or
device of a few half-baked enthusiasts. It is a necessity unless China is to rot, and unless its rotting carcass is to become in the end a menace to the peace of the world. The notion that, by the mere introduction of western economy, China can be 'saved', while it retains the old morality, the old set of ideas, the old Confucianism—or what genuine Confucianism had been petrified into—and the old family system, is the most utopian of sentimental idealisms. Economic and financial reform, unless it is accompanied by the growth of new ideals of culture, ethics and family life (which constitute the real meaning of the so-called student movement of today), will merely shift the sore spots. It will remedy some evils and create others. Taken by itself it is a valuable practical measure. But it is the height of absurdity to use it as a stick with which to beat the aspirations of men and women, old as well as young, for new beliefs, new ideas, new methods of thought, new social and natural science—in short, for a New and Young China.

Years ago there were many Chinese who sincerely thought that the evils from which China suffered and the dangers that threatened her were due to the Manchu régime and would be remedied by the introduction of a republican form of government. Some doubtless favored the change from motives of self-interest. If there were none such, then the Chinese are more different from Westerners than I think they are. But with the mass of republicans it was a sincere belief, born of hope and inexperience. It is a matter of pathos and not one for ridicule. Probably even more numerous now than were the republicans in the old days are those who think that existing evils are due to the Republic and who would welcome a return to monarchy—just as great numbers twenty years ago thought the removal of the foreigner would heal all evils and so tried the Boxer panacea. If an attempt is made to restore monarchy, these will be disillusioned as others have been of their panaceas. But what shall we say of an experienced Westerner who still seeks for a cure-all and who says, 'Introduce foreign international control of finance, and all will be well'? It is not surprising that such a one is skeptical of the value of foreign education.

There is in China a considerable class of foreigners, especially in the outports and political centres, who are frankly attached to Old China. The reasons are complex. In part they realize its virtues, and in other part they subconsciously rely upon its weaknesses to serve their own comfort and convenience. Such persons usually deprecate the efforts of missionaries and foreign educators, not usually because they are theoretically opposed to Christianity, but because the introduction of new ideas is disturbing to what they esteem and profit by. They also see new evils coming into China and a decay of some of its old virtues. Not having sufficient social and historical grasp to trace these changes to their source and see how inevitable they are in a period of social transition, they attribute all disintegration to the influence of foreign learning and ideas, introduced by missionaries and returned students. Leave Old China alone culturally and morally, they say in effect. It had its vices, but it had its stable virtues, and if the tares are uprooted, the grain also will be destroyed. Change China only in business and material ways. Give it the benefit of railways, mills, telegraphs, reformed currency, good financial administration; give it the external technique of western civilization free from disturbing western culture, and all will be well.

This view, widely current, is as superficial as it is plausible. It is not worth while to argue whether a change merely industrial is desirable. For it is impossible. Even if it were abstractly desirable, it is sentimentally utopian, in spite of its professed allegiance to hard business facts. What is really undermining the family system, which was the basis of Old China? The teachings of returned students? The desire of a small number to select their own life companions, thereby breaking down parental authority; to have educated women as their wives, thereby revolutionizing China by changing the traditional status of women? No. These things are, at most, symptoms, not causes. The real cause is precisely the modern methods born of the industrial revolution, which fatuous observers would introduce while they dream of leaving old institutions unchanged. The railway and the factory system are undermining the family system. They will continue to do so, even if every student take the vow of eternal silence.

Here is a village in the province of Chekiang, an actual, not an imaginary, one. For thirty generations the same families have lived and died there. They have been the leading spirits in
maintaining farming, industry and social order and peace. The town was a centre of scholars and literary men of the old, dignified, leisurely sort. There was little poverty and much prosperity. Now ancestral homes and temples are in a state of decay. The leading men, whose presence assured light, order and welfare are not there. Farming is degenerating. Even education has gone backward in quality, if not in amount. The lower classes are more restless and disorderly, as well as poorer, than they used to be. The influence of returned students? Precisely as much and as little as is a somewhat similar decay in parts of New England. The town has no railway nor mills. But it is not far from Hangchow and from Shanghai. The abler and more enterprising men, representatives of the solidarity of the old family system, have moved away to places where there is more life and opportunity. This one is in Peking, that one in Shanghai, the other in Hankow. Some are teaching; some are in banks; some are interested in foreign trade, some in developing cotton mills. They are adopting new professions, establishing new relationships, forming new families in new places. It is difficult to be patient with the notion that the industrial revolution can come in China without exercising just such far-reaching political, moral, domestic and intellectual changes as it has wrought in Europe. Europe had its eighteenth century of 'enlightenment', its attack upon the old, its subversive thought and action. And China is beginning to have its century of change, involving destruction, even of good things, as well as introduction of new, good things. How shall we regard men who, in the face of this inevitable transformation, can think only of a few individuals, and who place all blame on the personal beliefs and activities of these few? Even the greatest reactionary can hardly expect to introduce the railway and the mechanical technique of modern industry, and at the same time prevent the introduction of scientific ideas and methods. A few weeks ago there was a total eclipse of the moon. It was celebrated with the usual salute of gongs and firecrackers to prevent the heavenly dog from swallowing the moon. What is the attitude of the small boy and girl who have studied even elementary geography toward the activities of their elders? They are normal enough youngsters to enjoy the racket, but they hardly learn from the ceremony respect for the intelligence and beliefs of their ancestry. The boy learns a little about elementary chemistry, if not in school, then in the modern shop. His belief in ghosts, which is emotionally and intellectually associated with his ancestral worship, is surely modified, and with its modification goes less rigorous adherence to the traditional moral code.

These things are rudimentary. But they have a bearing on not only the whole topic of the so-called student movement, but even upon such a practical detail as foreign financial control. It is not necessary to try to assess the respective benefits and evils of the changes going on. It is enough that there are evils and dangers accompanying the transition, with its relaxation of old disciplines and codes. If schemes of reform are limited to financial and economic measures, these evils and dangers may only be increased. They can be remedied and the balance be made to fall heavily on the side of genuine progress, only as financial reform is accompanied by an intellectual and cultural renewal such as lies close to the heart of the student movement in China.

Financial reorganization, under international control, will save enormous sums of money. These funds will go largely into railways and highroads and into mills and factories. It takes an unthinking optimist to imagine that along with undoubted benefits there will be no spread of new evils, and no further loosening of old ties. Only a comic opera can do justice to the theme of those who say, 'Restore Old China', and, when asked how it is to be done, reply, 'By building railways and introducing factories'. The decay of the traditional family system will be hastened. With factories, sexual morality will go on the down-grade. Respect for the old and for custom will decrease. Love of money will get new opportunities for expression. Men will lose the chief old moral restraint, which came from lifelong living in the immediate presence of members of the family and clan, to whom every personal act was public and who exercised unremitting pressure of approbation and reproof. Labor difficulties will increase. Child labor is already increasing, and the taking of women from the home. Workmen and employers traditionally in close personal contact will become separated and divided in thought and sentiment. All of these things will surely come along with effective international control and reform of financial administration and the consequent diversion of funds into new
means of communication and production. These new evils do not, to be sure, preclude new great benefits or furnish any grounds for relaxing efforts at financial reform. But they suggest the utter ineptitude of schemes that depend wholly upon measures of financial reform, even admitting that they are carried out with complete wisdom, disinterestedness and honesty—as of course they will not be. They indicate that the leaders of the new culture movement in China who are interested in social, domestic and intellectual transformations are wiser, in the midst of all of their confusion, uncertainty and inevitable blundering, than are foreign critics who advise them to leave Old China morally and culturally alone and devote their energies to technical improvements. Here we have the background of the genuine student movement, or better, new culture movement, to some account of the aims and methods of which, my next article will be devoted. [DewJ29]

1921.05 John Dewey visits the provinces Fujian and Guangdong. [DewJ8]

1921.05.03-06 John Dewey : Lecture 'Self-activity and self-government' at the Fujian First High School. = Ze dong yu zi zhi. In : Chen bao fu kan ; May 3-6 (1921). [Kee3]

1921.05.07 John Dewey : Lecture 'The organization of educational associations in America and their influence on society' : delivered at the Educational Association of Fujian Province. = Meiguo jiao yu hui zhi zu zhi ji qi ying xiang yu she hui. In : Chen bao fu kan ; May 7 (1921). [Kee3]

1921.05.08-09 John Dewey : Lecture 'The relationship between education and the state' at the Fujian YMCA, Fuzhou. = Jiao yu yu guo jia zhan guan xi. In : Chen bao fu kan ; May 8-9 (1921). [Kee3]

1921.05.11-12 John Dewey : Lecture 'Educational principles for teaching the youth' : delivered at the Beijing Women's Teachers College. = Jiao shou qing nian di jiao yu yuan li. Fu Yin recorder. In : Chen bao fu kan ; May 10-11 (1921). [Kee3]

1921.05.13-14 John Dewey : Lecture 'Education and industry' : delivered at the Fuzhou YMCA. = Jiao yu yu shi ye. In : Chen bao fu kan ; May 13-14 (1921). [Kee3]

1921.05.26 Wu tuan ti gong jian Duwei zhi yan lun zhi. In : Chen bao ; May 26 (1921). [Report from the farewell banquet for John Dewey].

"Dewey was not only teaching us ; he was teaching Europeans and Americans about us. There have been politicians and diplomats in the country before. However, their reports about us were usually distorted by their own particular interests and agenda. Many came to visit for a few days and returned with a book of one or two thousand pages. Dewey was different. He reported our situations truthfully to the reading public in America. He would occasionally point out our problems and weaknesses, but he had great love for us". Jessica Wang : Dewey returned the kindness of his Chinese hosts by acknowledging that he had a wonderful time and learned very much from his visit. He stressed his admiration for the young people in China – their enthusiasm for new learning and their concern with the well-being of society at large – but he kindly reminded the Chinese that the problems of China could be solved only by actually trying to solve them. [DewJ2:S. 30]

1921.06 John Dewey : Lecture 'Farewell address' at the Beijing Teachers College. [DewJ8]

1921.06 Chinese students' monthly ; vol. 16, no 8 (June 1921).

"Mr. [John] Dewey's career in China is one of singular success. From the times of his arrival to the present, continual ovation follows his footsteps. Bankers and editors frequent his residences ; teachers and students flock to his classrooms. Clubs compete to entertain him, to hear him speak ; newspapers vie with each other in translating his latest utterances. His speeches and lectures are eagerly read, his biography has been elaborately written. The serious-minded comment on his philosophy ; the light-hearted remember his name." [Kee3:S. 34]

1921.06.20-21 John Dewey: Lecture 'The relationship between elementary education and the state': delivered at the Fujian YMCA, Fuzhou. = Guo min jiao yu guo jia zhi guan xi. Shu Lan, Wei Xuan recorder. In: Chen bao fu kan; June 20-21 (1921). [Kee3]

1921.06.23 John Dewey: Lecture 'Spontaneity in learning': delivered at the Fuzhou YMCA, Fujian. = Zi dong di yan jiu. In: Chen bao fu kan; June 23 (1921). [Kee3]


In his last public lecture in Beijing, John Dewey began by saying that because he had given so many lectures, he actually had nothing much to add. However, he felt reluctant to decline the invitation and thus agreed to give a farewell speech. [Kee3,DewJ2]

1921.06.28-29 John Dewey: Lecture 'The relationship of the natural and social environments with human life': delivered at Fuzhou YMCA, Fujian. = Tian ran huan jing she hui huan jing yu ren sheng zhi guan xi. In: Xue deng; June 28-29 (1921). [Kee3]

1921.06.30 Hu, Shi. Duwei xian sheng yu Zhongguo. [Speech at National Beijing University].

In the future, as 'experimental schools' gradually arise, John Dewey's educational theory will have the opportunity for experimentation; and that will be when Dewey's philosophy blooms and bears fruit! At the present time Dewey is just a famous name, but ten or twenty years from now Dewey's name will be attached to innumerable Dewey-style 'experimental schools', directly or indirectly influencing education in all China. Will not that kind of influence be one hundred thousand times larger than it is now? [Kee3:S. 55]

1921.06.30-07 John Dewey: Habit and thought: delivered at the Fuzhou YMCA, Fujian. = Xi guan yu si xiang. In: Chen bao fu kan; June 30-July 1 (1921). [Kee3]
Dewey, John. *New culture in China* [ID D28486].

A Chinese friend, to whom I owe so much that he would be justified in arresting me for intellectual theft, has summarized for me the stages of foreign influence in China. At first, new military devices were thought to be the secret of western power. According to tradition, earlier divinities had come to China borne by the waves or riding a white horse. Some divinity must be associated with all organized power; and now 'Christ was riding on a cannon-ball' to China. This is not a literary phrase; it was the common man's literal belief. So an arsenal was built in Shanghai, and then gunboats. The guns wouldn't go off, or they exploded. The men-of-war were sunk by the Japanese navy in the Chino-Japanese War. Then the weakness of China was attributed to her outworn form of government. Reform was to come by political means. A republic was to be constructed instead of a navy, as easily and in as short a time. But the republic hardly came off either. At this period, some foreigners made up their minds about Chinese ideas of reform and they have never changed their notion since. They labeled this political movement 'Young China' and have stuck right there. Meanwhile the thought of China has moved on; the representatives of this movement and their successors are now almost like fossil reminders of an olden time. The period is hardly ten years distant, but thoughts, if not things, change with such rapidity in China that one is hard pressed to keep up—and unfortunately many foreigners make little effort to keep pace. The third period is that of reliance upon technical improvements. After all, the artillery and the naval equipment of the West are due to applied science, to engineering. So the distinguishing feature of western civilization, the one to be imitated, was thought to be neither military nor political but economic. Civil and mechanical engineers were to be the saviors of the country. Railways, factories, steam and electricity were to enable the old country to compete with new nations on even terms. But somehow this movement ran up against all sorts of obstacles; progress was slow; it brought new dangers and evils. Soon there was a wave of moral reform. Thousands of societies were organized for the cure of this, that and the other evil. This was the time of the anti-footbinding societies, of anti-opium movements, of anti-gambling associations, of remodeling of the old system of education and so on through the list. Though Christian influence counted for much in the initiation of these reforms, they were mostly carried on in a Confucian revival.

Then came a conviction that underlying ideas must be changed, that democracy was a matter of beliefs, of outlook upon life, of habits of mind, and not merely a matter of forms of government. Democracy clearly demanded universal education, the extension of schools to all the people and a change from literary learning to something connected with civic and social action. It was the tradition that what was written must be written in the vocabulary, forms and cherished expressions of hundreds of years ago, in a language that bears little relationship to the spoken language of today. But the people could never be reached until the written language was simplified and made more accessible. And the language of speech must also be used in writing in order that modern ideas might get adequate expression. A scholar of the old school remarked to me in Hangchow, a centre of the older culture, that no one knew how many valuable ideas had been lost to China in the past few hundred years because those who thought them could not make them known, for lack of command of the cumbrous and artificial medium of writing. So there grew up, about two years ago, the so-called literary revolution—an attempt to write and publish in the vernacular and also to familiarize Chinese readers with what is distinctive in the trend of modern western literature, from free verse to Thomas Hardy, Bernard Shaw, Ibsen and Maeterlinck. I know of one school that criticized its foreign teacher of literature as not up-to-date, because he used Shakespeare and Dickens while they wanted H.G. Wells and Strindberg! They even suggested that he take a vacation, go home and catch up! He had become, they said, too 'Chinafied' and conservative. The matter of content, of ideas, soon became more important than that of language and style. The new ideas were turned full against ancient institutions. The family system came in for full measure of criticism, and this not only from the point of view of the traditional western idea of family life, but from that of *A Doll's House* and the most advanced western radical thought. Socialistic literature, anarchism, Marx and Kropotkin ran like wild-fire through reading circles. Tolstoi became perhaps the most read of foreign writers. Thus was evolved a new
China could not be changed without a social transformation based upon a transformation of ideas. The political revolution was a failure, because it was external, formal, touching the mechanism of social action but not affecting conceptions of life, which really control society.

And now there are signs that the next stage will be an interest in scientific method. It is recognized that technology and other branches of applied science are dependent upon science as a method of thought, observation, registration, criticism, experiment, judgment and reasoning. The idea is gaining ground that the real supremacy of the West is based, not on anything specifically western, to be borrowed and imitated, but on something universal, a method of investigation and of the testing of knowledge, which the West hit upon and used a few centuries in advance of the Orient.

These latter ideas underlie what may be literally translated from the Chinese as 'the new culture movement'. Concretely and practically it is associated with the student revolt that began on May 4, 1919. Some foreigners think of the latter as simply a new form of political movement. They have been encouraged in this belief by Chinese politicians and by conservatives, most of whom doubtless believed it was a purely political movement. Anything of a cultural and social nature is too far removed from their own lives and thought to be conceivable. But though it directed its outward manifestations against a group of corrupt politicians, and though it was stimulated by the failure of Chinese claims at Versailles, on account of commitments made by these politicians, for value received, to the Japanese, it was in its deeper aspect a protest against all politicians and against all further reliance upon politics as a direct means of social reform. The teachers and writers who are guiding the movement lose no opportunity to teach that the regeneration of China must come by other means, that no fundamental political reform is now possible in China, and that, when it comes, it will come as natural fruit of intellectual changes worked out in social, non-political ways. And the great mass of the student body in the higher schools of China is now virtually pledged to abstinence from official life. Doubtless many will fall by the way in the future. They will not be able to resist the lure of an easy living and of power. But the anti-political bias is pretty firmly established.

This sketch, hurried and superficial as it is, suggests a number of comments. In the first place, the movement, though instigated by foreign contacts, which is only to say, after all, by contacts with the distinctively modern world, has become more and more characteristically Chinese. The movement of May 4 was directly undertaken by Chinese students, not only without the instigation of returned students, but against their advice. It was spontaneous and native. The movement for a reform of language would hardly have been started without foreign influence, but it is naturally a movement conducted by Chinese, for specifically Chinese ends, and it has precedents in Chinese history. The subsidiary movement toward phonetic script has been encouraged largely by missionaries, and so one hears more about it in western newspapers. Even the anti-political movement, the belief that reform is conditional upon scientific and social changes, is in a way a return to Chinese modes of thinking, a recovery of an old Chinese idea, plus an assertion that the power of that idea was not exhausted and terminated by Confucianism. It has now to be worked out in adaptation to new conditions, even if it involves the overthrow of Confucian forms of belief and conduct.

Another obvious feature of the evolution is that it shows steady progress from the superficial to the fundamental.

The comments just made take the movement at its best, in its spirit. From the point of view of results concretely attained by it, they involve an undoubted idealization of its development. Each old stage has left behind it a deposit, a stratification. 'Young China' is at best an ambiguous term. It lumps into a single mass representatives of each of the phases described—military, political, economic, technological, ethical, literary, social, etc. By selecting certain individuals from each of these strata, one may, with some degree of truth, bring almost any charge against 'Young China'. Naturally, in other words, there is confusion, un-certainty, mutual criticism and hostility among the various tendencies. Most of the returned students of some years ago are opposed to the present anti-political movement and to the literary revolution. Many are still in a nationalistic stage where they rely upon some
change to be wrought miraculously in the army and the government. More are distinctly in the technical stage, believing that if they could get the engineering jobs for which they have trained themselves, China would begin to move—as it doubtless would, to some degree. One more discrimination has to be made. Although cultivated Japanese as well as politicians like Marquis Okuma have long proclaimed the right and duty of Japan to lead China, to be the mediator in introducing western culture into Asia (including India, where they look upon the English as alien interlopers), few Americans have taken seriously the dependence of China upon Japan in just these ways. I have seen books on the development of modern Chinese education which do not mention Japan, which attribute the renovation of the Chinese system to American influence, and which leave the impression that it is modeled upon the American common school system. As a matter of fact, it is modeled administratively wholly after the Japanese system, which, so far as western influence enters in, is based on the German system, with factors borrowed from French centralization. I have visited nine provinces and seen the educational leaders in the capitals where the higher schools are concentrated. There are but two cities, Peking and Nanking, where, in the government schools, direct western influence begins to approach the Japanese, either in methods or in personnel. To talk about returned students and fail to discriminate between those from Japan and those from Europe and America is to confuse everything touched by the discussion. This is not said by way of criticism of Japanese-trained returned students. I believe that, in spite of the too bitter rivalry between them and other Chinese students educated abroad (partly a matter of the ever present 'rice-bowl' question), the great mass of Japanese-trained students are doing the best they can, according to their light, for China. The exceptions are enormous, for they include some of the politicians and military men who have been doing their worst during the past few years for China, and who have provoked a large measure of the present universal condemnation of Japan and things Japanese.

The point is that western ideas from the West itself and via Japan are two such different things that only confusion ensues when representatives of both schools are massed, as Mr. Bland constantly combines them, under the name of 'Young China'. The defeat of Russia by Japan created a vogue for Japan that no western country has ever begun to touch. Here was another oriental nation, using Chinese characters and deriving its civilization from China, which had conquered the dreaded foe, the West, in the person of mighty Russia. No wonder thousands flocked to Japan to study and most reformers took their models from Japan. By far the greater number of the revolutionary leaders who formed the Republic were Japanese or had lived in Japan as refugees and imbibed its culture as they never assimilated that of the West. The Manchu dynasty was doomed in any case. Full fifty years before the Revolution, the Taiping rebellion would probably have put an end to it, if foreign aid had not come to the support of the throne. The direct cause of its final downfall was the defeat of Russia by Japan. The historic parallel is the overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate in Japan and the imperial restoration. By an accident, historically speaking, the change in China eventuated in a republic. Its main object, aside from getting rid of a foreign dynasty, was to modernize China as Japan had been modernized. 'Young China' at this period meant Japanized Chinese. What the new leaders brought to the situation was western ideas via Japanese utilization of them. And this meant in effect not a new culture, but a utilization of western technique in military, technological and administrative affairs in the interest of old culture. The Japanese have persistently taught, doubtless sincerely, that western civilization is essentially materialistic, while oriental culture is idealistic and spiritual in basis and aims. They have held that the West obtained its temporary supremacy merely by artillery and machines. Hence it must be fought by adoption of its own devices, while old oriental ideas and ideals are retained intact. Most of the Chinese who studied in Japan returned to China with this idea of the materialistic, technological nature of western civilization firmly fixed in their heads. It fell in with the conceit of their own superiority, which was so common and amusing a feature of all the earlier intercourse of the West with the Orient. All that China needed to learn from America and Europe was technical science and its applications.

'Young China' is thus a diversified and fluent term. Among those popularly labeled with that name by western writers there are all kinds of contradictory aspirations. But the two things
that stand out today as active and dominant features of the situation are the need of reform in culture as an antecedent of other reforms, and a tendency for leadership to revert to those who are distinctively Chinese in their attitude, as over against those who would introduce and copy foreign methods, whether from the West or from Japan.

The two traits seem to contradict each other. How can reversion to Chinese leadership coincide with attack upon Chinese customs and habits of mind? How can it coincide with a realization that the real source of western superiority is found, not in external technique, but in intellectual and moral matters? Well, history is never logical, and many movements are practically effectual in proportion to their logical inconsistency. But so far as an answer exists it is found in the fact, already alluded to, that the idea of the supremacy of intellectual and moral factors over all others is itself a native Chinese idea. It is much more Chinese than the idea that salvation can be found by introducing guns and factories and technical administrative improvements. It implies also that the real breakdown in Chinese national life is moral and intellectual. It implies a demand for new ways of thinking. Some of the new leaders might assert that they are truer to Confucianism in attacking it—as they mostly do—than others are in clinging to it. For the real idea, the vital idea in Confucius, they may say, is belief in the primacy of ideas, of knowledge, and in the influence of education to spread these ideas. But the ideas that are now petrified into Confucianism are not fitted to modern conditions. The breakdown in Chinese national life is proof of their inefficacy according to the standard of Confucianism itself. And Confucian education had become aristocratic, for the few only. Hence the need for a new culture, in which what is best in western thought is to be freely adopted—but adapted to Chinese conditions, employed as an instrumentality in building up a rejuvenated Chinese culture.

The program is an ambitious one. It may seem to many much more pretentious, much less hopeful, than an attempt to borrow specific devices from the West. To many foreigners on the ground, it certainly seems a deviation from the real path of Chinese reform, which they hold to be the adoption of Christianity. But its relation to Christianity bears out the account here given of it. Some of its leaders are as non-Christian as they are anti-Confucian. They do not attack Christianity. They are merely indifferent to it. Others, especially in active educational work, are Christians. But I have generally found that these men are profoundly indifferent not only to denominational and dogmatic Christianity, but to everything except the social aspect of Christianity. They do not even take the trouble to call themselves liberals in religious belief. They approach Christianity from such an angle that they are indifferent to the distinction between conservative and liberal in belief. In effect they assert their claim to develop a distinctively Chinese Christianity. And though the movement toward an independent Chinese Church has not as yet gone far, it is likely to be a large feature of the future.

It would be foolish to say that any great number of the students and teachers influenced by the new culture movement are wholly conscious of the underlying philosophy that has just been expounded. This is confined as yet to a small group of leaders. The movement is for the most part still a feeling rather than an idea. It is also accompanied by the extravagances and confusion, the undigested medley of wisdom and nonsense that inevitably mark so ambitious a movement in its early stages. By making a clever selection of extracts from the writings put forth in its name one could easily hold up the whole movement to ridicule, as less than half-baked, as an uncritical and more or less hysterial mixture of unrelated ideas and miscellaneous pieces of western science and thought. Or a selection of writings could be made which would show it to be dangerous to society, to the peace of the world. Japanese writers who have paid attention to it have mostly held it up as a subversive radicalism and have attributed it to Bolshevist propaganda. But in the nine provinces I have visited, I have yet to find a single trace of direct Russian influence. Indirectly the Russian upheaval has of course had a tremendous influence as a ferment, but far subordinate to that of the World War, and even to President Wilson’s ideas of democracy and self-determination. For the new culture movement, though it cares nothing for what is politely called a republic in present China, is enthusiastically stirred by democratic ideals, and is starting out with the premise that democracy must be realized in education and in industry before it can be realized politically.
For Bolshevism in the technical sense there is no preparation and no aptitude in China. But it is conceivable that military misrule, oppression and corruption will, if they continue till they directly touch the peasants, produce a chaos of rebellion that adherents of the existing order will certainly label Bolshevism.

After the upheaval of May 4, the student unions started periodicals all over China. It is significant that at this moment of the height of the revolt against corrupt and traitorous officials and also of the Japanese boycott, these topics were secondary in the students’ journals. They were written in Pei-wha, the vernacular already referred to, and were ardent in advocacy of its use. Their burden was the need of educational change; attacks upon the family system; discussion of socialism; of democratic ideas; of all kinds of utopias, such as taking away children from their parents and giving them to public authorities to be reared, the abolition of all national and even provincial government and the reduction of China to a state of self-governing communes. Naturally there was much effervescence along with the fermentation. Lacking definite background of experience, the students thought all ideas and proposals much alike, provided only they were new and involved getting away from old customs and traditions.

In one prominent provincial city, some teachers in a normal school joined with a youth of seventeen in advocating free love as a remedy and substitute for the family system, communal rearing of children, abolition of all private property, the election of teachers by students as a form of democracy, the abolition of examinations as a relic of autocracy. Since the articles were written in the vernacular, an alarmed provincial governor, scared by the noise made by this blowing off of steam, closed the school and wrote to Peking, demanding that future use of the vernacular be prohibited by law. But some official had enough of the saving grace of common sense to remark that these dangerous thoughts would then be written in the old literary language, and then it would be necessary in consistency to forbid its use, too.

Practically speaking, these ideas were about as dangerous as those set forth in schoolboys’ debating clubs would be in any country. Yet they are important symptoms and potentially they involve a menace, not to the peace of society, but to those who profit by the evils of the established order. It is significant that in my whole experience I have not found one of these extremists who had been trained in America or England. They are almost without exception persons who have been educated in China and who speak and read only Chinese. They can easily quote sanction for their extreme ideas from old Chinese writings and legends. The few exceptions were students trained in France, who had adopted as congenial to the anarchistic vein in Chinese thought certain ideas coming from the French Revolution.

In Nanking last spring some students were kind enough to make out for me a list of journals, mostly founded within the previous year and a half, to advocate the principles of the new culture. A cursory reading of the titles and professed objects of these periodicals confirms what has been said. The organ of this particular group of students gives the key-note of the whole undertaking. The journal is called Youth and Society. Its motto, with true Chinese balance of phrasing, is, 'To make society youthful and youth social'. The Dawn, New Voice of Society, The New Individual, The Citizen, The Warm Tide, Young China, The Young World, The New Group, The New Life, Upward, Construction, Learning and Labor and Truth are other typical names. And among the objects professed occur almost with monotony such phrases as 'to reform the nation and society, physically and socially'; 'to investigate society'; 'to study social and economic problems and introduce new ideas'; 'to introduce new thoughts to the citizen and uplift his personality while promoting home industries'—the last phrase of course an echo of the boycott; 'to arouse the workingman and reform society'; 'to promote popular education and save society'—this by a journal called Save the Country, 'to promote the new culture and develop thinking and pure science'; 'to bring about a development of learning so as to apply the idea of research and criticism to the reform of society'; 'to study society and introduce western ideas'; 'to reform society in the light of scientific ideas'; 'to introduce new thoughts to the world, and to apply an optimistic but critical attitude to the reconstruction of society'. Many of these papers were of course as ephemeral as all of them are ambitious. But they illustrate the spirit of the movement as hardly anything else could. The list would not be complete without the mention of journals like The New Woman, the
object of which is 'to arouse women as a means to reforming society', and The Woman's Bell, the aim of which is 'to educate women and enable them to take part in the progress of society'. In fact, in the journals as a whole, the three most discussed topics are reform of the family system, the emancipation of women and the labor question, all of them in connection with educational reform. The three parent journals, which continue to exercise the greatest influence, and so are peculiarly the organs of the new culture movement, are called 'Youth', 'The Renaissance' and 'Emancipation and Reconstruction'. It must not be gathered that the whole activity has been literary and theoretical. For the first time in Chinese history, the educated youth have given themselves to what at home we term social service.

I suppose most foreigners approach China with an antecedent belief in its essential conservatism, its aversion to change. The conservatism is unquestionably there. But so also is a predilection for change. And the scene shifts so often as to be dizzying to observe. Teachers complain of the 'bumptious' insubordination of students—not a new complaint in China, where students have prerogatives in respect to their own discipline most disconcerting to visitors from free America. They complain also of instability of mind, which leads students to rush enthusiastically into a new cause only in a few months to lose interest and turn to some newer thing. The symptom is characteristic of conditions outside of schools. It is to be regretted. But it is genuine evidence of a general state of transition, with the hesitation, uncertainty and openness to novel stimuli that such periods are bound to exhibit. On the other hand, there is a maturity of interest far beyond that which marks American students of the same years. High-school boys and girls listen soberly and intelligently to lectures on subjects that would create nothing but bored restlessness in an American school. There is an eager thirst for ideas—beyond anything existing, I am convinced, in the youth of any other country on earth. At present the zeal for ideas outruns persistence in getting knowledge with which to back up the ideas. But it supplies an extraordinary vitality to the growing desire for knowledge and scientific method. It means that knowledge is being acquired, not as a technical device nor as a conventional badge of culture, but for social application. If the students in any higher school in China are asked why they are taking a particular course, the greater number will answer, 'To help our country' or 'To promote the reform of society'. Discount the superficiality with which many make this reply and there still remains a substantial basis for hope for the future.

After a few months in China, a visitor will take an oath, if he is wise, never to indulge in prediction. For prophecy is sure to be dictated by hope or fear rather than adequate facts. Flesh is weak, however, and loves to pass upon the present in terms of the future. The observer will consequently fall into the vice he abjures—as I have occasionally done—to his own prompt undoing. Yet, moving between the thin, but exciting, ice of prediction and the safe, dull ground of sure fact, one may assert that, with all its crudities and vacillations, the new culture movement provides one of the firmest bases for hope for the future of China. It cannot take the place of better means of communication—railways and highways—without which the country will not be unified and hence will not be strong. But in China there is need, too, for a unified mind, and that is impossible without the new intellectual movement. It also makes a great deal of difference whether the mind when unified looks to the past or is in sympathy with modern thought in the rest of the world. A China unified according to the scheme that Japan successfully adopted would be no less isolated than Japan has turned out to be, and more menacing to the world. China needs schools; it needs, and needs badly, universal elementary education. But it makes a great deal of difference what these schools teach and what their spirit and aim is—as German and Japanese universal education both prove.

Chinese educated youth cannot permanently forswear their interest in direct political action. Their attention needs to be devoted more than it has been to detailed, practical economic questions, to currency reform, public finance and problems of taxation, to foreign loans and the Consortium. One finds schools where foreign-educated students are teaching theoretical political economy from books based on the assumption of competition, machine production and capitalistic accumulation, which have no more to do with the surrounding industry—strictly local as it is, and carried on by handwork according to custom and for a
static market—than has lunar astronomy. Or one finds the interest centering in socialism even when there is next to no problem of distribution of wealth (except checking the rapacity of officialdom) and when the problem of increased productivity for labor is acute. But China is after all in the early stage of the industrial revolution, and, if it is not to repeat the experience of the rest of the world, with all the evils and dangers of the warfare of capital and labor, with sweated industries, child and woman labor, oppression by capital and sabotage by the worker, if it is going to profit by the nineteenth-century experience of the rest of the world, it has to come to the problem prepared. And not even the most extravagant speculations of the present will, when brought to earth by the demands made by actual conditions, prove wholly useless as preparatory equipment.

China has the alternatives of perishing, to the disturbance of the world, as well as itself, or of condensing into a century or so the intellectual, scientific, industrial, political and religious progress for which the rest of the world has taken several centuries. It cannot, like the United States, make the change with plenty of elbow-room, but must accomplish it in a civilization crowded with traditions and superstitions as well as with people. Young China, especially Youngest China, shows an appreciation of this fact. There are hours when, stimulated by contact with what is best in the movement, I am willing to predict that it will succeed and, in succeeding with its own problems, will also give to the world things of new and permanent value. There are other times, when, after contact with the darker features of the situation, I wonder that the supporters of the cause do not all lose hope and pessimistically surrender. It is easy to see why some give up effort and devote themselves to making the best of a bad situation by feathering their own nests. At the end, one comes back to the sobriety, the industry, the fundamental solidity of the average common man. These qualities have weathered many previous storms. They will pull China through this one if they are redirected according to the demands and conditions of that modern world that has thrust itself so irresistibly and so disturbingly upon China. The new culture movement is a significant phase of the attempt to supply the direction so profoundly needed. [DewJ30]

1921.07 John Dewey : Lecture 'The scientific spirit and morality' at the Guangdong Provincial Education Association. [DewJ5]

1921.07 John Dewey : Lecture 'The importance of dynamic morality' : delivered at the Guangdong Teachers College. In : Guangdong sheng jiao yu hui za zhi ; July (1921). Dewey said, 'the static and passive morality which is characteristic of the Chinese people may produce strong and enduring character, but it stresses obedience and filial piety ; dynamic morality, on the other hand, stresses creativity, venturesomeness and willingness to assume responsibility'. He argued that static and passive morality was appropriate for an authoritarian state ; but 'in a democratic state where maintenance of social equilibrium and progress of social reconstruction are functions of individual responsibility, dynamic morality must be cultivated. China's survival, he insisted, hinged on the cultivation of dynamic morality through schooling. [DewJ2:S. 25-26,Kee3]

One of the two Presidents of China—it is unnecessary to specify which—recently stated that a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance meant a partition of China. In this division, Japan would take the north and Great Britain the south. Probably the remark was not meant to be taken literally in the sense of formal conquest or annexation, but rather symbolically with reference to the tendency of policies and events. Even so, the statement will appear exaggerated or wild to persons outside of China who either believe that the Open Door policy is now irrevocably established or that Japan is the only foreign Power which China has to fear. But a recent visit to the south revealed that in that section, especially in Canton, the British occupy much the same position of suspicion and dread which is held by the Japanese in the north.

Upon the negative side, the Japanese menace is negligible in the province of Kwantung, in which Canton is situated. There are said to be more Americans in Canton than Japanese, and the American colony is not extensive. Upon the positive side the history of the Cassel collieries contract is instructive. It illustrates the cause of the popular attitude toward the British, and quite possibly explains the bitterness in the remark quoted. The contract is noteworthy from whatever standpoint it is viewed, whether that of time, of the conditions it contains or of the circumstances which accompany it.

Premising that the contract delivers to a British company a monopoly of the rich coal deposits of the province for a period of ninety years and—quite incidentally of course—the right to use all means of transportation, water or rail, wharves and ports now in existence, and also to 'construct, manage, superintend and work other roads, railways, waterways as may be deemed advisable'—which reads like a monopoly of all further transportation facilities of the province—first take up the time of the making of the contract. It was drawn in April of last year and confirmed a few months later. It was made, of course, with the authorities of the Kwantung province, subject to confirmation at Peking. During this period, Kwantung province was governed by military carpet-baggers from the neighboring province of Kwangsei, which was practically alone of the southern provinces allied with the northern government, then under the control of the Anfu party. It was matter of common knowledge that the people of Canton and of the province were bitterly hostile to this outside control and submitted to it only because of military coercion. Civil strife for the expulsion of the outsiders was already going on, continually gaining headway, and a few months later the Kwangsei troops were defeated and expelled from the province by the forces of General Chen, now the civil governor of Kwantung, who received a triumphal ovation upon his entrance into Canton. At this time the present native government was established, a change which made possible the return of Sun Yat Sen and his followers from their exile in Shanghai. It is evident, then, that the collieries contract giving away the natural resources of the people of the province, was knowingly made by a British company with a government which no more represented the people of the province than the military government of Germany represented the people of Belgium during the war.

As to the terms of the contract, the statement that it gave the British company a monopoly of all the coal mines in the province, was not literally accurate. Verbally, twenty-two districts are enumerated. But these are the districts along the lines of the only railways in the province and the only ones soon to be built, including the as yet uncompleted Hankow-Canton railway. Possibly this fact accounts for the anxiety of the British partners in the Consortium that the completion of this line be the first undertaking financed by the Consortium. The document also includes what is perhaps a novelty in legal documents having such a momentous economic importance, namely, the words 'etc.' after the districts enumerated by name. For this concession, the British syndicate agreed to pay the provincial government the sum of $1,000,000 (silver of course). This million dollars is to bear six per cent interest to the company, and capital and interest are to be paid back to the company by the provincial government out of the dividends (if any) it is to receive. The nature of these 'dividends' is set forth in an article which should receive the careful attention of promoters elsewhere as a model of the possibilities of exploiting contracts. The ten million capital is divided equally into 'A' shares and 'B' shares. The 'A' shares go unreservedly to the directors of the company,
and three millions of the “B” shares are to be allotted by the directors of the company at their
discretion. The other two million are again divided into equal portions, one portion
representing the sum advanced by the company to the province and to be paid back as just
specified, while the other million—one-tenth of the capitalization—is to be a trust fund the
dividends of which are to go for the 'benefit of the poor people of the province' and for an
educational fund for the province. But before any dividends are paid upon the 'B' shares, eight
per cent dividends are to be paid upon the 'A' shares and a dollar a ton royalty upon all coal
mined. Those having any familiarity with the coal business with its usual royalty of about ten
cents a ton can easily calculate the splendid prospects of the 'poor people' and the schools,
prospects which represent the total return to the provinces of a concession of untold worth.
The contract also guarantees to the company the assistance of the provincial government in
expropriating the owners of all coal mines which have been granted to other companies but
not yet worked. These technical details make dry reading, but they throw light upon the spirit
with which the British company undertook its predatory negotiations with a government
renounced by the people it professed to govern. In comparison with the relatively crude
methods of Japan in Shantung, they show the advantages of wide business experience.
As for the circumstances and context which give added menace to the contract, the following
facts are significant. Hong Kong, a British crown colony, lies directly opposite the river upon
which Canton is situated. It is the port of export and import for the vast districts served by the
mines and railways of the province. It is unnecessary to point out the hold upon all economic
development which is given through a monopolistic control of coal. It is hardly too much to
say that the enforcement of the contract would enable British interests in Hong Kong to
control the entire industrial development of the most flourishing of the provinces of China. It
would be a comparatively easy and inexpensive matter to provide the mainland with a first
class modern harbor and port near Canton. But such a port would tend to reduce the assets of
Hong Kong to the possession of the most beautiful scenery in the world. There is already fear
that a new harbor will be built. Many persons think that the concession of building such
railways, etc., ‘as are deemed advisable for the purpose of the business of the company and to
improve those now existing’ is the object of the contract, even more than the coal monopoly.
For the British already own a considerable part of the mainland, including part of the railway
connecting the littoral with Canton. By building a cross-cut from the British owned portion of
this railway to the Hankow-Canton line, the latter would become virtually the Hankow-Hong
Kong line, and Canton would be a way-station. With the advantages thus secured, the project
for building a new port could be indefinitely blocked.
During the period in which the contract was being secured, a congress of British Chambers of
Commerce was held in Shanghai. Resolutions were passed in favor of abolishing henceforth
the whole principle of special nationalistic concessions, and of cooperating with the Chinese
for the upbuilding of China. At the close of the meeting the Chairman announced that a new
era for China had finally dawned. All of the British newspapers in China lauded the wise
action of the Chambers. At the same time, Mr. Lamont was in Peking, and was setting forth
that the object of the Consortium was the abolition of further concessions, and the uniting of
the financial resources of the banks in the Consortium for the economic development of China
itself. By an ironical coincidence, the Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank, which is the financial
power behind the contract and the new company, is the leading British partner in the
Consortium. It is difficult to see how any of the British can henceforth accuse the Japanese of
bad faith if any of the banking interests of that country should enter upon independent
negotiations with any government in China.
By the time the scene of action was transferred to Peking in order to secure the confirmation
of the central government, the Anfu regime was no more, and as yet no confirmation has been
secured. The new government at Canton has declined to recognize the contract as having any
validity. An official of the Hong Kong government has told an official of the Canton
government that the Hong Kong government stands behind the enforcement of the contract,
and that Kwantung province is a British Hinterland. Within the last few weeks the Governor
of Hong Kong and a leading Chinese banker of Hong Kong who is a British subject have
visited Peking. Rumors were rife in the south as to the object of the visit. British sources
published the report that one object was to return Weihiwei to China—in case Peking agreed to turn over more of the Kwantung mainland to Hong Kong as a quid pro quo. Chinese opinion in the south was that one main object was to secure the Peking confirmation of the Cassel contract, in which case $900,000 more would be forthcoming, $100,000 having been paid down when the contract was signed with the provincial government. Peking does not recognize the present Canton government but regards it as an outlaw. The crowd that signed the contract is still in control of the neighboring province of Kwangsi and they are relied upon by the north to effect the military subjugation of the seceded province. Fighting has already, indeed, begun, but the Kwangsi militarists are badly in need of money; if Peking ratifies the contract, a large part of the funds will be paid over to them—all that isn’t lost by the wayside to the northern militarists. Meantime British news agencies keep up a constant circulation of reports tending to discredit the Kwantung government, although all impartial observers on the spot regard it as altogether the most promising one in China.

These considerations not only throw light on some of the difficulties spoken of in a previous article concerning the functioning of the Consortium, but they give an indispensable background for judging the actual effect of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. By force of circumstances each government, even against its own wish, will be compelled to wink at the predatory policies of the other; and the tendency will be to create a division of spheres of influence between the north and south in order to avoid more direct conflicts. The English liberals who stand for the renewal of the alliance on the ground that it will enable England to exercise a check on Japanese policies, are more naïve than was Mr. Wilson with his belief in the separation of the economic and political control of Shantung. It cannot be too often repeated that the real point of friction between the United States and Japan is not in California but in China. It is silly—unless it is calculated—for English authorities to keep repeating that under no circumstances does the alliance mean that Great Britain would support Japan in a war with the United States. The day the alliance is renewed, the hands of the militarists in Japan will be strengthened and the hands of the liberals—already weak enough—be still further weakened. In consequence, all the sources of friction in China between the United States and Japan will be intensified. I do not believe in the predicted war. But should it come, the first act of Japan—so everyone in China believes—will be to seize the ports of northern China and its railways in order to make sure of an uninterrupted supply of food and raw materials. The act would be justified as necessary to national existence. Great Britain in alliance with Japan would be in no position to protest in anything but the most perfunctory way. The guarantee of such abstinence would be for Japan the next best thing to open naval and financial support. Without the guarantee they would not dare the seizure of Chinese ports. In recent years diplomats have shown themselves capable of unlimited stupidity. But it is not possible that the men in the British Foreign Office are not aware of these elementary facts. If they renew the alliance they knowingly take the responsibility for the consequences. [DewJ31]
Dewey, John.

Divided China [ID D28488].

I

About six months ago the Peking government issued an edict proclaiming the unification of China. On May 5th Sun Yat Sen was formally inaugurated in Canton as president of all China. Thus China has within six months been twice unified, once from the northern standpoint and once from the southern. Each act of 'unification' is in fact a symbol of the division of China, a division expressing differences of language, temperament, history, and political policy as well as of geography, persons and factions. This division has been one of the outstanding facts of Chinese history since the overthrow of the Manchus ten years ago and it has manifested itself in intermittent civil war. Yet there are two other statements which are equally true, although they flatly contradict each other and the one just made. One statement is that so far as the people of China are concerned there is no real division on geographical lines, but only the common division occurring everywhere between conservatives and progressives. The other is that instead of two divisions in China, there are at least five, two parties in both the north and south, and another in the central or Yangtse region, each one of the five splitting up again more or less on factional and provincial lines. And so far as the future is concerned, probably this last statement is the most significant of the three. That all three statements are true is what makes Chinese politics so difficult to understand even in their larger features.

By the good fortune of circumstances we were in Canton when the inauguration occurred. Peking and Canton are a long way apart in more than distance. There is little exchange of actual news between the two places; what filters through into either city and gets published consists mostly of rumors tending to discredit the other city. In Canton, the monarchy is constantly being restored in Peking; and in Peking, Canton is Bolshevized at least once a week, while every other week open war breaks out between the adherents of Sun Yat Sen, and General Chen Kwang Ming, the civil governor of the province. There is nothing to give the impression—even in circles which accept the Peking government only as an evil necessity—that the pretensions of Sun Yat Sen represent anything more than the desires of a small and discredited group to get some slight power for themselves at the expense of national unity. Even in Fukien, the province next north of Kwantung, one found little but gossip whose effect was to minimize the importance of the southern government. In foreign circles in the north as well as in liberal Chinese circles upon the whole, the feeling is general that bad as the de facto Peking government may be, it represents the cause of national unity, while the southern government represents a perpetuation of that division of China which makes her weak and which offers the standing invitation to foreign intrigue and aggression. Only occasionally during the last few months has some returned traveller timidly advanced the opinion that we had the 'wrong dope' on the south, and that they were really trying 'to do something down there'.

Consequently there was little preparation on my part for the spectacle afforded in Canton during the week of May 5th. This was the only demonstration I have seen in China during the last two years which gave any evidence of being a spontaneous popular movement. New Yorkers are accustomed to crowds, processions, street decorations and accompanying enthusiasm. I doubt if New York has ever seen a demonstration which surpassed that of Canton in size, noise, color or spontaneity—in spite of tropical rains. The country people flocked in in such masses, that, being unable to find accommodation even in the river boats, they kept up a parade all night. Guilds and localities which were not able to get a place in the regular procession organized minor ones on their own account on the day before and after the official demonstration. Making all possible allowance for the intensity of Cantonese local loyalty and the fact that they might be celebrating a Cantonese affair rather than a principle, the scene was sufficiently impressive to revise one’s preconceived ideas and to make one try to find out what it is that gives the southern movement its vitality.

A demonstration may be popular and still be superficial in significance. However, one found foreigners on the ground—at least Americans—saying that in the last few months the men in power in Canton were the only officials in China who were actually doing something for the people instead of filling their own pockets and magnifying their personal power. Even the
northern newspapers had not entirely omitted reference to the suppression of licensed
gambling. On the spot one learned that this suppression was not only genuine and thorough,
but that it meant a renunciation of an annual revenue of nearly ten million dollars on the part
of a government whose chief difficulty is financial, and where—apart from motives
of personal squeeze—it would have been easy to argue that at least temporarily the end justified
the means in retaining this source of revenue. English papers throughout China have given
much praise to the government of Hong Kong because it has cut down its opium revenue from
eight to four millions annually with the plan for ultimate extinction. Yet Hong Kong is
prosperous, it has not been touched by civil war, and it only needs revenue for ordinary civil
purposes, not as a means of maintaining its existence in a crisis.
Under the circumstances, the action of the southern government was hardly less than heroic.
This renunciation is the most sensational act of the Canton government, but one soon learns
that it is the accompaniment of a considerable number of constructive administrative
undertakings. Among the most notable are attempts to reform the local magistracies
throughout the province, the establishment of municipal government in Canton— something
new in China where local officials are all centrally appointed and controlled—based upon the
American Commission plan, and directed by graduates of schools of political science in the
United States; plans for introducing local self-government throughout the province; a scheme
for introduction of universal primary education in Canton to be completed in three steps.
These reforms are provincial and local. They are part of a general movement against
centralization and toward local autonomy which is gaining headway all over China, a protest
against the appointment of officials from Peking and the management of local affairs in the
interests of factions—and pocket-books— whose chief interest in local affairs is what can be
extracted in the way of profit. For the only analogue of provincial government in China at the
present time is the carpet-bag government of the south in the days following our civil war.
These things explain the restiveness of the country, including central as well as southern
provinces, under Peking domination. But they do not explain the setting up of a new national,
or federal government, with the election of Mr. Sun Yat Sen as its president. To understand
this event it is necessary to go back into history.
In June, 1917, the parliament in Peking was about to adopt a constitution. The parliament was
controlled by leaders of the old revolutionary party who had been at loggerheads with Yuan
and with the executive generally. The latter accused them of being obstructionists, wasting
time in discussing and theorizing when the country needed action. Japan had changed her
tactics regarding the participation of China in the war, and having got her position established
through the Twenty-one Demands, saw a way of controlling Chinese arsenals and virtually
amalgamating the Chinese armies with her own through supervising China's entrance into the
war. The British and French were pressing desperately for the same end. Parliament was slow
to act, and Tang Shao Yi, Sun Yat Sen and other southern leaders were averse, since they
regarded the war as none of China's business and were upon the whole more anti-British than
anti-German—a fact which partly accounts for the share of British journals in the present
press propaganda against the Canton government. But what brought matters to a head was the
fact that the constitution which was about to be adopted eliminated the military governors or
tuchuns of the provinces, and restored the supremacy of civil authority which had been
destroyed by Yuan Shih-kai, in addition to introducing a policy of decentralization. Coached
by members of the so-called progressive party which claimed to be constitutionalist and
which had a factionalist interest in overthrowing the revolutionaries who controlled the
legislative branch if not the executive, the military governors demanded that the president
suspend parliament and dismiss the legislators. This demand was more than passively
supported by all the Allied diplomats in Peking with the honorable exception of the American
defense. The president weakly yielded and issued an edict dispelling parliament, virtually
admitting in the document the illegality of his action. Less than a month afterwards he was a
refugee in the Dutch legation on account of the farce of monarchical restoration staged by
Chang Shun—who at the present time is again coming to the front in the north as adjutant to
the plans of Chang Tso Lin, the present 'strong man' of China. Later, elections were held and
a new parliament elected. This parliament has been functioning as the legislature of China at
Peking and elected the president, Shu Shi Chang, the head of the government recognized by the foreign Powers: in short it is the Chinese government from an international standpoint, the Peking government from a domestic standpoint.

The revolutionary members of the old parliament never recognized the legality of their dispersal, and consequently refused to admit the legal status of the new parliament, called by them the bogus parliament, and of the president elected by it, especially as the new legislative body was not elected according to the rules laid down by the constitution. Under the lead of some of the old members, the old parliament, called by its opponents the defunct parliament, has led an intermittent existence ever since. Claiming to be the sole authentic constitutional body of China, it finally elected Dr. Sun president of China and thus prepared the act of the fifth of May, already reported.

Such is the technical and formal background of the present southern government. Its attack upon the legality of the Peking government is doubtless technically justified. But for various reasons its own positive status is open to equally grave doubts. The terms 'bogus' and 'defunct', so freely cast at each other, both seem to an outsider to be justified. It is less necessary to go into the reasons which appear to invalidate the position of the southern parliament because of the belated character of its final action. A protest which waits four years to assert itself in positive action is confronted not with legal technicalities but with accomplished facts. In my opinion, legality for legality, the southern government has a shade the better of the technical argument. But in the face of a government which has foreign recognition and which has maintained itself after a fashion for four years, a legal shadow is a precarious political basis. It is wiser to regard the southern government as a revolutionary government, which in addition to the prestige of continuing the revolutionary movement of ten years ago has also a considerable sentimental asset as a protest of constitutionalism against the military usurpations of the Peking government.

It is an open secret that the southern movement has not received the undivided support of all the forces present in Canton which are opposed to the northern government. Tang Shao Yi, for example, was notable for his absence at the time of the inauguration, having found it convenient to visit the graves of his ancestors at that time. The provincial governor, General Chen Kwang Ming, was in favor of confining efforts to the establishment of provincial autonomy and the encouragement of similar movements in other provinces, looking forward to an eventual federal, or confederated, government of at least all the provinces south of the Yangtse. Many of his generals wanted to postpone action until Kwantung province had made a military alliance with the generals in the other southwestern provinces, so as to be able to resist the north should the latter undertake a military expedition. Others thought the technical legal argument for the new move was being overworked, and while having no objections to an out and out revolutionary movement against Peking, thought that the time for it had not yet come. They are counting on Chang Tso Lin's attempting a monarchical restoration and think that the popular revulsion against that move would create the opportune time for such a movement as has now been prematurely undertaken. However in spite of reports of open strife freely circulated by British and Peking government newspapers, most of the opposition elements are now loyal suppressing their opposition and supporting the government of Sun Yat Sen. A compromise has been arranged by which the federal government will confine its attention to foreign affairs, leaving provincial matters wholly in the hands of Governor Chen and his adherents. There is still room for friction however, especially as to the control of revenues, since at present there are hardly enough funds for one administration, let alone two.

The members of the new southern government are strikingly different in type from those one meets elsewhere whether in Peking or the provincial capitals. The latter men are literally mediaeval when they are not late Roman Empire, though most of them have learned a little modern patter to hand out to foreigners. The former are educated men, not only in the school sense and in the sense that they have had some special training for their jobs, but in the sense that they think the ideas and speak the language current among progressive folk all over the world. They welcome inquiry and talk freely of their plans, hopes and fears. I had the opportunity of meeting all the men who are most influential in both the local and federal
governments; these conversations did not take the form of interviews for publication, but I learned that there are at least three angles from which the total situation is viewed. Governor Chen has had no foreign education and speaks no English. He is distinctively Chinese in his training and outlook. He is a man of force, capable of drastic methods, straightforward intellectually and physically, of unquestioned integrity and of almost Spartan life in a country where official position is largely prized for the luxuries it makes possible. For example, practically alone among Chinese provincial officials of the first rank he has no concubines. Not only this, but he proposed to the provincial assembly a measure to disenfranchise all persons who have concubines. (The measure failed because it is said its passage would have deprived the majority of the assemblymen of their votes.) He is by all odds the most impressive of all the officials whom I have met in China. If I were to select a man likely to become a national figure of the first order in the future, it would be, unhesitatingly, Governor Chen. He can give and also command loyalty—a fact which in itself makes him almost unique.

His views in gist are as follows: The problem of problems in China is that of real unification. Industry and education are held back because of lack of stability of government, and the better elements in society seclude themselves from all public effort. The question is how this unification is to be obtained. In the past it has been tried by force used by strong individuals. Yuan Shih-kai tried and failed; Feng Kuo Chang tried and failed; Tuan Chi Jui tried and failed. That method must be surrendered. China can be unified only by the people themselves, employing not force but the methods of normal political evolution. The only way to engage the people in the task is to decentralize the government. Futile efforts at centralization must be abandoned. Peking and Canton alike must allow the provinces the maximum of autonomy; the provincial capitals must give as much authority as possible to the districts, and the districts to the communities. Officials must be chosen by and from the local districts and everything must be done to encourage local initiative. Governor Chen's chief ambition is to introduce this system into Kwantung province. He believes that other provinces will follow as soon as the method has been demonstrated, and that national unity will then be a pyramid built out of the local blocks.

With extreme self-government in administrative matters, Governor Chen will endeavor to enforce a policy of centralized economic control. He says in effect that the west has developed economic anarchy along with political control, with the result of capitalistic domination and class struggle. He wishes to avert this consequence in China by having government control from the first of all basic raw materials and all basic industries, mines, transportation, factories for cement, steel, etc. In this way the provincial authorities hope to secure an equable industrial development of the province, while at the same time procuring ample revenues without resorting to heavy taxation. Since almost all the other governors in China are using their power, in combination with the exploiting capitalists native and foreign, to monopolize the natural resources of their provinces for private profit, it is not surprising that Governor Chen's views are felt to be a menace to privilege and that he is advertised all over China as a devout Bolshevist. His views have special point in view of British efforts to get an economic stranglehold upon the province—efforts which are dealt with in another article.

Another type of view lays chief stress upon the internal political condition of China. Its adherents say in effect: Why make such a fuss about having two governments for China, when, in point of fact, China is torn into dozens of governments? In the north, war is sure to break out sooner or later between Chang Tso Lin and his rivals. Each military governor is afraid of his division generals. The brigade generals intrigue against the division leaders, and even colonels are doing all they can to further their personal power. The Peking government is a stuffed sham, taking orders from the military governors of the provinces, living only on account of jealousies among these generals, and by the grace of foreign diplomatic support. It is actually bankrupt, and this actual state will soon be formally recognized. The thing for us to do is to go ahead, maintain in good faith the work of the revolution, give this province the best possible civil administration; then in the inevitable approaching debacle, the southern government will be ready to serve as the nucleus of a genuine reconstruction. Meantime we
want, if not the formal recognition of foreign governments, at least their benevolent neutrality. Dr. Sun still embodies in himself the spirit of the revolution of 1911. So far as that was not anti-Manchu it was in essence nationalistic, and only accidentally republican. The day after the inauguration of Dr. Sun, a memorial was dedicated to the seventy-two patriot heroes who fell in an abortive attempt in Canton to throw off the Manchu yoke, some six months before the successful revolt. The monument is the most instructive single lesson which I have seen in the political history of the revolution. It is composed of seventy-two granite blocks. Upon each is engraved: Given by the Chinese National League of Jersey City, or Melbourne, or Mexico, or Liverpool, or Singapore, etc. Chinese nationalism is a product of Chinese migration to foreign countries; Chinese nationalism on foreign shores financed the revolution, and largely furnished its leaders and provided its organization. Sun Yat Sen was the incarnation of this nationalism, which was more concerned with freeing China—and Asia—from all foreign domination than with particular political problems. In spite of the movement of events since that day, he remains essentially at that stage, being closer in spirit to the nationalists of the European irredentist type than to the spirit of contemporary young China. A convinced republican, he nevertheless measures events and men in the concrete by what he thinks they will do to promote the independence of China from foreign control, rather than by what they will do to promote a truly democratic government. This is the sole explanation that can be given for his unfortunate coquetting a year ago with the leaders of the now fallen Anfu Club. He allowed himself to be deceived into thinking that they were ready to turn against the Japanese if he would give them his support; and his nationalist imagination was inflamed by the grandiose schemes of little Hsu for the Chinese subjugation of Mongolia. More openly than others, Dr. Sun admits and justifies the new southern government as representing a division of China. If, he insists, it had not been for the secession of the south in 1917, Japan would now be in virtually complete control of all China. A unified China would have meant a China ready to be swallowed whole by Japan. The secession localized Japanese aggressions, made it evident that the south would fight rather than be devoured, and gave a breathing spell in which public opinion in the north rallied against the Twenty-one Demands and against the military pact with Japan. Thus it saved the independence of China. But, while it checked Japan, it did not checkmate her. She still expects with the assistance of Chang Tso Lin to make northern China her vassal. The support which foreign governments in general and the United States in particular are giving Peking is merely playing into the hands of the Japanese. The independent south affords the only obstacle which causes Japan to pause in her plan of making northern China in effect a Japanese province. A more than usually authentic rumor says that upon the occasion of the visit of the Japanese consul general to the new president (no other foreign official has made an official visit), the former offered from his government the official recognition of Dr. Sun as president of all China, if the latter would recognize the Twenty-one Demands as an accomplished fact. From the Japanese standpoint the offer was a safe one, as this acceptance of Japanese claims is the one thing impossible to the new government. But meantime the offer naturally confirms the nationalists of Dr. Sun's type in their belief that the southern split is the key to maintaining the political independence of China; or, as Dr. Sun puts it, that a divided China is for the time being the only means to an ultimately independent China.

These views are not given as stating the whole truth of the situation. They are ex parte. But they are given as setting forth in good faith the conceptions of the leaders of the southern movement and as requiring serious attention if the situation of China, domestic and international, is to be understood. Upon my own account, and not simply as expressing the views of others, I have reached a conclusion quite foreign to my thought before I visited the south. While it is not possible to attach too much importance to the unity of China as a part of the foreign policy of the United States, it is possible to attach altogether too much importance to the Peking government as a symbol of that unity. To borrow and adapt the words of one southern leader, while the United States can hardly be expected to do other than recognize the Peking as the de facto government, there is no need to coddle that government and give it face. Such a course maintains a nominal and formal unity while in fact encouraging the military and corrupt forces that keep China divided and which make for foreign aggression.
In my opinion as the outcome of two years’ observation of the Chinese situation, the real interests of both China and the United States would be served if, in the first place, the United States should take the lead in securing from the diplomatic body in Peking the serving of express notice upon the Peking government that in no case would a restoration of the monarchy be recognized by the Powers. This may seem in America like an unwarranted intervention in the domestic affairs of a foreign country. But in fact such intervention is already a fact. The present government endures only in virtue of the support of foreign Powers. The notice would put an end to one kind of intrigue, one kind of rumor and suspicion, which is holding industry and education back and which is keeping China in a state of unrest and instability. It would establish a period of comparative quiet in which whatever constructive forces exist may come to the front. The second measure would be more extreme. The diplomacy of the United States should take the lead in making it clear that unless the promises about the disbanding of the army, and the introduction of general retrenchment are honestly and immediately carried out, the Powers will pursue a harsh rather than a benevolent policy toward the Peking government, insisting upon immediate payment of interest and loans as they fall due and holding up the government to the strictest meeting of all its obligations. The notification to be effective might well include a virtual threat of withdrawal of recognition in case the government does not seriously try to put its profuse promises into execution. It should also include a definite discouragement of any expenditures designed for military conquest of the south. Diplomatic recognition of the southern government is out of the question at present. It is not out of the question to put on the financial screws so that the southern government will be allowed space and time to demonstrate what it can do by peaceful means to give one or more provinces a decent, honest and progressive civil administration. It is unnecessary to enumerate the obstacles in the way of carrying out such a policy. But in my judgment it is the only policy by which the Great Powers will not become accomplices in perpetuating the weakness and division of China. It is the most straightforward way of meeting whatever plans of aggression Japan may entertain. [DewJ32]
Letter from Alice Chipman Dewey to Dewey children

[July 21, 1921?]

On Sayurday [23 July 1921] we are going up Paoshan. Laoshan is the second of the great mts of Shantung Perhpas yu know that Shantung means eastern mountains. The have a saying here Taishan is the greatest in height but Laoshan is the most magnificent of the Mountains of the province. I spose it sounds like a proverb in the native tongue. Well we are going with a picnic association of Chinese students. and shall probably spend the night on top Sat. On Snday we come back here and sail for Kobe on Tuesday the 2nd. I will tell you later what is a picnic association and about the trip.

We have met some missionaries and they tell us the worst thing about the Jap management here now is the red tape, We had a specimen of the usefullnes of red tape this mroning. As soon as the Chinese gentlemen were well seated and had begun talking in our room there was a knock at the door, In walked a dapper ajp. The rooms here are so fixed that he was in an outer room and we were seated in the inner one. Well Lucy caught him quick and backed him out while talking. His errand was to bring a blank to be filled out to request the privilege of embarking from this Japanese port to another J port. The blank had the heading of the South Manchurian R. Way. It must be very good polcy to have many kinds of small business on hand which enables you to make an excuse to enter the guests room whenever any thing is going on which it is desirable to see. It was interesting to see that there was no conversation here on the part of the Chinese gentlemen which might not have hd witnesses safely, Tonight we shall go to a Chinese restaurant and we shall see what goes on there. One of them was recommended as knowing every thing worth knowing and seldom opening up, We hope we may smile on him and get him open. He was educated by a missionary whom we saw yesterday who lives in Weihsien. where very interesting things happened during the first occupation of this province. That story has much which the American people know nothing about and perhaps will not believe when they are told, I should like to have friend Wilson compelled to listen to those stories everyday the rest of his life.

We have been for the drive and have seen all the old German forts now deserted. It beats the bnd to see how they have abolished every ger word The streets look as if they had been born with the Emp when nothing else but Jap words existed, Before the invasion of Chinese civilization as they themselves have the nerve to say. The Imperial interpreter called on Pa a little wisp or wasp of a thing with a pinched face who said he knew Pa was here because he had read it in the papers, We said but not to him well you need not have added the because. A man is waiting down stairs to escort us to the dinner party and this must start for Tsinan at nine tonight, so heres a goodbye perhaps the last in China if this can be called China, Glad we have the dinner tonight to remind us of that part of the world. And here is the red letter telling you the winecups are clean and ready and wait[n]g for you. Love and love till we get more time to write,

Mama. [DewJ3]
Letter from Lucy Dewey to Dewey family
Tsinanfu, July 22. [1921]
I've got to do this by hand as Mamma is using the machine to write marginal notes in a book of rubbings. We got some more of those books from Chufu with the story of Confucious' life that Evelyn got last year, and Mamma is getting the story translated bit by bit. She's typing the translation in the margin so the thing will be most complete and natty. Some girls who are being sent to U.S. by the provincial government did the translating and they nearly had hysterics over it. Some of the tales are screamingly funny.

[begin TL] Its just occurred to me that Dad is lecturing and I can use his machine. We had a wonderful trip to Chufu and Taishan this time, much better than last year as it was cool and we had more time. It rained most of the time we were in Chufu but we went and saw the things anyway. We were taken to call on the Confucian duchess but she refused to see us. The gentlemen who conducted us were furious as it had all been arranged ahead of time and the old lady was too lazy or something to bother with us. The major domo of the palace was toting the baby duke around the court and he was heard to remark that we all wore glasses and they didn't want to have anything to do with people of that kind. They took us out to the tomb of an emperor who died five thousand years ago and to the temple of the king who drove Confucius out of the kingdom of Lu. Confucius certainly has the better of him now. We stayed in a school house and lived on bad Chinese food. It can be trying when it is bad, too. Chiefly eggs and at the end of three days I had reached a state where the sight of an egg made me sick. The Chinese went right on eating them, tho. At Taian we had better luck as we were being taken care of by the magistrate. We slept that night in a school and had a delicious dinner. We started early the next morning and had breakfast at a nunnery about a quarter of the way up. It was a regular feast and the Chinese gentlemen all drank brandy for breakfast. This machine sticks like the devil, I don't see how Papa writes on it at all. The trip up the mountain was lovely. It was a partly cloudy day and the light on the plain below was beautiful. There has been a lot of rain here this spring and the brook bed was full of water, a real mountain stream and clear and nice. We got to the top about half past two. I had a chair this time and got out and walked past the place where Evelyn and I collapsed last year, just to show them I could do it. Its a shame Evelyn never got to the top as it is one of the most stunning views I ever saw. Taishan is the highest mountain around and the lower ranges and the valleys look just like the relief maps in school. You can see the Yellow River and beyond to the north and to the south a great plain. There has been plenty of rain this year and the country is very rich and green, much more beautiful that I have ever seen it before. In fact there has been about all the rain the country can stand for awhile. There are floods already at places on the Yangtse and the people here are quite worried about the Yellow river. There have been two days without rain now and that ought to give time for some of the water to run off and they say of there is no more for a few days longer they will be all right. In 1917 there were very bad floods, last year famine, and this year floods again, it doesn't give the people much chance to recuperate between catastrophes.

They have resumed the airoplane service between here and Peking after stopping for nearly two weeks because of floods in the landing field. One of the aviators I know came in last night and offered to take me back to Peking today and bring me back again tomorrow. It sounded awfully tempting but quite impossible, of course. I guess I never told you that I was taken up to see Peking from an airoplane. We were up for ten minutes and going beautifully along towards the city when the engine died. We landed in the middle of a corn field and walked three miles back to the aerodrome. And that ended that episode. I was very much disappointed because I loved the sensation of flying and I have wantd to see Peking from an air ship ever since I've been there. Such is life.

We leave here for Tsingtau on Sunday, stay there till the following Tuesday, probably, and then go across to Japan. Its getting quite exciting being so near home, Im beginning to realize that we are leaving China.

Well, I must go and do the family ironing. Evelyn will be pleased to know that we are still carrying the electric iron around. Loads of love to you all and well see you soon.
Lucy [DewJ3]

Sir, In your issue of July 24th there is a leaderette with whose general scope I am in agreement, but ending in a suggestion which seems to me misleading and not wholly just, to the effect that 'Professor Dewey… is not a good authority or an unprejudiced witness'. I do not know that any one of us could claim to be an unprejudiced witness where national bias enters in. I have myself struggled against the distorting influence of nationalism on my own thoughts for many years, yet I am still conscious of being by no means unprejudiced in an issue between Britain and a foreign country. Doubtless Professor Dewey also may be described – along with the rest of the human race – as a prejudiced witness in this sense, but in this sense only. He favours the Consortium. I do not. He sees in the extension of America's influence on China the best hope of China's regeneration. I do not. But these are very difficult questions in regard to which either opinion may be held rationally.
As to the statement that Professor Dewey 'is not a good authority', he has been in Canton and seen the leading men, and is, no doubt, repeating what they told him. Nor is he the only authority for the statement in question, which is repeated with more detail by Mr. Philip Haddon in the 'Review of the Far East' for July 16th. And certainly some explanation has to be sought for the extreme hostility of Hongkong to the Government of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The favour shown to that Government by the Americans also needs explanation, which, I hope, will be provided by some American as 'unpatriotic' as myself. [Russ6]

1921.07.24-09.24 1921.07.24-27 / 1921.09.19-24 (publ.)
1) 'Social factors'. = She hui zuo yao su.
2) 'The social factor in education'. = Jiao yu zhi she hui di yao su.
3) 'The relationship between school subjects and society'. = Xue xiao ke mu yu she hui zhi guan xi.
4) 'The relationship between the organization and administration of the schools and society'. = Xue bao di xing zheng he zu zhi yu she hui zhi guan xi. In : Chen bao fu kan ; July 24-27 (1921).
6) 'The relationship between school and society'. = Xue xiao yu she hui di guan xi. In : Chen bao fu kan ; Sept. 22-24 (1921). [Kee3]
Dearest family,

We are at least on the train on the way to Tsingtau, and for the first time I feel as if we were really leaving China, and I am feeling quite sentimental about it. We didn't get off yesterday because Friday the students came and asked to give us a farewell tea party, that day, what little there was left of it, was already occupied, and there were a lunch party farewell and a dinner, and an afternoon tea party already arranged for Saturday, so to stay Sunday was the only thing possible. I think what the stirred up the boys was the fact that the girls normal school had arranged an afternoon reception for Friday and they thought they would lose face. You can gather the advanced stage of "female education" in Shantung by the fact that this is the only girls school of high school grade in the entire province, thirty eight millions population, I mean gov't school, there are more missionary schools. There were about thirty girls staying at the school during the vacation, and they have lots of life and pep, also most of them quite pretty. It shows what habit does, but I see many more pretty women now than I did first, because I have got used now to their soft features that blend together. Lucy is more the Chinese type though still too western. It was a very interesting afternoon; I didn't have to speak for one thing, and after mamma got thru, she asked the girls to express their wishes and plans, and after a while three of them got up and made very interesting speeches on the backwardness[?] of girls education, the difficulty they had in securing preparation for even the few higher schools they were, one of them almost wept as she told how the men didn't want the women educated. Another said that she and several of her class-mates were going to start a primary school after they graduated, as the gov't schools didn't allow enough liberty and were too subject to interference from officials. The principal is a man but seemed more in sympathy with the wishes of the girls than most of them, at least his daughter was one who made quite a free speech. The province used to end sixty students to Japan every year, now they are going to send forty to America and twenty to Japan. More of the speeches here dwelt upon the friendship of America than they have anywhere else, and it rather pathetic to see how they are depending upon us. They expect us somehow to work a miracle for them. Their enthusiasm for the Pacific conference is tempered by a certain amount of scepticism however on acct of the Versailles conference. It is rather surprising how great the knowledge among educated people is of the war outcome and who absolutely uniform the judgement is. A Chinese who has recently gone to Geneva wrote back that there was no league of nations, but only an organization to enforce the Versailles treaty. A speaker at the dinner last night made much of the fact that England and France and France and Italy had already begun quarrelling among themselves as evidence that Europe was too selfish settle the Pacific question and that America and China must settle it, as America was the only question they trusted. He was a Japanese returned student and an old Chinese scholar too, the kind that begins by apologizing that they have been able to give only very little ad a very poor food and in general they regret the sufferings they have inflicted upon their guests, all te time they are doing more fr you than anybody else ever thought of doing. The provincial assembly took the lead in one farewell dinner, and the speaker after getting thru the introductory compliments in which he assured us that all the progress Shantung had made in the last two years ^and half^ was due to our previous visit and that the interest in America in the Shantung question was due holly to my writings got down to business and discusses the AJ alliance and the Pacific conference very intelligently. Well what I started out to stay was that among the students going to America this summer are three four girls, two are going to Texas and two to Oberlin. It is a sign that some change is occurring that they were invited to most of the public functions, being the only "females" present aside from Du Wei Furin and Du Wei Ni su. After making five farewell speeches in two days in response to their speeches of welcome etc, you can imagine how reduced I was. In spite of everything they made us some presents, two pieces if the best Shantung silk, two pieces of framed embroidery, etc.

We had another demonstration that you can't beat the game. I bough my own tickets to Tsingtao in advance in connection with steamer tickets to Kobe. Were they downhearted? Not they. We are accompanied on our trip by two guides, one the asst commissioner of education who
speaks no English and the other a young man who understands ad seaks some english and who can also speak Japanese.

To change the subject. A young man who has succeeded in learning a little English said that he had not been in Chufu but he was sure that it was very mysterious. Also that he believed that Taishan was a natural not an artificial mountain. As it six thousand feet high more or less, I was reluctantly obliged to concede the correctness of his remark. A foreigner who speaks good Chinese got in conversation with a soldier ho seemed to be above the average and asked him how and why he got into that business. He said he used to be a merchant, and he found he had to do everybody, his friends included, so he looked around for a calling where that wouldn't happen and decided uon soldiering where you only had too do your enemies. Then he was asked if he sent his pay home now. An he said, He only had enough to entertain his friends so he allowed his relatives to support his family. Upon the whole I think this story contains more sides of Chinese life than any other one I have heard. The newspaper men in Tsinan are vry interprising. At every lecture they circulatied copies of the speechs made at the 1st time, and at last evenings banquet they gave us little pamphlets with the reports of my six andyr your mothers two speeches. Can you wonder I hate to leave a country where educational lectures are treated as news? Its another of the strange contradictions here, next to no schools and money for the m, and so much more interest in educational discussion than in any other country. We saw in the paper that when Mr Russell was approached by the reporters when he reached Japan handed them out a slip in which he said that having died (in Japan) three months before, it was obviously impossible for him to say anything for publication. Also we saw by the paper that Mr Ono had engaged the entire roof garden of Hotel Peking last evening for a banquet to Japanese and Chinese bankers. He told us that he would robabily be back in Japan before we got away, but according to the newspapers he has not yet had much success in his mission of renewing loans.

This part of Shantung is much more fertile and prosperus than the parts which the road to Nanking goes thru. In fact it is the best farming country I've seen north of the Yangste. There has been a tremendous amount of rain, and some of the famine districts where the drought had been the worst, are now flooded, many villages entirely under water. This country we are going thru is high and dry however tho everything is very green from the rain. We stayed at a German hotel in Tsinan, and the proprietors with German thrift run a butcher shop and a tannery and leather factory. We have blown ourselves to four big leather bags. They are not so handsome, but good leather and very strong, they with several portfolios cost about a hundred sixty mex, which as leather goods were in America is about half price And I dont know whether we could get such strong ones. We now have ten pieces of checked bagage, and only nine pieces of hand baggae in the car with us. We have a certain number of presents for people in Japan, and hope we can cut down by one piece. It will take one of my checks I guess to pay excess bagage in Japan and the U S...

Lots and lots of love Dad [DewJ3]
Pa and Lucy have gone out to walk and I am staying at home to nurse my side. I have the door locked for it is not safe to assume that your room is your own in this hotel. Some D Jap just opens the door and walks in whenever he wants to. One stranger came this morning before I was out of bed. The others had gone out. I thought it might be the boy wanting to come in to do the room so I went in my nightdress and opened the door. But stepped back and stranger boldly presented himself at the crack of the door which I made narrower as fast as I could. He said in suave tones, Is the doctor No he didn't say that either, he just said Doctor Dewey? I said he is not in and as I shut the door I heard him murmer thank you. They are certainly the best illustration of the vulgarity of trying to follow customs they know nothing about that the world can show. This was nothing to what the manager of the hotel has just done. Lucy was undressed and said to me some one knocking. So I started but before I got underway this man opened the door wide and looked in at Lucy who requested him to withdraw. He closed the door and when I got there I asked him in no uncertain tone to please never walk into this room without being invited again. It had happened enough times that strange men had com[e] in and we did not like it. He looked me squarely in the face without changing a muscle and said he wanted to speak to the doctor and he thought he was in. I finihed by saying that he would please not think again but remember that this room was ours and not his and that we expected him not to come in unless he was invited. he wound off by saying he thought the doctor was in and that was why he did it. I couldnt take time to go into that question but left it to Pa. At one point he looked as if he were going to laugh at me but thought better of that and continued to stare and to wonder how I dared to talk to him like that. There is no doubt this has its reason for he was entirely brazen to the end of the talk and he will do it again of the door is not kept locked. I hate to go off for two days as we are planning to do on Saturday when we go.

Lucy and I conversed with Mr Ding last night at the bankers dinner. He has a son at Cornell studying engineering. Also a nephew. He has one little daughter six of who he seems very proud. He will send her to the states. He said he could see the difference between his mother and his wife. His mother never went to school his wife has. He believes it is very important to educate the mothers. Says the Chine women are good financiers. They make excellent accountants in the banks and good shopkeepers. Under the old system a certain number have always succ in this way, they get their training in the family where all work together. Regarding the Pacific conference he said it that man Nono, (Ono) who is trying to get Chin appoint as the Chinese representative. I know that man, I have seen him oftenly. Why he does not know anything, he just does not know anything.

The loan which Mr Ono has come to arrange is not yet settled. No I do not think it is settled yet. The Pekin Govt is bad. The Tuchuns are bad. I think Wang [Ching-wei] of Hupei will have to go, but we can not get rid of the system immediately. I think some one will follow Wang and he will be just as bad and after that we may throw it all away. The defeat of Kwangsi make it look as if the system were failing fast. No one would have thought it possible that Lu Yung Ting would fall down as he has done. They thought he was strongly entrenched, but now he is down and out, he will have to go soon perhaps at once. It looks now as if the Canton Govt would have a chance.

Speaking of women in business he said the women of his family in Yangchow run a silk store. They do the ent business of buying and judging themselves as well as administering the shop. It is the best store in Yangchow. The rich women like to buy there better than of the men they get better skill and better attention.

Yangchow is one of the old rich aristocratic towns above the Yngste on the Pukow R.R. It is famou[s] for good food and effete living. A rich town.6

[Alice Chipman Dewey] [DewJ3]
Letter from Lucy Dewey to Dewey family
Tsingtau July 28. [1921]

Dear Family,

Here we are in this historic, not to mention famous, spot. I am trying to write with Dads machine and first it hesitates, then it shimmies and ends up with a long glide at the end. I cant keep up with its speed so dont blame any little imperfections on me. We have a lovely room here on the top of the building looking out over the bay towards the real Tsingtao, which is a little bit of an island with a light house on it. The water is covered with square sailed fishing junks and there are mountains in the background. Its really a lovely place and the Germans have built a fine city here. The architecture is pure German with broad streets, lots of trees, both in the city and on the hills around. As Papa remarks, its no wonder the Germans are sore for this is in many respects the finest piece of work we have seen in China.

Last night the Chamber of Commerce and business men gave us a dinner. And gosh how they hate the Japs. They seem to have really liked the Germans and got along well with them but not so the present possessors. The Germans confined themselves to wholesale business but the Japs are gradually driving out the Chinese retailers and small shop keepers. There are thirty thousand Japs here, the figures for the Chinese varies from fifty to seventy thousand. Its an absolutely Japanese city to appearances, they run most of the shops and sell goods of J manufacture. There are some Chinese stores but they are small and not very numerous. Every one agrees that business is not very good just now and the town seems very dead. I gather its just temporary as those business men said last night that business on the whole was as good as before the war. I am absolutely feeble minded today, the letdown from the constant rush in this damp climate has left me a rag so Ill leave this and write more later.

[Lucy Dewey] [DewJ3]

Letter from Lucy Dewey to Dewey family
THE GRAND HOTELS, LIMITED. TSINGTAO, July 29. [1921]

I've given up the typewriter as a hopeless job. They took us out the other day to the old German fortification on the point. The Japs didn't do much damage there, only one of the guns had been injured at all. The Japs evidently do not consider the place tenable as they are not doing anything with it and these great guns are all rusting with their machinery. There are new forts up on a hill, higher & farther inland, which our cab drive said are not so large as the Germans. What a beastly thing war is, anyway, it made it all seem very real & vivid to see those fortifications with the shell holes and barbed wire.

Yesterday we didn't do much. Mamma has cracked her old broken rib and it bothers her a great deal. She stayed at home quietly all day yesterday to try and rest it and we stayed with her except for a short excursion down-town. She says her rib is some better this morning. Last night Dad & I went to the movies, it was quite an amusing show. This morning I am going out to swim with a girl I knew in Peking who is here for her vacation. It's very misty today—hasn't been really clear since we got here & we may give up the trip to the mountains tomorrow. Mamma is not very keen about it, especially as it involves spending the night and sleeping on board beds with all your ribs is not the most comfortable way to pass a night. If there is no chance for a view I think the whole thing will be given up, probably. I must run along to my swim. This will be continued in our next.

[Lucy Dewey] [DewJ3]
Our last three weeks in China were spent in the province of Shantung. A year and a half had elapsed since our previous visit. Then it was the dead of winter; this time the heat of midsummer reigned. The social atmospheric changes were as great as the climatic. During the earlier period, Tsinan was under martial law, and militarism was literally at bayonets' points with the students' movement whose revolt was at its height. The Anfuites were in control at the national capital, and in the province. Even educational lectures were suspect. The provincial officials telegraphed the authorities at Peking to prevent our visit, as it would surely cause disturbance. The message never reached us, and we were in Tsinan before we even learned how dangerous was the visit. The prevailing excitement immediately revealed that something was up; newspapersmen and assemblymen who were fighting the militaristic and pro-Japanese officials, provided an unusually warm welcome—and so did the officials. Soldiers lined the streets at intervals of twenty feet. The yard of the Provincial Assembly Hall was filled with companies of soldiers: machine guns were trained upon the building—all for fear that the students, then on strike as protest against the closing of their headquarters, might demonstrate in force. The chief of police occupied the position on the platform usually taken by an educational official.

This time everything was as quiet as in America when a teachers' institute is in progress. Only the ordinary number of armed policemen were in the streets. The provincial assemblymen were still engaged in fighting the provincial governor, but the struggle was a peaceful one; not a single soldier invaded the assembly hall. The present struggle is indicative of the political situation in China. The financial commissioner of the province was a Shantung man. As such he interested himself in protecting the people of the province by keeping expenditures confined to legitimate purposes. Since the office of provincial governor is prized because it is the shortest and quickest road to becoming a multi-millionaire, the governor removed the obnoxious treasurer-auditor. Hence the conflict with the provincial legislature. I call it characteristic of the present situation because while militarism is still rampant, the people of China are now learning the old lesson that political control goes with control of the public purse, and that soldiers in China are an effect as well as a cause of lack of legislative control of public funds. As this lesson is learned, the political development of China will begin to run parallel to the struggle for representative government in the western world. 'Republicanism' is slowly passing from an aspiration and a magic phrase to a matter of business.

Japanese relations as well as the domestic situation have assumed a much more tranquil aspect in the intervening year and a half. Direct acts of aggression have practically ceased, and the 'invasion' has now taken the form of a steady economic peaceful penetration. Provocative incidents still occur. For example, the governor was requested by the Japanese local authorities to forbid students' meetings and demonstrations on May 7th—the day of National Shame in commemoration of the signing of the Twenty-One Demands. The object was to provoke the students to some overt anti-Japanese move. But the order was passed on from the governor to the commissioner of education, from the commissioner to the principals, from them to the students—some time on the day after the anniversary. The meetings were held, and everything passed off peacefully. Again, on the spring holiday which is national tree-planting day, by some coincidence the garrison of Japanese soldiers in Tsinan appeared for manoeuvres on the same hill that had been selected by the students as the spot for planting trees. But the students are well organized; in this case the bull was educated to ignore the red rag however flaming, and the presumably desired provocation did not occur. But while such incidents still occur, the earlier outrages of arbitrary arrest and torture have ceased. In the main they are replaced by a conciliatory policy, so it is fair to presume that such incidents as occur are due to local bumptious Japanese who dislike the changed policy towards the Chinese. The change also affects foreigners in the province. There used to be more or less complaint about the brusque way in which passport regulations were enforced for travellers to Tsing Tao. Now a suave official, whose mouth might be a store-house for the provincial butter, asks if you are provided with one, and then informs you that since you are an American, it is not necessary to produce it. This trivial episode is characteristic of the way in which the traveller is now received, a way which is like the courtesy so uniformly found in
Japan proper, instead of the rudeness which up to a short time ago reminded the visitor to Japanese possessions on the continent that he was an intruder, there only by the ungracious grace of the Japanese.

In the residential part of Tsing Tao as distinct from the industrial part, the impressions gained are of Germany rather than of Japan. And whatever one’s opinions of the origin and aims of German possession, one has to admit that she did a good job while in control. There is no part of the Far East so solidly and attractively built as this city which the Germans, in a few years, turned from a dirty fishing village of mud huts into the most cleanly city of China and into a port of enormous commercial potentialities. Here too the change of spirit on the part of the Japanese is evident. The whole outward aspect of things is clearly intended to minimize military occupation and emphasize civil administration. Pains are taken to attract foreign guests to a pleasant summer resort, and permanent foreign residents no longer complain of inquisitorial visits and vexatious interference, but only of the appalling amount of red tape that has to be unwound to get through any official business, such as a lease or paying taxes. It is, however, significant of the tenor of our Bryan period of Far Eastern diplomacy that old American residents have never received compensation for the systematic looting done by Japanese soldiers when they took possession, although British citizens have been attended to. It cannot be truthfully said that the more conciliatory policy on the part of Japan has affected Chinese feeling or opinion. It would be enormously instructive to discover in full detail just why so little bitterness is felt toward prior German occupation and so much toward present Japanese control. The Japanese regard the contrast as part of the forward disposition of the Chinese people who characteristically decline to recognize their true friends. Idealization of a past that is done with, in contrast with a present that is acute, may have something to do with it. The friendly and tactful quality of German intercourse certainly had something to do with it also. So has the fact that German merchants mostly confined themselves to foreign trade while Japanese settlers are engaging in all kinds of retail trade, and, what is more serious, are getting hold of land. The fact counts also that the Shantung railway under German control was a private enterprise which freely used Chinese help and guards, while now it is a Japanese governmental enterprise with no use for Chinese except as coolie laborers. But I do not think that all these factors put together weigh in comparison with the fact that German possession seemed only one incident in a series of foreign aggressions which had to be dealt with as best they might, while Japanese control is a vast overshadowing threat of an engulfment which may become complete at any moment. Hence the depth and intensity of the feeling aroused. As compared with a year and a half ago, immediate complaints now centre about the opium affair, and the furnishing of weapons to bandits and otherwise encouraging them. The establishment of a government opium monopoly in Tsing Tao is an officially acknowledged fact, not a piece of rumor. Official details are naturally not easy to get. It is known however that the business is handled by a Chinese, one Liu Tze Shan by name; that about two million and a half ounces a year are imported, and that the concessionaire pays two dollars an ounce to the imperial administration, so that the opium and morphine trade yields about five million a year toward the expenses of occupation. So far it may be said that Japan is only following British and French precedents in south China. But there is at least this difference. Hong Kong and Indo-China are actually under foreign sovereignty. The Chinese flag still flies over the Tsing Tao custom house, and regular duties are paid on all goods which go into the interior. Opium is of course contraband. It would not do to have it appear on the manifest of imports. So it is shipped in, labelled 'military stores', and is thus exempt from examination. It is also universally believed that aside from merchants who carry the stores as part of their luggage, the military railway guards act as distributing agents through the interior. Definite facts about the distribution of arms to bandits are even harder to get at. One has to rely on what is generally stated by Chinese and foreigners alike. The objective fact is that the Japanese railway guards are sufficient to protect the zone, and that during German occupation even with Chinese guards the zone was entirely peaceful. Since then it has been much disturbed, sometimes to the extent of compelling the evacuation of whole villages. This state of things is of course impossible without the connivance of Japanese authorities. Making the waters troubled in order to fish in them is a policy which has good—or bad—precedents in
plenty in Manchuria. Circumstantial stories tell of renting by the night of revolvers by Japanese soldiers, as well as of the direct sale of guns and ammunition—which are under strict official Japanese supervision. As near to statistics as one can come is that during a single month there were twenty cases of banditry within five miles of Tsing Tao, in territory leased to Japanese, and that the Japanese have never suffered.

The Japanese government has publicly pledged itself to the International Anti-opium Society to cancel the opium monopoly in Shantung, and the Chinese admit that there are already some signs of amelioration. When and if the Japanese military are with-drawn, banditry may reduce itself to the usual Chinese average, though the temptation to make trouble in order to have an excuse to interfere so as to protect Japanese subjects will remain. The remaining sore point is the economic question. Intelligent Shantungese who are convinced that Japan now intends to carry out her promise of withdrawal of troops at a fairly early date, say it will make no real difference in the situation, because in the meantime Japan has obtained such an economic stranglehold on the province. Even if this hold had been secured by superior economic efficiency, the Chinese would hardly welcome it more than do, say, Californians, especially when it affects land ownership which in China concentrates in itself all the emotions which in western countries are distributed also among religious and patriotic interests. But fraud and force are alleged as the means by which the economic position of Japan has been consolidated. The so-called auction of German properties in Tsing Tao was certainly a scandal as respects favoritism as to persons and prices. The means by which farmers have been compelled to part with their lands were reported in my former article. It is also stated that it is useless to appeal to the courts when disputes arise affecting leases or other economic interests, as it is an axiom that the Japanese litigant is always right. A number of combined Sino-Japanese companies have been started. According to Chinese opinion most of them are formed because of coercion, and the result is unequal treatment. But upon this point it is hard to find unbiased testimony.

In spite of the general Chinese belief that the economic control of Japan is too firm to be shaken by anything short of international pressure or a political upheaval, I do not believe that the industrial and commercial situation is satisfactory to Japan, especially in view of the glowing hopes which were at first entertained. I haven't, as I write, the figures for last year at hand, but the customs statistics for 1919 show no great increase in trade over the last year of German occupation, in spite of the large number of factories which the Japanese have built. This might be attributed to general depression, but from 1916 to 1919, the imports of Dairen, Japan's northern port, almost trebled and exports more than doubled. Japanese plans when they took possession included the building of a number of railways to connect the interior with their railway at Tsinan. They indulged freely in predictions of the day when Tsing Tao would be the chief port of all central China, displacing Tientsin and rivalling Shanghai. Nor were the predictions based wholly on emotion, as is shown by the fact that the opposition of foreign commercial interests in China to Japanese occupation was openly based on the threat which their occupation conveyed of strangulation of the commerce of ports in which foreign firms were established. But in the intervening years Japan lavished her funds on unproductive political loans which won only the hatred of the people, and which made impossible the granting of the railway concessions. And now the projected railways come under the scope of the Consortium—a credit item in offset to the virtual omission of Manchuria from its scope. The gap between prospect and realization is so great that it inclines one to a belief that Japan would be willing to trade off some of her remaining privileges in Shantung for a Chinese and international solid acknowledgement of her 'special position' in Manchuria.

This brings us to the present diplomatic position of the Shantung question. It is quite true, as Japanese apologists state, that Japan has thrice approached China to open negotiations for the "return" of Shantung. These apologists when they are talking or writing for the benefit of those ignorant of conditions, say that Japan greatly deplores the absence of any government in China sufficiently stable to carry on negotiations, and say Japan longs for the time when such a government will come into existence. When they are more candid, they admit that no Chinese government dare enter into direct negotiations with Japan on the question. Even the Anfu government at its height dared not, knowing well that it would be the signal for an
explosion and possible revolution. In part this unwillingness is grounded in the deepest psychology of the Chinese: 'When in doubt, don't.' In this particular case, the policy of 'non-doing' had good reason in the uncertainty as to the intelligence, force and integrity of the officials who would have represented China in 'negotiations'. But there is also an objective ground for the refusal. The original Japanese request for negotiations was so worded as to commit the Chinese government, if it accepted it, to admitting the validity of the Versailles settlement as well as the treaties signed at the time of the Twenty-one Demands. Subsequent proposals repeat the original ground of offence. They refer to the 'formal agreement' by which the Chinese government pledged itself beforehand to acknowledge and consent to the transfer of German rights to Japan. Of course the whole case of China lies in its refusal to admit the validity of these earlier treaties. The grounds of their refusal are threefold. First, they were made under duress; second, Germany's title forbade alienation to a third power; and, thirdly, when China entered the war as an ally her whole status was changed. The latter claim was admitted by implication in Japan's efforts to prevent China's entering the war until after she had made her secret agreements with France and Great Britain to support her seizure of Shantung. Quite aside then from popular sentiment, for China to have entered into negotiations on the only basis proposed by Japan would be to stultify her recent diplomacy, and to surrender all hope of a rectification of the conditions growing out of the Twenty-one Demands. And the latter include much more than the Shantung question. For example, public opinion in the world seems as yet hardly awake to the fact that the original lease of Port Arthur and surrounding country to Russia expires in 1924, and that Japan's case for retention of its Manchurian possessions rests upon the validity of the treaties in which the Twenty-one Demands are embodied.

It is not surprising that the hopes and fears of China now centre about the Pacific Conference, and that it is the chief topic of conversation among intelligent Shantungese. It is hardly too much to say that its crucial issue is whether or not the treaties which embody the Twenty-one Demands are faits accomplis. If the conference regularizes Japan's position, one chapter in the fate of China is sealed. If it refuses to do so, the conference will doubtless be broken up unless Japan is willing to go further in compromise than now appears likely. The attempt was well worth making. But too great optimism about its outcome would be childish. It hardly requires Versailles to remind us that a peace conference may be as dangerous as war. [DewJ33]

A Message

For those who believe in the Chinese people and who also believe in their genuinely democratic character, the Tenth Anniversary of the declaration of the Republic of China is an occasion for both congratulation and sorrow. Congratulation that the country has at least faced toward a goal where its strength, happiness and freedom may be found; regret that the Republic is still so largely only a name, and that under cover of this name autocratic and militaristic forces have won power in China's domestic affairs. If we look at the political condition of the country, either in the nation at large, in most of the provinces or the cities, we have to admit that while the Revolution of ten years ago succeeded in overthrowing the Manchu dynasty, it is not as yet a complete revolution in any positive sense. The revolution as a transfer of power and authority to the people, as a liberation of the common people from a corrupt, despotic and ignorant oligarchy has still for the most part to be accomplished. Nevertheless two years stay in China and visits to capitals of eleven of its provinces have convinced me that the signs of progress are unmistakable. I even believe that many of the things which, taken superficially, are discouraging, in reality mark the stirring of forces which in the next decade are going to accomplish great things for China. I shall not go into detail, but the most impressive single feature of my stay in China was witnessing the sure and rapid growth of an enlightened and progressive public opinion. The power of moral and intellectual force in China is so great that all lovers of China may take heart and courage and have faith that the people are going to win in their great struggle for a Republic which will be one in fact and not merely in name. As one of these lovers of China and as one who has faith in its destiny, I wish to add my humble voice to the many which upon the Tenth of October will acclaim the foundation of China as a Republic. [DewJ34]

1921.10.03 Letter from John Macrae to John Dewey

October 3. 1921.

Prof. John Dewey, | 2880 Broadway, | New York City. My dear Professor Dewey: I am taking a liberty with a busy and a distinguished man. Your daughter, Miss Evelyn, informs me that you are back in New York; this I take to be official. I read your article in the NEW REPUBLIC on China. You probably have stored in your brain and graven across your heart a good deal of valuable feeling on the subject of China. I should like to publish a book by you on China; and I should like to publish another book by you on your feeling regarding the whole Asiatic and Japanese question,—in fact, I urge you to write such a book and to let me publish it for you. It is good to realize that you are back here, and that you will devote your marvellous gifts to the education of America.

With my very kind personal regards, I am Sincerely yours, | [John Macrae] [DewJ3]

1921.10.10 John Dewey speaks to the Chinese students clubs of Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute and to the Columbia University, New York, celebrating the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China. [DewJ8]
The newcomer in China in observing and judging events usually makes the mistake of attaching too much significance to current happenings. Occurrences take place which in the western world would portend important changes—and nothing important results. It is not easy to loosen the habit of years; and so the visitor assumes that an event which is striking to the point of sensationalism must surely be part of a train of events having a definite trend; some deep-laid plan must be behind it. It takes a degree of intellectual patience added to time and experience to make one realize that even when there is a rhythm in events the tempo is so retarded that one must wait a long time to judge what is really going on. Most political events are like daily changes in the weather, fluctuations back and forth which may seriously affect individuals but which taken one by one tell little about the movement of the seasons. Even the occurrences which are due to human intention are usually sporadic and casual, and the observer errs by reading into them too much plot, too comprehensive a scheme, too far-sighted a plan. The aim behind the event is likely to be only some immediate advantage, some direct increase of power, the overthrow of a rival, the grasping at greater wealth by an isolated act, without any consecutive or systematic looking ahead.

Foreigners are not the only ones who have erred, however, in judging the Chinese political situation of the last few years. Beginning two years ago, one heard experienced Chinese with political affiliations saying that it was impossible for things to go on as they were for more than three months longer. Some decisive change must occur. Yet outwardly the situation has remained much the same not only for three months but for two years, the exception being the overthrow of the Anfu faction a year ago. And this occurrence hardly marked a definite turn in events, as it was, to a considerable extent, only a shifting of power from the hands of one set of tuchuns to another set. Nevertheless at the risk of becoming a victim of the fallacy which I have been setting forth, I will hazard the remark that the last few months have revealed a definite and enduring trend—that through the diurnal fluctuations of the strife for personal power and wealth a seasonal political change in society is now showing itself.

Certain lines of cleavage seem to show themselves, so that through the welter of striking, picturesque, sensational but meaningless events, a definite pattern is revealed. This pattern is indicated by the title of this article—a movement toward the development of a federal form of government. In calling the movement one toward federalism, there is, however, more of a jump into the remote future than circumstances justify. It would be more accurate, as well as more modest, to say that there is a well defined and seemingly permanent trend toward provincial autonomy and local self-government accompanied by a hope and a vague plan that in the future the more or less independent units will recombine into the United or Federated States of China. Some who look far into the future anticipate three stages; the first being the completion of the present secessionist movement; the second the formation of northern and southern confederations respectively; the third a reunion into a single state.

To go into the detailed evidence for the existence of a definite and lasting movement of this sort would presume too much on the reader's knowledge of Chinese geography and his acquaintance with specific recent events. I shall confine myself to quite general features of the situation. The first feature is the new phase which has been assumed by the long historic antagonism of the north and the south. Roughly speaking, the revolution which established the republic and overthrew the Manchus represented a victory for the south. But the transformation during the last five years of the nominal republic into a corrupt oligarchy of satraps or military governors or feudal lords has represented a victory for the north. It is a significant fact, symbolically at least, that the most powerful remaining tuchun or military governor in China—in some respects the only powerful one who has survived the vicissitudes of the last few years—namely Chang Tso Lin, is the uncrowned king of the three Manchurian provinces. The so-called civil war of the north and south is not, however, to be understood as a conflict of republicanism located in the south and militarism in the north. But the transformation during the last five years of the nominal republic into a corrupt oligarchy of satraps or military governors or feudal lords has represented a victory for the north. It is a significant fact, symbolically at least, that the most powerful remaining tuchun or military governor in China—in some respects the only powerful one who has survived the vicissitudes of the last few years—namely Chang Tso Lin, is the uncrowned king of the three Manchurian provinces. The so-called civil war of the north and south is not, however, to be understood as a conflict of republicanism located in the south and militarism in the north. Such a notion is directly contrary to facts. The 'civil war' till six or eight months ago was mainly a conflict of military governors and factions, part of that struggle for personal power and wealth which has been going on all over China.

But recently events have taken a different course. In four of the southern provinces, tuchuns...
who seemed all powerful have toppled over, and the provinces have proclaimed or tacitly assumed their independence of both the Peking and the former military Canton governments—the province in which Canton is situated being one of the four. I happened to be in Hunan, the first of the southerly provinces to get comparative independence, last fall, not long after the overthrow of the vicious despot who had ruled the province with the aid of northern troops. For a week a series of meetings were held in Changsha, the capital of the province. The burden of every speech was 'Hunan for the Hunanese'. The slogan embodies the spirit of two powers each aiming at becoming the central authority; it is a conflict of the principle of provincial autonomy, represented by the politically more mature south, with that of militaristic centralization, represented by Peking.

As I write, in early September, the immediate issue is obscured by the fight which Wu Pei Fu is waging with the Hunanese who with nominal independence are in aim and interest allied with the south. If, as is likely, Wu Pei Fu wins, he may take one of two courses. He may use his added power to turn against Chang Tso Lin and the northern militarists which will bring him into virtual alliance with the southerners and establish him as the antagonist of the federal principle. This is the course which his earlier record would call for. Or he may yield to the usual official lust for power and money and try once more the Yuan Shih-kai policy of military centralization with himself as head, after trying out conclusions with Chang Tso Lin as his rival. This is the course which the past record of military leaders indicates. But even if Wu Pei Fu follows precedent and goes bad, he will only hasten his own final end. This is not prophecy. It is only a statement of what has uniformly happened in China just at the moment a military leader seemed to have complete power in his grasp. In other words, a victory for Wu Pei Fu may either accelerate or may retard the development of provincial autonomy according to the course he pursues. It cannot permanently prevent or deflect it.

The basic factor that makes one sure that this trend toward local autonomy is a reality and not merely one of those meaningless shiftings of power which confuse the observer, is that it is in accord with Chinese temperament, tradition and circumstance. Feudalism is past and gone two thousand years ago, and at no period since has China possessed a working centralized government. The absolute empires which have come and gone in the last two millenniums existed by virtue of non-interference and a religious aura. The latter can never be restored; and every episode of the republic demonstrates that China with its vast and diversified territories, its population of between three hundred and fifty and four hundred million, its multitude of languages and lack of communications, its enormous local attachments sanctified by the family system and ancestral worship, cannot be managed from a single and remote centre. China rests upon a network of local and voluntary associations cemented by custom. This fact has given it its unparalleled stability and its power to progress even under the disturbed political conditions of the past ten years. I sometimes think that Americans with their own traditional contempt for politics and their spontaneous reliance upon self-help and local organization are the only ones who are naturally fitted to understand China's course. The Japanese with their ingrained reliance upon the state have continually misjudged and misacted. The British understand better than we do the significance of local self-government; but they are misled by their reverence for politics so that they cannot readily find or see government when it does not take political form.

It is not too much to say that one great cause for the overthrow of the Manchus was the fact that because of the pressure of international relations they attempted to force, especially in fiscal matters, a centralization upon the provinces wholly foreign to the spirit of the people. This created hostility where before there had been indifference. China may possibly not emerge from her troubles a unified nation, any more than a much smaller and less populous Europe emerged from the breakup of the Holy Roman Empire, a single state. Indeed one often wonders, not that China is divided, but that she is not much more broken up than she is. But one thing is certain. Whatever progress China finally succeeds in making will come from a variety of local centres, not from Peking or Canton. It will be effected by means of associations and organizations which even though they assume a political form are not primarily political in nature.

Criticisms are passed, especially by foreigners, upon the present trend of events.
criticisms are more than plausible. It is evident that the present weakness of China is due to her divided condition. Hence it is natural to argue that the present movement being one of secession and general disintegration will increase the weakness of the country. It is also evident that many of China’s troubles are due to the absence of any efficient administrative system; it is reasonable to argue that China cannot get even railways and universal education without a strong and stable central government. There is no doubt about the facts. It is not surprising that many friends of China deeply deplore the present tendency while some regard it as the final accomplishment of the long predicted breakup of China. But remedies for China’s ills based upon ignoring history, psychology and actual conditions are so utopian that it is not worth while to argue whether or not they are theoretically desirable. The remedy of China’s troubles by a strong, centralized government is on a par with curing disease by the expulsion of a devil. The evil is real, but since it is real it cannot be dealt with by trying a method which implies its non-existence. If the devil is really there, he will not be exorcized by a formula. If the trouble is internal, not due to an external demon, the disease can be cured only by using the factors of health and vigor which the patient already possesses. And in China while these factors of recuperation and growth are numerous, they all exist in connection with local organizations and voluntary associations. The increasing volume of the cry that the ‘tuchuns must go’ comes from the provincial and local interests which have been insulted and violated by a nominally centralized but actually chaotic situation. After this negative work is completed, the constructive rebuilding of China can proceed only by utilizing local interests and abilities. In China the movement will be the opposite of that which occurred in Japan. It will be from the periphery to the centre. Another objection to the present tendency has force especially from the foreign standpoint. As already stated, the efforts of the Manchu dynasty in its latter days to enhance central power were due to international pressure. Foreign nations treated Peking as if it were a capital like London, Paris or Berlin, and in its efforts to meet foreign demands it had to try to become such a centre. The result was disaster. But foreign nations still want to have a single centre which may be held responsible. And subconsciously, if not consciously, this desire is responsible for much of the objection of foreign nationals to the local autonomy movement. They well know that it is going to take a long time to realize the ideal of federation, and meantime where and what is to be the agency responsible for diplomatic relations, the enforcing of indemnities and the securing of concessions?

In one respect the secessionist tendency is dangerous to China herself as well as inconvenient to the powers. It will readily stimulate the desire and ability of foreign nations to interfere in China’s domestic affairs. There will be many centres at which to carry on intrigues and from which to get concessions instead of one or two. There is also danger that one foreign nation may line up with one group of provinces, and another foreign nation with another group, so that international friction will increase. Even now some Japanese sources and even such an independent liberal paper as Robert Young’s Japan Chronicle are starting or reporting the rumor that the Cantonese experiment is supported by subsidies supplied by American capitalists in the hope of economic concessions. The rumor was invented for a sinister purpose and is persisted in through jealousy. But it illustrates the sort of situation that may come into existence if there are several political centres in China and one foreign nation backs one and another nation, another.

The danger is real enough. But it cannot be dealt with by attempting the impossible—namely checking the movement toward local autonomy, even though disintegration may temporarily accompany it. The danger only emphasizes the fundamental fact of the whole Chinese situation; that its essence is time. The evils and troubles of China are real enough, and there is no blinking the fact that they are largely of her own making, due to corruption, inefficiency and absence of popular education. But no one who knows the common people doubts that they will win through if they are given time. And in the concrete this means that they be left alone to work out their own destiny. There will doubtless be proposals at the Pacific Conference to place China under some kind of international tutelage. This article and the events connected with the tendency which it reports will be cited as showing this need. Some of the schemes will spring from motives that are hostile to China. Some will be benevolently
conceived in a desire to save China from herself and shorten her period of chaos and confusion. But the hope of the world's peace, as well as of China’s freedom, lies in adhering to a policy of Hands Off. Give China a chance. Give her time. The danger lies in being in a hurry, in impatience, possibly in the desire of America to show that we are a power in international affairs and that we too have a positive foreign policy. And a benevolent policy of supporting China from without, instead of promoting her aspirations from within, may in the end do China about as much harm as a policy conceived in malevolence. [DewJ35]
Dewey, John. *China and disarmament* [ID D28493].

In cordially acceding to the request of the editor of the *Chinese Students’ Monthly* to say a few words about the coming Pacific Conference, I do so more because I am glad of an opportunity to give expression to my interest in China than because I feel I have anything to add to what is already matter of general discussion and knowledge. It is quite clear that the difficulties which will face the Conference are enormous. In the United States as well as in Great Britain and Japan there are those who feel that the limitation of armaments is the most important matter, and that it was an unwise move to complicate that difficulty by introducing the discussion of such a vexed problem as the conflict of international policies in the Far East. There are others (with whom I find myself in sympathy) who regard the adjustment of policies as the fundamental issue, who feel that even a sweeping reduction of armaments will not of itself materially improve international relations although it may relieve the burden of taxation; who feel that if a settlement of policies is attained, the causes of competition in armament will be largely eliminated; and that the growth of peaceful domestic sentiment and opinion in each country will compel retrenchment, when once the grounds for mutual suspicion and fear are done away with. Then there is a large number in every country which looks upon the whole matter with what President Hibben of Princeton has well termed ‘cynical pessimism’. Some are influenced by the disillusionment which followed the Versailles peace treaties. They believe that each country is going in to get what it can for itself in the way of aggrandizement, and they have no faith that diplomats who represent the present political order will accomplish anything constructive. Then there are the economic radicals who believe that the rivalry of powers is the necessary expression of the existing capitalistic system, and that it is absurd to look for any real amelioration as long as capitalism is powerful.

This division of public sentiment creates an atmosphere which adds to the difficulties of a successful outcome. I am not writing in this vein, however, to encourage despair, but to suggest one direction in which the Conference may be a success, a direction which it seems to me is of chief importance for China. It is possible that a by-product of the Conference may be more valuable than any direct results which will be obtained. I mean by this a better understanding, a greater knowledge of the conditions which obtain in the Far East. In spite of the fact that the world seems to be suffering from a kind of moral fatigue as a result of the overstrain of the war, I believe that a new social consciousness is gradually forming in every country, a new type of liberal and international thought, and that this new consciousness is going to have more and more influence in shaping the international conduct of every nation.

It is not necessary to point out how awakened American public opinion is regarding everything which concerns China as compared with a few years ago. I am not enough of an inflamed patriot to assume that all of this awakening takes a form which is good for my own country or in the long run for China. Some of it, unfortunately, is mainly negative, an accompaniment of rivalry with and fear and suspicion of Japan as a potential rival, economic and naval. But with the mass of the American people, it is the product I think of real interest in the Chinese people, sympathy for them, and a wish that they have an opportunity to work out their own destiny free from that external interference which in the past has been such an unhappy feature of the intercourse of the world’s great powers with China. Now this more sensitive feeling about justice for China is not confined to the United States. I believe that it is rapidly growing in England and will become more articulate as soon as the subsidence of war passions permits a revival of political liberalism in Great Britain. In Japan there is a growing section of the population which is uneasy about the past policy of Japan toward China and who wish to bring about its revision. It is still comparatively unorganized and almost impotent against the power of the forces represented by the Imperial General Staff. But the feeling is there and is constantly growing in strength especially in the younger generation.

Now one great opportunity presented by the Conference is that of enlightening and to some extent crystallizing this sentiment and opinion in all countries. Even in Japan a favorite phrase in connection with the Conference is the need of laying all the cards on the table. What we may call the educative effect of the Conference, the indirect effect of its discussions in bringing conditions and issues to light, may in the long run outweigh the actual success of the Conference with respect to its direct and avowed aims. I do not say this to minimize the
importance of the direct aims nor because I believe that failure is inevitable with respect to them. There are rather two motives for emphasizing this phase of the matter. Other more competent persons will deal with the direct military, naval and political issues, and this educative aspect of the matter may easily be slurred over. And also this phase of the matter is the one, it seems to me, which is the most natural concern of the body of Chinese students and shows where their influence can be most useful in connection with the Conference. The world has had altogether too much propaganda of late, and I should be sorry to write anything which would encourage more of a bad thing. But there is an opportunity for Chinese students to help the world, at least the American part of it, understand better the difficulties and problems of China, internal and foreign, and in a truthful way to develop intelligent sympathy with an international policy of justice toward weak nations in general and China in particular. There are some who think that our new interest in China is because Americans want to displace other nations in order to play a greater part there itself. I hope this isn't true; I do not believe it is true. But if there is any such danger, the Conference provides an opportunity for Chinese students to present the rights of China to its own independent development and self-determination, free from intervention and tutelage which is professedly benevolent as well as free from interference which is openly hostile. [DewJ37]
III. China's Interest

China's relation to the Conference and to the possibility of war is a peculiar one. She is admitted on all hands to be the storm centre. But her share is passive, not active. She breeds trouble by exciting the cupidity of other nations, not by what she herself does. Yet what she is and still more what she isn't, her internal disorganization and inefficiency is such a factor in making her a lure for other nations that it must be reckoned with.

There are, so to speak, three Chinas. There is the China which generates friction and antagonism among the nations, the China of international relationships. There is domestic China, torn, distracted, factional, largely corrupt in government. And there is the China of the Chinese people, populous, patient, industrious, self-governing by nonpolitical methods, solid, enduring and persistent beyond the power of the Western imagination to figure, the real China of the past and of the potential future when China is transformed.

In objecting to international coordination of finance for railways and mines as a solution of present difficulties, on the ground that it treats China as a patient rather than as an active living force, it is the second and third of these Chinas that are in mind. Mr. Brailsford expressly provides for the first China. He stipulates that she 'must be an active and willing partner' in the arrangements made; that Chinese bankers must share in the syndicate; that she must retain political control of her railways; that provision be made for ultimate reversion of economic ownership and control; that an arbiter tribunal be established to which China can appeal against the 'tremendous power' of syndicated international finance. There is no slighting on Mr. Brailsford's part of the rightful share of China in fixing her international relationships.

Why, then, object to his plan? Because, to put it dogmatically and briefly, the worst thing in China, its present political and administrative condition, makes it impossible for China to be an active and willing partner, while the good things in China, her transformation into what she may and should become, make it undesirable—first, for herself and then for the world—that she should be a passive and coerced partner. The interest of China is that she have an opportunity to develop, and to develop in her own way. In my judgment, this is also the interest of the peace of the world, since any peace secured by other means is a temporary truce which only postpones an ultimate explosion.

Present domestic internal conditions in China make the formula of China's entrance into an international arrangement as an active and willing partner a barren thing. It is as remote from facts as the formulae of the past about its territorial and administrative integrity. Like them, it is a form of words when realistically confronted with actual conditions. There is danger that, like them, it will become a means by which foreign offices will quiet their consciences and deceive their peoples while predatory activities go on which are harmful to China and in the end productive of new sources of friction among the nations.

There is no Government in China capable of speaking for the country, none having jurisdiction, none having the power to execute the conditions of the proposed agreement. It could be carried out only by continual foreign interference in Chinese domestic affairs. It is natural that Chinese, especially those in political life, speaking to foreigners should put the best face possible on her present state. But it is no kindness to China to gloss over the fact that the Government at present recognized by foreign powers is a hollow shell whose jurisdiction hardly extends beyond the walls of Peking. It lacks the confidence and support of the educated and the commercial class, of all bankers except those political bankers who have profited by its corruption and inefficiency. It is largely dominated by self-appointed military provincial governors and generals.

This does not mean that foreign powers should recognize and deal with some other Government, such as the Cantonese. At present the latter is more decent and progressive. But its active jurisdiction hardly extends beyond two provinces. It is a fiction due to distance and ignorance which causes many Americans to think that the disturbed condition of China is due simply to a conflict between north and south. The importance of this conflict for China is immensely exaggerated. The fact is that there is a double conflict going on all over China which is independent of the conflict between north and south. One is the factional struggle of
a large number of military provincial governors for increased power and revenue. To this are due the tremendous unproductive expenditure for soldiers, the ruling administrative inefficiency, neglect of schools and constant interference with normal commercial development. For legitimate industrial enterprises are now only an invitation to governmental graft and plunder.

The other and promising conflict is that of the enlightened class—teachers, students, the more farsighted merchants, the bankers, the convinced republicans—against existing governments, both national and provincial. This movement now finds expression in a desire for local self-government and provincial autonomy. It is a movement based upon recognition of the fact that the revolution of 1911 was abortive, that the republic then established has now become a name, that as respects political administration—though not social and intellectual affairs—the country is now worse off than it was under the Manchus. Its purpose is to change the nominal revolution into a fact. The failure of the hopes entertained in 1911 only makes it the clearer that this transformation will not be accomplished in a day or in a few years. This state of affairs makes it impossible for China to enter as an active partner into any proposed international arrangement for her economic exploitation. Any agreement to which the nominal assent of China is given would involve constant interference in Chinese domestic politics. It would require increasing supervision of her affairs, a supervision which in a crisis could not be made effective without the presence of foreign soldiers. And Japan, be it noted, is the only country near enough to deliver large numbers of soldiers at short notice, and the country in which there would be least popular objection to armed interference in China. Moreover, Japan in such a situation would act as the authorized agent of the powers that had entered into the agreement involving international regulation of China's economic interests. To add that such an arrangement would tend to arrest the normal political development of China from within is perhaps a consideration too disinterested to appeal to any but idealists. But it also enlists American self-interest. If the United States became in the present state of China a partner in any arrangement for international exploitation of China, the effect would be to destroy the greatest asset of America in China—the good will of the Chinese people. The future cannot be predicted. But under certain circumstances the scheme might ultimately throw China into the arms of a Japanese Pan-Asianism, especially if Japan were to show more tact and sense than she has in the past. Linder other circumstances, it might create what would be virtually an offensive and defensive alliance with a restored Russia, or with Russia and Germany.

That the proposed arrangement would arrest and distort the normal economic development of China is also a remote and disinterested suggestion. China has so far resisted the rapid introduction of Western industrialism. To most this seems to be a piece of stupid conservative inertia. To a few, it appears to be an expression of a sound instinct to resist the introduction of forces which man has not learned to control and which have caused the exploitation of man by man and brought about bitter class conflict. Educated Chinese have a unanimous and lively sense of the dangers of industrialism. In a vague and ethical sense of the word, they are almost to a man socialistic. If the Chinese are permitted to work out their own economic destiny, it is conceivable that they will evolve some better scheme than that which now troubles Western nations. The natural resources of China in coal and iron have been enormously exaggerated. The capacities of its vast and industrious working population with its habituation to low standards of living have been underestimated. He is a recklessly brave spirit who will take the risks of forcing the pace of the industrialization of China.

There is a practical detailed objection to the proposed scheme. It is proposed that various nations should make pro-rata contributions to the syndicated fund. What nations are in condition to do so at the present time? The existing consortium is cited as a beginning in the right direction. So far the consortium has brought good rather than harm to China, barring the implied reservation of Japanese special rights in Manchuria. But so far its action has been negative and preventive. It has stopped national monopolistic loans. One reason for its failure to function in a more positive way has been the inability of England and European countries to export capital, an inability consequent upon the war. They have no desire to see the United States and Japan the active agents in financing China. An enlarged proposition of the same
general nature would, in effect, mean that the United States and Japan would mainly supply the funds allotted to other nations. Hence the scheme would work out to give these two countries an economic lead in China. Such an arrangement does not appear calculated to reduce international friction.

IV. Suggested Measures

Previous articles have been given up to stating some of the conditions in the Far East which produce international friction. Conclusions so far have been chiefly negative. On the one hand, we have China, which moves slowly, which is just beginning her transformation socially and politically. On the other hand, there are acute urgent clashes of interest between Japan and the United States and remoter difficulties between England and the United States. Is it possible to find measures which will both safeguard China’s slow but normal and independent development and also remove the sources of discord among other nations? This seems to me to define the basic problem at Washington. A solution is not easy. It almost reminds one of the old question of what will happen when an irresistible force meets an insurmountable obstacle.

The present writer has no cut and dried solution to offer. It does seem possible, however, to indicate the helpful way of approaching the problem. Coordination of action among other nations in respect to the issues of the Far East is a necessity. But there is a wide difference between a coordination of foreign powers which is directed at China and one which is directed toward one another. A solution should be sought which involves the minimum of international supervision and control of China, while it involves the maximum of practicable international supervision and control of individual nations' activities toward China. Let us try out international regulation on one another before we try it out on China.

This seems to me the first formula with which to attack the problem of combining justice to China—and Siberia—with lessening of friction between other nations. This general formula translates into the concrete in some such fashion as follows: The Conference should establish a permanent international commission for Far Eastern affairs. In order to secure proper supervision of foreign activities in China without unduly interfering with China itself the Conference should establish a kind of constitution to govern the conduct of the commission. This should cover the following points:

1. All monopolies and monopolistic contracts should be absolutely forbidden. More space than these articles occupy would be required to give a history of monopolistic contracts which in the past have brought friction between other nations and limited the freedom of action of China. The nations should agree that every contract of China for public services and properties should be submitted to the commission, not for confirmation but for rejection if it implies any monopolistic features.

2. All consenting nations should agree to submit to the commission all existing contracts involving governmental action of Chinese governments, national and provincial. They should agree to gradual, if not immediate, cancellation of all monopolies provided for in these contracts, though, of course, this need not involve abandonment of specific works already undertaken.

3. All loans to Chinese governments, national and provincial, should be prohibited which make possible a diversion of Chinese funds to unproductive purposes, including so-called administrative loans. Such loans as are made by nationals of any of the countries entering into the agreement should establish credits to be drawn upon as work is actually done in constructing ports, building railways, developing mines, etc.

Why has China given so many concessions and bartered away so many resources in the past? Not wholly because of foreign pressure. Internal corruption and inefficiency have played a part. The ordinary technique is as follows: Some group of Chinese officials needs money, partly for settling accounts, partly for their own pockets. Some foreign concern with banking affiliations offers to loan a certain number of millions, provided they are given a monopolistic concession or provided China will buy some materials, wireless apparatus, airplanes or whatever the foreign concern wishes to dispose of. The loan is not, however, in the form of a credit for the specified purchase. The loan is used to pay current debts and is squandered in 'administration', mostly squeeze. It becomes accordingly another debt to be met when it falls
due by a repetition of the same process. If the Conference can take steps absolutely to prevent this sort of operation in the future it will be to the benefit of China, and will also eliminate one source of friction between the lending nations.

4. The commission should make an honest effort to list all Chinese obligations, including indemnities, which are outstanding, with full information regarding their terms. It should then see what can be done in the way of pooling and refunding. At present it is practically impossible in Peking itself to discover just what are the debts and revenues of China, especially the domestic ones. China's ability to avoid bankruptcy and meet its foreign obligations is so great that foreign nations holding Chinese securities are entitled to secure a definite system of auditing and publicity as a precondition of any more foreign loans for any purpose whatever.

This involves some supervision of Chinese administrative finance, just as our third provision requires supervision, technological and by auditing, of expenditure on credits established. But it is a supervision for specific purposes that involves no political interference, and it is in the interest of a more honest and intelligent administration of public funds in China. As such, free from all the interference which accompanies present methods, it would be welcomed by intelligent Chinese.

5. There should be provision for the maximum of publicity about public works to be undertaken whether nationally or provincially, and for open bidding. China recently needed some locomotives for the only railway built wholly under Chinese direction and under exclusive Chinese management. The wants were made known and there was free international bidding. As a result, a Belgian firm secured the contract for most of the locomotives, an American firm for the remainder. If this practice could be made universal and compulsory for all purchases of supplies—in connection with the abolition of monopolies and 'preferences'—it would automatically do away with many of the financial practices which now create international friction and which further domestic corruption in China.

6. The consortium, already in existence, forms a nucleus for the commission on the side of finance. It should, however, be freed from its monopolistic features, its limitation to four powers and to select groups of bankers in the four countries. It should also be openly associated with authorized representatives of the governments concerned. There is now a tacit, a disguised alliance between the consortium bankers and their respective governments. It should be made avowed, so that there would be political responsibility and publicity for the bankers' activities. Up to the present the consortium has not been recognized by the Chinese Government, largely because the Government wants unproductive administrative loans which the consortium will not make. Its existence, however, has been the chief factor in stopping loans which meant only the further alienation of Chinese resources. However, the expenses of maintaining a consortium can hardly be kept up indefinitely for the sake of protecting China against the incapacity—and rapacity—of its own officials. The Governments should assume their share of the expense. Then the consortium might function in a small way as an international syndicate, confining itself, at least until it had been tried out, to minor undertakings, branch railways and those having no strategic or political importance.

7. The Conference should take steps which will result in restoring to China control over her foreign tariffs. Foreign control of Chinese customs was established because of foreign debts and indemnities. It seemed to be the only way—probably it was the only way—by which foreign nations could be assured of repayment of loans and meeting of indemnities. But as a consequence, confirmed by a network of treaties, China cannot now regulate her tariff on imports. Not only that, but the assent of other nations to any change requires unanimity. Any single nation can now block an increase of a tariff which was fixed at 5 per cent ad valorem on an arbitrary basis and is not now over 7 1/2 per cent. The inability of China to increase her national revenues through customs charges is one of the occasions that make her resort to continuous foreign loans. The Conference should by concerted action and by moral or economic pressure on recalcitrant nations remedy this serious abuse.

The suggested program will meet with two opposite objections. It will be regarded as too modest, as failing in constructive sweep. It will also be regarded as going too far,
impracticable, involving too much surrender of vested interests by foreign nations, especially by Japan. For it implies a surrender of her claims to 'special' interests in China. There is no space to argue the whole matter. But it may be pointed out that action on these or similar concrete proposals is a test of the sincerity of the loud profession of the nations regarding their supreme hope for peace. Japan's economic interests, however it may be with her political, lie in establishing good relations with the Chinese people. At present her industrialists say they are compelled to employ courses which they would prefer not to use in getting hold of raw materials, etc., because of the corruption of provincial officials. Put the whole matter of purchases aboveboard and she would have the advantages of proximity and would not need to resort to measures which give her possession of materials only at the expense of irritating and alienating Chinese and making her an object of suspicion to the rest of the world.

The United States ought also to assist in guaranteeing Japan direct access to oil supplies for industrial purposes, even if that means Mexico. It needs to be borne in mind that general advantage to traders and industrialists as distinct from profit to small groups of concessionaires and bankers depends wholly upon an increase of purchasing power by the Chinese people. China as she now stands isn't a market that ranks high; it is not worth the fuss made over it. Give her a chance to develop herself and she will become a great market for regular peaceful trade, in which Japan has many natural advantages. It cannot be stated too often that the essence of the Chinese question is time. The West and Japan are in too much of a hurry. The war has increased impatience till the world is almost in a state of hysteria about the Far East. Such measures as are indicated, even though they are largely negative, will secure a breathing space. During this period the world can recover from the shock to its nerves and regain sanity. There will be opportunity for further needed measures to reveal themselves, and in a normal way. Put a stop to the piecemeal partition of China and the alienation of its resources from without; put a stop to the building of warships and the problems of the Far East will gradually present themselves in a proper perspective. It will not then be many years before the world will be able to look back with a smile at its state of alarm over the problems of the Pacific in 1921. Fail to do these things, and the small causes of friction will go on accumulating and present fears will be realized. After the catastrophe men will realize how little was actually at stake in comparison with the evil done and how a moderate amount of prevision and good-will might have prevented the conflagration. [DewJ38]
Dewey, John. *Shrewd tactics are shown in Chinese plea* [ID D28495].

The Chinese proposals are both shrewd and wise. It was good tactics for the Chinese delegates to present their own case instead of having it first presented by either the United States or Japan, thus saving the susceptibilities of both Oriental countries. It was shrewd to conceive the 10 points in broad fundamental terms. No nation can object to points 1 and 2, for example, regarding the territorial integrity and political independence of China and regarding the open door. All nations have repeatedly put their assent on paper. But the formal reassertions by all nations at this time of joint conclave puts China in a position of vantage in calling attention to the specific points in which prior agreements have been violated. It was shrewd not to make demands too immediate and to allow for compromise in time of execution, as for example, in Point 5, regarding removal of limitations on China's present freedom of action. It would not be of advantage to China itself to have an immediate abolition of extra-territorial rights nor to have the customs administrations turned over to her out of hand. She is entitled, however, to know the conditions under which these things will be done so she can have assurance that at a definite time in the future these things will be done, provided she takes certain specified steps.

Point 3 is a shrewd way of approaching the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the Lansing-Ishii agreement, both of which concern China and in neither of which was she consulted. The proposition that she be notified of all engagements affecting her and be given a chance to share is so reasonable that a nation which declines to give assent at once puts itself under suspicion.

Wisdom, as distinct from good tactics, centres to my mind in Point 4, to which 6 and 7 are auxiliary, and 10, to which presumably g is auxiliary. For 'provisions for a peaceful settlement of international disputes' is mere Pickwickian verbiage, without provision for future conferences. Neither provision can be carried into effect without something which, in fact if not name, will be a permanent committee of reference and arbitration in which China will sit as a partner and not as a victim.

Point 4 contains the teeth of the document. It is a bold and just move to demand that all commitments, special rights, privileges, etc., be made public under the penalty of otherwise being voided, and that they and those already public be examined with reference to their validity and harmony with one another, and that they be construed strictly in favor of the grantor.

These clauses go to the root of the matter. They will bring to light all of China's grievances against Japan in particular and other nations in general. They make open diplomacy a reality. They abolish that atmosphere of secrecy and intrigue which has been China's greatest enemy within as well as without. It is a bold move, because if this point is accepted and full publicity follows it will expose something of China's own weakness and official corruption as well as the cupidity and intrigues of other nations. It is a guarantee of better internal government in China as well as a safeguard against other nations. It undoubtedly goes much further than appears on the surface.

Nothing is said about the 21 demands. But it is impossible to harmonize some of the clauses of the treaties based on these demands with other commitments which China has made with other nations. The question of their validity brings up the state of duress under which the treaties were signed, an ultimatum with virtual threat of war.

Nothing is said about Shantung. But so far as China's consent is concerned the occupation of Shantung rests upon the 21 demands, while it also is in conflict with the terms of China's treaty with Germany, which made German leases and privileges inalienable to any third nation. Any nation which openly objects to articles 4, 6 and 7 at once comes under suspicion of harboring unfair designs. To give assent means rectification of some of the worst wrongs from which China suffers. The more one studies these articles in the light of past events the more far-reaching they are seen to be. The danger is that they will be accepted 'in principle' and then whittled down in fact.

Coming to lesser points the Associated Press has reported that Point 8 is the one which most puzzles Japanese circles. Considering the point declares that China's rights as a neutral are to be fully respected in all future wars, and considering that Japan's wars with Russia and
Germany were both fought in violation of Chinese neutrality, this puzzlement is not easy to understand. It becomes a little ominous in view of the accompanying suggestion that the point may mean that the powers guarantee China’s neutrality, reducing her to a Belgium, and that its enforcement along with other points goes back to a question of China's internal order and governmental unity.

It is too early to predict, but it looks as if Japanese policy were going to be an expression of general sympathy with China’s aims, while laying emphasis upon her lack of internal unity, her so-called chaos, and the argument that in order to secure an eventual realization of China's aims and aspirations she must be put for a period under some kind of international tutelage. In the latter case, Japan would become in virtue of propinquity the actual guardian and trustee in behalf of the powers. In that case Japan will have gained her point as regards China plus the blessing of the powers. [DewJ39]
I

The realities of American policy in China and toward China are going to be more seriously tested in the future than they ever have been in the past. Japanese papers have been full of protests against any attempt by the Pacific Conference to place Japan on trial. Would that American journals were full of warnings that America is on trial at the Conference as to the sincerity and intelligent good will behind her amicable professions. The world will not stop with the Pacific Conference; the latter, however important, will not arrest future developments, and the United States will continue to be on trial till she has established by her acts a permanent and definite attitude. For the realities of the situation cannot be exhausted in any formula or in any set of diplomatic agreements, even if the Conference confounds the fears of pessimists and results in a harmonious union of the powers in support of China’s legitimate aspirations for free political and economic growth.

The Conference, however, stands as a symbol of the larger situation; and its decisions or lack of them will be a considerable factor in the determination of subsequent events. Sometimes one is obliged to fall back on a trite phrase. We are genuinely at a parting of the ways. Even if we should follow in our old path, there would none the less be a parting of the ways, for we cannot consistently tread the old path unless we are animated by a much more conscious purpose and a more general and intelligent knowledge of affairs than have controlled our activities in the past.

The ideas expressed by an English correspondent about the fear that America is soon to be an active source of danger in the Far East are not confined to persons on foreign shores. The prevailing attitude in some circles of American opinion is that called by President Hibben cynical pessimism. All professed radicals and many liberals believe that if our course has been better in the past it has been due to geographical accidents combined with indifference and with our undeveloped economic status. Consequently they believe that since we have now become what is called a world-power and a nation which exports instead of importing capital, our course will soon be as bad as that of any of the rest of them. In some quarters this opinion is clearly an emotional reaction following the disillusionments of Versailles. In others, it is due to adherence to a formula: nothing in international affairs can come out of capitalism and America is emphatically a capitalistic country. Whether or not these feelings are correct, they are not discussable; neither an emotion nor an absolute formula is subject to analysis.

But there are specific elements in the situation which give grounds for apprehension as to the future. These specific elements are capable of detection and analysis. An adequate realization of their nature will be a large factor in preventing cynical apprehensions from becoming actual. This article is an attempt at a preliminary listing, inadequate, of course, as any preliminary examination must be. While an a priori argument based on a fatalistic formula as to how a “capitalistic nation” must conduct itself does not appeal to me, there are nevertheless concrete facts which are suggested by that formula. Part of our comparatively better course in China in the past is due to the fact that we have not had the continuous and close alliance between the State Department and big banking interests which is found in the case of foreign powers. No honest well-informed history of developments in China could be written in which the Russian Asiatic Bank, the Foreign Bank of Belgium, the French Indo-China Bank and Banque Industrielle, the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Hongkong-Shanghai Bank, etc., did not figure prominently. These banks work in the closest harmony, not only with railway and construction syndicates and big manufacturing interests at home, but also with their respective foreign offices. It is hardly too much to say that legations and banks have been in most important matters the right and left hands of the same body. American business interests have complained in the past that the American government does not give to American traders abroad the same support that the nationals of other states receive. In the past these complaints have centred largely about actual wrongs suffered or believed to have been suffered by American business undertakings carried on in a foreign country. With the present expansion of capital and of commerce, the same complaints and demands are going to be made not with reference to grievances suffered, but with reference to furthering, to pushing American commercial interests in connection with large banking groups. It would take a credulous
person to deny the influence of big business in domestic politics. As we become more interested in commerce and banking enterprises what assurance have we that the alliance will not be transferred to international politics?

It should be noted that the policy of the open door as affirmed by the great powers—and as frequently violated by them—even if it be henceforth observed in good faith, does not adequately protect us from this danger. The open door policy is not primarily a policy about China herself but rather about the policies of foreign powers toward one another with respect to China. It demands equality of economic opportunity for different nations. Were it enforced, it would prevent the granting of monopolies to any one nation: there is nothing in it to render impossible a conjoint exploitation of China by foreign powers, an organized monopoly in which each nation has its due share with respect to others. Such an organization might conceivably reduce friction among the great powers, and thereby reduce the danger of future wars—as long as China herself is impotent to go to war. The agreement might conceivably for a considerable time be of benefit to China herself. But it is clear that for the United States to become a partner in any such arrangement would involve a reversal of our historic policy in the Far East. It might be technically consistent with the open door policy, but it would be a violation of the larger sense in which the American people has understood and praised that ideal. He is blind who does not see that there are forces making for such a reversal. And since we are all more or less blind, an opening of our eyes to the danger is one of the conditions of its not being realized.

One of the forces which is operative is indicated by the phrase that an international agreement on an economic and financial basis might be of value to China herself. The mere suggestion that such a thing is possible is abhorrent to many, especially to radicals. There seems to be something sinister in it. So it is worth explaining how and why it might be so. In the first place, it would obviously terminate the particularistic grabbing for 'leased' territory, concessions and spheres of influence which has so damaged China. At the present time, the point of this remark lies in its implied reference to Japan, as at one time it might have applied to Russia. Fear of Japan's aims in China is not confined to China; the fear is widespread. An international economic arrangement may therefore be plausibly presented as the easiest and most direct method of relieving China of the Japanese men-ace. For Japan to stay out would be to give herself away; if she came in, it would subject Japanese activities to constant scrutiny and control. There is no doubt that part of the fear of Japan regarding the Pacific Conference is due to a belief that some such arrangement is contemplated. The case is easily capable of such presentation as to make it appeal to Americans who are really friendly to China and who haven't the remotest interest in her economic exploitation. The arrangement would, for example, automatically eliminate the Lansing-Ishii agreement with its embarrassing ambiguous recognition of Japan's special interests in China. The other factor is domestic. The distraction and civil wars of China are commonplaces. So is the power exercised by the military governors and generals. The greater one's knowledge, the more one perceives how intimately the former evil is dependent upon the latter. The financial plight of the Chinese government, its continual foreign borrowings which threaten bankruptcy in the near future, depend upon militaristic domination and wild expenditure for unproductive purposes and squeeze. Without this expense, China would have no great difficulty henceforth in maintaining a balance in her budget. The retardation of public education whose advancement—especially in elementary schools—is China's greatest single need is due to the same cause. So is the growth in official corruption which is rapidly extending into business and private life.

In fact, every one of the obstacles to the progress of China is connected with the rule of military factions and their struggles with one another for complete mastery. An economic international agreement among the great powers can be made which would surely reduce and possibly eliminate the greatest evils of 'militarism'. Many liberal Chinese say in private that they would be willing to have a temporary international receivership for government finance, provided they could be assured of its nature and the exact date and conditions of its termination—a proviso which they are sensible enough to recognize would be extremely difficult of attainment. American leadership in forming and executing any such scheme
would, they feel, afford the best reassurance as to its nature and terms. Under such circumstances a plausible case can be made out for proposals which, under the guise of traditional American friendship for China, would in fact commit us to a reversal of our historic policy.

There are radicals abroad and at home who think that our entrance into a Consortium already proves that we have entered upon the road of reversal and who naturally see in the Pacific Conference the next logical step. I have previously stated my own belief that our State Department proposed the Consortium primarily for political ends, as a means of checking the policy pursued by Japan of making unproductive loans to China in return for which she was getting an immediate grip on China's natural resources and preparing the way for direct administrative and financial control when the day of reckoning and foreclosure should finally come. I also said that the Consortium was between two stools, the financial and the political and that up to the present its chief value had been negative and preventive, and that jealousy or lack of interest by Japan and Great Britain in any constructive policy on the part of the Consortium was likely to maintain the same condition. I have seen no reason thus far to change my mind on this point, nor in regard to the further belief that probably the interests of China in the end will be best served by the continuation of this deterrent function. But the question is bound to arise: why continue the Consortium if it isn't doing anything? The pressure of foreign powers interested in the exploitation of China and of impatient American economic interests may combine to put an end to the present rather otiose existence led by the Consortium. The two stools between which the past action of the American government has managed to swing the Consortium may be united to form a single solid bench.

At the risk of being charged with credulous gullibility, or something worse, I add that up to the present time the American phase of the Consortium hasn't shown perceptible signs of becoming a club exercised by American finance over China's economic integrity and independence. I believe the repeated statements of the American representative that he himself and the interests he represents would be glad if China proved her ability to finance her own public utilities without resorting to foreign loans. This belief is confirmed by the first public utterance of the new American minister to China who in his reference to the Consortium laid emphasis upon its deterrent function and upon the stimulation it has given to Chinese bankers to finance public utilities. And it is the merest justice to Mr. Stevens, the American representative, to say that he represents the conservative investment type of banker, not the 'promotion' type, and that thus far his great concern has been the problem of protecting the buyer of such securities as are passed on by the banks to the ultimate investor—so much so that he has aroused criticism from American business interests impatient for speedy action. But there is a larger phase of the Consortium concerning which I think apprehensions may reasonably be entertained.

Suppose, if merely by way of hypothesis, that the American government is genuinely interested in China and in making the policy of the open door and Chinese territorial and administrative integrity a reality, not merely a name, and suppose that it is interested in doing so from an American self-interest sufficiently enlightened to perceive that the political and economic advancement of the United States is best furthered by a policy which is identical with China's ability to develop herself freely and independently: what then would be the wise American course? In short, it would be to view our existing European interests and issues (due to the war) and our Far Eastern interests and issues as parts of one and the same problem. If we are actuated by the motive hypothetically imputed to our government and we fail in its realization, the chief reason will be that we regard the European question and the Asiatic problem as two different questions, or because we identify them from the wrong end. Our present financial interest in Europe is enormous. It involves not merely foreign governmental loans but a multitude of private advances and commitments. These financial entanglements affect not merely our industry and commerce but our politics. They involve much more immediately pressing concerns than do our Asiatic relations, and they involve billions where the latter involve millions. The danger under such conditions that our Asiatic relations will be sacrificed to our European is hardly fanciful.

To make this abstract statement concrete, the firm of bankers, J- P. Morgan & Co., which is
most heavily involved in European indebtedness to the United States, is the firm which is the leading spirit in the Consortium for China. It seems almost inevitable that the Asiatic problem should look like small potatoes in comparison with the European one, especially as our own industrial recuperation is so closely connected with European relations, while the Far East cuts a negligible figure. To my mind the real danger is not that our big financial interests will determine to set out upon selfish exploitation of China: intelligent self-interest, tradition and the fact that our chief asset in China is our past freedom from a predatory course, dictate a course of cooperation with China. The danger is that China will be subordinated and sacrificed because of primary preoccupation with the high finance and politics of Europe, that she will be lost in the shuffle.

The European aspect of the problem can be made more concrete by reference to Great Britain in particular. That country suffers from the embarrassment of the Japanese alliance. She has already made it sufficiently clear that she would like to draw America into the alliance, making it tripartite, since that would be the easiest way of maintaining good relations with both Japan and the United States. There is no likelihood that any such step will be consummated. But British diplomacy is experienced and astute. And by force of circumstances our high finance has contracted a sort of economic alliance with Great Britain. There is no wish to claim superior virtue for America or to appeal to the strong current of anti-British sentiment. But the British foreign office exists and operates apart from the tradition of liberalism which has mainly actuated English domestic politics. It stands peculiarly for the Empire side of the British Empire, no matter what Party is in the saddle in domestic affairs. Every resource will be employed to bring about a settlement at the Pacific Conference which, even though it includes some degree of compromise on the part of Great Britain, will bend the Asiatic policy of the United States to the British traditions in the Far East, instead of committing Great Britain to combining with the United States in making a reality of the integrity of China to which both countries are nominally committed. It does not seem an extreme statement to say that the immediate issues of the Conference depend upon the way in which our financial commitments in Europe are treated, either as reasons for our making concessions to European policy or on the other hand as a means of securing an adherence of the European powers to the traditional American policy.

A publicist in China who is of British origin and a sincere friend of China remarked in private conversation that if the United States could not secure the adherence of Great Britain to her Asiatic policy by persuasion (he was deploring the Japanese alliance) she might do so by buying it—through remission of her national debt to us. It is not necessary to resort to the measure so baldly suggested. But the remark at least suggests that our involvement in European, especially British, finance and politics may be treated in either of two ways for either of two results.

In this article I have set forth as conservatively as possible some of the reasons which seem to justify reasonable apprehension regarding our course at the Conference and in the future. In a further article I shall set forth the reasons for hoping that our ways will not part in this direction, and the main factor that seems to me involved in our deliberate entrance upon a better course.

II

That the Chinese people, generally speaking, has a less antagonistic feeling towards the United States than towards other powers seems to me an undoubted fact. The feeling has been disturbed at divers times by the treatment of the Chinese upon the Pacific coast, by the exclusion act, by the turning over of our interest in the building of the Peking-Canton (or Hankow) railway to a European group, by the Lansing-Ishii agreement, and finally by the part played by President Wilson in the Versailles decision regarding Shantung. Those disturbances in the main, however, have made them dubious as to our skill, energy and intelligence rather than as to our goodwill. Americans, taken individually and collectively, are to the Chinese—at least such was my impression—a rather simple folk, taking the word in its good and its deprecatory sense. In noting the Chinese reaction to the proposed Pacific Conference, it was interesting to see the combination of an almost unlimited hope that the United States was to lead in protecting them from further aggressions and in rectifying existing evils, with a
lack of confidence, a fear that the United States would have something put over on it. Friendly feeling is, of course, mainly based upon a negative fact, the fact that the United States has taken no part in 'leasing' territories, establishing spheres and setting up extra-national postoffices. On the positive side stands the contribution made by Americans to education, especially medical and that of girls and women, and to philanthropy and relief. Politically, there are the early service of Burlingame, the open door policy of John Hay (though failure to maintain it in fact while securing signatures to it on paper has a great deal to do with the Chinese belief in our defective energy) and the part played by the United States in moderating the terms of the settlement of the Boxer outbreak, in addition to a considerable number of minor helpful acts. China also remembers that we were the only nation to take exception to the treaties embodying the Twenty-one Demands. While our exception was chiefly made on the basis of our own interests which these treaties might injuriously affect, a sentiment exists that the protest was a pledge of assistance to China when the time should be opportune for raising the whole question. And without doubt the reservation made on May 16, 1915, by our State Department is a strong card at the forthcoming Conference if the Department wishes to play it.

From the American standpoint, the open door principle represents one of the only two established principles of American diplomacy, the other being, of course, the Monroe Doctrine. In connection with sentimental or idealistic associations which have clustered about it, it constitutes us in some vague fashion, in both Chinese and American public opinion, a sort of guardian or at least spokesman of the interests of China in relation to foreign powers. Although, as was pointed out in a former article, the open door policy directly concerns other nations in their relation to China rather than China herself, yet the violation of the policy by other powers has been so frequent and so much to the detriment of China, that American interest, prestige and moral sentiment are now implicated in such an enforcement of it as will redound to the advantage of China.

Citizens of other countries are often irritated by a suggestion of such a relationship between the United States and China. It presents itself as a proclamation of superior national virtue under cover of which the United States aims to establish its influence in China at the expense of other countries. The irritation is exasperated by the fact that the situation as it stands is an undoubted economic and political asset of the United States in China. We may concede without argument any contention that the situation is not due to superior virtue but rather to contingencies of history and geography—in which respect it is not unlike many things that pass for virtues with individuals. The contention may be admitted without controversy because it is not pertinent to the main issue. The question is not so much how the state of affairs came about as what it now is, how it is to be treated and what consequences are to flow from it. It is a fact that up to the present the intelligent self-interest of America has coincided with the interests of a stable, independent and progressive China. It is also a fact that American traditions and sentiments have gathered about this consideration so that now there is widespread conviction in the American people of moral obligations of assistance and friendly protection owed by us to China. At present, no policy can be entered upon that does not bear the semblance of fairness and goodwill. We have at least so much protection against the dangers discussed in the prior article.

Among Americans in China and presumably at home there is a strong feeling that we should adopt stronger and more positive policies for the future than we have maintained in the past. This feeling seems to me fraught with dangers unless we make very clear to ourselves in just what respects we are to continue and make good our traditional policy in a more positive manner. To some extent our past policy has been one of drifting. Radical change in this respect may go further than appears upon the surface in altering other fundamental aspects of our policy. What is condemned as drifting is in effect largely the same thing that is also praised as non-interference. A detailed settled policy, no matter how ‘constructive’ it may appear to be, can hardly help involving us in the domestic policies of China, an affair of factions and a game which the Chinese understand and play much better than any foreigners. Such an involvement would at once lessen a present large asset in China, aloofness from internal intrigues and struggles.
The specific protests of Chinese in this country—mainly Cantonese—against the Consortium seem to me mainly based on misapprehension. But their general attitude of opposition nevertheless conveys an important lesson. It is based on a belief that the effect of the Consortium will be to give the Peking government a factitious advantage in the internal conflict which is waging in China, so that to all intents and purposes it will mark a taking of sides on our part. It is well remembered that the effect of the 'reorganization' loan of the prior Consortium—in which the United States was not a partner—was to give Yuan Shih-kai the funds which seated him, and the militarist faction after him, firmly in the governmental saddle. Viewing the matter from a larger point of view than that of Canton vs. Peking, the most fundamental objection I heard brought by Chinese against the Consortium was in effect as follows: The republican revolution in China has still to be wrought out; the beginning of ten years ago has been arrested. It remains to fight it out. The inevitable effect of increased foreign financial and economic interest in China, even admitting that its industrial effect was advantageous to China, would be to create an interest in stabilizing China politically, which in effect would mean to sanctify the status quo, and prevent the development of a revolution which cannot be accomplished without internal disorders that would affect foreign investments unfavorably. These considerations are not mentioned for the sake of throwing light on the Consortium: they are cited as an illustration of the probability that a too positive and constructive development of our tradition of goodwill to China would involve us in an interference with Chinese domestic affairs injurious to China's welfare, to that free and independent development in which we profess such interest.

But how, it will be asked, are we to protect China from foreign depredations, particularly those of Japan, how are we to change our nominal goodwill into a reality, if we do not enter upon much more positive and detailed policies? If there was in existence at the present time any such thing as a diplomacy of peoples as distinct from a diplomacy of governments, the question would mean something quite different from what it now means. As things now stand the people should profoundly distrust the politicians' love for China. It is too frequently the reverse side of fear and incipient hatred of Japan, colored perhaps by anti-British feeling. There should be no disguising of the situation. The aggressive activities of other nations in China, centring but not exhausted at this time in Japan, are not merely sources of trouble to China but they are potential causes of trouble in our own international relationships. We are committed by our tradition and by the present actualities of the situation to attempt something positive for China as respects her international status. To live up to our responsibility is a most difficult and delicate matter. We have on the one side to avoid getting entangled in quasi-imperialistic European policies in Asia, whether under the guise of altruism, of putting ourselves in a position where we can exercise a more effective supervision of their behavior, or by means of economic expansion. On the other side, we have to avoid drifting into that kind of covert or avowed antagonism to European and Japanese imperialism which will only increase friction, encourage a combination especially of Great Britain and Japan—or of France and Japan—against us, and bring war appreciably nearer.

We need to bear in mind that China will not be saved from outside herself. Even if by a successful war we should relieve China from Japanese encroachments, from all encroachments, China would not of necessity be brought nearer her legitimate goal of orderly and prosperous internal development. Apart from the question of how far war can now settle any fundamental issues without begetting others as dangerous, there is the fact that China of all countries is the one where settlement by force, especially by outside force, is least applicable and most likely to be enormously disserviceable. China is used to taking time for her problems: she can neither understand nor profit by the impatient methods of the western world which are profoundly alien to her genius. Moreover, a civilization which is on a continental scale, which is so old that the rest of us are parvenus in comparison, which is thick and closely woven, cannot be hurried in its development without disaster. Transformation from within is its sole way out, and we can best help China by trying to see to it that she gets the time she needs in order to effect this transformation, whether or not we like the particular form it assumes at any particular time.

A successful war in behalf of China would leave untouched her problems of education, of
factional and sectional forces, of political immaturity showing itself in present incapacity for organization. It would affect her industrial growth undoubtedly, but in all human probability for the worse, increasing the likelihood that she would enter upon an industrialization which would repeat the worst evils of western industrial life without the immunities, resistances and remedial measures which the west has evolved. The imagination cannot conceive a worse crime than fastening western industrialism upon China before she has developed within herself the means of coping with the forces which it would release. The danger is great enough as it is. War waged in China's behalf by western powers and western methods would make the danger practically irresistible. In addition we should gain a permanent interest in China which is likely to be of the most dangerous character to ourselves. If we were not committed by it to future imperialism, we should be luckier than we have any right to hope to be. These things are said against a mental protest to admitting even by implication the prospect of war with Japan, but it seems necessary to say them.

These remarks are negative and vague as to our future course. They imply a confession of lack of such wisdom as would enable me to make positive definite proposals. But at least I have confidence in the wisdom and goodwill of the American and other peoples to deal with the problem, if they are only called into action. And the first condition of calling wisdom and goodwill into effective existence is to recognize the seriousness of the problem and the utter futility of trying to force its solution by impatient and hurried methods. Pro-Japanese apologetics is dangerous; it obscures the realities of the situation. An irritated anti-Japanism that would hasten the solution of the Chinese problem merely by attacking Japan is equally fatal to discovering and applying a proper method.

More specifically and also more genetically, proper publicity is the greatest need. If, as Secretary Hughes has intimated, a settlement of the problems of the Pacific is made a condition of arriving at an agreement regarding reduction and limitation of armaments, it is likely that the Conference might better never be held. In eagerness to do something which will pass as a settlement, either China's—and Siberia's—interests will be sacrificed in some unfair compromise, or irritation and friction will be increased—and in the end so will armaments. In any literal sense, it is ridiculous to suppose that the problems of the Pacific can be settled in a few weeks, or months—or years. Yet the discussion of the problems, in separation from the question of armament, may be of great use. For it may further that publicity which is a precondition of any genuine settlement. This involves public diplomacy. But it also involves a wider publicity, one which will enlighten the world about the facts of Asia, internal and international.

Scepticism about Foreign Offices, as they are at present conducted, is justified. But scepticism about the power of public opinion, if it can be aroused and instructed, to reshape Foreign Office policies means hopelessness about the future of the world. Let everything possible be done to reduce armament, if only to secure a naval holiday on the part of the three great naval powers, and if only for the sake of lessening taxation. Let the Conference on Problems devote itself to discussing and making known as fully and widely as possible the element and scope of those problems, and the fears—or should one call them hopes?—of the cynics will be frustrated. It is not so important that a decision in the American sense of the Yap question be finally and forever arrived at, as it is that the need of China and the Orient in general for freer and fuller communications with the rest of the world be made clear—and so on, down or up the list of agenda. The commercial open door is needed. But the need is greater that the door be opened to light, to knowledge and understanding. If these forces will not create a public opinion which will in time secure a lasting and just settlement of other problems, there is no recourse save despair of civilization. Liberals can do something better than predicting failure and impugning motives. They can work for the opened door of open diplomacy, of continuous and intelligent inquiry, of discussion free from propaganda. To shirk this responsibility on the alleged ground that economic imperialism and organized greed will surely bring the Conference to failure is supine and snobbish. It is one of the factors that may count in leading the United States to take the wrong course in the parting of the ways. [DewJ36]
If the four principles regarding China, adopted by the Washington Conference, concluded discussion instead of beginning it, they would be most discouraging. They would show that the old tactics of diplomacy had been victorious and that general formulae, susceptible as Admiral Kato is reported to have said of various interpretations, were to be again handed out to China as they have been in the past.

It is not necessary to say that China needs definite action, as concrete as the proposals regarding limitation of armament, not kind words and pious phrases. But coming at the outset instead of at the end, it is only fair to assume that the principles represent the framework of a chart which subsequent decisions will develop into a detailed scheme of action. Regarded as a basic outline, two questions arise. Are the principles exclusive of all matters not directly touched upon? Or do they admit of additions as well as interpretation? Unless the latter is the case, they do not directly affect past actions. The fundamental question is whether they only concern acts to be performed in the future or whether they are to be applied also to the rectification of acts committed in the past.

If the former, then Japan has won a large part of her case. Certain things very important to her will be treated as accomplished facts not open to revision. China will have gained certain securities against similar acts in the future, which is something. But accomplished facts are stubborn things and they will have a way of going on and influencing the future in comparison with which general guarantees will be rather impotent.

It is hard to reconcile this interpretation, however, with the sweeping terms of the first and third principles. To respect the administrative integrity of China and to use influence for effectually establishing and maintaining equal opportunity for all nations mean, if words mean anything, an opportunity to examine existing commitments and privileges which violate these principles. In this case, China has gained a virtual recognition of her point requiring an examination of existing commitments of all sorts. The teeth of the Chinese proposals will then begin to bite.

The third point regarding the enforcement of the open door and the fourth pledging all nations to refrain from taking advantage of the troubled condition of China to secure special privileges and rights, will, if acted upon, at least prevent the granting of industrial and commercial monopolies in the future. They will also prevent such demands for special advisers, financial and military, for special police and for rights to make loans for railway undertakings and ports, such as have played havoc with China in the past. But there are so many ways of infringing upon these principles without openly violating them that they will be likely to become a dead letter unless provision is made, as suggested in the tenth Chinese point, for a continuing commission or recurrent conferences and for continuing official publicity.

The four principles have apparently been framed to dodge or postpone one important matter. Just what is China geographically? What about its relations to Manchuria, Mongolia and Thibet? And Japanese claims to special rights in Mongolia are complicated by the fact that at present Russians, rather than either Chinese or Japanese, are in practical control there. China, south of the Great Wall, sounds like a complete entity. But one look at the map will decide how slight is the probability that it would maintain its political and administrative integrity with a great power in command of the territory to the north as well as of the seas. The Great Wall itself is evidence of the difficulty of doing this when China was in contact with only barbaric hordes and when railways and steamships were not in existence. Congratulations on what has been accomplished are premature. There is a promising start. But the start only indicates the lines whose further development must be closely watched. The tug will come when the attempt is made to define the territory of China; when it is shown whether the four principles are to be limited to future actions to the exclusion of accomplished facts, and when we find out whether provision is to be made for some agency of continuing conference, arbitration and publicity.

Till we know these three things we shall not know whether the demands of the Chinese points have been met in fact or only in polite phrases to the evasion of the real issues. Further
developments on these three points will decide whether a genuine attempt is being made to help China or whether diplomats are leading us into the old trap, where burning affairs are settled in words, only to be evaded and postponed in fact by the use of vague and ambiguous formulae. Let us wait and see. [DewJ40]
Ever since the Conference was called I have believed that in the end publicity would be more important than the particular decisions reached. We are at a point where the chief guarantees for the peace and security of the world are found in the trust of the nations in one another’s good faith and good will. Publicity is the way to develop mutual trust. Nations who have no sinister plans have everything to gain from making their attitude known; nations with predatory policies are best restrained by the knowledge that their operations are subject to exposure and general discussion. Publicity means, of course, the utmost possible in the way of open diplomacy. But it also means an education of the public so that it will be immune against dishonest propaganda and reasonably intelligent in passing judgment on events as they happen.

Coming to Washington for a few days with this prepossession in mind, my first concern was naturally to try to get an idea of the atmosphere. I wanted to know how much ventilation and circulation there was, whether things were stifling and close or open and relaxed. Thanksgiving was a critical time.

At the beginning of the Conference the American eagle had made a great flight in the open. No one had expected so much frankness; having had a good taste of it, we all hoped for as much candid publicity in the discussion of Far Eastern issues. But it didn’t come. The American eagle seemed to be idly perched on a tree half asleep, while moles and woodchucks were burrowing underground and rabbits scurrying for cover. Two of the European nations at the Conference were accusing France of insincere statements and a desire to promote her own advantage, even if it wrecked the Conference. It was reported that the Chinese so resented the interpretation put by British delegates objected to even the measure of publicity involved in keeping records of meetings; that the Chinese delegation was losing the support of Chinese unofficial representatives because they were dickering privately with the Japanese over Shantung; that the British were saying nothing and lying low; that the Japanese after saying at first that a 50 per cent, navy was adequate for defensive purposes were holding out for 70 per cent.; that the Root principles were meant to refer only to the future and out of deference to Japanese and British susceptibilities would consolidate the status quo—and so on and so on.

In short, there was an unmistakable atmosphere of nervousness; there was an air of distrust. The nervousness and distrust were associated with shutting down on the publicity that accompanied the naval proposals. The latter days of the week brought official denials of a number of the rumors mentioned above. There followed an unmistakable letting down of the tension of the previous days. Some of the reports, however, were not denied; they were confirmed. Out of the combination of denials and confirmations there formed in my mind a picture of the situation which I give for what it may be worth.

As compared with the earlier days, there is an absence of disclosures on important topics. The public has no such clear and authorized idea of the position of the various nations on Far Eastern issues as it has on their attitude toward naval reductions. This, however, is not so much because important events going on behind the scenes are kept from the public as because the leading nations are hesitating from bringing up any issue which is so important that to talk about it would result in committing the nation and giving away its position. If there weren't so much public publicity there might be, so to speak, more private, more diplomatic, publicity. As it is, the nations seem to feel that they are approaching a mined field. No one wishes to step on it first for fear of the resulting explosion. Each delegation is rather waiting in hopes that some other delegation is going to make a false move which will redound to its own advantage.

This means in effect that there are a series of committee meetings, occupied in part in reducing to stated form decisions already reached and in part with discussion of minor points, minor comparatively speaking. Extra-territoriality, postoffices and customs are not exactly minor points for China, the last in particular. But they are much less explosive than the 21 demands and Manchuria, or than Shantung. For it seems likely that the Chinese could get large concessions about the latter if they were willing to join other nations in admitting Japan's special rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia. The present disposition
seems to be to assist China in getting what she can on minor points, lest raising the bigger points would result in a breakup and China would depart having gained nothing.

This phase of diplomacy was probably inevitable. It denotes some marking time and some deploying to sound other nations out, and to discover a policy by which each nation can later justify itself, in case nothing significant is done about the Far East. The Conference is entitled to breathing spells, especially when during them routine business is accomplished. But they cannot last indefinitely. The dangerous questions exist and they must be faced.

The most important of all the issues of the Conference is still in suspense. When the 21 demands, Manchuria, Shantung and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance are dealt with is it to be in the light of open and avowed statements of the respective positions of Japan, Great Britain and the United States? Or are the main issues to be lost in a fog of irrelevant issues, pious generalities, evasions, dickerings, private understandings? The United States appears committed by a high authority to the former alternative. The next best thing to getting results is for the public of all countries to know just why they were not got and who has stood in the way and why. It is not too much to say that the failure or success of United States policies now depends upon their being backed up by an adequate demand for publicity on the part of all nations. Underground burrows have got to be dug open.

Meantime Great Britain, to my mind, is the sphinx. I have found no one who professes to know exactly where she stands on any specific issue. Speaking for myself alone, I shall judge the probable outcome of the Conference by watching to see whether in the next week or two she breaks her sphinxlike silence. We know in general what the United States and China want. We know what Japan would like, although we do not know just what she would be willing to accept. It seems to be Great Britain's turn to come forward and tell what she wants. Opportunism is well enough under some circumstances. An excess of opportunism on the part of the British may spoil the Conference. [DewJ148]
Mathematicians sometimes treat a circle as a series of a great number of straight lines. As the angles increase, you get a circular effect. When they are infinite you get it all rounded off. So with a sphere. You start with a solid having many projecting angles, and finally get a ball which will roll. This is one way to see the Shantung question. There are plenty of angles. Can they be smoothed down till you get a smooth surface? If so, which way will the ball roll, toward China or toward Japan?

The number of projecting angles make the issue thorny to the touch. They also make it difficult to judge the meaning and outcome of the discussions going on. They make it hard to tell what the object was in referring the matter to conversations between China and Japan, and who is to profit thereby. Only the insiders know, and it may be doubted whether they are any too sure, although they have their hopes. It is worth while, however, to point out some of the angles.

Supposing the Senate had ratified the Versailles treaty. Our State Department would then hardly be in a position to request the Conference to take up the Chinese side of the Shantung question. Great Britain and France ratified, and, previous to ratification, had secret treaties with Japan operating adversely to China's claims. They must both be anxious to leave the trouble which they have had a share in creating to be settled between Japan and China. They don't want to admit they were wrong, and in view of the attitude of China and the United States they would be embarrassed at having openly to defend their past actions.

Moreover, Great Britain has an alliance with Japan. She is hardly likely to go into a general conference and back China against her own ally. But, on the other hand, Great Britain wants to assure Americans that she is on the side of the United States and that the alliance was and never could be used against American policies.

The obvious moral is to sidestep the issue. Let the Chinese and Japanese settle their own little family dispute between themselves. France is in even a more delicate position to question the Shantung clause of the Versailles treaty which would open the way to question other clauses. Any one who has read anything from French sources knows just how likely the French are to do anything which would create a precedent for opening up the Versailles treaty.

One can guess what the United States angle is. The State Department knows the positions of France and Great Britain. It can use its friendly offices with China to suggest that under the circumstances China may well consider whether she is not likely to get more by direct negotiations with Japan than by bringing up the matter where she is likely to meet with additional opposition. Also the Administration wants the Conference to succeed. The Shantung question might wreck the Conference. It might displace the naval question in importance. Again the same lesson. Try a little direct talk between China and Japan with Balfour present as the official friend of Japan and Hughes as the unofficial friend of China. Where is the Chinese angle? China is anxious to recover Shantung. Japan has repeatedly asserted her desire to return Shantung in full political sovereignty, 'retaining only those economic privileges granted to Germany'. Japan has several times offered to enter into direct negotiations with China, in order, so she explains, that she may carry her promise into effect. But China obstinately declines. A remarkable situation to all appearances! China refuses to accept what she most wants when her neighbor self-sacrificingly offers it to her.

It is so remarkable that there is clearly something below the surface. The Chinese hold that there is nothing to negotiate about, any more than Great Britain and France needed to negotiate with Belgium about the return of Belgium to Belgium when the Germans were expelled.

They point out that the original treaty with Germany expressly disclaimed any political rights for Germany, as well as forbade any alienation of her concessions to another power. What, then, does Japan mean by offering to return political rights which she has not got, retaining 'only' everything she has got? Again, past experience has taught the Chinese that in China economic rights, when they include mines, railways and a port, become in practice something that looks and acts astonishingly like political control. And they know that during and after the war Japan carried this transformation scene much beyond anything which Germany had ever attempted.
There is another Chinese angle. The Chinese are shrewd diplomats and the world's best bargainers. But in large matters they trust to the working of moral forces rather than to legal and formal arrangements based on a bargain. The educated liberals of China looked forward to the Conference mainly as an opportunity for China to make known to the world her national sentiments, aspirations and wrongs. This purpose can be realized only by a submission of the Shantung question to the entire Conference with a maximum of open diplomacy.

Their desire is shocked by the arrangement which has been entered into. The shock accounts for the active opposition of non-official Chinese in Washington and elsewhere to direct conversations between China and Japan. They feel they are being cheated of their greatest opportunity. Probably they would prefer to let the Shantung question stay just as it is for a time, if their position could be made known to the whole world, rather than to get three-quarters of what they want, leaving Japan in control of the other quarter, especially if the settlement were made on the side.

Meantime, there is the probability that the angles won't be smoothed off. It is well to scrutinize and remember the exact language officially used. There are no negotiations, there are 'conversations'. The Chinese at least are quite a conversational people. There is nothing said about a settlement, but only about 'looking to a settlement'. There is no harm in looking. The Chinese will probably have their chance at publicity later, and then others will also have a chance to look and see what there is to see. [DewJ41]
If the American people are going to bring an enlightened public opinion to bear on the Conference, we need more sob sisters and fewer joy brothers to report the Conference. The nations and diplomats who are interested in maintaining the status quo in the Far East have everything to gain by spreading a Pollyanna atmosphere over the doings of the Conference. Foreign diplomats are well aware of American national psychology. They know our sentimental optimistic streak and our desire to feel that we are playing a great part in promoting the idealistic welfare of the world. They know that when all is said and done, it is going to be important to the Washington administration to have the American people believe that American policies have won out as regards the Far East, and that it is essential to the administration to secure results as to navies. These things are among the best cards held by foreign diplomats. A disposition of the American public to put the best face possible on everything done by the Conference is one of the surest ways to help some of the worst things happen or at least to fail to get done some of the possible good things.

Matters have reached, as this is written, the point where it is much more important to note what isn't done and said than what is said, because the former decides the meaning of the latter. The obvious exception is in the case of the reduction of armaments, where there are specific, statistical conditions to keep track of, not such generalities as are being fed to the public as regards the Far East. I suggest three matters, one for the United States, one for Great Britain and one for Japan, which will bear watching. What happens with reference to them will give a fair test for the reader of the daily news to apply to the outgivings from Washington, and will give him a means by which he can decide which way things are really going.

Everything that has so far occurred bears out the original in-formation as to the general instructions under which the Japanese delegates were to operate. The information was that Japan was to favor in a hearty and sincere manner the reduction of armaments, provided that it was confined to the navy and applied in fair ratio to the three great powers; but was to discourage, so far as possible, the discussion of Far Eastern policies and secure postponement if some action threatened. It was also understood that she would put emphasis upon the disorganized state of China—as of course she is entitled to do up to a certain point—and insist that if anything was done about China it would require a political concert of the powers with a supervisory control of China to make sure of execution.

The point of the latter policy is obvious. If it is accepted, Japan becomes, because of inevitable geographical facts, the trustee of the powers for China. If it fails, Japan can throw the blame upon others, especially upon the United States. She will say in effect that after talking as usual a great deal about her interest in China, the United States as usual failed to come to the point when it was a matter of doing something. It does not take much ingenuity to see that her policy may be to shape things so that there will be but two alternatives; one, doing nothing, leaving the status quo with all its advantages for Japan; the other, forcing to the front a plan for joint action which the United States will reject. Of course this policy does not preclude a number of incidental concessions which the Sino-Japanese relations call for anyway, and which a happy and hopeful American public will greet as victories for American policies.

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The gush about Briand and the French necessities for land armament must have been highly pleasing to Japan. It practically disposed of any chance for consideration that the question of reduction of soldiery and abolition of conscription may ever have had. Those who were in Japan at the time of the Versailles Peace Conference know the one thing which made a great popular impression. It was erroneously reported at one time that the abolition of conscription had been decided upon. It was several days before the error was corrected. It is impossible to imagine the extent of official consternation and the amount of popular satisfaction during this short period. The Japanese are a very patriotic people. But if anyone believes they are in love with compulsory military service, the enormous sigh of relief that greeted the false report was the lesson of a lifetime. The optimistic American outburst of sentiment that met the eloquence of Briand would perhaps have been dampened if it had been realized that if there had been a definite understanding between the French and Japanese, the French position is just the one that Japan would have asked France to take, so that Japan might be relieved of the burden of defending her system of conscription and her huge army.

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'happy ending' to the Washington drama which is so much needed by our mental habit and by
our still sore pride. [DewJ149]
The numerous resignations of influential men connected with the Chinese delegation to the Washington Conference raise the question as to the reasons for such action. The average American, I think, will regard them as unwise and illtimed. The action will appear somewhat unsportsmanlike, like quitting because you are afraid you are going to be beaten before you actually have been beaten. Chinese custom in such matters is different. The usual act of an official who differs from his superiors is to resign, more often as a protest or as a means of calling public attention to some action that he disapproves than as a final deed. Resignation as a means of publicity occupies in China something of the position once occupied in Russia by assassination.

If Chinese representatives thought that the American public was not aware that affairs were going badly for China, if they thought that American public opinion could be stirred to greater activity by a dramatic gesture, it would be quite in their habit to resign. There are also other possible motives. One, at least, of the advisers who has protested by resignation belongs to a faction of Chinese politics which has been engaged for many months in an active struggle to get its men into the Cabinet. Nothing would be more likely to overthrow the present ministry than an act which would convince the Chinese people that the Cabinet is not duly protecting the interests of China, especially in Shantung.

An American can hardly conceive the closeness with which the deliberations of the Conference are watched by the educated class in China. What for us is an interesting game, or at most an important event, is to them almost a matter of life and death. Sentiment is easily stirred under such circumstances, and it is a fairly safe guess that public feeling is already gathering against what it regards as supine action on the part of the Cabinet. No matter what the difficulties in Washington, the present Government will almost surely have to bear the brunt of failure and there will be a temptation to many to get out from under while there is still time.

One speculation may be dismissed as probably unfounded. There has been a widespread report that the Peking Government is under the control of Chang Tso Lin, the military governor of Manchuria, while he is managed by the Japanese. Those who accept this rumor believe that the resignations may be directed against a pro-Japanese element in the government which instructs the delegation.

But so far as international relations are concerned, a pro-Japanese policy in Washington is a myth. In the first place, foreign diplomats are never much under the control of Peking, and, in the second place, no Chinese politician would dare to be pro-Japanese in foreign politics, even if he wanted to be. It would be social and political suicide, if not physical.

At the time of the Versailles Conference a pro-Japanese Cabinet was in power in Peking. There were reliable reports of an attempt on the part of Japan to influence the chief delegate from China as he passed through Tokio. But the delegates unanimously declined to sign the treaty and China made a separate peace with Germany. What could not be done then cannot possibly be done now. There were internal dissensions at Paris among the peace delegates and they may exist now at Washington. If so, however, they are more personal and factional than due to any difference as respects Japan.

The resignations, whatever their cause, raise the question of how China is faring at Washington and what her reasonable expectations are. Roughly speaking, I fancy there are four parties in Chinese sentiment, leaving out of account any attempt to use the Conference for internal political purposes. One pins itself to the United States to such an extent that its hopes are unbounded. It says, in effect, that Wilson took Shantung away from China at Versailles and Harding is going to get it back at Washington.

Another party wants, of course, good results, but is hopeful of nothing. A letter from one of the most distinguished leaders of intellectual China says that he had just made a public speech in which he warned his audience that China was due for a great shock, a great disappointment. This group is out of politics and is opposed to all existing political factions. They insist upon the need of internal reforms and are firmly convinced that when they are attained Japan cannot stand against China, and that other nations will be obliged to give up their wrongful possessions and practices.
A third group, largely educated abroad, many as students of political science, are ardent nationalists. They have learned to talk about sovereignty. They are actively interested in such topics as extra-territoriality and foreign municipal concessions in China. The freeing of China from foreign legal interferences is their chief aim.

The fourth and largest party, in my opinion, consists of those who will measure the failure or success of the Conference by what happens with reference to the 21 demands and Shantung. They don't care so much for postoffices, customs, consular courts, etc., which they regard as minor matters in comparison with the main issues.

I have just seen a copy of a telegram addressed to the American public by the combined chambers of commerce and combined educational associations of China, the bodies most representative of the enlightened non-political opinion of China. The cablegram begins by thanking the American people for past aid. It ends by requesting American public opinion to back up China energetically in her two essential requirements—restoration of Shantung and abrogation of the 21 demands. Doubtless the State Department as well as the Chinese delegation is in a difficult and delicate position at Washington. But the Chinese delegates will naturally be held to a stricter accounting by the Chinese people than will American representatives by our citizens for whatever results are attained or not attained on these points. So far the Chinese have refrained to a surprising extent from direct propaganda in the United States. Resignations may be the forerunners of an active propaganda, mainly anti-Japanese. [DewJ42]


Senator Lodge's speech is the high-water mark of genuine eloquence in the Conference. While under its spell one is likely to read its glow and felicity into the agreement and find more in it than is actually there. The islands are not, of course, the danger point in the Pacific, but Asia. Nevertheless, the four-power treaty accomplishes three results. It sets a precedent of consultation among great powers. This goes further than two-powers' agreement to arbitrate. It puts an end to the Anglo-Japanese alliance. This is a great gain to better relations between the United States and Great Britain. Indirectly it renders war less likely between Japan and the United States. Indirectly it affords promise to China. She may be disappointed in other respects, but she has obtained from the Conference one great result.

The chief object of the present pact in the mind of those who drew it was probably to afford a graceful means of ending the alliance. In the third place it ought to stop the American talk of a naval base at Guam. The Philippines would not, I think, ever have become a source of trouble between Japan and the United States. But a fortified naval base is a provocation to Japan. We Americans may not intend it as such, but if we were in the place of the Japanese we should feel about it as they do.

Since the Philippines are now protected by the treaty, it is to be hoped that the Guam project will be abandoned. If it is, Japan's assent to the 5-5-3 naval ratio will probably soon follow. Negatively at least, the terms of the treaty are ground for congratulation. Our State Department has probably been subject to pressure to make an agreement which would include China in an agreement of the powers. The islands are a safe place to attempt a diplomatic guarantee of the status quo. To have joined in guaranteeing it in China would have been a fatal blunder. That we are saved from. [DewJ150]
Second thoughts often change first impressions. In a previous letter to the Sun I expressed the belief that the chief point of the four-power treaty was to allow Great Britain and Japan to make a graceful exit from their alliance. A little more rumination convinced me that even if that were so the fourth clause, to the effect that the alliance would cease when the four-power treaty was ratified, should not have been introduced.

The policy for this country was to keep pointing out to the British and Japanese the ugly influence exerted by the alliance upon our friendly relations with them, while stating that abrogation was their own affair, to be decided in view of their estimate of the importance of our good relations. Then there would have been neither a bargain nor an appearance of a bargain, nor of bringing pressure to bear upon the Senate for ratification.

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The inclusion of the clause suggests that our delegation, like President Wilson at Versailles, had something to sell, and in order to sell it was willing to make an offer. The thing to be sold is the 5-5-3 ratio in particular and naval reduction in general. The latter is close to a political necessity for the Administration; the former is important for the prestige of our delegates, a seeming diplomatic victory. But was a bargain necessary?

The cold facts of the case are that Japan was likely to go bankrupt if she continued her naval program. If our delegation had been bold instead of cautious, if it had declared that the United States would reduce anyway, business and popular pressure would have compelled a similar reduction in Japan. And it would appear as if the financial relations of the United States and Great Britain were sufficient to secure a like policy on the part of England, provided Great Britain had assurance that we were going to reduce naval armaments.

Moreover, it is highly probable that the Anglo-Japanese alliance would have had to go anyway or be seriously modified suggestion of surrender to bargaining on our part to secure something we could have got without bargaining is confirmed by a story which comes from highly dependable sources. Admiral Kato was at first willing to accept the 5-5-3 ratio. But the naval experts objected. Then they were told by the British experts that if they held out the United States would yield a larger quota to them. Japanese naval experts, according to reliable information, told others that their proposals had the approval of British experts and used this fact to justify their claim.

At the same time, a propaganda was started by their means at home, so that the delegates became frightened about their reception at home if they consented to Hughes' original proposal. Kato weakened. This state of affairs imperiled the whole limitation issue. Thus the British indirectly created a situation which brought pressure to bear upon the United States to enter the four-power pact as a condition of securing the 5-5-3 ratio. Meantime Japan's propaganda at home got rather out of hand, especially because of reports that we were coercing Japan to accept our proposition, and a feeling of hostility was created which goes far to offset the moral effect of the naval reductions.

Another second thought was caused by an inquiry made of me by a lawyer the day after the pact was announced. He asked if the treaty did not apply to Japan proper. He called attention to the wording by which a 'controversy arising out of any Pacific question' comes within the scope of the treaty. The query put a new face on the matter for me. Leaving China out of account, Japan is due for trouble sooner or later with the Far Eastern Republic, if not with all Russia.

Are we committed to discussion and adjustment of this matter in a conference where Japan is represented and the Russians excluded? If so, this fact alone is sufficient, in my opinion, to justify the Senate in either rejecting the treaty or insisting upon a reservation that, if the controversy involves a nation which is not a party to the treaty, that power shall be entitled to representation in the conference on an equality with other powers.

If the controversy concerned China, this would also protect her and our own good relations with her. No nation could refuse without exposing its own purposes. I still feel that the treaty has the benefit of allaying American suspicion about Japan and the Philippines, Australian fears of Japan and Japan's fears of us about Guam. So far it makes for real peace. But to put over a treaty nominally applying to insular possessions when it actually applies to Japan proper as well, and leaves out the two nations with which Japan may have a serious
controversy, namely, Russia and China, is not to give up the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It is to make us a party to it, minus, of course, any explicit provision for armed assistance. More than one paper this morning asserts positively that the treaty includes Japan; one, close to the State Department in the past, denies it. The matter is too fundamental to be left in the ambiguity of which diplomacy is so fond. If any ambiguity is left, it is likely that some emergency will arise where the United States will not be willing to take part in adjusting matters against China and Russia. Then we shall be exposed to bitter charges of bad faith. In the end more bitterness will be stirred up than is now temporarily calmed down.

It is noteworthy that President Harding is not sending the treaty at once to the Senate. This omission is probably connected with the fact that the nine-power pact which has been talked about, relating to China, is not settled upon. This means that one cannot be understood without the other. It also indicates that our delegates made a mistake in committing themselves upon one while the other was still uncertain. Final judgment must, therefore, be reserved upon the four-power agreement. If it is too early to condemn unreservedly, it is also too soon for approval. The two treaties must be judged together. If the additional agreement does not remove the uncertainties in the present treaty, and if it adds additional ambiguities on its own account, the American people ought to be getting ready to express a public opinion which will affect our own Senate and also the representatives of other powers.

The intimation which has been put forth that the vague four Principles of Root are to form the core of further treaty is discoursing. China cannot get all she ought to have or all she hopes for. But the United States ought not to become a party to sacrificing her even to the extent of assent to ambiguous generalities. Such generalities, while they remove immediate friction between diplomats, are always in the end a threat to the peace of the world. Each power interprets them in its own way and accuses others of bad faith.

It is also to be hoped that the new treaty, instead of calling for a conference after some controversy has actually arisen, will substitute a series of annual or biennial conferences. Provision ought to be made also for popular or parliamentary representation at these conferences. The world is surely ready for that much concession to open diplomacy. Provision for a regular series of conferences will give China some security for the future in return for failure to obtain what she now requires. It will put the nations on their good behavior between times. It will avert the necessity of having to try to adjust matters which are always more or less accomplished facts, a necessity which is the bane of diplomatic meetings that occur only after controversy has become acute. It will do away with the objection to the four-power treaty, so ably urged by Senator Borah, that under present conditions the normal commitment to back up an adjustment means practically a promise to use force to carry it out. It will tend to avert future trouble instead of striking bargains and making compromises about troubles that have already got well under way. It represents an intelligent way to cooperate with other nations without getting into entangling alliances. [DewJ151]

Ding Zijiang: Hu Shi attempted to treat John Dewey's scientific method as a precondition for resolving China's social and cultural problems. The establishment of a scientific tradition in China was a result of interactions between Hu's psychological need to have a Chinese resource for facing the superior culture of America, and his intellectual need to construct a reformist means for the drastic purpose of Deweyanizing China. Before Hu adopted Dewey's experimentalism, his view of Confucianism and Chinese cultural traditions were by no means negative, since later he began formulating a 'way' to reform them. This 'way' was based on Dewey's scientific method. Hu's discovery of Dewey decisively transformed his previous simple, vague, tentative, but genuinely reformist attitude into a clear and straightforward advocacy of reformist means to westernize China according to the model of modernity and modernization provided by Dewey's early philosophical framework. Because Dewey argued for gradual social and cultural change, Hu wanted China's development to follow this path to avoid the Russian style of revolution. For Dewey, China needed gradual and peaceful reform, not radical and violent revolution, since 'reformation' is a very efficient type of experiment or instrument for socio-political transitions. Hu intended to adopt Dewey's experimentalism to make an 'overall transformation' to Chinese culture, not only for socio-political change, but also for almost all fields of culture, including language, literature, and thought patterns, such as 'the poetry revolution', 'the vernacular movement' and the 'Chinese logic method'.

Hu Shi followed his pragmatic master in seeking an 'ever-enduring process of perfecting' rather than perfection. Accordingly, he said it was requisite for the progress of the present society to uphold natural science and pragmatic philosophy and to abolish superstition and fantasy. Although Hu Shi devoted himself to spreading Dewey's experimentalism, his efforts were not as successful as expected. [Russ43]

Mo, Fenglin. *Ping Duwei ping min yu jiao yu* [ID D28520].

Mo Fenglin reviewed John Dewey's book 'Democracy and education'. He first acknowledged Dewey's contribution in connecting education to broader experiences in life and the larger society. He criticized Dewey for neglecting religious and aesthetic dimensions of human experience. Life, he said, was not simply about coping with problems in the environment; it should also be about appreciating life itself. Dewey was wrong to talk more about geography and history than about art. Furthermore, Dewey mistook inventions for fine arts. 'The intrinsic value of fine arts, such as Sophocles' and Shakespeare's plays, Phaedias' sculptures, is not to be compared to the instrumental value of an invented object such as a printing machine or a coin.' Dewey's 'child-centered' education was also a target of criticism. Mo accused Dewey of advocating random expressions of the impulses of youth, thus turning 'the autocracy of the adult' into 'an autocracy of the child'. He also thought that Dewey's emphasis on interest and play would sacrifice the importance of discipline and effort in the educational process. Even though Dewey's democratic theories of education successfully challenged an aristocratic style of learning enjoyed only by a privileged few, Dewey failed to consider what Mo called 'natural aristocracy'. Lastly, Mo faulted Dewey for putting too much emphasis on elementary education at the expense of adult learning. Dewey's 'Democracy and education' was a philosophy of elementary education, not a philosophy of education. Mo lamented the fact that Dewey's book was regarded as the bible of the field. [DewJ2:S 54-55]


"There were several famous men who rejected political careers and turned their full energy to the academic and educational worlds. It was then that Dr. [John] Dewey came to our country propagating his theories, informing us what the new education was, and what the way to the new education should be. Then educational thought in the entire country underwent a change, and this was the New Education Movement." [Kee3:S 65]
Wu complimented Dewey's effort to unite knowledge with experience so that learning was not limited to what was contained in books. She also perceived great value in Dewey's concept of school as a miniature society and his emphasis on learning by doing. She felt that Dewey's vision of education was too narrow because he talked only about controlling the environment. Wu asserted that Dewey advocated a life completely governed by rationality to the exclusion of sentiments. She also agreed that Dewey's focus on children did not qualify his book to be properly regarded as 'the philosophy of education'. [DewJ2:S. 55]

Educational Conference: Standards of the new school system reflected the advocated by pragmatism. John Dewey's influence was particularly strong.
1) To adapt itself to a changed and changing society.
2) To promote the spirit of democracy.
3) To develop individuality.
4) To take into special consideration the economic status of the average citizen.
5) To adjust education to the needs of life.
6) To facilitate the spread of universal education.
7) To make itself flexible enough to allow for local variations.

Dewey and his pragmatic educational philosophy had important influence on Chinese educational theories. Since the introduction of pragmatic educational philosophy, Chinese education theorists began to adapt the educational ideas to Chinese conditions and needs and attempted to establish systematic educational theories of their own. [DewJ185,DewJ186]

Lin criticized Dewey for emphasizing process over purpose, society over the individual, the child over the adult, interest over discipline, rationality over sentiment, participation over contemplation and practical life over spiritual life. Dewey emphasized the importance of social sympathy and responsibility, but neglected the importance of individual interests and needs. In her opinion, schools should help transform society to serve individual needs better.

Lin also thought that Dewey's process-oriented conception of education prevented him from specifying the aims of education, thus rendering the educational process haphazard and pointless. She also found Dewey's scientific, rational approach to life limited and inadequate. Dewey represented a typical Western mindset in its excessive desire to control nature rather than appreciate it. Dewey 'only knew the value of an active life but not that of a tranquil life. [DewJ2:S. 55-56]

Before his visit to China Mr. Russell had been in Russia. While journeying on the Volga he realized how 'profound is the disease in our Western mentality'—a mentality which even then the Bolshevicks were trying to force upon an essentially Asiatic population. The disease springs from excess of energy and its rationalizations. 'Our industrialism, our militarism, our love of progress, our missionary zeal, our imperialism, our passion for dominating and organizing, all spring from a superflux of the itch for activity'. The company on the Volga boat was 'noisy, quarrelsome, full of facile theories, with glib explanations of everything'. Yet one of the company lay at death's door, and 'all around us lay a great silence, strong as death, unfathomable as the heavens. It seemed that none had the leisure to hear the silence, yet it called to me so insistently that I grew deaf to the harangues of propagandists and the information of the well-informed'.

One night while the vocal and futile arguing was going on, the boat stopped and Mr. Russell went ashore, and in the silence found on the sand a strange assemblage of human beings... The flickering names lighted up gnarled, bearded faces of wild men; strong, patient, primitive women, and children as slow and sedate as their parents... To me they seemed to typify the very soul of Russia, unexpressive, inactive from despair, unheeded by the little set of westernizers who make up all the parties of progress or reaction... Something of the patient silence communicated to me, something lonely and unspoken remained in my heart all through the comfortable familiar intellectual talk. And at last the I began to feel that all politics are inspired by a grinning devil, teaching the energetic and quick-witted to torture submissive populations for the profit of pocket or power or theory... From time to time I heard sad songs or the hunting music of the balalaika; but the sound mingled with the great silence of the steppes, and left me with a terrible questioning pain in which Occidental hopefulness grew pale. It was in this mood that I set out for China to seek a new hope.

The passage gives more than the background of Mr. Russell's experience in China of which this book is a fruit. It is a symbol of the Problem of China, which in Mr. Russell's treatment becomes the problem of our Western civilization. The noisy, doctrinaire assertive, cocksure, propagandizing set of passengers is Western mentality going headlong to destruction. China is the brooding silence of nature, calm—indolent perhaps, but still tranquil in soul—tolerant, possessed of an unbroken instinctive sympathy with nature and power to draw consolation and happiness from simple things, content with death as with life because free from the corroding egotism of the West.

The book, of course, is more than an expatiation on this philosophic theme. It is a remarkably clear and condensed account of the historical forces and factors which have led up to the present situation in the Far East together with an analysis of the present situation. The report supplements his personal experience with a judicious and discriminating use of secondary sources. As a result, the book is to me the most enlightening, as a matter of information and comment, of all the many works which have been recently written to put Western readers in touch with the issues of the Far East. It is extraordinarily well done; so well done in fact that only those who by some personal experience recognize the difficulties which have been overcome, will perceive how well it is done.

But those who extract information from the book will miss its chief significance if they do not find on almost every page the haunting refrain of the note sounded in the passage quoted. Through 'industrialism and the high pressure at which most of us live' we have lost that 'instinctive happiness and joy of living' which China has retained. 'Our prosperity can be obtained only by wide-spread oppression and exploitation of weaker nations, while the Chinese are not strong enough to injure other countries, and they secure whatever they enjoy by means of their own merits and exertions alone... By valuing progress and efficiency we have secured power and wealth; by ignoring them Chinese, until we brought disturbance, secured upon the whole peaceable existence and a life full of enjoyment... Chinese have discovered, and have practised for many centuries a way of life which, if it could be adopted by all the world, would make all the world happy. We Europeans have not. Our way of life demands strife, exploitation, restless change, discontent and destruction.' And America, it should be added, is Europe at its worst because it is Europe at its peak of energy, efficiency,
and proselytizing intolerance, plus a complacent and impenetrable self-righteousness which in Europe is beginning to crumble. America presents the acme of the mechanistic outlook, 'something which exists equally in imperialism, Bolshevism and the Y.M.C.A… the habit of regarding mankind as raw material, to be molded by our scientific manipulation into whatever form may happen to suit our fancy... the cultivation of will at the expense of perception'. It is belief in government, in a life against nature, in the desirability of conversion to one's own point of view and creed that Chinese culture has escaped. Discriminating Chinese would probably be the first to admit that Mr. Russell has idealized their civilization, slighted its defects and exaggerated its excellences. China tends to become an angel of light to show up the darkness of Western civilization. Chinese virtues are made a whip of scorpions with which to lash the backs of complacent Westerners. I do not regard this fact, however, as a serious defect. For my own experience in China convinces me that Mr. Russell has justly stated the direction in which Chinese excellence exists, even though, in his soul's revulsion against the stupidities of the West, he has overstated its degree of attainment. And I do not find it in me to differ with Mr. Russell as to the extent and urgency of the need in the West to pause and to learn from the Orient. A ground of complaint lies elsewhere, I think. His method permits Mr. Russell to make a lucid exposition of the external, or political and economic, problem of China—with a lucidity which, emerging in an obscure world, must always be close, as it is with Mr. Russell, to irony. For, of course, it is precisely the restless predatory energy of the Occident which in itself and as communicated to Japan has created the present political industrial problems of China. With biting precision and his accustomed artistry of selection and elimination Mr. Russell has depicted this situation to all who still have eyes to see.

But the internal and deeper problem of China, that of the transformation of its own culture and institutions, Mr. Russell hardly seems to touch. He mentions indeed some of the bad consequences of their family system, the lack of science in their tradition, their callousness. But he appears content to dismiss them with the remark that they have not brought in their train consequences as tragic as the defects of the Western mind have brought to the Western world. This may be quite true; and for who is chiefly interested in the West perhaps it suffices. I cannot see however that it throws much light upon the problem of China as that exists for the Chinese. A sense of the deepest problem of China as it exists in the consciousness of thoughtful Chinese is what one misses in Mr. Russell's pages. As a good European he is perhaps chiefly interested in European culture and what Europe has to learn from Asia; in comparison the stupendous and marvellous problem of the intrinsic remaking of the oldest, thickest, and most extensive civilization of the world does not attract his attention. It would be churlish to quarrel with Mr. Russell for what he has not done, in the view of what he has done so well. But the world still needs, although probably no one but a Chinese can give it to the world, a picture of the most wonderful drama now enacting anywhere in the world, and, I sometimes think, the most wonderful as well as the most difficult to bring to conclusion of any that human history has yet witnessed. Contact with the West has induced in China a ferment of reawakening, a true Renaissance. I rarely met a Chinese who, with all his sense of the unjust and cruel problems which the exploiting, aggressive West had forced upon China, who with all his sense of the evils of Western materialism, nationalism, and egotistic individualism, was without a grateful recognition of an awakening due to Western influence—an awakening which seemed necessary to prevent further decay of what was good in old culture as well as necessary to a new and richer life. The ultimate 'Problem of China' concerns, it seems to me, the question of what is to win in the present turmoil of change: the harsh and destructive impact of the West, or the internal re-creation of Chinese culture inspired by intercourse with the West. [DewJ45]
1923.02.14 Opposition to John Dewey's pragmatism derived its power from the new currents of Western philosophy, based on the thought of Hegel and Bergson, that began to appear in the 1920's. Zhang Junmai expressed this opposition to Dewey in a lecture delivered at Qinghua University in Beijing on February 14, 1923, dealing with philosophies of life. This led to a new controversy. Zhang was at the time returned from studies in Japan and Germany. His study of Bergson had given him a vision of reality radically opposed to the positivistic philosophies of the period, particularly when he saw these philosophies imported into China and used by Chinese scholars against the classical thought of the Chinese themselves. He was among the few Chinese at this time who had a true insight into what constitutes philosophical thought in the Western sense and what makes it distinct from inductive scientific thought. He insisted that our acquaintance with reality obtained through philosophy, aesthetics and religion is a higher and more necessary type of knowledge than that obtained by science and that, consequently, we must go beyond the range of the empirical sciences, both in subject matter and in method. [DewJ186]


"Der wichtigste Beitrag Darwins und Huxleys hinsichtlich der philosophischen Methode besteht in deren 'Agnostizismus' (cun yi zhu yi). Der Begriff Agnostizismus wurde von Huxley geschaffen, wörtlich übersetzt 'Nicht-Wissen-Ismus' (bu zhi zhu yi). Konfuzius sprach: 'Das, was man Weiss, für Wissen halten und das, was man nich weiss, für Nicht-Wissen halten, das ist Wissen'. Dieses Zitat ist wirklich eine gute Erklärung des 'Agnostizismus'. Aber die Wissenschaftler der Neuzeit gehen noch einen Schritt weiter, sie wollen fragen: 'Welches Wissen kann erst als nicht anzweifelbares Wissen gelten?' Huxley sagt, erst jenes ausreichend bewiesene Wissen kann man glauben, all das, was nicht ausreichend bewiesen werden kann, kann nur als Zweifel, aber nicht als Glauben gelten. Das ist das Hauptprinzip des Agnostizismus.


"Henri Bergson vertritt auch eine Art Evolutionslehre, welche er 'kreative Evolution' (chuang zao de jin hua) nennt. Diese Lehre setzt einen dualen Ursprung voraus: ein Aspekt ist jene tote, passive Materie; ein Aspekt ist jener 'élan vital' (Sheng huo de chong dong). Leben besteht lediglich in der Neigung, die Funktion / Anwendung dieses ursprünglichen Impulses in der Materie anzuregen. Dieser ursprüngliche Impuls ist die eigentliche Ursache der biologischen Evolution (sheng wu yan hua)." [DewJ175:S. 108, 177-178, 211]
If it were not a fact and a fact of a kind more or less familiar, the Conference now in solemn conclave in Peking would be incredible. The orthodox axiom of all 'sound political science' is national sovereignty; in practice no phase of political independence is more jealously guarded than the right to control taxation and to levy tariffs, whether for revenue or for the rearing of infant industries. In session in Peking are representatives of the three great democracies of the world, Great Britain, the United States and France, each professing unqualified faith in the right of independent nations to self-government. In addition there is a wide-spread hostility to everything which smacks of 'internationalism'; for are not the 'Reds' internationalists, and are not the Pekings a menace? From these premises, one would hardly conclude that the Conference in Peking sits an international assembly held to take part in governing China; that it arrogates to itself one of the most 'sacred' functions of sovereignty, that of fixing the tariff on foreign goods, and that it has no notion of yielding any more to the expressed desire and purpose of China concerning its own affairs than it shall find necessary in order to avoid serious trouble. It is doubtless highly theoretical to call attention to such flagrant discrepancies between political theory and practice. Nevertheless it may be one way to induce the American public to visualize the Chinese scene, and to realize that the State department of the United States has soon to decide whether it will continue to engage in the regulation of the internal affairs of China, contrary to the practically united will of the Chinese people, or whether it will have the courage and initiative to act in not merely a democratic but a decent way in permitting financial self-government to the Chinese government. There is no reason to doubt the kind sentiments of the State department; in all probability it means well by China, and its expressions of goodwill are not hypocritical camouflage. But the department is influenced by precedent, by routine, by the etiquette of diplomacy which might more easily fear a breach of manners toward other nations than a breach of justice towards China. And it is also exposed to direct and more or less powerful influence from business interests that want in behalf of their own pockets to keep the tariff of China on foreign goods at the lowest possible point. Is it too much to hope that the general public shall have an active concern in the decisions which are to be made, and shall bring greater pressure to bear upon the State department to act in a fair, humane and democratic way, than self-interest and hidden groups bring to bear in the opposite direction? It is futile to lecture the general public on its responsibilities in this matter; it is fed up with foreign responsibilities and wants to be left alone. But it may do no harm to assert with all possible emphasis that in China at present the American people is on trial, and that the attitude taken toward tariff autonomy by the United States will determine for long years the attitude taken by the Chinese towards us. Are our professions of goodwill to China sincere? Are our assertions of greater disinterestedness than animates other nations genuine? Or are they a combination of Pharisaism, sentimentality and highfaluting talk? That is the issue in the minds of most Chinese, and the way the American people meets the tariff question may determine for a generation the moral and political alignment of the Chinese people to western civilization in general and to American ideas and institutions in particular. Needless to say the illogical position of interference of democratic nations, themselves highly nationalistic, and mostly addicted to protective tariffs, with the internal affairs of China grew up gradually for historic reasons, and so was tolerated until it became familiar and a vested interest. At the outset, the Chinese people were indifferent, and it is almost correct to say that the Chinese government invited the interference. In the past, it has not worked altogether badly; considerable good came of it. If international conferences to help regulate the affairs of individual nations were the rule and not an exception confined to countries so weak that they can be safely meddled with, there might even be something to say for continuing the practice in China. But the past is not the present, and present China is bent upon a radical break with the past in all that concerns its own management of its own affairs. The danger is that diplomats will not face the reality and extent of this change, and will palter, compromise, truckle over details, do as little as they possibly can, and trust to future events to be able to get away with their evasion of the issue. It is not too much to say that unless the International Conference takes action which looks in a definite and stated way towards the resumption of Chinese tariff autonomy, not at some vague future time when all shall be well with the
government of China but at a specified date under specified conditions, public opinion in China will force any Chinese government that may exist to resume tariff autonomy in defiance of the powers, and that at no distant date. To put the matter at its lowest level, it might be as well to make a virtue of necessity, and by anticipating events get the credit for a just and sensible act.

It is understood that the powers are willing to permit China to level duties up to ten or fifteen percent. Japan is reported to have sprung a surprise by volunteering at the first meeting to agree to a raise up to twelve and a half percent. One feels helpless to comment adequately upon the situation. If the imagination will only work and think of a similar conference called to pass upon the affairs of France or Italy, or the United States, or even of a third-rate European power, there will be no need for any comment; a sense of the indignation and resentment of an awakened China and of the danger of giving cause for its continued growth, will take care of the affair. But it is more than the amount of tariff which China is to be permitted to levy that is under consideration. It is also proposed to decide for China what China shall do with the moneys when they are raised. There is a story that the assent of Japan to the American proposal of a Conference was secured by a tacit agreement that the United States would join in urging that the added funds be employed to pay off the Nishihara loans by Japan. The story may well be false—but it may also have a grain of fact in it. Doubtless China should meet her foreign obligations. But in view of the fact that these loans were made at a time when the Anfu pro-Japanese party was in power at Peking and are universally regarded as part of the betrayal of China to foreign interests, it is obvious that the popularity and prestige of the Conference will not be increased by any such proposals. And this situation illustrates the danger which now attends upon every pretension of foreign powers to decide China’s domestic affairs for her. Some decisions as to the use to be made by China of additional funds would be less unpopular than some others, but any attempt to decide and to enforce decision, anything more than advice which in the present entangled condition of Chinese finance is legitimate, will surely make trouble instead of alleviating an already troubled situation.

It is trite to say that in the present condition of the world nations can no longer do the sort of thing which once they did as a matter of course and with impunity. But that trite fact is the essence of the Chinese situation. The only question is whether it is to be recognized only by small bits, grudgingly, and by yielding to trouble after it has broken out, or whether it will be recognized at once in its full force and whole-heartedly. If the United States shows a disposition to compromise, to postpone, to take half steps and quarter steps, to evade, to depend upon time-honored formulae that have nothing to do with the present situation, the case, difficult enough at best as between the powers, is lost in advance. If it leads with a definite and thoroughgoing policy of which financial autonomy for China is a central feature, something definite will be accomplished.

The American public should bear in mind that there is no question of even what is called national honor and prestige at stake. There is only a vested interest. Reduced to its lowest terms, the question for American citizens to form a judgment upon is whether they wish the power of the United States government to be used to promote, at the expense of China and of the good relations of China and the United States, the pecuniary interests of a small group of manufacturers, merchants, commission agents and exporters. They are doubtless all enthusiastic high-tariff men at home, but they want to retain a cheap and easy hold on Chinese markets by keeping down the rate of duty. At bottom, this is what the solemn and dignified International Conference at Peking is about, in spite of the fact that it is possible to overlay this ground-work with many important but irrelevant matters. The issue is simple enough so that even a people sick of foreign questions and policies should be able to pass upon it, and do so with promptness and efficacy. Do we wish China to be treated as a free and self-respecting people should be treated or as a market upon which to dump goods for the pecuniary profit of a small number? [DewJ156]

1926 Gründung des China Institute in America in New York, N.Y. durch Kuo Pingwen, John Dewey und Hu Shi. [Colu]
Dewey, John. *We should deal with China as nation to nation* [ID D28619].

In the recent number of the Survey dealing with Oriental problems in their connection with the United States, Mr. Lewis Gannett reports a conversation with General Chiang Kai-shek in Canton. According to Mr. Gannett, the Chinese leader said: 'Thinking men in China hate America more than they hate Japan... Japan talks to us in ultimatums; she says frankly she wants special privileges—extraterritoriality, tariff control—in China. We understand that and know how to meet it. The Americans come to us with smiling faces and friendly talk; but in the end your government acts just like the Japanese. And we, disarmed by your fair words, do not know how to meet such insincerity'.

I have no way of knowing how far such statements are representative of Chinese opinion. To some extent they are perhaps colored by local feeling at Canton, which resents the support given by the American government to the Peking government. But nevertheless it is significant that they are held by such a representative person as Chiang Kai-shek. Probably most Americans, including those sympathetic with China, will feel that the statements are unfair, and will incline to be irritated. I do not think they are fair either, but I quote them not to controvert them, but to indicate the great difficulty nations have in understanding each other. For I do not think that American opinion about China, and about the relations of the United States to China, are very fair either as a rule. Yet I do not think that on either side there is a desire to be anything but fair—leaving out the case of those who have something to gain by misrepresentations.

The conclusion I would draw is that official and governmental relations ought to be such that the misunderstandings and unfair statements which develop will do as little harm as is possible. I recognize the great truth in what is constantly said about the importance of nations' understanding one another, appreciating one another's Culture, etc. This is all true. But such understanding and appreciation is of very slow growth, and it will be a long, long time before it will develop to a point where it can be counted upon to regulate international relations. Persons of the same country, of the same culture and tradition, even persons of the same family, find great difficulty in properly understanding one another. We are not as yet sufficiently civilized or sufficiently scientific in our methods to understand one another. We do not believe that for a very long time the mass of Americans are going to see the Orientals as they see and feel themselves, nor do I know any reason why we should expect the mass of Orientals to judge us from the standpoint we take in estimating our own conduct.

It may seem harsh to say that we have to count, for a long time in the future, upon a large measure of misunderstanding between peoples. But I think a frank recognition of this fact would afford a measure of security and protection. It would lessen the amount of exasperation and irritation that grows up when a misunderstanding is revealed and patent. Above all, it would, as has been already suggested, indicate that the great thing is so to direct public policies that the inevitable misunderstandings will, when they arise, be shorn of power to result in practical harm.

It is because I believe that present American governmental policies in China tend to invest misunderstandings with power to work actual evil that I would see those policies changed. It is quite 'natural' that state departments and diplomats should follow traditional policies. One of these traditional policies is that western nations should unite and pursue a common policy in China instead of each nation conducting its diplomacy independently. It is easy to see how from a historical point of view the method grew up. The inertia of diplomacy, the desire to follow precedents, the feeling that it is risky to do anything new, all operate to induce the American state department to continue to act in concert with the foreign offices of other nations in dealing with China. But because I believe it increases international misunderstanding between China and the United States, because it clothes these misunderstandings with power to work practical evil, and because it prevents our state department from actively manifesting and executing what is at least the passive desire of most Americans, I am opposed to it. I think that we should at once deal with China as nation to nation, and leave other nations to pursue a similar independent course. A policy of complete non-intervention may not seem benevolent, but I do not believe that any nation at present is wise enough or good enough to act upon an assumption of altruism and benevolence toward
other nations. Till conditions have changed, the great thing is to leave one another alone, and
give each nation a chance to manage its own affairs, no matter how inadequate and
incompetent the management may seem to us to be.

I think our present policy has also a tendency to prevent Chinese from facing frankly their
own situation. As long as the unequal treaties exist, and as long as foreign nations encroach
politically—or economically with political support—upon Chinese territory, the Chinese
people will use this fact as an alibi. It will minimize its own responsibility for the bad
condition of its own affairs and will throw all the blame upon foreigners. Only China can
straighten out Chinese affairs. It seems to me that one reason they are not tackling the job
with greater energy and persistence is because they can allege foreign policies, including that
of the United States, as long as we engage in the diplomatic concert as an excuse. At present,
in my opinion—and I recognize how readily opinion may be mistaken—thought and energy
that should be directed by Chinese upon their own internal affairs are diverted largely to
criticising and blaming foreigners. This is natural; we all love alibis and excuses. But the
United States should, as far as it is concerned, abrogate all special privileges and onesided
relations so that the attention of the Chinese may centre upon improving their own conditions.

Another reason which has great weight with me in making me believe that our government
should change its policy is that when a certain result is seen to be sure to come about sooner
or later in any case, it is the part of good-sense to anticipate that result, and see to it that it
comes about earlier, and with the least possible disturbance and ill-will. In any case, the
present onesided relations with China cannot continue indefinitely. I do not agree with those
who think that they can be abrogated without some disturbance, and without some harm
resulting to China itself. But with the growing development of national sentiment in China,
these evils and disturbances are in my opinion slight in comparison with those which will take
place if things are allowed to drift until China of her own initiative and without negotiation
with other nations denounces the existing treaties and arrangements. [DewJ157]

I should like to emphasize the word 'real' in my title. The apparent crisis is that which fills columns in the daily press; foreigners killed, houses looted, security so threatened that foreigners are being concentrated in a few ports and warned to leave the country, the turmoil of war and the barbarities of civil war. Yet in all the rumor, gossip and facts that come to us, there is a frequent note struck, which is a sign, to the discerning, of the real crisis through which China is passing. The entire animus of the latent—in some cases flagrant—propaganda to which we are treated is directed against the nationalistic movement and forces. The Northern forces are invariably let down as easily as possible. Why?

The most direct way to get at the reality of the situation is to inquire what the tone of the news would have been, were it proved that the retreating Shantung troops—whose commander is an ex-bandit—had done the killing and the looting. The answer is that the incidents would surely have been glossed over; they would have been treated as unfortunate concomitants of civil war; it would have been noted that defeated armies were wont, on their retreats, to get out of hand. Doubtless, demands for indemnities would have been made in due course on the Peking government. But we should have had no appeals from Shanghai and London for concerted intervention, for blockades of Chinese ports. In other words, there would have been no clamor for us to take sides with the Cantonese against the Northerners. Just as the news has been colored against the Nationalists, it would have been smoothed over in favor of the Northerners. I cannot imagine anyone who has followed the course of events in China denying this statement.

Again why? What is the significance of this double method in reporting news? If it were true that the Peking government genuinely represents the unity and integrity of China against a band of outlaw rebels, it could be understood. If it were true that there is a stable government in Peking which maintains general and possesses moral and legal authority, the discrimination could be understood. If the Northern troops were, in general, better disciplined and comported themselves in a more orderly way, it could be understood. But it is notorious that each of these suppositions is contrary to fact.

The Peking government has, for many years, been a blind creature in the hands of whatever military overlords happened to be in power. In common with many others, I have seen the President and Cabinet in power thunder against some general, denounce him as a traitor, offer rewards for his head, and, a few weeks later, take it all back, and issue precisely similar edicts against the generals at whose behest the first pronunciamentos were made. I well remember my surprise, when, a newcomer in Peking, I was told by our minister, Mr. Reinsch, in a matter-of-fact way, that the Peking government would not last a month, save for the recognition of foreign powers. It did not take a long residence to convince me that he had revealed no secret of state. In the country at large, the Peking government commanded no authority. Its own supporters kept back its revenues for their own purposes, raised and supported their own troops for their own uses. And this was long before there was an organized popular rebellion against Peking.

No, the explanation of the tone and temper of the news we are receiving lies in the simple fact that the Nationalist government represents a national movement, and that, under the circumstances, any national movement in China is bound to be anti-foreign—against, that is, the special privileges which foreign nationals enjoy because of old treaties. It is not surprising that the mass of foreigners in commercial and industrial centres like Hankow and Shanghai are against the so-called Cantonese revolution. Nor is their opposition wholly to be explained on strictly economic grounds. The American economic stake in China is not large; yet in the large centres, outside of missionary groups, Americans generally share the feelings of the English residents, feelings which centre and flourish in the foreign clubs, where most of the correspondents imbibe their ideas and gather the news they send. The whole mode of life has become history comparable with it; possibly none in our own day, even the World War. Such a statement, given our habitual provincialism and racial snobbishness, may seem foolishness to the wise. But I doubt if most of the great changes of history were not obscured to their contemporaries by superficial froth and clamor. We think of Asia as outside of our world, and it is hard for us to recognize that any changes going on there are of great importance. But
when the changes have produced their consequences, and are seen in historic perspective, it is certain that the reconstitution of the life of the oldest and most numerous people of Asia will stand revealed as at least as significant as the transition of Europe out of medievalism into a modernized culture. Such questions as the bearing of the changes upon the special privileges of a few thousand foreigners, the control of India by Great Britain, and the other features which are now conspicuous, will fall into place as paragraphs in a volume. It is not easy to take a long view of contemporary events. But without such a view, we shall see in the events in China simply sound and fury, a confused medley of passions. This result is not only intellectually unfortunate; it is practically dangerous. For it marks a disposition upon which race and color prejudice and deliberate propaganda operate disastrously. Our historic sympathy with China is in danger of being undermined; further untoward events in China might draw us, on the basis of inflation of emotions due to misunderstandings, into support of European policies which are contrary both to our traditions and to our interests. [DewJ10]

Tao creatively and critically implemented John Dewey's ideas in the normal school and its surrounding rural setting. He ded a 'half somersault' of Dewey's theory and transformed Dewey's 'education means life' to his 'life means education', Dewey's 'school as society' to his 'society as school', and Dewey's 'learning by doing' to his 'unity of three : teaching, learning, and reflective acting'. [DewJ220]

1928 Dewey, John. To the Chinese friends in the United States [ID D28464].
From time to time cases of our Chinese friends seriously involved in difficulties with the authorities here have come under the notice of individual members of this Committee. Not infrequently a good deal of hardship and at times no little injustice have been worked upon these people because of the discriminatory acts and attitudes of those charged with the administration of the laws. A real need was felt, therefore, for some organized effort to meet the situation. The direct outcome of this sentiment was the formation of the committee known as THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL DEFENSE OF CHINESE. Its purpose is Specifically to secure to the Chinese of all classes in this country their full legal rights by providing access to adequate counsel and by any other related type of assistance it can give. The Committee also regards efforts to change discriminatory attitudes in the administration of the law as entirely within its scope.
It is plain that the Committee has a real task on its hands, because of both the difficult nature and the very large scope of its work. It is plain, too, that successful furtherance of its purposes must depend upon the combined support of every Chinese and every American who is interested in this new effort.
We have engaged Mr. John T. Find as executive secretary, and we earnestly hope that all our Chinese friends throughout the United States will cooperate with him and the members of this Committee either as individuals or as a group, to make this organization an effective instrument for promoting the legal interests of the Chinese people in this country and thereby strengthening the friendly relations between the United States and China. [DewJ9]
General Crozier has furnished us with an interesting essay on the conditions in China which make it difficult for that country to establish a unified, stable and efficient Government. He has supplemented this account with a briefer essay on the comparative ease with which military conquest of that country could be accomplished. The two statements form the foundation for what is in effect a plea for intervention in China to be undertaken by preferably concerted action of several Great Powers. This intervention is to be wholly altruistic in character, based on desire to help China find her own unity, assist her in development of civil law and administration, free her from the rapacious interference by militarists and officials leagued with them, and is to terminate in turning over a smoothly running Government to the Chinese people. It reads like a dream. If tried, it might turn out a nightmare.

His account of conditions in China, even if once substantially correct as far as it goes, leaves out a fundamentally important fact. He fails to give weight in estimating the probable reception of benevolent intervention by the Chinese to the extraordinary development of national sentiment in recent years. I should not have believed it possible to write about Chinese political affairs and make as little reference as he has done to this feature of the situation. It is quite true that it is not sufficiently strong or well organized to create a unified Government. It may well be years before that goal is reached. But it is powerful enough to bring to naught any such scheme as that proposed.

The probability and the effectiveness of organized resistance to a Government resting upon foreign force is immensely under-estimated. It is true the Chinese still lack ability in positive and constructive combination. They have, however, an enormous capacity for negative organization, for resistance. The agitation against foreign interferences carried on in the last few years has already aroused that power into action. Increase of interference would render it an irresistible force. The Chinese are factional; but foreign intervention would weld them into a solid unit, as long as the foreigner was there. General Crozier thinks, apparently on the basis of reports from Hongkong, that they could not successfully unite for even a boycott without assistance from governmental powers, which naturally could not be had with the Government in the hands of foreign agents. Well, I happened to be in China eight years ago at the time the boycott against the Japanese was started. It was started by students. Instead of having support from the Government, the latter was pro-Japanese and set out to suppress the movement by force. In a few short weeks the Cabinet was overthrown; and it is commonly understood that the boycott was so harmful to Japanese interests that it is responsible for the change in Japan’s attitude toward China.

Since then things have moved fast and far. The merchants, as well as students, are now organized, while in all industrial centers the workingmen are an organized power. Quite aside from boycotts and means of passive resistance, the proposed scheme of government would be brought to naught by Chinese noncooperation. Its success would depend upon enlisting Chinese so that they might be educated in modern administrative and legal procedures. The only Chinese that would engage in service in a Government conducted by foreigners, having armed support, would be from the corrupt, self-seeking class. These would be regarded as traitors by their countrymen. The foreign Government would be a mere shell. It might last for years and the Chinese be no nearer self-government than they are today In fact, with irritation, hatred and union on the basis of hostility to the foreigner it would produce, the last state would be worse than the first.

General Crozier has himself stated so candidly the difficulties in the way of cooperative foreign intervention and of establishing an honest and intelligent Government really managed for the sake of the Chinese people, that it is not necessary to say much about that phase of the matter. As General Crozier says: “The only justification we admit for making use of our strength is the defense of our interests, of the lives and property of our nationals.” He regards this as selfish. But it is the only recognized ground, and it is so because the political sense of nations knows how fantastic is the idea of a genuinely benevolent, self-denying, intelligent intervention. At that, interventions already conducted have too often been the causes of predatory aggression and exploitation of peoples subject to it. In the world in which we live General Crozier’s ideal of a union of great and imperialistic Powers having the sole purpose of
assisting another nation, a nation so unlike in customs and traditions as is China, is a dream. It took centuries for Western nations to emerge from political conditions not unlike those of China into our present semblance of honest and efficient self-government. It will take time for China to make the transition. She needs our help. But it must come by patience, sympathy and educative effort, and the slow processes of commerce and exchange of ideas, not by a foreign rule imposed by military force. [DewJ11]

"Mr. [John] Dewey taught me how to think; he taught me to think with strict regard to the antecedents and consequences of thought, to consider all schools of thought and concepts as mere hypotheses waiting for proof. Dewey and Huxley enabled me to understand the nature and function of the scientific method."
It was also with Dewey that Hu received his systematic introduction to the function and significance of science and its method. Science, for Hu as for Dewey, was the whole realm of observational and experimental methods. It was a new philosophy of life which was 'built on the scientific knowledge of the past two or three hundred years'. [DewJ177:S. 30]

Tao devoted his life to the cause of educational reform in China. He was the first of John Dewey's Chinese followers to develop his own system of educational theory and practice, and the first to seek to extend Dewey's influence from the college level down to the rural school. [DewJ74]
Liang Shuming was deeply impressed by Dewey's seminal work, in which Dewey had presented a more profound and comprehensive conception of education than anything he had encountered before. Liang's essay is a penetrating analysis of Dewey's ideas from Confucian perspectives. Liang acclaims Dewey's conception of education for encompassing life itself. Liang argues that life is the central concept in Dewey and that his understanding of education derives from his view of life. Since Dewey understands human life to be ineluctably social, he sees education to be possible and necessary only where individual life intersects with social life. As Liang comments, 'where there are no people, there is no education; and where there is only one person, there is no education'. Liang suggests that, in reading 'Democracy and education', one should start with chapter four, 'Education as growth', which explores the meaning of life from an individual perspective, and then continue with chapters three, two, one, and finally chapter seven. Liang believes that in so reading, one can better comprehend the meaning of individual life in the larger context of social life and thus better grasp Dewey's central contention that democracy is education and education is democracy.

Liang comments that Dewey's philosophy is deep and thorough because he always tries to trace the origin of things, to 'start from the very beginning', as Liang puts it. According to Liang, Dewey rightly understands that the most active part of human life – and the universe at large – is 'renxin', the human heart-and-mind. As he observes, Dewey's writings are filled with profound insights into the nature of human sociality.

He observes that Dewey and Confucius share the same conception of social individuals, for they both understand that humans are inevitably bound together by their very nature. Since human life is naturally social education, to be worthy of the name, must be essentially social and moral. Liang claims that by education Dewey means educating the human-hear-and-mind for a social life. He notes that Dewey end his book by reminding readers what it means to be moral: 'All education which develops power to share effectively in social life is moral' and particularly that 'interest in learning from all the contacts of life is the essential moral interest'. Liang laments the fact that most people fail to understand Dewey's view of morality because they have a narrow and rigid conception of morality as following rules or obeying duty. Even though Liang praises Dewey and sees many commonalities between Dewey and Confucius, he nonetheless points out what he thinks is lacking in Dewey's philosophy. Although Dewey has a penetrating understanding of the endlessly changing, lively, and dynamic aspects of life, he fails to see another side, that is, the unchanging and the absolute. According to Liang, Dewey makes circular arguments, such as, the end of education is more education, because 'he has not discovered morality, even though everything he said is quite moral'. Liang thinks that Dewey has taught people only how to apply intelligence in dealing with the practicalities of life, but not in reflecting inwardly upon the value of life. Liang's comment seems to reflect a prevailing criticism of Dewey in China during the 1920s and 30s – that he often fails to not the tranquil, spiritual, and aesthetic dimensions of human life.

Your country and my country, China and the United States, are alike in being countries that love peace and have no designs on other nations. We are alike in having been attacked without reason and without warning by a rapacious and treacherous enemy. We are alike, your country and mine, in having a common end in this war we have been forced to enter in order to preserve our independence and freedom. We both want to see a world in which nations can devote themselves to the constructive tasks of industry, education, science, and art without fear of molestation by nations that think they can build themselves up by destroying the lives and the work of the men, women, and children of other peoples. We are alike, your country and mine, in being resolved to see this fight through to the end.

In one important respect we are unlike. You have borne the burden, heat, and tragedy of the struggle much longer than we have. We are deeply indebted to you for the enduring and heroic struggle you have put up. Our task is severe but it is much easier than it would have been were it not for what you have done in holding a powerful enemy at bay through these long years of suffering. We are now comrades in a common fight and in defending our-selves; all our energies are pledged to your defense and your triumph.

The United Nations will win the whole war, and the United States and China will win against Japan. Of that there can be no more doubt than that the sun will rise tomorrow. Because we are a peaceful nation, we, like you, were taken at a disadvantage at the outset. I assure you that the early disaster has been a stimulus that has evoked the united energies and the unalterable resolve of the people of this county. We are in it with you and with the other peoples near you, and we shall carry on till complete victory is ours, and till you and they are forever relieved of the menace under which you have lived for so many years. For the twenty-one demands Japan made upon you a quarter of a century ago is an enduring memorial of how many years you have lived under a threat from which you shall not suffer in future years, and you are able to return to the peaceable task of building up your own culture in peaceful cooperation with other nations of goodwill.

You have assumed by your heroic struggle a new position in the family of nations. You have won the undying respect and admiration of all nations that care for freedom. As the result of the victorious outcome of the war all inequalities to which you have been subject will be completely swept away. Our gratitude to you, our respect for you, our common struggle and sacrifice in the common cause, guarantee to China an equal place in the comity of nations when the light of victory dawns. Both of our nations, even in the midst of the sufferings we undergo and the sacrifices we make, can be of good cheer as we make a reality out of our vision of a world in which we can live without constant dread, and where we have taken a step forward toward a world of friendship and goodwill. In this new world you are assured the position of spiritual leadership, of Eastern Asia to which your enduring tradition of culture as well as your present heroic struggle so richly entitle you. We cannot forget that a Japan got her technical and mechanical resources, industry, and war from Western nations, so she got her literature, her art, and all that is best in her religion from you. The coming victory will restore to China her old and proper leadership in all that makes for the development of the human spirit. [DewJ5]

Letter from John Dewey to Tao Xingzhi.
"My dear Dr. Tao, I have been happy to get news of you through your former associate Professor Chu. I am glad to know your health remains good and that your educational work goes on, even under the difficult conditions you experience..." [DewJ220]

John Dewey received the invitation to lecture in China and he decided to accept it, even though his family was concerned for his safety and health. The invitation was cancelled due to unsettling political situations. [DewJ2:S. 136]
Feng, Yu-lan [Feng, Youlan]. A short history of Chinese philosophy [ID D10068]. Feng Youlan pointed out that what John Dewey and Bertrand Russell mainly lectured about in China was their own philosophy: “This gave their hearers the impression that the traditional philosophical systems had all been superseded and discarded. With little knowledge of the history of Western philosophy, the great majority of audiences failed to see the significance of their theories. One cannot understand a philosophy unless at the same time he understands the earlier traditions that it either approves or refutes. So these two philosophers, though well received by many, were understood by few. Their visit to China, nevertheless, opened new intellectual horizons for most of the students at that time. In this respect, their stay had great cultural and educational value. [Russ43]

Cao, Fu. Yuehan Duwei pi pan yin lun [ID D28696]. Chao Fu urged that criticism of Dewey should begin with a critique of his anti-Marxist, reactionary positions. While Marxism has been regarded as the absolute truth and guiding principles for all undertakings, including education, in the People's Republic, it has been constantly doubted and critized by Dewey, both in his lectures in China and in his writings on political and social philosophy. For example, while Marxists believe in using methods of violence to overthrow the old system, Dewey advocates the use of methods of intelligence or other nonviolent measures to gradually change and improve society. Marxist theory predicts that as capital squeezes out competition, the workers will become poorer and poorer, while Dewey argues that the workers will come to fare better and better as a result of competition. Marxists claim that Communism will inevitably win the final victory in the world, while Dewey maintains that the future is highly uncertain. [DewJ205]

John Dewey: Shortly after the Communist takeover of the Chinese mainland, organized efforts were made to criticize and discredit John Dewey's philosophy and its practical influence in China. This began in a number of articles singling out for attach Dewey's educational philosophy, grew into a vehement and systematic campaign directed against Hu Shi but usually involving Dewey as well, and continued sporadically through the articles and books directed either against Hu Shi or Dewey himself, or against pragmatism as a school of though. This reaction might be considered a continuation of the 'radical' response already discussed earlier, except that, this time, the earlier radicals have come into power. Indeed, Chen Duxiu himself has been discredited much earlier. The reactions of the 1950s are entirely negative. There is no longer any discussion of pros and cons, any impartial analysis of Dewey's thought and influence. What we have is a thoroughgoing critique of Dewey's pragmatic theory of truth, his experimentalist methodology, as well as his social, political and educational philosophy. The criteria for criticism are derived from Marxist theories and are assumed to be themselves free from error. Dewey is criticized for being an idealist, who regards as truth only the data of subjective experience, and neglects the reality of the objective world. The pragmatic theory of truth is attacked for being relativistic and diametrically opposed to the absolute verity of the materialist interpretation of the laws governing class struggle and historical development. Dewey's social, political and educational theories are regarded as serving the interests of American capitalism and imperialism. [DewJ188]
Chen, Heqin. *Pi pan Duwei fan dong jiao yu xue de zhe xue ji chu* [ID D28575].

"The child-centered curriculum in living education has destroyed scientific knowledge's nature of system, design, and organization, debased the leading role of the teacher, obstructed the child's potentiality in world reconstruction through the mastery of scientific knowledge and consequently discouraged the will of the wild and the youth to reconstruct the fatherland and defend world peace. This is the consequence of my being hit by Dewey's second gunshot, namely, his pragmatic, reactionary theory of the child-centered curriculum — school is society, education is life. Doing in learning and teaching was not the same as 'practice' in Marxism-Leninism. 'practice' in Marxism-Leninism is social and purposeful, while 'doing' in the Deweyan method of teaching is trivial, fragmentary, and splitting scientific knowledge in an attempt to subject the youth to slavery at the service of American monopolizing capitalists." [DewJ5]
John Dewey was born October 20, 1859, and died in 1952, in his ninety-third year. This coming October there will be a celebration of the Centennial of his birth in many parts of the free world.

Forty years ago, early in 1919, Professor Dewey and his wife, Alice, left the United States for a trip to the Far East. The trip was to be solely for pleasure. But, before their departure from San Francisco, Dewey was invited by cable to give a series of lectures at the Imperial University of Tokyo and later at other centers of higher learning in Japan.

While in Japan, he received a joint invitation from five educational bodies in China to lecture in Peking, Nanking, Shanghai, and other cities. He accepted the invitation, and the Deweys arrived in Shanghai on May 1, 1919—just three days before the outburst of the Student Movement on May 4th in Peking. That was the Student Movement which is often referred to as 'The May Fourth Movement'.

It was the Student Movement and its successes and failures that so much intrigued the Deweys that they changed their original plan to return to America after the summer months and decided to spend a full year in China. Dewey applied to Columbia University for a year's leave of absence, which was granted, and which was subsequently extended to two years. So, he spent a total of two years and two months in China, from May, 1919, to July, 1921.

When Miss Evelyn Dewey wrote in her Preface to the volume of Dr. and Mrs. Dewey's letters that 'the fascination of the struggle going on in China for a unified and independent democracy caused them to alter their plan to return to the United States in the summer of 1919', she was referring to their keen interest in the Student Movement. It is in order, therefore, to give a brief sketch of the May Fourth Movement and its nationwide influence as background of this talk on John Dewey in China.

World War I had ended only a few months before, and the Peace Conference in Paris was drafting the final terms of the peace treaty. The Chinese people had hoped that, with Woodrow Wilson's idealistic 'Fourteen Points' still echoing throughout the world, China might have some of her grievances redressed at the Peace Conference. But in the first days of May, 1919, authentic reports began to reach China that President Wilson had failed to render his moral support to China's demand that the former German possessions and concessions in Shantung be restored to China; and that the Peace Conference had decided to leave the Shantung question to Japan to settle with China. The Chinese delegation was helpless; the Chinese government was powerless. The people were disappointed and disheartened, but helpless.

On Sunday, May 4th, the students in Peking called a mass meeting of all colleges and secondary schools to protest against the Paris decision and to call on the government to instruct the Chinese delegation in Paris to refuse to accept it. The whole thing was a spontaneous and unpremeditated outburst of youthful patriotism. The communists' claim that 'the May Fourth Movement' was a part of the World Revolution and was planned and led by Chinese communists is sheerly a big lie. There was no communist in China in 1919.

After the speeches and resolutions, the mass meeting decided on a demonstration parade which ended in forcing the closed gates of the house of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had been notorious for his pro-Japanese policies. The marching students went into the house and beat up one of the luncheon guests, who happened to be the Chinese Minister to Tokyo, recalled for consultation. In the turmoil, the house was set on fire—probably to frighten away the demonstrators. A number of students were arrested on their way back to their schools. That was what happened on the fourth of May, forty years ago.

The Deweys were still in Shanghai when the news of the Peking student movement was first published and was immediately arousing sympathetic responses from students and the general public all over the country.

When the Deweys arrived in Peking, they saw the student movement at its highest moments during the first days of June. Hundreds of students were making speeches in the streets, preaching to the people that China could regain her lost rights by boycotting Japanese goods. On June 5, the Deweys wrote to their daughters at home: 'This is Thursday morning, and last night we heard that about a thousand students were arrested the day before. They had filled
the building of Law [of the National Peking University, used as a temporary 'prison'], and have begun on the Science building.'

Later, on the same day, they reported the most astonishing news: 'In the evening, a telephone call came that the tents [of the soldiers] around the university buildings where the students were imprisoned had been struck and the soldiers were leaving. Then the students inside held a meeting and passed a resolution asking the government whether they were guaranteed freedom of speech, because if they were not, they would not leave the building merely to be arrested again, as they planned to go on speaking. So they embarrassed the government by remaining in 'jail' all night.'

The Deweys later explained that the government's ignominious surrender was due to the fact that the merchants in Shanghai had called a strike the day before as a protest against the arrest of the thousand students. And they remarked: 'This is a strange country. The so-called republic is a joke... But in some ways there is more democracy than we have. Leaving out the women, there is complete social equality. And while the legislature is a perfect farce, public opinion, when it does express itself, as at the present time, has remarkable influence.'

On June 16, the Deweys wrote home that the three pro-Japanese high officials (including the Minister of Foreign Affairs) had resigned from the government, and the students' strike had been called off.

On July 2, they wrote home: 'The anxiety here is tense. The report is that the [Chinese] Delegates did not sign [the Peace Treaty].' Two days later, they wrote: 'You can't imagine what it means here for China not to have signed [the Peace Treaty]. The entire government had been for it. The President up to ten days before the signing said it was necessary [to sign]. It was a victory for public opinion, and all set going by these little schoolboys and girls.'

I have quoted these letters to show a part of the first impressions Dr. and Mrs. Dewey had during their first two or three months in Peking. Somehow, this 'strange country' had a strange appeal to them. They decided to stay on, for a year at first, and finally for two years and two months. They visited 11 of the 22 provinces—4 provinces in the North, 5 in Central China, from Shanghai to Changsha, and 2 in the South.

A word may be said about the preparations made for the reception of Dewey's lectures. A month before his arrival in China, I was asked by the sponsoring organizations to give a series of four lectures on the Pragmatic Movement, beginning with Charles S. Peirce and William James, but with special emphasis on Dewey. A series of articles on Dewey's educational philosophy was published in Shanghai under the editorship of Dr. Chiang Monlin, one of his students in Teachers' College at Columbia.

A number of Dewey's students were asked to interpret his lectures in the Chinese language. For example, I was his translator and interpreter for all his lectures in Peking and in the provinces of Shantung and Shansi. For his several major series of lectures, we also selected competent recorders for recording every lecture in full for the daily newspapers and periodicals. What came to be known as 'Dewey's Five Major Series of Lectures' in Peking, totaling 58 lectures, were recorded and reported in full and later published in book form, going through ten large reprints before Dewey left China in 1921, and continuing to be reprinted for three decades until the communists put a stop to them.

The topics of the Five Series will give some idea of the scope and content of Dewey's lectures:

I. 3 lectures on Modern Tendencies in Education
II. 16 lectures on Social and Political Philosophy
III. 16 lectures on Philosophy of Education
IV. 15 lectures on Ethics
V. 8 lectures on Types of Thinking
His lectures in Peking included two other series:
VI. 3 lectures on Democratic Developments in America
VII. 3 lectures on Three Philosophers of the Modern Period (William James, Henri Bergson, Bertrand Russell—these lectures were given at special request as an introduction to Russell before the latter's arrival in China in 1920 to deliver a number of lectures.)

Dewey's lectures in Nanking included these series:
1. 10 lectures on the Philosophy of Education
2. 10 lectures on the History of Philosophy
3. 3 lectures on Experimental Logic

Typing on his own typewriter, Dewey always wrote out his brief notes for every lecture, a copy of which would be given to his interpreter so that he could study them and think out the suitable Chinese words and phrases before the lecture and its translation. After each lecture in Peking, the Dewey notes were given to the selected recorders, so that they could check their reports before publication. I have recently re-read most of his lectures in Chinese translation after a lapse of 40 years, and I could still feel the freshness and earnestness of the great thinker and teacher who always measured every word and every sentence in the classroom or before a large lecture audience.

After one year of public lectures in many cities, Dewey was persuaded by his Chinese friends to spend another year in China, primarily as a Visiting Professor at the National Peking University, lecturing and discussing with advanced students without the aid of an interpreter, and devoting a part of his time to lectures at the Teachers’ College in Peking and in Nanking. He was interested in the few ‘experimental schools’ which had been established by his former students in various educational centers, such as Peking, Nanking, Soochow, and Shanghai. Some of the schools, such as the one at the Teachers’ College in Nanking, were named Dewey schools.

The Deweys left China in 1921. In October, 1922, the National Educational Association met in Tsinan to discuss a thorough revision of the national 4 school system and curriculum. Article 4 of the New Educational System of 1922 reads: ‘The child is the center of education. Special attention should be paid to the individual characteristics and aptitudes of the child in organizing the school system. Henceforth, the elective system should be adopted for secondary and higher education, and the principle of flexibility should be adopted in the arrangement and promotion of classes in all elementary schools.’ In the new school curriculum of 1923 and the revised curriculum of 1929, the emphasis was placed on the idea that the child was the center of the school. The influence of Dewey’s educational philosophy is easily seen in these revisions.

Dewey went to China in May, 1919—forty years ago. Can we now give a rough estimate of his influence in China after the passing of forty years? Such an estimate has not been easy, because these forty years have been mostly years of great disturbance, of civil wars, revolutions, and foreign wars—including the years of the Nationalist Revolution, the eight years of the Japanese War and the Second World War, the years of the communist wars, and the communist conquest of the Chinese mainland. It is exceedingly difficult to say how much influence any thinker or any school of thought has had on a people that has suffered so much from the tribulations of war, revolution, exile, mass migration, and general insecurity and deprivation.

In our present case, however, the Chinese communist regime has given us unexpected assistance in the form of nationwide critical condemnation and purging of the Pragmatic philosophy of Dewey and of his Chinese followers. This great purge began as early as 1950 in a number of inspired but rather mild articles criticizing Dewey’s educational theories, and citing American critics such as Kandel, Bode, Rugg, and Hook in support of their criticism. But the purge became truly violent in 1954 and 1955, when the Chinese communist regime ordered a concerted condemnation and purge of the evil and poisonous thoughts of Hu Shih in many aspects of Chinese intellectual activity—in philosophy, in history, in the history of philosophy, in political thought, in literature, and in histories of Chinese literature. In those two years of 1954 and 1955, more than three million words were published for the purging and exorcising of the ‘ghost of Hu Shih’. And in almost every violent attack on me, Dewey was inevitably dragged in as a source and as the fountainhead of the heinous poison.

And in most of the articles of this vast purge literature, there was a frank recognition of the evil influence of Dewey, Dewey’s philosophy and method, and the application of that philosophy and method by that ‘rotten and smelly’ Chinese Deweyan, Hu Shih, and his slavish followers. May we not accept such confessions from the communist-controlled world as fairly reliable, though probably slightly exaggerated, estimates of the ‘poisonous’ influence left by
Dewey and his friends in China?
I quote only a few of these confessions from Red China:
1. 'If we want to criticize the old theories of education, we must begin with Dewey. The
educational ideas of Dewey have dominated and controlled Chinese education for thirty years,
and his social philosophy and his general philosophy have also influenced a part of the
Chinese people'. (The People's Education, October, 1950).
2. 'How was Dewey's poisonous Pragmatic educational philosophy spread over China? It was
spread primarily through his lectures in China preaching his Pragmatic philosophy and his
reactionary educational ideas, and through that center of Dewey's reactionary thinking,
namely, Columbia University, from which thousands of Chinese students, for over thirty
years, have brought back all the reactionary, subjective-idealistic, Pragmatic educational ideas
of Dewey, ... As one who has been most deeply poisoned by his reactionary educ¬cational
ideas, as one who has worked hardest and longest to help spread his educational ideas, I now
publicly accuse that great fraud and deceiver in the modern history of education, John Dewey!
(By Ch'en Ho-ch'in, one of the great educators of the Dewey school, who was responsible
for the moderniza-tion of the Shanghai schools, who was ordered to make this public
accusation in February, 1955. It was published in the Wenhui Pao, February 28, 1955.)
3. 'The battlefield of the study of Chinese literature has, for over thirty years, been occupied
by the representative of bourgeoís idealism [that is, Pragmatism], namely, Hu Shih, and his
school. Even years after the 'Libera-tion' when the intellectual circles have supposedly
acknowledged the leader¬ship position of Marxism, the evil influence of that school has not
yet received the purge it rightly deserves'. (The People's Daily, the official organ of the
4. 'The poison of the philosophical ideas of Pragmatism [as represented by Hu Shih] has not
only infiltrated the field of the study of Chinese literature, but has also penetrated deep into
the fields of history, education, linguistics, and even the realm of natural science—of course,
the greatest evil effect has been in the field of philosophy'. (Kuang-ming Daily, of Peking,
These confessions should be sufficient to give us an idea of the extent of the evil influence of
Dewey and his followers and friends in China. According to these confessions, the Pragmatic
philosophy and method of Dewey and his Chinese friends have dominated Chinese education
for thirty years, and have infiltrated and dominated for over thirty years the fields of the study
of Chinese literature, linguistics, history, philosophy, and even the realm of natural science!
What is this Deweyan brand of Pragmatism or Experimentalism that is so much feared in
communist China as to deserve three million words of purge and condemnation?
As I examine this vast purge literature, I cannot help laughing heartily at all this fuss and fury.
After wading through literally millions of words of abuse, I find that what those Red masters
and slaves dread most and want to purge is only a philosophical theory of thinking which
Dewey had expounded in many of his logical studies and which he had made popular in his
little book, How We Think. According to this theory, thinking is not passive and slavish
deduction from unquestioned absolute truths, but an effective tool and method for resolving
doubt and overcoming difficulties in our daily life, in our active dealings with Nature and
man. Thinking, says Dewey, always begins with a situation of doubt and perplexity; it
proceeds with a search for facts and for possible suggestions or hypotheses for the resolution
of the initial difficulty; and it terminates in proving, testing, or verifying the selected
hypothesis by successfully and satisfactorily resolving the perplexing situation which had
challenged the mind to think. That's the Deweyan theory of think¬ing, which I have in the
last forty years tried to popularize by pointing out that that was an adequate analysis of the
method of science as well as an adequate analysis of the method of 'evidential investigation'
(k'ao-chü, k'ao- cheng), which the great Chinese classical scholars of the last three centuries
had been using so efficaciously and Fruitfully. That is the method of the dis¬ciplined
common sense of mankind: it is the essence of the method of science, consisting mainly in a
boldness in suggesting hypotheses, coupled with metic¬ulous care in seeking verification by
evidence or by experimentation.
Two corollaries from this conception of thinking stand out pre-eminently. First, the progress
of man and of society depends upon the patient and successful solution of real and concrete problems by means of the active use of the intelligence of man. 'Progress', says Dewey, is piecemeal. It is always a retail job, never wholesale.' That is anathema to all communists, who believe in total and cataclysmic revolution, which will bring about wholesale progress overnight.

The second corollary is equally anathema to the communists, namely, that, in this natural and orderly process of rational thinking, all doctrines and all theories are to be regarded, not as absolute truths, but only as tentative and suggestive hypotheses to be tested in use—only as tools and materials for aiding human intelligence, but never as unquestioned and unquestionable dogmas to stifle or stop thinking. Dewey said in his Peking lecture on moral education: 'Always cultivate an open mind. Always cultivate the habit of intellectual honesty. And always learn to be responsible for your own thinking.' That was enough to scare the Commies out of their wits, and enough to start years of violent attack and abuse on Dewey and Pragmatism and the 'ghost of Hu Shih'.

And the most amusing fact was that all those years of violent attack and all those millions of words of condemnation began in 1954 with a communist discussion of a popular Chinese novel of the eighteenth century entitled 'The Dream of the Red Chamber'. Why? Because nearly forty years ago I was tempted to apply the method of scientific research to a study of the authorship, the remarkable family background of the author, and the history of the evolution of the text of the novel. In the course of subsequent years, numerous hitherto-unknown materials were discovered and published by me, all of which have verified and strengthened my first researches. That was a conscious application of the Dewey theory of thinking to a subject-matter which was well known to every man and woman who could read at all. I have applied the same theory and method of thinking to several other Chinese novels, as well as to many difficult and forbidding problems of research in the fields of the history of Chinese thought and belief, including the history of Ch'an or Zen Buddhism.

But the best-known example or material with which I illustrated and popularized the Deweyan theory of thinking was the great novel 'The Dream of the Red Chamber'. Nearly thirty years ago (November, 1930), at the request of my publisher, I made an anthology of my Essays, in which I included three pieces on 'The Dream of the Red Chamber'. I wrote a preface to this anthology intended for younger readers. In my wicked moments, I wrote these words in introducing my three studies of that novel:

My young friends, do not regard these pieces on 'The Dream of the Red Chamber' as my efforts to teach you how to read a novel. These essays are only a few Examples or illustrations of a method of how to think and study. Through these simple essays, I want to convey to you a little bit of the scientific spirit, the scientific attitude of mind, and the scientific method. The scientific spirit lies in the search for facts and for truth. The scientific attitude of mind is a willingness to put aside our feelings and prejudices, a willingness to face facts and to follow evidence wherever it may lead us. And the scientific method is only 'a boldness to suggest hypotheses coupled with a meticulous care in seeking proof and verification'. When evidence is lacking or insufficient, there must be a willingness to suspend judgment. A conclusion is valid only when it is verified. Some Ch'an (Zen) monk of centuries ago said that Bodhidharma came all the way to China in search of a man who would not be deceived by man. In these essays, I, too, wish to present a method of how not to be deceived by men. To be led by the nose by a Confucius or a Chu Hsi is not highly commendable. But to be led by the nose by a Marx, a Lenin, or a Stalin is also not quite becoming a man. I have no desire to lead anybody by the nose: I only wish to convey to my young friends my humble hope that they may learn a little intellectual skill for their own self-protection and endeavor to be, men who cannot be deceived by others.

These words, I said then, were penned with infinite love and infinite hope. For these words, I have brought upon my head and the head of my beloved teacher and friend, John Dewey, years of violent attack and millions of words of abuse and condemnation. But, ladies and gentlemen, these same millions of words of abuse and condemnation have given me a feeling of comfort and encouragement—a feeling that Dewey's two years and two months in China were not entirely in vain, that my forty years of humble effort in my own country have not
been entirely in vain, and that Dewey and his students have left in China plenty of 'poison', plenty of antiseptic and antitoxin, to plague the Marxist-Leninist slaves for many, many years to come. [DewJ6]

1964

He, Minlin. Duwei jiao yu xue shuo dai yu wo guo dang qian jiao yu zhi ying xiang. [The influence of Dewey's theory of teaching method and subject matter upon Chinese education]. [ID D28583].

John Dewey was a reformer and a foreign philosopher; his educational theory has had a tremendous influence upon Chinese education. Dewey lectured in China between 1919 and 1921 during which time he made a great many constructive suggestions to the existing Chinese educational system and curriculum. Even the present educational system was established also directly or indirectly under his influence. In spite of the fact that his prestige has been rapidly reduced in America, his philosophy of education and his way of thinking are still worthy to study. [DewJ74]

1980-1992

John Dewey and Tao Xingzhi.

Contemporary Chinese scholars hold three different views regarding the relationship between Tao Xingzhi and John Dewey's educational ideas. Some believe that Tao's educational theory is a direct product of Dewey's pragmatic philosophy and that Tao only made certain nonessential changes to adapt Dewey's theories to the Chinese conditions. A second school of thought maintains that there are essential differences between Tao and Dewey: Dewey's ideas belong to the old democratic pragmatism in capitalist societies while Tao's ideas belong to the new democratic culture in socialist countries; Dewey's education serves the young students in schools while Tao's education serves people of all ages, especially those from poor, ordinary, and rural families. Dewey's purpose of education is to produce a labor force that serves bourgeois interests whereas Tao's purpose of education is to enlighten the oppressed and exploited masses of working people so that they become masters of their own fate and serve the interests of the common people; and Dewey's educational methods try to make school imitate society and education imitate life whereas Tao's educational methods help students live the real life in the real, larger society.

Many Chinese scholars argue that Tao's educational ideas originate from Dewey but they are better developed and more suitable for Chinese educational practice. They maintain that Tao creatively and critically adapted Dewey's educational ideas to Chinese education and successfully used education as an instrument in the Chinese people's anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist struggle, which has far more significant meaning than Dewey's promotion of education as an instrument in an individual student's adaptation to the immediate environment. Their interpretation of Dewey's views on the relationship among the individual, the school, and the society is narrow and misconceptualized, but the important thing is that they have affirmed the positive and powerful influence of Dewey on Tao's ideas. [DewJ220]

1982

Second annual meeting of the Chinese Society for the Study of Educational History. They opened special panels on John Dewey and received enthusiastic responses from nay scholars. They proposed that the study of Dewey's educational theory should be conducted with a liberated mind and result in an honest, matter-of-fact evaluation. [DewJ205]

1983


"John Dewey is a reactionary in his political ideology and class position, but he is also a respectable scholar and thinker because of his lifetime efforts, his intelligence, and his achievements. Dewey's ideas are products of a special era and a special society." [DewJ205]

1983


文教論評存稿

"No other western educator has wielded quite as much influence on education in China as John Dewey and his pragmatism". [DewJ185]

Jiang, Meng and Zhao observe that by putting emphasis on education as life and growth rather than as the preparation for life, Dewey did not dispute the importance of preparation. Rather, he meant that only through meaningful activities in the process of education can one be prepared for life, in the real sense of the word. Despite these positive interpretations, Dewey's theory on educational goals still receives strong political criticism from some Chinese scholars, who charge that Dewey's real educational purpose is to serve the interests and needs of the bourgeoisie and monopoly capitalists in the United States. [DewJ205]

Zhang, Fakun. "Chuan tong jiao yu" yu "xian dai jiao yu" de yi xing chu yi [ID D28689].
"The Chinese educators will not totally abandon their established educational system, but they now see the necessity of incorporating the useful elements from Western education, including Dewey's ideas, into the Chinese system. They will avoid going to either extreme - 'traditional education', as represented by Confucian and Herbart's educational theories, or 'modern education', as represented by Dewey and his advocates in China." [DewJ205]
Knowledge for John Dewey was the result of inquiry utilizing the scientific method. The individual attainment of this knowledge, then, is contingent upon that person's 'active' and methodological search for it. Dewey faced a child-centered, activity-oriented process of education and considered it essential that school and society become one. In order to analyze the position of pragmatism and Dewey's education thought in the Chinese educational debate during the 1980s, several types of sources have been examined. Chinese educational journals, and monographs dealing specifically with Western educational theories. Much of what is written about pragmatism and Dewey was heavily influenced by Dewey's prominent historical role in China, and as such subject to ideological colorations that Chinese accounts of other educational theories did not suffer from.

Under the entry of 'Pragmatism' in the encyclopedia, we find it described as an 'important school in Western modern capitalist educational thought'. Its central ideas are equated with those of Dewey, and most of the entry concentrates on his work. He is termed an 'idealistic empiricist' because he considered experience to be the basic unit of the world, though it remains unclear precisely why he is labeled an idealist; his pragmatic emphasis on experience as the product of interaction between an organism and its environment and as the central criteria for knowledge make it difficult to understand this categorization. One author attempted to explain why Dewey's thought was labeled idealistic: he stated that it is because Dewey 'brings the mind into the natural system, attaching great importance to the role of knowledge and regards the result as natural evolution.

The entry goes on to cite some of Dewey's most prominent contributions to educational theory, namely his criticism of Herbart's formalistic, 'teacher-centered' educational thought and consequent emphasis on developing educational techniques and materials appropriate and relevant to a child's age and experience, his re-thinking of teacher-student relations with stress being placed on cooperation rather than confrontation, and finally his radically new conception of education's role in society. The entry concludes with a brief criticism of Dewey's attack on Marx's class-struggle theory and his advocacy of the use of the 'intelligent method' to solve social problems as well. A common point made by all the authors was Dewey's close attachment not only to the United States as his homeland but also to the period of great economic and social change in which he wrote. They pointed out the importance of the immense progress made in industrialization and capital accumulation during this period as opposed to the continuing stagnancy of the educational sector. They considered Dewey's thought to be the logical reaction to this state of affairs. The schools were no longer fulfilling the needs of society (the capitalists), ergo reform was needs. Dewey's educational theories were seen as serving the interests of the ruling bourgeoisie. His emphasis on developing individuality in the child was regarded as antithetical to the nurturing of communist morality, but a necessary ingredient of a capitalist system based on mutual competition. Dewey was attacked by several of the writers for attempting to conceal class differences and thus prevent class contradictions from becoming visible through a drowning diffusion of his concept of 'democracy'. By pitting individuals against each other on the economic market, and by giving them a false sense of political power, Dewey was accused of perpetuating the capitalist system and serving the interests of the oppressing class.

Another related criticism shared by the majority of the Chinese writers was that Dewey disregarded the importance of the productive forces in determining social and economic relations which in turn delimit social consciousness. Norms, values and even ideals of the people are, according to the Chinese Marxists, inescapably tied to the fundamental economic production forms of a given society. Dewey was accused of ignoring the existing socio-economic context in which education takes place, making his 'social reform' in effect unattainable. In addition his learning theories themselves were criticized for not taking into account social relations within the classroom; these relations were called in Deweyan terms by the Chinese 'indirect experience' and were considered an important part of a child's intellectual baggage. [DewJ147:S. 304-306]
Shi, Weiping. *Guan yu Duwei jiao yu mu di de hong guan fen xi* [ID D28691].
Shi Weiping points out that the conclusion drawn in the 1950s of John Dewey's theory of educational purpose was too simplistic, subjective, and unfair. He cites different arguments from Dewey's own works to demonstrate that as a pragmatist, Dewey firmly believes in the role of education as a means of social reform for a democracy; thus he has a very clear social goal for education. [DewJ205]

Wu, Yuanxun. *Shi ping duwei de "cong zuo zhong xue"* [ID D28692].
"We do not want children to learn by doing, but we do not oppose children's participation in practice. We can experiment with different structures of curriculum to create conditions for children to apply what they learn in practice." [DewJ205]

Fu, Tongxian; Zhang, Wenyu. *Jiao yu zhe xue* [ID D28693].
Fu Tongxian recognizes the worthy elements in John Dewey's theory: "Dewey tried to remind us that the purpose of education must conform to the development of the child, and must not be disconnected from the child's experiences and needs. Otherwise, education cannot reach any of its goals nor produce effective results. We feel that he is right on that point." [DewJ205]

Tao Xingzhi and John Dewey were one of the major research topics by the China Society for the Study of Tao Xingzhi. [DewJ220]

Zhang, Yong. *Duwei jiao yu li lun zhong de bian zheng fa* [ID D28694].
Zhang concurs with Shi Weiping and concludes that John Dewey has a strong focus on the society in his discussion on creating a balance between individual growth and social development in the educational process. Zhang further quotes from Dewey's lectures in China, which offered explicit warning to Chinese educators against education without a purpose. Zhang observes that Dewey dialectically and appropriately handled the relationship between the child, the teaching materials, and the curriculum, and this is a significant contribution to education: "If we say that Marx creatively applied dialects to the study of political, social and economic issues, we have to admit that Dewey's contribution is as great as Marx's when he applied dialectics to the study of educational problems". [DewJ205]

Huang, Jiande. *Xi fang zhe xue dong jian shi : 1840-1949*. [ID D17438].
"John Dewey's influence has two sides: The negative and the positive. The negative influence is traced in his preference for social reform to Marxism, while the positive derives from his advocacy of pragmatism, new educational philosophy, and democracy. These ideas oppose dogmatism, and stress reflective thinking, drawing on spirits of practicality and innovation formed during America's pioneering years. Dewey conveyed to Chinese listeners American style characterized by pioneer spirit and determination to succeed, which are concurrent with the spirit of 'science' and 'democracy' that many Chinese intellectuals were promoting at this time." [DewJ200]

"In the mid-fifties, dominated by the leftist political ideological line, a large-scale movement was launched in order to criticize pragmatism. This wave of critique mainly aimed to serve certain political purposes; as a result, most critics divorced themselves from Dewey's pragmatism itself. Henceforth, the leftist political criterion dominated the academic criticism of Dewey and other western philosophers, resulting in oversimplified negation taking the place of objective and concrete analysis. As a result, the real image of Dewey and other western scholars as well as their theories was often twisted. Actually, the fundamental feature of Dewey's philosophy lies in its opposition against dualism, stressing that the world that man confronts, lives in and regards as the object of cognition, is the world in man's view (experience) that has been acted upon and reconstructed (humanized) instead of the world per se that exists outside of man." [DewJ181]
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今日四大思想家信仰之自述

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1822-1882 Ralph Waldo Emerson und China : Allgemein

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Ansom Burlingame

Senator Charles Sumner sent Emerson Senate documents on Chinese correspondence.
Sekundärliteratur

1930
Frederic Ives Carpenter: Chinese literature and Buddhism were the only two Oriental systems which Emerson did not wholly welcome. Buddhism epitomized for him the quietism of the East, and its passiveness. Chinese literature epitomized its formalism, and its lack of the progressive element.

1932
Arthur Christy: The tie that bound Emerson to Confucius was their common belief in the goodness of man. When the responsibilities of manhood were on his shoulders and when he faced economic necessities, he found, after browsing among his books, that Confucius could speak to his condition. The simplest exposition of further influence from the reading of the Confucian books is the most significant instances in the essays in which Confucian thought is apparent. Confucius gave Emerson moral corroboration of his observations on men – not the universe.

1944
Chang Chi-yun: Emerson took the personality of Confucius as an example of human greatness. The great man was he who embodied in himself to the highest degree the virtue, the vital force of the universe. Emerson was one of the first American to take the trouble to acquaint himself with the thought and civilization of the East. His interest in Chinese literature remained constant; and so, to a high degree, he qualified himself to be the announcer and the interpreter of this 'New era'.

1956
Donald M. Murray: One of the more exotic facts about 19th-century American culture is that transcendental New England imported intellectual cargoes from the Orient. Scholars have several times weighed and gauged this philosophical freight, and Emerson received and assimilated certain Confucian ideas. This interest continued over many years. There is a remarkable analogy between the structure of written Chinese and Emerson's theory of language and poetry. The ideographs, as explained in the books of his own time, offer an illuminating parallel with the theories expressed in Nature and The poet. Emerson's belief in the special efficacy of words conveying hard, sharp images of things; his preference for words denoting the simple and even 'mean' objects of ordinary life; and his interest in compressed, succinct language, like that of proverbs.

1985
Chang Yao-hsin: Confucianism proved to be part of the inexhaustible source of human wisdom from which Emerson never tired of drawing. Another reason for Emerson's interest in Confucius is to be sought in the nature of his philosophy. He did not recognize the Chinese sage at once. He knew at first little or nothing about China and Confucius. The three points which Confucius made accord well with what Emerson was to say all his life, namely, the divine nature of man, the possibility of achieving perfection by being true to one's nature, and the important role of the great man in the culture of men in general. These are the areas where Confucius exerted some influence on Emerson.

1992
Qian Mansu: Although Confucianism, with its practical orientation, was not Emerson's favorite, He read the Confucian Four Books in several editions and quoted from them for
almost a hundred times in various speeches and writings. The part of Confucianism that he most willingly accepted was the attitude towards moral principles and self-cultivation. Emerson appreciated Confucius as an outstanding individual and rejected China as a nation. His criticism was quite representative of the prevalent Western image of China of the time: an ancient society caught in stagnation and self-complacency, unable to walk out of her own past. Emerson was most critical of China for her despotic system and her lack of individualism. Emerson's understanding of religion far outreached Christianity. Although he did not deny God, religion to him has nothing to do with a personified God – God of tradition or God of rhetoric, nor anything to do with church, or doctrines and rituals. His interest in Asia covers many fields, including the Indian Vedas, Hinduism, Menu, Zoroaster, Persian poetry, and Confucianism. For a long time, Emerson had no direct knowledge of Oriental philosophy. His idea of the Orient came mainly from impression and intuition. But with the maturity of his own philosophy, his prejudice relaxed and his vision broadened. Interest in the East was part of his search for new sources of ideas in order to draw inspiration and arguments to reinforce his newly-built system. A long time Confucius was the only Chinese philosopher Emerson was familiar with. Later Mencius became known to him. But Laozi and Zhuangzi were never mentioned by him. Self-reliance is Emerson's most important teaching. He found in Mencius a fellow exponent of the principle.

Chen, Li-jen: For Emerson, Confucius was the greatest thinker in Chinese history. Emerson clearly showed his respect and admiration for Confucius. He quoted the Sayings of Confucius and Mencius as illustrations of his ideas. He copied a passage from the Chinese Classics explaining well the action of Confucius into his Journals. [THD16:S. 124, 126, 129,Eme26,Eme29,Eme9,Eme30,Pou103:S. 53, 57,Eme7:S. 3-4, 66, 71, 78, 81, 180,Eme6]

1822-1894 Ralph Waldo Emerson and China. [Primärliteratur].

Wide world 3

If divine Providence shall always mix the fates of man, if good & evil must ever encamp (together) side by side then Europe must decline as Asia rises & Civilization will not be propagated but only transferred. Travellers, those missionaries of science & scholars of Observation, have in the case of China rather added to the marvel than otherwise; a case unusual... Our forefathers believed that the East was a great empire whose simple political institutions had a recorded antiquity (trip) at least triple the (poetical) fabled period of any other; that this nation augmented its territory with its age, incorporating all it took by the inherent virtues of its policy; that by reason of its perfect adaptation to human wants the paternal yoke of the government embraced the densest population in the world; that this population had for ages enjoyed all the great inventions that had recently been imparted to Europe as the Compass, the Press, & Gunpowder, that it was possessed of science unknown in Europe & that the peasants of this sunny land lived in greater luxury than the privileged order in the Western nations. This plausible tale is true in the particular but false on the whole. The Celestial Empire, - hang the Celestial Empire! I hate Pekin. I will not drink of the waters of the Yellow Sea. Exorciso tea, celestissime, even tea. One is apt to mix up an idea of the productions of a nation in our opinion of the producers, & Tea the insignificant sop of an herb, wholly a luxury in the West, the frivolous employment of millions in the making & tens of millions in the drinking is a fit representative of China. It is useful to know the (productions) state of man in circumstances widely dissimilar. It is a help to an inference concerning our progress. 'This like getting two angles to compute a third. But I hate China. 'Tis a tawdry vase. Out upon China. Words! Words. -
We judge of the value of every portion of history by its usefulness in application to our own and other times. Can we learn from the greatness, or the disasters it recounts, how to mould our own governments, in order to ensure the benefits and avoid the faults of the nation we see? – then the history is valuable. But the annals of the Chinese monarchy could be of little comparative advantage to the European Statesman; certainly of much less, than those of the ancient European dynasties. Exactly the opposite of the great Asiatic anomaly, is Italy. I cannot accurately judge of the Chronicles of China since they are little accessible to many, and less so, to me; but from the vague knowledge we possess of that empire, and from our minute acquaintance with Italian history, we may learn this; that both are insupportably tedious from different causes.

But in China, as in Venice, will faction & cabal always watch to check the continuance of every administration, good or bad?

But private life hath more delicate varieties, which differ in unlike circumstances; and the barbarian in his tent by the Rhine, the Tartar burrowing in the ground, the Spartan in the humble house of the Republic, the Roman in the luxurious palace of the Emperors, the Chinese in his floating house, & the Englishman in his comfortable tenement fill up the hours of the day with very different thoughts & different actions…

The theological notions of a Chinese are anomalous I trust in besotted perversity.

“In Friday ev.-g. Edward has just been home to say he has got a first prize for a Dissertation on China.” [Emerson, Edward. Antiquity, extent, cultivation, and present state of the Empire of China. In : Columbian centinel; July 10, 1824].

Indeed, the light of Confucius goes out in translation into the language of Shakespear [sic] & Bacon. The closer contemplation we condescend to bestow the more disgusting is that booby nation. The Chinese Empire enjoys precisely a Mummy's reputation, that of having preserved to a hair for 3 or 4,000 years the ugliest features in the world. I have no gift to see a meaning in the venerable vegetation of this extraordinary (nation) people. They are not tools for other nations to use. Even miserable Africa can say I have hewn the wood & drawn the water to promote the wealth & civilization of other lands. But, China, reverend dullness! hoary ideot!, all she can say at the convocation of nations must be – 'I made the tea'.
1830
Journal. De Gerando
I begin the *Histoire Comparée des Systèmes de Philosophie* par M. De Gérando.
The first distinction that is made is that of Material and Work: changes, not creation. First come the Cosmogonies. Indians, Chinese, Chaldeans, Egyptians, Phoenicians, Persians, have a striking sameness in them, but all these are an intellectual offspring; no utility, mere curiosity... The rule "Do as you would be done by" is found in the "Invariable Medium" of the Chinese, but thrown into the 3d paragraph of the 3d chap. So the Invariable Milieu begins with these promising definitions. "The order established by heaven is called Nature. What is conformed to nature is called Law, the establishment of law (in the mind?) is called Instruction."
(This Invariable Milieu M. Abel Remusat has translated into French in Tome II. Des Notices des manuscrits, 1818).

1830
Journal
And let him change the names, and read it in Chinese in a bazar at Pekin, and he will find it is pertinent still to the human mind. So much for the doctrine so much prosed over of pertinent preaching.

1833
Journal
Well, thou navigating muse of mine; 't is now the hour of Chinese inspiration, the post-tea-uptime...

1834
Journal
What more sensible than what they say of Mr. -, that he sells his splendid Chinese house and goes to live at Watertown because he cannot make a bow and pleasantly entertain the crowd of company that visit him.

1835
George Fox: lecture, delivered Febr. 26, 1835.
This alleged Light, or Conscience, or Spirit, takes different names in every new receiver, but its attributes are essentially the same. Zoroaster in Persia, Confucius in China, Orpheus in Greece, Numa in Italy, Manco Capac in Peru.

1835
Journal
As he taught, it seemed pleasant, the tie of principle that holds as brothers, all men, to that when a stranger comes to me from the other side the globe, Otaheitan or Chinese, to buy or sell with me, he shall have that measure from me as shall fill his mind with pleasant conviction that he has dealt with a fellow man in the deepest and dearest sense.

1835
Journal
Give me one single man, and uncover for me his pleasures and pains, let me minutely and in the timbers and ground-plan study his architecture, and you may travel all round the world and visit the Chinese, the Malay, the Esquimaux and the Arab.
1835-1837
1835 ? 1837 ? Date ?
Silence is absolutely necessary to the wise man. Great speeches, elaborate discourses, pieces of eloquence ought to be a language unknown to him; his actions ought to be his language. As for me, I would never speak more. Heaven speaks; but what language does it use to preach to men that there is a sovereign principle (which makes them to act & move) from which all things depend; a sovereign principle which makes them to act & move? Its motion is its language; it reduces the seasons to their time; it agitates nature; it makes it produce. This silence is eloquence. Confucius.

1836
Chap. 4. Language
1. Words are signs of natural facts.
2. Particular natural facts are symbols of particular spiritual facts.
3. Nature is the symbol of spirit.

1836
Journal
This is the effervescence & result of all religions. This is what remains at the core of each when all forms are taken away. This is the Law of Laws, Vedas, Zoroaster, Koran, Golden Verses of Pythagoras, Bible, Confucius.

1837
Journal
I read with great content the August number of the Asiatic journal. Herein is always the piquancy of the meeting of civilization and barbarism. Calcutta or Canton are twilights were Night and Day contend. A very good paper is the narrative of Lord Napier's mission to China... There stand in close contrast the brief, wise English despatches, with the mountainous nonsense of Chinese diplomacy.

1838
Journal
Anna comes now into the world a slave, he comes saddled with twenty or forty centuries. Asia has arrearages & Egypt arrearages; not to mention all the subsequent history of Europe & America.

1838
Divinity School address : delivered before the senior class in Divinity College, Cambridge, Sunday Evening, July 15, 1838
The sentences of the oldest time, which ejaculate this piety, are still fresh and fragrant. This thought dwelt always deepest in the minds of men in the devout and contemplative East; not alone in Palestine, where it reached its purest expression, but in Egypt, in Persia, in India, in China. Europe has always owed to oriental genius, its divine impulses.

1838
War : delivered in March, 1838 in Boston.
It weaned the Scythians and Persians from some cruel and licentious practices, to a more civil way of life. It introduced the sacredness of marriage among them. It built seventy cities, and sowed the Greek customs and humane laws over Asia, and united hostile nations under one code.

1838
Literary ethics : an oration delivered before the Literary Societies of Dartmouth College, July 24, 1838.
What else are churches, literatures, and empires? The new man must feel that he is new, and has not come into the world mortgaged to the opinions and usages of Europe, and Asia, and Egypt.
1838
The heart : lecture delivered at the Masonic Temple, Boson, Jan. 3, 1838.
"When a daughter is born," said the Chinese Sheking, "she sleeps on the ground ; she is
clothed with a wrapper ; she plays with a tile ; she is incapable either of evil or of good." [Shi
jing].

1838
Journal
The heart of Christianity is the heart of all philosophy. It is the sentiment of piety which Stoic &
Chinese, Mahometan & Hindoo labor to awaken.

1838
Journal
In order to present the bare idea of virtue, it is necessary that we should go quite out of our
circumstance & custom, else it will be instantly confounded with the poor decency &
inanition, the poor ghost that wears its name in good society. Therefore it is that we fly to the
pagans & use the name & relations of Socrates, of Confucius, Menu, Zoroaster ; not that these
are better or as good as Jesus & Paul, but because th3ey are good algebraic terms not liable, to
confusion of thought like those we habitually use.

1838
Letter, Oct. 1838, discussed the religious literature of Germany and Chinese writing.

1838
Journal
The only speech will at last be action, such as Confucius describes the speech of God.

1838-1842
Early lectures, vol. 3 (1838-1842).
I may even say that not only in idea of the race but in actual history the emerging of each rare
individual of a finished man always speaks to us a language of admonition & Hope. That
wonderful sympathy & attraction which we find in each great man by which we prefer one
eminent individual to nations of Chinese & Indians what does it say but this that we have n
inextinguishable conviction that the powers which he was permitted to unfold he folded in us.

1840
Thoughts on modern literature. In : Dial ; vol. 1, no 2 (Oct. 1840).
When one of these grand monads is incarnated whom Nature seems to design for eternal men
and draw to her bosom, we think that the old weariness of Europe and Asia, the trivial forms
of daily life will now end, and a new morning break on us all.
Of the perception now fast becoming a conscious fact, — that there is One Mind, and that all
the powers and privileges which lie in any, lie in all; that I as a man may claim and
appropriate whatever of true or fair or good or strong has anywhere been exhibited; that
Moses and Confucius, Montaigne and Leibnitz are not so much individuals as they are parts
of man and parts of me, and my intelligence proves them my own, — literature is far the best
expression.

1840
Journal
What is the State ?
The Hero is the State :
The Soul should legislate,
Postponing still the measure to the man ;
One sage outweighs all China and Japan.

I. History
The Chinese pagoda is plainly a Tartar tent. The Indian and Egyptian temples still betray the mounds and subterranean houses of their forefathers…
I believe in Eternity. I can find Greece, Asia, Italy, Spain, and the Islands, -- the genius and creative principle of each and of all eras in my own mind.

IV. Spiritual laws
It is a Chinese wall which any nimble Tartar can leap over. It is a standing army, not so good as a peace. It is a graduated, titled, richly appointed empire, quite superfluous when town-meetings are found to answer just as well.
Can a cook, a Chiffinch, an Iachimo be mistaken for Zeno or Paul? Confucius exclaimed, -- "How can a man be concealed! How can a man be concealed!"

VIII. Heroism
The first step of worthiness will be to disabuse us of our superstitious associations with places and times, with number and size. Why should these words, Athenian, Roman, Asia, and England, so tingle in the ear? Where the heart is, there the muses, there the gods sojourn, and not in any geography of fame.

XII. Art
Now that which is inevitable in the work has a higher charm than individual talent can ever give, inasmuch as the artist's pen or chisel seems to have been held and guided by a gigantic hand to inscribe a line in the history of the human race. This circumstance gives a value to the Egyptian hieroglyphics, to the Indian, Chinese, and Mexican idols, however gross and shapeless.

Journal
Confucius/Chinese classic : Hea Lun being just one of the many subsections into which Collie's work is divided. With his increasing acquaintance with Confucianism, he saw more wisdom and greatness in the Chinese philosopher. Confucius found himself secure in his position as one of the ethical and contemplative geniuses of the Orient whose all-embracing apophthegms are like the profound moments of heavenly life.

Journal
Chang Tsoo & Kee Neih retired from the state to the fields on account of misrule & showed their displeasure at Confucius who remained in the world. Confucius sighed & said ; 'I cannot associate with birds & beasts. If I follow not men whom shall I follow ? If the world were in possession of right principles, I should not seek to change it'.

Journal
I find an analogy also in the Asiatic sentences to this fact of life. The Oriental genius has no dramatic or epic turn, but ethical, contemplative, delights in Zoroastrian oracles, in Vedas, & Menu & Confucius. These embracing apophthegms are like these profound moments of the heavenly life.

Journal
All your learning of all literatures and states of society, Platonistic, Calvinistic, English or Chinese, would never enable you to anticipate one thought or expression.

The Conservative : a lecture delivered at the Masonic Temple, Boston, December 9, 1841. I understand well the respect of mankind for war, because that breaks up the Chinese stagnation of society, and demonstrates the personal merits of all men.
Man the reformer: a lecture read before the Mechanics' Apprentices' Library Association, Boston, January 25, 1841.
The women fought like men, and conquered the Roman men. They were miserably equipped, miserably fed. They were Temperance troops. There was neither brandy nor flesh needed to feed them. They conquered Asia, and Africa, and Spain, on barley.

The transcendentalist: a lecture read at the Masonic Temple, Boston, Jan. 1842.
The oriental mind has always tended to this largeness. Buddhism is an expression of it. The Buddhist who thanks no man, who says, "do not flatter your benefactors," but who, in his conviction that every good deed can by no possibility escape its reward, will not deceive the benefactor by pretending that he has done more than he should, is a Transcendentalist.

Journal
Naming, yes, that is the office of the newspapers of the world, these famous editors from Moses, Homer, Confucius, and so on, down to Goethe and Kant: the y name what the people already done, and the thankful people say, "Doctor, 't is a great comfort to know the disease whereof I die".
1843
Journal: The reformer (after the Chinese).
Emerson supped up the Confucian idea into two paragraphs:

There is a class whom I call the thieves of virtue. They are those who mock the simple & sincere endeavourers after a better way of life, & say, these are pompous talkers; but when they come to act, they are weak, nor do they regard what they have said. These mockers are continually appealing to the ancients. And they say, Why make ourselves singular? Let those who are born in this age, act as men of this age. – Thus they secretly obtain the flattery of the age.
The inhabitants of the village & of the city, all praise them. Wherever they go they are attentive & generous. If you would blame them, there is nothing to lay hold of. They accord with prevailing customs & unite with a polluted age. They appear faithful & sincere, & act as if sober & pure. The multitude all delight in them but they confuse virtue.

Chinese reformer.
Chin Seang praised Heu Tsze to Mencius as a prince who taught and exemplified a righteous life. A truly virtuous prince, he added, will plough along with his people, and while he rules will cook his own food.

Mencius. Does Heu Tsze sow the grain which he eats? Seang. Yes.
M. Does Heu Tsze weave cloth and then wear it?
S. No: Heu Tsze wears coarse hair-cloth.
M. Does Heu Tsze wear a cap?
S. Yes.
M. What sort of a cap?
S. A coarse cap.
M. Does he make it himself?
S. No: he gives grain in exchange for it.
M. Why doesn't he make it himself?
S. It would be injurious to his farming.
M. Does he use earthenware in cooking his victuals, or iron utensils in tilling his farm?
S. Yes.
M. Does he make them himself?
S. No, he gives grain in barter for them.
M. Why does not Heu Tsze act the potter, and take everything from his own shop he wants to use? Why should he be in the confused bustle exchanging articles with the mechanics? He is not afraid of labor, surely?
S. The work of the mechanic and that of the husbandman ought not to be united.
M. Oh, then the government of the Empire and the labor of the husbandman are the only employments that ought to be united. Were every man to do all kinds of work, it would be necessary that he should first make his implements, and then use them: thus all men would constantly crowd the roads. Some men labor with their minds, and some with bodily strength. Those who labor with their strength are ruled by men. Those who are governed by others, feed others. This is a general rule under the whole heavens. [The Chinese Classical Work…, 1828, “Shang Mung”, pp. 78-79].

Mencius proceeds to instance Yu, who, after the deluge, was eight years abroad directing the opening of channels to let off the inundation into the sea, and the burning of forests and marshes to clear the land of beasts of prey, so that he had no time to go home even, but passed his own door repeatedly without entering; and asks if he had leisure for husbandry, if he had been inclined? Yu and Shun employed their whole minds in governing the Empire, yet they did not plough the fields.
The antagonist urges again the leveling principles of Tsze, - saying that if these were followed, there would not be two market prices, nor any deceit in the country. Cloth of the same length would be of the same price. &c &c. Mencius replies; Things are naturally unequal in value.
Afterwards the defender of Tsze adduces for praise the (ex) behavior of Chung as an example of moderation (the highest virtue).

Was not, he says Chin Chung Tsze a moderate scholar? When in Ling, he was three days without food, till his ear heard not, nor did his eye see. On the side of the well was a Le (a sort of plum), which the Tsau had more than half eaten: he crawled to it, attempted to eat it, & after three efforts, managed to swallow it, after which his ear heard & his eye saw.

Mencius replied: I must consider Chung as chief among the scholar of Tsze, but I cannot deem him moderate. Were he to act up to his own principles, he ought to become an earthworm. Then he might be considered moderate. The worm above eats dry earth, & below, drinks muddy water. Was the house which Chung lived in built by Pih E (a sage) or by Taou Chih, (a robber some say)? Was the grain he sown by Pih E. or by Taou Chih? This he could not know.

What (injury) harm can be in that? said the other. He made shoes, & his wife prepared hemp, & gave these in exchange for food.

Chung's brother had ten thousand chung of salary. He deemed it unjust, & would not eat of it. He considered his brother's house unjust, & would not live in it. He avoided his (mother) brother, left his mother, & dwelt in Woo Ling. Having afterwards returned, some one presented a live goose to his brother, on seeing which he gathered up his brows, & said, Why use that crackling thing? Another day his mother killed this same goose, & gave it him to eat. His brother happening to come in, said, 'You are eating the flesh of that cackling thing'. On which he went out, & spewed out what he had eaten. Had he become an earthworm, then would he have acted up to his own tenets?

Yang taught that we should love ourselves only,
Mih taught that we should love all men alike.
Confucius taught the law of the Golden Mean,
Tsze taught not to be dependent on any other.

1843
Letter to Margaret Fuller, June 1843.
I have the best of Chinese Confucian books lately, an octavo published at Malacca, in English. Much of it is the old Confucius more fully rendered; but the book of Mencius is fully new to me, and in its quiet sunshine a dangerous foil to Carlyle's stormlights.

1843
Journal
There is nothing in history to parallel the influence of Jesus Christ. The Chinese books say of Wen Wang on of their kings "From the west from the east from the south from the north there was not one thought not brought in subjection to him". This can be more truly said of Jesus than of any mortal.

1843
Journal.
The Chinese are as wonderful for their etiquette as the Hebrews for their piety.

1843
Journal
My Chinese book does not forget to record of Confucius, that his nightgown was one length and a half of his body.

1843
Journal
Chinese reformer; Mencius; Gonzalo's Kingdom.
II. Experience

The Chinese Mencius has not been the least successful in his generalization. "I fully understand language," he said, "and nourish well my vast-flowing vigor." -- "I beg to ask what you call vast-flowing vigor?" -- said his companion. "The explanation," replied Mencius, "is difficult. This vigor is supremely great, and in the highest degree unbending. Nourish it correctly, and do it no injury, and it will fill up the vacancy between heaven and earth. This vigor accords with and assists justice and reason, and leaves no hunger (or deficiency)."

III. Character

The virtuous prince confronts the gods, without any misgiving. He waits a hundred ages till a sage comes, and does not doubt. He who confronts the gods, without any misgiving, knows heaven; he who waits a hundred ages until a sage comes, without doubting, know men. Hence the virtuous prince moves and for ages shows empire the way. [Mencius].

Confucius said one day to Ke Kang: "Sir, in carrying on your government, why should you use killing at all? Let your evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good. The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it." Ke Kang, distressed about the number of thieves in the state, inquired of Confucius how to do away with them. Confucius said, "If you, sir, were not covetous, although you should reward them to do it, they would not steal." A completed nation will not import its religion. Duty grows everywhere, like children, like grass; and we need not go to Europe or to Asia to learn it...

I find it more credible, since it is anterior information, that one man should know heaven, as the Chinese say, than that so many men should know the world...

The sentiment, of course, is the judge and measure of every expression of it, - measures Judaism, Stoicism, Christianity, Buddhism, or whatever philanthropy, or politics, or saint, or seer pretends to speak in its name...

Men may well come together to kindle each other to virtuous living. Confucius said, "If in the morning I hear of the right way, and in the evening lie, I can be happy."

IV. Manners

It is easy to push this deference to a Chinese etiquette; but coolness and absence of heat and haste indicate fine qualities. A gentleman makes no noise: a lady is serene.

1844

Emancipation in the British West Indies: address delivered in concord on the anniversary of the emancipation of the negroes, in the British West Indies, Aug. 1, 1844.

That of Asia Minor in poetry, music and arts; that of Palestine in piety; that of Rome in military arts and virtues, exalted by a prodigious magnanimity; that of China and Japan in the last exaggeration of decorum and etiquette.

1844

The young American: a lecture read before the Mercantile Library Association, Boston, February 7, 1844.

Public gardens, on the scale of such plantations in Europe and Asia, are now unknown to us.

1845

Journal.

Yes; but Confucius. Confucius, glory of the nations. Confucius, sage of the Absolute East, was a middle man. He is the Washington of philosophy, the Moderator, the Meden agan of modern history.

1845

Journal

I should say again that the East loved infinity, & the West delighted in boundaries.
1846
Poems : Monadnoc
Sparta's stoutness, Bethlehem's heart,
Asia's rancor, Athens' art,
Sloswsure Britain's secular might,
And the German's inward sight…
Earth smiled with flowers, and man was born.
Then Asia yeaned her shepherd race..

1847
Journal
Crier, call Pythagoras, Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, Proclus, Plotinus, Spinoza, Confucius and Menu, Kepler, Friar Bacon.

1848
Journal
To me it looks as if a wise Frenchman should say to his country, Leave Pland and China and Oregon to themselves.

1850
Uses of great men.
We cannot read Plutarch without a tingling of the blood; and I accept the saying of the Chinese Mencius: "A sage is the instructor of a hundred ages. When the manners of Loo are heard of, the stupid become intelligent, and the wavering, determined."
Our colossal theologies of Judaism, Christism, Buddhism, Mahometism, are the necessary and structural action of the human mind.
Plato ; or, the philosoper.
The mind of Plato is not to be exhibited by a Chinese catalogue, but is to be apprehended by an original mind in the exercise of its original power. In him the freest abandonment is united with the precision of a geometer…
Such is the history of Europe, in all points; and such in philosophy. Its early records, almost perished, are of the immigrations from Asia, bringing with them the dreams of barbarians; a confusion of crude notions of morals and of natural philosophy, gradually subsiding through the partial insight of single teachers…
The unity of Asia and the detail of Europe ; the infinitude of the Asiatic soul and the defining, result-loving, machine-making, surface-seeking, opera-going Europe – Plato came to join, and, by contact, to enhance the energy of each.

1851
The fugitive slave law : address to citizens of Concord, 3 May, 1851.
Europe is little compared with Asia and Africa ; yet Asia and Africa are its ox and its ass.
Europe, the least of all the continents, has almost monopolized for twenty centuries the genius and power of them all.

1852
Journal
In Massachusetts, every twelfth man is a shoemaker ; tea-plant for China ; oranges for Spain ; coal for England ; wheat for Canada.

1855
Woman : a lecture read before the Woman's rights convention, Boston, Sept. 20, 1855.
The action of society is progressive. In barbarous society the position of women is always low - in the Eastern nations lower than in the West. "When a daughter is born," says the Shiking, the old Sacred Book of China," she sleeps on the ground, she is clothed with a wrap-per, she plays with a tile ; she is incapable of evil or of good." And something like that position, in all low society, is the position of woman ; because, as before remarked, she is herself its civilization.
1855
Journal
Connais les ceremonies. Si tu en pénètres le sens, tu gouverneras un royaume avec la même facilité que tu regards dans ta main. Confucius.

1856
English traits. (Boston : Phillips, Sampson, and Co., 1856).

III. Land
The Russian in his snows is aiming to be English. The Turk and Chinese also are making awkward efforts to be English…
As America, Europe, and Asia lie, these Britons have precisely the best commercial position in the whole planet, and are sure of a market for all the goods they can manufacture.

V. Ability
The English trade does not exist for the exportation of native products, but on its manufactures, or the making well every thing which is ill made elsewhere. They make ponchos for the Mexican, bandannas for the Hindoo, ginseng for the Chinese, beads for the Indian, laces for the Flemings, telescopes for astronomers, cannons for kings.

IX. Cockayne
The same insular limitation pinches his foreign politics. He sticks to his traditions and usages, and, so help him God! he will force his island by-laws down the throat of great countries, like India, China, Canada, Australia, and not only so, but impose Wapping on the Congress of Vienna, and trample down all nationalities with his taxed boots…
I suppose that all men of English blood in America, Europe, or Asia, have a secret feeling of joy that they are not French natives.

XVI Stonehenge.
For the science, he had, if possible, even less tolerance, and compared the savans of Somerset House to the boy who asked Confucius "how many stars in the sky?" Confucius replied, "he minded things near him:" then said the boy, "how many hairs are there in your eyebrows?" Confucius said, "he didn't know and didn't care." [Zitat von Thomas Carlyle].

1856
Journal
But the others (those wise hermits), who speak from their thought, speak from the deep heart of men, from a far wide public, the public of all sane and good men, from a broad humanity: and Greek and Syrian, Parthian and Chinese, Cherokee and Kanaka, hear them speaking in their own tongue.

1856
Journal
Well, in England and in America there is the widest difference of altitude between the culture of their scholars and that of the Germans, and here are in America a nation of Germans living with the Organon of Hegel in their hands, which makes the discoveries and thinking of the English and American look of a Chinese narrowness, and yet, good easy dunces that we are, we never suspect our inferiority.
Well, when India was explored, and the wonderful riches of Indian theologie literature found, that dispelled once for all the dream about Christianity being the sole revelation, - for, here in India, there in China, were the same principles, the same grandeurs, the like depths, moral and intellectual.

Art and criticism: lecture 13 April 1859 at the Music Hall Boston.
The Chinese have got on so long with their solitary Confucius and Mencius: the Arabs with their Mahomet; the Scandinavians with their Snorre Sturleson; and if the English island had been larger and the Straits of Dover wider, to keep it at pleasure a little out of the imbroglio of Europe, they might have managed to feed on Shakspeare for some ages yet; as the camel in the desert is fed by his humps, in long absence from food…

He [George Borrow] therefore mastered the patois of the gypsies, called Romany, which is spoken by them in all countries where they wander, in Europe, Asia, Africa.

The conduct of life. (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1860).
I Fate
Mahometan and Chinese know what we know of leap-year, of the Gregorian calendar, and of the precession of the equinoxes.

Reading.
Laurence Oliphant, Narrative of the Earl of Elgin’s Mission to China.
"The two mandarins (namely, Pihkwei and the Tartar General) were in full official costume, and retained throughout that chamred and delighted manner, which a Chinaman always puts on when he is powerless and alarmed. " When Lord Elgin put these two captured officials into temporary office again, after the taking of Canton.

The Englishman in China, seeing a doubtful dish set before him inquired, "Quack-quack?"
The Chinese replied, "Bow-wow".

"Better is virtue in the sovereign than plenty in the season," say the Chinese.

Perpetual forces: delivered on 18 Nov. 1862 before the Parker Fraternity, Boston.
Certain thoughts, certain observations, long familiar to me in night-watches and daylights, would be my capital if I removed to Spain or China, or, by stranger translation, to the planet Jupiter or Mars, or to new spiritual societies.
1863

The wise Confucius. Sayings of Confucius.

Confucius says, "Now all over the empire carriages have wheels of the same size, all writing is with the same characters ; and for conduct there are the same rules." – Doctrine of the mean. (Confucius, apud Legge.)

"Of their seeing and hearing, their thinking and revolving, their moving and acting, men all say, It is from Me. Every one thus brings out his self, and his smallness becomes known. But let the body be taken away, and all would be Heaven. How can the body be taken away ? Simply by subduing and removing that self-having of the Ego. This is the taking it away. That being done so wide and great as Heaven is, my mind is as wide and great, and production and transformation cannot be separated from me. Hence it is said, - how vast in his Heaven! " – Idem, note, vol. 1, p. 294.

The text is, "Call him man in his ideal, how earnest is he! Call him an abyss, how deep is he! Call him Heaven, how vast is he!"

I am reading a better Pascal. "It is said in the Book of poetry, "Over her embroidered robe she puts a plain single garment." So it is the way of the superior man to prefer the concealment of his virtue, while it daily becomes more illustrious, and the way of the mean man to seek notoriety ; while he daily goes more and more to ruin. It is characteristic of the superior man, appearing insipid, yet never to produce satiety ; while showing a simple negligence, yet to have his accomplishments recognized ; while seemingly plain, yet to be discriminating. He knows how what is distance lies in what is near, - whence the wind proceeds from, how what is minute becomes manifested." – Idem, vol. 1, p. 295.

"In hewing an axe-handle, the patterns is not far off." We grasp one axe-handle to hew another.

"Is virtue a thing remote ? I wish to be virtuous, and lo ! virtue is at hand."

"If one's actions be previously determined, there will be no sorrow in connection with them. If principles of conduct be, the practice of them will be inexhaustible."

"It is characteristic of entire sincerity to be able to foreknow. The individual possessed of complete sincerity is like a spirit."

"The way of heaven and earth may be declared in a sentence : - They are without any doubleness, and so they produce things in a manner that is unfathomable. Heaven is a shining spot, yet sun, moon, stars, constellations, are suspended in it ; the earth is a handful of soil, but sustains mountains like Hwa and Yoh without feeling their weight, and contains rivers and seas without leaking away."

To the colleges : "Learning without Thought is labour lost ; Thought without Learning is perilous. The accomplished scholar is not a utensil."

Here is an acute observation that belongs to "Classes of Men" : -

"The Master said, The faults of men are characteristic of the class to which they belong. By observing a man's faults, it may be known that he is virtuous."

"The superior man thinks of virtue ; the small man thinks of comfort."

Culture. "It is from music that the finish is received." – Confucius.

"The subjects on which the Master did not talk were – extraordinary things, feats of strength, disorder, and spiritual beings." – Legge, p. 65.

He anticipated the speech of Socrates, and the Do as be done by, of Jesus.

1863

Authors or Books quoted or referred to in Journal for 1863

Confucius, Book of poetry, apud James Legge…

The Wise Confucius…. Etc. S. 533-535…

I justified to W---- yesterday Confucius's speech about making money, lest he should rashly resign his position at Chicago…
1863
Journal
It is with difficulty that we wont ourselves in the language of the Eastern poets, in the melodramatic life, as if one should go down to Lewis’s Wharf and find an ivory boat and a ping sea. He thinks he is at the opera. As, for example, in the Chinese Two Fair Cousins… Life is ideal; Death is to break up our styles. This the use of war, to shatter your porcelain dolls; to break up in a nation Chinese conservatism, death in life.

1863
Journal
Confucius, his Doctrine of the Mean, Book of Poetry,

1864
Journal
This is bad omen for England, that, in these years, her foreign policy is ignominious, that she plays a sneaking part with Denmark, with France, with Russia, with China, with America.

1865
Journal
Vishnu Purana bear witness-Socrates, Zeno, Menu, Zertushi, Confucius, Rabia are as tender as St. Francis, St. Augustine, and St. Bernard.

1867
Progress of culture : address read before The Phi Beta Kappa Society at Cambridge [Mass.], July 18, 1867.
But if these works still survive and multiply, what shall we say of names more distant, or hidden through their very superiority to their coevals, - names of men who have left remains that certify a height of genius in their several directions not since surpassed, and which men in proportion to their wisdom still cherish, - as Zoroaster, Confucius, and the grand scriptures, only recently known to Western nations, of the Indian Vedas, the Institutes of Menu, the Puranas, the poems of the Mahabarat and the Ramayana ?...
Our towns are still rude, - the make-shifts of emigrants, - and the whole architecture tent-like, when compared with the monumental solidity of medieval and primeval remains in Europe and Asia.
Speech at Banquet in honor of the Chinese Embassy, Boston, 1868.

[Speech of Ralph Waldo Emerson at the banquet given by the City of Boston, August 21, 1868, to the Hon. Anson Burlingame, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from China, and his associates, Chih Ta-Jin and Sun Ta-Jin, of the Chinese Embassy to the United States and the European powers. Mr. Emerson responded to the toast: "The union of the farthest East and the farthest West."]

MR. MAYOR: I suppose we are all of one opinion on this remarkable occasion of meeting the embassy sent from the oldest Empire in the world to the youngest Republic. All share the surprise and pleasure when the venerable Oriental dynasty - hitherto a romantic legend to most of us - suddenly steps into the fellowship of nations. This auspicious event, considered in connection with the late innovations in Japan, marks a new era, and is an irresistible result of the science which has given us the power of steam and the electric telegraph. It is the more welcome for the surprise. We had said of China, as the old prophet said of Egypt, "Her strength is to sit still." Her people had such elemental conservatism that by some wonderful force of race and national manners, the wars and revolutions that occur in her annals have proved but momentary swells or surges on the pacific ocean of her history, leaving no trace. But in its immovability this race has claims. China is old, not in time only, but in wisdom, which is gray hair to a nation, or, rather, truly seen, is eternal youth. As we know, China had the magnet centuries before Europe; and block-printing or stereotype, and lithography, and gunpowder, and vaccination, and canals; had anticipated Linnus's nomenclature of plants; had codes, journals, clubs, hackney coaches, and, thirty centuries before New York, had the custom of New Year's calls of comity and reconciliation. I need not mention its useful arts, - its pottery indispensable to the world, the luxury of silks, and its tea, the cordial of nations. But I must remember that she has respectable remains of astronomic science, and historic records of forgotten time, that have supplied important gaps in the ancient history of the western nations. Then she has philosophers who cannot be spared. Confucius has not yet gathered all his fame. When Socrates heard that the oracle declared that he was the wisest of men, he said, it must mean that other men held that they were wise, but that he knew that he knew nothing. Confucius had already affirmed this of himself: and what we call the GOLDEN RULE of Jesus, Confucius had uttered in the same terms five hundred years before. His morals, though addressed to a state of society unlike ours, we read with profit to-day. His rare perception appears in his GOLDEN MEAN, his doctrine of Reciprocity, his unerring insight, - putting always the blame of our misfortunes on ourselves; as when to the governor who complained of thieves, he said, "If you, sir, were not covetous, though you should re-ward them for it, they would not steal." His ideal of greatness predicts Marcus Antoninus. At the same time, he abstained from paradox, and met the ingrained prudence of his nation by saving always, "Bend one cubit to straighten eight." China interests us at this moment in a point of politics. I am sure that gentlemen around me bear in mind the bill which the Hon. Mr. Jenckes of Rhode Island has twice attempted to carry through Congress, requiring that candidates for public offices shall first pass examinations on their literary qualifications for the same. Well, China has preceded us, as well as England and France, in this essential correction of a reckless usage; and the like high esteem of education appears in China in social life, to whose distinctions it is made an indispensable passport. It is gratifying to know that the advantages of the new intercourse between the two countries are daily manifest on the Pacific coast. The immigrants from Asia come in crowds. Their power of continuous labor, their versatility in adapting themselves to new conditions, their stoical economy, are unlooked-for virtues. They send back to their friends, in China, money, new products of art, new tools, machinery, new foods, etc., and are thus establishing a commerce without limit. I cannot help adding, after what I have heard to-night, that I have read in the journals a statement from an English source, that Sir Frederic Bruce attributed to Mr. Burlingame the merit of the happy reform in the relations of foreign governments to China. I am quite sure that I heard from Mr. Burlingame in New York, in his last visit to America, that the whole merit of it belonged to Sir Frederic Bruce. It appears that the ambassadors were emulous in their magnanimity. It is certainly the best guaranty for the
interests of China and of humanity.

1868
Journal
Can anyone doubt that if the noblest saint among the Buddhists, the noblest Mahometan, the highest Stoic of Athens, the purest and wisest Christian, Menu in India, Confucius in China, Spinoza in Holland, could somewhere meet and converse together, they would all find themselves of one religion, and all would find themselves denounced by their own sects, and sustained by these believed adversaries of their sects?

1868
Journal. Revolutions.
When I see the Japanese building a steam navy, and their men of rank sending children to America for their education, the Chinese, instead of stoning an ambassador if he steps out of the walls of Canton, now choosing Mr. Burlingame as their ambassador to Western courts...

1868
Greatness : an address before the Amherst Social Union.
This day-labor of ours, we confess, has hitherto a certain emblematic air, like the annual ploughing and sewing of the Emperor of China...
Who can doubt the potency of an individual mind, who sees the shock given to torpid races---torpid for ages -- by Mahornet; a vibration propagated over Asia and Africa? What of Menu? What of Buddha? of Shakspeare? of Newton? of Franklin?

1870
II Civilization
Each nation grows after its own genius, and has a civilization of its own. The Chinese and Japanese, though each complete in his way, is different from the man of Madrid or the man of New York.
VII Works and days
Nature loves to cross her stocks, - and German, Chinese, Turk, Russ and Kanaka were putting out to sea,' and intermarrying race with race ; and commerce took the hint, and ships were built capacious enough to carry the people of a county.'

VIII Books
After the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, which constitute the sacred books of Christendom, these are, the Desatir of the Persians, and the Zoroastrian Oracles ; the Vedas and Laws of Menu ; the Upanishads, the Vishnu Purana, the Bhagvat Geeta, of the Hindoos; the books of the Buddhists ; the Chinese Classic, of four books, containing the wisdom of Confucius and Mencius.' …
As whole nations have derived their culture from a single book, - as the Bible has been the literature as well as the religion of large portions of Europe ; as Hafiz was the eminent genius of the Persians, Confucius of the Chinese, Cervantes of the Spaniards ; so, perhaps, the human mind would be a gainer if all the secondary writers were lost, - say, in England, all but Shakspeare, Milton and Bacon,-through the profounder study so drawn to those wonderful minds...
The missionary must be carried by it, and find it there, or he goes in vain. Is there any geography in these things ? We call them Asiatic, we call them primeval ; but perhaps that is only optical, for Nature is always equal to herself, and there are as good eyes and ears now in the planet as ever were. Only these ejaculations of the soul are uttered one or a few at a time, at long intervals, and it takes millenniums to make a Bible.

XI Success
Thus we do not carry a counsel in our breasts, or do not know it; and because we cannot shake off from our shoes this dust of Europe and Asia, the world seems to be born old, society is under a spell, every man is a borrower and a mimic, life is theatrical and literature a quotation; and hence that depression of spirits, that furrow of care, said to mark every American brow.
1870
Journal
Confucius and Menu had a deeper civilization than Paris or London.

1871
Journal
The superior man thinks of virtue, the small man thinks of comfort. Confucius.

1875
Letters and social aims. (Boston : J. R. Osgood, 1875).
Poetry and imagination
As soon as a man masters a principle, and sees his facts in relation to it, fields, waters, skies, offer to clothe his thoughts in images. Then all men understand him: Parthian, Mede, Chinese, Spaniard, and Indian hear their own tongue.
Social aims.
Why have you statues in your hall, but to teach you that, when the door-bell rings, you shall sit like them. "Eat at your table as you would eat at the table of the king," said Confucius…
The old Confucius in China admitted the benefit, but stated the limitation: "If the search for riches were sure to be successful, though I should become a groom with whip in hand to get them, I will do so. As the search may not be successful, I will follow after that which I love."…
Resources
We have seen China opened to European and American ambassadors and commerce; the like in Japan: our arts and productions begin to penetrate both. As the walls of a modern house are perforated with water-pipes, sound-pipes, gas-pipes, heat-pipes, so geography and geology are yielding to man's convenience, and we begin to perforate and mould the old ball, as a carpenter does with wood…
The disgust of California has not been able to drive nor kick the Chinaman back to his home; and now it turns out that he has sent home to China American food and tools and luxuries, until he has taught his people to use them, and a new market has grown up for our commerce. The emancipation has brought a whole nation of negroes as customers to buy all the articles which once their few masters bought, and every manufacturer and producer in the North has an interest in protecting the negro as the consumer of his wares.
Quotation and originality
The Patent-Office Commissioner knows that all machines in use have been invented and re-invented over and over; that the mariner's compass, the boat, the pendulum, glass, movable types, the kaleidoscope, the railway, the power-loom, etc., have been many times found and lost, from Egypt, China, and Pompeii down; and if we have arts which Rome wanted, so also Rome had arts which we have lost; that the invention of yesterday of making wood indestructible by means of vapor of coal-oil or paraffine was suggested by the Egyptian method which has preserved its mummy-cases four thousand years…
Now shall we say that only the first men were well alive, and the existing generation is invalided and degenerate? Is all literature eavesdropping, and all art Chinese imitation?
"A painter in China once painted a hall;-
Such a web never hung on an emperor's wall;-
One half from his brush with rich colors did run,
The other he touched with a beam of the sun;-
So that all which delighted the eye in one side,
The same, point for point, in the other replied.
"In thee, friend, that Tyrian chamber is found;
Thine the star-pointing roof, and the base on the ground: Is one half depicted with colors less bright?
Beware that the counterpart blazes with light!"
Inspirations
The legends of Arabia, Persia and India are of the same complexion as the Christian. Socrates, Menu, Confucius, Zertusht, -- we recognize in all of them this ardor to solve the hints of thought.
1878
If I miss the inspiration of the saints of Calvinism, or of Platonism, or Buddhism, our times are not up to theirs, or, more truly, have not yet their own legitimate force.
1878
The fortune of the Republic: lecture delivered at the Old south church, Boston, March 30, 1878.
They built great works and called their manufacturing village Etruria. Flaxman, with his
greek taste, selected and combined the loveliest forms, which were executed in English clay;
sent boxes of these as gifts to every court of Europe, and formed the taste of the world. It was
a renaissance of the breakfast-table and china-closet. The brave manufacturers made their
fortune. The jewellers imitated the revived models in silver and gold.

1894
Natural history of intellect & other papers. (Boston: Houghton, 1894).
Concord walks
I possess here all that I desire of the spoils of the East and the West, and, unless I am very
much mistaken, what is far more beautiful than Babylonian robes, or vases of the Chinese.
Here I learn what I teach.

Boston
Of these writers, of this spirit which deified them, I will say with Confucius, "If in the
morning I hear of the right way, and in the evening die, I can be
happy." [Eme4,Eme5,Eme7,Eme27,Pou103:S. 103,Eme1,Eme2,Eme3]

1830 Ralph Waldo Emerson reads De Gérando's Histoire comparée des systèmes de
philosophie. [Eme26]

1834 Ralph Waldo Emerson reads the 'Sheking'. [Eme26]

1836 Ralph Waldo Emerson reads Marshman's Confucius. [Eme26]

1838 Ralph Waldo Emerson reads 'Confucius'. [Eme25]

1841 Ralph Waldo Emerson reads 'Confucius'. [Eme26]
The Dial [ID D29685].

Ethnical scriptures : sayings of Confucius.

Chee says, if in the morning I hear about the right way, and in the evening die, I can be happy. A man's life is properly connected with virtue. The life of the evil man is preserved by mere good fortune.

Coarse rice for food, water to drink, and the bended arm for a pillow – happiness may be enjoyed even in these. Without virtue, riches and honor seem to me like a passing cloud.

A wise and good man was Hooi. A piece of bamboo was his dish, a cocoa-nut his cup, his dwelling a miserable shed. Men could not sustain the sight of his wretchedness; but Hooi did not change the serenity of his mind. A wise and good man was Hooi.

Chee-koong said, Were they discontented? The sage replies, They sought and attained complete virtue; - how then would they be discontented?

Chee says, Yaou is the man who, in torn clothes or common apparel, sits with those dressed in furred robes without feeling shame.

To worship at a temple not your own is mere flattery.

Chee says, grieve not that men know not you; grieve that you are ignorant of men.

How can a man remain concealed! How can a man remain concealed!

Have no friend unlike yourself.

Chee-Yaou enquired respecting filial piety. Chee says, the filial piety of the present day is esteemed merely ability to nourish a parent. This care is extended to a dog or a horse. Every domestic animal can obtain food. Beside veneration, what is the difference?

Chee entered the great temple, frequently enquiring about things. One said, who says that the son of the Chou man understands propriety? In the great temple he is constantly asking questions. Chee heard and replied - 'This is propriety'.

Choy-ee slept in the afternoon. Chee says, rotten wood is unfit for carving: a dirty wall cannot receive a beautiful color. To Ee what advice can I give?

A man's transgression partakes of the nature of his company.

Having knowledge, to apply it; not having knowledge, to confess your ignorance; this is real knowledge.

Chee says, to sit in silence and recal past ideas, to study and feel no anxiety, to instruct men without weariness; - have I this ability within me?

In forming a mountain, were I to stop when one basket of earth is lacking, I actually stop; and in the same manner were I to add to the level ground though but one basket of earth daily, I really go forward.

A soldier of the kingdom of Ci lost his buckler; and having sought after it a long time in vain; he comforted himself with this reflection: 'A soldier has lost his buckler, but a soldier of our camp will find it; he will use it.'

The wise man never hastens, neither in his studies nor his words; he is sometimes, as it were, mute; but when it concerns him to act and practice virtue, he, as I may say, precipitates all.

The truly wise man speaks little; he is little eloquent. I see not that eloquence can be of very great use to him.

Silence is absolutely necessary to the wise man. Great speeches, elaborate discourses, pieces of eloquence, ought to be a language unknown to him; his actions ought to be his language. As for me, I would never speak more. Heaven speaks; but what language does it use to preach to men, that there is a sovereign principle from which all things depend; a sovereign principle which makes them to act and move? Its motion is its language; it reduces the seasons to their time; it agitates nature; it makes it produce. This silence is eloquent.
**Ethical scriptures : Chinese four books.**

[Preliminary Note. Since we printed a few selections from Dr. Marshman's translation of the sentences of Confucius, we have received a copy of the Chinese Classical Work, commonly called the Four Books, translated and illustrated with notes by the late Rev. David Collie, Principal of the Anglo-Chinese College, Malacca. Printed at the Mission Press. This translation, which seems to have been undertaken and performed as an exercise in learning the language, is the most valuable contribution we have yet seen from the Chinese literature. That part of the work, which is new, is the Memoirs of Mencius in two books, the Shang Mung and Hea Mung, which is the production of Mung Tsze (or Mencius), who flourished about a hundres years after Confucis. The subjoined extracts are chiefly taken from these books.]

All things are contained complete in ourselves. There is no greater joy than to turn round on ourselves and become perfect.

The human figure and color possess a divine nature, but it is only the sage who can fulfill what his figure promises.

The superior man's nature consists in this, that benevolence, justice, propriety, and wisdom, have their root in his heart, and are exhibited in his countenance. They shine forth in his face and go through to his back. They are manifested in his four members. Wherever the superior man passes, renovation takes place. The divine spirit which he cherishes above and below, flows on equal in extent and influence with heaven and earth.

Tsze Kung says, The errors of the superior man are like the eclipses of the sun and moon. His errors all men see, and his reformation all men look for.

Mencius says, There is not anything but is decreed; accord with and keep to what is right. Hence he, who understands the decrees, will not stand under a falling wall. He, who dies in performing his duty to the utmost of his power, accords with the decrees of heaven. But he who dies for his crimes, accords not with the divine decree.

There is a proper rule by which we should seek, and whether we obtain what we seek or not, depends on the divine decree.

Put men to death by the principles which have for their object the preservation of life, and they will not grumble.

**The Scholar.**

Teen, son of the king of Tse, asked what the business of the scholar consists in? Mencius replied, In elevating his mind and inclination. What do you mean by elevating the mind? It consists merely in being benevolent and just. Where is the scholar's abode? In benevolence. Where is his road? Justice. To dwell in benevolence, and walk in justice, is the whole business of a great man.

Benevolence is man's heart, and justice is man's path. If a man lose his fowls or his dogs, he knows how to seek them. The duty of the student is no other than to seek his lost heart. He who employs his whole mind, will know his nature. He who knows his nature, knows heaven.

It were better to be without books than to believe all that they record.

**The Taou.**

Sincerity is the Taou or way of heaven. To aim at it is the way of man. From inherent sincerity to have perfect intelligence, is to be a sage by nature; to attain sincerity by means of intelligence, is to be such by study. Where there is sincerity, there must be intelligence. Where intelligence is, it must lead to sincerity. He who offends heaven, has none to whom he can pray.

Mencius said, To be benevolent is man. Then man and benevolence are united, they are called Taou.

To be full of sincerity, is called beauty. To be so full of sincerity that it shines forth in the external conduct, is called greatness. Holiness or sageness which is above comprehension, is called divine.

Perfection (or sincerity) is the way of heaven, and to wish for perfection is the duty of a man. It has never been the case that he who possessed genuine virtue in the highest degree, could not influence others, nor has it ever been the case that he who was not in the highest degree
sincere could influence others. There is a divine nobility and a human nobility. Benevolence, justice, fidelity, and truth, and to delight in virtue without weariness, constitute divine nobility. To be a prince, a prime minister, or a great officer of state constitute human nobility. The ancients adorned divine nobility, and human nobility followed it. The men of the present day cultivate divine nobility in order that they may obtain human nobility; and when they once get human nobility, they throw away divine nobility. This is the height of delusion, and must end in the loss of both.

Of reform.
Taou is not far removed from man. If men suppose that it lies in something remote, then what they think of is not Taou. The ode says, 'Cut hatchet handles.' This means of doing it, is not remote; you have only to take hold of one handle, and use it to cut another. Yet if you look aslant at it, it will appear distant. Hence the superior man.

When Tsze Loo heard anything that he had not yet fully practiced, he was afraid of hearing anything else.
The governor of Yih asked respecting government. Confucius replied, Make glad those who are near, and those who are at a distance will com.
The failing of men is that they neglect their own field, and dress that of others. They require much of others, but little of themselves.

War.
Mencius said, From this time and ever after I know the heavy consequences of killing a man's parents. If you kill a man's elder brother, he will kill your elder brother. Hence although you do not yourself kill them, you do nearly the same thing.

When man says, I know well how to draw up an army, I am skilled in fighting, he is a great criminal.

Politics.
Ke Kang asked Confucius respecting government. Confucius replied, Government is rectitude.
Ke Kang was harassed by robbers, and consulted Confucius on the subject. Confucius said, if you, sir, were not covetous, the people would not rob, even though you should hire them to do it.

Mencius said, Pih E's would not look on a bad color, nor would his ear listen to a bad sound. Unless a prince were of his own stamp, he would not serve him, and unless people were of his own stamp, he would not employ them. In times of good government, he went into office, and in times of confusion and bad government, he retired. Where disorderly government prevailed, or where disorderly people lived, he could not bear to dwell. He thought that to live with low men was as bad as to sit in the mud with his court robes and cap. In the time of Chou, he dwelt on the banks of the North Ka, watching till the Empire should be brought to peace and order. Hence, when the fame of Pih E is heard of, the stupid become intelligent, and the weak determined.

E Yin said, What of serving a prince not of one's own stamp! What of ruling a people which are not to your mind! In times of good government he went into office, and so did he in times of disorder. He said, heaven has given life to this people, and sent those who are first enlightened to enlighten those who are last, and has sent those who are first aroused to arouse those who are last. I am one of heaven's people who am first aroused. I will take if there was a single man or woman in the Empire, who was not benefited by the doctrines of Yaou and Shun, that he was guilty of pushing them into a ditch. He took the heavy responsibility of the Empire on himself.

Lew Hea Hooi was not ashamed of serving a dirty Prince, nor did he refuse an inferior Office. He did not conceal the virtuous, and acted according to his principles. Although he lost his place, he grumbled not. In poverty he repined not. He lived in harmony with mean of little worth, and could not bear to abandon them. He said, 'You are you, and I am I; although you sit by my side with your body naked, how can you defile me?' Hence when the fame of Lew Hea Hooi is heard of, the mean man becomes liberal, and the miserly becomes generous.

Virtue.
Chung Kung asked, What is perfect virtue? Confucius said, What you do not wish others to
do to you, do not to them.
Sze Ma Neu asked, What constitutes perfect virtue? Confucius replied; It is to find it
difficult to speak. To find it difficult to speak! Is that perfect virtue? Confucius rejoined,
What is difficult to practice, must it not be difficult to speak?
Confucius says, Virtue runs swifter than the royal postillions carry despatches.
The She King says, 'Heaven created all men having their duties and the means of rules of
performing them. It is the natural and constant disposition of men to love beautiful virtue.'
Confucius says, that he who wrote this ode knew right principles.
Confucius exclaimed, Is virtue far off? I only wish for virtue, and virtue comes.
Confucius said, I have not seen any one who loves virtue as we love beauty.
Confucius says, The superior man is not a machine which is fit for one thing only.
Tze Kung asked, Who is a superior man? Confucius replied, He who first practices his
words, and then speaks accordingly.
The principles of great man illuminate the whole universe above and below. The principles of
the superior man commence with the duties of common men and women, but in their highest
extent they illuminate the universe.
Confucius said, Yew, permit me to tell you what is knowledge. What you are acquainted with,
consider that you know it; what you do not understand, consider that you do not know ist;
this is knowledge.
Confucius exclaimed, How vast the influence of the Kwei Shin (spirits or gods). If you look
for them, you cannot see them; if you listen, you cannot hear them; they embody all things,
and are what things cannot be separated from. When they cause mankind to fast, purity, and
dress themselves, everything appears full of them. They seem to be at once above, and on the
right, and on the left. The ode says, The descent of the gods cannot be comprehended; with
what reverence should we conduct ourselves! Indeed that which is least, is clearly displayed.
The cannot be concealed. [Eme28]

1843 Ralph Waldo Emerson reads 'The four books' and 'Shiking'. [Eme26]

1856 Letter from Walt Whitman to Ralph Waldo Emerson. Brooklyn, August, 1856.
With Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, Oregon—with the states around the Mexican sea—with
cheerfully welcomed immigrants from Europe, Asia, Africa—with Connecticut, Vermont,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island—with all varied interests, facts, beliefs, parties,
genesis—there is being fused a determined character, fit for the broadest use for the
freewomen and freemen of Tho States, accomplished and to be accomplished, without any
exception whatever—each indeed free, each idiomatic, as becomes live states and men, but
each adhering to one enclosing general form of politics, manners, talk, personal style, as the
plenteous varieties of the race adhere to one physical form. [WhiW77]

1863 Ralph Waldo Emerson began to read the Chinese classics, translated by James
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II. Essays I
III. Essays II
IV. Representative Men
V. English Traits
VI. Conduct of Life
VII. Society and Solitude
VIII. Letters and Social Aims
IX. Poems
X. Lectures & Biographical Sketches
XI. Miscellanies
XII. Natural History of Intellect [WC]

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http://books.google.ch/books?id=C7M9fa6yZSIC&pg=PA378&lpg=PA378&dq=emerson+the+light+of+confucius+goes+out+in+translation+source&bl=013j3SACwzj&sig=FZrDxivwB40su5DwnZDb9koyI2I&hl=de&sa=X&ei=odJbUdFG4eThBLyUgZAL&ved=0CDkQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=emerson+the+light+of+confucius+goes+out+in+translation+source&f=false. [WC,ZB]

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<table>
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<th>Title</th>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Emerson, Ralph Waldo</td>
<td><em>Zi ran chen si lu. Aimosheng zhuan; Bo Fan yi.</em> (Shanghai: Shanghai she hui ke xue yuan chu ban she, 1993). (Ming ren ming zhi yi cong). Übersetzung von Emerson, Ralph Waldo. <em>Nature.</em> (Boston: J. Munroe and Co., 1836). 自然沉思录 [WC]</td>
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III. Essays II
IV. Representative Men
V. English Traits
VI. Conduct of Life
VII. Society and Solitutde
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**Bibliographie : Autor**


**Fromm, Erich** (Frankfurt a.M. 1900-1980 Muralto, Tessin) : Deutsch-amerikanischer Psychoanalytiker, Philosoph, Sozialpsychologe

**Bibliographie : Autor**
1970


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Einstein, Albert. The faith of a scientist.
Silone, Ignazio. The God that failed.
Clark, John Maurice. Alternative to serfdom.
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Sartre, Jean-Paul. Atheistic existentialism.
Popper, Karl R. Critical rationalism.
Russell, Bertrand. Philosophic rationality for a changing world.
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Gass, William Howard (Fargo, North Dakota 1924-) : Schriftsteller, Professor für Philosophie

Biographie

1984.10.16-12
Gary Snyder travels in the Peoples' Republic of China as part of an American Academy of Arts & Letters delegation for a 4-day writers conference, as guest of the Writers' Union with Toni Morrison, Allen Ginsberg, Harrison Salisbury, William Gass, Francine du Plessix Gray. The American writers were taken to the most famous tourist destinations : Beijing, the Chinese Acrobat Theatre, the Imperial Palace, a section of the Great Wall. After a week in Beijing, the group went to Xian, to Shanghai, to see the Buddhist temples, the Tang gardens in Suzhou and Han Shan's Cold Mountain.

After the other members of the mission went back to America, Allen Ginsberg stayed in China by himself for some time to have more communication with contemporary Chinese writers and a spiritual dialogue with great ancient Chinese poets. He wen to the universities in Beijing, Shanghai, Baoding and Guiling to read and instruct his own poems and other western poets. In this period he wrote more than ten poems : One morning I took a walk in China, Reading Bai Juyi, Improvisation in Beijing, I love old Whitman so, Black shroud. In these poems Ginsberg depicts his endearment of China and its profound culture. And the poems have been praised as opening a window for western readers to understand China. [Gin1,Sny1,Sny3,Sny6]

Gier, Nicholas F. (1944-) : Professor of Philosophy, University of Idaho

Bibliographie : Autor

Gildin, Hilail (Polen 1928-2015 New York, N.Y.) : Professor Queens College ; Department of Philosophy, City University, New York

Bibliographie : Autor


Goldsmith, Maurice (1933-2008) : Professor für Political Theory, University of Exeter, Dozent für Philosophie University of Wellington, Victoria

Bibliographie : Autor


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論藝術的本質：名家精選集

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Bibliographie : Autor


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2. Griffin, David R. Whitehead, China, postmodern politics, and global democracy
3. Keller, Catherine. The Tao of modernity: process, deconstruction and postcolonial theory.
8. Ziporyn, Brook. Whitehead and Tiantai: eternal objects and the "twofold three thousand".

Pt. II. Perspectives: process thought in Chinese minds.
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Green, Thomas Hill (Birkin, Yorkshire 1836-1882 Oxford): Philosopher, Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy, Balliol College Oxford

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Greene, Marjorie Glicksman (Milwaukee, Wisc. 1910-2009 Blacksburg, Va.): Philosophin, Professorin für Philosophie Virginia Tech

Bibliographie: Autor

**Griffin, David Ray** (1939-) : Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Theology, Claremont School of Theology, Calif.

*Bibliographie : Autor*

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**Gu, Linyu** (um 1998) : Department of Philosophy, University of Hawaii at Manoa

*Bibliographie : Autor*


**Hall, David L.** (1937-2001) : Anglo-amerikanischer Philosoph

*Bibliographie : Autor*


**Hampshire, Stuart** (1914-2004) : Philosoph, Literaturkritiker, Fellow All Souls College, Oxford

*Bibliographie : Autor*


**Hansen, Chad** (Utah 1942-) : Professor of Philosophy, University of Hong Kong
**Biographie**

1972 Chad Hansen promoviert an der University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. [WC]
1972-1977 Chad Hansen unterrichtet Philosophie an der University of Pittsburgh. [HanC6]
1977-1978 Chad Hansen forscht und unterrichtet an der Stanford University. [HanC6]
1978-1990 Chad Hansen ist Dozent für Philosophie an der University of Vermont, Gastdozent an der University of Michigan, University of Hong Kong, University of Hawaii und der University of California, Los Angeles. [HanC6]
1991-1993 Chad Hansen ist Visiting Lecturer in Philosophy an der University of Hong Kong. [HanC6]
1993-1995 Chad Hansen ist Reader in Philosophy an der University of Hong Kong. [HanC6]
1995-2008 Chad Hansen ist Professor of Philosophy an der University of Hong Kong. [HanC6]
2000 Chad Hansen ist Vorsteher des Department of Philosophy der University of Hong Kong. [HanC6]

**Bibliographie : Autor**

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**Hartshorne, Charles** (Kittanning, Penn. 1897-2000 Austin, Texas) : Philosoph ; Professor of Philosophy, University of Chicago, Emory University, University of Texas

**Bibliographie : Autor**


**Haven, Joseph** = Haiwen (Dennis, Mass. 1816-1874 Chicago) : Priester, Professor für Philosophie in Amherst, am Chicago theological seminary und an der Chicago University

**Bibliographie : Autor**

心靈學 [Mapp]
Helm, Robert M. = Helm, Robert Meredith (Winston-Salem, N.C. 1917-) : Professor of Philosophy, Wake Forest University, N.C.

Bibliographie : Autor


Hobbes, Thomas (Westport, Wiltshire 1588-1679 Hardwick Hall, Derbyshire) : Philosoph, Mathematiker, Staatstheoretiker

Bibliographie : erwähnt in


Hoffer, Eric (New York, N.Y. 1902-1983 San Francisco) : Moral- und Sozialphilosoph

Bibliographie : Autor


**Hook, Sidney** (New York, N.Y. 1902-1989 Stanford, Calif.) : Philosoph, Publizist

*Bibliographie : Autor*


理性社会神话和民主 [WC]
1970


**Hume, David** (Edinburgh 1711-1776 Edinburgh) : Philosoph, Historiker

**Biographie**

1739-1740

Hume, David. *A treatise of human nature* [ID D26718].

Er schreibt : Antient busts and inscriptions are more valued than Japan tables: And not to mention the Greeks and Romans, it is certain we regard with more veneration the old Chaldeans and Egyptians, than the modem Chinese and Persians, and bestow more fruitless pains to dear up the history and chronology of the former, than it would cost us to make a voyage, and be certainly informed of the character, learning and government of the latter. [Hum2]

1742-1748

Hume, David. *Essays and treatises on several subjects* [ID D26700].

Pt. 1 : Essays, moral, political, and literary.
Pt. 2 : Philosophical essays concerning human understanding.

Hume, David. Of superstition and enthusiasm. Pt. 1, X

The Chinese Literati have no priests or ecclesiastical establishment. [Confucius (551-479 B.C.) was a teacher and thinker whose ideas on virtue and human relationships profoundly influenced traditional Chinese life and thought. Included among the tenets of Confucianism is awe for Heaven as a cosmic spiritual power with moral significance.]

Hume, David. Of national characters. Pt. 1, XI

We may observe, that, where a very extensive government has been established for many centuries, it spreads a national character over the whole empire, and communicates to every part a similarity of manners. Thus the Chinese have the greatest uniformity of character imaginable: though the air and climate, in different parts of those vast dominions, admit of very considerable variations.

Shall we say, that the neighbourhood of the sun inflames the imagination of men, and gives it a peculiar spirit and vivacity. The French, Greeks, Egyptians, and Persians are remarkable for gaiety. The Spaniards, Turks, and Chinese are noted for gravity and a serious deportment, without any such difference of climate as to produce this difference of temper.
Hume, David. Of the rise and progress of arts and sciences. Pt. 1, XIV
In China, there seems to be a considerable stock of politeness and science, which, in the course of so many centuries, might naturally be expected to ripen into something more perfect and finished, than what has arisen from them. But China is one vast empire, speaking one language, governed by one law, and sympathizing in the same manners. The authority of any teacher, such as Confucius, was propagated easily from one corner of the empire to the other. None had courage to resist the torrent of popular opinion. And posterity was not bold enough to dispute what had been universally received by their ancestors. This seems to be one natural reason why the sciences have made so slow a progress in that mighty empire.
If we consider the face of the globe, Europe, of all the four parts of the world, is the most broken by seas, rivers, and mountains; and Greece of all countries of Europe. Hence these regions were naturally divided into several distinct governments. And hence the sciences arose in Greece; and Europe has been hitherto the most constant habitation of them.
If it be asked, who have always been governed by a monarch, and can scarcely form an idea of a free government; I would answer, that though the Chinese government be a pure monarchy, it is not, properly speaking, absolute. This proceeds from a peculiarity in the situation of that country: They have no neighbours, except the Tartars, from whom they were, in some measure, secured, at least seemed to be secured, by their famous wall, and by the great superiority of their numbers. By this means, military discipline has always been much neglected amongst them; and their standing forces are mere militia, of the worst kind; and unfit to suppress any general insurrection in countries so extremely populous. The sword, therefore, may properly be said to be always in the hands of the people, which is a sufficient restraint upon the monarch, and obliges him to lay his mandarins or governors of provinces under the restraint of general laws, in order to prevent those rebellions, which we learn from history to have been so frequent and dangerous in that government. Perhaps, a pure monarchy of this kind, were it fitted for defence against foreign enemies, would be the best of all governments, as having both the tranquillity attending kingly power, and the moderation and liberty of popular assemblies.

Hume, David. Of the balance of trade. Pt. 2, V
Thus the immense distance of China, together with the monopolies of our India companies obstructing the communication, preserve in Europe the gold and silver, especially the latter, in much greater plenty than they are found in that kingdom. But, notwithstanding this great obstruction, the force of the causes above mentioned is still evident. The skill and ingenuity of Europe in general surpasses perhaps that of China, with regard to manual arts and manufactures, yet are we never able to trade thither without great disadvantage. And were it not for the continual recruits which we receive from America, money would soon sink in Europe, and rise in China, till it came nearly to a level in both places.

Hume, David. Of the populousness of ancient nations. Pt. 2, XI
If we may judge from the younger Pliny's account of his own house, and from Bartoli's plans of ancient buildings, the men of quality had very spacious palaces; and their buildings were like the Chinese houses at this day, where each apartment is separated from the rest, and rises no higher than a single storey.
China, the only country where this practice of exposing children prevails at present, is the most populous country we know of; and every man is married before he is twenty. Such early marriages could scarcely be general, had not men the prospect of so easy a method of getting rid of their children. I own, that Plutarch speaks of it as a very general maxim of the poor to expose their children; and as the rich were then averse to marriage, on account of the courtship they met with from those who expected legacies from them, the public must have been in a bad situation between them.
Hume, David. Of the original contract. Pt. 2, XII
We find also, every where, subjects, who acknowledge this right in their prince, and suppose
themselves born under obligations of obedience to a certain sovereign, as much as under the
ties of reverence and duty to certain parents. These connexions are always conceived to be
equally independent of our consent, in PERSIA and CHINA; in FRANCE and SPAIN; and
even in HOLLAND and ENGLAND, wherever the doctrines above-mentioned have not been
carefully inculcated.

Hume, David. Variant readings.
On the other Hand, our Sectaries, who were formerly such dangerous Bigots, are now become
our greatest Free-thinkers; and the Quakers are, perhaps, the only regular Body of Deists in
the Universe, except the Literati or Disciples of Confucius in China. [Hum3]

1920 Cai, Yuanpei. Mei xue de jin hua [ID D1741].
Liu Gangji : Cai erläutert die Geschichte der westlichen, besonders der deutschen Ästhetik
und gibt einen Überblick über die Entwicklung von der klassischen griechischen Ästhetik
Platons und Aristoteles' bis zur Ästhetik von David Hume und Edmund Burke. Dabei
unterstreicht er die grosse Bedeutung des Buches Aesthetica von Alexander Gottlieb
Baumgarten. Es folgt eine prägnante Erläuterung der Ästhetik Immanuel Kants und der
Bedeutung der Schriften Critik der reinen Vernunft, Critik der praktischen Vernunft und
Critik der Urteilskraft. Dann geht Cai auf den Beitrag von Friedrich Schiller zur
Weiterentwicklung von Kants Theorien ein und anschliessend gibt er einen Überblick über die
Ästhetik von Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel und
Arthur Schopenhauer. [LiuG1:S. 9-10]

1980 International Conference about European Empiricism and Rationalism an der
Wuhan-Universität.
The ideas concerning David Hume's anti-metaphysics and anti-induction were still strange to
most of those attending. But now they have become hackneyed topics. [Hum1]

1999 Gregory Blue : David Hume believed that the Chinese had the greatest uniformity of character
imaginable, and he accounted for this in terms of their common language and their country's
government. In his view, the natural divisions of Europe, and originally of Greece, had resulted
at one level in a variety of political regimes and at another in achievement in the sciences and
arts, whereas the lack of geographical divisions in China had led to stagnation in the
sciences. [Bro4:S. 74]

2003 Zhou Xiaoliang : Nowadays David Hume's philosophy is more and more discussed by
Chinese philosophers, including those who are studying Western analytical philosophy and
the philosophy of sciences. In these two fields, as we know, Hume is regarded as either a
precursor or an important contributor. One more reason for explaining the attraction of
Hume's philosophy is, that in Chinese philosophy, there is a lack of a sceptical tradition.
Chinese philosophers, therefore, have special interests in considering how to evaluate a theory
like Hume's scepticism. [Hum1]

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Millar, 1742-1748.
Pt. 1 : Essays, moral, political, and literary. Pt. 2 : Philosophical essays concerning human
[Enthält Eintragungen über China]. [WC]


人之悟性論


人類理解研究 [WC]


人類理解研究 [WC]


自然宗教對話錄 [WC]


人性論 [WC]


休谟经济论文选 [WC]


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[Tindall, Matthew]. *Zi ran shen lun zhe*. Tingdele zhu ; Zhao Zhensong yi. Übersetzung von Tindall, Matthew. *Christianity not as old as the creation*... (London : T. Warner, 1730).

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2000  


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Vol. 11. Yi shu ji you yi han de xing shi : Beier. = Art as significant form : Clive Bell.
Vol. 29. Dao lun. = About the authors. [WC]

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杜里舒講演錄. 第1期


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**Lampert, Laurence** (1941-) : Professor of Philosophy, Indiana University-Purdue University, Indianapolis

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1998- Charles Le Blanc ist Herausgeber der Collection Sociétés et cultures de l'Asie. [LeB1]  
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Lindsay, Alexander Dunlop (Glasgow 1879-1952 Keele) : 1st Baron Lindsay of Birker, Philosoph

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Locke, John (Wrington bei Bristol 1632-1704 Oates, Essex) : Philosoph

Biographie

Lu Xun schreibt:
"He who has searched out the ancient wellspring will seek the source of the future, the new wellspring. O my brothers, the works of the new life, the surge from the depths of the new source, is not far off". Nietzsche...
Later the poet Kalidasa achieved fame for his dramas and occasional lyrics; the German master Goethe revered them as art unmatched on earth or in heaven...
Iran and Egypt are further examples, snapped in midcourse like well-ropes – ancient splendor now gone arid. If Cathay escapes this roll call, it will be the greatest blessing life can offer. The reason? The Englishman Carlyle said: "The man born to acquire an articulate voice and grandly sing the heart's meaning is his nation's raison d'être. Disjointed Italy was united in essence, having borne Dante, having Italian. The Czar of great Russia, with soldiers, bayonets, and cannon, does a great feat in ruling a great tract of land. Why has he no voice? Something great in him perhaps, but he is a dumb greatness. When soldiers, bayonets and cannon are corroded, Dante's voice will be as before. With Dante, united; but the voiceless Russian remains mere fragments".
Nietzsche was not hostile to primitives; his claim that they embody new forces is irrefutable. A savage wilderness incubates the coming civilization; in primitives' teeming forms the light of day is immanent...
Russian silence; then stirring sound. Russia was like a child, and not a mute; an underground stream, not an old well. Indeed, the early 19th century produced Gogol, who inspired his countrymen with imperceptible tear-stained grief, compared by some to England's Shakespeare, whom Carlyle praised and idolized. Look around the world, where each new contending voice has its own eloquence to inspire itself and convey the sublime to the world; only India and those other ancient lands sit motionless, plunged in silence...
I let the past drop here and seek new voices from abroad, an impulse provoked by concern for the past. I cannot detail each varied voice, but none has such power to inspire and language as gripping as Mara poetry. Borrowed from India, the 'Mara' – celestial demon, or 'Satan' in Europe – first denoted Byron. Now I apply it to those, among all the poets, who were committed to resistance, whose purpose was action but who were little loved by their age; and I introduce their words, deeds, ideas, and the impact of their circles, from the sovereign Byron to a Magyar (Hungarian) man of letters. Each of the group had distinctive features and made his own nation's qualities splendid, but their general bent was the same: few would create conformist harmonies, but they'd bellow an audience to its feet, these iconoclasts whose spirit struck deep chords in later generations, extending to infinity...Humanity began with heroism and bravado in wars of resistance; gradually civilization brought culture and changed ways; in its new weakness, knowing the perils of charging forward, its idea was to revert to the feminine; but a battle loomed from which it saw no escape, and imagination stirred, creating an ideal state set in a place as yet unattained if not in a time too distant to measure. Numerous Western philosophers have had this idea ever since Plato's "Republic". Although there were never any signs of peace, they still craned toward the future, spirits racing toward the longed-for grace, more committed than ever, perhaps a factor in human evolution...
Plato set up his imaginary "Republic", alleged that poets confuse the polity, and should be exiled; states fair or foul, ideas high or low – these vary, but tactics are the same...
In August 1806 Napoleon crushed the Prussian army; the following July Prussia sued for peace and became a dependency. The German nation had been humiliated, and yet the glory of the ancient spirit was not destroyed. E.M. Arndt now emerged to write his "Spirit of the Age" (Geist der Zeit), a grand and eloquent declaration of independence that sparked a blaze of hatred for the enemy; he was soon a wanted man and went to Switzerland. In 1812 Napoleon, thwarted by the freezing conflagration of Moscow, fled back to Paris, and all of Europe – a brewing storm – jostled to mass its forces of resistance. The following year Prussia's King Friedrich Wilhelm III called the nation to arms in a war for three causes: freedom, justice, and homeland; strapping young students, poets, and artists flocked to enlist. Arndt himself returned and composed two essays, "What is the people's army" and "The Rhine is a great German river, not its border", to strengthen the morale of the youth. Among
the volunteers of the time was Theodor Körner, who dropped his pen, resigned his post as Poet of the Vienne State Theater, parted from parents and beloved, and took up arms. To his parents he wrote: "The Prussian eagle, being fierce and earnest, has aroused the great hope of the German people. My songs without exception are spellbound by the fatherland. I would forget all joys and blessings to die fighting for it! Oh, the power of God has enlightened me. What sacrifice could be more worthy than one for our people's freedom and the good of humanity? Boundless energy surges through me, and I go forth! " His later collection "Lyre and sword" (Leier und Schwert), also resonates with this same spirit and makes the pulse race when one recites from it. In those days such a fervent awareness was not confined to Körner, for the entire German youth were the same. Körner's voice as the voice of all Germans, Körner's blood was the blood of all Germans. And so it follows that neither State, nor Emperor, nor bayonet, but the nation's people beat Napoleon. The people all had poetry and thus the poets' talents; so in the end Germany did not perish. This would have been inconceivable to those who would scrap poetry in their devotion to utility, who clutch battered foreign arms in hopes of defending hearth and home. I have, first, compared poetic power with rice and beans only to shock Mammon's disciples into seeing that gold and iron are far from enough to revive a country; and since our nation has been unable to get beyond the surface of Germany and France, I have shown their essence, which will lead, I hope, to some awareness. Yet this is not the heart of the matter...

England's Edward Dowden once said: "We often encounter world masterpieces of literature or art that seem to do the world no good. Yet we enjoy the encounter, as in swimming titanic waters we behold the vastness, float among waves and come forth transformed in body and soul. The ocean itself is but the heave and swell of insensible seas, nor has it once provided us a single moral sentence or a maxim, yet the swimmer's health and vigor are greatly augmented by it"...

If everything were channeled in one direction, the result would be unfulfilling. If chill winter is always present, the vigor of spring will never appear; the physical shell lives on, but the soul dies. Such people live on, but hey have lost the meaning of life. Perhaps the use of literature's uselessness lies here. John Stuart Mill said, "There is no modern civilization that does not make science its measure, reason its criterion, and utility its goal". This is the world trend, but the use of literature is more mysterious. How so? It can nurture our imagination. Nurturing the human imagination is the task and the use of literature...

Matthew Arnold's view that "Poetry is a criticism of life" has precisely this meaning. Thus reading the great literary works from Homer on, one not only encounters poetry but naturally makes contact with life, becomes aware of personal merits and defects one by one, and naturally strives harder for perfection. This effect of literature has educational value, which is how it enriches life; unlike ordinary education, it shows concretely a sense of self, valor, and a drive toward progress. The devline and fall of a state has always begun with is refusal to heed such teaching...

[The middle portion of this essay is a long and detailed description of Lu Xun's exemplary Mara poets, including Byron, Shelley, Pushkin, Lermontov, Mickiewicz, Slowacki and Petőfi].

In 18th-century England, when society was accustomed to deceit, and religion at ease with corruption, literature provided whitewash through imitations of antiquity, and the genuine voice of the soul could not he heard. The philosopher Locke was the first to reject the chronic abuses of politics and religion, to promote freedom of speech and thought, and to sow the seeds of change. In literature it was the peasant Burns of Scotland who put all he had into fighting society, declared universal equality, feared no authority, nor bowed to gold and silk, but poured his hot blood into his rhymes; yet this great man of ideas, not immediately the crowd's proud son, walked a rocky outcast road to early death. Then Byron and Shelley, as we know, took up the fight. With the power of a tidal wave, they smashed into the pillars of the ancien régime. The swell radiated to Russia, giving rise to Pushkin, poet of the nation; to Poland, creating Mickiewicz, poet of revenge; to Hungary, waking Petőfi, poet of patriotism; their followers are too many to name. Although Byron and Shelley acquired the Mara title, they too were simply human. Such a fellowship need not be labeled the "Mara School", for
life on earth is bound to produce their kind. Might they not be the ones enlightened by the
voice of sincerity, who, embracing that sincerity, share a tacit understanding? Their lives are
strangely alike; most took up arms and shed their blood, like swordsmen who circle in public
view, causing shudders of pleasure at the sight of mortal combat. To lack men who shed their
blood in public is a disaster for the people; yet having them and ignoring them, even
proceeding to kill them, is a greater disaster from which the people cannot recover...
"The last ray", a book by the Russian author Korolenko, records how an old man teaches a
boy to read in Siberia: "His book talked of the cherry and the oriole, but these didn't exist in
frozen Siberia. The old man explained: It's a bird that sits on a cherry branch and carols its
fine songs". The youth reflected. Yes, amid desolation the youth heard the gloss of a man of
foresight, although he had not heard the fine song itself. But the voice of foresight does not
come to shatter China's desolation. This being so, is there nothing for us but reflection, simply
nothing but reflection?

Ergänzung von Guo Ting:
Byron behaved like violent weaves and winter wind. Sweeping away all false and corrupt
customs. He was so direct that he never worried about his own situation too much. He was
full of energy, and spirited and would fight to the death without losing his faith. Without
defeating his enemy, he would fight till his last breath. And he was a frank and righteous man,
hiding nothing, and he spoke of others' criticism of himself as the result of social rites instead
of other's evil intent, and he ignored all those bad words. The truth is, at that time in Britain,
society was full of hypocrites, who took those traditions and rites as the truth and called
anyone who had a true opinion and wanted to explore it a devil.

Ergänzung von Yu Longfa:
Die Bezeichnung Mara stammt aus dem Indischen und bedeutet Himmelsdämon. Die
Europäer nennen das Satan. Ursprünglich bezeichnete man damit Byron. Jetzt weist das auf
alle jene Dichter hin, die zum Widerstand entschlossen sind und deren Ziel die Aktion ist,
ausserdem auf diejenigen Dichter, die von der Welt nicht sehr gemocht werden. Sie alle
gehören zu dieser Gruppe. Sie berichten von ihren Taten und Überlegungen, von ihren
Schulen und Einflüssen. Das beginnt beim Stammvater dieser Gruppe, Byron, und reicht
letztlich hin bis zu dem ungarischen Schriftsteller Petöfi. Alle diese Dichter sind in ihrem
äusserlichen Erscheinungsbild sehr unterschiedlich. Jeder bringt entsprechend den
Besonderheiten des eigenen Landes Grossartiges hervor, aber in ihrer Hauptsichtung tendieren
sie zur Einheitlichkeit. Meistens fungieren sie nicht als Stimme der Anpassung an die Welt
und der einträchtigen Freude. Sobald sie aus voller Kehle ihre Stimme erheben, geraten ihre
Zuhörer in Begeisterung, bekämpfen das Himmlische und widersetzen sich den gängigen
Sitten. Aber ihr Geist rührt auch tief an die Seelen der Menschen nachfolgender Generationen
und setzt sich fort bis in die Unendlichkeit. Sie sind ohne Ausnahme vital und unnachgiebig
und treten für die Wahrheit ein... Nietzsche lehnt den Wilden nicht ab, da er neue Lebenskraft
in sich berge und gar nicht anders könne, als ehrlich zu sein. So stammt die Zivilisation denn
auch aus der Unzivilisation. Der Wilde erscheint zwar roh, besitzt aber ein gütmütiges
Inneres. Die Zivilisation ist den Blüten vergleichbar und die Unzivilisation den Knospen.
Vergleicht man jedoch die Unzivilisation mit den Blüten, so entspricht die Zivilisation den
Früchten. Ist die Vorstufe bereits vorhanden, so besteht auch Hoffnung.

Sekundärliteratur
Yu Longfa: Lu Xun befasst sich zwar nicht ausführlich mit Friedrich Nietzsche, aber auf der
Suche nach dem 'Kämpfer auf geistigem Gebiet', dessen charakteristische Eigenschaften,
besonders die Konfiguration des Übermenschen, macht er ausfindig. Lu Xun ist überzeugt,
dass die Selbststärkung eines Menschen und der Geist der Auflehung kennzeichnend für den
Übermenschen sind. In Anlehnung an den Übermenschen zitiert er aus Also sprach
Zarathustra: "Diejenigen, die auf der Suche nach den Quellen des Altertums alles
ausgeschöpft haben, sind im Begriff, die Quellen der Zukunft, die neuen Quellen zu suchen.
Ach, meine Brüder, die Schaffung des neuen Lebens und das Sprudeln der neuen Quellen in
der Tiefe, das dürft wohl nicht weit sein!"
Tam Kwok-kan: Earliest reference to Henrik Ibsen. This is the first Chinese article that discusses in a comprehensive manner the literary pursuits of the Byronic poets. Lu Xun ranks Ibsen as one of these poets and compares the rebellious spirit exemplified in Ibsen's drama to Byron's satanic tendency. Lu Xun had a particular liking for the play An enemy of the people, in which Ibsen presented his ideas through the iconoclast Dr. Stockmann, who in upholding truth against the prejudices of society, is attacked by the people. Lu Xun thought that China needed more rebels like Ibsen who dared to challenge accepted social conventions. By introducing Ibsen in the image of Dr. Stockmann, the moral superman, together with the satanic poets, Lu Xun believed that he could bring in new elements of iconoclasm in the construction of a modern Chinese consciousness. As Lu Xun said, he introduced Ibsen's idea of individualism because he was frustrated with the Chinese prejudice toward Western culture and with the selfishness popular among the Chinese.

Chu Chih-yu: Lu Xun adapted for the greater part of Mara poetry his Japanese sources (Kimura Katataro), he also added some of his own comments and speculations.

Guo Ting: Given Lu Xun's leading position in the Chinese literary field at that time, his defense of Byron was powerful and set the overarching tone for the time of Byron when he was first introduced to Chinese readers.

Liu Xiangyu: On the power of Mara poetry itself is an expression of Byronism to 'speak out against the establishent and conventions' and to 'stir the mind'. Lu Xun criticized traditional Chinese culture and literature. [Yu1:S. 43-46,Byr1:S. 24,KUH7:S. 444,Milt1,Byr5,Byr3,Ibs1:S. 34,Ibs109]

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1998


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[WC]


Ludovici, Anthony Mario (London 1882-1971 London) : Philosoph

Biographie


Wir müssen uns noch im klaren darüber sein, dass es sich nur um eine Lehre bzw. um ein Werkzeug handelt, das uns zur Verbesserung des Lebens, zum Suchen nach Wahrheit verhelfen kann. Wir versuchen aus seiner Lehre etwas Nützliches zu gewinnen, lassen sein Unnützliches im Stich, ja wir vergessen es gänzlich.


Yu Longfa : Anlässlich der Diskussion um Verantwortungsprobleme des vergangenen Krieges scheint Mao Dun eine neue Bewertung von Nietzsches besonders notwendig, um ein 'neues China' zu begründen und zugleich die damit verbundene Kulturbewegung weiter zu fördern. Mao Duns Nietzsche-Rezeption ist keine wissenschaftliche Studie über die Lehre Nietzsches. Er konnte kein Deutsch und war deshalb auf englischsprachige Sekundärliteratur angewiesen. Er hat eine Teilübersetzung von Zarathustra: *Thus spoke Zarathustra* gelesen, sowie *Beyond good and evil* und *Genealogy of morals*.


Mao Duns Vermittlung von Nietzsches Lehre führte in damaliger Zeit zur Popularisierung von Nietzsches Denken einerseits und zu neuen Begriffen andererseits, die extreme Gedanken der damaligen Intellektuellen widerspiegeln.
Raoul David Findeisen: Mao Dun betont, dass Nietzsche ein Elfenbeinturmdasein geführt habe und deshalb ihm gegenüber Vorsicht geboten sei, denn 'er habe keine Ahnung, unter welchen Bedingungen das gewöhnliche Volk lebt'. Mao setzt sich mit dem konfuzianischen Wertesystem auseinander und fordert, sich der 'Umwertung' zu bedienen, um 'die alte Moral zu zerstören'. Der Wert der Tradition müsse 'neu festgesetzt' werden. Er bezeichnet den 'Übermenschen' als einen 'fortschrittlichen Menschen'. Zwar betont er, das Ideal des Übermenschen sei die wichtigste Forderung in Nietzsches Ethik, doch wie durchschlagend sein darwinistisches Vorverständnis war und wie sehr er den Übermenschen als zulässigsten biologischen Phänomen verstand, wird deutlich wenn er ihn charakterisiert: "Der Übermensch steht zum jetzigen Menschen im gleichen Verhältnis wie der jetzige Mensch zum Affen". Mao Dun betont den Wert von Nietzsches Moralkritik, lehnt aber dessen Ableitungen, die er mit "Die Herren werden stärker und die Sklaven schwächer" wiedergibt, entschieden ab, weil sie sich mit den elementarsten Forderungen der Demokratie und des Sozialismus nicht vereinbaren liessen.


Mao Duns zentrale Thesen lautet: Seid unabhängig und nicht unterwürfig, seid fortschrittlich und nicht konservativ, seid kämpferisch und zieht euch nicht zurück, seid utilitaristisch und nicht formalistisch, seid wissenschaftlich und phantasiert nicht. [Yu1:S. 74-81, 91, Find2:S. 23-28]

MacDonald Ross, George (um 1983): Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Director of the Subject Centre for Philosophical and Religious Studies of the Higher Education Academy, University of Leeds

Bibliographie: Autor


MacIntyre, Alasdair C. = MacIntyre, Alastair Chalmers (Glasgow, Schottland 1929-) : Philosoph

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*Bibliographie : Autor*


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Lu Xun schreibt:
"He who has searched out the ancient wellspring will seek the source of the future, the new wellspring. O my brothers, the works of the new life, the surge from the depths of the new source, is not far off". Nietzsche...

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Iran and Egypt are further examples, snapped in midcourse like well-ropes – ancient splendor now gone arid. If Cathay escapes this roll call, it will be the greatest blessing life can offer. The reason? The Englishman Carlyle said: "The man born to acquire an articulate voice and grandly sing the heart's meaning is his nation's raison d'être. Disjointed Italy was united in essence, having borne Dante, having Italian. The Czar of great Russia, with soldiers, bayonets, and cannon, does a great feat in ruling a great tract of land. Why has he no voice? Something great in him perhaps, but he is a dumb greatness. When soldiers, bayonets and cannon are corroded, Dante's voice will be as before. With Dante, united; but the voiceless Russian remains mere fragments".

Nietzsche was not hostile to primitives; his claim that they embody new forces is irrefutable. A savage wilderness incubates the coming civilization; in primitives' teeming forms the light of day is immanent...

Russian silence; then stirring sound. Russia was like a child, and not a mute; an underground stream, not an old well. Indeed, the early 19th century produced Gogol, who inspired his countrymen with imperceptible tear-stained grief, compared by some to England's Shakespeare, whom Carlyle praised and idolized. Look around the world, where each new contending voice has its own eloquence to inspire itself and convey the sublime to the world; only India and those other ancient lands sit motionless, plunged in silence...

I let the past drop here and seek new voices from abroad, an impulse provoked by concern for the past. I cannot detail each varied voice, but none has such power to inspire and language as gripping as Mara poetry. Borrowed from India, the 'Mara' – celestial demon, or 'Satan' in Europe – first denoted Byron. Now I apply it to those, among all the poets, who were committed to resistance, whose purpose was action but who were little loved by their age; and I introduce their words, deeds, ideas, and the impact of their circles, from the sovereign Byron to a Magyar (Hungarian) man of letters. Each of the group had distinctive features and made his own nation's qualities splendid, but their general bent was the same: few would create conformist harmonies, but they'd bellow an audience to its feet, these iconoclasts whose spirit struck deep chords in later generations, extending to infinity...

Humanity began with heroism and bravado in wars of resistance; gradually civilization brought culture and changed ways; in its new weakness, knowing the perils of charging forward, its idea was to revert to the feminine; but a battle loomed from which it saw no escape, and imagination stirred, creating an ideal state set in a place as yet unattained if not in a time too distant to measure. Numerous Western philosophers have had this idea ever since Plato's "Republic". Although there were never any signs of peace, they still craned toward the future, spirits racing toward the longed-for grace, more committed than ever, perhaps a factor in human evolution...

Plato set up his imaginary "Republic", alleged that poets confuse the polity, and should be exiled; states fair or foul, ideas high or low – these vary, but tactics are the same...

In August 1806 Napoleon crushed the Prussian army; the following July Prussia sued for peace and became a dependency. The German nation had been humiliated, and yet the glory of the ancient spirit was not destroyed. E.M. Arndt now emerged to write his "Spirit of the Age" (Geist der Zeit), a grand and eloquent declaration of independence that sparked a blaze of hatred for the enemy; he was soon a wanted man and went to Switzerland. In 1812 Napoleon, thwarted by the freezing conflagration of Moscow, fled back to Paris, and all of Europe – a brewing storm – jostled to mass its forces of resistance. The following year Prussia's King Friedrich Wilhelm III called the nation to arms in a war for three causes: freedom, justice, and homeland; strapping young students, poets, and artists flocked to enlist. Arndt himself returned and composed two essays, "What is the people's army" and "The Rhine is a great German river, not its border", to strengthen the morale of the youth. Among
the volunteers of the time was Theodor Körner, who dropped his pen, resigned his post as Poet of the Vienne State Theater, parted from parents and beloved, and took up arms. To his parents he wrote: "The Prussian eagle, being fierce and earnest, has aroused the great hope of the German people. My songs without exception are spellbound by the fatherland. I would forget all joys and blessings to die fighting for it! Oh, the power of God has enlightened me. What sacrifice could be more worthy than one for our people's freedom and the good of humanity? Boundless energy surges through me, and I go forth!" His later collection "Lyre and sword" (Leier und Schwert), also resonates with this same spirit and makes the pulse race when one recites from it. In those days such a fervent awareness was not confined to Körner, for the entire German youth were the same. Körner's voice as the voice of all Germans, Körner's blood was the blood of all Germans. And so it follows that neither State, nor Emperor, nor bayonet, but the nation's people beat Napoleon. The people all had poetry and thus the poets' talents; so in the end Germany did not perish. This would have been inconceivable to those who would scrap poetry in their devotion to utility, who clutch battered foreign arms in hopes of defending hearth and home. I have, first, compared poetic power with rice and beans only to shock Mammon's disciples into seeing that gold and iron are far from enough to revive a country; and since our nation has been unable to get beyond the surface of Germany and France, I have shown their essence, which will lead, I hope, to some awareness. Yet this is not the heart of the matter...

England's Edward Dowden once said: "We often encounter world masterpieces of literature or art that seem to do the world no good. Yet we enjoy the encounter, as in swimming titanic waters we behold the vastness, float among waves and come forth transformed in body and soul. The ocean itself is but the heave and swell of insensible seas, nor has it once provided us a single moral sentence or a maxim, yet the swimmer's health and vigor are greatly augmented by it"...

If everything were channeled in one direction, the result would be unfulfilling. If chill winter is always present, the vigor of spring will never appear; the physical shell lives on, but the soul dies. Such people live on, but hey have lost the meaning of life. Perhaps the use of literature's uselessness lies here. John Stuart Mill said, "There is no modern civilization that does not make science its measure, reason its criterion, and utility its goal". This is the world trend, but the use of literature is more mysterious. How so? It can nurture our imagination. Nurturing the human imagination is the task and the use of literature...

Matthew Arnold's view that "Poetry is a criticism of life" has precisely this meaning. Thus reading the great literary works from Homer on, one not only encounters poetry but naturally makes contact with life, becomes aware of personal merits and defects one by one, and naturally strives harder for perfection. This effect of literature has educational value, which is how it enriches life; unlike ordinary education, it shows concretely a sense of self, valor, and a drive toward progress. The devline and fall of a state has always begun with is refusal to heed such teaching...

[The middle portion of this essay is a long and detailed description of Lu Xun's exemplary Mara poets, including Byron, Shelley, Pushkin, Lermontov, Michiewicz, Slowacki and Petőfi].

In 18th-century England, when society was accustomed to deceit, and religion at ease with corruption, literature provided whitewash through imitations of antiquity, and the genuine voice of the soul could not he heard. The philosopher Locke was the first to reject the chronic abuses of politics and religion, to promote freedom of speech and thought, and to sow the seeds of change. In literature it was the peasant Burns of Scotland who put all he had into fighting society, declared universal equality, feared no authority, nor bowed to gold and silk, but poured his hot blood into his rhymes; yet this great man of ideas, not immediately the crowd's proud son, walked a rocky outcast road to early death. Then Byron and Shelley, as we know, took up the fight. With the power of a tidal wave, they smashed into the pillars of the ancien régime. The swell radiated to Russia, giving rise to Pushkin, poet of the nation; to Poland, creating Mickiewicz, poet of revenge; to Hungary, waking Petőfi, poet of patriotism; their followers are too many to name. Although Byron and Shelley acquired the Mara title, they too were simply human. Such a fellowship need not be labeled the "Mara School", for
life on earth is bound to produce their kind. Might they not be the ones enlightened by the 
voice of sincerity, who, embracing that sincerity, share a tacit understanding? Their lives are 
strangely alike; most took up arms and shed their blood, like swordsmen who circle in public 
view, causing shudders of pleasure at the sight of mortal combat. To lack men who shed their 
blood in public is a disaster for the people; yet having them and ignoring them, even 
proceeding to kill them, is a greater disaster from which the people cannot recover...
"The last ray", a book by the Russian author Korolenko, records how an old man teaches a 
boy to read in Siberia: "His book talked of the cherry and the oriole, but these didn't exist in 
frozen Siberia. The old man explained: It's a bird that sits on a cherry branch and carols its 
fine songs". The youth reflected. Yes, amid desolation the youth heard the gloss of a man of 
foresight, although he had not heard the fine song itself. But the voice of foresight does not 
come to shatter China's desolation. This being so, is there nothing for us but reflection, simply 
nothing but reflection?

Ergänzung von Guo Ting:
Byron behaved like violent weaves and winter wind. Sweeping away all false and corrupt 
customs. He was so direct that he never worried about his own situation too much. He was 
full of energy, and spirited and would fight to the death without losing his faith. Without 
defeating his enemy, he would fight till his last breath. And he was a frank and righteous man, 
hiding nothing, and he spoke of others' criticism of himself as the result of social rites instead 
of other's evil intent, and he ignored all those bad words. The truth is, at that time in Britain, 
society was full of hypocrites, who took those traditions and rites as the truth and called 
anyone who had a true opinion and wanted to explore it a devil.

Ergänzung von Yu Longfa:
Die Bezeichnung Mara stammt aus dem Indischen und bedeutet Himmelsdämon. Die 
Europäer nennen das Satan. Ursprünglich bezeichnete man damit Byron. Jetzt weist das auf 
alle jene Dichter hin, die zum Widerstand entschlossen sind und deren Ziel die Aktion ist, 
ausserdem auf diejenigen Dichter, die von der Welt nicht sehr gemocht werden. Sie alle 
gehören zu dieser Gruppe. Sie berichten von ihren Taten und Überlegungen, von ihren 
Schulen und Einflüssen. Das beginnt beim Stammvater dieser Gruppe, Byron, und reicht 
letztlich hin bis zu dem ungarischen Schriftsteller Petöfi. Alle diese Dichter sind in ihrem 
äusserlichen Erscheinungsbild sehr unterschiedlich. Jeder bringt entsprechend den 
Besonderheiten des eigenen Landes Grossartiges hervor, aber in ihrer Hauptrichtung tendieren 
sie zur Einheitlichkeit. Meistens fungieren sie nicht als Stimme der Anpassung an die Welt 
und der einträchtigen Freude. Sobald sie aus voller Kehle ihre Stimme erheben, geraten ihre 
Zuhörer in Begeisterung, bekämpfen das Himmlische und widersetzen sich den gängigen 
Sitten. Aber ihr Geist rührt auch tief an die Seelen der Menschen nachfolgender Generationen 
und setzt sich fort bis in die Unendlichkeit. Sie sind ohne Ausnahme vital und unnachgiebig 
und treten für die Wahrheit ein… Nietzsche lehnt den Wilden nicht ab, da er neue Lebenskraft 
in sich berge und gar nicht anders könne, als ehrlich zu sein. So stammt die Zivilisation denn 
auch aus der Unzivilisation. Der Wilde erscheint zwar roh, besitzt aber ein gütährigtes 
Inneres. Die Zivilisation ist den Blüten vergleichbar und die Unzivilisation den Knospen. 
Vergleicht man jedoch die Unzivilisation mit den Blüten, so entspricht die Zivilisation den 
Früchten. Ist die Vorstufe bereits vorhanden, so besteht auch Hoffnung.

Sekundärliteratur
Yu Longfa: Lu Xun befasst sich zwar nicht ausführlich mit Friedrich Nietzsche, aber auf der 
Suche nach dem 'Kämpfer auf geistigem Gebiet', dessen charakteristische Eigenschaften, 
besonders die Konfiguration des Übermenschen, macht er ausfindig. Lu Xun ist überzeugt, 
dass die Selbststärkung eines Menschen und der Geist der Auflehnung kennzeichnend für den 
Übermenschen sind. In Anlehnung an den Übermenschen zitiert er aus Also sprach 
Zarathustra: "Diejenigen, die auf der Suche nach den Quellen des Altersums alles 
ausgeschöpft haben, sind im Begriff, die Quellen der Zukunft, die neuen Quellen zu suchen. 
Ach, meine Brüder, die Schaffung des neuen Lebens und das Sprudeln der neuen Quellen in 
der Tiefe, das dürfte wohl nicht weit sein!"
Tam Kwok-kan: Earliest reference to Henrik Ibsen. This is the first Chinese article that discusses in a comprehensive manner the literary pursuits of the Byronic poets. Lu Xun ranks Ibsen as one of these poets and compares the rebellious spirit exemplified in Ibsen's drama to Byron's satanic tendency. Lu Xun had a particular liking for the play *An enemy of the people*, in which Ibsen presented his ideas through the iconoclast Dr. Stockmann, who in upholding truth against the prejudices of society, is attacked by the people. Lu Xun thought that China needed more rebels like Ibsen who dared to challenge accepted social conventions. By introducing Ibsen in the image of Dr. Stockmann, the moral superman, together with the satanic poets, Lu Xun believed that he could bring in new elements of iconoclasm in the construction of a modern Chinese consciousness. As Lu Xun said, he introduced Ibsen's idea of individualism because he was frustrated with the Chinese prejudice toward Western culture and with the selfishness popular among the Chinese.

Chu Chih-yu: Lu Xun adapted for the greater part of *Mara poetry* his Japanese sources (Kimura Katataro), he also added some of his own comments and speculations.

Guo Ting: Given Lu Xun's leading position in the Chinese literary field at that time, his defense of Byron was powerful and set the overarching tone for the time of Byron when he was first introduced to Chinese readers.

Liu Xiangyu: *On the power of Mara poetry* itself is an expression of Byronism to 'speak out against the establishment and conventions' and to 'stir the mind'. Lu Xun criticized traditional Chinese culture and literature. [Yu1:S. 43-46, Byr1:S. 24, KUH7:S. 444, Milt1, Byr5, Byr3, Ibs1:S. 34, Ibs109]

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1903


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1931


近世六大家心理學 [WC]

Monk, Ray (1957-) : Professor of Philosophy, University of Southampton

**Bibliographie : Autor**


Moore, George Edward (London 1873-1958 Cambridge) : Philosoph

**Bibliographie : erwähnt in**


More, Thomas = Morus, Thomas (London 1478-1535 London) : Staatsmann, Humanistischer Autor, Märtyrer

**Bibliographie : Autor**
Munro, Donald J. = Munro, Donald Jacques (1931-) : Professor of Philosophy and of Chinese, Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan

Biographie

1953  Donald J. Munro erhält den B.A. des Harvard College. [UMich]
1964  Donald J. Munro promoviert an der Columbia University. [UMich]
1964-1972 Donald J. Munro ist Assistant Professor am Department of Philosophy der University of Michigan. [UMich]
1964-1996 Donald J. Munro ist Associate des Center for Chinese Studies der University of Michigan. [UMich]
1973-1990 Donald J. Munro ist Professor of Philosophy am Department of Philosophy der University of Michigan. [UMich]
1980  Donald J. Munro ist Fritz Lecturer an der University of Washington. [UMich]
1983  Donald J. Munro ist Gilbert Ryle Lecturer an der Trent University, Ontaio. [UMich]
1988-1989 Donald J. Munro ist John Dewey Lecturer an der University of Vermont, Burlington. [UMich]
1991-1996 Donald J. Munro ist Professor of Philosophy and of Chinese an der University of Michigan. [UMich]
2003  Donald J. Munro ist Ch’ien Mu Lecturer in History and Culture am New Asia College der Chinese University of Hong Kong. [UMich]

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<td>A Chinese ethics for the new century: the Ch’ien Mu lectures in history and culture, and other essays on science and Confucian ethics.</td>
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**Natanson, Maurice Alexander** (1924-1996): Professor of Philosophy, Yale University

*Bibliographie: Autor*


**Nathanson, Jerome** (1907-1975): Philosoph, Chairman of the board of leaders of the New York Society for Ethical Culture

*Bibliographie: Autor*


**Niebuhr, Reinhold** = Niebuhr, Karl Paul Reinhold (Wright City, Missouri. 1892-1971 Stockbridge, Mass): Theologe, Philosoph, Politikwissenschaftler

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Toynbee, Arnold J. An historian's view of the crisis of modern civilization.
Einstein, Albert. The faith of a scientist.
Silone, Ignazio. The God that failed.
Clark, John Maurice. Alternative to serfdom.
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Russell, Bertrand. Philosophic rationality for a changing world.
Hook, Sidney. Naturalism and democracy-
Koch, Adrienne. Reason and values ; Toward a common faith. [WC]

Norris, Christopher (1947-) : Distinguished Research Professor in Philosophy, Cardiff School of English Communication and Philosophy

Bibliographie : Autor

O'Connor, D.J. = O'Connor, Daniel John (1914-2012) : Professor of Philosophy, University of Exeter

Bibliographie : Autor

O'Hagan, Timothy = O'Hagan, Timothy David Brendan (Farnham, Norwich 1945-) : Professor of Philosophy, University of East Anglia, Norwich

Bibliographie : Autor

Odell, S. Jack (1933-) : Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Maryland

Bibliographie : Autor

**Odin, Steve** (1953-) : Professor of Philosophy, University of Hawaii at Manoa

**Bibliographie : Autor**


**Ogden, Charles Kay** = Ogden, C.K. (Fleetwood, Lancashire 1889-1957 London) : Sprachwissenschaftler, Philosoph, Schriftsteller

**Biographie**

1921.11.07  Letter from Xu Zhimo to Bertrand Russell. 7.11.1921.

C[harles] K[ay] Ogden planed to publish a World philosophy series, in which Hu Shi's Zhongguo zhe xue shi da gang [Outlines of the history of Chinese philosophy] was to be included upon Russell's proposal. The project of Ogden did not materialize.

Xu did not agree with Russell :
"The author [Hu Shi] is too much concerned with combatting his predecessors on points which are not likely to interest the Western readers not well-informed in this field ; in the second place, it is too bulky, the first volume alone amounting to four hundred pages. It occurs to me [that] the best man for our purpose is Mr. Liang Qichao (the man who gave you that piece of painting) who, as you probably know, is one of the very most learned scholars and probably the most powerful and lucid writer China has ever produced. His continual effort of emancipating Chinese thought and introducing and popularizing Western ideas is worthy of our great admiration. His power of assimilating and discriminating learning has never been equaled. So it would be simply ideal if we could get him to do the job, and that I think more than possible. If you would just kindly write to him, urging him to produce a standard book on Chinese thought and indicating the general character of the Series, it would be, I have no doubt, a tremendous spur to his amazing creative energy and he would be more than pleased to comply with the request. There could be no better arrangement than this." [Russ45]

**Bibliographie : Autor**


**Ogden, Suzanne** (1942-) : Professor Department of Political Science, Northeastern University, Boston

**Bibliographie : Autor**


**Parkes, Graham** (1949-): Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Hawaii

*Bibliographie*


1976 Graham Parkes promoviert in Philosophy an der University of California, Berkeley. [Park]

1976-1977 Graham Parkes ist Lecturer des Aesthetic Studies Program der University of California, Santa Cruz. [Park]

1977-1979 Graham Parkes ist Lecturer in Philosophy an der University of California, Santa Cruz. [Park]

1979-1985 Graham Parkes ist Assistant Professor of Philosophy an der University of Hawaii. [Park]

1985-1992 Graham Parkes ist Associate Professor of Philosophy an der University of Hawaii. [Park]

1992- Graham Parkes ist Professor of Philosophy an der University of Hawaii. [Park]


1995-1996 Graham Parkes ist Senior Fellow am Center for the Study of World Religions der Harvard University. [Park]

1997-1998 Graham Parkes ist Visiting Professor for Asian Philosophy am Institut für Philosophie der Universität Innsbruck, Österreich. [Park]

2001 Graham Parkes ist Visiting Professor for Asian Philosophy am Institut für Philosophie der Universität Wien. [Park]

2002- Graham Parkes ist Adjunct Professor der Division of Ecology & Health, John A. Burns School of Medicine, University of Hawaii. [Park]

2002- Graham Parkes ist Mitglied der Core Faculty, Academy of Cinematic and Digital Arts der University of Hawaii, Manoa. [Park]

2006 Graham Parkes ist Research Fellow am Columbia University Institut for Schoars at Reid Hall, Paris. [Park]

*Bibliographie: Autor*


Peirce, Charles Sanders  (Cambridge, Mass. 1839-1914 Milford, Penn.) : Philosoph, Mathematiker, Wissenschaftler

*Bibliographie : erwähnt in*


Perkins, Franklin  (um 2004) : Assistant Professor of Philosophy, DePaul University, Chicago

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Piper, Adrian  (New York, N.Y. 1948-) : Philosophin, Konzeptkünstlerin

*Bibliographie : Autor*
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Immanuel Kant.
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1987


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Pynn, Tom (um 2002) : Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies, Kennesaw State University, Ga.

Bibliographie : Autor

2002


Quinton, Anthony = Quinton, Anthony Meredith, Baron (Chatham 1925-2010 Oxford) : Philosoph, Rundfunkmoderator, Politiker, Präsident Trinity College

Bibliographie : Autor


Bibliographie : Autor


Raws, John (Baltimore, Md. 1921-2002 Lexington, Mass.) : Philosoph

Bibliographie : erwähnt in


Read, Herbert (Muscoats, bei Stonegrave, Yorkshire 1893-1968 Stonegrave) : Schriftsteller, Dichter, Philosoph, Literaturkritiker, Kunsthistoriker

Bibliographie : Autor


Robinson, Dave (um 1999) : Englischer Philosoph

Bibliographie : Autor

Rockmore, Tom (1942-) : Amerikanischer Philosoph, Professor für Philosophie University of Pittsburgh

Bibliographie : Autor


Bibliographie : Autor


**Bibliographie : erwähnt in**


**Rosen, Stanley (2)** (Cleveland, Ohio 1929-2014 Philadelphia, Penn.) : Philosoph, Professor of Philosophy, Boston University

**Bibliographie : Autor**

Royce, Josiah (Grass Valley, Calif. 1855-1916 Cambridge, Mass.) : Philosoph, Professor für Philosophie, Harvard University

Bibliographie : Autor


1964 Xi fang xian dai zi chan jie ji zhe xue lun zhu xuan ji. Hong Qian zhu bian. (Beijing : Shang wu yin shu guan, 1964).


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1919 Zhang, Shenfu. Lian duo shi [ID D28288].
Zhang complained that, since Hegel, formal logics had almost been banned from philosophy and gave an overview of logics in Western philosophy, starting with Plato and ending with Russell. During the previous 40 years, mathematics and philosophy had grown closer together. This was, according to Zhang, mainly due to Russell's efforts and not without social implications; such an approach to philosophy could offer models for responsible and rationalized thought. [Russ3]

1919.03 Suzanne P. Ogden : The immediate stimulus leading to the invitation to Bertrand Russell for a visit in China may have been the series of lectures given by John Dewey in Beijing in March 1919 on The three great philosophers of our day, James, Bergson, and Russell. [Russ10]

Liang Shuming attacked Bertrand Russell vigorously, together with Henri Bergson. Though they used different methods, their mathematical and intuitive epistemologies respectively were nothing but 'delusion' that made true knowledge impossible. [Russ3]
Raoul Findeisen: Bertrand Russell talked publicly on board the French liner 'Porthos' on what he had seen in Soviet Russia which incited some fellow-travellers to ask the British Embassy in China whether it would be possible to prevent him getting off board in Shanghai, since he had 'expressed pro-Bolshevik and anti-British sentiments' and would 'prove subversive and dangerous to British interests at Chinese educational institutions. The Chinese authorities were not of the same opinion and Russell held a triumphant première in Shanghai, together with Dora Black. They were 'treated like Emperor and Empress' and Russell would be represented even on a cigarette advertisement. They both had declared that they were not married to each other. Chinese newspapers announced Mrs. Black as 'the favourite concubine of the world famous English philosopher'. Russell sometimes gave four introductory speeches on his ideas every day and the Western guests first travelled to Hangzhou, Nanjing, by boat to Hankou to reach Changsha. In Changsha, Russell met John Dewey and Mao Zedong. He gave four lectures in Changsha. When arriving in Beijing, Zhao Yuanren was assigned as official interpreter and lived in the household with Dora Black and Russell at Sui'anbo hutong no 2 (Chaoyang district). Chinese publications, declared as Russell's works, were usually based on notes taken during his lectures and sometimes even published in the next day's newspapers. So they do not necessarily correspond to books of the same title. [Russ3, Russ9]

Formation of the Bertrand Russell Study Group in Beijing. [Russ6]
Since there is much more to Bertrand Russell in China than can be covered in this brief article, I have prefixed the title with "with" to make it clear that it was my part as Russell's interpreter that I am going to write about. Russell arrived in China less than a month after I returned to China after studying in America for ten years. I had been called back to teach mathematics and physics at Tsing Hua College in Peking. But on August 19, 1920, the third day of my arrival in Shanghai, I was asked by the newly formed Lecture Society to be Russell's interpreter. This society was formed by the Progressive Party, led by men like Liang Ch'i Ch'ao, Chiang Po Li, Fu Tung, et al. My friends the Hu brothers, Hu Tun-Fu and Hu Ming-Fu, and (unrelated) Suh Hu (later better known as Hu Shih) warned me not to be misled by people who invited Russell here just to enhance the political prestige of their political party. When Chin Pang-Cheng (better known as P.C. King), President of Tsing Hua College, was approached about borrowing me to interpret for Russell, he agreed, provided that I did not leave the Peking locality. As a matter of fact, the Lecture Society was organized right in Peking and before I had taught a full month at Tsing Hua, I was on my way to Shanghai to meet Bertrand Russell arriving on October 13. This was what I wrote in my diary for that date:

"Bertrand Russell looked very much what I had expected from photographs and descriptions, except that he looked stronger, taller, and more gracious-mannered than I had thought. He looked like a scholar. It was easy for me to get acquainted with him thru mutual acquaintances at Harvard."

Before going to Peking both Russell and Miss Dora Black gave lectures in Shanghai, Hangchow, Nanking, and Changsha. I usually interpreted for them in Standard Mandarin. But, having always been interested in the Chinese dialects, I tried the Hangchow dialect in Hangchow and the Hunan dialect in Changsha, the capital of the province. After one of the lectures at Changsha, a member of the audience came up and asked me, "Sir, which county of the province are you from?" He had not realized that I was a speaker of Mandarin imitating Hunanese imperfectly and assumed instead that I was a Hunanese speaking Mandarin imperfectly. On the same trip I had to interpret a speech by Governor T'an Yen-k'ai into English and somebody else interpreted Russell's. It happened that there was a total eclipse of the moon that night, to which Russell referred in his usual witty manner. But the interpreter left out that best part of his speech and repeated only the usual after-dinner polite words.

It was quite a job getting settled in Peking. Having found a house at No. 2 Sui-An Po Hutung in the eastern part of the city, we had to find an English-speaking servant-cook, as I was in no way obliged or qualified to do that sort of interpreting. Mr. Russell and Miss Black used the main northern part of the courtyard and I moved out from Tsing Hua College to join them in the eastern and western apartments. People very easily got used to the idea that Mr. Russell and Miss Black lived in the same apartment, although it was a revolutionary idea of recent origin that a boy and a girl should meet each other at all before they got married. As a matter of fact, I myself was very much concerned with the problem of breaking an engagement with a girl I had never met and was much occupied after my return from America to settle the matter, especially as I began to know and was attracted to a Miss Buwei Yang, who was running a hospital in Peking. This made it all the more attractive to move from the Tsing Hua suburb into the city.

On November 5, 1920, I interpreted an interview with Russell by Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao. This was my first meeting with Liang, whose writings had had a great influence on the young men of our generation. November 7 was the date of Russell's first regular lecture. It was on problems of philosophy, held on the Third Campus of the National Peking University. There was an audience of some 1500 people. I find in my diary I noted that "there is more pleasure to speak as interpreter than as the original speaker, because the former gets the response from the audience."

Other topics Russell lectured on included analysis of mind, idealism, causality, theory of relativity, gravitation, and symbolic logic. As a matter of fact, one reason for getting me to interpret for Russell was my dissertation had been on problems related to logic.
of the lectures alternated between the National University of Peking and the Teachers' College, which had a very large auditorium. Once I spent too much time with my girl friend Dr. Yang and arrived almost ten minutes late, while Russell stood helplessly on the podium. Seeing that I had come in with a girl, he whispered to me, "Bad man, bad man!"

I also interpreted Dora Black's lectures. Although the topics were mostly socio-politically oriented, which was outside my line, I found them fairly easy to translate. Once, before a large audience at the Women's Normal School, Miss Black mentioned something about unmarried men and unmarried women. There being different words in Chinese for "marry" for men and for women, I happened to use the wrong verbs and it came out something like "men who have no husbands and women who have no wives", at which the audience roared with laughter, of course. When the speaker wondered why they were so hilarious, I had to whisper to her, "I'll have to explain it to you later, it'll take too long now."

Besides the regular lectures there were organized small seminars and study groups for Russell's philosophy and a Russell Monthly was published under the editorship of Ch' u Shih-Ying. I myself had of course to attend and join these activities. Add to this my activities in getting disengaged from the girl I didn't know, so that I could get married to the girl I did learn to know and love, plus translating Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and making National Language Records, it was a wonder that I had nothing more than frequent colds from overwork and overexposure during those chilly northern months. Now Russell fared much less well then I did. With all his radicalism in thought, he was a perfect English gentleman in manners down to the last detail in dress, a habit which almost cost him his life.

On March 14, I went with him to Paoting, about 100 miles south of Peking, where he lectured at the Yu Te ("cultivate virtue") Middle school on the subject of education. It was still wintry and windy and he lectured as usual without an overcoat while I shivered beside him even with my overcoat on. Three days after his return to Peking, he ran a high fever and was attended by Dr. Dipper of the German Hospital in the Legation Quarters. After being brought into the Hospital, he became worse. March 26 was a black day for me. First, there was news from Dr. Yang, saying that her colleague Dr. Yu had died of the plague on a trip to Manchuria to survey the epidemic there. Then I got word that my maternal grandmother had had a stroke in Soochow, of which she died a few days later. That evening I was called to the hospital. I reported in my diary for that evening:

"Prof. Dewey made out form for Mr. Rus. to sign. He was weak but seemed quite clear what he was doing. He could mutter "power of attorney?" [to Dora Black, that is], then tried to sign. The doctor was afraid "er kann nicht." But he did scribble out B. Russell. He could recognize me and called me in, whispered "Mister Ch'." He called Dewey by name and said "I hope all my friends will stick by me." I stayed for a while talking with Mr. Brandauer of the oxygen administrator."

The next day Dr. Esser said that Mr. Russell was "more worse". But by March 29 Miss Black reported that Russell was better. From then on he improved steadily until he was discharged from the hospital and returned to the house. Meanwhile a garbled Japanese report said that Russell had died. When the report reached Russell himself, he said, "Tell them the news of my death was very much exaggerated." During the weeks of Russell's convalescence, I was busy finishing my translation of Alice in wonderland, meeting with members of the Committee on Unification of the National Committee, and, what was of greater personal concern, going to Shanghai to conclude the business of breaking my engagement with the girl I had never met and then to marry the girl I did know and love. On June 1, 1921, with my friend Hu Shih and Buwei Yang's friend Miss Chu Cheng to sign as witnesses, we were married just by moving to a house on Hsiao Yapao Hutung. When we asked Russell whether our no-ceremony wedding ceremony was too conservative, he replied, "That was radical enough." July 6 was the last day Russell and Black gave lectures, followed the next day by a farewell party given by Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao, at which Ting Wen-Chiang (better known as V.K. Ting) made a very good send-off speech.

On July 11 we saw John Dewey off in the morning and saw Mr. Russel I and Miss Black off in the afternoon. So this is the end of my story of the year with Bertrand Russell in China. After that my wife and I had the opportunity of seeing him once every few years. In 1924 we
saw him at Land's End in Penzance (where Gilbert and Sullivan's Pirates came from and had access to what he called the Inaccessible Beach. In 1939 we saw him briefly at the Claremont Hotel in Berkeley, California. He said that by the time China wins, the sacrifice in having to become more and more totalitarian would not be worth the victory. He ordered, with great disapproval, such strange drink as 7-up for our children. In 1941 Professor Ernest Hocking of Harvard invited me to his departmental lunch, at which Mr. Russell reported on placement surveys, an unusual topic for him to discuss. In 1954 we visited with him in his London home in Richmond and had the pleasure of meeting Edith Russell for the first time. Finally, in 1968, we took a taxi from London to Plas Penrhyn, Penrhyndeudraeth, Merioneth, on the west coast of Wales and had tea with the Russells. On this occasion I thanked him for the gift of a pun. For one of his few popular lectures in Peking had been on "Causes of the Present Chaos in China." When after his return to England I informed him of the birth of our first child, Rulan, he said in reply, "Congratulations I see that you are among the causes of the present Chaos in China." But in his Autobiography he attributed that pun to me. The last view of him was when he and Lady Russell stood at the door, Chinese fashion, and waved to us as we were leaving, until we were out of sight. After his decease we received two letters from two Lady Russells, Dora and Edith, on the same day. [Russ5]
We travelled to China from Marseille in a French boat called 'Portos'. Just before we left London, we learned that, owing to a case of plague on board, the sailing would be delayed for three weeks. We did not feel, however, that we could go through all the business of saying goodbye a second time, so we went to Paris and spent three weeks there. During this time I finished my book on Russia, and decided, after much hesitation, that I would publish it. To say anything against Bolshevism was, of course, to play into the hands of reaction, and most of my friends took the view that one ought not to say what one thought about Russia unless what one thought was favourable. I had, however, been impervious to similar arguments from patriots during the War, and it seemed to me that in the long run no good purpose would be served by holding one's tongue. The matter was, of course, much complicated for me by the question of my personal relations with Dora. One hot summer night, after she had gone to sleep, I got up and sat on the balcony of our room and contemplated the stars. I tried to see the question without the heat of party passion and imagined myself holding a conversation with Cassiopeia. It seemed to me that I should be more in harmony with the stars if I published what I thought about Bolshevism than if I did not. So I went on with the work and finished the book on the night before we started for Marseille.

The voyage lasted five or six weeks, to that one got to know one's fellow-passengers pretty well. The French people mostly belonged to the official classes. They were much superior to the English, who were rubber planters and business men. There were rows between the English and the French, in which we had to act as mediators. On one condition the English asked me to give an address about Soviet Russia. In view of the sort of people that they were, I said only favourable things about the Soviet Government, so there was nearly a riot, and when we reached Shanghai our English fellow-passengers sent a telegram to the Consulate General in Peking, urging that we should not be allowed to land. We consoled ourselves with the thought of what had befallen the ring-leader among our enemies at Saigon. There was at Saigon an elephant whose keeper sold bananas which the visitors gave to the elephant. We each gave him a banana, and he made us a very elegant bow, but our enemy refused, whereupon the elephant squirted dirty water all over his immaculate clothes, which also the keeper had taught him to do. Perhaps our amusement at this incident did not increase his love of us.

When we arrived at Shanghai there was at first no one to meet us. I had had from the first a dark suspicion that the invitation might be a practical joke, and in order to test its genuineness I had got the Chinese to pay my passage money before I started. I thought that few people would spend £125 on a joke, but when nobody appeared at Shanghai our fears revived, and we began to think we might have to creep home with our tails between our legs. It turned out, however, that our friends had only made a little mistake as to the time of the boat's arrival. They soon appeared on board and took us to a Chinese hotel, where we passed three of the most bewildering days that I have ever experienced. There was at first some difficulty in explaining about Dora. They got the impression that she was my wife, and when we said that this was not the case, they were afraid that I should be annoyed about their previous misconception. I told them that I wished her treated as my wife, and they published a statement to that effect in the Chinese papers. From the first moment to the last of our stay in China, every Chinese with whom we came in contact treated her with the most complete and perfect courtesy, and with exactly the same deference as would have been paid to her if she had been in fact my wife. There did this in spite of the fact that we insisted upon her always
Our time in Shanghai was spent in seeing endless people, Europeans, Americans, Japanese, and Koreans, as well as Chinese. In general the various people who came to see us were not on speaking terms with each other; for instance, there could be no social relations between the Japanese and the Korean Christians who had been exiled for bomb-throwing. (In Korea at that a time a Christian was practically synonymous with a bomb-thrower.) So we had to put our guests at separate tables in the public room, and move round from table to table throughout the day. We had also to attend an enormous banquet, at which various Chinese made after-dinner speeches in the best English style, with exactly the type of joke which is demanded of such an occasion. It was our first experience of the Chinese, and we were somewhat surprised by their wit and fluency. I had not realized until then that a civilized Chinese is the most civilized person in the world. Sun Yat-sen invited me to dinner, but to my lasting regret the evening he suggested was after my departure, and I had to refuse. Shortly after this he went to Canton to inaugurate the nationalist movement which afterwards conquered the whole country, and as I was unable to go to Canton, I never met him.

Our Chinese friends took us for two days to Hangchow to see the Western Lane. The first day we went round it by boat, and the second day in chairs. It was marvelously beautiful, with the beauty of ancient civilization, surpassing even that of Italy. From there we went to Hanking, and from Nankin by boat to Hankow. The days on the Yangtse were as delightful as the days on the Volga had been horrible. From Hankow we went to Changsha, where an educational conference was in progress. They wished us to stay there for a week, and give addresses every day, but we were both exhausted and anxious for a chance to rest, which made us eager to reach Peking. So we refused to stay more than twenty-four hours, in spite of the fact that the Governor of Hunan in person held out every imaginable inducement, including a special train in all the way to Wuchang.

However, in order to do my best to conciliate the people of Changsha, I gave four lectures, two after-dinner speeches, and an after-lunch speech, during the twenty-four hours. Changsha was a place without modern hotels, and the missionaries very kindly offered to put us up, but they made it clear that Dora was to stay with one set of missionaries, and I with another. We therefore thought it best to decline their invitation, and stayed at a Chinese hotel. The experience was not altogether pleasant. Armies of bugs walked across the bed all through the night.

The Tuchun (the military Governor of the Province) gave a magnificent banquet, at which we first met the Deweys, who behaved with great kindness, and later, when I became ill, John Dewey treated us both with singular helpfulness. I was told that when he came to see me in the hospital, he was much touched by my saying, 'We must make a plan for peace' at a time when everything else that I said was delirium. We assembled in one vast hall and then moved into another for the feast, which was sumptuous beyond belief. In the middle of it the Tuchun apologized for the extreme simplicity of the fare, saying that he thought we should like to see how they lived in everyday life rather than to be treated with any pomp. To my intense chagrin, I was unable to think of a retort in kind, but I hope the interpreter made up for my lack of wit. We left Changsha in the middle of a lunar eclipse, and saw bonfire being lit and heard gongs beaten to frighten off the Heavenly Dog, according to the traditional ritual of China on such occasions. From Changsha, we travelled straight through to Peking, where we enjoyed our first wash for ten days.

Our first months in Peking were a time of absolute and complete happiness. All the difficulties and disagreements that we had were completely forgotten. Our Chinese friends were delightful. The work was interesting, and Peking itself inconceivably beautiful. We had a house boy, a male cook and a rickshaw boy. The house boy spoke some English and it was through him that we made ourselves intelligible to the others. This process succeeded better than it would have done in England. We engaged the cook sometime before we came to live in our house and told him that the first meal we should want would be dinner some days hence. Sure enough, when the time came, dinner was ready. The house boy knew everything. One day we were in need of change and we had hidden what we believed to be a dollar in an old table. We described its whereabouts to the house boy and asked him to fetch it. He replied
imperturbably. 'No, Madam. He bad'. We also had the occasional services of a sewing woman. We engaged her in the winter and dispensed with her services in the summer. We were amused to observe that while, in winter, she had been very fat, as the weather grew warm, she became gradually very thin, having replaced the thick garments of winter gradually by the elegant garments of summer. We had to furnish our house which we did from the very excellent second-hand furniture shops which abounded in Peking. Our Chinese friends could not understand our preferring old Chinese things to modern furniture from Birmingham. We had an official interpreter assigned to look after us. His English was very good and he was especially proud of his ability to make puns in English. His name was Mr Chao and, when I showed him an article that I had written called 'Causes of the Present Chaos', he remarked, 'Well, I suppose, the causes of the present Chaos are the previous Chaos'. I became a close friend of his in the course of our journeys. He was engaged to a Chinese girl and I was able to remove some difficulties that had impeded his marriage. I still hear from him occasionally and once or twice he and his wife come to see me in England.

I was very busy lecturing, and I also had a seminar of the more advanced students. All of them were Bolsheviks except one, who was the nephew of the Emperor. They used to slip off to Moscow one by one. They were charming youths, ingenuous and intelligent at the same time, eager to know the works and to escape from the trammels of Chinese tradition. Most of them had been betrothed in infancy to old-fashioned girls, and were troubled by the ethical question whether they would be justified in breaking the betrothal to marry some girl of modern education. The gulf between the old China and the new as vast, and family bonds were extraordinarily irksome for the modern-minded young man. Dora used to go to the Girls' Normal School, where those who were to be teachers were being trained. They would put to her every kind of question about marriage, free love, contraception, etc., and she answered all their questions with complete frankness. Nothing of the sort would have been possible in any similar European institution. In spite of their freedom of thought, traditional habits of behavior had a great hold upon them. We occasionally gave parties to the young men of my seminar and the girls at the Normal School. The girls at first would take refuge in a room to which they supposed no men would penetrate, and they had to be fetched out and encouraged to associate with males. It must be said that when once the ice was broken, no further encouragement was needed.

The National University of Peking for which I lectured was a very remarkable institution. The Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor were men passionately devoted to the modernising of China. The Vice-Chancellor was one of the most whole-hearted idealists that I have ever known. The funds which should have gone to pay salaries were always being appropriated by Tuchums, so that the teaching was mainly a labour of love. The students deserved what their professors had to give them. They were ardently desirous of knowledge, and there was no limit to the sacrifices that they were prepared to make for their country. The atmosphere was electric with the hope of a great awakening. After centuries of slumber, China was becoming aware of the modern world, and at that time the sordidnesses and compromises that go with governmental responsibility had not yet descended upon the reformers. The English sneered at the reformers, and said that China would always be China. They assured me that it was silly to listen to the frothy talk of half-baked young men; yet within a few years those half-baked young men had conquered China and deprived the English of many of their most cherished privileges.

Since the advent of the Communists to power in China, the policy of the British towards that country has been somewhat more enlightened than that of the United States, but until that time the exact opposite was the case. In 1926, on three separate occasions, British troops fired on unarmed crowds of Chinese students, killing and wounding many. I wrote a fierce denunciation of these outrages, which was published first in England and then throughout China. An American missionary in China, with whom I corresponded, came to England shortly after this time, and told me that indignation in China had been such as to endanger the lives of all Englishmen living in that country. He even said — though I found this scarcely credible — that the English in China owed their preservation to me, since I had caused infuriated Chinese to include that not all Englishmen are vile. However that may be, I
incurred the hostility, not only of the English in China, but of the British Government. White men in China were ignorant of many things that were common knowledge among the Chinese. On one occasion my bank (which was American) gave me notes issued by a French bank, and I found that Chinese tradesmen refused to accept them. My bank expressed astonishment, and gave me other notes instead. Three months later, the French bank went bankrupt, to the surprise of all other white banks in China.

The Englishman in the East, as far as I was able to judge of him, is a man completely out of touch with his environment. He plays polo and goes to his club. He derives his ideas of native culture from the works of eighteenth-century missionaries, and he regards intelligence in the East with the same contempt which he feels for intelligence in his own country. Unfortunately for our political sagacity, he overlooks the fact that in the East intelligence is respected, so that enlightened Radicals have an influence upon affairs which is denied to their English counterparts. MacDonald went to Windsor in knee-breeches, but the Chinese reformers showed no such respect to their Emperor, although our monarchy is a mushroom growth of yesterday compared to that of China.

My views as to what should be done in China I put into my book The problem of China and so shall not repeat them here.

In spite of the fact that China was in a ferment, it appeared to us, as compared with Europe, to be a country filled with philosophic calm. Once a week the mail would arrive from England, and the letters and newspapers that came from there seemed to breathe upon us a hot blast of insanity like the fiery heat that comes from a furnace door suddenly opened. As we had to work on Sundays, we made a practice of taking a holiday on Mondays, and we usually spent the whole day in the Temple of Heaven, the most beautiful building that it has ever been my good fortune to see. We would sit in the winter sunshine saying little, gradually absorbing peace, and would come away prepared to face the madness and passion of our own distracted continent with poise and calm. At other times, we used to walk on the walls of Peking. I remember with particular vividness a walk one evening starting at sunset and continuing through the rise of the full moon.

The Chinese have (or had) a sense of humour which I found very congenial. Perhaps communism has killed it, but when I was there they constantly reminded me of the people in their ancient books. One hot day two fat middle-aged business men invited me to motor into the country to see a certain very famous half-ruined pagoda. When we reached it, I climbed the spiral staircase, expecting them to follow, but on arriving at the top I saw them still on the ground. I asked why they had not come up, and with portentous gravity they replied: 'We thought of coming up, and debated whether we should do so. Many weighty arguments were advanced on both sides, but at last there was one which decided us. The pagoda might crumble at any moment, and we felt that, if it did, it would be well there should be those who could bear witness as to how the philosopher died.' What they meant was that it was hot and they were fat.

Many Chinese have that refinement of humour which consists in enjoying a joke more when the other person cannot see it. As I was leaving Peking a Chinese friend gave me a long classical passage microscopically engraved by hand on a very small surface; he also gave me the same passage written out in exquisite calligraphy. When I asked what it said, he replied: 'Ask Professor Giles when you get home'. I took his advice, and found that it was 'The consultation of the Wizard', in which the wizard merely advises his clients to do whatever they like. He was poking fun at me because I always refused to give advice to the Chinese as to their immediate political difficulties.

The climate of Peking in winter is very cold. The wind blows almost always from the north, bringing an icy breath from the Mongolian mountains. I got bronchitis, but paid no attention to it. It seemed to get better, and one day, at the invitation of some Chinese friends, we went to a place about two hours by motorcar from Peking, where there were hot springs. The hotel provided a very good tea, and someone suggested that it was unwise to eat too much tea as it would spoil one's dinner. I objected to such prudence on the ground that the Day of Judgement might intervene. I was right, as it was three months before I ate another square meal. After tea, I suddenly began to shiver, and after I had been shivering for an hour or so,
we decided that we had better get back to Peking at once. On the way home, our car had a puncture, and by the time the puncture was mended, the engine was cold. By this time, I was nearly delirious, but the Chinese servants and Dora pushed the car to the top of a hill, and on the descent the engine gradually began to work. Owing to the delay, the gates of Peking were shut when we reached them, and it took an hour of telephoning to get them open. By the time we finally got home, I was very ill indeed. Before I had time to realize what was happening, I was delirious. I was moved into a German hospital, where Dora nursed me by day, and the only English professional nurse in Peking nursed me by night. For a fortnight the doctors thought every evening that I should be dead before morning. I remember nothing of this time except a few dreams. When I came out of delirium, I did not know where I was, and did not recognise the nurse. Dora told me that I had been very ill and nearly died, to which I replied: 'How interesting', but I was so weak that I forgot it in five minutes, and she had to tell me again. I could not even remember my own name. But although for about a month after my delirium had ceased they kept telling me I might die at any moment, I never believed a word of it. The nurse whom they had found was rather distinguished in her profession, and had been the Sister in charge of a hospital in Serbia during the War. The whole hospital had been captured by the Germans, and the nurses removed to Bulgaria. She was never tired of telling me how intimate she had become with the Queen of Bulgaria. She was a deeply religious woman, and told me when I began to get better that she had seriously considered whether it was not her duty to let me die. Fortunately, professional training was too strong for her moral sense.

All through the time of my convalescence, in spite of weakness and great physical discomfort, I was exceedingly happy. Dora was very devoted, and her devotion made me forget everything unpleasant. At an early stage of my convalescence Dora discovered that she was pregnant, and this was a source of immense happiness to us both. Ever since the moment when I walked on Richmond Green with Alys, the desire for children had been growing stronger and stronger within me, until at last it had become a consuming passion. When I discovered that I was not only to survive myself, but to have a child, I became completely indifferent to the circumstances of convalescence, although, during convalescence, I had a whole series of minor diseases. The main trouble had been double pneumonia, but in addition to that I had heart disease, kidney disease, dysentery, and phlebitis. None of these, however prevented me from feeling perfectly happy, and in spite of all gloomy prognostications, no ill effects whatever remained after my recovery.

Lying in my bed feeling that I was not going to die was surprisingly delightful. I had always imagined until then that I was fundamentally pessimistic and did not greatly value being alive. I discovered that in this I had been completely mistaken, and that life was infinitely sweet to me. Rain in Peking is rare, but during my convalescence there came heavy rains bringing the delicious smell of damp earth through the windows, and I used to think how dreadful it would have been to have never smelt that smell again. I had the same feeling about the light of the sun, and the sound of the wind. Just outside my windows were some very beautiful acacia trees, which came into blossom at the first moment when I was well enough to enjoy them. I have known ever since that at bottom I am glad to be alive. Most people, no doubt, always know this, but I did not.

I was told that the Chinese said that they would bury me by the Western Lake and build a shrine to my memory. I have some slight regret that this did not happen, as I might have become a god, which would have been very chic for an atheist.

There was in Peking at that time a Soviet diplomatic mission, whose members showed great kindness. They had the only good champagne in Peking, and supplied it liberally for my use, champagne being apparently the only proper beverage for pneumonia patients. They used to take first Dora, and later Dora and me, for motor drives in the neighbourhood of Peking. This was a pleasure, but a somewhat exciting one, as they were as bold in driving as they were in revolutions.

I probably owe my life to the Rockefeller Institute in Peking which provided a serum that killed the pneumococci. I owe them the more gratitude on this point, as both before and after I was strongly opposed to them politically, and they regarded me with as much horror as was
felt by my nurse.
The Japanese journalists were continually worrying Dora to give them interviews when she wanted to be nursing me. At last she became a little curt with them, so they caused the Japanese newspapers to say that I was dead. This news was forwarded by mail from Japan to America and from America to England. It appeared in the English newspapers on the same day as the news of my divorce. Fortunately, the Court did not believe it, or the divorce might have been postponed. It provided me with the pleasure of reading my obituary notices, which I had always desired without expecting my wishes to be fulfilled. One missionary paper, I remember, had an obituary notice of one sentence: 'Missionaries may be pardoned for heaving a sigh of relief at the news of Mr Bertrand Russell's death'. I fear they must have heaved a sigh of a different sort when they found that I was not dead after all. The report caused some pain to friends in England. We in Peking knew nothing about it until a telegram came from my brother enquiring whether I was still alive. He had been remarking meanwhile that to die in Peking was not the sort of thing I would do.

The most tedious stage of my convalescence was when I had phlebitis, and had to lie motionless on my back for six weeks. We are very anxious to return home for the confinement, and as time went on it began to seem doubtful whether we should be able to do so. In these circumstances it was difficult not to feel impatience, the more so as the doctors said there was nothing to do but wait. However, the trouble cleared up just in time, and on July 10th we were able to leave Peking, though I was still very weak and could only hobble about with the help of a stick.

Shortly after my return from China, the British Government decided to deal with the question of the Boxer indemnity. When the Boxers had been defeated, the subsequent treaty of peace provided that the Chinese government should pay an annual sum to all those European Powers which had been injured by it. The Americans very wisely decided to forgo any payment on this account. Friends of China in England urged England in vain to do likewise. At last it was decided that, instead of a punitive payment, the Chinese should make some payment which should be profitable to both China and Britain. What form this payment should take was left to be determined by a Committee on which there should be two Chinese members. While MacDonald was Prime Minister he invited Lowes Dickinson and me to be members of the Committee, and consented to our recommendation of V.K. Ting and Hu Shih as the Chinese members. When, shortly afterwards, MacDonald's Government fell, the succeeding Conservative Government informed Lowes Dickinson and myself that our services would not be wanted on the Committee, and they would not accept either V.K. Ting or Hu Shih as Chinese members of it, on the ground that we knew nothing about China. The Chinese government replied that it desired the two Chinese whom I had recommended and would not have anyone else. This put an end to the very feeble efforts at securing Chinese friendship. The only thing that had been secured during the Labour period of friendship was that Shantung should become a golf course for the British Navy and should no longer be open for Chinese trading.

Before I became ill I had undertaken to do a lecture tour in Japan after leaving China. I had to cut this down to one lecture, and visits to various people. We spent twelve hectic days in Japan, days which were far from pleasant, though very interesting. Unlike the Chinese, the Japanese proved to be destitute of good manners, and incapable of avoiding intrusiveness. Owing to my being still very feeble, we were anxious to avoid all unnecessary fatigues, but the journalists proved a very difficult matter. At the first port at which our boat touched, some thirty journalists were lying in wait, although we had done our best to travel secretly, and they only discovered our movements through the police. As the Japanese papers had refused to contradict the news of my death, Dora gave each of them a type-written slip saying that as I was dead I could not be interviewed. They drew in their breath through their teeth and said: 'Ah ! veree funnee !'… [Es folgen Bericht Japan und Briefe]. [Russ9]

1920-1921

Suzanne P. Ogden: Chinese students flooded abroad for advanced education, while Chinese educational institutions were remodeled to serve better the goals of modernization. Bertrand Russell's visit produced rapid disillusionment for many Chinese, widespread confusion among others, and a kind of half-hearted admiration on the part of a few, which seemed to spring as much from inertia, embarrassment, or the wish to be polite, as from intellectual or political commitment.

To many Chinese intellectuals, Russell appeared as a man who, because of his intellectual power and because of his commitment to social change, would have unusually valuable insights into the problems besetting the Chinese people at that time. That the Chinese seriously considered Russell's ideas for institutional and societal change in China indicates the inherent problem of assuming that a leader in one field will be equally well qualified to speak on totally unrelated topics. A foreign philosopher, a scientist turned ideologist, met a group of Chinese in search of a theory of social and political change.

Russell arrived at a crucial time in China's intellectual and political evolution. The major split within the leadership of the new culture movement, between the Marxists and the 'liberals', occurred in 1921. While the Lecture Society encompassed a broad range of the 'liberal' Chinese political spectrum, the more radical, would-be Communists and socialists largely remained outside of it. But there were no rigid classifications at that time, only individuals who flowed from one group to another, for the differences were only of degree. On the definition of fundamental issues, there was near accord between the 'liberals' and the socialists-communists. That is, the major segments of Russell's 'political' audience (those interested in his ideas on social reconstruction) were each an assortment of 'progressives' in their attitudes toward change and development, even if later some 'socialists' were to be denounced as 'neo-conservatives'. They wanted to break with the past and 'progress' in a new direction. And both groups were preeminently nationalists, so that in spite of ideological differences, they agreed that China's major problems were economic backwardness, political disunity, and bad government. Still, the ideological perspective became important when each group inquired into the best methods for confronting these problems.

Chinese intellectuals became more receptive to leftist views, including not only Marxism but also guild socialism, syndicalism, and anarchism. Since Russell was known to have spoken on all three ideas, was believed to have been an ardent guild socialist before his arrival in China, his trip generated enthusiasm not only among the 'liberals' who associated him with progressive individualist and libertarian values, but also among the various leftist groups.

The Chinese also admired many of Russell's personal qualities: his near-heroic pacifism, his independence of thought and action, his advocacy of the ideal of world unity and his defiance of authority. The last trait was thoroughly compatible with the general Chinese new culture ideal of defiance.

Russell came to China with a view to discovering what China's problems were; but he also came with many preconceptions of what the best solutions would be. Throughout his life, Russell held two general convictions. The first was that political and economic problems could be solved by choosing and effecting the right economic system and the right political values. The second was that the right solutions would involve fundamental change which would be revolutionary unless action was taken to ensure an evolutionary path. A brief exposure to China's conditions convinced him that although his social ideas were correct in theory, they were inapplicable to China. Once in China, he talked, observed, argued and learned, so that his judgments changed as his information and understanding increased.

Having visited Bolshevik Russia immediately prior to his trip to China, Russell was eager to expound on the evils of Bolshevism, but to separate this issue from socialism as a value construct. Russell and the Chinese began with different hopes and drew different conclusions from viewing the consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution. The question of revolution's 'humanity' was not a luxury in which the Chinese felt they could indulge. For Russell it became the key issue. What the Chinese socialists saw in the Russian Revolution was the existential possibility of complete and rapid change. Russell saw no need to wonder that
revolution could occur. So he approached it instead from the perspective of morality: the Bolshevik method of industrialization exploited the worker. This increased Russell's skepticism about socialism as a method of industrializing.

While Russell endorsed socialism as 'necessary to the world', his concern for morality caused him to condemn Bolshevik methods of establishing it.

Russell recommended a form of state socialism for China, a system about which he was alternately cynical, hopeful, dubious, critical, and enthusiastic. Instead of a Western-style democracy or a Soviet-style socialism, Russell suggested that China had first to experience a government 'analogous to', but not the same as, the dictatorship of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. This analogous form of dictatorship, carried out by '10,000 resolute men' would presumably educate the people to recognize the incompatibility between capitalism and democracy, would carry out 'non-capitalistic' industrialization, and would re-invest profits for the benefit of the people.

Russell's vision of the best form of government for China presupposed political reform, but reform was the prerequisite for economic reform: the Chinese had to establish a unified, strong, and honest state capable of governing China before they nationalized, permitting the right people to control the socialist economy. Russell's views on the role of socialism in industrialization provoked much controversy among China's intelligentsia, which was already debating these questions in 1920-21.

Russell asserted that education had to precede socialism in China: power without wisdom was dangerous, as Bolshevik Russia demonstrated. Industrialization would provide the resources for mass education, and education would reveal the incompatibility between capitalism and democracy. If the capitalists kept control, they could preempt discussion of individual freedom, so that the people's awareness of the incompatibility between democracy and capitalism would have no active implications. The only solution then, said Russell, would be revolution. He counseled against foreign control of Chinese education which in the past had made Chinese students 'slavish toward Western education'. China should not depend, for leadership, on 'returned students' who would adopt many foreign perspectives. Finally, Chinese education should preserve the 'courtesy, the candor and the pacific temper' which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a knowledge of Western science and its application to the practical problems of China. Russell's advice to continue the good aspects of Chinese education and culture, but to adopt Western science was difficult to implement, since Western science brought with it values not wholly compatible with traditional Chinese values. The events of the May fourth period indicated that, with China under militarist control, education remained nearly inseparable from politics.

References to Russell's observations, long after his departure from China, are remarkable for two reasons. First, they indicate that while the major periodicals did not continue to publish articles on Russell's social and political ideas, people did continue to think about Russell and to read his books and articles. Second, it is what Russell said about the Chinese people that is remembered by the Chinese, not his solutions or proposals for action to reconstruct China. It was Russell as a traveler and an observer, someone who could, in the Chinese view, convey an accurate impression of China to the outside world, that left a lasting impression on the Chinese.

1987
nicht verwirklicht wird, sondern dass er zu früh verwirklicht wird, so wie auch Russell es feststellte".

1994
Raoul Findeisen: The interest in Russell and his work had begun in China some time before the May fourth demonstrations and had risen to such an extent that Russell, upon his arrival in Shanghai Oct. 12 1920, was even celebrated as 'Confucius II'. There were many reasons for such an enthusiastic response, not least of course mutual sympathies. These sympathies had a solid basis: As many of the May fourth intellectuals, Russell had been much attracted by the foundation of the Soviet state in which he first saw, as the Chinese did, the 'utopia' of social equality and democracy realized. On the other hand, Russell's 'will of a system of philosophy' that would re-establish philosophy as a science of sciences fitted in perfectly well with the aim of Chinese students to acquire Western scientific methods. Highlight of this systematic effort are the Principia mathematica (1910-1913) and proposing formal logics as starting point for such a role of philosophy. The shock of World War I had also some similarities on both sides, with and Chinese and with Russell, and it was commonly known in China that Russell's pacifist activities had brought him to jail. Furthermore Russell's ethical commitment had certain common traits with the still effective traditional Chinese image of the 'literatus' and civil servant. Finally Russell's rhetorical and didactic abilities perhaps made him more suitable than any other Western philosopher to quench the Chinese thirst for 'yang xue'. Especially the young generation of May fourth activists, who were interested in formal and logical problems of philosophy. They believed that a more systematic approach, to Western ideas as well as to their own tradition, would make their fight against traditional beliefs more effective and turn philosophy to practice.

2007
Ding Zijiang: Russell's contributions to philosophy were not accepted by Chinese intellectuals because his methods were too technical, too trivial, and totally different from traditional Chinese patterns of thinking.
Russell's educational philosophy was not very influential in China. His 'school' is similar to the traditional Chinese private school. It even mimics the Confucian educational 'mode', which also includes a country estate for its setting, a modest tutorial staff, some servants, and a small group of students whose parents supported the project, where a demonstration of the application of Confucian theory could be carried on. There are three basic distinctions between Russell's school and a Confucian schools: (1) while the former emphasized freethinking, the latter did not; (2) while the former had no discipline and penalty, the latter did; and (3) while the former approved liberal sexual education, the latter did not. For Chinese new educators, the most important task was to save and reconstruct China through science, technology, industrialization, and democracy. They wanted to extend and develop a 'popular education' rather than an aristocratic education. For most of them, the urgent task was to enable their motherland to eliminate poverty, weakness, and backwardness. Therefore, for both Nationalists and Communists, nationalism and patriotism are more important than individualism and liberalism.
For many Chinese intellectuals, Russell was a very enthusiastic and revolutionary social transformer. In his lecture at Beijing University, he treated himself as a Communist and stated that there would be real happiness and enjoyment after the realization of Communism. He said that he believed in many social claims made by Marxism. Later, different schools of Chinese intellectuals wanted to ask Russell to join their own 'fronts' or interpreted his theories to suit their own needs and images. The moderate reformers hoped that he would be a moderate reformer; the anarchists hoped that he would be an anarchist; the communists hoped that he would be a communist. [Russ3,Russ10,Russ43,KUH7:S. 509-510,Shaw63]
"The night before last, Mr. Dewey talked about Bertrand Russell as a despairing pessimist. In fact, Russell stands for ethical neutrality (lun li zhong li). Russell stands beyond judgement in all categories of thought. Furthermore, Dewey is thoroughly mistaken when he describes Russell's philosophy as elitist. This leads us to think of him as somehow anti-democratic. In fact, Russell is a thorough realist who upholds logical atomism (duo li yuan zi lun) and the principle of absolute pluralism (duo yuan lun). Russell's philosophical method is to dissect all categories of thought, be they political, scientific or philosophical. To make this clear I have translated his piece on Dreams and facts which appeared first in the January issue of Athenaeum and was reprinted again in the February, 1920 issue of *Dial.*" [Russ8]

1920.06.07  Letter from Mao Zedong to a friend.
"I'm reading three great contemporary philosophers : John Dewey, Bertrand Russell and Henri Bergson." [DewJ181]

1920.06.30  On June 30 1920 Bertrand Russell was back in Battersea from his tour through the Soviet Union and found the Invitation to Bertrand Russell to lecture at Beijing University. Sponsored by the Jiang xue hui [Lecture Society], sent under the name of Fu Tong, Zhang Songnian and Liang Qichao. The invitation enclosed a letter from the Government University, Beijing to John Henry Muirhead : "Fu Tong would like Muirhead to ask Bertrand Russell to come to China for a year to give some lectures. Bertrand Russell would be paid 2000 pounds and his travelling expenses". The invitation seemed to express primary interest in Russell's theory on mathematics and logic and suggested that although the writer did not know precisely what Russell's social and political views were, he would be welcome to lecture on them as well as on his theoretical philosophy. The invitation was being sent primarily in recognition of Russell's achievement as philosopher. But it made explicit at least a secondary interest in Russell's view as a social reformer, and other Chinese connected with the invitation were clearly more concerned with social problems than with logic and epistemology. Russell required to address two different groups in China : 'social' and 'political' intellectuals, and philosophers. He had come prepared with 'purely academic lectures on psychology and the principles of physics'. Thus he was surprised to find upon his arrival in China that those who had invited him 'insisted' that he also lecture on social questions, and especially on Russia's experience with Bolshevism. Liang Qichao was as much interested in Russell's political views as in his theoretical philosophy. He was committed to bringing men such as Russell to China to talk about politics, even though he also hoped that Russell's concept of scientific method would have a beneficial impact on China. [MML,Russ10]

Dear Sir,

We are very glad to have the greatest social philosopher of the world to arrive here in China, so as to salve the Chronic deseases of the thought of Chinese Students. Since 1919, the student's circle seems to be the greatest hope of the future of China; as they are ready to welcome to have revolutionary era in the society of China. In that year, Dr John Dewey had influenced the intellectual class with great success.

But I dare to represent most of the Chinese Students to say a few words to you: Although Dr Dewey is successful here, but most of our students are not satisfied with his conservative theory. Because most of us want to acquire the knowledge of Anarchism, Syndicalism, Socialism, etc.; in a word, we are anxious to get the knowledge of the social revolutionary philosophy. We are the followers of Mr Kropotkin, and our aim is to have anarchical society in China. We hope you, Sir, to give us fundamentally the thorough Social philosophy, based on Anarchism. Moreover, we want you to recorrect the theory of Dr Dewey, the American Philosopher. We hope you have the absolute freedom in China, not the same as in England. So we hope you to have a greater success than Dr Dewey here.

I myself am old member of the Peking Govt. University, and met you in Shanghai many times, the first time is in 'The Great Oriental Hotel', the first time of your reception here, in the evening.

The motto, you often used, of Lao-Tzu ought to be changed in the first word, as 'Creation without Possession...' is better than the former translative; and it is more correctly according to what you have said 'the creative impulsive and the possessive impulse'. Do you think it is right?

Your Fraternally Comrade Johnson Yuan (Secretary of the Chinese Anarchist-Communist Association). [Russ9]

Bertrand Russell arrives in Hong Kong. [Russ6]


Dear Sir,

We beg to inform you that the educational system of our province is just at infancy and is unfortunately further weakened by the fearful disturbances of the civil war of late years, so that the guidance and assistances must be sought to sagacious scholars. The extent to which your moral and intellectual power has reached is so high that all the people of this country are paying the greatest regard to you. We, Hunanese, eagerly desire to hear your powerful instructions as a compass.

A few days ago, through Mr Lee-Shuh-Tseng, our representative at Shanghai, we requested you to visit Hunan and are very grateful to have your kind acceptance. A general meeting will therefore be summoned on the 25th instant in order to receive your instructive advices. Now we appoint Mr Kun-Chao-Shuh to represent us all to welcome you sincerely. Please come as soon as possible.

We are, Sir Your obedient servants The General Educational Association of Hunan. [Russ9]

Bertrand Russell arrived in Shanghai. Zhang Shenfu was on hand to welcome him to China. Zhang had, by that time, already made plans to go to France on the same boat as Cai Yuanpei. After the public meeting with Russell in Shanghai, Zhang and Russell continued conversation over tea in Beijing in November. [Russ8,Russ6]

Reception for Bertrand Russell by educational associations at Da Dong Hotel in Shanghai. [Russ6]

Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Principles of social reconstruction" in Shanghai. [Russ6]

Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Uses of education" to the Jiangsu Education Society. [Russ6]

Bertrand Russell spends two days in Hangzhou to see the West Lake. [Russ6]

Lecture by Bertrand Russel on "Problems of education" at Zhejiang Normal School in Hangzhou. [Russ6]
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I wrote the following account on the Yangtse: To Ottoline Morrell. Since landing in China we have had a most curious and interesting time, spent, so far, entirely among Chinese students and journalists, who are more or less Europeanised. I have delivered innumerable lectures – on Einstein, education and social questions. The eagerness for knowledge on the part of students is quite extraordinary. When one begins to speak, their eyes have the look of starving men beginning a feast. Everywhere they treat me with a most embarrassing respect. The day after I landed in Shanghai they gave a vast dinner to us, at which they welcomed me as Confucius the Second. All the Chinese newspapers that day in Shanghai had my photograph. Both Miss Black and I had to speak to innumerable schools, teachers' conferences, congresses, etc. It is a country of curious contrasts. Most of Shanghai is quite European, almost American; the names of streets, and notices and advertisements are in English (as well as Chinese). The buildings are magnificent offices and banks; everything looks very opulent. But the side streets are still quite Chinese. It is a vast city about the size of Glasgow. The Europeans almost all look villainous and ill. One of the leading Chinese newspapers invited us to lunch, in a modern building, completed in 1917, with all the latest plant (except linotype, which can't be used for Chinese characters). The editorial staff gave us a Chinese meal at the top of the house with Chinese wine made of rice, and innumerable dishes which we ate with chopsticks. When we had finished eating they remarked that one of their number was fond of old Chinese music, and would like to play to us. So he produced an instrument with seven strings, made by himself on the ancient model, out of black wood two thousand years old, which he had taken from a temple. The instrument is played with the finger, like a guitar, but is laid flat on a table, not held in the hand. They assured us that the music he played was four thousand years old, but that I imagine must be an overstatement. In any case, it was exquisitely beautiful, very delicate, easier for a European ear than more recent music (of which I have heard a good deal). When the music was over they became again a staff of bustling journalists.

From Shanghai our Chinese friends took us for three nights to Hanchow on the Western Lane, said to be the most beautiful scenery in China. That was merely holiday. The Western Lake is not large – about the size of Grasmere – it is surrounded by wooded hills, on which there are innumerable pagodas and temples. It has been beautified by poets and emperors for thousands of years. (Apparently poets in ancient China were as rich as financiers in modern Europe.) We spent one day in the hills – a twelve hour expedition in Sedan chairs – and the next in seeing country houses, monasteries, etc. on islands in the lake.

Chinese religion is curiously cheerful. When one arrives at a temple, they give one a cigarette and a cup of delicately fragrant tea. Then they show one round. Buddhism, which one thinks of as ascetic, is here quite gay. The saints have fat stomachs, and are depicted as people who thoroughly enjoy life. No one seems to believe the religion, not even the priests. Nevertheless, one sees many rich new temples.

The country houses are equally hospitable – one is shewn round and given tea. They are just like Chinese pictures, with many arbours where one can sit, with everything made for beauty and nothing for comfort – except in the grandest rooms, where there will be a little hideous European furniture.

The most delicious place we saw on the Western Lake was a retreat for scholars, built about eight hundred years ago on the lake. Scholars certainly had a pleasant life in the old China. Apart from the influence of Europeans, China makes the impression of what Europe would have become if the eighteenth century had gone on till now without industrialism or the French Revolution. People seem to be rational hedonists, knowing very well how to obtain happiness, exquisite through intense cultivation of their artistic sensibilities, differing from Europeans through the fact that they prefer enjoyment to power. People laugh a great deal in all classes, even the lowest.

The Chinese cannot pronounce my name, or write it in their characters. They call me 'Luo-Su' which is the nearest they can manage. This, they can both pronounce and print.

From Hanchow we went back to Shanghai, thence by rail to Nanking, an almost deserted city. The wall is twenty-three miles in circumference, but most of what it encloses is country. The
city was destroyed at the end of the Taiping rebellion, and again injured in the Revolution of 1911, but it is an active educational centre, eager for news of Einstein and Bolshevism. From Nanking we went up the Yangtse to Hangkow, about three days' journey, through very lovely scenery – thence by train to Cheng-Sha, the capital of Hun-Nan, where a great educational conference was taking place. There are about three hundred Europeans in Cheng-Sha, but Europeanisation has not gone at all far. The town is just like a mediaeval town – narrow streets, every house a shop with a gay sign hung out, no traffic possible except Sedan chairs and a few rickshaws. The Europeans have a few factories, a few banks, a few missions and a hospital – the whole gamut of damaging and repairing body and soul by western methods. The Governor of Hun-Nan is the most virtuous of all the Governors of Chinese provinces, and entertained us last night at a magnificent banquet. Professor and Mrs Dewey were present; it was the first time I had met them. The Governor cannot talk any European language, so, though I sat next to him, I could only exchange compliments through an interpreter. But I got a good impression of him; he is certainly very anxious to promote education, which seems the most crying need of China. Without it, it is hard to see how better government can be introduced. It must be said that bad government seems somewhat less disastrous in China than it would be in a European nation, but this is perhaps a superficial impression which time may correct.

We are now on our way to Peking, which we hope to reach on October 31st. [Russ9,Russ6]


Mr. Zhang Dongsun's is thoroughly misreading Bertrand Russell when he describes his philosophy with the Chinese words 'shi yong zhu yi'. The English equivalent for this is 'pragmatism' not 'realism'. This is a major, fundamental mistake. Anyone who knows anything about contemporary philosophy and about Russell's work knows that Russell is a firm opponent of pragmatism. His view is very different from Bergson and Dewey, in the same way that his mathematics is fundamentally different from that of Galileo. Since last year, when he began to study modern psychology, Russell has developed a new theory which suggests that there is no difference between mind and matter. They are both part of a continuum of varied perception. In this respect, Russell's theories are quite close to those of William James. Russell's idea that 'truth propositions correspond to actual facts' is nonetheless different from James' notion that 'truth is an assumption we need in order to proceed with the work of philosophy'. The difference in their positions is amply evident in the Principia mathematica and in other of Russell's works. So how can one of our so called illustrious commentators make such a fundamental mistake? [Russ8]

1920.10.31 Bertrand Russell arrives in Beijing. [Russ6]

1920.11.03 The Beijing da xue shu li za zhi announced on 3 Nov. that Bertrand Russell was to lecture at Beijing University. He lecture weekly on 'Mathematical logic', 'Structure of society', 'The analysis of matter', 'The analysis of mind', 'The problems of philosophy'. Russell agreed to give four lectures in all, the first two at Beijing University, the last two at the Teachers College. [Russ3,Russ42]

1920.11.05 Interview by Bertrand Russell with Liang Qichao and Zhao Yuanren as interpreter. [Russ5]

1920.11.07 Bertrand Russell gives the first lecture about "The problem of philosophy" to an audience of 1000 people at Beijing University He explained the meanings of the different symbols he would use, and then introduced both the calculus and algebra of propositions. [Russ6,Russ42]

1920.11.09 Letter from Zhang Shenfu to Bertrand Russell 9 Nov. 1920. Probably I will leave Peking for France on the 17th, or later. I am very sorry we would separate so soon. But even I go to France, I will continually study your philosophy and as I always attempt to read anything you write, henceforward when you publish books or articles (even reviews), please kindly make me knowing at once. Thank you in anticipation for the trouble you will take. May you favour me with a copy of your photograph with your autograph? I only wish this because I worship you. [Russ8]
1920.11.09 Welcome party for Bertrand Russell in Beijing. [Russ6]

I am very sorry your are going away so soon. I would have made more attempts to see you, but was persuaded you hated me on account of my criticism of Bolshevism. Letter from Zhang Shenfu to Bertrand Russell.
Many thanks for your reply. I will see you tomorrow at the time requested. I am delighted very much by your so estimable reply. Its last sentence surprises me also very much. Not only I never hated you at all, but I hope eagerly that there would be no hatred at all. Even Mr. Anatole France's saying 'to hate the hatred', for me, is not quite right. Your criticism of Bolshevism are all right, and valuable, I believe. Even if not so, there would be no reason for me to hate only on account of this. You said, 'If I be a Russian, I would defend the socialist gov't' (cited from memory). This attitude, I quite admire. Though I consider Russia as the most advanced country in the world at the present, and though I believe in communism, I am not a Bolshevik. This is of course also your opinion. I believe I agree with you at nearly every point and believe myself I can almost always understand you quite correctly. [Russ8]

1920.11.11 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The analysis of mind" at Beijing University.
He meets Zhang Shenfu at the Continental Hotel in Shanghai. [Russ5,Russ6]

1920.11.14 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The problems of philosophy" at the Normal School in Beijing. [Russ6]

1920.11.18 Banquet for Bertrand Russell in the Beijing Hotel. [Russ6]

1920.11.19 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Bolshevik thought" at the Women's Higher Normal School in Beijing. [Russ6]

1920.11.27 Bertrand Russell speaks to the Anarchist Mutual Aid Society in Beijing. [Russ6]

1920.12.03 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Industry in undeveloped countries" to the Chinese Social and Political Association in Beijing. [Russ6]

1920.12.10 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on Albert Einstein at the Qinghua University in Beijing. [Russ6]

Dear Allen… Dora and I have taken a house (address as above) and furnished it in Chinese style. It is very pleasant, built round a courtyard as they all are. Peking treats us as if we were married – the legation calls and asks us to dinner. It makes Dora furious to find herself respectable against her will. But she enjoys furnishing, and she is going to lecture at the University. I find the students lazy and stupid. Most of them are Bolsheviks, but they don't know what that means, and are timid and comfort-loving. The Japs of course are wicked, but I have hopes that their reformers also are vigorous, and therefore better than the Chinese. I enclose a letter from one of them who is arranging for me to lecture there next summer. Please send it to Colette. The Chinese are exceedingly cordial and make a lot of fuss about me, but one remains on terms of politeness – they are hard to get to know well. I find there are very few whom I can like. They say they are socialists but complain of foreigners for over-paying the coolies so that life becomes a little less comfortable for the rich. The Government is corrupt ; usually it takes money from the Japs and is then turned out by a revolution but succeeded by a new Government which is just as bad. I think 50 years of foreign domination is the only hope.
Dora sends her love. We are very happy, though we have fits of home-sickness, but we are too busy to notice them much. [Russ36]

He traveller arriving in China from Europe for the first time is struck to begin with by the great artistic beauty of all that is traditional, and the aesthetic ruin wrought by modern industrialism wherever it has penetrated. If he is a man whose main interest is art and beauty, he will probably continue to deplore the influence of Europe: he will observe the decay of Chinese painting and poetry, the substitution of (to him) commonplace Western furniture for the stiff tables and chairs of the old tradition. He will perhaps go even further, and carry his conservatism into the domain of ideas. He will find an old-world charm in Buddhist monasteries and Buddhist thought; he will rejoice to find that there are men of high education in their own line, whose whole outlook and knowledge is utterly different from that of learned Europeans. And he will wish such peculiarities preserved, in order to increase the interest and diversity of the spectacle which the world offers to studious contemplation.

But if he takes the trouble to consider China in itself, not merely as a spectacle, he is not likely to remain content with this conservative attitude. He will realize that the old beauty no longer has any vitality, and that it can only be preserved by treating the whole country as a museum. He will find that many of the most vigorous and intelligent of the Chinese are entirely unappreciative of all ancient excellence in China, and distinctly impatient when foreigners praise it. He will quickly discover that progress is only possible by abandoning the old, even when it is really good. Industrialism, democracy, science and modern education do not have the statuesque beauty of traditional and unchanging civilizations; Europe at the present day lacks the charm which it had four or five centuries ago, yet hardly any European would wish to revert to the Middle Ages. And similarly what is most vital in China wishes to press forward, without too much tenderness for the aesthetic losses that must be involved.

One is struck, on arriving from Europe, by the tremendous eagerness for ideas, for enlightenment, for guidance, which exists among those who have lost faith in the old traditions. Something of the old Confucian's belief in the value of learning and the importance of the sage survives even among the most iconoclastic. China has been governed for many ages very largely by men chosen, at least nominally, on account of their literary eminence. There has come to be a scholarly caste, of whom the younger ones now look to America (or, in some cases, Europe) for intellectual guidance. Their desire is usually not for facts to much as for what may be called wisdom. It is impossible not to be surprised by the general belief that a sage must be able to give moral advice by which a nation's difficulties can be solved. We in the West have lost our belief in Wise Men. This is part of the general diminution of belief in the individual, which has been brought about by organization, by the vast size of our States, our business enterprises, and our political parties. But in China there is still an expectation that a wise man may play the part of Solon or Lycurgus. There is a willingness and desire to follow, but there is, apparently, no correlative ability to lead.

What China has achieved in the last twenty years is quite amazing. I have no doubt that the most important thing for China now is education, not only of the present class, but of the whole people. China is traditionally aristocratic in its social organization, and this tradition is still very dominant. Life in China reminds a European of the eighteenth century; the cheapness and abundance of labour, the multitude of servants, the survival of handicrafts, produce and economic situation such as Europe experienced before the industrial revolution. And the mental atmosphere, too, is not dissimilar: the skepticism in regard to traditional beliefs, and the eager search after some new gospel, are just what was characteristic of France a hundred and fifty years ago. I do not think any new gospel which is to be of value to China is possible without a more democratic spirit, and I think this spirit will have to be displayed first of all in the provision of education for the working classes. I am of course very conscious of the difficulties and obstacles that stand in the way, but I believe they can be overcome in time by patience and determination.

The problem of relations with other Powers and with Western ideas and methods is obviously a very delicate one. If it were possible, I suppose a patriotic Chinese with a modern outlook would desire to have the greatest possible benefit from Western science and industrial methods, with the least possible political and economic domination by foreign nations. But probably the ideas and the domination are difficult to dissociate. Probably any steps that
might be taken to resist foreign capital and foreign aggression would only be successful, at present, if they were part of a great patriotic campaign, which would inevitably extend also into the region of ideas and economic methods and social organization. Under these circumstances, it seems difficult to obtain the good without the bad. At any rate, a newly-arrived foreigner feels puzzled, and does not know exactly what he should desire. It is clear, in any case, that industrialism must profoundly change China during the next twenty years. One could wish that industrialism might develop here without the bad features which have proved inseparable from its growth everywhere else, but perhaps that is too much to hope. I have no doubt that by foresight and method the transition to industrialism could be effected without any evils of a serious kind; but no nation hitherto has shown foresight and method in the transition, and there is no reason to suppose that China will prove an exception. The hopeful features in China, on a superficial acquaintance of only a few weeks, seem to me to be the great eagerness for ideas on the part of the educated minority, and the great willingness to accept leadership towards some better political and social system. I fully believe that, given patience and a willingness to traverse the necessary stages, these qualities can lead to a wonderful national awakening if wise leaders can be found. But I do not yet know what likelihood there is of these conditions being fulfilled.

One thing, at any rate, I can praise with complete confidence, and that is Chinese hospitality. I have been welcomed with a warmth which has surprised and touched me, and have been treated everywhere with a quite extraordinary kindness. It is natural to wish that I could make some return for this kindness in the form of help in China; but I am impressed by the complexity and difficulty of these problems, and by the impossibility of understanding them when one is a recent arrival ignorant of the Chinese language. So long as this remains the case, anything that I may find to say must continue to suffer from superficiality and ignorance. [Russ6]

Letter from China (1920).

You say you find it difficult to imagine me here, so I will try to describe the world in which I am living. I have a Chinese house, built round a courtyard, with only the ground-floor. The front door opens into a small street; as one walks along the street, one sees only one continuous wall with an occasional door, because the houses are hidden. Ten minutes’ walk from my house are the City Walls, which go all round the City (fourteen miles). They are high and broad, and the best place for an afternoon walk, because one sees the whole of Peking and the Western Hills beyond. The region between Hankow and Peking, when I came through it in the train, seemed to me very like Southern Russia: vastness, unbounded plains, and primaeval peasants. Southern China, from the Yangtse to Hongkong, is utterly different – tropical or sub-tropical, very beautiful in a straightforward fashion, fertile, populous, and gay. But this northern land is tragic. The sand blows over from the desert of Gobi in great yellow storms, and makes moving sand-hills which engulf whole villages. The rivers are cruel, always either dried up or in flood. Owing to drought last summer, twenty million peasants are starving; they offer their little girls for sale as slaves at three dollars, and if they don’t get that price they bury them alive. The Chinese don’t care; whatever is being done for relief is European or American. There are many rich Chinese, but they won’t lend to their government, because they know the money would be spent in corruption. The Chinese politicians take Japanese money, while Japan steals Shantung and behaves in Korea even worse than we are behaving in Ireland. Japan and England smuggle opium into the country by corrupting the customs officials. The provincial governors even each his own army, usually unpaid, but making money by looting unoffending towns, bayonetting shopkeepers who try to keep something back. Meanwhile the intellectuals prate of socialism or communism, pretend to be very advanced, and sit with folded hands enjoying inherited wealth, while the Japs, the Russians, the English and the Americans are all trying to get pickings off the corpse. There was until lately a native art which was very beautiful, and a native poetry of exquisite delicacy. But the palseying touch of industrialism has killed all that. The common people are the best; they are good-natured children, full of laughter, physically tough, and mentally less effete than the people of inherited culture. I feel as if they would be quite good material for education, whereas the pupils I get are incurably lazy and soft. Peking is very beautiful, full of broad open spaces, trees, palaces, streets of water, and temples. The climate is delicious, bright and dry, always freezing in winter, but with almost no snow. Europeans dash about in motor-cars, Chinese men make a more stately progress in carriages with footmen standing behind, humbler folk go in rickshas, and your correspondent on his feet for the sake of exercise. Walking here has the drawback of the beggars: shivering men and women and children in rags which scarcely secure decency, who run after one for long distances repeating ‘da la yeh’ (great old sire!). Some are fat and evidently make a good living; others look terribly poor and hungry and cold. There are many dogs in the streets, but they are despised; some are covered with sores, others one sees dying in the ditch. [Russ6]

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Zhao, Yuanren. Luosu zhe xue de jing shen [ID D28289].

Zhao Yuanren writes about methodological implications of Bertrand Russell's philosophy. He characterized. He characterized it as empirical, analytical and specific. The ultimate goal of Russell's empirism was to establish experience as standard of truth, not matter or spirit, as done in the two influential philosophical schools of materialism and idealism, but events being immediately accessible to experience. Zhao conceded similarities with James' empirism, but underlined that Russell's thought integrated the most up-to-date results in modern physics. When calling Russell's philosophy specific, Zhao reminds that it can not be encapsulated in a central hypothesis (as Descartes’ or Schopenhauer's ideas). It strove to give 'specific answers to specific questions', i.e. to carefully and analytically inquire about any question or problem before giving any judgement. Since this analysis stemmed from suggesting 'classes of events' Russell's philosophy could, as Zhao thought, also be compared to materialism. [Russ3]
Liang, Shuming. *Dui Luosu zhi bu man* [ID D28357].
To my friend Zhang Shenfu who already loves Russell's theories. Over the past, seven, eight years, he has not stopped talking about and praising Russell's theories. Following Mr. Zhang's urgings, I have also tried to read Russell's works and to like them. And in fact found that some aspects of his theories accord well with my own thought – such as his social psychology. Also his theory of impulsion is quite coherent. I also found Russell's theories of cognition and of the essential continuity of all matter very suggestive. Last year, when Russell passed through Nanjing, he gave a very convincing lecture on the subject using the example of the concept of 'hat' to prove that hats seen by people in the present are nothing more than extensions of hats that they have seen before – though they might not actually be the hats bought originally. So I accept some of Russell's theories. But my dissatisfaction with Russell's thought is more serious. I am full of doubt about its foundation.
What gives me great unease about Russell is the way he criticizes – quite unfairly and ignorantly the theories of Bergson. Although I do not know much about mathematical logic, sill, I have deep reservations about Russell's unscholarly attitude in intellectual debate. It is well known that Russell opposes Bergson. But he has never bothered to understand the other's point of view. In Beijing, he attacked Bergson for 'mythical idealism' without any basis at all. Finally, I also want to warn my readers about the quest for an all encompassing, comprehensive philosophy. Truths attained through such comprehensive philosophies might sound good. Indeed, they appear to be perfect in their claim to certainty. But the real truth is always more complex. It is neither as pleasant nor as fine sounding as Russell likes to claim. A scholar is an expert only in his own field. Outside of it, he is just a commoner. Zhang Shenfu is right in saying that 'Today's philosophy belongs either to the Russell's school or to that of Bergson'. One is a leader in rationalism, the other is a leader in non-rational thought. Russell and Bergson are the two greatest contemporary philosophers. Although they are different, each has claim to truth.
But from Russell's short-sighted words it is evident he is not open to learning. He seeks for truth, but cannot attain it. In this Russell has forsaken the outlook of a true scholar. I write this not only to criticize Russell. There are many people who discuss philosophical issues the same way as Russell does. I have been feeling pity for them for a long time now. The reason that such persons cannot be true scholars is they are not prudent in their outlook. They do not know that only one who is calm, careful and insightful can be a truly great philosopher. [Russ8]

Liang, Qichao. *Jiang xue she huan yi Luosu zhi sheng* [ID D28358].
The liberal attitudes of Bertrand Russell's hosts were indicated in Liang Qichao's speech welcoming Russell to China. Here he undertook an explanation of the role of the Lecture Society within the May Fourth Movement. The Society, he said, was made up of many study groups, each of which could contribute to finding and effecting the right solutions to China's problems, even though no one of them had all the right answers. The Society was in search of theories, 'any theory as long as it has value' for advancing Chinese culture. Liang noted China's willingness to import Western ideas and theoretical systems, even including those which had not yet been successfully implemented in Europe. China, he said, might be the best place to try new theories because it had advanced slowly and, unlike the Western nations, had not committed itself to a number of modern institutions. Thus it was free to experiment without extraordinary sacrifice. As Liang put it, the Society was like a large business firm looking at available patterns and samples and then deciding what to buy for its customers. [Russ10]
Before I embark on the detail of this course of lectures, I wish to state in a few words my own position on the questions with which we shall be concerned. I am a Communist. I believe that Communism, combined with developed industry, is capable of bringing to mankind more happiness and well-being, and higher development of the arts and sciences, than have ever hitherto existed in the world. I therefore desire to see the whole world become communistic in its economic structure. I hold also, what was taught by Karl Marx, that there are scientific laws regulating the development of societies, and that any attempt to ignore these laws is bound to end in failure. Marx taught what his nominal disciples have forgotten, that communism was to be the consummation of industrialism, and did not believe it to be possible otherwise. It was in this emphasis upon laws of development that he different from previous religious and Utopian communists. There have been Christian communists ever since Christianity began, but they have had little effect, because economic structure was not ripe for communism. If, here in China, a government were to decree communism tomorrow, communism would not result from the decree, because there would be resistances and incapacities in the habits of the people, and because the material conditions in the way of machinery etc. do not exist. The power of governments is strictly limited to what is technically and psychologically possible at any moment in a given population. For success in social reconstruction, it is vitally necessary, not merely to understand the ethical purposes at which we should aim, but also to know the scientific laws determining what is possible. Miss Black's lectures (which I shall assume you have all heard) are dealing with these laws as applied to the past; I shall be dealing with them as applied to the present and the near future. Ethics without science is useless; we must know not only what is good, but also what is possible and what are the means for achieving it. [Russ7]

Liang's statement on language indicates why Bertrand Russell's scientific approach to the logic of language was not compatible with the Chinese view: in the West, language seeks clarity of definition, while in the East, language that is suggestive, that 'touches upon something without defining it' is preferred. He also noted the Chinese penchant for intuition over reason, and sentiment over utility, a distinct weakness of Chinese civilization, and yet also its 'redeeming virtue'. [Russ10]

Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The analysis of matter" at Beijing University. [Russ6]

Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The essence and effect of religion" to the Philosophy Research Group in Beijing. [Russ6]
My Darling Love… I don't think I shall write on China – it is a complex country, with an old
civilization, very hard to fathom. In many ways I prefer the Chinese to Europeans- they are
less fierce – their faults only injure China, not other nations.
I have a busy life – 3 courses of lectures, a Seminar, and odd lectures – for instance today I
lecture on Religion. I like the students, though they don't work hard and have not much
brains. They are friendly and enthusiastic, and very open-mined. I hate most of the Europeans,
because they are mostly diplomats or missionaries, both professionally engaged in trying to
deceive the Chinese, with very little success. There is a man named R.F. Johnston whom I
like very much – he wrote a delightful book on Buddhist China, which you would love… I get
£200 a month from the Chinese, and £100 a month from the Japs for articles – so I am very
well off. I try to save, but men come round with lovely Chinese things, and the money goes.
Also of course furnishing costs a good deal. One lives in expectation of a revolution here, but
it seems that revolutions make very little difference. There is less government in China than
there ever was in Europe – it is delightful. All the gloomy things I wrote you the other day are
true, but they are only one side of the picture. Chinese soldiers kill a few compatriots, other
kill many foreigners, so Chinese soldiers are best. The state of the world at large makes me
very unhappy. Ever since I began to hate the Bolsheviks I have felt more than ever a stranger
in this planet… Bless you my Heart's Comrade. B. [Russ36]

1921.01.09  Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The problems of philosophy" in Beijing. [Russ6]
1921.01.11  Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The analysis of matter".
Meeting for lunch with Vasilyevich Ivanov Razumnik of the Soviet diplomatic mission in
Beijing. [Russ6]
1921.01.12  Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The analysis of matter" in Beijing. [Russ6]
1921.02.03  Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Principles of social organization" at the Beijing
University. [Russ6]
1921.02.16 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Elizabeth Russell; 16. Febr. 1921.

My dear Elizabeth

Your delicious letter of December 19 reached me yesterday, with such a lovely Candide! Thank you 1,000 times. I am glad you liked the Bolsheie book. It has involved being quarreled with by most of my friends, and praised by people I hate – e.g. Winston and Lloyd George. I have no home on this planet – China comes nearer to one than any other place I know, because the people are not ferocious. It is true that the soldiers occasionally run amok, sack a town and bayonet all who do not instantly deliver up their whole wealth. But this is such a trivial matter compared to what is done by 'civilized' nations that it seems not to count. 20 million people are starving in provinces near here, and the Chinese do nothing to relive them. But they are better than we are, because the famine is not caused deliberately by them, whereas we deliberately cause famines for the pleasure of gloating over dying children.

You are quite right about the sunshine. Since I came to Peking, we have had rain once and snow 3 times, otherwise continuous sun and frost. I like the climate and am always well, but it doesn’t suit Dora, who gets bronchitis. Just at the moment the weather is not at its best – there is a dust-storm from the desert of Gobi. One can't go out, and has to shut every chink of window.

I am glad you noticed the whisks of my tail. I have been severely reproved by many grave persons for one which occurs on p. 130.

My students here are charming people, full of fun – we have parties for them with fireworks in the courtyard, and dancing and singing and blindman's buff – young men and girl-students. In ordinary Chinese life a woman sees no men except relations, but we ignore that, and so earn the gratitude of the young. The students are all Bolshies, and think me an amiable old fogy, and hopelessly behind the times.

We have a very happy existence, reading, writing, and talking endlessly. Lady Clifton lent us 'In the Mountains' which we read with great delight – she wasn't sure who it was by, but I was. I gave her a rude message to you, because you hadn't written to me, and when I got home, there was your letter.

We shall be home the end of September, unless war between Japan and U.S. delays us. Best of love, dear Elizabeth, and thanks for all the lovely things you say –

Yours affectionately B.R. [Russ36]

1921.02.26 Bertrand Russell has lunch with Vasilyevich Ivanov Razumnik in Beijing. [Russ6]

1921.03 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Mathematical logic" at the Beijing University. [Russ6]

1921.03.10-11 Bertrand Russell visits the Great Wall. [Russ6]

1921.03.14-17 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Problems of education" at the Baoding Middle School in Baoding (Hebei).

He caught a severe cold which led to double pneumonia. Throughout the two weeks Russell suffered of extremely high fever and the physicians lost any hope. On March 27 a Japanese news agency bulletin reporting Russell's death went around the world. A Beijing newspaper wrote: "Missionaries may be pardoned for heaving a sigh of relief at the news of Mr. Bertrand Russell's death". [Russ3,Russ6,Russ9]

1921.03.23 Letter from Fu Zhongsun and Zhang Bangming to Bertrand Russell; 23.3.1921.

They explained that they were translating "Introduction of mathematical philosophy", based on the second edition of 1920, and that they had both attended his first lecture on mathematical logic and planned to attend the remaining three. They also intended to publish their lecture notes as an appendix to the translation of the book. The main purpose of their letter was to ask Russell to clarify some questions they had while preparing their translation. [Russ42]
1921.05.11  Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell, German Hospital, Peking, 11 May 1921.

I am now much better, indeed quite well except for a tiresome aftermath in the shape of inflammation of the vein of a leg. It doesn't hurt, but the only cure is to keep the leg absolutely motionless, so I am tied to my bed, which is boring. The Doctors say it is bound to get well soon, but it has now lasted 3 weeks. My lungs are completely healed, which is a comfort, as bad pneumonia generally leaves a weakness. My nurse, who is very religious, says my recovery is literally a miracle, only explicable by the direct interposition of Providence. I suggested to her, in Gibbonian phrase, that Providence works through natural causes, but she rejected this view, rightly feeling that it savours of atheism. Everybody who had to do with me when I was ill is amazed that I am alive. For my part, I am astonished to find how much I love life: when I see the sun I think I might never have seen him again, and I feel 'Ugh! it is good to be alive'. Out of my window I see great acacia trees in blossom, and think how dreadful it would have been to have never seen the spring again. Oddly enough these things come into my mind more instinctively than human things.

I grow more and more like Voltaire – I have been having enemas constantly. (Dora complains that I scream for them, as he did). I have realized one ambition which I almost despaired of. I have read an obituary notice of myself. In Japan I was reported dead, and the 'Japan Chronicle' had a long article on me. My illness has not changed me in the slightest, in fact it has made hardly more impression than a bad toothache. I have missed much by not dying here, as the Chinese were going to have given me a terrific funeral in Central Park, and then bury me on an island in the Western Lake, where the greatest poets and emperors lived, died, and were buried. Probably I should have become a God. What an opportunity missed.

Goodbye dearest O. Fondest love. B. [Russ36]
The foreigner who ventures to have an opinion on any Chinese question incurs a great risk of complete folly, particularly if, as in my case, his stay in the country has been short and his knowledge of the language is nil. China has an ancient and complex civilization, the most ancient now existing in the world. The traditions of China are quite different from those of Europe. China has in the past achieved great things in philosophy, in art and in music, but in all these respects, what has been done has been practically independent of European influence and widely different from all that issued out of the Hellenic culture. The mere effort to understand a society whose religion and morals have been framed in independence of Christianity requires for a European no small amount of psychological imagination. When one adds to all this the difficulty of ascertaining the facts concerning modern China, it is evident that any European is likely to go far astray in an attempt to lay down a programme of reform for the Chinese nation. For all these reasons, I am persuaded that those Chinese who have the welfare of their country at heart will have to frame their own programme and not rely too much upon the intellectual assistance of foreigners. Nevertheless, I am venturing to put before you some considerations as to the state of China and the way in which it might be improved considerations which have grown up in me slowly during my stay among you and were by no means present to my mind when I first landed. Two things of a very general nature seem to me evident: the first that it is not to be desired that China should adopt the civilization of Europe in its entirety; the second, that the traditional civilization of China is inadequate to present needs and must give way to something radically new. The evils of European civilization have been made obvious to all thoughtful observers by the great war and its outcome. In the early days of the war most Europeans imagined that these evils were not inherent in our system, but would be eradicated by the victory of one’s own side, whichever that might be. This has proved to be a delusion. The basis of our civilization is capitalistic industrialism, a system, which, though in its early stages it brings about immensely rapid technical and material progress, cannot but lead on to increasingly destructive wars, first for markets and then for raw materials. It is by no means improbable that our Western civilization may go under in the course of these wars and of the class conflicts due to the opposition of capital and labour. Even if our civilization should survive, it is to be feared that it will become increasingly mechanical, with a constantly augmenting disregard for the individual and his idiosyncrasies. From such a civilization little that is of value is to be expected. It is, therefore, not by mere imitation of Western ways that the Chinese can do most for the welfare of their own country or of the world. On the other hand, the traditional civilization of China based upon Confucianism tempered by Buddhism has worn itself out, and is no longer capable either of inspiring individual achievement or of solving the internal and external political problems with which China is beset. For the last thousand years or so this civilization has been decaying, slowly losing vigour as the Greco-Roman civilization lost vigour in the centuries preceding the barbarian invasion. I think these evils are inseparable from an ancient tradition which is greatly respected, no matter what that tradition may be. It is necessary for each generation to think and feel for itself, and not to seek wisdom in the utterances of ancestors, however wise their ancestors may have been in their own time. I hear it said by Europeans that China would go to pieces morally if respect for the teaching of Confucius were lost. Perhaps this might be the case if a mere vacuum were left in the mental region from which that teaching had been removed, but it would most certainly not be the case if a newer doctrine, more suited to modern problems, could inspire the same belief and the same enthusiasm as must have been inspired by
Confucianism in its creative period. The Chinese reformer, therefore, if I am not mistaken, will be no more willing to uphold what is traditional in his own country than to seek novelty by slavish imitation of the West. I am convinced that China, in the future as in the past, has a distinctive contribution to make to civilization, and something more than mere quantity to add to the world's mental possessions. Passing from these generalizations to the actual state of your affairs, every reasonable man is convinced of the necessity of putting an end to the present condition of anarchic militarism. This is common ground among all reformers, from the mildest to the most extreme; but the method by which it is to be achieved is a matter of endless controversy. Among Europeans especially there is a tendency to favour restoration of the monarchy, but such a step can hardly be expected to appeal to the progressive Chinese. It is not by restoring old conditions that new problems can be solved. It is clear, of course, that a radical and permanent solution must depend upon education. But education is a somewhat vague word, and any education worthy of the name is difficult to secure under the present political conditions, as the course of the teachers’ strike has indicated. The education that China needs must be at once widespread and modern. It must not be, as in the past, the privilege of a favoured minority, nor the mere learning of ancient books and their commentators. It must be universal and must be scientific and the science must not be merely theoretical, but in close touch with modern industry and economics. So long as the bulk of your population is uneducated it will be incapable of supporting an industrial state or of resisting the ambitions of ruthless adventurers. But the building up of such a system of education in a country such as yours is an immense task, requiring a generation for its fulfilment, even with all possible good will on the part of the government. You would not, to begin with, have the necessary supply of teachers, nor would the State be able to support the expense without a much greater development of industrialism than has hitherto taken place in China. And until you have a better government than you have now, you will not be able to secure even the preliminary measures. All that can be done at present in the way of education is to the good, and is, as the mathematicians say, necessary, but not sufficient. Thus the need for education brings us back to economic and political problems as its pre-conditions. I think it must be taken as nearly certain that your industrial resources will lead in the near future to a great development of industrialism. I am by no means convinced that industrialism will be a boon to China, or can ever be anything but a misfortune to any country, but if, as I believe, industrial development is in any case inevitable, it is a mere waste of time to argue whether it is desirable or undesirable. The only problem of practical importance for you is the problem of developing industrialism with the minimum of attendant evils and the maximum of national and cultural advantage. All the Great Powers are anxious to secure a share in the exploitation of your resources, and unless you develop more national strength than you have hitherto shown, you will be unable to withstand aggressions fomented by foreign industrialists. I see that the American ex-Minister, Mr. Crane, has been advocating international control for China on the ground that the Chinese government cannot keep order, a prospect which grows not unnaturally out of the Consortium. There is much to be said for international control, not only in China but also in other countries. If England were subject to it, there would be an end of the reign of rapine and murder in Ireland. In America also Mr. Crane's proposal might be adopted with advantage. In that country there are constantly recurring Boxer risings—against the negroes. Under international control these risings might be put down by contingents of black troops drawn from all parts of Africa, and Fifth Avenue might be enlivened by memorial arches erected to the most prominent victims. International control of all nations must be the ultimate goal of all who wish to further the cessation of war which is only possible by substituting law for the present anarchy in relations between States. But international control, when it comes, must recognize the citizens of different states as equals, and not subject some of them to a despotism exerted by a league of certain others. No doubt the Chinese government is bad, but so are all other governments, and I doubt whether the Chinese government does as much harm as those of the Powers which were victors in the war. International control cannot, I am convinced, be a boon to China until the existence of a national State in China is fully assured, and until this State is strong enough to repel all attempts at exploitation by foreign capitalists backed by armies and warships. I think the most
urgent need of China is the development of active patriotism, especially among those who, by their education, are the natural teachers of public opinion. Japanese aggression has begun to produce a movement of this kind, but something much more active, instinctive, and widespread is necessary if China is to be saved from subjugation. Your Empire subsisted for thousands of years without coming into contact with any really formidable enemies. Even the Tartars and Manchus who acquired dominion were few and made a comparatively small mark upon Chinese civilization. Consequently patriotism, which is chiefly evoked by the need of self-defence, plays little part in Chinese traditional morality. Its place was taken, more or less inadequately, by respect for the Emperor. And this substitute for patriotism has been destroyed since you became a Republic. Unfortunately you now for the first time in your history are faced with the danger of foreign aggression on the part of really formidable nations, and therefore the necessity of patriotism has become urgent. If your independence is to be preserved, it is necessary to transfer to the nation the kind of devotion which has hitherto been given to the family. The family is too narrow a group for modern needs, and a race which upholds the family as strongly as it is upheld in China, cannot develop that integrity and zeal in the public service without which no modern state can prosper. It would of course be absurd to hope that public spirit could in a short time be diffused among the bulk of the population, but this is by no means necessary for the beginning of regeneration. Ten thousand resolute men, inspired by an ideal and willing to risk their lives, could acquire control of the government, regenerate Chinese institutions, and institute an industrial development which should be free from the evils associated with capitalism in the West. Such men would have to be honest, energetic and intelligent, incapable of corruption, unrewarding in work, willing to assimilate whatever is good in the West, and yet not the slaves of mechanism like most Europeans and Americans. The powers of evil in China are not strong; they only seem so because the opposition to them is too theoretical. There is one question which I find on the lips of almost all the thoughtful Chinese whom I have met and that is the question: 'How can we develop industry without at the same time developing capitalism and all its evils ?' This is a very difficult question, and I do not know whether you will in fact succeed in solving it. When I first came to China I thought it insoluble, but I am now of the opinion that if you could create such a band of resolute men as I have mentioned it would be possible to solve the problem. But it is useless in China to approach the economic problem directly; the political problem must be solved first. Until you have a strong and honest State, with able and incorruptible administration, you cannot institute any form of genuine socialism or communism. Suppose, for example, that your mines were now nominally nationalized; it is as clear as noon day that the profits to be derived from them would go to the Tuchuns and their armies, not to the people. Political reform must precede any desirable economic development in China. Political reform in China cannot for many years to come take the form of democracy after the Western model. Democracy presupposes a population that can read and write and that has some degree of knowledge as to political affairs. These conditions cannot be satisfied in China until at least a generation after the establishment of a government devoted to the public welfare. You will have to pass through a stage analogous to that of the dictatorship of the communist party in Russia, because it is only by some such means that the necessary education of the people can be carried through, and the non-capitalistic development of industry effected. The Russian Bolsheviks, as is natural to pioneers, have made many mistakes, more especially in the measures which antagonized the peasants. They are now, very wisely, repealing these measures, and those who follow them on the same road will be able to profit by their experience. When I was in Russia, I was much concerned with the Bolshevik attempt to introduce their methods and aims into Western countries. I believe this to be a quite useless attempt. Where there is already a developed industry and an educated proletariat, different methods must be adopted, and democracy must be preserved. But where, as in Russia and China, these conditions are absent, where there is a population which is neither educated nor accustomed to industrial processes, the methods adopted by the Russian communists seem, in broad outline, the best possible. Various ways of organizing non-capitalistic industry have been suggested by various schools. There is anarchist communism, where, as in ancient Poland and in the League of Nations, no decision can be taken unless it is
unanimous. There is syndicalism, which is a kind of federation of trade unions; there is State Socialism, which is the system adopted in Russia; and there is Guild Socialism, which is a blend of syndicalism and State Socialism. Anarchist communism, syndicalism, and Guild Socialism all presuppose a developed industry and the habits of industrialism. They are therefore impossible as the first step towards socialism in an undeveloped country. The early developments of industry must—so it seems to me—be either capitalistic or state-socialistic. Accordingly, if I am confronted by the problem: 'How can China develop her industries without capitalism?' I must reply: 'In the first instance only by State Socialism.' State Socialism has grave drawbacks, and in an undeveloped country reproduces many of the evils of capitalism. But I believe it is easier to pass from it to a better system, when industrial and educational progress makes it possible, than it is to eradicate capitalism when once it has acquired the hold it has in England and America. There is much that is not essential in the practice of the Bolsheviks, and in non-essentials I do not desire to see them imitated. The essential thing is the State ownership and exploitation of mines, railways, waterways, and all urban and industrial land. (Theoretically, agricultural land should also belong to the State, but this raises such difficulties with the peasants that in a country of small proprietors it is not politically feasible on any large scale.) If this system is to avoid the inequalities of wealth which are among the evils of capitalism, the officials who direct industry must not use their power, as capitalists do, to extort vast fortunes out of the workers. This requires a degree of self-denial which can only be secured by a great enthusiasm and a great devotion to an ideal. Further, if the system of State Socialism is not to remain a bureaucratic tyranny, those who carry it out must be imbued with the love of democracy and liberty, and must direct their efforts to the realization of these as soon as the people can be sufficiently educated. It is mainly in this that I think the Russian communist party open to criticism: a system which gives all power to the communist party seems to its members quite satisfactory, and they are in no hurry to pave the way for a greater freedom and a wider distribution of power. It is customary among communists to maintain that economic factors are the only ones of importance in the life of a community. This seems to me an entire delusion. I believe that ethical factors are at least as important. Consider the ethical qualities required of the men who are to bring about such an economic revolution in China as I have been suggesting. Such men, in the first place, will have to be intellectuals by training, but largely soldiers by profession. They will have to fight anarchic militarism within, and the whole might of capitalistic Powers without. What this means can be seen from what Russia has had to endure from the hostility of reactionary governments. In the course of the fighting, many will lose their lives, and all will have to endure hardships and the persecution of mankind. Assuming the victory won, the victors will be in a position to secure wealth and a long term of power for themselves; but they will have to forego wealth and prepare for the abolition of their power in favour of a more democratic system at the earliest possible moment. To pursue this course steadfastly to the end requires ethical qualities of the highest order. Especially rare is the willingness to abrogate power secured after a bitter struggle. The great difficulty of the Bolshevik method of introducing Socialism lies in the severity of its ethical demands. The Russian Bolsheviks seem, on the whole, successful in resisting the temptation to wealth, but likely to succumb to the temptation to prolongation of their power. All their talk against democracy and in favour of the dictatorship of what they call the proletariat is, in essence, merely camouflage for their love of power. In China, so far as I have been able to observe the national character, one might expect the opposite failure, because the love of money seems to be stronger than the love of power. The love of money is, I think, the greatest danger you will have to combat if you attempt a non-capitalistic development of industry. The ethical difficulties of the line of action I have been suggesting are so great that I cannot feel any confidence in its practicability. China is ruled at present by a set of Tuchuns whose dominant passion is money. You can only defeat them if you love the welfare of China more passionately and more energetically than they love money. This is a high standard, but what I have seen of Young China makes me not despair of its attainment. If you cannot realize a moral and economic revolution, the alternative is a gradually increasing foreign control, perhaps leaving China's nominal sovereignty intact, but securing all real power to foreigners through
possession of economic resources. Such a system would produce a growth of industrial capitalism, and the training of a population accustomed to industrial work—at first only in its lower grades, but later on probably in higher grades also. This process might lead after about a century to a movement for national liberation. But the movement would find success just as difficult then as now, and a century would have been wasted. Meanwhile the habits of capitalism would have been acquired, and would probably prevent the establishment of socialism even if national independence were achieved. From every point of view, therefore, a vigorous movement in the near future is infinitely preferable to the policy of drifting while foreign nations act. Industry and the economic side of life have been thought of in the West too much as the ends of existence. They are not ends, but mere means to a good life. The ideal to be aimed at is a community where industry is the servant of man, not his master; where there is sufficiency and leisure for all; where economic aims are not dominant; where leisure is used for art and science and friendship, instead of being sacrificed to the production of an excess of commodities. China has many of the qualities required for realizing this ideal, particularly the artistic sense and the capacity for civilized enjoyment without which leisure has little value. These qualities make it possible to hope that China may lead the world in the next stage of development, and give back to the restless West something of that inner calm without which we must perish in frantic madness. In this way not only China, but the whole world, may be regenerated by your achievements. [Russ6]

1921.07.06 Bertrand Russell and Dora Black gave the last lectures in Beijing. [Russ5]
1921.07.07 Farewell party for Bertrand Russell in Beijing. [Russ6]
1921.07.11 Bertrand Russell and Dora Black Russell left Beijing. [Russ6]
1921.07.24 Russell, Bertrand. To the Editor of The Japan Chronicle, Tokyo, 24. July (1921). In : The Japan Chronicle ; 26. July (1921). Sir, In your issue of July 24th there is a leaderette with whose general scope I am in agreement, but ending in a suggestion which seems to me misleading and not wholly just, to the effect that 'Professor Dewey… is not a good authority or an unprejudiced witness'. I do not know that any one of us could claim to be an unprejudiced witness where national bias enters in. I have myself struggled against the distorting influence of nationalism on my own thoughts for many years, yet I am still conscious of being by no means unprejudiced in an issue between Britain and a foreign country. Doubtless Professor Dewey also may be described – along with the rest of the human race – as a prejudiced witness in this sense, but in this sense only. He favours the Consortium. I do not. He sees in the extension of America's influence on China the best hope of China's regeneration. I do not. But these are very difficult questions in regard to which either opinion may be held rationally. As to the statement that Professor Dewey 'is not a good authority', he has been in Canton and seen the leading men, and is, no doubt, repeating what they told him. Nor is he the only authority for the statement in question, which is repeated with more detail by Mr. Philip Haddon in the 'Review of the Far East' for July 16th. And certainly some explanation has to be sought for the extreme hostility of Hongkong to the Government of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The favour shown to that Government by the Americans also needs explanation, which, I hope, will be provided by some American as 'unpatriotic' as myself. [Russ6]

1921.08.05 Ting, V.K. [Ding Wenjiang]. Letter to Peking Leader ; 5. Aug, 1921. Ting wrote that Bertrand Russell had made a 'profound' impression on those who heard his lectures on psychology, mathematics, and physics, 'for they realized for the first time that philosophy is nothing but the synthetic results of all the sciences and Mr. Russell's ideas of social reconstruction were the outcome of mature thinking. Ting implied that 'superficial' men, such as journalists, who were not prepared for, nor interested in, such technical lectures, erroneously concluded that others could not have found Russell of interest. He interpreted Russell's 'Farwell speech' as a clear mandate to the Chinese intellectual minority to be responsible for the reconstruction of China. [Russ10]
"The Lecture Association would have found it worthwhile to invite Bertrand Russell if he had merely come to mingle with the present and future leaders of China to acquaint them with fair ways of thinking. His presence made dry as cotton books on abstract subjects sell like novels."
Zhang noted that Russell's lectures were to be published for profit by several commercial presses, and that discussion circles 'were formed with a zeal as has rarely been shown on any occasions'. Russell's close contact with the 'returned students' led them to 'constructive thinking and doing'. Zhao contended that even Russell's 'opponents' (reactionaries) were unable to ignore Russell and had to be content with alleging that others 'ignored' him. Zhao noted the young Chinese leaders' disappointment that Russell could not completely deliver 'his more directly practical lectures', but his opponents were 'joyful' over it. [Russ10]

1921.10.18  Letter from Xu Zhimo to Bertrand Russell. 18.10.1921.
Xu Zhimo obtained the London address of Russell from his Cambridge friend C[harles] K[ay] Ogden. He wrote: "Indeed I have been longing for an occasion to be with you since I came to England." Through this self-introduction, Xu became a friend of the Russells and commuted frequently between Cambridge and London in order to attend the lecture meetings given by Russell. [Russ45]
China is by far the most important part of the earth's surface still unexploited and subject to a weak government. The Great Powers are determined to develop China, and the Washington Conference, if it succeeds, is to decide how the proceeds are to be shared. China has an ancient and valuable civilization, with a way of life far more humane than that of the white man; this is to be destroyed. China wishes to develop her own industry, but not on the lines of private capitalism; this must be prevented.

Four Powers are specially concerned with Chinese affairs: Japan, Great Britain, the United States, and Russia. Let us leave Russia on one side for the moment. Japan is more hated in China than any other Power; we come next, as the allies of Japan, the possessors of Hongkong and Wei-hai-wei (the latter in explicit contravention of our treaty rights), and the aggressors in China's first wars with modern nations. The interests of the English and Americans in China are, however, more capable of adjustment than either with the Japanese, because both desire commercial, financial, and industrial advantages, while the Japanese desire territory to live in. The Japanese therefore, wherever they acquire a secure hold, will keep the exploitation to themselves, even if the open door is nominally safeguarded by treaty. There are two ways of sharing Chinese loot; one is that of spheres of influence, the other that of the Consortium, according to which the whole of China is to be exploited jointly. The Americans, who claim a monopoly of high moral sentiment, consider the latter method morally preferable, presumably because it gives a prospect of opening to their enterprise regions now monopolized by the Japanese. Wherever the can, however, the Americans secure monopolies for themselves. They negotiated in Peking a wireless monopoly, and were indignant when they discovered that the Chinese (with their usual sly fun) had granted the same monopoly simultaneously to the Japanese. Liberal Americans, from Professor Dewey downward, have denounced us, very justly, for the iniquitous Cassel agreement with the former Canton Government; but not one of them, so far as I know, has so much as mentioned the at least equally iniquitous Shank Agreement [negotiated by George H. Shank, gives a twenty years' monopoly to America of all the industrial resources of Guangdong] concluded by the Americans with the present Canton Government. American Liberalism is in the Palmerstonian phase, able to see the faults of all other nations, but blind to its own, at any rate in international affairs. The fact is, of course, that all capitalist nations are equally vile in their dealings with China. The notion that some are better and others worse is merely a nationalist delusion.

The situation to be dealt with by the Washington Conference may be regarded from two points of view: first, that of China's welfare; secondly, that of the preservation of peace among the Great Powers. I do not know whether the Americans desire the latter, or trust to Japanese mistakes to give them a moral pretext for war while securing our neutrality. Japan is in a mood like that of Germany before the war, and America is in a mood very like that of England before the war. The Japanese are hysterical and terrified, not realizing how imperialistic they are, feeling that nothing they can do will enable them to escape war with America, that when that happens we shall desert them, and that only vigorous military and naval preparation can preserve their independence. The Americans, on the other hand, believe that their own intentions are wholly virtuous, and that Japan's fears must be hypocritical. A little self-knowledge on both sides would solve the difficulty, but neither side has any. Japan has a surplus population and wants territory for emigration. America and the British dominions being closed, it is natural to turn to the mainland of Asia. There is room for a great increase of population in Manchuria, but hitherto the immigration there has been almost wholly Chinese. And this Chinese immigration must be restricted if there is to be room for the Japanese, which is impossible by any measures which America is likely to tolerate. Meanwhile there is the Far Eastern Republic which, being in effect Bolshevik, is the enemy of mankind, i.e. of big finance everywhere. Neither it nor Russia is to be represented at Washington; therefore we may presume that the Japanese are to be bought off, if possible, by permission to wage a holy war in Eastern Siberia. Clearly the easiest way to secure peace among the imperialist Powers is at the expense of Russia. Meanwhile Russia has her own new-style imperialism on the borders of China, having recently conquered and Bolshevized.
Mongolia, formerly part of the Chinese empire. Russia has, of course, the ardent sympathy of all the young advanced people in China, and is the only Great Power having access to China by land. The Japanese in Vladivostok (which is part of the Far Eastern Republic) are perpetually intriguing against the Chita Government, and war between the two has often seemed imminent. But for American hatred of Bolshevism, it would be natural for America to support Chita [capital of Far Eastern Republic] against Tokyo, but self-determination has its limits, and does not operate in favour of people who determine to be Communists. Therefore it is probable that, if the Washington Conference succeeds in reaching an agreement, America will allow Japan a free hand against the Far Eastern Republic, which, of course, involves a war between Japan and Soviet Russia.

Thus from the point of view of the interests of China, the Far Eastern Republic, and Soviet Russia, it is to be hoped that the Washington Conference will fail. But if it fails, there is the certainty of a great increase in naval armaments, the probability of a long war between American and Japan, leading to the complete destruction of the Japanese civilization, and the by no means remote probability of a war between America and Great Britain, involving our downfall and the death by starvation of half our population. Whether the brigands agree or disagree when they assemble at Washington, the outlook is equally gloomy for the world. It is possible that before all these evils are realized some spark of humanity, justice, or even common prudence may enter into the policies of great nations? I doubt is; yet there seems no other hope for humanity during the next few centuries. [Russ6]

1921.11.07 Letter from Xu Zhimo to Bertrand Russell. 7.11.1921.
C[harles] K[ay] Ogden planed to publish a World philosophy series, in which Hu Shi's Zhongguo zhe xue shi da gang 中國哲學史大綱 [Outlines of the history of Chinese philosophy] was to be included upon Russell's proposal. The project of Ogden did not materialize.
Xu did not agree with Russell:
"The author [Hu Shi] is too much concerned with combatting his predecessors on points which are not likely to interest the Western readers not well-informed in this field; in the second place, it is too bulky, the first volume alone amounting to four hundred pages. It occurs to me [that] the best man for our purpose is Mr. Liang Qichao (the man who gave you that piece of painting) who, as you probably know, is one of the very most learned scholars and probably the most powerful and lucid writer China has ever produced. His continual effort of emancipating Chinese thought and introducing and popularizing Western ideas is worthy of our great admiration. His power of assimilating and discriminating learning has never been equalled. So it would be simply ideal if we could get him to do the job, and that I think more than possible. If you would just kindly write to him, urging him to produce a standard book on Chinese thought and indicating the general character of the Series, it would be, I have no doubt, a tremendous spur to his amazing creative energy and he would be more than pleased to comply with the request. There could be no better arrangement than this." [Russ45]
Progressive China undoubtedly has great hopes of the Washington Conference. Hitherto, in all dealings with foreign Powers, America alone has been found friendly. As everyone knows, the American share of the Boxer indemnity has been spent in education Chinese students, both in China and in America. This was in itself a friendly act, and had the result that a large majority of young educated Chinese have an American outlook. Our Government, very shortsightedly, has not yet seen its way to a similar restitution.

Another great cause of Chinese friendship for America is the fact that America has always opposed Japanese aggression, and has, alone among Great Powers, shown no desire to acquire territory on the mainland of Asia, or even concessions in the Treaty Ports. American ambitions in China are commercial and industrial, not territorial. And in addition to education, the Americans have done much good work in the way of hospitals, famine relief, etc.

The ambitions of the Japanese are not merely capitalistic, they are also militaristic and imperial. It is true that the Japanese desire raw materials for their industry, which are to be had in China but not in Japan. This desire, however, if it stood alone, would be capable of gratification without infringing the principle of the Open Door. What makes the Japanese desire more than the Americans claim in China is the love of empire, the desire for might based on armaments which led Germany to disaster. The Japanese expected Germany to win the war, and are still inclined to adopt pre-war Germany as their model.

There is in Japan a Socialist and Labour Party on European lines, and among its leaders are some of the finest men I have ever met. But they have no influence on Japanese policy, and cannot hope to have while only about four per cent of the population are industrial. Even moderate Liberalism has little practical influence, because the Army and Navy are directly responsible to the Mikado, and not in any degree subject to Parliament or the Cabinet, or even the Prime Minister. Thus the extreme militarists have a free hand.

During the last quarter of a century, the Japanese have acquired Korea, Manchuria, and Shantung, in each case with the help of Great Britain. Korea was only loosely connected with China by a traditional protectorate, and although the sufferings of Koreans at the hands of Japan have been very great, Korea is hardly a Chinese question. Manchuria, on the other hand, concerns China vitally.

The Manchu conquerors came from there in the seventeenth century, and from there it is easy still to exercise military domination over Peking. There is in Manchuria, under Japanese protection and influence, a Chinese reactionary viceroy, who is often able to overawe the Peking politicians and compel them to adopt a pro-Japanese policy. In this way all China north of the Yangtse is more or less terrorized.

And civil discord is kept alive by skilful loans from the Japanese to all parties in the strife of rival generals. So long as Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern Railway remain subject to Japanese military control, it is not easy to see how this situation can be altered except for the worse.

The question of Shantung is, however, of still greater importance if China is to be saved from foreign domination. Shantung is as intimately Chinese as Kent is English; the situation now is about what ours would have been if the Germans had held Dover and Folkestone and the South-Eastern Railway up to Sevenoaks.

Shantung interests the Chinese sentimentally, because it contains the birth-place of Confucius, and materially, because it has considerable wealth, which the Japanese are using for the subjugation of China. The Japanese announced in 1914 that they were attacking the Germans in Shantung with a view to restoring Germany's possessions to China, but they concluded secret treaties with England and France stipulating that they were to retain all they conquered from Germany.

These secret treaties were used to defeat President Wilson at Versailles. We forced China into the war as our ally, and rewarded her by robbing her of one of her richest provinces. And on account of the secret treaties, our emissaries at Washington will probably feel bound to support Japan in any resistance to restitution.

Nevertheless, there is reason to hope that the Shantung question may be satisfactorily dealt with at Washington, if the Powers succeed in reaching any agreement. America is not bound...
by the Treaty of Versailles, owing to the Senate's refusal to ratify; and unless our support of Japan is more vigorous than it seems likely to be, fear of America may make the Japanese conciliatory to China, as it has made us to Sinn Fein. If this should happen, however, it is by no means improbable that the Japanese will demand and obtain compensation in Siberia at the expense of the semi-Bolshevik Far-Eastern Republic.

It is not only by support of the Japanese that British diplomacy in China has been harmful. It has been almost invariably reactionary, supporting everything conservative against Young China, showing no understanding of the country's needs or desire for its regeneration. A mere change of alliances without a change of outlook would not remedy our defects as regards China. So long as our diplomatic service remains what it is, every question not in the forefront of public interest will be decided by our diplomats in an anti-progressive fashion. For example, when Yuan-shi-kai, in the early days of the Chinese Republic, was endeavouring to acquire arbitrary power without control from the newly-constituted Parliament, we hastened to conclude a loan which rendered him financially independent. For the moment, America may prove useful to China, and Japan is certainly harmful. But in the long run China cannot be saved except by the Chinese. American imperialism is economic, not territorial; but if it were firmly established it would involve a terrible suppression of liberty. It would soon be found, for example, that educated Chinese inclined to Socialism (as most of them are) would be unable to get employment.

The Chinese civilization, which is pacific and non-industrial, which cares more about beauty and truth than about railways or dividends, would be ruthlessly destroyed by apostles of 'pep'. The weakness of China in international affairs is due quite as much to Chinese virtues as to Chinese vices.

The Chinese have not that insane thirst for power and ruthless activity which characterizes the West, and especially America; they were horrified by the war, far more than any European neutral. It is useless to hope that we shall acquire the Chinese virtues; therefore, very patriotic Chinaman must endeavor to acquire our vices. [Russ6]
The great thing to be desired is the independence of China with help from friendly powers in quelling anarchy. I should rejoice greatly if Great Britain led the way in restitution by restoring Hongkong and Wei-Hai Wei. The latter is possible, the former I fear is not.

The Japanese must evacuate Shantung unconditionally. There can be no question about that. If this is not brought about the Washington Conference will fail as regards China. China joined us in war and was rewarded by the loss of one of her best provinces. The former German position in Shantung was absolutely indefensible, but the Japanese claim even more than the Germans had. My sincere hope is that Britain will not support Japan at Washington in her Chinese contentions.

The proposed joint control of the Shantung railroads is not sound. It means, in practice, Japanese control. There is no doubt of that. It is vital that there should be exclusive Chinese control.

There is nothing in the Japanese pretence of a Pan-Asiatic movement. The feeling of antagonism upon the part of the Chinese is much more against the Japanese than any other foreigner. The Japanese position in Manchuria is a menace to Peking and prevents any genuine independence of the Chinese Government. The Chinese forces in Manchuria are compelled to serve Japan.

The Japanese control of the Chinese Eastern Railway prevents through traffic to the Siberian Railway which the Far East republic desires. This makes the journey to Europe six weeks in length, instead of fourteen days. Chinese independence requires control of all its railways. It also means autonomy as regards tariff, which now is fixed by treaties with thirteen States and requires unanimous consent of the thirteen before any alteration can be made.

One difficulty that faces China is honest administration. That has been solved in the customs service by employing foreigners appointed by China. This system is good in time of transition and might be extended with a time limit.

Military anarchy must be stopped, the Canton Government should be recognized on the condition of federal union with North China, provincial autonomy is necessary, private armies should be disbanded and private occupations found for the soldiers. All this should be offered China with a reconstruction loan and a restitution of stolen territory and abandonment of monopoly rights.

The reconstruction scheme could be drawn up in consultation with leading Chinese, excluding the military. The adoption of general principles only is possible at the Washington Conference. The details will require time.

The dangers to this programme are, of course, certain Japanese opposition. America wants Japan's consent to the naval programme. Perhaps Japan will consent only if allowed to keep all she has in China. The Washington Conference might easily lead to war if Japan is obstinate. I earnestly hope she will not be, both for the sake of Japan as well as of China. It is vitally important that England should not encourage Japan, first, because American friendship is necessary to us; second, because the American policy in China is better than ours and better than Japan's; third, because this is the last moment when Japan can avoid disaster my moderation.

If Japan does not moderate her demands she will sooner or later be smashed by America. I do not desire this. I hate war and wish the peaceful development of Japan.

The open door consortium and so forth are not enough for China. They only give the foreign nations equality in exploitation and do not give freedom to China. China should be allowed freedom for development even if it is slow.

The progress of modern education will make China a different country twenty years hence. China ultimately will be invincible and it will be disastrous if foreigners take temporary advantage of her present weakness. The Chinese civilization is quite as good as ours. We must not imagine ourselves as missionaries of a higher culture. The Chinese are more patient, philosophic, pacific, artistic and are only less efficient in killing. Why force them to learn this from us?

It is a pity Russia is not represented at Washington. She has been and will be a great pacific
power. She can dominate China from the north and already holds outer Mongolia. There is likely to be a conflict between Russia and Japan before long. I hope Japan will not be compensated in Eastern Siberia without Russian participation, as no such agreement will give China security. Japan will not voluntarily adopt a generous policy towards China. She must be coerced. If England supports America diplomatic pressure will suffice. If not, there is a great danger of war between American and Japan soon or late. The British in the Far East are almost unanimous against the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The time for its usefulness is gone. A generous policy towards China is best for our interests as well as theirs. China's immense potential market requires a better government and foreign friendship for development. Japan wants raw material for her industries and could get them with the 'open door'. She also wants territory for the glory of the empire. She must be thwarted in this. She does not want more territory for colonizing, as few go to Manchuria, Korea or Formosa. In Manchuria there are 100 Chinese immigrants to one Japanese. The Chinese are stronger in the long run because they are more patient, more populous, less ambitious and also are more genuinely civilized in their mental outlook.

The limitation of naval armament also is very important. I rejoice at the prospect of the Hughes plan being adopted. But the freedom of China is even important. The Chinese are one-fourth of the human race and the most ancient civilization now existing. It is different from ours, but it makes the Chinese happy. They are one of the happiest peoples on earth. All advanced nations are greedy for China's industrial resources. American capitalists are like the others, although the American Government is blameless. The Chinese mentality is not yet adapted to modern industrial methods, but perhaps in time they will develop better methods than ours. The Chinese want to learn our science, which they think is good, but not our ruthlessness, our purposeless bustle or our indifference to individuals. Their civilization is gentler than ours, less persecuting and will remain so if they are not too much bullied. If forced to adopt our vices, they will become the strongest nation in the world, but lose those qualities which make them worth preserving.

The Washington Conference is the turning point in the world's history. If China is liberated she will develop freely and do great things towards founding a new civilization better than ours. If coerced, she ultimately will achieve freedom through war, then become imperialistic and be as bad as her present oppressors. All that is liberal in the world looks to America at this moment. Can America save other powers from their own egoistic follies? And if so, will America in the long run escape similar follies on her own account? The future of civilization depends upon the answer to these questions. [Russ6]

There are many Europeans who view China simply as a diplomatic question, which the Powers must settle if they are not to fight. To such people, China seems analogous in this generation to Africa thirty or forty years ago. This analogy is profoundly misleading to all whom it influences. Africa is a continent of many races and many religions, with no indigenous civilization except to some slight extent along the Mediterranean. China is homogeneous (broadly speaking) in race and culture; a great empire which has subsisted for thousands of years, and which is a definitely a civilizing influence in the Far East as ancient Greece was in Europe. The nearest analogue to present-day China is Rome at the time of the barbarian invasion. The Chinese Empire has been, until very recently, much greater in extent than the Roman Empire, and is still much greater in population. Its first philosopher, Lâo-tsze, who lived in the sixth century B.C., laments the hurry of modern life and the loss of that simplicity which was practiced by 'the pure men of old'. From his day to our own, China has been a highly civilized country in all that concerns art and literature, manners and government. For 2'000 years, officials have been chosen by competitive examination, and have had all the characteristics which that method of selection would lead one to expect. Those who would see in its true perspective what is happening in China must learn to regard themselves as the analogues of the Chilperics, Theodorics, and Attilas who swooped down upon the Roman Empire when it had grown too civilized to fight. Where we differ from these worthies, we differ for the worse, since they at least revered the majesty of Rome even in decay, while we have no sense of the historical greatness of China, because our conventional culture still considers that no country is spiritually important unless it is near the Mediterranean. Those who destroyed Rome politically nevertheless allowed something of Roman culture to be transmitted to future ages; but the armies which attack China from without and the missionaries and merchants who undermine Chinese civilization from within have no idea that there is anything of value to be preserved in a country which is bad at making munitions and a bit too provident in the use of soap. So long as this ignorance persists, it is impossible to understand the Chinese question.

The question 'What is China?' which is being asked in bewilderment by those who would wish to help the Chinese, can be answered only by some understanding of the historical position of the Celestial Empire. The Chinese first appear in history along the banks of the Yellow River, a fierce unnavigable stream, constantly in flood and occasionally changing its course, spreading fertility and devastation by turns, tempting men to cultivation of the alluvial soil, and then drowning them by the hundred thousand. The earliest annals of China are concerned with attempts to curb the inundations of the Yellow River. In the time of Confucius, China was still confined to this region, embracing roughly the provinces of Shansi, Chili, and part of Shantung. The so-called First Emperor (ca. 200 B.C.) extended the empire to the Yangtze, while his successors of the Han dynasty conquered the south almost up to the boundaries of present-day China before the beginning of the Christian era. The empire of the Han dynasty, with a few additions, constitutes China proper in the narrowest sense, excluding Manchuria, consists of eighteen provinces, extending from Peichi-li (containing Peking) in the north of Kwang-tung (containing Canton) in the south, and from Shantung (containing the birthplace of Confucius) in the east to Sze-chwan on the borders of Tibet in the west. The four hundred millions who are said to constitute the population of China are mainly concentrated in China proper, which is densely populated while its dependencies are but sparsely settled. There has never been an accurate census in China, but it is probably safe to assume that the number of inhabitants of China proper is between three and four hundred millions. Almost the whole of this area has had for 2'000 years a uniform administration, a uniform culture, a uniform written language, education, literature, and art. The spoken language differs greatly in different places – about as much as French differs from Italian – but owing to the non-phonetic character of the Chinese script, there is no corresponding difference in the written language. Educated people speak what is called the 'Mandarin language', which is approximately the dialect of Peking; but knowledge of the Mandarin is by no means universal even among the most cultivated. There is strong provincial patriotism,
sufficiently strong to make a federal constitution desirable; but as against the foreigner the Chinese feel themselves very definitely one nation.

Outside China proper there are vast areas loosely connected with China. Burma, Annam, Korea and Japan all at one time or another acknowledged the suzerainty of China. (As regards Japan, the facts are briefly set forth in Putnam Weale's 'The truth about China and Japan', pp. 16-19.) From China the Japanese adopted their writing, art, and religion, and, broadly speaking, whatever civilization they had before 1868. Political relations with these countries, however, were at most times slight. Much closer and more interesting were the relations with Tibet and Mongolia. Buddhism, the one important foreign element in Chinese civilization, has, as everyone knows, a northern and a southern form, with Lhasa as the religious headquarters of the northern branch. Tibet and Mongolia are almost identical in matters of religion; they both have Lamas, who hold all the power in Tibet and most of it in Mongolia. Both are fanatically religious. At times when the belief in Buddhism was increasing in China, the Lamas acquired considerable favour; thus Lamaism has been an influence on China, as well as China on Lamaism. But the usual temperament of the Chinese educated classes is skeptical, polished and literary, more inclined to make epigrams about a religion than to believe it. The Mongolians are at a very much lower level of culture than the Chinese, being largely nomads and almost all sunk in superstition. There is in Peking a Lama temple, where Tibetan and Mongolian religious pictures and statues can be seen. They are dark and terrible, altogether unlike the gay, cheerful art of Chinese temples. One feels at once the hot breath of barbarian fierceness, the sort of spirit that one associates with the name of Attila. Moreover, the Mongolians have a strong though intermittent anti-Chinese nationalism; they remember that Jenghis Khan was of their race, and they cherish the hope that some day they will repeat his conquest of China. They are described with affectionate humour by the Jesuit missionary M. Huc, whose 'Souvenirs d'un voyage dans la Tartarie et le Thibet pendant les années 1844, 1845, et 1846' is one of the most delightful books with which I am acquainted.

Mongolia is not really part of China, and in losing it the Chinese lose what they have always held by conquest only. It is divided into two parts, inner and outer, of which the former is more or less under Japanese control, while the latter has had, during the last twelve months, a series of adventures typical of the confusions existing in that part of the world. I must beg the reader not to disbelieve in these adventures merely because they sound romantic.

Soon after I arrived in Peking, the newspapers there were full of the news that Urga, an important town of Outer Mongolia, had been attacked by a certain leader of Russian White troops named Baron Ungern. The Chinese garrison resisted, but was overpowered. The Japanese were understood to be, as usual, supporting the Russian reactionaries. The Chinese refugees appealed to Peking, which paid Chang-tso-lin, Viceroy of Manchuria, several million taels to undertake the reconquest of Mongolia. Unfortunately, however, he lost the whole sum within a few days by gambling, and was forced to retire in Mukden to economize. Meanwhile the Mongolians, in alliance with the reactionary Russians, had started a religious and nationalistic revival, under the leadership of the Chief Lama of Urga, a living Buddha commonly known as the Hu-tuk-tu, although in fact are many other Hu-tuk-tus. The Government of the Far Eastern Republic (which is in effect Bolshevik) made many offers to the Chinese to help in expelling Ungern from Chinese territory, but Peking refused their help, from fear of offending the Powers, especially the Japanese.

Unfortunately for the Hu-tuk-tu, however, he had a wife. Living Buddhas used to be vowed to celibacy, but the Chinese Government, on rationalist grounds, issued orders, many years ago, that they were all to marry. They obeyed; like the curate in the 'Bab Ballads', they 'did it on compulsion'. The Hu-tuk-tu was therefore married, and, what was more, his wife was (if report spoke true) a Bolshevik. As he was invariably drunk, she acquired control of policy. Accordingly – so at least the correspondent of the 'Times' in Peking reports – the Bolsheviks descended on Urga, captured Baron Ungern, sent him to Moscow, exhibiting him at every station as a monster, plied the Hu-tuk-tu with all the liquor he desired, declaring that when he dies of 'delirium tremens' he is to have no successors, and explained to the nomads and bandits that they were permitted by the doctrines of communism to take to themselves the flocks and herds hitherto belonging to the Mongolian Princes. Consequently Outer Mongolia,
which is about half the size of India, is now part of the Bolshevik Empire and a firm believer in the religion of Karl Marx. [Russ6]
With the exception of America, all the Powers have a thoroughly discreditable record in China. But although the first and worst crime was ours (the Opium War of 1840), the chief offender at the present day is Japan, not because of any special depravity (Japan has merely been copying Christian morals), but because of propinquity and freedom from preoccupation with the war. It is a mistake to suppose that one nation is better or worse than another; they merely differ as to the direction taken by their criminal tendencies. Americans vent their brutality on negroes and socialists, and their subtlety on business rivals, while the Japanese are brutal to the Koreans and subtle in their diplomacy; neither side has any ethical superiority. I wish to emphasize this point, because I am firmly convinced that the belief in the moral superiority or inferiority of one nation to another is thoroughly mischievous, and a source of much futility in the efforts of reformers.

The two regions which the Japanese are specially engaged in absorbing are Manchuria and Shantung. Manchuria is not part of China proper, but is much more intimately related to China than Mongolia is. One might compare Manchuria to the Highlands of Scotland and Mongolia to Ireland; the analogy must not be pressed, but will serve to give a rough idea. As everyone knows, the Manchus differ from the Chinese in race, and originally in language; they were a warlike northern tribe who conquered the Chinese throne in 1644, and retained it until the revolution of 1911. But in the meantime they had adopted the Chinese language and many Chinese customs; immense numbers of Chinese settled in Manchuria, and are continuing to do so. Ever since 1644, Manchuria has been administered as an integral part of China, except in so far as foreigners have interfered. From the point of view of sentiment, language, customs, and even population (on account of immigration), Manchuria must now be reckoned as thoroughly Chinese. The Russians acquired Port Arthur and the railway rights as a reward for befriending China after the Sin-Japanese war of 1894-95; the Japanese acquired Port Arthur and the Russian rights in South Manchuria by their war against Russia in 1904-05, while they replaced Russia throughout the rest of Manchuria after the Bolshevik revolution—of course with the tacit approval of the Powers, as the champions of civilization against the Red Spectre. The Chinese still have the nominal sovereignty and the civil administration, but the Japanese have Port Arthur, the railway, control of all the industrial undertakings, the right to military occupation, and in short everything worth having.

Chang-tso-lin, the Chinese viceroy, has a Chinese army, and is nominally subject to Peking. But in fact whatever energy he can spare from serving his own ends has to be devoted to the interests of the Japanese, upon whom he is utterly dependent. He and his army are a constant menace to the Peking Government, upon which he descends from time to time to levy blackmail. (He was originally a bandit, and is now a government servant.) If the Peking Government did anything annoying to Japan, Chang-tso-lin's army could be used to cause repentance, without Japan's appearing in the business. So long as Japan retains her exclusive position in Manchuria, this situation is difficult to avoid unless the Chinese develop a strong patriotic army. It may be said: How can Chang-tso-lin get an army of Chinese to work against China? One might as well ask: How can governments get armies of proletarians to shoot down strikers? The answer is the same in both cases: ignorance. But there is a further factor in China. The immense majority of Chinese are peaceful and law-abiding; the armies are a very small proportion of the population. Soldiers are despised, and are largely criminals and bandits. Does anyone doubt that if we went round the German prisons we should find men willing to 'maintain order' in return for liberty and pay?

The question of Manchuria must be dealt with if China is to have any real independence. Except in the southern corner, the claims of Japan have never, so far as I know, been formally recognized by the Powers. Certainly America has never assented to them. It would probably be impossible to get the Japanese out of Port Arthur without a first-class war, which I fear is in any case very probable sooner or later. But outside Port Arthur and its neighbourhood, perhaps the Open Door and the rights of China could be insisted upon, and Japanese military occupation could be prevented. I doubt, however, whether, short of war, a virtual Japanese protectorate over Manchuria is now avoidable, until China becomes strong enough to fight her own battles. And the question of Manchuria, important as it is, is certainly not worth a
first-class war. Shantung is at once a more vital and a more hopeful question. The Washington Conference will have failed hopelessly as regards China if it does not secure the complete evacuation of Shantung by the Japanese and of Wei-hai-wei by ourselves. To begin with the latter: The lease of Wei-hai-wei to the British provides that we are to hold it as long as the Russians hold Port Arthur. The Russians lost Port Arthur sixteen years ago, but we still hold Wei-hai-wei. To all Chinese protests, we reply that the Japanese are just as bad as the Russians, implying that, in spite of the alliance, we regard a war with Japan as by no means improbable. We thus simultaneously display bad faith to the Chinese and show the Japanese how little we believe in the alliance. Our delegation at Washington ought at once to announce the unconditional return of Wei-hai-wei to the Chinese. We should then be in a better position to join America in insisting upon the Japanese restitution of Kiao-chow.

The history of Kiao-chow is briefly as follows: In 1897 two German missionaries were murdered in Shantung, and the Germans made this an excuse for seizing the port of Tsingtau, and extracting by force from the Chinese a treaty which gave them (1) the right to use Tsingtau as a naval base; (2) a lease of Kiao-chow for ninety-nine years; (3) the right to construct certain railways and have a controlling interest in them; (4) preference for German firms as regards all industrial undertakings in Shantung. (Shantung is a province, Kia-cho Bay a district in Shantung, and Tsingtau a harbor in Kiao-chow Bay. The text of the Sino-German Treaty of 1898 is given in George Gleason's 'What shall I think of Japan? Appendix to Chap. IV). In 1914, the Chinese were willing to join the Allies and undertake, with Allied help, the reconquest of Kiao-chow; but this did not suit the Japanese, who kept China neutral (till 1917), and themselves presented an ultimatum to Germany, demanding the cession of all that the Germans possessed in Kiao-chow 'with a view of eventual restoration of the same to China'. In 1915, after the Japanese had succeeded, Notes were interchanged between China and Japan, stipulating that 'when, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiao-chow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China' under certain conditions. In 1917, secret agreements were concluded by Japan with France and England, whereby those Powers undertook to support Japan's claims in Shantung at the Peace Conference. By the Versailles Treaty, 'Germany renounces in favour of Japan all her rights, title and privileges' acquired by the treaty of 1898. This might be taken as an epitome of the Versailles Treaty: whatever iniquity Germany had committed in the past is henceforth to be committed by the Allies. Fortunately, America is not a signatory of the Versailles Treaty, and is free to raise the Shantung question at Washington. The Japanese have lately been making efforts to secure a direct settlement with China, so as to prevent the raising of the question at Washington; but the Chinese, very wisely, have rejected the Japanese proposals as containing merely illusory concessions, and have firmly demanded the unconditional retrocession of all the rights acquired by Germany in 1898, as well as those extensions subsequently acquired by Japan. In this America will no doubt support them, and I earnestly hope that we shall not support Japan. [Russ6]
It is common form for every Power to profess a desire for the integrity and independence of China. To preserve these is one of the purposes of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and as regards this purpose the Alliance has succeeded admirably, having enabled Japan to absorb Manchuria and Shantung and establish a virtual protectorate over North China as a result of the twenty-one demands presented by Japan to China in 1915. (For the text of these demands, in their original and revised forms, see George Gleason, 'What shall I think of Japan' p. 80ff.) The uninitiated require a dictionary in reading diplomatic documents. When A and B guarantee the independence and integrity of C, that means that they have agreed how C is to be partitioned. For example, England and France made a treaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Morocco, with secret articles specifying the parts of Morocco which were to belong to France and Spain respectively. Ignorant people regarded the published articles as deceitful when the secret articles became known; but those who understand the language of diplomacy could have inferred the secret articles from those which were published.

Accordingly the Chinese were justly alarmed when they learned that the Preamble of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance mentions ‘the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China’ as one of the objects which the Alliance had in view. One of the most obviously legitimate of China’s demands at Washington is that no treaties mentioning China shall be concluded without Chinese participation. We should certainly be surprised if we found that France and Italy had agreed to preserve the independence and integrity of Great Britain, especially if we had reason to think that France was going to preserve them in England and Italy in Scotland. Such agreements are an infringement of sovereignty, and are never concluded except as a prelude to interference.

I have considered the integrity of China in connection with Manchuria and Shantung; I wish now to consider its independence. Apart from the military influence of Japan, all the powers except America have acquired rights which gravely limit the autonomy of China, and it is not easy to see how these rights are to be abrogated.

We may take as typical the question of the Chinese Customs. On this subject there is in ‘The Times’ of November 26 a leading article which is amazingly misleading, the writer of which (for the sake of his moral character) I presume to be profoundly ignorant. The facts are as follows: By the treaty of 1842, we stipulated with the Chinese that they were to impose a uniform duty of five per cent on all imports. By the treaty of 1858, it was agreed that this duty should be reckoned on a schedule of prices to be revised every ten years. It was, however, only revised twice, in 1901 and 1918, and on the latter occasion current prices were rejected as being inflated by the war, and the average prices of 1913-1916 were taken as the basis of the new schedule. In virtue of commercial treaties involving most-favoured-clauses, no alteration in tariff or schedule is possible without the unanimous consent of thirteen foreign Powers. Meanwhile the Customs receipts, while remaining essential for China’s revenue, have become the security for the Boxer indemnity and for many loans. China is allowed by treaty to levy an export duty of not more than five per cent, and is compelled to do so, in spite of the bad effect on Chinese trade, because otherwise it would be impossible to raise sufficient revenue. It is obvious that this system constitutes at once a grave interference with Chinese independence and a serious drawback to Chinese industry, because all imports are charged at the same rate, whether they are raw materials or finished articles, necessaries or luxuries. Quite distinct from this system, though also regulated by treaty, is the administration of the Customs. Ever since 1842, the collection of the duties has been under the control of foreigners. The system now in force for many years is that there is an Inspector-General, appointed by the Chinese Government, but bound by treaty to be British so long as the British Empire has a greater share of Chinese trade than any other Power. The Inspector-General has the appointment of his subordinates, and gives the higher posts to foreigners. In 1918 (the latest year for which I have figures) there were in the Customs administration 2'000 foreigners and 5'000 Chinese. The foreigners, from the inspector-General downwards, are responsible to
China, not to their own governments. Sir Robert Hart, for many years Inspector-General, won universal admiration, and the Chinese themselves are quite content with the system for the present, since it affords a training-ground for more honest and efficient officials than those produced by traditional Chinese methods. Mr. Sih-Gung Cheng, M.A., B.Sc., in his book on 'Modern China' (an admirable work, published by the Clarendon Press), says:

'The foreign members of the staff have served China loyally, and have never shown any prejudice in favour of their own countries. They have maintained the standard of efficiency and vigilance set up by Sir Robert Hart, and have won the admiration of foreigners and the Chinese alike... So long as the loans and indemnities mortgaged on Customs receipts are not redeemed by China, it will be difficult to get the foreign Powers, who are distrustful of the Chinese on monetary matters, to consent to a restoration of the Customs Administration to the Chinese themselves. (Pp. 206-6).'

Reforming and patriotic Chinese desire fiscal autonomy for their country as regards the tariff, but are in no hurry to see a change as regards the administration of the Customs. Mr. Wellington Koo, at Washington, has issued a statement setting forth this point of view. 'The Times', in the leader mentioned above, assumes that it is the administration that he wishes to see in Chinese hands, and insinuates that the motive for this desire is the hope of corrupt pickings out of dishonest dealings with traders. The last two sentences deserve to be quoted:

'That the Mandarins would like to have the handling of the large sums receivable by the Customs is undoubted; that the people would care to see it in their hands is very doubtful indeed. The eloquence of the Chinese delegates may delude the uninformed; it can only serve to remind those who know Asians that the more an Oriental diplomatist is Westernized the less confidence does he command in the East.'

Was ever such an amazing insult of the Minister of a friendly Power? Mr. Koo speaks throughout of the tariff, not of the administration. I do not know how long the writer of this tactful and polite article has spent in China, or how intimately he is acquainted with modern-minded reforming Chinese. Probably he only knows China through the reports of business men whom he has met in his club. I can assure him that 'those who know Asians', at any rate those who know them in China, do not take the view which he attributes to them. My own experience of the Chinese who have had a modern education was that they are as upright, as intelligent, as delicately considerate, and as free from national prejudice, as any set of men it has ever been my good fortune to meet. They have to contend against a mass of bad tradition in their own country, and they are intensely grateful for Western help in this struggle. But those who pretend that they are not to be trusted, and are only seeking to deceive the guileless Westerners, must be either very ignorant or very depraved. One is often tempted to think that Europeans wish China to remain weak and corrupt, in order that they may obtain such pickings as 'The Times' supposes Mr. Wellington Koo to hanker after. America has adopted a more enlightened policy, and there are signs that our Government intends to follow America's lead. Even Lord Northcliffe, since he visited Peking, has become a champion of China. But he has apparently not yet succeeded in impressing his new knowledge upon his organs at home.

I have no space to deal with various other issues, analogous to the tariff, involving China's legitimate claims to independence. In all these issues, men with financial motives which they dare not avow will mislead journalists and public opinion at home, if they can. It is therefore necessary to be very wary, and above all the remember that the Chinese are not an inferior race, but a great nation with a civilization at least as good as our own. Their only serious inferiority is in scientific homicide. [Russ6]

I. The East and the eclipse.

China is traditionally a land of leisure, but the visiting foreigner must not hope for much personal experience of this side of Chinese life. The busiest thirty hours I ever spent in my life were spent in Chang-sha, a city which is reached by travelling up the Yangtze for three or four days from Shanghai to Hankow, and then going south for another day across a vast lake. (In spite of its remoteness it is a Treaty Port.) When I arrived in Chang-sha, there was an educational Congress in session, at which all kinds of people lectured on all kinds of subjects. During my thirty hours, I gave four lectures and two after-dinner speeches, and attended a great reception at the American hospital. My lectures, which were on Russia, displeased the student by being somewhat critical of the Bolsheviks, whom almost all Chinese students passionately admire. I spent the night (in a Chinese hotel), as Saint Paul spent his time in Ephesus, fighting with wild beasts. So on the whole my impression of Chang-sha was lacking in Oriental calm.

The proceedings ended with a great feast given by the Tuchun, the military governor of the Province of Hunan. Most Tuchuns are wicked; indeed they are the chief internal source of trouble in China. They intercept the provincial revenue and spend it on raising private armies; they indulge in war, one against another; and they practice depredations in the style of Verres. A British missionary for many years resident at Chang-sha assured me that the predecessor of our host had, in two years, amassed a fortune of thirty million dollars, partly by downright robbery and partly by debasing the currency in his province. At the end of that time he had fled from popular vengeance, with his plunder, to Japan, where, I gathered, he is living happily ever afterwards. An Englishman not accustomed to China might expect to find, in consequence of this worthy's activities, such scenes of desolation as are now to be seen in Eastern Europe, but he would be agreeably disappointed. Chinese scoundrels have sill much to learn from the West as regards efficiency in evil, and it was clear that the absconding Tuchun had done far less harm than is done by the 'honest' governments of the Great Powers. The Chinese government does some harm to its own people, but none to anybody else; from an international point of view, it is the best government in the world, because it is the most inefficient.

However, the Tuchun who was our host was an exception to the general rule, being perfectly virtuous and a great friend of education. (He fell a few weeks after my visit.) The guests were received in one vast hall, and banqueted in another. The food was European; there was an endless succession of courses and an infinite variety of wines. Our host, through an interpreter, apologized to me for the frugal fare he was offering in his humble abode, but said he thought we would rather have a glimpse of every-day Chinese life than be treated to a display of pomp and splendor. I tried to remember quickly all I had read of Chinese etiquette, and mumbled something about my pigship being honoured that His Magnificence should deign to notice me; but I fear I was not very adequate.

If the Tuchun displayed something of traditional Chinese manners, the after-dinner speeches differed from those of Europe in the opposite direction, by being free from make-believe and humour, very serious and very businesslike. Professor Dewey spoke of Chinese education and of the lines along which it should progress; Mrs. Dewey informed the dignitaries of Chang-sha that in some provinces co-education had been adopted, and that Hunan ought to do likewise. To this the Tuchun made a statesmanlike reply, promising that the matter should receive his best consideration, and that action should be taken when the time was ripe. Various Chinese educationists, whose speeches were interpreted into English by Chinese interpreters, spoke of their aims and their efforts, and of what they hoped from their European and American guests. Reverence for sages is traditional in China, and many modern Chinese transfer this attitude to the educationists who come from foreign countries. Their expectations are so far beyond one's powers as to be often embarrassing; it is very difficult to explain that one is not a sage without feeling that one is rather a fool.

The educationists and the students in China are extraordinarily keen, and there is no doubt that the movement for modern education represents the most solid advance that is being
made. Chinese who have been at foreign universities do not become unbalanced, or unable to see what is good in China (except in art). Their native civilization is sufficiently strong and solid to enable them to assimilate what the West has to teach without becoming simply Europeans; and, strange to say, they like our best better than our worst. They are, as a rule, less learned than Japanese professors, but more genuinely cultivated, more open-minded, more capable of a scientifically skeptical outlook. Nationalism and religion, the two great enemies of honest thought in the West, are absent from the educated classes in China; respect for Confucius is not excessive among those who have assimilated Western culture. I was never conscious in China, as one almost always is in Japan, of a barrier to mutual comprehension. The Oriental is said to be inscrutable and remote, but this is certainly not true in China. I found the Chinese just as easy to talk to as the English, and just as easy (or as difficult) to understand psychologically.

But Young China has to contend against a terrible dead-weight of ignorance and superstition in the mass of the people. When I left the banquet to go on board the boat on which I was leaving Chang-sha, it happened that an eclipse of the moon was in progress. As in the earliest annals of Chinese history, the streets were full of people beating gongs to frighten away the Heavenly Dog who was supposed to be trying to eat up the moon; little bonfires were being lit everywhere to rekindle the moon's light by sympathetic magic. The missionary whom I mentioned earlier told me that often, as he walked about, he had heard passers-by express astonishment that he could bend the knee, because he was a 'foreign devil', and devils have to keep their knees always straight. They also can only travel in straight lines, and therefore every Chinese house has the front door opening onto a blank wall, with the courtyard round the corner. Even within the courtyard, a screen provides other corners, so that at worst the evil spirits cannot get beyond the servants' quarters. Great care has to be taken in putting up telegraph wires to prevent them from pointing straight at any man's house, because if they did they would help devils to get at him. There are innumerable superstitions of this kind, some merely picturesque, others very inconvenient. Educated people do not believe them, but they have to be respected in any public undertaking. Until recently, no house could be built of more than one story, for fear of disturbing the spirits of the wind and the air. The only cure for these superstitions is universal education, and for that, at present, there are not enough funds or enough modern teachers. But the love of education and respect for it are so great that one may hope to see it rapidly extended, provided political troubles can be sufficiently settled for the money to be forthcoming. I hope that, when education becomes more widespread, it will be in the hands of the Chinese themselves, not in those of missionaries, clerical or lay, who want to spread our civilization as the finest thing on earth. China has shortcomings, which to us are very obvious, but it also has merits in which we are deficient. What is to be hoped is not that China should become like ourselves, reproducing our Napoleons and Bismarcks and Eminent Victorians, but that a new civilization should be developed, combining our knowledge with Chinese culture. The Chinese are capable of this, if they are encouraged but not coerced. The methods of Europe and Japan would force them in time to become like Japan, militaristic, imperialist and brutal; the methods of America would persuade them to become like America. But if their development can be left free, I think they can give the world a new civilization, to carry on the arts and sciences after Europe has perished in a sea of blood.
II. Chinese ethics.
The Chinese are more fond of laughter than any other nation with which I am acquainted. Every little incident amuses them, and their talk is almost always humorous. They have neither the grim determination to succeed which characterizes the Anglo-Saxon, nor the tragic self-importance of the Slav; Samuel Smiles and Dostoevsky, the typical prophets of these two races, are both equally remote from the Chinese spirit. A Slav of Teuton believes instinctively that he alone is truly real, and that the apparently external world is merely a product of his imagination; hence the vogue of idealistic philosophies. It follows that one's own death is a tremendous event, since it makes the universe collapse; nothing short of personal immortality can avert this awful cataclysm. To the Anglo-Saxon, it is his own purposes rather than his own imaginings that are sacred, because he cares more for action than for thought; but to him, as to the Slav, the ego is all-important, because the immutable principles of morality demand the victory of his volitions. And so he snatches a moral victory out of the very jaws of death by alliance with a Heavenly Will.

These solemnities are not for the Chinese. Their instinctive outlook is social rather than individual; the family takes the place which for us is taken by the single personality. To us, self-development or self-realization is not a palpably absurd basis for ethics; to the Chinaman, the development of the family is not a palpably absurd basis. Accordingly, when a Chinaman finds that he is dying, he does not take the event tragically, as we do; he merely follows the rites. He assembles his sorrowing family (their sorrow is part of the rites); he makes an appropriate farewell speech to them; he sees to it that his coffin is duly prepared, and that his funeral will be worthy of so important a family. When these duties are accomplished, his dead is an occurrence to which he resigns himself without any particular interest or emotion.

This absence of self-feeling produces and absence of pomposity; Meredith's Egoist would be impossible in China. The Chinese, of course, are selfish, like other people, but their selfishness is instinctive, as in children and animals, not clothed in fine phrases as ours is. I doubt whether psycho-analysis would find much material among them. There is in Chinese no word for 'persecution'; I forgot to ask whether there was any word for 'prig', but I doubt it. Barring Confucius himself, I cannot think of any Chinaman, either in history or among my acquaintance who could be described as a prig. The result of all this is a liberation of the impulses to play and enjoyment which makes Chinese life unbelievably restful and delightful after the solemn cruelties of the West.

It would, however, be misleading to suggest that Chinese conventional morality is less absurd, or demands less self-sacrifice, than that of Christian countries. While I was in Peking an old woman of no particular importance died, and her daughter died of grief immediately afterwards. (I heard of the case from the European doctor who was attending them, and who assured me that no ordinary cause of death could be found in the daughter.) To die of grief on the death of a parent is a supreme victory of filial piety, conferring great lustre upon the individual and the family. It is customary to put up memorial arches, nominally at the public expense, in some public place, to hand down to posterity the knowledge of such signal virtue. So far, so good; but the sequel is not so pleasant. In the case in question, public opinion demanded that the family should provide a specially magnificent funeral for the mother and daughter, and in order to defray the expenses, the sons, who were moderately well-to-do, had to sell all they possessed and become rickshaw coolies. This is one concrete example of the harm done by making the family the basis of ethics.

The family is the source of a great deal of the corruption that vitiates Chinese public life. When a man is appointed to a post, filial piety demands that he should use his position to enrich his relations. As his legitimate salary does not admit of much being done in this way, he is compelled to eke it out by methods which we should consider dishonest; if he does not, he is condemned by public opinion as an unnatural son or brother. Many returned students who begin with Western ideals find themselves caught in this net and unable to escape from its meshes.

The subjection of women is, of course, essential to a strong family system, and is carried very far by Chinese conventional morality, though not so far as in Japan. Old-fashioned Chinese
women are not allowed to see any men except their husbands’ relations, though they may go out (with a female attendant) for shopping or visiting other women. When a man marries, he takes his wife to live in his father’s house, and she becomes, usually, the slave of her mother-in-law, who believes any slanders brought by the servants, and uses them to keep her daughter-in-law in subjection. The wife is not considered to have any ground of complaint if her husband takes a concubine, and she is censured if she marries again after his death. Betrothals are arranged by the parents of the young people, who do not meet until the wedding ceremony. Betrothals are often entered into in infancy, and are more binding even than marriage. There are recognized grounds for divorce, but there is no recognized way of escaping from a betrothal.

All this is, of course, very bad, and Young China reacts against it vigorously. I became acquainted with various married couples living in houses of their own, where the wife enjoyed all the liberties that an English wife would have. Many girls nowadays are well educated on Western lines in normal schools and afterwards in colleges or universities. They are admitted to Peking Government University, where quite a number attended my lectures. These girls, naturally, are not willing to enter upon the old-fashioned kind of marriage, and the men students whom I came across were quite at one with them on this point.

When I arrived in Peking, I said that I wished to have a seminar for the better students. Accordingly they organized what they called a ‘Society for studying Russell’s philosophy’, which met one a week under the presidency of an Oxford philosopher, Professor Fu, who usually acted as interpreter. We met in the ‘Returned Students’ Club’, the pupils seated at a long table and the professors at a smaller table with tea and cakes. The pupils asked questions and discussed our answers with great keenness and perfect candour. After spending some time on problems of pure philosophy, we began to consider social questions, which interested them far more. We had lively debates on communism and Bolshevism, most of the students taking the view that China could and ought to become communist tomorrow. But the liveliest evening of all was devoted to the family system. Afterwards I discovered that these youths, to whom a new intellectual and moral world was just opening, were most of them already married or betrothed, without their participation, to girls whom they did not know and who were presumably full of traditional prejudices. This presented an acute moral problem, upon which it was difficult for an outsider to offer an opinion.

It is clear that worship of the family in China is an evil comparable in magnitude to worship of the State or the nation among ourselves, though the nature of its bad effects is quite different. Most Europeans in China are ultra-conservative as regards Chinese institutions, and assert that without the family ethic all Chinese morality would crumble. I believe this to be a profound mistake. All progressive Chinese take the opposite view, and I am firmly convinced that they are right. All that is worst in Old China is connected with the family system. In old days, some degree of public duty was deduced from the system by the fiction that filial piety demanded service of the Emperor. But since the establishment of the Republic this fiction no longer serves, and a new morality is needed to inculcate public spirit and honesty in government. Young China fully understands this need, and will, given time, provide the new teaching that is required. But whether the Powers will allow enough time is very doubtful. Chinese problems are not capable of being satisfactorily settled by a mechanical imposition of order and what we consider good government. Adjustment to new ideas demands a period of chaos, and it is not for the ultimate good of China to shorten this period artificially. But I doubt whether this view will commend itself to the foreigners who think they know how to save China.
III. Chinese amusements.

One of the most obvious characteristics of the Chinese is their love of fireworks. On arriving at a Chinese temple, the worshipper is given a set of Chinese crackers to explode on the temple steps, so as to put him in a good humour. When I invited the most intellectual of my students to an evening party, they sent several days ahead extraordinarily elaborate 'feux d'artifice' to be let off in my courtyard. On the night of the Chinese New Year (which is different from ours) it is impossible to sleep a wink, because every household north, south, east, and west, spends the whole night sending off rockets and golden rain and very imaginable noisy display. I did not find any Chinaman, however grave, who failed to enjoy these occasions.

Chinese New Year is like our Christmas, or rather, what our Christmas would be if no one in the country were over ten years old, except the shopkeepers and confectioners. Everybody buys toys of one sort or another: paper windmills which go round and round in the wind as they are held in the hands of fat old gentlemen in rickshas; rattles more rattling than any European baby enjoys; gaudy paper pictures of all kinds; Chinese lanterns with horsemen on the outside who begin to gallop round as soon as the lantern is lit. All these things are sold in the courtyards of temples, which take the place of Hampstead Heath on a Bank Holiday. I went on their New Year's Day to the 'Temple of the Eighteen Hells', where the posthumous tortures of eighteen kinds of sinners are depicted in the spirit of 'Ruthless Rhymes'. A vast crowd was going round, shouting with laughter at the various horrors, none of which were portrayed in any but a comic spirit. In the largest, gayest and most crowded temple, in the inmost court, I found the Salvation Army singing hymns to a brass band and preaching through an interpreter, assuring the Bank Holiday crowd that its amusements were idolatrous and must infallibly bring eternal damnation. The crowd enjoyed this even more than the eighteen native hells, laughed more vociferously, and applauded with vast good humour. I do not think it occurred to any of them that the Salvationists were in earnest, for if it had, good manners (never deficient in any class in China) would have demanded a different reception. I alone was left somewhat pensive, reflecting upon the benefits of the civilization we are bringing to the poor benighted heathen.

The educated classes, though they do not lose the capacity for childish pleasures, have also others of a more refined kind; in fact the art of exquisite enjoyment has probably been carried to greater perfection than anywhere else in the world. In all the most beautiful places are Buddhist monasteries, to which scholars go when they desire a studious retreat. At any specially admirable point of view, one finds a pavilion, put up, not by a tourist agency, but by some Emperor of poet with a perfect appreciation of what the landscape needs. No sooner has one sat down in this astonishing summer-house than some kind person, like a genie in 'The Arabian Nights', brings tea in little cups – not the gross liquid that we call tea, but an amber-coloured nectar with an intoxicating fragrance, half aromatic, half like the meadows in June, combining the freshness of spring with the beauty of summer sunshine robbed of its dust and heat. One's Chinese hosts begin immediately to discuss some ancient philosophic theme: whether progress is rectilinear or cyclic; whether the perfect sage must be always self-sacrificing, or may on occasion consider his own interest; whether it is better to meditate on death or to ignore it. These subjects will be argued with a wealth of classical quotation and anecdotes of ancient philosophers. But presently some one will mention Japanese aggression in Shantung, or missionary education, or labour conditions in the cotton mills on the Yangtze. At once the delicate spell is broken, and one realizes that, willingly or unwillingly, one is part of the force that must inevitably destroy this beauty and peace inherited from a happier age.

The Chinese have a great aptitude for games of skill. They play a kind of chess which is far more complicated than ours, and needs a board of 256 squares. Those who subsequently learn our variety of the game find it exceedingly simple, and can soon beat quite good European players. They are also much addicted to various easier games, which they play for money. Gambling has always been a national vice, and is their principal vice now that the smoking of opium has been nearly stamped out except where Japanese pedlars can smuggle it in.

One of the less agreeable sides of Peking life is the enormous number of beggars. Even in the severest winter frosts, they are dressed in rags which let the air through; sometimes they have
wounds or sores at which they point like the Saints in medieval pictures. As one goes through the streets in a ricksha, beggars run after one, calling out in a piteous voice: 'Da lao yeh!' which means 'Great old sire'. If one is on foot, they sometimes perform the kow-tow to one in the middle of the street. All this is embar¬rassing and painful, and at first one reacts with a C.O.S. emotion. But gradually one discovers that they have their beats and their office hours; that well-to-do Chinese like giving to them, and that many of them are fat. When they are not at work, they congregate together under a sunny wall and smoke cigarettes. At these times they take a holiday from the pretence of misery, and talk and laugh with the utmost gaiety. I do not think any European tramp could endure the hardships they put up with, and live; but there is no doubt that they preserve to the full that capacity for enjoy¬ing every pleasant moment which is the gift of the gods to the Chinese nation.

Educated Chinese derive considerable pleasure from gently pulling the foreigner's leg—but with such delicacy that no one could possibly be annoyed. I was taken one day by two Chinese friends to see a famous old pagoda, which was in a slightly ruinous condition. I went up the winding stairs to the top, and thought they were following; but when I emerged I saw them below me engaged in earnest conversation. On reaching the bottom again, I asked why they had not come up. Their reply was characteristic: 'We debated for a long time, with many weighty arguments pro and con, whether we should follow you or not. But at last we decided that if the pagoda should crumble while you were on it, it would be as well that there should be some one to bear witness as to how the philosopher died, so we stayed below.' The fact was that the weather was warm and one of them was fat.

The modernized Chinese, unfortunately, have mostly lost the power to appreciate native art; when I praised Chinese pictures, they invariably retorted that the perspective is wrong. I was assured by Europeans that good pictures in the old style are still being produced, but I saw none of them myself; I was shown the imitations of our painting produced in the up-to-date art schools, but it was a devastating and horrible experience. The older Chinese still appreciate the old pictures, many of which are inconceivably beautiful. There is in China a much closer connection than in Europe between painting and poetry, perhaps because the same instru¬ment, the brush, is used for both. The Chinese value a good piece of calligraphy just as much as a good picture; often the painter will write a poem or sentiment on the margin of his picture, and the beauty of the writing will be as much admired as that of the painting. Pictures are not hung on walls, as with us, but kept rolled up, and treated like books, to be read one at a time. Some of them are so long that they cannot be seen all at once; they represent, perhaps, all the scenery that you might see successively during a long day's walk in the mountains. At the beginning of the picture you see two figures starting up a footpath from the plain, probably with a willow-pattern bridge in the foreground; presently you find the same figures ascending through strange gorges and forests, which are realistic though no one unacquainted with China would think so; just as your legs begin to ache in sympathy, the friends arrive at some exquisite temple and enjoy tea with philosophic converse in a pavilion. From there the mountains rise vaster and more inaccessible, into dim regions where their shapes seem like misty epiphanies of something divine, and the spectator cannot tell where solid ground has passed into the cloud-shapes of mystical imagination. This is only one style of picture; there are many others, just as admirable. For my part, I derive far more pleasure from them than from even the best of European pictures; but in this I am willing to suppose that my taste is bad. I wish I could believe that some¬thing of the Chinese capacity for creating beauty could survive, but at the devastating approach of the white man beauty flies like a shy ghost. For us, beauty belongs to museums or to the final self-glorification of blatant millionaires; we cannot regard it as a thing for every day, or as equal in importance to health or cleanliness or money. Chinese dealers, with whom avarice is a passion, will sacrifice large sums sooner than sell a beautiful thing to a person of no taste. But neither they nor anyone else can keep alive the ancient loveliness of China, or the instinctive happiness which makes China a paradise after the fierce weariness of our distracted and trivial civilization.
Letter from Xu Zhimo to Bertrand Russell. 6. Dez.1921. [Birth of Kate Russell].
Do let me congratulate Mrs. Russell and yourself most heartily upon the advent of your beautiful baby as I learnt from Miss Power whom I met the other day in Cambridge. We should expect dyed eggs and stewed noodles as is the custom with us in China on this occasion. We expect Mrs. Russell shall be able to come with you on the 10th. [Russ45]
In international dealings it is useless to expect any nation to pursue any end which it does not believe to be in its own interest. No good to China could be expected to come out of the Washington Conference but for the fact that the interests of both England and America are, for the present, identical with those of China, except in a few points, such as our possession of Hong Kong. The immediate and pressing aims of any Chinese patriot must be two: to end the internal anarchy and to recover the independence and integrity of China. The aims of English and American statesmanship in China, from a purely selfish point of view, may be taken to be the extension of trade and the opportunity to exploit Chinese natural resources. Territorial ambitions have no place in America's programme, and ought to have none in ours; I believe that, in fact, our ambitions in that respect are limited (in China) to the retention of what we already possess, or rather part of it, for our Government seems to have realized that our true national interest would be furthered by the restitution of Wei-Hai-Wei. What both English and American interests most urgently require in China is stable government and the open door; that is to say, the ending of anarchy and of Japanese territorial aggression. Our interests are, therefore, for the present, almost completely identical with those of China.

The interests of Japan, at any rate as conceived by the militarists who control policy, are different from ours, and not compatible with the well-being of China. Japan wishes to be a Great Power, in territory, population, and industrial resources. Japan has not much of the raw materials of industry, whereas China has them in abundance. If Japan is to be able to conduct a long war successfully, control of mines in some portion of China is essential. Moreover, Japanese statesmen have not merely economic aims, but also the desire for dynastic grandeur and a vast empire. Psychologically, one of the fundamental causes of the whole situation is the Japanese inferiority-complex. At every moment they are afraid that they are being insulted or cold-shouldered on account of not being white, and this makes them aggressive and ill-mannered. This is by far the strongest part of the Japanese case. Europeans do not beat Japanese ricksha-drivers to make them hurry, nor do their chauffeurs dismount to cuff pedestrians who are slow in getting out of the way, as I have seen the chauffeur of an American do in Peking. The Japanese are not liked by either Europeans or Americans, but they are treated with a respect which few white men show to the Chinese. The reason is simply that Japan has a strong army and navy. White men, as a rule, only respect those who have power to kill them or deprive them of their means of livelihood; and as wealth depends upon success in war, skill in homicide is, in the last analysis, the only thing that secures tolerable courtesy from a white man. If the Japanese are defeated in war by the Americans or by an Anglo-American alliance there will be a setback for the coloured races all over the world, and an intensification of the intolerable insolence displayed towards them by white men. There will be an immediate catastrophic destruction of the Japanese civilization, which still has many merits that our civilization lacks. And following upon this there will be a slow destruction of the civilization of China, not by war, but by Americanization. The big towns will become like Chicago, and the small towns like 'Main Street'. Americans would feel that they were conferring a boon in effecting this transformation, but no person with any receptivity or aesthetic sense would share their view.

We may, therefore, diagnose the situation as follows: Japan is in a bad mood, and is more immediately dangerous to China than any other nation; but England and America—especially the latter—are, by the very nature of their civilization and outlook, destructive of all that is best in the Far East, and doomed, nolens volens, to be oppressors if they have the power. Under these circumstances the worst thing that could happen would be a Japanese-American war, leading to the destruction of everything distinctive in the civilization of the yellow races, the increase of white tyranny, and the launching of America upon a career of militarist Imperialism. On the other hand, the best thing that could happen would be a diplomatic humiliation of the Japanese military party, causing Japan itself to become less aggressive and less anxious to subjugate the adjoining mainland. The difficulty is that Japan will not yield except to the threat of war. If England and America, at Washington, join in insisting upon acceptance of the naval ratio and evacuation of Shantung, one may presume that Japan will give way sooner than face a war against both combined. If America alone threatens, Japan
will probably choose war, and be destroyed. What is, of course, to be expected is that America will give way, in substance though not in form, about Shantung, in return for Japanese acceptance of the naval ratio; that after a few years American spies will report (truly or falsely) that Japan is building secretly; that in the meantime America will have fortified naval bases in the neighbourhood of Japan; and that then America will proceed to destroy Japan with a good conscience. I do not see any issue from this cycle of disaster except a change of heart in Japan. Of course, a change of heart in America would be just as good, but nothing will convince Americans that they need a change of heart.

China, unfortunately, cannot escape being industrialized. It would be far better for China to develop her industries slowly with native capital; but they will, in fact, be developed quickly with foreign capital. So much, I fear, is independent of the issue at Washington. For the immediate interests of China it would be well if America and England combined to force Japan by diplomatic pressure, not by war, both to accept the naval ratio and to evacuate Shantung. This would also be good for Japan, since it would be a blow to the military party, and perhaps introduce a much more liberal régime. (Evacuation of Vladivostok and friendly relations with the Far Eastern Republic should also be insisted upon.) But in the long run it is not in the interests of Asia that the one genuinely independent Asiatic Power should be crushed. England and America can, if they choose, exercise despotism over the world. There is much good that they might do in that case. They might curb the ambitions of France and Japan, make all nations except themselves disarm, undertake the economic rehabilitation of Germany and Russia for the sake of their own trade, and liberate China from the fear of Japan. But if they were able to accomplish all this they would also acquire the habit of bullying, and become confirmed in the ruthless certainty of their own moral superiority. They would soon come to display an economic and cultural despotism such as the world has never known—always, of course, in a missionary spirit. From such a tyranny the world could only escape by a universal rebellion, possibly with Great Britain at the head of the rebels. From the alternative of tyranny or war there is, so far as I can see, no escape while the industrial nations continue their system of capitalist exploitation. Nothing offers any real escape except Socialism—i.e., in this connection, production for use instead of production for commercial profit. America is still in the phase of Liberalism which more experienced nations have outgrown since the war. President Wilson attempted to save the world by Liberal ideas, and failed; President Harding is making a second attempt, and will fail even if he seems to have succeeded. He will fail, I mean, as a humanitarian, not as the champion of American capital. The existing capitalist system is in its very nature predatory, and cannot be made the basis of just dealing between nations. So long as America draws nearly all the dividends derived from Capitalism, she will continue to think the present system heaven-sent, and will employ Liberal futilities which will delude fools into supporting knaves. But in all this I am speaking of the future, not of the immediate situation. For the moment, Anglo-American cooperation at Washington can secure two important things: (1) the naval ratio, (2) a breathing space for China by a curbing of Japanese ambitions. If these ends are achieved the Washington Conference will have been useful. If it leaves Japan's activities in China unchecked, it will have been futile; but if it leads to war with Japan it will have been immeasurably harmful. [Russ6]
Russell, Bertrand. *The problem of China* [ID D5122]. (1)

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The Ruler of the Southern Ocean was Shû (Heedless), the Ruler of the Northern Ocean was Hû (Sudden), and the Ruler of the Centre was Chaos. Shû and Hû were continually meeting in the land of Chaos, who treated them very well. They consulted together how they might repay his kindness, and said, "Men all have seven orifices for the purpose of seeing, hearing, eating, and breathing, while this poor Ruler alone has not one. Let us try and make them for him."

Accordingly they dug one orifice in him every day; and at the end of seven days Chaos died.—[Chuang Tze, Legge's translation.]
Chapter I

Questions

A European lately arrived in China, if he is of a receptive and reflective disposition, finds himself confronted with a number of very puzzling questions, for many of which the problems of Western Europe will not have prepared him. Russian problems, it is true, have important affinities with those of China, but they have also important differences; moreover they are decidedly less complex. Chinese problems, even if they affected no one outside China, would be of vast importance, since the Chinese are estimated to constitute about a quarter of the human race. In fact, however, all the world will be vitally affected by the development of Chinese affairs, which may well prove a decisive factor, for good or evil, during the next two centuries. This makes it important, to Europe and America almost as much as to Asia, that there should be an intelligent understanding of the questions raised by China, even if, as yet, definite answers are difficult to give.

The questions raised by the present condition of China fall naturally into three groups, economic, political, and cultural. No one of these groups, however, can be considered in isolation, because each is intimately bound up with the other two. For my part, I think the cultural questions are the most important, both for China and for mankind; if these could be solved, I would accept, with more or less equanimity, any political or economic system which ministered to that end. Unfortunately, however, cultural questions have little interest for practical men, who regard money and power as the proper ends for nations as for individuals. The helplessness of the artist in a hard-headed business community has long been a commonplace of novelists and moralizers, and has made collectors feel virtuous when they bought up the pictures of painters who had died in penury. China may be regarded as an artist nation, with the virtues and vices to be expected of the artist: virtues chiefly useful to others, and vices chiefly harmful to oneself. Can Chinese virtues be preserved? Or must China, in order to survive, acquire, instead, the vices which make for success and cause misery to others only? And if China does copy the model set by all foreign nations with which she has dealings, what will become of all of us?

China has an ancient civilization which is now undergoing a very rapid process of change. The traditional civilization of China had developed in almost complete independence of Europe, and had merits and demerits quite different from those of the West. It would be futile to attempt to strike a balance; whether our present culture is better or worse, on the whole, than that which seventeenth-century missionaries found in the Celestial Empire is a question as to which no prudent person would venture to pronounce. But it is easy to point to certain respects in which we are better than old China, and to other respects in which we are worse. If intercourse between Western nations and China is to be fruitful, we must cease to regard ourselves as missionaries of a superior civilization, or, worse still, as men who have a right to exploit, oppress, and swindle the Chinese because they are an "inferior" race. I do not see any reason to believe that the Chinese are inferior to ourselves; and I think most Europeans, who have any intimate knowledge of China, would take the same view.

In comparing an alien culture with one's own, one is forced to ask oneself questions more fundamental than any that usually arise in regard to home affairs. One is forced to ask: What are the things that I ultimately value? What would make me judge one sort of society more desirable than another sort? What sort of ends should I most wish to see realized in the world? Different people will answer these questions differently, and I do not know of any argument by which I could persuade a man who gave an answer different from my own. I must therefore be content merely to state the answer which appeals to me, in the hope that the reader may feel likewise.

The main things which seem to me important on their own account, and not merely as means to other things, are: knowledge, art, instinctive happiness, and relations of friendship or affection. When I speak of knowledge, I do not mean all knowledge; there is much in the way of dry lists of facts that is merely useful, and still more that has no appreciable value of any kind. But the understanding of Nature, incomplete as it is, which is to be derived from science, I hold to be a thing which is good and delightful on its own account. The same may be said, I think, of some biographies and parts of history. To enlarge on this topic would,
however, take me too far from my theme. When I speak of art as one of the things that have value on their own account, I do not mean only the deliberate productions of trained artists, though of course these, at their best, deserve the highest place. I mean also the almost unconscious effort after beauty which one finds among Russian peasants and Chinese coolies, the sort of impulse that creates folk-songs, that existed among ourselves before the time of the Puritans, and survives in cottage gardens. Instinctive happiness, or joy of life, is one of the most important widespread popular goods that we have lost through industrialism and the high pressure at which most of us live; its commonness in China is a strong reason for thinking well of Chinese civilization.

In judging of a community, we have to consider, not only how much of good or evil there is within the community, but also what effects it has in promoting good or evil in other communities, and how far the good things which it enjoys depend upon evils elsewhere. In this respect, also, China is better than we are. Our prosperity, and most of what we endeavour to secure for ourselves, can only be obtained by widespread oppression and exploitation of weaker nations, while the Chinese are not strong enough to injure other countries, and secure whatever they enjoy by means of their own merits and exertions alone.

These general ethical considerations are by no means irrelevant in considering the practical problems of China. Our industrial and commercial civilization has been both the effect and the cause of certain more or less unconscious beliefs as to what is worth while; in China one becomes conscious of these beliefs through the spectacle of a society which challenges them by being built, just as unconsciously, upon a different standard of values. Progress and efficiency, for example, make no appeal to the Chinese, except to those who have come under Western influence. By valuing progress and efficiency, we have secured power and wealth; by ignoring them, the Chinese, until we brought disturbance, secured on the whole a peaceable existence and a life full of enjoyment. It is difficult to compare these opposite achievements unless we have some standard of values in our minds; and unless it is a more or less conscious standard, we shall undervalue the less familiar civilization, because evils to which we are not accustomed always make a stronger impression than those that we have learned to take as a matter of course.

The culture of China is changing rapidly, and undoubtedly rapid change is needed. The change that has hitherto taken place is traceable ultimately to the military superiority of the West; but in future our economic superiority is likely to be quite as potent. I believe that, if the Chinese are left free to assimilate what they want of our civilization, and to reject what strikes them as bad, they will be able to achieve an organic growth from their own tradition, and to produce a very splendid result, combining our merits with theirs. There are, however, two opposite dangers to be avoided if this is to happen. The first danger is that they may become completely Westernized, retaining nothing of what has hitherto distinguished them, adding merely one more to the restless, intelligent, industrial, and militaristic nations which now afflict this unfortunate planet. The second danger is that they may be driven, in the course of resistance to foreign aggression, into an intense anti-foreign conservatism as regards everything except armaments. This has happened in Japan, and it may easily happen in China. The future of Chinese culture is intimately bound up with political and economic questions; and it is through their influence that dangers arise.

China is confronted with two very different groups of foreign Powers, on the one hand the white nations, on the other hand Japan. In considering the effect of the white races on the Far East as a whole, modern Japan must count as a Western product; therefore the responsibility for Japan's doings in China rests ultimately with her white teachers. Nevertheless, Japan remains very unlike Europe and America, and has ambitions different from theirs as regards China. We must therefore distinguish three possibilities: (1) China may become enslaved to one or more white nations; (2) China may become enslaved to Japan; (3) China may recover and retain her liberty. Temporarily there is a fourth possibility, namely that a consortium of Japan and the White Powers may control China; but I do not believe that, in the long run, the Japanese will be able to co-operate with England and America. In the long run, I believe that Japan must dominate the Far East or go under. If the Japanese had a different character this would not be the case; but the nature of their ambitions makes them exclusive and
unneighbourly. I shall give the reasons for this view when I come to deal with the relations of China and Japan.

To understand the problem of China, we must first know something of Chinese history and culture before the irruption of the white man, then something of modern Chinese culture and its inherent tendencies; next, it is necessary to deal in outline with the military and diplomatic relations of the Western Powers with China, beginning with our war of 1840 and ending with the treaty concluded after the Boxer rising of 1900. Although the Sino-Japanese war comes in this period, it is possible to separate, more or less, the actions of Japan in that war, and to see what system the White Powers would have established if Japan had not existed. Since that time, however, Japan has been the dominant foreign influence in Chinese affairs. It is therefore necessary to understand how the Japanese became what they are: what sort of nation they were before the West destroyed their isolation, and what influence the West has had upon them. Lack of understanding of Japan has made people in England blind to Japan's aims in China, and unable to apprehend the meaning of what Japan has done.

Political considerations alone, however, will not suffice to explain what is going on in relation to China; economic questions are almost more important. China is as yet hardly industrialized, and is certainly the most important undeveloped area left in the world. Whether the resources of China are to be developed by China, by Japan, or by the white races, is a question of enormous importance, affecting not only the whole development of Chinese civilization, but the balance of power in the world, the prospects of peace, the destiny of Russia, and the chances of development towards a better economic system in the advanced nations.

The Washington Conference has partly exhibited and partly concealed the conflict for the possession of China between nations all of which have guaranteed China's independence and integrity. Its outcome has made it far more difficult than before to give a hopeful answer as regards Far Eastern problems, and in particular as regards the question: Can China preserve any shadow of independence without a great development of nationalism and militarism? I cannot bring myself to advocate nationalism and militarism; yet it is difficult to know what to say to patriotic Chinese who ask how they can be avoided. So far, I have found only one answer. The Chinese nation, is the most, patient in the world; it thinks of centuries as other nations think of decades. It is essentially indestructible, and can afford to wait. The "civilized" nations of the world, with their blockades, their poison gases, their bombs, submarines, and negro armies, will probably destroy each other within the next hundred years, leaving the stage to those whose pacifism has kept them alive, though poor and powerless. If China can avoid being goaded into war, her oppressors may wear themselves out in the end, and leave the Chinese free to pursue humane ends, instead of the war and rapine and destruction which all white nations love. It is perhaps a slender hope for China, and for ourselves it is little better than despair. But unless the Great Powers learn some moderation and some tolerance, I do not see any better possibility, though I see many that are worse.

Our Western civilization is built upon assumptions, which, to a psychologist, are rationalizings of excessive energy. Our industrialism, our militarism, our love of progress, our missionary zeal, our imperialism, our passion for dominating and organizing, all spring from a superflux of the itch for activity. The creed of efficiency for its own sake, without regard for the ends to which it is directed, has become somewhat discredited in Europe since the war, which would have never taken place if the Western nations had been slightly more indolent. But in America this creed is still almost universally accepted; so it is in Japan, and so it is by the Bolsheviks, who have been aiming fundamentally at the Americanization of Russia. Russia, like China, may be described as an artist nation; but unlike China it has been governed, since the time of Peter the Great, by men who wished to introduce all the good and evil of the West. In former days, I might have had no doubt that such men were in the right. Some (though not many) of the Chinese returned students resemble them in the belief that Western push and hustle are the most desirable things on earth. I cannot now take this view. The evils produced in China by indolence seem to me far less disastrous, from the point of view of mankind at large, than those produced throughout the world by the domineering cocksureness of Europe and America. The Great War showed that something is wrong with
our civilization; experience of Russia and China has made me believe that those countries can
help to show us what it is that is wrong. The Chinese have discovered, and have practised for
many centuries, a way of life which, if it could be adopted by all the world, would make all
the world happy. We Europeans have not. Our way of life demands strife, exploitation,
restless change, discontent and destruction. Efficiency directed to destruction can only end in
annihilation, and it is to this consummation that our civilization is tending, if it cannot learn
some of that wisdom for which it despises the East.

It was on the Volga, in the summer of 1920, that I first realized how profound is the disease in
our Western mentality, which the Bolsheviks are attempting to force upon an essentially
Asiatic population, just as Japan and the West are doing in China. Our boat travelled on, day
after day, through an unknown and mysterious land. Our company were noisy, gay,
quarrelsome, full of facile theories, with glib explanations of everything, persuaded that there
is nothing they could not understand and no human destiny outside the purview of their
system. One of us lay at death's door, fighting a grim battle with weakness and terror and the
indifference of the strong, assailed day and night by the sounds of loud-voiced love-making
and trivial laughter. And all around us lay a great silence, strong as death, unfathomable as the
heavens. It seemed that none had leisure to hear the silence, yet it called to me so insistently
that I grew deaf to the harangues of propagandists and the endless information of the
well-informed.

One night, very late, our boat stopped in a desolate spot where there were no houses, but only
a great sandbank, and beyond it a row of poplars with the rising moon behind them. In silence
I went ashore, and found on the sand a strange assemblage of human beings, half-nomads,
wandering from some remote region of famine, each family huddled together surrounded by
all its belongings, some sleeping, others silently making small fires of twigs. The flickering
flames lighted up gnarled, bearded faces of wild men, strong, patient, primitive women, and
children as sedate and slow as their parents. Human beings they undoubtedly were, and yet it
would have been far easier for me to grow intimate with a dog or a cat or a horse than with
one of them. I knew that they would wait there day after day, perhaps for weeks, until a boat
came in which they could go to some distant place in which they had heard—falsely
perhaps—that the earth was more generous than in the country they had left. Some would die
by the way, all would suffer hunger and thirst and the scorching mid-day sun, but their
sufferings would be dumb. To me they seemed to typify the very soul of Russia,
unexpressive, inactive from despair, unheeded by the little set of Westernizers who make up
all the parties of progress or reaction. Russia is so vast that the articulate few are lost in it as
man and his planet are lost in interstellar space. It is possible, I thought, that the theorists may
increase the misery of the many by trying to force them into actions contrary to their primeval
instincts, but I could not believe that happiness was to be brought to them by a gospel of
industrialism and forced labour.

Nevertheless, when morning came I resumed the interminable discussions of the materialistic
conception of history and the merits of a truly popular government. Those with whom I
discussed had not seen the sleeping wanderers, and would not have been interested if they had
seen them, since they were not material for propaganda. But something of that patient silence
had communicated itself to me, something lonely and unspoken remained in my heart
throughout all the comfortable familiar intellectual talk. And at last I began to feel that all
politics are inspired by a grinning devil, teaching the energetic and quickwitted to torture
submissive populations for the profit of pocket or power or theory. As we journeyed on, fed
by food extracted from the peasants, protected by an army recruited from among their sons, I
wondered what we had to give them in return. But I found no answer. From time to time I
heard their sad songs or the haunting music of the balalaika; but the sound mingled with the
great silence of the steppes, and left me with a terrible questioning pain in which Occidental
hopefulness grew pale.

It was in this mood that I set out for China to seek a new hope. [Russ2]
Chapter II
China before the nineteenth century

Where the Chinese came from is a matter of conjecture. Their early history is known only from their own annals, which throw no light upon the question. The Shu-King, one of the Confucian classics (edited, not composed, by Confucius), begins, like Livy, with legendary accounts of princes whose virtues and vices are intended to supply edification or warning to subsequent rulers. Yao and Shun were two model Emperors, whose date (if any) was somewhere in the third millennium B.C. "The age of Yao and Shun," in Chinese literature, means what "the Golden Age" mean with us. It seems certain that, when Chinese history begins, the Chinese occupied only a small part of what is now China, along the banks of the Yellow River. They were agricultural, and had already reached a fairly high level of civilization—much higher than that of any other part of Eastern Asia. The Yellow River is a fierce and terrible stream, too swift for navigation, turgid, and full of mud, depositing silt upon its bed until it rises above the surrounding country, when it suddenly alters its course, sweeping away villages and towns in a destructive torrent. Among most early agricultural nations, such a river would have inspired superstitious awe, and floods would have been averted by human sacrifice; in the Shu-King, however, there is little trace of superstition. Yao and Shun, and Yü (the latter's successor), were all occupied in combating the inundations, but their methods were those of the engineer, not of the miracle-worker. This shows, at least, the state of belief in the time of Confucius. The character ascribed to Yao shows what was expected of an Emperor:—

He was reverential, intelligent, accomplished, and thoughtful—naturally and without effort. He was sincerely courteous, and capable of all complaisance. The display of these qualities reached to the four extremities of the empire, and extended from earth to heaven. He was able to make the able and virtuous distinguished, and thence proceeded to the love of the nine classes of his kindred, who all became harmonious. He also regulated and polished the people of his domain, who all became brightly intelligent. Finally, he united and harmonized the myriad States of the empire; and lo! the black-haired people were transformed. The result was universal concord.[1]

The first date which can be assigned with precision in Chinese history is that of an eclipse of the sun in 776 B.C.[2] There is no reason to doubt the general correctness of the records for considerably earlier times, but their exact chronology cannot be fixed. At this period, the Chou dynasty, which fell in 249 B.C. and is supposed to have begun in 1122 B.C., was already declining in power as compared with a number of nominally subordinate feudal States. The position of the Emperor at this time, and for the next 500 years, was similar to that of the King of France during those parts of the Middle Ages when his authority was at its lowest ebb. Chinese history consists of a series of dynasties, each strong at first and weak afterwards, each gradually losing control over subordinates, each followed by a period of anarchy (sometimes lasting for centuries), and ultimately succeeded by a new dynasty which temporarily re-establishes a strong Central Government. Historians always attribute the fall of a dynasty to the excessive power of eunuchs, but perhaps this is, in part, a literary convention. What distinguishes the Emperor is not so much his political power, which fluctuates with the strength of his personality, as certain religious prerogatives. The Emperor is the Son of Heaven; he sacrifices to Heaven at the winter solstice. The early Chinese used "Heaven" as synonymous with "The Supreme Ruler," a monotheistic God;[3] indeed Professor Giles maintains, by arguments which seem conclusive, that the correct translation of the Emperor's title would be "Son of God." The word "Tien," in Chinese, is used both for the sky and for God, though the latter sense has become rare. The expression "Shang Ti," which means "Supreme Ruler," belongs in the main to pre-Confucian times, but both terms originally represented a God as definitely anthropomorphic as the God of the Old Testament.[4]

As time went by the Supreme Ruler became more shadowy, while "Heaven" remained, on account of the Imperial rites connected with it. The Emperor alone had the privilege of worshipping "Heaven," and the rites continued practically unchanged until the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911. In modern times they were performed in the Temple of Heaven in
Peking, one of the most beautiful places in the world. The annual sacrifice in the Temple of Heaven represented almost the sole official survival of pre-Confucian religion, or indeed of anything that could be called religion in the strict sense; for Buddhism and Taoism have never had any connection with the State.

The history of China is known in some detail from the year 722 B.C., because with this year begins Confucius' Springs and Autumns, which is a chronicle of the State of Lu, in which Confucius was an official.

One of the odd things about the history of China is that after the Emperors have been succeeding each other for more than 2,000 years, one comes to a ruler who is known as the "First Emperor," Shih Huang Ti. He acquired control over the whole Empire, after a series of wars, in 221 B.C., and died in 210 B.C. Apart from his conquests, he is remarkable for three achievements: the building of the Great Wall against the Huns, the destruction of feudalism, and the burning of the books. The destruction of feudalism, it must be confessed, had to be repeated by many subsequent rulers; for a long time, feudalism tended to grow up again whenever the Central Government was in weak hands. But Shih Huang Ti was the first ruler who made his authority really effective over all China in historical times. Although his dynasty came to an end with his son, the impression he made is shown by the fact that our word "China" is probably derived from his family name, Tsin or Chin[5]. (The Chinese put the family name first.) His Empire was roughly co-extensive with what is now China proper. The destruction of the books was a curious incident. Shih Huang Ti, as appears from his calling himself "First Emperor," disliked being reminded of the fact that China had existed before his time; therefore history was anathema to him. Moreover the literati were already a strong force in the country, and were always (following Confucius) in favour of the preservation of ancient customs, whereas Shih Huang Ti was a vigorous innovator. Moreover, he appears to have been uneducated and not of pure Chinese race. Moved by the combined motives of vanity and radicalism, he issued an edict decreeing that—

All official histories, except the memoirs of Tsin (his own family), shall be burned; except the persons who have the office of literati of the great learning, those who in the Empire permit themselves to hide the Shi-King, the Shu-King (Confucian classics), or the discourses of the hundred schools, must all go before the local civil and military authorities so that they may be burned. Those who shall dare to discuss among themselves the Shi-King and the Shu-King shall be put to death and their corpses exposed in a public place; those who shall make use of antiquity to belittle modern times shall be put to death with their relations.... Thirty days after the publication of this edict, those who have not burned their books shall be branded and sent to forced labour. The books which shall not be proscribed are those of medicine and pharmacy, of divination ..., of agriculture and of arboriculture. As for those who desire to study the laws and ordinances, let them take the officials as masters. (Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 203.)

It will be seen that the First Emperor was something of a Bolshevik. The Chinese literati, naturally, have blackened his memory. On the other hand, modern Chinese reformers, who have experienced the opposition of old-fashioned scholars, have a certain sympathy with his attempt to destroy the innate conservatism of his subjects. Thus Li Ung Bing[6] says:—

No radical change can take place in China without encountering the opposition of the literati. This was no less the case then than it is now. To abolish feudalism by one stroke was a radical change indeed. Whether the change was for the better or the worse, the men of letters took no time to inquire; whatever was good enough for their fathers was good enough for them and their children. They found numerous authorities in the classics to support their contention and these they freely quoted to show that Shih Huang Ti was wrong. They continued to criticize the government to such an extent that something had to be done to silence the voice of antiquity ... As to how far this decree (on the burning of the books) was enforced, it is hard to say. At any rate, it exempted all libraries of the government, or such as were in possession of a class of officials called Po Szu or Learned Men. If any real damage was done to Chinese literature under the decree in question, it is safe to say that it was not of such a nature as later writers would have us believe. Still, this extreme measure failed to secure the desired end, and a number of the men of letters in Han Yang, the capital, was subsequently buried alive.
This passage is written from the point of view of Young China, which is anxious to assimilate Western learning in place of the dead scholarship of the Chinese classics. China, like every other civilized country, has a tradition which stands in the way of progress. The Chinese have excelled in stability rather than in progress; therefore Young China, which perceives that the advent of industrial civilization has made progress essential to continued national existence, naturally looks with a favourable eye upon Shih Huang Ti’s struggle with the reactionary pedants of his age. The very considerable literature which has come down to us from before his time shows, in any case, that his edict was somewhat ineffective; and in fact it was repealed after twenty-two years, in 191 B.C.

After a brief reign by the son of the First Emperor, who did not inherit his capacity, we come to the great Han dynasty, which reigned from 206 B.C. to A.D. 220. This was the great age of Chinese imperialism—exactly coeval with the great age of Rome. In the course of their campaigns in Northern India and Central Asia, the Chinese were brought into contact with India, with Persia, and even with the Roman Empire.[7] Their relations with India had a profound effect upon their religion, as well as upon that of Japan, since they led to the introduction of Buddhism. Relations with Rome were chiefly promoted by the Roman desire for silk, and continued until the rise of Mohammedanism. They had little importance for China, though we learn, for example, that about A.D. 164 a treatise on astronomy was brought to China from the Roman Empire.[8] Marcus Aurelius appears in Chinese history under the name An Tun, which stands for Antoninus.

It was during this period that the Chinese acquired that immense prestige in the Far East which lasted until the arrival of European armies and navies in the nineteenth century. One is sometimes tempted to think that the irruption of the white man into China may prove almost as ephemeral as the raids of Huns and Tartars into Europe. The military superiority of Europe to Asia is not an eternal law of nature, as we are tempted to think; and our superiority in civilization is a mere delusion. Our histories, which treat the Mediterranean as the centre of the universe, give quite a wrong perspective. Cordier,[9] dealing with the campaigns and voyages of discovery which took place under the Han dynasty, says:—

The Occidentals have singularly contracted the field of the history of the world when they have grouped around the people of Israel, Greece, and Rome the little that they knew of the expansion of the human race, being completely ignorant of these voyagers who ploughed the China Sea and the Indian Ocean, of these cavalcades across the immensities of Central Asia up to the Persian Gulf. The greatest part of the universe, and at the same time a civilization different but certainly as developed as that of the ancient Greeks and Romans, remained unknown to those who wrote the history of their little world while they believed that they, were setting forth the history of the world as a whole.

In our day, this provincialism, which impregnates all our culture, is liable to have disastrous consequences politically, as well as for the civilization of mankind. We must make room for Asia in our thoughts, if we are not to rouse Asia to a fury of self-assertion. After the Han dynasty there are various short dynasties and periods of disorder, until we come to the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907). Under this dynasty, in its prosperous days, the Empire acquired its greatest extent, and art and poetry reached their highest point.[10] The Empire of Jenghis Khan (died 1227) was considerably greater, and contained a great part of China; but Jenghis Khan was a foreign conqueror. Jenghis and his generals, starting from Mongolia, appeared as conquerors in China, India, Persia, and Russia. Throughout Central Asia, Jenghis destroyed every man, woman, and child in the cities he captured. When Merv was captured, it was transformed into a desert and 700,000 people were killed. But it was said that many had escaped by lying among the corpses and pretending to be dead; therefore at the capture of Nishapur, shortly afterwards, it was ordered that all the inhabitants should have their heads cut off. Three pyramids of heads were made, one of men, one of women, and one of children. As it was feared that some might have escaped by hiding underground, a detachment of soldiers was left to kill any that might emerge.[11] Similar horrors were enacted at Moscow and Kieff, in Hungary and Poland. Yet the man responsible for these massacres was sought in alliance by St. Louis and the Pope. The times of Jenghis Khan remind one of the present day, except that his methods of causing death were more merciful than those that have been
employed since the Armistice.
Kublai Khan (died 1294), who is familiar, at least by name, through Marco Polo and
Coleridge; was the grandson of Jenghis Khan, and the first Mongol who was acknowledged
Emperor of China, where he ousted the Sung dynasty (960-1277). By this time, contact with
China had somewhat abated the savagery of the first conquerors. Kublai removed his capital
from Kara Korom in Mongolia to Peking. He built walls like those which still surround the
city, and established on the walls an observatory which is preserved to this day. Until 1900,
two of the astronomical instruments constructed by Kublai were still to be seen in this
observatory, but the Germans removed them to Potsdam after the suppression of the
Boxers.[12] I understand they have been restored in accordance with one of the provisions of
the Treaty of Versailles. If so, this was probably the most important benefit which that treaty
secured to the world.

Kublai plays the same part in Japanese history that Philip II plays in the history of England.
He prepared an Invincible Armada, or rather two successive armadas, to conquer Japan, but
they were defeated, partly by storms, and partly by Japanese valour.

After Kublai, the Mongol Emperors more and more adopted Chinese ways, and lost their
tyrrannical vigour. Their dynasty came to an end in 1370, and was succeeded by the pure
Chinese Ming dynasty, which lasted until the Manchu conquest of 1644. The Manchus in turn
adopted Chinese ways, and were overthrown by a patriotic revolution in 1911, having
contributed nothing notable to the native culture of China except the pigtail, officially
abandoned at the Revolution.

The persistence of the Chinese Empire down to our own day is not to be attributed to any
military skill; on the contrary, considering its extent and resources, it has at most times shown
itself weak and incompetent in war. Its southern neighbours were even less warlike, and were
less in extent. Its northern and western neighbours inhabited a barren country, largely desert,
which was only capable of supporting a very sparse population. The Huns were defeated by
the Chinese after centuries of warfare; the Tartars and Manchus, on the contrary, conquered
China. But they were too few and too uncivilized to impose their ideas or their way of life
upon China, which absorbed them and went on its way as if they had never existed. Rome
could have survived the Goths, if they had come alone, but the successive waves of barbarians
came too quickly to be all civilized in turn. China was saved from this fate by the Gobi Desert
and the Tibetan uplands. Since the white men have taken to coming by sea, the old
geographical immunity is lost, and greater energy will be required to preserve the national
independence.

In spite of geographical advantages, however, the persistence of Chinese civilization,
fundamentally unchanged since the introduction of Buddhism, is a remarkable phenomenon.
Egypt and Babylonia persisted as long, but since they fell there has been nothing comparable
in the world. Perhaps the main cause is the immense population of China, with an almost
complete identity of culture throughout. In the middle of the eighth century, the population of
China is estimated at over 50 millions, though ten years later, as a result of devastating wars,
it is said to have sunk to about 17 millions.[13] A census has been taken at various times in
Chinese history, but usually a census of houses, not of individuals. From the number of
houses the population is computed by a more or less doubtful calculation. It is probable, also,
that different methods were adopted on different occasions, and that comparisons between
different enumerations are therefore rather unsafe. Putnam Weale[14] says:—
The first census taken by the Manchus in 1651, after the restoration of order, returned China's
population at 55 million persons, which is less than the number given in the first census of the
Han dynasty, A.D. 1, and about the same as when Kublai Khan established the Mongal
dynasty in 1295. (This is presumably a misprint, as Kublai died in 1294.) Thus we are faced
by the amazing fact that, from the beginning of the Christian era, the toll of life taken by
internecine and frontier wars in China was so great that in spite of all territorial expansion the
population for upwards of sixteen centuries remained more or less stationary. There is in all
history no similar record. Now, however, came a vast change. Thus three years after the death
of the celebrated Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi, in 1720, the population had risen to 125
millions. At the beginning of the reign of the no less illustrious Ch'ien Lung (1743) it was
returned at 145 millions; towards the end of his reign, in 1783, it had doubled, and was given as 283 millions. In the reign of Chia Ch'ing (1812) it had risen to 360 millions; before the Taiping rebellion (1842) it had grown to 413 millions; after that terrible rising it sunk to 261 millions.

I do not think such definite statements are warranted. The China Year Book for 1919 (the latest I have seen) says (p. 1):—

The taking of a census by the methods adopted in Western nations has never yet been attempted in China, and consequently estimates of the total population have varied to an extraordinary degree. The nearest approach to a reliable estimate is, probably, the census taken by the Minchengpu (Ministry of Interior) in 1910, the results of which are embodied in a report submitted to the Department of State at Washington by Mr. Raymond P. Tenney, a Student Interpreter at the U.S. Legation, Peking.... It is pointed out that even this census can only be regarded as approximate, as, with few exceptions, households and not individuals were counted.

The estimated population of the Chinese Empire (exclusive of Tibet) is given, on the basis of this census, as 329,542,000, while the population of Tibet is estimated at 1,500,000. Estimates which have been made at various other dates are given as follows (p. 2):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year A.D.</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1381</td>
<td>59,850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1412</td>
<td>66,377,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1580</td>
<td>60,692,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1662</td>
<td>21,068,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>333,000,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1668</td>
<td>25,386,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360,440,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1710</td>
<td>23,312,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27,241,129</td>
<td>1842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1711</td>
<td>28,241,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1736</td>
<td>125,046,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1743</td>
<td>157,343,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753</td>
<td>143,125,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760</td>
<td>143,125,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1812</td>
<td>362,467,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>404,946,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>380,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>381,309,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>377,636,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>380,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures suffice to show how little is known about the population of China. Not only are widely divergent estimates made in the same year (e.g. 1760), but in other respects the figures are incredible. Mr. Putnam Weale might contend that the drop from 60 millions in 1580 to 21 millions in 1662 was due to the wars leading to the Manchu conquest. But no one can believe that between 1711 and 1736 the population increased from 28 millions to 125 millions, or that it doubled between 1790 and 1792. No one knows whether the population of China is increasing or diminishing, whether people in general have large or small families, or any of the other facts that vital statistics are designed to elucidate. What is said on these subjects, however dogmatic, is no more than guess-work. Even the population of Peking is unknown. It is said to be about 900,000, but it may be anywhere between 800,000 and a million. As for the population of the Chinese Empire, it is probably safe to assume that it is between three and four hundred millions, and somewhat likely that it is below three hundred and fifty millions. Very little indeed can be said with confidence as to the population of China in former times; so little that, on the whole, authors who give statistics are to be distrusted.

There are certain broad features of the traditional Chinese civilization which give it its distinctive character. I should be inclined to select as the most important: (1) The use of ideograms instead of an alphabet in writing; (2) The substitution of the Confucian ethic for religion among the educated classes; (3) government by literati chosen by examination instead of by a hereditary aristocracy. The family system distinguishes traditional China from modern Europe, but represents a stage which most other civilizations have passed through, and which
is therefore not distinctively Chinese; the three characteristics which I have enumerated, on the other hand, distinguish China from all other countries of past times. Something must be said at this stage about each of the three.

1. As everyone knows, the Chinese do not have letters, as we do, but symbols for whole words. This has, of course, many inconveniences: it means that, in learning to write, there are an immense number of different signs to be learnt, not only 26 as with us; that there is no such thing as alphabetical order, so that dictionaries, files, catalogues, etc., are difficult to arrange and linotype is impossible; that foreign words, such as proper names and scientific terms, cannot be written down by sound, as in European languages, but have to be represented by some elaborate device.[15] For these reasons, there is a movement for phonetic writing among the more advanced Chinese reformers; and I think the success of this movement is essential if China is to take her place among the bustling hustling nations which consider that they have a monopoly of all excellence. Even if there were no other argument for the change, the difficulty of elementary education, where reading and writing take so long to learn, would be alone sufficient to decide any believer in democracy. For practical purposes, therefore, the movement for phonetic writing deserves support.

There are, however, many considerations, less obvious to a European, which can be adduced in favour of the ideographic system, to which something of the solid stability of the Chinese civilization is probably traceable. To us, it seems obvious that a written word must represent a sound, whereas to the Chinese it represents an idea. We have adopted the Chinese system ourselves as regards numerals; "1922," for example, can be read in English, French, or any other language, with quite different sounds, but with the same meaning. Similarly what is written in Chinese characters can be read throughout China, in spite of the difference of dialects which are mutually unintelligible when spoken. Even a Japanese, without knowing a word of spoken Chinese, can read out Chinese script in Japanese, just as he could read a row of numerals written by an Englishman. And the Chinese can still read their classics, although the spoken language must have changed as much as French has changed from Latin.

The advantage of writing over speech is its greater permanence, which enables it to be a means of communication between different places and different times. But since the spoken language changes from place to place and from time to time, the characteristic advantage of writing is more fully attained by a script which does not aim at representing spoken sounds than by one which does.

Speaking historically, there is nothing peculiar in the Chinese method of writing, which represents a stage through which all writing probably passed. Writing everywhere seems to have begun as pictures, not as a symbolic representation of sounds. I understand that in Egyptian hieroglyphics the course of development from ideograms to phonetic writing can be studied. What is peculiar in China is the preservation of the ideographic system throughout thousands of years of advanced civilization—a preservation probably due, at least in part, to the fact that the spoken language is monosyllabic, uninflected and full of homonyms.

As to the way in which the Chinese system of writing has affected the mentality of those who employ it, I find some suggestive reflections in an article published in the Chinese Students' Monthly (Baltimore), for February 1922, by Mr. Chi Li, in an article on "Some Anthropological Problems of China." He says (p. 327):—

Language has been traditionally treated by European scientists as a collection of sounds instead of an expression of something inner and deeper than the vocal apparatus as it should be. The accumulative effect of language-symbols upon one's mental formulation is still an unexploited field. Dividing the world culture of the living races on this basis, one perceives a fundamental difference of its types between the alphabetical users and the hieroglyphic users, each of which has its own virtues and vices. Now, with all respects to alphabetical civilization, it must be frankly stated that it has a grave and inherent defect in its lack of solidity. The most civilized portion under the alphabetical culture is also inhabited by the most fickle people. The history of the Western land repeats the same story over and over again. Thus up and down with the Greeks; up and down with Rome; up and down with the Arabs. The ancient Semitic and Hametic peoples are essentially alphabetic users, and their civilizations show the same lack of solidity as the Greeks and the Romans. Certainly this
phenomenon can be partially explained by the extra-fluidity of the alphabetical language
which cannot be depended upon as a suitable organ to conserve any solid idea. Intellectual
contents of these people may be likened to waterfalls and cataracts, rather than seas and
oceans. No other people is richer in ideas than they; but no people would give up their
valuable ideas as quickly as they do....
The Chinese language is by all means the counterpart of the alphabetic stock. It lacks most of
the virtues that are found in the alphabetic language; but as an embodiment of simple and
final truth, it is invulnerable to storm and stress. It has already protected the Chinese
civilization for more than forty centuries. It is solid, square, and beautiful, exactly as the spirit
of it represents. Whether it is the spirit that has produced this language or whether this
language has in turn accentuated the spirit remains to be determined.

Without committing ourselves wholly to the theory here set forth, which is impregnated with
Chinese patriotism, we must nevertheless admit that the Westerner is unaccustomed to the
idea of "alphabetical civilization" as merely one kind, to which he happens to belong. I am not
competent to judge as to the importance of the ideographic script in producing the distinctive
characteristics of Chinese civilization, but I have no doubt that this importance is very great,
and is more or less of the kind indicated in the above quotation.

2. Confucius (B.C. 551-479) must be reckoned, as regards his social influence, with the
founders of religions. His effect on institutions and on men's thoughts has been of the same
kind of magnitude as that of Buddha, Christ, or Mahomet, but curiously different in its nature.
Unlike Buddha and Christ, he is a completely historical character, about whose life a great
deal is known, and with whom legend and myth have been less busy than with most men of
his kind. What most distinguishes him from other founders is that he inculcated a strict code
of ethics, which has been respected ever since, but associated it with very little religious
dogma, which gave place to complete theological scepticism in the countless generations of
Chinese literati who revered his memory and administered the Empire.

Confucius himself belongs rather to the type of Lycurgus and Solon than to that of the great
founders of religions. He was a practical statesman, concerned with the administration of the
State; the virtues he sought to inculcate were not those of personal holiness, or designed to
secure salvation in a future life, but rather those which lead to a peaceful and prosperous
community here on earth. His outlook was essentially conservative, and aimed at preserving
the virtues of former ages. He accepted the existing religion—a rather unemphatic
monotheism, combined with belief that the spirits of the dead preserved a shadowy existence,
which it was the duty of their descendants to render as comfortable as possible. He did not,
however, lay any stress upon supernatural matters. In answer to a question, he gave the
following definition of wisdom: "To cultivate earnestly our duty towards our neighbour, and
to reverence spiritual beings while maintaining always a due reserve."[16] But reverence for
spiritual beings was not an active part of Confucianism, except in the form of
ancestor-worship, which was part of filial piety, and thus merged in duty towards one's
neighbour. Filial piety included obedience to the Emperor, except when he was so wicked as
to forfeit his divine right—for the Chinese, unlike the Japanese, have always held that
resistance to the Emperor was justified if he governed very badly. The following passage
from Professor Giles[17] illustrates this point:—

The Emperor has been uniformly regarded as the son of God by adoption only, and liable to
be displaced from that position as a punishment for the offence of misrule.... If the ruler failed
in his duties, the obligation of the people was at an end, and his divine right disappeared
simultaneously. Of this we have an example in a portion of the Canon to be examined by and
by. Under the year 558 B.C. we find the following narrative. One of the feudal princes asked
an official, saying, "Have not the people of the Wei State done very wrong in expelling their
ruler?" "Perhaps the ruler himself," was the reply, "may have done very wrong.... If the life of
the people is impoverished, and if the spirits are deprived of their sacrifices, of what use is the
ruler, and what can the people do but get rid of him?"

This very sensible doctrine has been accepted at all times throughout Chinese history, and has
made rebellions only too frequent.

Filial piety, and the strength of the family generally, are perhaps the weakest point in
Confucian ethics, the only point where the system departs seriously from common sense. Family feeling has militated against public spirit, and the authority of the old has increased the tyranny of ancient custom. In the present day, when China is confronted with problems requiring a radically new outlook, these features of the Confucian system have made it a barrier to necessary reconstruction, and accordingly we find all those foreigners who wish to exploit China praising the old tradition and deriding the efforts of Young China to construct something more suited to modern needs. The way in which Confucian emphasis on filial piety prevented the growth of public spirit is illustrated by the following story:[18]

One of the feudal princes was boasting to Confucius of the high level of morality which prevailed in his own State. "Among us here," he said, "you will find upright men. If a father has stolen a sheep, his son will give evidence against him." "In my part of the country," replied Confucius, "there is a different standard from this. A father will shield his son, a son will shield his father. It is thus that uprightness will be found."

It is interesting to contrast this story with that of the elder Brutus and his sons, upon which we in the West were all brought up.

Chao Ki, expounding the Confucian doctrine, says it is contrary to filial piety to refuse a lucrative post by which to relieve the indigence of one's aged parents.[19] This form of sin, however, is rare in China as in other countries.

The worst failure of filial piety, however, is to remain without children, since ancestors are supposed to suffer if they have no descendants to keep up their cult. It is probable that this doctrine has made the Chinese more prolific, in which case it has had great biological importance. Filial piety is, of course, in no way peculiar to China, but has been universal at a certain stage of culture. In this respect, as in certain others, what is peculiar to China is the preservation of the old custom after a very high level of civilization had been attained. The early Greeks and Romans did not differ from the Chinese in this respect, but as their civilization advanced the family became less and less important. In China, this did not begin to happen until our own day.

Whatever may be said against filial piety carried to excess, it is certainly less harmful than its Western counterpart, patriotism. Both, of course, err in inculcating duties to a certain portion of mankind to the practical exclusion of the rest. But patriotism directs one's loyalty to a fighting unit, which filial piety does not (except in a very primitive society). Therefore patriotism leads much more easily to militarism and imperialism. The principal method of advancing the interests of one's nation is homicide; the principal method of advancing the interest of one's family is corruption and intrigue. Therefore family feeling is less harmful than patriotism. This view is borne out by the history and present condition of China as compared to Europe.

Apart from filial piety, Confucianism was, in practice, mainly a code of civilized behaviour, degenerating at times into an etiquette book. It taught self-restraint, moderation, and above all courtesy. Its moral code was not, like those of Buddhism and Christianity, so severe that only a few saints could hope to live up to it, or so much concerned with personal salvation as to be incompatible with political institutions. It was not difficult for a man of the world to live up to the more imperative parts of the Confucian teaching. But in order to do this he must exercise at all times a certain kind of self-control—an extension of the kind which children learn when they are taught to "behave." He must not break into violent passions; he must not be arrogant; he must "save face," and never inflict humiliations upon defeated adversaries; he must be moderate in all things, never carried away by excessive love or hate; in a word, he must keep calm reason always in control of all his actions. This attitude existed in Europe in the eighteenth century, but perished in the French Revolution: romanticism, Rousseau, and the guillotine put an end to it. In China, though wars and revolutions have occurred constantly, Confucian calm has survived them all, making them less terrible for the participants, and making all who were not immediately involved hold aloof. It is bad manners in China to attack your adversary in wet weather. Wu-Pei-Fu, I am told, once did it, and won a victory; the beaten general complained of the breach of etiquette; so Wu-Pei-Fu went back to the position he held before the battle, and fought all over again on a fine day. (It should be said that battles in China are seldom bloody.) In such a country, militarism is not the scourge it is
with us; and the difference is due to the Confucian ethics.[20] Confucianism did not assume its present form until the twelfth century A.D., when the personal God in whom Confucius had believed was thrust aside by the philosopher Chu Fu Tze.[21] whose interpretation of Confucianism has ever since been recognized as orthodox. Since the fall of the Mongols (1370), the Government has uniformly favoured Confucianism as the teaching of the State; before that, there were struggles with Buddhism and Taoism, which were connected with magic, and appealed to superstitious Emperors, quite a number of whom died of drinking the Taoist elixir of life. The Mongol Emperors were Buddhists of the Lama religion, which still prevails in Tibet and Mongolia; but the Manchu Emperors, though also northern conquerors, were ultra-orthodox Confucians. It has been customary in China, for many centuries, for the literati to be pure Confucians, sceptical in religion but not in morals, while the rest of the population believed and practised all three religions simultaneously. The Chinese have not the belief, which we owe to the Jews, that if one religion is true, all others must be false. At the present day, however, there appears to be very little in the way of religion in China, though the belief in magic lingers on among the uneducated. At all times, even when there was religion, its intensity was far less than in Europe. It is remarkable that religious scepticism has not led, in China, to any corresponding ethical scepticism, as it has done repeatedly in Europe.

3. I come now to the system of selecting officials by competitive examination, without which it is hardly likely that so literary and unsuperstitious a system as that of Confucius could have maintained its hold. The view of the modern Chinese on this subject is set forth by the present President of the Republic of China, Hsu Shi-chang, in his book on China after the War, pp. 59-60.[22] After considering the educational system under the Chou dynasty, he continues: In later periods, in spite of minor changes, the importance of moral virtues continued to be stressed upon. For instance, during the most flourishing period of Tang Dynasty (627-650 A.D.), the Imperial Academy of Learning, known as Kuo-tzu-chien, was composed of four collegiate departments, in which ethics was considered as the most important of all studies. It was said that in the Academy there were more than three thousand students who were able and virtuous in nearly all respects, while the total enrolment, including aspirants from Korea and Japan, was as high as eight thousand. At the same time, there was a system of "elections" through which able and virtuous men were recommended by different districts to the Emperor for appointment to public offices. College training and local elections supplemented each other, but in both moral virtues were given the greatest emphasis. Although the Imperial Academy exists till this day, it has never been as nourishing as during that period. For this change the introduction of the competitive examination or Ko-chü system, must be held responsible. The "election" system furnished no fixed standard for the recommendation of public service candidates, and, as a result, tended to create an aristocratic class from which alone were to be found eligible men. Consequently, the Sung Emperors (960-1277 A.D.) abolished the elections, set aside the Imperial Academy, and inaugurated the competitive examination system in their place. The examinations were to supply both scholars and practical statesmen, and they were periodically held throughout the later dynasties until the introduction of the modern educational regime. Useless and stereotyped as they were in later days, they once served some useful purpose. Besides, the ethical background of Chinese education had already been so firmly established, that, in spite of the emphasis laid by these examinations on pure literary attainments, moral teachings have survived till this day in family education and in private schools. Although the system of awarding Government posts for proficiency in examinations is much better than most other systems that have prevailed, such as nepotism, bribery, threats of insurrection, etc., yet the Chinese system, at any rate after it assumed its final form, was harmful through the fact that it was based solely on the classics, that it was purely literary, and that it allowed no scope whatever for originality. The system was established in its final form by the Emperor Hung Wu (1368-1398), and remained unchanged until 1905. One of the first objects of modern Chinese reformers was to get it swept away. Li Ung Bing[23] says: In spite of the many good things that may be said to the credit of Hung Wu, he will ever be remembered in connection with a form of evil which has eaten into the very heart of the
nation. This was the system of triennial examinations, or rather the form of Chinese composition, called the "Essay," or the "Eight Legs," which, for the first time in the history of Chinese literature, was made the basis of all literary contests. It was so-named, because after the introduction of the theme the writer was required to treat it in four paragraphs, each consisting of two members, made up of an equal number of sentences and words. The theme was always chosen from either the Four Books, or the Five Classics. The writer could not express any opinion of his own, or any views at variance with those expressed by Chu Hsi and his school. All he was required to do was to put the few words of Confucius, or whomsoever it might be, into an essay in conformity with the prescribed rules. Degrees, which were to serve as passports to Government positions, were awarded the best writers. To say that the training afforded by the time required to make a man efficient in the art of such writing, would at the same time qualify him to hold the various offices under the Government, was absurd. But absurd as the whole system was, it was handed down to recent times from the third year of the reign of Hung Wu, and was not abolished until a few years ago. No system was more perfect or effective in retarding the intellectual and literary development of a nation. With her "Eight Legs," China long ago reached the lowest point on her downhill journey. It is largely on account of the long lease of life that was granted to this rotten system that the teachings of the Sung philosophers have been so long venerated. These are the words of a Chinese patriot of the present day, and no doubt, as a modern system, the "Eight Legs" deserve all the hard things that he says about them. But in the fourteenth century, when one considers the practicable alternatives, one can see that there was probably much to be said for such a plan. At any rate, for good or evil, the examination system profoundly affected the civilization of China. Among its good effects were: A widely-diffused respect for learning; the possibility of doing without a hereditary aristocracy; the selection of administrators who must at least have been capable of industry; and the preservation of Chinese civilization in spite of barbarian conquest. But, like so much else in traditional China, it has had to be swept away to meet modern needs. I hope nothing of greater value will have to perish in the struggle to repel the foreign exploiters and the fierce and cruel system which they miscall civilization.

FOOTNOTES:

[10] Murdoch, in his History of Japan (vol. i. p. 146), thus describes the greatness of the early Tang Empire:
In the following year (618) Li Yuen, Prince of T'ang, established the illustrious dynasty of that name, which continued to sway the fortunes of China for nearly three centuries (618-908). After a brilliant reign of ten years he handed over the imperial dignity to his son, Tai-tsung (627-650), perhaps the greatest monarch the Middle Kingdom has ever seen. At this time China undoubtedly stood in the very forefront of civilization. She was then the most powerful, the most enlightened, the most progressive, and the best governed empire, not only in Asia, but on the face of the globe. Tai-tsung's frontiers reached from the confines of Persia, the Caspian Sea, and the Altai of the Kirghis steppe, along these mountains to the north side of the Gobi desert eastward to the inner Hing-an, while Sogdiana, Khorassan, and the regions around the Hindu Rush also acknowledged his suzerainty. The sovereign of Nepal and Magadha in India sent envoys; and in 643 envoys appeared from the Byzantine Empire and the Court of Persia.

Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 212.


Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 484.


For example, the nearest approach that could be made in Chinese to my own name was "Lo-Su." There is a word "Lo," and a word "Su," for both of which there are characters; but no combination of characters gives a better approximation to the sound of my name.

Giles, op. cit., p. 74. Professor Giles adds, à propos of the phrase "maintaining always a due reserve," the following footnote: 'Dr. Legge has 'to keep aloof from them,' which would be equivalent to 'have nothing to do with them.' Confucius seems rather to have meant 'no familiarity.'"

Giles, op. cit. p. 86.

Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 167.

As far as anti-militarism is concerned, Taoism is even more emphatic. "The best soldiers," says Lao-Tze, "do not fight." (Giles, op. cit. p. 150.) Chinese armies contain many good soldiers.

Giles, op. cit., Lecture VIII. When Chu Fu Tze was dead, and his son-in-law was watching beside his coffin, a singular incident occurred. Although the sage had spent his life teaching that miracles are impossible, the coffin rose and remained suspended three feet above the ground. The pious son-in-law was horrified. "O my revered father-in-law," he prayed, "do not destroy my faith that miracles are impossible." Whereupon the coffin slowly descended to earth again, and the son-in-law's faith revived.

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Chapter III
China and the Western powers

In order to understand the international position of China, some facts concerning its nineteenth-century history are indispensable. China was for many ages the supreme empire of the Far East, embracing a vast and fertile area, inhabited by an industrious and civilized people. Aristocracy, in our sense of the word, came to an end before the beginning of the Christian era, and government was in the hands of officials chosen for their proficiency in writing in a dead language, as in England. Intercourse with the West was spasmodic and chiefly religious. In the early centuries of the Christian era, Buddhism was imported from India, and some Chinese scholars penetrated to that country to master the theology of the new religion in its native home, but in later times the intervening barbarians made the journey practically impossible. Nestorian Christianity reached China in the seventh century, and had a good deal of influence, but died out again. (What is known on this subject is chiefly from the Nestorian monument discovered in Hsianfu in 1625.) In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries Roman Catholic missionaries acquired considerable favour at Court, because of their astronomical knowledge and their help in rectifying the irregularities and confusions of the Chinese calendar.[24] Their globes and astrolabes are still to be seen on the walls of Peking. But in the long run they could not resist quarrels between different orders, and were almost completely excluded from both China and Japan.

In the year 1793, a British ambassador, Lord Macartney, arrived in China, to request further trade facilities and the establishment of a permanent British diplomatic representative. The Emperor at this time was Chien Lung, the best of the Manchu dynasty, a cultivated man, a patron of the arts, and an exquisite calligraphist. (One finds specimens of his writing in all sorts of places in China.) His reply to King George III is given by Backhouse and Bland.[25] I wish I could quote it all, but some extracts must suffice. It begins:

You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless, impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilization, you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial.... To show your devotion, you have also sent offerings of your country's produce. I have read your memorial: the earnest terms in which it is cast reveal a respectful humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy.

He goes on to explain, with the patient manner appropriate in dealing with an importunate child, why George III's desires cannot possibly be gratified. An ambassador, he assures him, would be useless, for:

If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial Dynasty fills you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the Envoy might become, nothing would be gained thereby.

Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. I... have no use for your country's manufactures. ...It behoves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter. He can understand the English desiring the produce of China, but feels that they have nothing worth having to offer in exchange:

"Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce. But as the tea, silk and porcelain which the Celestial Empire produces are absolute necessities to European nations and to yourselves," the limited trade hitherto permitted at Canton is to continue.

He would have shown less favour to Lord Macartney, but "I do not forget the lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world by intervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your excusable ignorance of the usages of our Celestial Empire." He concludes with the injunction: "Tremblingly obey and show no negligence!"
What I want to suggest is that no one understands China until this document has ceased to seem absurd. The Romans claimed to rule the world, and what lay outside their Empire was to them of no account. The Empire of Chien Lung was more extensive, with probably a larger population; it had risen to greatness at the same time as Rome, and had not fallen, but invariably defeated all its enemies, either by war or by absorption. Its neighbours were comparatively barbarous, except the Japanese, who acquired their civilization by slavish imitation of China. The view of Chien Lung was no more absurd than that of Alexander the Great, sighing for new worlds to conquer when he had never even heard of China, where Confucius had been dead already for a hundred and fifty years. Nor was he mistaken as regards trade: China produces everything needed for the happiness of its inhabitants, and we have forced trade upon them solely for our benefit, giving them in exchange only things which they would do better without.

Unfortunately for China, its culture was deficient in one respect, namely science. In art and literature, in manners and customs, it was at least the equal of Europe; at the time of the Renaissance, Europe would not have been in any way the superior of the Celestial Empire. There is a museum in Peking where, side by side with good Chinese art, may be seen the presents which Louis XIV made to the Emperor when he wished to impress him with the splendour of Le Roi Soleil. Compared to the Chinese things surrounding them, they were tawdry and barbaric. The fact that Britain has produced Shakespeare and Milton, Locke and Hume, and all the other men who have adorned literature and the arts, does not make us superior to the Chinese. What makes us superior is Newton and Robert Boyle and their scientific successors. They make us superior by giving us greater proficiency in the art of killing. It is easier for an Englishman to kill a Chinaman than for a Chinaman to kill an Englishman. Therefore our civilization is superior to that of China, and Chien Lung is absurd. When we had finished with Napoleon, we soon set to work to demonstrate this proposition. Our first war with China was in 1840, and was fought because the Chinese Government endeavoured to stop the importation of opium. It ended with the cession of Hong-Kong and the opening of five ports to British trade, as well as (soon afterwards) to the trade of France, America and Scandinavia. In 1856-60, the English and French jointly made war on China, and destroyed the Summer Palace near Peking,[26] a building whose artistic value, on account of the treasures it contained, must have been about equal to that of Saint Mark's in Venice and much greater than that of Rheims Cathedral. This act did much to persuade the Chinese of the superiority of our civilization so they opened seven more ports and the river Yangtze, paid an indemnity and granted us more territory at Hong-Kong. In 1870, the Chinese were rash enough to murder a British diplomat, so the remaining British diplomats demanded and obtained an indemnity, five more ports, and a fixed tariff for opium. Next, the French took Annam and the British took Burma, both formerly under Chinese suzerainty. Then came the war with Japan in 1894-5, leading to Japan's complete victory and conquest of Korea. Japan's acquisitions would have been much greater but for the intervention of France, Germany and Russia, England holding aloof. This was the beginning of our support of Japan, inspired by fear of Russia. It also led to an alliance between China and Russia, as a reward for which Russia acquired all the important rights in Manchuria, which passed to Japan, partly after the Russo-Japanese war, and partly after the Bolshevik revolution. The next incident begins with the murder of two German missionaries in Shantung in 1897. Nothing in their life became them like the leaving of it; for if they had lived they would probably have made very few converts, whereas by dying they afforded the world an object-lesson in Christian ethics. The Germans seized Kiaochow Bay and created a naval base there; they also acquired railway and mining rights in Shantung, which, by the Treaty of Versailles, passed to Japan in accordance with the Fourteen Points. Shantung therefore became virtually a Japanese possession, though America at Washington has insisted upon its restitution. The services of the two missionaries to civilization did not, however, end in China, for their death was constantly used in the German Reichstag during the first debates on the German Big Navy Bills, since it was held that warships would make Germany respected in China. Thus they helped to exacerbate the relations of England and Germany and to hasten the advent of the Great War. They also helped to bring on the Boxer rising, which is said to
have begun as a movement against the Germans in Shantung, though the other Powers emulated the Germans in every respect, the Russians by creating a naval base at Port Arthur, the British by acquiring Wei-hai-wei and a sphere of influence in the Yangtze, and so on. The Americans alone held aloof, proclaiming the policy of Chinese integrity and the Open Door. The Boxer rising is one of the few Chinese events that all Europeans know about. After we had demonstrated our superior virtue by the sack of Peking, we exacted a huge indemnity, and turned the Legation Quarter of Peking into a fortified city. To this day, it is enclosed by a wall, filled with European, American, and Japanese troops, and surrounded by a bare space on which the Chinese are not allowed to build. It is administered by the diplomatic body, and the Chinese authorities have no powers over anyone within its gates. When some unusually corrupt and traitorous Government is overthrown, its members take refuge in the Japanese (or other) Legation and so escape the punishment of their crimes, while within the sacred precincts of the Legation Quarter the Americans erect a vast wireless station said to be capable of communicating directly with the United States. And so the refutation of Chien Lung is completed.

Out of the Boxer indemnity, however, one good thing has come. The Americans found that, after paying all just claims for damages, they still had a large surplus. This they returned to China to be spent on higher education, partly in colleges in China under American control, partly by sending advanced Chinese students to American universities. The gain to China has been enormous, and the benefit to America from the friendship of the Chinese (especially the most educated of them) is incalculable. This is obvious to everyone, yet England shows hardly any signs of following suit.

To understand the difficulties with which the Chinese Government is faced, it is necessary to realize the loss of fiscal independence which, China has suffered as the result of the various wars and treaties which have been forced upon her. In the early days, the Chinese had no experience of European diplomacy, and did not know what to avoid; in later days, they have not been allowed to treat old treaties as scraps of paper, since that is the prerogative of the Great Powers—a prerogative which every single one of them exercises.

The best example of this state of affairs is the Customs tariff.[27] At the end of our first war with China, in 1842, we concluded a treaty which provided for a duty at treaty ports of 5 per cent. on all imports and not more than 5 per cent on exports. This treaty is the basis of the whole Customs system. At the end of our next war, in 1858, we drew up a schedule of conventional prices on which the 5 per cent. was to be calculated. This was to be revised every ten years, but has in fact only been revised twice, once in 1902 and once in 1918.[28] Revision of the schedule is merely a change in the conventional prices, not a change in the tariff, which remains fixed at 5 per cent. Change in the tariff is practically impossible, since China has concluded commercial treaties involving a most-favoured-nation clause, and the same tariff, with twelve States besides Great Britain, and therefore any change in the tariff requires the unanimous consent of thirteen Powers.

When foreign Powers speak of the Open Door as a panacea for China, it must be remembered that the Open Door does nothing to give the Chinese the usual autonomy as regards Customs that is enjoyed by other sovereign States.[29] The treaty of 1842 on which the system rests, has no time-limit of provision for denunciation by either party, such as other commercial treaties contain. A low tariff suits the Powers that wish to find a market for their goods in China, and they have therefore no motive for consenting to any alteration. In the past, when we practised free trade, we could defend ourselves by saying that the policy we forced upon China was the same as that which we adopted ourselves. But no other nation could make this excuse, nor can we now that we have abandoned free trade by the Safeguarding of Industries Act.

The import tariff being so low, the Chinese Government is compelled, for the sake of revenue, to charge the maximum of 5 per cent, on all exports. This, of course, hinders the development of Chinese commerce, and is probably a mistake. But the need of sources of revenue is desperate, and it is not surprising that the Chinese authorities should consider the tax indispensable.

There is also another system in China, chiefly inherited from the time of the Taiping
rebelling, namely the erection of internal customs barriers at various important points. This plan is still adopted with the internal trade. But merchants dealing with the interior and sending goods to or from a Treaty Port can escape internal customs by the payment of half the duty charged under the external tariff. As this is generally less than the internal tariff charges, this provision favours foreign produce at the expense of that of China. Of course the system of internal customs is bad, but it is traditional, and is defended on the ground that revenue is indispensable. China offered to abolish internal customs in return for certain uniform increases in the import and export tariff, and Great Britain, Japan, and the United States consented. But there were ten other Powers whose consent was necessary, and not all could be induced to agree. So the old system remains in force, not chiefly through the fault of the Chinese central government. It should be added that internal customs are collected by the provincial authorities, who usually intercept them and use them for private armies and civil war. At the present time, the Central Government is not strong enough to stop these abuses. The administration of the Customs is only partially in the hands of the Chinese. By treaty, the Inspector-General, who is at the head of the service, must be British so long as our trade with China exceeds that of any other treaty State; and the appointment of all subordinate officials is in his hands. In 1918 (the latest year for which I have the figures) there were 7,500 persons employed in the Customs, and of these 2,000 were non-Chinese. The first Inspector-General was Sir Robert Hart, who, by the unanimous testimony of all parties, fulfilled his duties exceedingly well. For the time being, there is much to be said for the present system. The Chinese have the appointment of the Inspector-General, and can therefore choose a man who is sympathetic to their country. Chinese officials are, as a rule, corrupt and indolent, so that control by foreigners is necessary in creating a modern bureaucracy. So long as the foreign officials are responsible to the Chinese Government, not to foreign States, they fulfil a useful educative function, and help to prepare the way for the creation of an efficient Chinese State. The problem for China is to secure practical and intellectual training from the white nations without becoming their slaves. In dealing with this problem, the system adopted in the Customs has much to recommend it during the early stages.[30]

At the same time, there are grave infringements of Chinese independence in the present position of the Customs, apart altogether from the fact that the tariff is fixed by treaty for ever. Much of the revenue derivable from customs is mortgaged for various loans and indemnities, so that the Customs cannot be dealt with from the point of view of Chinese interests alone. Moreover, in the present state of anarchy, the Customs administration can exercise considerable control over Chinese politics by recognizing or not recognizing a given de facto Government. (There is no Government de jure, at any rate in the North.) At present, the Customs Revenue is withheld in the South, and an artificial bankruptcy is being engineered. In view of the reactionary instincts of diplomats, this constitutes a terrible obstacle to internal reform. It means that no Government which is in earnest in attempting to introduce radical improvements can hope to enjoy the Customs revenue, which interposes a formidable fiscal barrier in the way of reconstruction.

There is a similar situation as regards the salt tax. This also was accepted as security for various foreign loans, and in order to make the security acceptable the foreign Powers concerned insisted upon the employment of foreigners in the principal posts. As in the case of the Customs, the foreign inspectors are appointed by the Chinese Government, and the situation is in all respects similar to that existing as regards the Customs.

The Customs and the salt tax form the security for various loans to China. This, together with foreign administration, gives opportunities of interference by the Powers which they show no inclination to neglect. The way in which the situation is utilized may be illustrated by three telegrams in The Times which appeared during January of this year.

On January 14, 1922, The Times published the following in a telegram from its Peking correspondent:

It is curious to reflect that this country (China) could be rendered completely solvent and the Government provided with a substantial income almost by a stroke of the foreigner's pen, while without that stroke there must be bankruptcy, pure and simple. Despite constant civil war and political chaos, the Customs revenue consistently grows, and last year exceeded all
records by £1,000,000. The increased duties sanctioned by the Washington Conference will provide sufficient revenue to liquidate the whole foreign and domestic floating debt in a very few years, leaving the splendid salt surplus unencumbered for the Government. The difficulty is not to provide money, but to find a Government to which to entrust it. Nor is there any visible prospect of the removal of this difficulty.

I venture to think The Times would regard the difficulty as removed if the Manchu Empire were restored.

As to the "splendid salt surplus," there are two telegrams from the Peking correspondent to The Times (of January 12th and 23rd, respectively) showing what we gain by making the Peking Government artificially bankrupt. The first telegram (sent on January 10th) is as follows:

Present conditions in China are aptly illustrated by what is happening in one of the great salt revenue stations on the Yangtsze, near Chinkiang. That portion of the Chinese fleet faithful to the Central Government—the better half went over to the Canton Government long ago—has dispatched a squadron of gunboats to the salt station and notified Peking that if $3,000,000 (about £400,000) arrears of pay were not immediately forthcoming the amount would be forcibly recovered from the revenue. Meanwhile the immense salt traffic on the Yangtsze has been suspended. The Legations concerned have now sent an Idenitc Note to the Government warning it of the necessity for immediately securing the removal of the obstruction to the traffic and to the operations of the foreign collectorate.

The second telegram is equally interesting. It is as follows:

The question of interference with the Salt Gabelle is assuming a serious aspect. The Chinese squadron of gunboats referred to in my message of the 10th is still blocking the salt traffic near Chingkiang, while a new intruder in the shape of an agent of Wu-Pei-Fu [the Liberal military leader] has installed himself in the collectorate at Hankow, and is endeavouring to appropriate the receipts for his powerful master. The British, French, and Japanese Ministers accordingly have again addressed the Government, giving notice that if these irregular proceedings do not cease they will be compelled to take independent action. The Reorganization Loan of £25,000,000 is secured on the salt revenues, and interference with the foreign control of the department constitutes an infringement of the loan agreement. In various parts of China, some independent of Peking, others not, the local Tuchuns (military governors) impound the collections and materially diminish the total coming under the control of the foreign inspectorate, but the balance remaining has been so large, and protest so useless, that hitherto all concerned have considered it expedient to acquiesce. But interference at points on the Yangtsze, where naval force can be brought to bear, is another matter. The situation is interesting in view of the amiable resolutions adopted at Washington, by which the Powers would seem to have debarred themselves, in the future, from any active form of intervention in this country. In view of the extensive opposition to the Liang Shih-yi Cabinet and the present interference with the salt negotiations, the $90,000,000 (£11,000,000) loan to be secured on the salt surplus has been dropped. The problem of how to weather the new year settlement on January 28th remains unsolved.

It is a pretty game: creating artificial bankruptcy, and then inflicting punishment for the resulting anarchy. How regrettable that the Washington Conference should attempt to interfere!

It is useless to deny that the Chinese have brought these troubles upon themselves, by their inability to produce capable and honest officials. This inability has its roots in Chinese ethics, which lay stress upon a man's duty to his family rather than to the public. An official is expected to keep all his relations supplied with funds, and therefore can only be honest at the expense of filial piety. The decay of the family system is a vital condition of progress in China. All Young China realizes this, and one may hope that twenty years hence the level of honesty among officials may be not lower in China than in Europe—no very extravagant hope. But for this purpose friendly contact with Western nations is essential. If we insist upon rousing Chinese nationalism as we have roused that of India and Japan, the Chinese will begin to think that wherever they differ from Europe, they differ for the better. There is more truth in this than Europeans like to think, but it is not wholly true, and if it comes to be believed our
power for good in China will be at an end.
I have described briefly in this chapter what the Christian Powers did to China while they were able to act independently of Japan. But in modern China it is Japanese aggression that is the most urgent problem. Before considering this, however, we must deal briefly with the rise of modern Japan—a quite peculiar blend of East and West, which I hope is not prophetic of the blend to be ultimately achieved in China. But before passing to Japan, I will give a brief description of the social and political condition of modern China, without which Japan's action in China would be unintelligible.

FOOTNOTES:
[24] In 1691 the Emperor Kang Hsi issued an edict explaining his attitude towards various religions. Of Roman Catholicism he says: "As to the western doctrine which glorifies Tien Chu, the Lord of the Sky, that, too, is heterodox; but because its priests are thoroughly conversant with mathematics, the Government makes use of them—a point which you soldiers and people should understand." (Giles, op. cit. p. 252.)
[26] The Summer Palace now shown to tourists is modern, chiefly built by the Empress Dowager.
[27] There is an admirable account of this question in Chap. vii. of Sih-Gung Cheng's Modern China, Clarendon Press, 1919.
[28] A new revision has been decided upon by the Washington Conference.
[29] If you lived in a town where the burglars had obtained possession of the Town Council, they would very likely insist upon the policy of the Open Door, but you might not consider it wholly satisfactory. Such is China's situation among the Great Powers.
[30] The Times of November 26, 1921, had a leading article on Mr. Wellington Koo's suggestion, at Washington, that China ought to be allowed to recover fiscal autonomy as regards the tariff. Mr. Koo did not deal with the Customs administration, nevertheless The Times assumed that his purpose was to get the administration into the hands of the Chinese on account of the opportunities of lucrative corruption which it would afford. I wrote to The Times pointing out that they had confused the administration with the tariff, and that Mr. Koo was dealing only with the tariff. In view of the fact that they did not print either my letter or any other to the same effect, are we to conclude that their misrepresentation was deliberate and intentional? [Russ2]
Chapter IV

Modern China

The position of China among the nations of the world is quite peculiar, because in population and potential strength China is the greatest nation in the world, while in actual strength at the moment it is one of the least. The international problems raised by this situation have been brought into the forefront of world-politics by the Washington Conference. What settlement, if any, will ultimately be arrived at, it is as yet impossible to foresee. There are, however, certain broad facts and principles which no wise solution can ignore, for which I shall try to give the evidence in the course of the following chapters, but which it may be as well to state briefly at the outset. First, the Chinese, though as yet incompetent in politics and backward in economic development, have, in other respects, a civilization at least as good as our own, containing elements which the world greatly needs, and which we shall destroy at our peril. Secondly, the Powers have inflicted upon China a multitude of humiliations and disabilities, for which excuses have been found in China's misdeeds, but for which the sole real reason has been China's military and naval weakness. Thirdly, the best of the Great Powers at present, in relation to China, is America, and the worst is Japan; in the interests of China, as well as in our own larger interests, it is an immense advance that we have ceased to support Japan and have ranged ourselves on the side of America, in so far as America stands for Chinese freedom, but not when Japanese freedom is threatened. Fourthly, in the long run, the Chinese cannot escape economic domination by foreign Powers unless China becomes military or the foreign Powers become Socialistic, because the capitalist system involves in its very essence a predatory relation of the strong towards the weak, internationally as well as nationally. A strong military China would be a disaster; therefore Socialism in Europe and America affords the only ultimate solution.

After these preliminary remarks, I come to the theme of this chapter, namely, the present internal condition of China.

As everyone knows, China, after having an Emperor for forty centuries, decided, eleven years ago, to become a modern democratic republic. Many causes led up to this result. Passing over the first 3,700 years of Chinese history, we arrive at the Manchu conquest in 1644, when a warlike invader from the north succeeded in establishing himself upon the Dragon Throne. He set to work to induce Chinese men to wear pigtails and Chinese women to have big feet. After a time a statesmanlike compromise was arranged: pigtails were adopted but big feet were rejected; the new absurdity was accepted and the old one retained. This characteristic compromise shows how much England and China have in common.

The Manchu Emperors soon became almost completely Chinese, but differences of dress and manners kept the Manchus distinct from the more civilized people whom they had conquered, and the Chinese remained inwardly hostile to them. From 1840 to 1900, a series of disastrous foreign wars, culminating in the humiliation of the Boxer time, destroyed the prestige of the Imperial Family and showed all thoughtful people the need of learning from Europeans. The Taiping rebellion, which lasted for 15 years (1849-64), is thought by Putnam Weale to have diminished the population by 150 millions,[31] and was almost as terrible a business as the Great War. For a long time it seemed doubtful whether the Manchus could suppress it, and when at last they succeeded (by the help of Gordon) their energy was exhausted. The defeat of China by Japan (1894-5) and the vengeance of the Powers after the Boxer rising (1900) finally opened the eyes of all thoughtful Chinese to the need for a better and more modern government than that of the Imperial Family. But things move slowly in China, and it was not till eleven years after the Boxer movement that the revolution broke out.

The revolution of 1911, in China, was a moderate one, similar in spirit to ours of 1688. Its chief promoter, Sun Yat Sen, now at the head of the Canton Government, was supported by the Republicans, and was elected provisional President. But the Northern Army remained faithful to the dynasty, and could probably have defeated the revolutionaries. Its Commander-in-Chief, Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, hit upon a better scheme. He made peace with the revolutionaries and acknowledged the Republic, on condition that he should be the first President instead of Sun Yat Sen. Yuan Shih-k'ai was, of course, supported by the
Legations, being what is called a "strong man," i.e. a believer in blood and iron, not likely to be led astray by talk about democracy or freedom. In China, the North has always been more military and less liberal than the South, and Yuan Shih-k'ai had created out of Northern troops whatever China possessed in the way of a modern army. As he was also ambitious and treacherous, he had every quality needed for inspiring confidence in the diplomatic corps. In view of the chaos which has existed since his death, it must be admitted, however, that there was something to be said in favour of his policy and methods.

A Constituent Assembly, after enacting a provisional constitution, gave place to a duly elected Parliament, which met in April 1913 to determine the permanent constitution. Yuan soon began to quarrel with the Parliament as to the powers of the President, which the Parliament wished to restrict. The majority in Parliament was opposed to Yuan, but he had the preponderance in military strength. Under these circumstances, as was to be expected, constitutionalism was soon overthrown. Yuan made himself financially independent of Parliament (which had been duly endowed with the power of the purse) by unconstitutionally concluding a loan with the foreign banks. This led to a revolt of the South, which, however, Yuan quickly suppressed. After this, by various stages, he made himself virtually absolute ruler of China. He appointed his army lieutenants military governors of provinces, and sent Northern troops into the South. His régime might have lasted but for the fact that, in 1915, he tried to become Emperor, and was met by a successful revolt. He died in 1916—of a broken heart, it was said.

Since then there has been nothing but confusion in China. The military governors appointed by Yuan refused to submit to the Central Government when his strong hand was removed, and their troops terrorized the populations upon whom they were quartered. Ever since there has been civil war, not, as a rule, for any definite principle, but simply to determine which of various rival generals should govern various groups of provinces. There still remains the issue of North versus South, but this has lost most of its constitutional significance.

The military governors of provinces or groups of provinces, who are called Tuchuns, govern despotically in defiance of Peking, and commit depredations on the inhabitants of the districts over which they rule. They intercept the revenue, except the portions collected and administered by foreigners, such as the salt tax. They are nominally appointed by Peking, but in practice depend only upon the favour of the soldiers in their provinces. The Central Government is nearly bankrupt, and is usually unable to pay the soldiers, who live by loot and by such portions of the Tuchun's illgotten wealth as he finds it prudent to surrender to them. When any faction seemed near to complete victory, the Japanese supported its opponents, in order that civil discord might be prolonged. While I was in Peking, the three most important Tuchuns met there for a conference on the division of the spoils. They were barely civil to the President and the Prime Minister, who still officially represent China in the eyes of foreign Powers. The unfortunate nominal Government was obliged to pay to these three worthies, out of a bankrupt treasury, a sum which the newspapers stated to be nine million dollars, to secure their departure from the capital. The largest share went to Chang-tso-lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria and commonly said to be a tool of Japan. His share was paid to cover the expenses of an expedition to Mongolia, which had revolted; but no one for a moment supposed that he would undertake such an expedition, and in fact he has remained at Mukden ever since.[32]

In the extreme south, however, there has been established a Government of a different sort, for which it is possible to have some respect. Canton, which has always been the centre of Chinese radicalism, succeeded, in the autumn of 1920, in throwing off the tyranny of its Northern garrison and establishing a progressive efficient Government under the Presidency of Sun Yat Sen. This Government now embraces two provinces, Kwangtung (of which Canton is the capital) and Kwangsi. For a moment it seemed likely to conquer the whole of the South, but it has been checked by the victories of the Northern General Wu-Pei-Fu in the neighbouring province of Hunan. Its enemies allege that it cherishes designs of conquest, and wishes to unite all China under its sway.[33] In all ascertainable respects it is a Government which deserves the support of all progressive people. Professor Dewey, in articles in the New Republic, has set forth its merits, as well as the bitter enmity which it has encountered from Hong-Kong and the British generally. This opposition is partly on general principles, because
we dislike radical reform, partly because of the Cassel agreement. This agreement—of a common type in China—would have given us a virtual monopoly of the railways and mines in the province of Kwangtung. It had been concluded with the former Government, and only awaited ratification, but the change of Government has made ratification impossible. The new Government, very properly, is befriended by the Americans, and one of them, Mr. Shank, concluded an agreement with the new Government more or less similar to that which we had concluded with the old one. The American Government, however, did not support Mr. Shank, whereas the British Government did support the Cassel agreement. Meanwhile we have lost a very valuable though very iniquitous concession, merely because we, but not the Americans, prefer what is old and corrupt to what is vigorous and honest. I understand, moreover, that the Shank agreement lapsed because Mr. Shank could not raise the necessary capital.

The anarchy in China is, of course, very regrettable, and every friend of China must hope that it will be brought to an end. But it would be a mistake to exaggerate the evil, or to suppose that it is comparable in magnitude to the evils endured in Europe. China must not be compared to a single European country, but to Europe as a whole. In The Times of November 11, 1921, I notice a pessimistic article headed: "The Peril of China. A dozen rival Governments." But in Europe there are much more than a dozen Governments, and their enmities are much fiercer than those of China. The number of troops in Europe is enormously greater than in China, and they are infinitely better provided with weapons of destruction. The amount of fighting in Europe since the Armistice has been incomparably more than the amount in China during the same period. You may travel through China from end to end, and it is ten to one that you will see no signs of war. Chinese battles are seldom bloody, being fought by mercenary soldiers who take no interest in the cause for which they are supposed to be fighting. I am inclined to think that the inhabitants of China, at the present moment, are happier, on the average, than the inhabitants of Europe taken as a whole.

It is clear, I think, that political reform in China, when it becomes possible, will have to take the form of a federal constitution, allowing a very large measure of autonomy to the provinces. The division into provinces is very ancient, and provincial feeling is strong. After the revolution, a constitution more or less resembling our own was attempted, only with a President instead of a King. But the successful working of a non-federal constitution requires a homogeneous population without much local feeling, as may be seen from our own experience in Ireland. Most progressive Chinese, as far as I was able to judge, now favour a federal constitution, leaving to the Central Government not much except armaments, foreign affairs, and customs. But the difficulty of getting rid of the existing military anarchy is very great. The Central Government cannot disband the troops, because it cannot find the money to pay them. It would be necessary to borrow from abroad enough money to pay off the troops and establish them in new jobs. But it is doubtful whether any Power or Powers would make such a loan without exacting the sacrifice of the last remnants of Chinese independence. One must therefore hope that somehow the Chinese will find a way of escaping from their troubles without too much foreign assistance.

It is by no means impossible that one of the Tuchuns may become supreme, and may then make friends with the constitutionalists as the best way of consolidating his influence. China is a country where public opinion has great weight, and where the desire to be thought well of may quite possibly lead a successful militarist into patriotic courses. There are, at the moment, two Tuchuns who are more important than any of the others. These are Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu, both of whom have been already mentioned. Chang-tso-lin is supreme in Manchuria, and strong in Japanese support; he represents all that is most reactionary in China. Wu-Pei-Fu, on the other hand, is credited with liberal tendencies. He is an able general; not long ago, nominally at the bidding of Peking, he established his authority on the Yangtze and in Hunan, thereby dealing a blow to the hopes of Canton. It is not easy to see how he could come to terms with the Canton Government, especially since it has allied itself with Chang-tso-lin, but in the rest of China he might establish his authority and seek to make it permanent by being constitutional (see Appendix). If so, China might have a breathing-space, and a breathing-space is all that is needed.

The economic life of China, except in the Treaty Ports and in a few regions where there are
mines, is still wholly pre-industrial. Peking has nearly a million inhabitants, and covers an enormous area, owing to the fact that all the houses have only a ground floor and are built round a courtyard. Yet it has no trams or buses or local trains. So far as I could see, there are not more than two or three factory chimneys in the whole town. Apart from begging, trading, thieving and Government employment, people live by handicrafts. The products are exquisite and the work less monotonous than machine-minding, but the hours are long and the pay infinitesimal.

Seventy or eighty per cent. of the population of China are engaged in agriculture. Rice and tea are the chief products of the south, while wheat and other kinds of grain form the staple crops in the north.[34] The rainfall is very great in the south, but in the north it is only just sufficient to prevent the land from being a desert. When I arrived in China, in the autumn of 1920, a large area in the north, owing to drought, was afflicted with a terrible famine, nearly as bad, probably, as the famine in Russia in 1921. As the Bolsheviks were not concerned, foreigners had no hesitation in trying to bring relief. As for the Chinese, they regarded it passively as a stroke of fate, and even those who died of it shared this view.

Most of the land is in the hands of peasant proprietors, who divide their holdings among their sons, so that each man's share becomes barely sufficient to support himself and his family. Consequently, when the rainfall is less than usual, immense numbers perish of starvation. It would of course be possible, for a time, to prevent famines by more scientific methods of agriculture, and to prevent droughts and floods by afforestation. More railways and better roads would give a vastly improved market, and might greatly enrich the peasants for a generation. But in the long run, if the birth-rate is as great as is usually supposed, no permanent cure for their poverty is possible while their families continue to be so large. In China, Malthus's theory of population, according to many writers, finds full scope.[35] If so, the good done by any improvement of methods will lead to the survival of more children, involving a greater subdivision of the land, and in the end, a return to the same degree of poverty. Only education and a higher standard of life can remove the fundamental cause of these evils. And popular education, on a large scale, is of course impossible until there is a better Government and an adequate revenue. Apart even from these difficulties, there does not exist, as yet, a sufficient supply of competent Chinese teachers for a system of universal elementary education.

Apart from war, the impact of European civilization upon the traditional life of China takes two forms, one commercial, the other intellectual. Both depend upon the prestige of armaments; the Chinese would never have opened either their ports to our trade or their minds to our ideas if we had not defeated them in war. But the military beginning of our intercourse with the Middle Kingdom has now receded into the background; one is not conscious, in any class, of a strong hostility to foreigners as such. It would not be difficult to make out a case for the view that intercourse with the white races is proving a misfortune to China, but apparently this view is not taken by anyone in China except where unreasoning conservative prejudice outweighs all other considerations. The Chinese have a very strong instinct for trade, and a considerable intellectual curiosity, to both of which we appeal. Only a bare minimum of common decency is required to secure their friendship, whether privately or politically. And I think their thought is as capable of enriching our culture as their commerce of enriching our pockets.

In the Treaty Ports, Europeans and Americans live in their own quarters, with streets well paved and lighted, houses in European style, and shops full of American and English goods. There is generally also a Chinese part of the town, with narrow streets, gaily decorated shops, and the rich mixture of smells characteristic of China. Often one passes through a gate, suddenly, from one to the other; after the cheerful disordered beauty of the old town, Europe's ugly cleanliness and Sunday-go-to-meeting decency make a strange complex impression, half-love and half-hate. In the European town one finds safety, spaciousness and hygiene; in the Chinese town, romance, overcrowding and disease. In spite of my affection for China, these transitions always made me realize that I am a European; for me, the Chinese manner of life would not mean happiness. But after making all necessary deductions for the poverty and the disease, I am inclined to think that Chinese life brings more happiness to the Chinese than
English life does to us. At any rate this seemed to me to be true for the men; for the women I do not think it would be true.

Shanghai and Tientsin are white men's cities; the first sight of Shanghai makes one wonder what is the use of travelling, because there is so little change from what one is used to. Treaty Ports, each of which is a centre of European influence, exist practically all over China, not only on the sea coast. Hankow, a very important Treaty Port, is almost exactly in the centre of China. North and South China are divided by the Yangtze; East and West China are divided by the route from Peking to Canton. These two dividing lines meet at Hankow, which has long been an important strategical point in Chinese history. From Peking to Hankow there is a railway, formerly Franco-Belgian, now owned by the Chinese Government. From Wuchang, opposite Hankow on the southern bank of the river, there is to be a railway to Canton, but at present it only runs half-way, to Changsha, also a Treaty Port. The completion of the railway, together with improved docks, will greatly increase the importance of Canton and diminish that of Hong-Kong.

In the Treaty Ports commerce is the principal business; but in the lower Yangtze and in certain mining districts there are beginnings of industrialism. China produces large amounts of raw cotton, which are mostly manipulated by primitive methods; but there are a certain number of cotton-mills on modern lines. If low wages meant cheap labour for the employer, there would be little hope for Lancashire, because in Southern China the cotton is grown on the spot, the climate is damp, and there is an inexhaustible supply of industrious coolies ready to work very long hours for wages upon which an English working-man would find it literally impossible to keep body and soul together. Nevertheless, it is not the underpaid Chinese coolie whom Lancashire has to fear, and China will not become a formidable competitor until improvement in methods and education enables the Chinese workers to earn good wages. Meanwhile, in China, as in every other country, the beginnings of industry are sordid and cruel. The intellectuals wish to be told of some less horrible method by which their country may be industrialized, but so far none is in sight.

The intelligentsia in China has a very peculiar position, unlike that which it has in any other country. Hereditary aristocracy has been practically extinct in China for about 2,000 years, and for many centuries the country has been governed by the successful candidates in competitive examinations. This has given to the educated the kind of prestige elsewhere belonging to a governing aristocracy. Although the old traditional education is fast dying out, and higher education now teaches modern subjects, the prestige of education has survived, and public opinion is still ready to be influenced by those who have intellectual qualifications. The Tuchuns, many of whom, including Chang-tso-lin, have begun by being brigands,[36] are, of course, mostly too stupid and ignorant to share this attitude, but that in itself makes their régime weak and unstable. The influence of Young China—i.e. of those who have been educated either abroad or in modern colleges at home—is far greater than it would be in a country with less respect for learning. This is, perhaps, the most hopeful feature in the situation, because the number of modern students is rapidly increasing, and their outlook and aims are admirable. In another ten years or so they will probably be strong enough to regenerate China—if only the Powers will allow ten years to elapse without taking any drastic action.

It is important to try to understand the outlook and potentialities of Young China. Most of my time was spent among those Chinese who had had a modern education, and I should like to give some idea of their mentality. It seemed to me that one could already distinguish two generations: the older men, who had fought their way with great difficulty and almost in solitude out of the traditional Confucian prejudices; and the younger men, who had found modern schools and colleges waiting for them, containing a whole world of modern-minded people ready to give sympathy and encouragement in the inevitable fight against the family. The older men—men varying in age from 30 to 50—have gone through an inward and outward struggle resembling that of the rationalists of Darwin's and Mill's generation. They have had, painfully and with infinite difficulty, to free their minds from the beliefs instilled in youth, and to turn their thoughts to a new science and a new ethic. Imagine (say) Plotinus recalled from the shades and miraculously compelled to respect Mr. Henry Ford; this will
give you some idea of the centuries across which these men have had to travel in becoming European. Some of them are a little weary with the effort, their forces somewhat spent and their originality no longer creative. But this can astonish no one who realizes the internal revolution they have achieved in their own minds.

It must not be supposed that an able Chinaman, when he masters our culture, becomes purely imitative. This may happen among the second-rate Chinese, especially when they turn Christians, but it does not happen among the best. They remain Chinese, critical of European civilization even when they have assimilated it. They retain a certain crystal candour and a touching belief in the efficacy of moral forces; the industrial revolution has not yet affected their mental processes. When they become persuaded of the importance of some opinion, they try to spread it by setting forth the reasons in its favour; they do not hire the front pages of newspapers for advertising, or put up on hoardings along the railways "So-and-so's opinion is the best." In all this they differ greatly from more advanced nations, and particularly from America; it never occurs to them to treat opinions as if they were soaps. And they have no admiration for ruthlessness, or love of bustling activity without regard to its purpose. Having thrown over the prejudices in which they were brought up, they have not taken on a new set, but have remained genuinely free in their thoughts, able to consider any proposition honestly on its merits.

The younger men, however, have something more than the first generation of modern intellectuals. Having had less of a struggle, they have retained more energy and self-confidence. The candour and honesty of the pioneers survive, with more determination to be socially effective. This may be merely the natural character of youth, but I think it is more than that. Young men under thirty have often come in contact with Western ideas at a sufficiently early age to have assimilated them without a great struggle, so that they can acquire knowledge without being torn by spiritual conflicts. And they have been able to learn Western knowledge from Chinese teachers to begin with, which has made the process less difficult. Even the youngest students, of course, still have reactionary families, but they find less difficulty than their predecessors in resisting the claims of the family, and in realizing practically, not only theoretically, that the traditional Chinese reverence for the old may well be carried too far. In these young men I see the hope of China. When a little experience has taught them practical wisdom, I believe they will be able to lead Chinese opinion in the directions in which it ought to move.

There is one traditional Chinese belief which dies very hard, and that is the belief that correct ethical sentiments are more important than detailed scientific knowledge. This view is, of course, derived from the Confucian tradition, and is more or less true in a pre-industrial society. It would have been upheld by Rousseau or Dr. Johnson, and broadly speaking by everybody before the Benthamites. We, in the West, have now swung to the opposite extreme: we tend to think that technical efficiency is everything and moral purpose nothing. A battleship may be taken as the concrete embodiment of this view. When we read, say, of some new poison-gas by means of which one bomb from an aeroplane can exterminate a whole town, we have a thrill of what we fondly believe to be horror, but it is really delight in scientific skill. Science is our god; we say to it, "Though thou slay me, yet will I trust in thee." And so it slays us. The Chinese have not this defect, but they have the opposite one, of believing that good intentions are the only thing really necessary. I will give an illustration. Forsythe Sherfesee, Forestry Adviser to the Chinese Government, gave an address at the British Legation in January 1919 on "Some National Aspects of Forestry in China."[37] In this address he proves (so far as a person ignorant of forestry can judge) that large parts of China which now lie waste are suitable for forestry, that the importation of timber (e.g. for railway sleepers) which now takes place is wholly unnecessary, and that the floods which often sweep away whole districts would be largely prevented if the slopes of the mountains from which the rivers come were reafforested. Yet it is often difficult to interest even the most reforming Chinese in afforestation, because it is not an easy subject for ethical enthusiasm. Trees are planted round graves, because Confucius said they should be; if Confucianism dies out, even these will be cut down. But public-spirited Chinese students learn political theory as it is taught in our universities, and despise such humble questions as the utility of trees. After
learning all about (say) the proper relations of the two Houses of Parliament, they go home to
find that some Tuchun has dismissed both Houses, and is governing in a fashion not
considered in our text-books. Our theories of politics are only true in the West (if there); our
theories of forestry are equally true everywhere. Yet it is our theories of politics that Chinese
students are most eager to learn. Similarly the practical study of industrial processes might be
very useful, but the Chinese prefer the study of our theoretical economics, which is hardly
applicable except where industry is already developed. In all these respects, however, there is
beginning to be a marked improvement.

It is science that makes the difference between our intellectual outlook and that of the Chinese
intelligentsia. The Chinese, even the most modern, look to the white nations, especially
America, for moral maxims to replace those of Confucius. They have not yet grasped that
men's morals in the mass are the same everywhere: they do as much harm as they dare, and as
much good as they must. In so far as there is a difference of morals between us and the
Chinese, we differ for the worse, because we are more energetic, and can therefore commit
more crimes per diem. What we have to teach the Chinese is not morals, or ethical maxims
about government, but science and technical skill. The real problem for the Chinese
intelligents is to acquire Western knowledge without acquiring the mechanistic outlook.
Perhaps it is not clear what I mean by "the mechanistic outlook." I mean something which
exists equally in Imperialism, Bolshevism and the Y.M.C.A.; something which distinguishes
all these from the Chinese outlook, and which I, for my part, consider very evil. What I mean
is the habit of regarding mankind as raw material, to be moulded by our scientific
manipulation into whatever form may happen to suit our fancy. The essence of the matter,
from the point of view of the individual who has this point of view, is the cultivation of will at
the expense of perception, the fervent moral belief that it is our duty to force other people to
realize our conception of the world. The Chinese intellectual is not much troubled by
Imperialism as a creed, but is vigorously assailed by Bolshevism and the Y.M.C.A., to one or
other of which he is too apt to fall a victim, learning a belief from the one in the class-war and
the dictatorship of the communists, from the other in the mystic efficacy of cold baths and
dumb-bells. Both these creeds, in their Western adepts, involve a contempt for the rest of
mankind except as potential converts, and the belief that progress consists in the spread of a
doctrine. They both involve a belief in government and a life against Nature. This view,
though I have called it mechanistic, is as old as religion, though mechanism has given it new
and more virulent forms. The first of Chinese philosophers, Lao-Tze, wrote his book to
protest against it, and his disciple Chuang-Tze put his criticism into a fable[38]:—
Horses have hoofs to carry them over frost and snow; hair, to protect them from wind and
cold. They eat grass and drink water, and fling up their heels over the champaign. Such is the
real nature of horses. Palatial dwellings are of no use to them.

One day Po Lo appeared, saying: "I understand the management of horses."
So he branded them, and clipped them, and pared their hoofs, and put halters on them, tying
them up by the head and shackling them by the feet, and disposing them in stables, with the
result that two or three in every ten died. Then he kept them hungry and thirsty, trotting them
and galloping them, and grooming, and trimming, with the misery of the tasselled bridle
before and the fear of the knotted whip behind, until more than half of them were dead.
The potter says: "I can do what I will with clay. If I want it round, I use compasses; if
rectangular, a square."
The carpenter says: "I can do what I will with wood. If I want it curved, I use an arc; if
straight, a line."
But on what grounds can we think that the natures of clay and wood desire this application of
compasses and square, of arc and line? Nevertheless, every age extols Po Lo for his skill in
managing horses, and potters and carpenters for their skill with clay and wood. Those who
govern the Empire make the same mistake.

Although Taoism, of which Lao-Tze was the founder and Chuang-Tze the chief apostle, was
displaced by Confucianism, yet the spirit of this fable has penetrated deeply into Chinese life,
making it more urbane and tolerant, more contemplative and observant, than the fiercer life of
the West. The Chinese watch foreigners as we watch animals in the Zoo, to see whether they
"drink water and fling up their heels over the champaign," and generally to derive amusement from their curious habits. Unlike the Y.M.C.A., they have no wish to alter the habits of the foreigners, any more than we wish to put the monkeys at the Zoo into trousers and stiff shirts. And their attitude towards each other is, as a rule, equally tolerant. When they became a Republic, instead of cutting off the Emperor's head, as other nations do, they left him his title, his palace, and four million dollars a year (about £600,000), and he remains to this moment with his officials, his eunuchs and his etiquette, but without one shred of power or influence. In talking with a Chinese, you feel that he is trying to understand you, not to alter you or interfere with you. The result of his attempt may be a caricature or a panegyric, but in either case it will be full of delicate perception and subtle humour. A friend in Peking showed me a number of pictures, among which I specially remember various birds: a hawk swooping on a sparrow, an eagle clasping a big bough of a tree in his claws, water-fowl standing on one leg disconsolate in the snow. All these pictures showed that kind of sympathetic understanding which one feels also in their dealings with human beings—something which I can perhaps best describe as the antithesis of Nietzsche. This quality, unfortunately, is useless in warfare, and foreign nations are doing their best to stamp it out. But it is an infinitely valuable quality, of which our Western world has far too little. Together with their exquisite sense of beauty, it makes the Chinese nation quite extraordinarily lovable. The injury that we are doing to China is wanton and cruel, the destruction of something delicate and lovely for the sake of the gross pleasures of barbarous millionaires. One of the poems translated from the Chinese by Mr. Waley[39] is called Business Men, and it expresses, perhaps more accurately than I could do, the respects in which the Chinese are our superiors:—

Business men boast of their skill and cunning But in philosophy they are like little children. Bragging to each other of successful depredations They neglect to consider the ultimate fate of the body. What should they know of the Master of Dark Truth Who saw the wide world in a jade cup, By illumined conception got clear of heaven and earth: On the chariot of Mutation entered the Gate of Immutability?

I wish I could hope that some respect for "the Master of Dark Truth" would enter into the hearts of our apostles of Western culture. But as that is out of the question, it is necessary to seek other ways of solving the Far Eastern question.

FOOTNOTES:
[31] The Truth about China and Japan, Allen & Unwin, 1921, p. 14. On the other hand Sih-Gung Cheng (Modern China, p. 13) says that it "killed twenty million people," which is the more usual estimate, cf. China of the Chinese by E.T.C. Werner, p. 24. The extent to which the population was diminished is not accurately known, but I have no doubt that 20 millions is nearer the truth than 150 millions.
[32] In January 1922, he came to Peking to establish a more subservient Government, the dismissal of which has been ordered by Wu-Pei-Fu. A clash is imminent. See Appendix.
[33] The blame for this is put upon Sun Yat Sen, who is said to have made an alliance with Chang-tso-lin. The best element in the Canton Government was said to be represented by Sun's colleague General Cheng Chiung Ming, who is now reported to have been dismissed (The Times, April 24, 1922). These statements are apparently unfounded. See Appendix.
[34] The soya bean is rapidly becoming an important product, especially in Manchuria.
[35] There are, however, no accurate statistics as to the birth-rate or the death-rate in China, and some writers question whether the birth-rate is really very large. From a privately printed pamphlet by my friend Mr. V.K. Ting, I learn that Dr. Lennox, of the Peking Union Medical College, from a careful study of 4,000 families, found that the average number of children (dead and living) per family was 2.1, while the infant mortality was 184.1. Other investigations are quoted to show that the birth-rate near Peking is between 30 and 50. In the absence of statistics, generalizations about the population question in China must be received
with extreme caution.

[36] I repeat what everybody, Chinese or foreign, told me. Mr. Bland, per contra, describes Chang-tso-lin as a polished Confucian. Contrast p. 104 of his China, Japan and Korea with pp. 143, 146 of Coleman's The Far East Unveiled, which gives the view of everybody except Mr. Bland. Lord Northcliffe had an interview with Chang-tso-lin reported in The Times recently, but he was, of course, unable to estimate Chang-tso-lin's claims to literary culture.

[37] Printed in China in 1918, published by the Peking Leader.


Chapter V
Japan before the Restoration

For modern China, the most important foreign nation is Japan. In order to understand the part played by Japan, it is necessary to know something of that country, to which we must now turn our attention.

In reading the history of Japan, one of the most amazing things is the persistence of the same forces and the same beliefs throughout the centuries. Japanese history practically begins with a "Restoration" by no means unlike that of 1867-8. Buddhism was introduced into Japan from Korea in 552 A.D. At the same time and from the same source Chinese civilization became much better known in Japan than it had been through the occasional intercourse of former centuries. Both novelties won favour. Two Japanese students (followed later by many others) went to China in 608 A.D., to master the civilization of that country. The Japanese are an experimental nation, and before adopting Buddhism nationally they ordered one or two prominent courtiers to adopt it, with a view to seeing whether they prospered more or less than the adherents of the traditional Shinto religion. After some vicissitudes, the experiment was held to have favoured the foreign religion, which, as a Court religion, acquired more prestige than Shinto, although the latter was never ousted, and remained the chief religion of the peasantry until the thirteenth century. It is remarkable to find that, as late as the sixteenth century, Hideyoshi, who was of peasant origin, had a much higher opinion of "the way of the gods" (which is what "Shinto" means) than of Buddhism.

The object of the Restoration in 1867-8 was, at any rate in part, to restore the constitution of 645 A.D. The object of the constitution of 645 A.D. was to restore the form of government that had prevailed in the good old days. What the object was of those who established the government of the good old days, I do not profess to know. However that may be, the country before 645 A.D. was given over to feudalism and internal strife, while the power of the Mikado had sunk to a very low ebb. The Mikado had had the civil power, but had allowed great feudatories to acquire military control, so that the civil government fell into contempt. Contact with the superior civilization of China made intelligent people think that the Chinese constitution deserved imitation, along with the Chinese morals and religion. The Chinese Emperor was the Son of Heaven, so the Mikado came to be descended from the Sun Goddess. The Chinese Emperor, whenever he happened to be a vigorous man, was genuinely supreme, so the Mikado must be made so.

The similarity of the influence of China in producing the Restoration of 645 A.D. and that of Europe in producing the Restoration of 1867-8 is set forth by Murdoch as follows:

In the summer of 1863 a band of four Choshu youths were smuggled on board a British steamer by the aid of kind Scottish friends who sympathized with their endeavour to proceed to Europe for purposes of study. These, friends possibly did not know that some of the four had been protagonists in the burning down of the British Legation on Gotenyama a few months before, and they certainly could never have suspected that the real mission of the four youths was to master the secrets of Western civilization with a sole view of driving the Western barbarians from the sacred soil of Japan. Prince Ito and Marquis Inouye—for they were two of this venturesome quartette—have often told of their rapid disillusionment when they reached London, and saw these despised Western barbarians at home. On their return to Japan they at once became the apostles of a new doctrine, and their effective preaching has had much to do with the pride of place Dai Nippon now holds among the Great Powers of the world.

The two students who went to China in 608 A.D. "rendered even more illustrious service to their country perhaps than Ito and Inouye have done. For at the Revolution of 1868, the leaders of the movement harked back to the 645-650 A.D. period for a good deal of their inspiration, and the real men of political knowledge at that time were the two National Doctors."
Politically, what was done in 645 A.D. and the period immediately following was not unlike what was done in France by Louis XI and Richelieu—curbing of the great nobles and an exaltation of the sovereign, with a substitution of civil justice for military anarchy. The movement was represented by its promoters as a Restoration, probably with about the same amount of truth as in 1867. At the latter date, there was restoration so far as the power of the Mikado was concerned, but innovation as regards the introduction of Western ideas. Similarly, in 645 A.D., what was done about the Mikado was a return to the past, but what was done in the way of spreading Chinese civilization was just the opposite. There must have been, in both cases, the same curious mixture of antiquarian and reforming tendencies.

Throughout subsequent Japanese history, until the Restoration, one seems to see two opposite forces struggling for mastery over people's minds, namely the ideas of government, civilization and art derived from China on the one hand, and the native tendency to feudalism, clan government, and civil war on the other. The conflict is very analogous to that which went on in mediæval Europe between the Church, which represented ideas derived from Rome, and the turbulent barons, who were struggling to preserve the way of life of the ancient Teutons. Henry IV at Canossa, Henry II doing penance for Becket, represent the triumph of civilization over rude vigour; and something similar is to be seen at intervals in Japan.

After 645, the Mikado's Government had real power for some centuries, but gradually it fell more and more under the sway of the soldiers. So long as it had wealth (which lasted long after it ceased to have power) it continued to represent what was most civilized in Japan: the study of Chinese literature, the patronage of art, and the attempt to preserve respect for something other than brute force. But the Court nobles (who remained throughout quite distinct from the military feudal chiefs) were so degenerate and feeble, so stereotyped and unprogressive, that it would have been quite impossible for the country to be governed by them and the system they represented. In this respect they differed greatly from the mediæval Church, which no one could accuse of lack of vigour, although the vigour of the feudal aristocracy may have been even greater. Accordingly, while the Church in Europe usually defeated the secular princes, the exact opposite happened in Japan, where the Mikado and his Court sank into greater and greater contempt down to the time of the Restoration.

The Japanese have a curious passion for separating the real and the nominal Governments, leaving the show to the latter and the substance of power to the former. First the Emperors took to resigning in favour of their infant sons, and continuing to govern in reality, often from some monastery, where they had become monks. Then the Shogun, who represented the military power, became supreme, but still governed in the name of the Emperor. The word "Shogun" merely means "General"; the full title of the people whom we call "Shogun" is "Sei-i-Tai Shogun," which means "Barbarian-subduing great General"; the barbarians in question being the Ainus, the Japanese aborigines. The first to hold this office in the form which it had at most times until the Restoration was Minamoto Yoritomo, on whom the title was conferred by the Mikado in 1192. But before long the Shogun became nearly as much of a figure-head as the Mikado. Custom confined the Shogunate to the Minamoto family, and the actual power was wielded by Regents in the name of the Shogun. This lasted until near the end of the sixteenth century, when it happened that Iyeyasu, the supreme military commander of his day, belonged to the Minamoto family, and was therefore able to assume the office of Shogun himself. He and his descendants held the office until it was abolished at the Restoration. The Restoration, however, did not put an end to the practice of a real Government behind the nominal one. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet are presented to the world as the Japanese Government, but the real Government is the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, and their successors, of whom I shall have more to say in the next chapter.

What the Japanese made of Buddhism reminds one in many ways of what the Teutonic nations made of Christianity. Buddhism and Christianity, originally, were very similar in spirit. They were both religions aiming at the achievement of holiness by renunciation of the world. They both ignored politics and government and wealth, for which they substituted the future life as what was of real importance. They were both religions of peace, teaching gentleness and non-resistance. But both had to undergo great transformations in adapting themselves to the instincts of warlike barbarians. In Japan, a multitude of sects arose, teaching
doctrines which differed in many ways from Mahayana orthodoxy. Buddhism became national and militaristic; the abbots of great monasteries became important feudal chieftains, whose monks constituted an army which was ready to fight on the slightest provocation. Sieges of monasteries and battles with monks are of constant occurrence in Japanese history. The Japanese, as every one knows, decided, after about 100 years' experience of Western missionaries and merchants, to close their country completely to foreigners, with the exception of a very restricted and closely supervised commerce with the Dutch. The first arrival of the Portuguese in Japan was in or about the year 1543, and their final expulsion was in the year 1639. What happened between these two dates is instructive for the understanding of Japan. The first Portuguese brought with them Christianity and fire-arms, of which the Japanese tolerated the former for the sake of the latter. At that time there was virtually no Central Government in the country, and the various Daimyo were engaged in constant wars with each other. The south-western island, Kyushu, was even more independent of such central authority as existed than were the other parts of Japan, and it was in this island (containing the port of Nagasaki) that the Portuguese first landed and were throughout chiefly active. They traded from Macao, bringing merchandise, match-locks and Jesuits, as well as artillery on their larger vessels. It was found that they attached importance to the spread of Christianity, and some of the Daimyo, in order to get their trade and their guns, allowed themselves to be baptized by the Jesuits. The Portuguese of those days seem to have been genuinely more anxious to make converts than to extend their trade; when, later on, the Japanese began to object to missionaries while still desiring trade, neither the Portuguese nor the Spaniards could be induced to refrain from helping the Fathers. However, all might have gone well if the Portuguese had been able to retain the monopoly which had been granted to them by a Papal Bull. Their monopoly of trade was associated with a Jesuit monopoly of missionary activity. But from 1592 onward, the Spaniards from Manila competed with the Portuguese from Macao, and the Dominican and Franciscan missionaries, brought by the Spaniards, competed with the Jesuit missionaries brought by the Portuguese. They quarrelled furiously, even at times when they were suffering persecution; and the Japanese naturally believed the accusations that each side brought against the other. Moreover, when they were shown maps displaying the extent of the King of Spain's dominions, they became alarmed for their national independence. In the year 1596, a Spanish ship, the San Felipe, on its way from Manila to Acapulco, was becalmed off the coast of Japan. The local Daimyo insisted on sending men to tow it into his harbour, and gave them instructions to run it aground on a sandbank, which they did. He thereupon claimed the whole cargo, valued at 600,000 crowns. However, Hideyoshi, who was rapidly acquiring supreme power in Japan, thought this too large a windfall for a private citizen, and had the Spanish pilot interviewed by a man named Masuda. The pilot, after trying reason in vain, attempted intimidation. He produced a map of the world, and on it pointed out the vast extent of the dominions of Philip II. Thereupon Masuda asked him how it was so many countries had been brought to acknowledge the sway of a single man.... "Our Kings," said this outspoken seaman, "begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer religieux who induce the people to embrace our religion, and when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who combine with the new Christians, and then our Kings have not much trouble in accomplishing the rest."[44]

As Spain and Portugal were at this time both subject to Philip II, the Portuguese also suffered from the suspicions engendered by this speech. Moreover, the Dutch, who were at war with Spain, began to trade with Japan, and to tell all they knew against Jesuits, Dominicans, Franciscans, and Papists generally. A breezy Elizabethan sea captain, Will Adams, was wrecked in Japan, and on being interrogated naturally gave a good British account of the authors of the Armada. As the Japanese had by this time mastered the use and manufacture of fire-arms, they began to think that they had nothing more to learn from Christian nations. Meanwhile, a succession of three great men—Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Iyeyasu—had succeeded in unifying Japan, destroying the quasi-independence of the feudal nobles, and establishing that reign of internal peace which lasted until the Restoration—period of nearly two and a half centuries. It was possible, therefore, for the Central Government to enforce
whatever policy it chose to adopt with regard to the foreigners and their religion. The Jesuits and the Friars between them had made a considerable number of converts in Japan, probably about 300,000. Most of these were in the island of Kyushu, the last region to be subdued by Hideyoshi. They tended to disloyalty, not only on account of their Christianity, but also on account of their geographical position. It was in this region that the revolt against the Shogun began in 1667, and Satsuma, the chief clan in the island of Kyushu, has had great power in the Government ever since the Restoration, except during its rebellion of 1877. It is hard to disentangle what belongs to Christianity and what to mere hostility to the Central Government in the movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However that may be, Iyeyasu decided to persecute the Christians vigorously, if possible without losing the foreign trade. His successors were even more anti-Christian and less anxious for trade. After an abortive revolt in 1637, Christianity was stamped out, and foreign trade was prohibited in the most vigorous terms:—

So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold as to come to Japan, and let all know that if King Philip himself, or even the very God of the Christians, or the great Shaka contravene this prohibition, they shall pay for it with their heads.[45]

The persecution of Christians, though it was ruthless and exceedingly cruel, was due, not to religious intolerance, but solely to political motives. There was reason to fear that the Christians might side with the King of Spain if he should attempt to conquer Japan; and even if no foreign power intervened, there was reason to fear rebellions of Christians against the newly established central power. Economic exploitation, in the modern sense of the word, did not yet exist apart from political domination, and the Japanese would have welcomed trade if there had been no danger of conquest. They seem to have overrated the power of Spain, which certainly could not have conquered them. Japanese armies were, in those days, far larger than the armies of Europe: the Japanese had learnt the use of fire-arms; and their knowledge of strategy was very great. Kyoto, the capital, was one of the largest cities in the world, having about a million inhabitants. The population of Japan was probably greater than that of any European State. It would therefore have been possible, without much trouble, to resist any expedition that Europe could have sent against Japan. It would even have been easy to conquer Manila, as Hideyoshi at one time thought of doing. But we can well understand how terrifying would be a map of the world showing the whole of North and South America as belonging to Philip II. Moreover the Japanese Government sent pretended converts to Europe, where they became priests, had audience of the Pope, penetrated into the inmost councils of Spain, and mastered all the meditated villainies of European Imperialism. These spies, when they came home and laid their reports before the Government, naturally increased its fears. The Japanese, therefore, decided to have no further intercourse with the white men. And whatever may be said against this policy, I cannot feel convinced that it was unwise. For over two hundred years, until the coming of Commodore Perry’s squadron from the United States in 1853, Japan enjoyed complete peace and almost complete stagnation—the only period of either in Japanese history. It then became necessary to learn fresh lessons in the use of fire-arms from Western nations, and to abandon the exclusive policy until they were learnt. When they have been learnt, perhaps we shall see another period of isolation.

FOOTNOTES:
[40] The best book known to me on early Japan is Murdoch's History of Japan, The volume dealing with the earlier period is published by Kegan Paul, 1910. The chronologically later volume was published earlier; its title is: A History of Japan during the Century of Early Foreign Intercourse (1542—1651), by James Murdoch M.A. in collaboration with Isoh Yamagata. Kobe, office of the Japan Chronicle, 1903. I shall allude to these volumes as Murdoch I and Murdoch II respectively.
[42] Ibid., II. pp. 375 ff.
[43]
Murdoch I. p. 147. [44]
Murdoch, II, p. 288. [45]
Murdoch II, p. 667.
Russell, Bertrand. The Problem of China [ID D5122]. (6)
Chapter VI
Modern Japan
The modern Japanese nation is unique, not only in this age, but in the history of the world. It combines elements which most Europeans would have supposed totally incompatible, and it has realized an original plan to a degree hardly known in human affairs. The Japan which now exists is almost exactly that which was intended by the leaders of the Restoration in 1867. Many unforeseen events have happened in the world: American has risen and Russia has fallen, China has become a Republic and the Great War has shattered Europe. But throughout all these changes the leading statesmen of Japan have gone along the road traced out for them at the beginning of the Meiji era, and the nation has followed them with ever-increasing faithfulness. One single purpose has animated leaders and followers alike: the strengthening and extension of the Empire. To realize this purpose a new kind of policy has been created, combining the sources of strength in modern America with those in Rome at the time of the Punic Wars, uniting the material organization and scientific knowledge of pre-war Germany with the outlook on life of the Hebrews in the Book of Joshua. The transformation of Japan since 1867 is amazing, and people have been duly amazed by it. But what is still more amazing is that such an immense change in knowledge and in way of life should have brought so little change in religion and ethics, and that such change as it has brought in these matters should have been in a direction opposite to that which would have been naturally expected. Science is supposed to tend to rationalism; yet the spread of scientific knowledge in Japan has synchronized with a great intensification of Mikado-Worship, the most anachronistic feature in the Japanese civilization. For sociology, for social psychology, and for political theory, Japan is an extraordinarily interesting country. The synthesis of East and West which has been effected is of a most peculiar kind. There is far more of the East than appears on the surface; but there is everything of the West that tends to national efficiency. How far there is a genuine fusion of Eastern and Western elements may be doubted; the nervous excitability of the people suggests something strained and artificial in their way of life, but this may possibly be a merely temporary phenomenon. Throughout Japanese politics since the Restoration, there are two separate strands, one analogous to that of Western nations, especially pre-war Germany, the other inherited from the feudal age, which is more analogous to the politics of the Scottish Highlands down to 1745. It is no part of my purpose to give a history of modern Japan; I wish only to give an outline of the forces which control events and movements in that country, with such illustrations as are necessary. There are many good books on Japanese politics; the one that I have found most informative is McLaren's Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era 1867-1912 (Allen and Unwin, 1916). For a picture of Japan as it appeared in the early years of the Meiji era, Lafcadio Hearn is of course invaluable; his book Japan, An Interpretation shows his dawning realization of the grim sides of the Japanese character, after the cherry-blossom business has lost its novelty. I shall not have much to say about cherry-blossom; it was not flowering when I was in Japan. Before, 1867, Japan was a feudal federation of clans, in which the Central Government was in the hands of the Shogun, who was the head of his own clan, but had by no means undisputed sway over the more powerful of the other clans. There had been various dynasties of Shoguns at various times, but since the seventeenth century the Shogunate had been in the Tokugawa clan. Throughout the Tokugawa Shogunate, except during its first few years, Japan had been closed to foreign intercourse, except for a strictly limited commerce with the Dutch. The modern era was inaugurated by two changes: first, the compulsory opening of the country to Western trade; secondly, the transference of power from the Tokugawa clan to the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, who have governed Japan ever since. It is impossible to understand Japan or its politics and possibilities without realizing the nature of the governing forces and their roots in the feudal system of the former age. I will therefore first outline these internal movements, before coming to the part which Japan has played in international affairs. What happened, nominally, in 1867 was that the Mikado was restored to power, after having been completely eclipsed by the Shogun since the end of the twelfth century. During this long
period, the Mikado seems to have been regarded by the common people with reverence as a holy personage, but he was allowed no voice in affairs, was treated with contempt by the Shogun, was sometimes deposed if he misbehaved, and was often kept in great poverty. Of so little importance was the Imperial person in the days of early foreign intercourse that the Jesuits hardly knew of the Emperor's existence. They seem to have thought of him as a Japanese counterpart of the Pope of Rome, except that he had no aspirations for temporal power. The Dutch writers likewise were in the habit of referring to the Shogun as "His Majesty," and on their annual pilgrimage from Dashima to Yedo, Kyoto (where the Mikado lived) was the only city which they were permitted to examine freely. The privilege was probably accorded by the Tokugawa to show the foreigners how lightly the Court was regarded. Commodore Perry delivered to the Shogun in Yedo the autograph letter to the Emperor of Japan, from the President of the United States, and none of the Ambassadors of the Western Powers seem to have entertained any suspicion that in dealing with the authorities in Yedo they were not approaching the throne.

In the light of these facts, some other explanation of the relations between the Shogunate and the Imperial Court must be sought than that which depends upon the claim now made by Japanese historians of the official type, that the throne, throughout this whole period, was divinely preserved by the Heavenly Gods.[46]

What happened, in outline, seems to have been a combination of very different forces. There were antiquarians who observed that the Mikado had had real power in the tenth century, and who wished to revert to the ancient customs. There were patriots who were annoyed with the Shogun for yielding to the pressure of the white men and concluding commercial treaties with them. And there were the western clans, which had never willingly submitted to the authority of the Shogun. To quote McLaren once more (p. 33):—

The movement to restore the Emperor was coupled with a form of Chauvinism or intense nationalism which may be summed up in the expression "Exalt the Emperor! Away with the barbarians!" (Kinno! Joi!) From this it would appear that the Dutch scholars' work in enlightening the nation upon the subject of foreign scientific attainments was anathema, but a conclusion of that kind must not be hastily arrived at. The cry, "Away with the barbarians!" was directed against Perry and the envoys of other foreign Powers, but there was nothing in that slogan which indicates a general unwillingness to emulate the foreigners' achievements in armaments or military tactics. In fact, for a number of years previous to 1853, Satsuma and Choshu and other western clans had been very busily engaged in manufacturing guns and practising gunnery: to that extent, at any rate, the discoveries of the students of European sciences had been deliberately used by those men who were to be foremost in the Restoration. This passage gives the key to the spirit which has animated modern Japan down to the present day.

The Restoration was, to a greater extent than is usually realized in the West, a conservative and even reactionary movement. Professor Murdoch, in his authoritative History of Japan,[47] says:—

In the interpretation of this sudden and startling development most European writers and critics show themselves seriously at fault. Even some of the more intelligent among them find the solution of this portentous enigma in the very superficial and facile formula of "imitation." But the Japanese still retain their own unit of social organization, which is not the individual, as with us, but the family. Furthermore, the resemblance of the Japanese administrative system, both central and local, to certain European systems is not the result of imitation, or borrowing, or adaptation. Such resemblance is merely an odd and fortuitous resemblance. When the statesmen who overthrew the Tokugawa régime in 1868, and abolished the feudal system in 1871, were called upon to provide the nation with a new equipment of administrative machinery, they did not go to Europe for their models. They simply harked back for some eleven or twelve centuries in their own history and resuscitated the administrative machinery that had first been installed in Japan by the genius of Fujiwara Kamatari and his coadjutors in 645 A.D., and more fully supplemented and organized in the succeeding fifty or sixty years. The present Imperial Cabinet of ten Ministers, with their departments and departmental staff of officials, is a modified revival of the Eight Boards
adapted from China and established in the seventh century.... The present administrative system is indeed of alien provenance; but it was neither borrowed nor adapted a generation ago, nor borrowed nor adapted from Europe. It was really a system of hoary antiquity that was revived to cope with pressing modern exigencies.

The outcome was that the clans of Satsuma and Choshu acquired control of the Mikado, made his exaltation the symbol of resistance to the foreigner (with whom the Shogun had concluded unpopular treaties), and secured the support of the country by being the champions of nationalism. Under extraordinarily able leaders, a policy was adopted which has been pursued consistently ever since, and has raised Japan from being the helpless victim of Western greed to being one of the greatest Powers in the world. Feudalism was abolished, the Central Government was made omnipotent, a powerful army and navy were created, China and Russia were successively defeated, Korea was annexed and a protectorate established over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, industry and commerce were developed, universal compulsory education instituted; and worship of the Mikado firmly established by teaching in the schools and by professorial patronage of historical myths. The artificial creation of Mikado-worship is one of the most interesting features of modern Japan, and a model to all other States as regards the method of preventing the growth of rationalism. There is a very instructive little pamphlet by Professor B.H. Chamberlain, who was Professor of Japanese and philosophy at Tokyo, and had a knowledge of Japanese which few Europeans had equalled. His pamphlet is called The Invention of a New Religion, and is published by the Rationalist Press Association. He points out that, until recent times, the religion of Japan was Buddhism, to the practical exclusion of every other. There had been, in very ancient times, a native religion called Shinto, and it had lingered on obscurely. But it is only during the last forty years or so that Shinto has been erected into a State religion, and has been reconstructed so as to suit modern requirements.[48] It is, of course, preferable to Buddhism because it is native and national; it is a tribal religion, not one which aims at appealing to all mankind. Its whole purpose, as it has been developed by modern statesmen, is to glorify Japan and the Mikado. Professor Chamberlain points out how little reverence there was for the Mikado until some time after the Restoration:—

The sober fact is that no nation probably has ever treated its sovereigns more cavalierly than the Japanese have done, from the beginning of authentic history down to within the memory of living men. Emperors have been deposed, emperors have been assassinated; for centuries every succession to the throne was the signal for intrigues and sanguinary broils. Emperors have been exiled; some have been murdered in exile.... For long centuries the Government was in the hands of Mayors of the Palace, who substituted one infant sovereign for another, generally forcing each to abdicate as he approached man's estate. At one period, these Mayors of the Palace left the Descendant of the Sun in such distress that His Imperial Majesty and the Imperial Princes were obliged to gain a livelihood by selling their autographs! Nor did any great party in the State protest against this condition of affairs. Even in the present reign (that of Meiji)—the most glorious in Japanese history—there have been two rebellions, during one of which a rival Emperor was set up in one part of the country, and a Republic proclaimed in another.

This last sentence, though it states sober historical fact, is scarcely credible to those who only know twentieth-century Japan. The spread of superstition has gone pari passu with the spread of education, and a revolt against the Mikado is now unthinkable. Time and again, in the midst of political strife, the Mikado has been induced to intervene, and instantly the hottest combatants have submitted abjectly. Although there is a Diet, the Mikado is an absolute ruler—as absolute as any sovereign ever has been.

The civilization of Japan, before the Restoration, came from China. Religion, art, writing, philosophy and ethics, everything was copied from Chinese models. Japanese history begins in the fifth century A.D., whereas Chinese history goes back to about 2,000 B.C., or at any rate to somewhere in the second millennium B.C. This was galling to Japanese pride, so an early history was invented long ago, like the theory that the Romans were descended from Æneas. To quote Professor Chamberlain again:—

The first glimmer of genuine Japanese history dates from the fifth century after Christ, and
even the accounts of what happened in the sixth century must be received with caution. Japanese scholars know this as well as we do; it is one of the certain results of investigation. But the Japanese bureaucracy does not desire to have the light let in on this inconvenient circumstance. While granting a dispensation re the national mythology, properly so called, it exacts belief in every iota of the national historic legends. Woe to the native professor who strays from the path of orthodoxy. His wife and children (and in Japan every man, however young, has a wife and children) will starve. From the late Prince Ito's grossly misleading Commentary on the Japanese Constitution down to school compendiums, the absurd dates are everywhere insisted upon.

This question of fictitious early history might be considered unimportant, like the fact that, with us, parsons have to pretend to believe the Bible, which some people think innocuous. But it is part of the whole system, which has a political object, to which free thought and free speech are ruthlessly sacrificed. As this same pamphlet says:—

Shinto, a primitive nature cult, which had fallen into discredit, was taken out of its cupboard and dusted. The common people, it is true, continued to place their affections on Buddhism, the popular festivals were Buddhist; Buddhist also the temples where they buried their dead. The governing class determined to change all this. They insisted on the Shinto doctrine that the Mikado descends in direct succession from the native Goddess of the Sun, and that He himself is a living God on earth who justly claims the absolute fealty of his subjects. Such things as laws and constitutions are but free gifts on His part, not in any sense popular rights. Of course, the ministers and officials, high and low, who carry on His government, are to be regarded not as public servants, but rather as executants of supreme—one might say supernatural—authority. Shinto, because connected with the Imperial family, is to be alone honoured.

All this is not mere theorizing; it is the practical basis of Japanese politics. The Mikado, after having been for centuries in the keeping of the Tokugawa Shoguns, was captured by the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, and has been in their keeping ever since. They were represented politically by five men, the Genro or Elder Statesmen, who are sometimes miscalled the Privy Council. Only two still survive. The Genro have no constitutional existence; they are merely the people who have the ear of the Mikado. They can make him say whatever they wish; therefore they are omnipotent. It has happened repeatedly that they have had against them the Diet and the whole force of public opinion; nevertheless they have invariably been able to enforce their will, because they could make the Mikado speak, and no one dare oppose the Mikado. They do not themselves take office; they select the Prime Minister and the Ministers of War and Marine, and allow them to bear the blame if anything goes wrong. The Genro are the real Government of Japan, and will presumably remain so until the Mikado is captured by some other clique.

From a patriotic point of view, the Genro have shown very great wisdom in the conduct of affairs. There is reason to think that if Japan were a democracy its policy would be more Chauvinistic than it is. Apologists of Japan, such as Mr. Bland, are in the habit of telling us that there is a Liberal anti-militarist party in Japan, which is soon going to dominate foreign policy. I see no reason to believe this. Undoubtedly there is a strong movement for increasing the power of the Diet and making the Cabinet responsible to it; there is also a feeling that the Ministers of War and Marine ought to be responsible to the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, not only to the Mikado directly.[49] But democracy in Japan does not mean a diminution of Chauvinism in foreign policy. There is a small Socialist party which is genuinely anti-Chauvinist and anti-militarist; this party, probably, will grow as Japanese industrialism grows. But so-called Japanese Liberals are just as Chauvinistic as the Government, and public opinion is more so. Indeed there have been occasions when the Genro, in spite of popular fury, has saved the nation from mistakes which it would certainly have committed if the Government had been democratic. One of the most interesting of these occasions was the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, after the Sino-Japanese war, which deserves to be told as illustrative of Japanese politics.[50]

In 1905, after the battles of Tsushima and Mukden, it became clear to impartial observers that Russia could accomplish nothing further at sea, and Japan could accomplish nothing further
on land. The Russian Government was anxious to continue the war, having gradually accumulated men and stores in Manchuria, and greatly improved the working of the Siberian railway. The Japanese Government, on the contrary, knew that it had already achieved all the success it could hope for, and that it would be extremely difficult to raise the loans required for a prolongation of the war. Under these circumstances, Japan appealed secretly to President Roosevelt requesting his good offices for the restoration of peace. President Roosevelt therefore issued invitations to both belligerents to a peace conference. The Russian Government, faced by a strong peace party and incipient revolution, dared not refuse the invitation, especially in view of the fact that the sympathies of neutrals were on the whole with Japan. Japan, being anxious for peace, led Russia to suppose that Japan's demands would be so excessive as to alienate the sympathy of the world and afford a complete answer to the peace party in Russia. In particular, the Japanese gave out that they would absolutely insist upon an indemnity. The Government had in fact resolved, from the first, not to insist on an indemnity, but this was known to very few people in Japan, and to no one outside Japan. The Russians, believing that the Japanese would not give way about the indemnity, showed themselves generous as regards all other Japanese demands. To their horror and consternation, when they had already packed up and were just ready to break up the conference, the Japanese announced (as they had from the first intended to do) that they accepted the Russian concessions and would waive the claim to an indemnity. Thus the Russian Government and the Japanese people were alike furious, because they had been tricked—the former in the belief that it could yield everything except the indemnity without bringing peace, the latter in the belief that the Government would never give way about the indemnity. In Russia there was revolution; in Japan there were riots, furious diatribes in the Press, and a change of Government—of the nominal Government, that is to say, for the Genro continued to be the real power throughout. In this case, there is no doubt that the decision of the Genro to make peace was the right one from every point of view; there is also very little doubt that a peace advantageous to Japan could not have been made without trickery. Foreigners unacquainted with Japan, knowing that there is a Diet in which the Lower House is elected, imagine that Japan is at least as democratic as pre-war Germany. This is a delusion. It is true that Marquis Ito, who framed the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1889, took Germany for his model, as the Japanese have always done in all their Westernizing efforts, except as regards the Navy, in which Great Britain has been copied. But there were many points in which the Japanese Constitution differed from that of the German Empire. To begin with, the Reichstag was elected by manhood suffrage, whereas in Japan there is a property qualification which restricts the franchise to about 25 per cent of the adult males. This, however, is a small matter compared to the fact that the Mikado's power is far less limited than that of the Kaiser was. It is true that Japan does not differ from pre-war Germany in the fact that Ministers are not responsible to the Diet, but to the Emperor, and are responsible severally, not collectively. The War Minister must be a General, the Minister of Marine must be an Admiral; they take their orders, not from the Prime Minister, but from the military and naval authorities respectively, who, of course, are under the control of the Mikado. But in Germany the Reichstag had the power of the purse, whereas in Japan, if the Diet refuses to pass the Budget, the Budget of the previous year can be applied, and when the Diet is not sitting, laws can be enacted temporarily by Imperial decree—a provision which had no analogue in the German Constitution. The Constitution having been granted by the Emperor of his free grace, it is considered impious to criticize it or to suggest any change in it, since this would imply that His Majesty's work was not wholly perfect. To understand the Constitution, it is necessary to read it in conjunction with the authoritative commentary of Marquis Ito, which was issued at the same time. Mr. Coleman very correctly summarizes the Constitution as follows[51]:—

"By reigned over and governed," wrote Marquis Ito in his Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan, "it is meant that the Emperor on His Throne combines in Himself the Sovereignty of the State and the Government of the country and of His subjects."
Article 3 of the Constitution states that "the Emperor is sacred and inviolate." Marquis Ito's comment in explanation of this is peculiarly Japanese. He says, "The Sacred Throne was established at the time when the heavens and earth became separated. The Empire is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; He is pre-eminent above all His subjects. He must be reverenced and is inviolable. He has, indeed, to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no power to hold Him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall He neither be made a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion."

Through the Constitution of Japan the Japanese Emperor exercises the legislative power, the executive power, and the judiciary power. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, prorogues, and dissolves it. When the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial ordinances may be issued in place of laws. The Emperor has supreme control of the Army and Navy, declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties; orders amnesty, pardon and commutation of punishments.

As to the Ministers of State, the Constitution of Japan, Article 55, says: "The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it."

Ito's commentary on this article indicates his intention in framing it. "When a Minister of State errs in the discharge of his functions, the power of deciding upon his responsibilities belongs to the Sovereign of the State: he alone can dismiss a Minister who has appointed him. Who then is it, except the Sovereign, that can appoint, dismiss, and punish a Minister of State? The appointment and dismissal of them having been included by the Constitution in the sovereign power of the Emperor, it is only a legitimate consequence that the power of deciding as to the responsibility of Ministers is withheld from the Diet. But the Diet may put questions to the Ministers and demand open answers from them before the public, and it may also present addresses to the Sovereign setting forth its opinions.

"The Minister President of State is to make representations to the Emperor on matters of State, and to indicate, according to His pleasure, the general course of the policy of the State, every branch of the administration being under control of the said Minister. The compass of his duties is large, and his responsibilities cannot but be proportionately great. As to the other Ministers of State, they are severally held responsible for the matters within their respective competency; there is no joint responsibility among them in regard to such matters. For, the Minister President and the other Ministers of State, being alike personally appointed by the Emperor, the proceedings of each one of them are, in every respect, controlled by the will of the Emperor, and the Minister President himself has no power of control over the posts occupied by other Ministers, while the latter ought not to be dependent upon the former. In some countries, the Cabinet is regarded as constituting a corporate body, and the Ministers are not held to take part in the conduct of the Government each one in an individual capacity, but joint responsibility is the rule. The evil of such a system is that the power of party combination will ultimately overrule the supreme power of the Sovereign. Such a state of things can never be approved of according to our Constitution."

In spite of the small powers of the Diet, it succeeded, in the first four years of its existence (1890-94), in causing some annoyance to the Government. Until 1894, the policy of Japan was largely controlled by Marquis Ito, who was opposed to militarism and Chauvinism. The statesmen of the first half of the Meiji era were concerned mainly with introducing modern education and modern social organization; they wished to preserve Japanese independence vis-à-vis the Western Powers, but did not aim, for the time being, at imperialist expansion on their own account. Ito represented this older school of Restoration statesmen. Their ideas of statecraft were in the main derived from the Germany of the 'eighties, which was kept by Bismarck from undue adventurousness. But when the Diet proved difficult to manage, they reverted to an earlier phase of Bismarck's career for an example to imitate. The Prussian Landtag (incredible as it may seem) was vigorously obstreperous at the time when Bismarck first rose to power, but he tamed it by glutting the nation with military glory in the wars against Austria and France. Similarly, in 1894, the Japanese Government embarked on war against China, and instantly secured the enthusiastic support of the hitherto rebellious Diet. From that day to this, the Japanese Government has never been vigorously opposed except for
its good deeds (such as the Treaty of Portsmouth); and it has atoned for these by abundant international crimes, which the nation has always applauded to the echo. Marquis Ito was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1894. He was afterwards again opposed to the new policy of predatory war, but was powerless to prevent it.[52] His opposition, however, was tiresome, until at last he was murdered in Korea.

Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, Japan has pursued a consistent career of imperialism, with quite extraordinary success. The nature and fruits of that career I shall consider in the next two chapters. For the time being, it has arrested whatever tendency existed towards the development of democracy; the Diet is quite as unimportant as the English Parliament was in the time of the Tudors. Whether the present system will continue for a long time, it is impossible to guess. An unsuccessful foreign war would probably destroy not only the existing system, but the whole unity and morale of the nation: I do not believe that Japan would be as firm in defeat as Germany has proved to be. Diplomatic failure, without war, would probably produce a more Liberal regime, without revolution. There is, however, one very explosive element in Japan, and that is industrialism. It is impossible for Japan to be a Great Power without developing her industry, and in fact everything possible is done to increase Japanese manufactures. Moreover, industry is required to absorb the growing population, which cannot emigrate to English-speaking regions, and will not emigrate to the mainland of Asia because Chinese competition is too severe. Therefore the only way to support a larger population is to absorb it into industrialism, manufacturing goods for export as a means of purchasing food abroad. Industrialism in Japan requires control of China, because Japan contains hardly any of the raw materials of industry, and cannot obtain them sufficiently cheaply or securely in open competition with America and Europe. Also dependence upon imported food requires a strong navy. Thus the motives for imperialism and navalism in Japan are very similar to those that have prevailed in England. But this policy requires high taxation, while successful competition in neutral markets requires—or rather, is thought to require—starvation wages and long hours for operatives. In the cotton industry of Osaka, for example, most of the work is done by girls under fourteen, who work eleven hours a day and got, in 1916, an average daily wage of 5d.[53] Labour organization is in its infancy, and so is Socialism;[54] but both are certain to spread if the number of industrial workers increases without a very marked improvement in hours and wages. Of course the very rigidity of the Japanese policy, which has given it its strength, makes it incapable of adjusting itself to Socialism and Trade Unionism, which are vigorously persecuted by the Government. And on the other hand Socialism and Trade Unionism cannot accept Mikado-worship and the whole farrago of myth upon which the Japanese State depends.[55] There is therefore a likelihood, some twenty or thirty years hence—assuming a peaceful and prosperous development in the meantime—of a very bitter class conflict between the proletarians on the one side and the employers and bureaucrats on the other. If this should happen to synchronize with agrarian discontent, it would be impossible to foretell the issue.

The problems facing Japan are therefore very difficult. To provide for the growing population it is necessary to develop industry; to develop industry it is necessary to control Chinese raw materials; to control Chinese raw materials it is necessary to go against the economic interests of America and Europe; to do this successfully requires a large army and navy, which in turn involve great poverty for wage-earners. And expanding industry with poverty for wage-earners means growing discontent, increase of Socialism, dissolution of filial piety and Mikado-worship in the poorer classes, and therefore a continually greater and greater menace to the whole foundation on which the fabric of the State is built. From without, Japan is threatened with the risk of war against America or of a revival of China. From within, there will be, before long, the risk of proletarian revolution.

From all these dangers, there is only one escape, and that is a diminution of the birth-rate. But such an idea is not merely abhorrent to the militarists as diminishing the supply of cannon-fodder; it is fundamentally opposed to Japanese religion and morality, of which patriotism and filial piety are the basis. Therefore if Japan is to emerge successfully, a much more intense Westernizing must take place, involving not only mechanical processes and knowledge of bare facts, but ideals and religion and general outlook on life. There must be
free thought, scepticism, diminution in the intensity of herd-instinct. Without these, the
population question cannot be solved; and if that remains unsolved, disaster is sooner or later
inevitable.

FOOTNOTES:


[48] "What popular Shinto, as expounded by its village priests in the old time, was we simply do
not know. Our carefully selected and edited official edition of Shinto is certainly not true
aboriginal Shinto as practised in Yamato before the introduction of Buddhism and Chinese
culture, and many plausible arguments which disregard that indubitable fact lose much of
their weight." (Murdoch, I, p. 173 n.)

[49] The strength of this movement may, however, be doubted. Murdoch (op. cit. i, p. 162) says:
"At present, 1910, the War Office and Admiralty are, of all Ministries, by far the strongest in
the Empire. When a party Government does by any strange hap make its appearance on the
political stage, the Ministers of War and of Marine can afford to regard its advent with the
utmost insouciance. For the most extreme of party politicians readily and unhesitatingly admit
that the affairs of the Army and Navy do not fall within the sphere of party politics, but are
the exclusive concern of the Commander-in-Chief, his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of
Japan. On none in the public service of Japan are titles of nobility, high rank, and still more
substantial emoluments showered with a more liberal hand than upon the great captains and
the great sailors of the Empire. In China, on the other hand, the military man is, if not a
pariah, at all events an exceptional barbarian, whom policy makes it advisable to treat with a
certain amount of gracious, albeit semi-contemptuous, condescension."

[50] The following account is taken from McLaren, op. cit. chaps. xii. and xiii.


[53] Coleman, op. cit. chap. xxxv.

[54] See an invaluable pamphlet, "The Socialist and Labour Movements in Japan," published by
the Japan Chronicle, 1921, for an account of what is happening in this direction.

[55] The Times of February 7, 1922, contains a telegram from its correspondent in Tokyo, à
propos of the funeral of Prince Yamagata, Chief of the Genro, to the following effect:—
"To-day a voice was heard in the Diet in opposition to the grant of expenses for the State
funeral of Prince Yamagata. The resolution, which was introduced by the member for Osaka
constituency, who is regarded as the spokesman of the so-called Parliamentary Labour Party
founded last year, states that the Chief of the Genro (Elder Statesmen) did not render true
service to the State, and, although the recipient of the highest dignities, was an enemy of
mankind and suppressor of democratic institutions. The outcome was a foregone conclusion,
but the fact that the introducer could obtain the necessary support to table the resolution
formally was not the least interesting feature of the incident." [Russ2]
Chapter VII
Japan and China before 1914

Before going into the detail of Japan's policy towards China, it is necessary to put the reader on his guard against the habit of thinking of the "Yellow Races," as though China and Japan formed some kind of unity. There are, of course, reasons which, at first sight, would lead one to suppose that China and Japan could be taken in one group in comparison with the races of Europe and of Africa. To begin with, the Chinese and Japanese are both yellow, which points to ethnic affinities; but the political and cultural importance of ethnic affinities is very small. The Japanese assert that the hairy Ainus, who are low in the scale of barbarians, are a white race akin to ourselves. I never saw a hairy Ainu, and I suspect the Japanese of malice in urging us to admit the Ainus as poor relations; but even if they really are of Aryan descent, that does not prove that they have anything of the slightest importance in common with us as compared to what the Japanese and Chinese have in common with us. Similarity of culture is infinitely more important than a common racial origin.

It is true that Japanese culture, until the Restoration, was derived from China. To this day, Japanese script is practically the same as Chinese, and Buddhism, which is still the religion of the people, is of the sort derived originally from China. Loyalty and filial piety, which are the foundations of Japanese ethics, are Confucian virtues, imported along with the rest of ancient Chinese culture. But even before the irruption of European influences, China and Japan had had such different histories and national temperaments that doctrines originally similar had developed in opposite directions. China has been, since the time of the First Emperor (c. 200 B.C.), a vast unified bureaucratic land empire, having much contact with foreign nations—Annamese, Burmese, Mongols, Tibetans and even Indians. Japan, on the other hand, was an island kingdom, having practically no foreign contact except with Korea and occasionally with China, divided into clans which were constantly at war with each other, developing the virtues and vices of feudal chivalry, but totally unconcerned with economic or administrative problems on a large scale. It was not difficult to adapt the doctrines of Confucius to such a country, because in the time of Confucius China was still feudal and still divided into a number of petty kingdoms, in one of which the sage himself was a courtier, like Goethe at Weimar. But naturally his doctrines underwent a different development from that which befell them in their own country.

In old Japan, for instance, loyalty to the clan chieftain is the virtue one finds most praised; it is this same virtue, with its scope enlarged, which has now become patriotism. Loyalty is a virtue naturally praised where conflicts between roughly equal forces are frequent, as they were in feudal Japan, and are in the modern international world. In China, on the contrary, power seemed so secure, the Empire was so vast and immemorial, that the need for loyalty was not felt. Security bred a different set of virtues, such as courtesy, considerateness, and compromise. Now that security is gone, and the Chinese find themselves plunged into a world of warring bandits, they have difficulty in developing the patriotism, ruthlessness, and unscrupulousness which the situation demands. The Japanese have no such difficulty, having been schooled for just such requirements by their centuries of feudal anarchy. Accordingly we find that Western influence has only accentuated the previous differences between China and Japan: modern Chinese like our thought but dislike our mechanism, while modern Japanese like our mechanism but dislike our thought.

From some points of view, Asia, including Russia, may be regarded as a unity; but from this unity Japan must be excluded. Russia, China, and India contain vast plains given over to peasant agriculture; they are easily swayed by military empires such as that of Jenghis Khan; with modern railways, they could be dominated from a centre more securely than in former times. They could be self-subsistent economically, and invulnerable to outside attack, independent of commerce, and so strong as to be indifferent to progress. All this may come about some day, if Russia happens to develop a great conqueror supported by German organizing ability. But Japan stands outside this order of possibilities. Japan, like Great Britain, must depend upon commerce for power and prosperity. As yet, Japan has not developed the Liberal mentality appropriate to a commercial nation, and is still bent upon
Asiatic conquest and military prowess. This policy brings with it conflicts with China and Russia, which the present weakness of those Powers has enabled Japan, hitherto, to conduct successfully. But both are likely to recover their strength sooner or later, and then the essential weakness of present Japanese policy will become apparent.

It results naturally from the situation that the Japanese have two somewhat incompatible ambitions. On the one hand, they wish to pose as the champions of Asia against the oppression of the white man; on the other hand, they wish to be admitted to equality by the white Powers, and to join in the feast obtained by exploiting the nations that are inefficient in homicide. The former policy should make them friendly to China and India and hostile to the white races; the latter policy has inspired the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its fruits in the annexation of Korea and the virtual annexation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. As a member of the League of Nations, of the Big Five at Versailles, and of the Big Three at Washington, Japan appears as one of the ordinary Great Powers; but at other moments Japan aims at establishing a hegemony in Asia by standing for the emancipation from white tyranny of those who happen to be yellow or brown, but not black. Count Okuma, speaking in the Kobe Chamber of Commerce, said: "There are three hundred million natives in India looking to us to rescue them from the thraldom of Great Britain."[56] While in the Far East, I inquired of innumerable Englishmen what advantage our Government could suppose that we derived from the Japanese Alliance. The only answer that seemed to me to supply an intelligible motive was that the Alliance somewhat mitigates the intensity of Japanese anti-British propaganda in India. However that may be, there can be no doubt that the Japanese would like to pose before the Indians as their champions against white tyranny. Mr. Pooley[57] quotes Dr. Ichimura of the Imperial University of Kyoto as giving the following list of white men's sins:—

(1) White men consider that they alone are human beings, and that all coloured races belong to a lower order of civilization.
(2) They are extremely selfish, insisting on their own interests, but ignoring the interests of all whom they regard as inferiors.
(3) They are full of racial pride and conceit. If any concession is made to them they demand and take more.
(4) They are extreme in everything, exceeding the coloured races in greatness and wickedness.
(5) They worship money, and believing that money is the basis of everything, will adopt any measures to gain it.

This enumeration of our vices appears to me wholly just. One might have supposed that a nation which saw us in this light would endeavour to be unlike us. That, however, is not the moral which the Japanese draw. They argue, on the contrary, that it is necessary to imitate us as closely as possible. We shall find that, in the long catalogue of crimes committed by Europeans towards China, there is hardly one which has not been equalled by the Japanese. It never occurs to a Japanese, even in his wildest dreams, to think of a Chinaman as an equal. And although he wants the white man to regard himself as an equal, he himself regards Japan as immeasurably superior to any white country. His real desire is to be above the whites, not merely equal with them. Count Okuma put the matter very simply in an address given in 1913:—

The white races regard the world as their property and all other races are greatly their inferiors. They presume to think that the rôle of the whites in the universe is to govern the world as they please. The Japanese were a people who suffered by this policy, and wrongfully, for the Japanese were not inferior to the white races, but fully their equals. The whites were defying destiny, and woe to them.[58]

It would be easy to quote statements by eminent men to the effect that Japan is the greatest of all nations. But the same could be said of the eminent men of all other nations down to Ecuador. It is the acts of the Japanese rather than their rhetoric that must concern us. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 concerned Korea, with whose internal affairs China and Japan had mutually agreed not to interfere without first consulting each other. The Japanese claimed that China had infringed this agreement. Neither side was in the right; it was a war
caused by a conflict of rival imperialisms. The Chinese were easily and decisively defeated, and from that day to this have not ventured to oppose any foreign Power by force of arms, except unofficially in the Boxer rebellion. The Japanese were, however, prevented from reaping the fruits of their victory by the intervention of Russia, Germany and France, England holding aloof. The Russians coveted Korea for themselves, the French came in as their allies, and the Germans presumably joined them because of William II's dread of the Yellow Peril. However that may be, this intervention made the Russo-Japanese war inevitable. It would not have mattered much to Japan if the Chinese had established themselves in Korea, but the Russians would have constituted a serious menace. The Russians did not befriend China for nothing; they acquired a lease of Port Arthur and Dalny (now called Dairen), with railway and mining rights in Manchuria. They built the Chinese Eastern Railway, running right through Manchuria, connecting Port Arthur and Peking with the Siberian Railway and Europe. Having accomplished all this, they set to work to penetrate Korea. The Russo-Japanese war would presumably not have taken place but for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902. In British policy, this Alliance has always had a somewhat minor place, while it has been the corner-stone of Japanese foreign policy, except during the Great War, when the Japanese thought that Germany would win. The Alliance provided that, in the event of either Power being attacked by two Powers at once, the other should come to its assistance. It was, of course, originally inspired by fear of Russia, and was framed with a view to preventing the Russian Government, in the event of war with Japan or England, from calling upon the help of France. In 1902 we were hostile to France and Russia, and Japan remained hostile to Russia until after the Treaty of Portsmouth had been supplemented by the Convention of 1907. The Alliance served its purpose admirably for both parties during the Russo-Japanese war. It kept France from joining Russia, and thereby enabled Japan to acquire command of the sea. It enabled Japan to weaken Russia, thus curbing Russian ambitions, and making it possible for us to conclude an Entente with Russia in 1907. Without this Entente, the Entente concluded with France in 1904 would have been useless, and the alliance which defeated Germany could not have been created.

Without the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan could not have fought Russia alone, but would have had to fight France also. This was beyond her strength at that time. Thus the decisive step in Japan's rise to greatness was due to our support.

The war ended with a qualified victory for Japan. Russia renounced all interference in Korea, surrendered Port Arthur and Dalny (since called Dairen) to the Japanese, and also the railway as far north as Changchun. This part of the railway, with a few branch lines, has since been called the South Manchurian Railway. From Dairen to Changchun is 437 miles; Changchun is 150 miles south of Harbin. The Japanese use Dairen as the commercial port for Manchuria, reserving Port Arthur for purely naval purposes. In regard to Korea, Japan has conformed strictly to Western models. During the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese made a treaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Korea; in 1910 they annexed Korea; since then they have suppressed Korean nationalists with every imaginable severity. All this establishes their claim to be fully the equals of the white men.

The Japanese not merely hold the South Manchurian Railway, but have a monopoly of railway construction in South Manchuria. As this was practically the beginning of Japan's control of large regions in China by means of railways monopolies, it will be worth while to quote Mr. Pooley's account of the Fa-ku-Men Railway incident,[59] which shows how the South Manchurian monopoly was acquired:

"In November 1907 the Chinese Government signed a contract with Messrs Pauling and Co. for an extension of the Imperial Chinese railways northwards from Hsin-min-Tung to Fa-ku-Men, the necessary capital for the work being found by the British and Chinese Corporation. Japan protested against the contract, firstly, on an alleged secret protocol annexed to the treaty of Peking, which was alleged to have said that 'the Chinese Government shall not construct any main line in the neighbourhood of or parallel to the South Manchurian Railway, nor any branch line which should be prejudicial to the interests of that railway', and, secondly, on the Convention of 1902, between China and Russia, that no railway should be built from Hsin-min-Tung without Russian consent. As by the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan
succeeded to the Russian rights, the projected line could not be built without her consent. Her diplomatic communications were exceedingly offensive in tone, and concluded with a notification that, if she was wrong, it was obviously only Russia who could rightfully take her to task!

"The Chinese Government based its action in granting the contract on the clause of the 1898 contract for the construction of the Chung-hon-so to Hsin-min-Tung line, under which China specifically reserved the right to build the Fa-ku-Men line with the aid of the same contractors. Further, although by the Russo-British Note of 1898 British subjects were specifically excluded from participation in railway construction north of the Great Wall, by the Additional Note attached to the Russo-British Note the engagements between the Chinese Government and the British and Chinese Corporation were specifically reserved from the purview of the agreement.

"Even if Japan, as the heir of Russia's assets and liabilities in Manchuria, had been justified in her protest by the Convention of 1902 and by the Russo-British Note of 1899, she had not fulfilled her part of the bargain, namely, the Russian undertaking in the Note to abstain from seeking concession, rights and privileges in the valley of the Yangtze. Her reliance on the secret treaty carried weight with Great Britain, but with no one else, as may be gauged from the records of the State Department at Washington. A later claim advanced by Japan that her action was justified by Article VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which assigned to Japan all Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway (South Manchurian Railway) 'with all rights and properties appertaining thereto,' was effectively answered by China's citation of Articles III and IV of the same Treaty. Under the first of these articles it is declared that 'Russia has no territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in Manchuria in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity'; whilst the second is a reciprocal engagement by Russia and Japan 'not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.'

"It would be interesting to know whether a refusal to allow China to build a railway on her own territory is or is not an impairment of Chinese sovereignty and whether such a railway as that proposed was not a measure for the 'development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.'

"It is doubtful if even the Russo-Japanese war created as much feeling in China as did the Fa-ku-men incident. Japan's action was of such flagrant dishonesty and such a cynical repudiation of her promises and pledges that her credit received a blow from which it has never since recovered. The abject failure of the British Government to support its subjects' treaty rights was almost as much an eye-opener to the world as the protest from Tokio.... "The methods which had proved so successful in stopping the Fa-ku-men railway were equally successful in forcing the abandonment of other projected railways. Among these were the Chin-chou-Aigun line and the important Antung-Mukden line.[60] The same alleged secret protocol was used equally brutally and successfully for the acquisition of the Newchwang line, and participation in 1909, and eventual acquisition in 1914, of the Chan-Chun-Kirin lines. Subsequently by an agreement with Russia the sixth article of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1896 was construed to mean 'the absolute and exclusive rights of administration within the railway zone.'"

Japan's spheres of influence have been subsequently extended to cover the whole of Manchuria and the whole of Shantung—though the latter has been nominally renounced at Washington. By such methods as the above, or by loans to impecunious Chinese authorities, the Japanese have acquired vast railway monopolies wherever their influence has penetrated, and have used the railways as a means of acquiring all real power in the provinces through which they run.

After the Russo-Japanese war, Russia and Japan became firm friends, and agreed to bring pressure on China jointly in any matter affecting Manchuria. Their friendship lasted until the Bolshevik revolution. Russia had entered into extensive obligations to support Japan's claims at the Peace Conference, which of course the Bolsheviks repudiated. Hence the implacable hostility of Japan to Soviet Russia, leading to the support of innumerable White filibusters in
the territory of the Far Eastern Republic, and to friendship with France in all international questions. As soon as there began to be in China a revolutionary party aiming at the overthrow of the Manchus, the Japanese supported it. They have continuously supported either or both sides in Chinese dissensions, as they judged most useful for prolonging civil war and weakening China politically. Before the revolution of 1911, Sun Yat Sen was several times in Japan, and there is evidence that as early as 1900 he was obtaining financial support from some Japanese.[61] When the revolution actually broke out, Japan endeavoured to support the Manchus, but was prevented from doing so effectively by the other Legations. It seems that the policy of Japan at that time, as later, was to prevent the union of North and South, and to confine the revolution to the South. Moreover, reverence for monarchy made Japan unwilling to see the Emperor of China dispossessed and his whole country turned into a Republic, though it would have been agreeable to see him weakened by the loss of some southern provinces. Mr. Pooley gives a good account of the actions of Japan during the Chinese Revolution, of which the following quotation gives the gist[62]:—

It [the Genro] commenced with a statement from Prince Katsura on December 18th [1911], that the time for intervention had arrived, with the usual rider "for the sake of the peace of the Far East." This was followed by a private instruction to M. Ijuin, Japanese Minister in Peking, whereunder the latter on December 23rd categorically informed Yuan-shi-k'ai that under no circumstances would Japan recognize a republican form of government in China.... In connection with the peace conference held at Shanghai, Mr. Matsui (now Japanese Ambassador to France), a trusted Councillor of the Foreign Office, was dispatched to Peking to back M. Ijuin in the negotiations to uphold the dynasty. Simultaneously, Mr. Denison, Legal Adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office, was sent to Shanghai to negotiate with the rebel leaders. Mr. Matsui's mission was to bargain for Japanese support of the Manchus against the rebels, Manchuria against the throne; Mr. Denison's mission was to bargain for Japanese support of the rebels against the throne, recognition by Peking of the Southern Republic against virtually a Japanese protectorate of that Republic and exclusive railway and mining concessions within its borders. The rebels absolutely refused Mr. Denison's offer, and sent the proposed terms to the Russian Minister at Peking, through whom they eventually saw the light of day. Needless to say the Japanese authorities strenuously denied their authenticity. The British Legation, however, supported Yuan Shi-k'ai, against both the Manchus and Sun Yat Sen; and it was the British policy which won the day. Yuan Shi-k'ai became President, and remained so until 1915. He was strongly anti-Japanese, and had, on that ground, been opposed as strongly as Japan dared. His success was therefore a blow to the influence of Japan in China. If the Western Powers had remained free to make themselves felt in the Far East, the course of events would doubtless have been much less favourable to the Japanese; but the war came, and the Japanese saw their chance. How they used it must be told in a separate chapter.

FOOTNOTES:

[56] Quoted by A.M. Pooley, Japan's Foreign Policy, Allen & Unwin, 1920, p. 18.
[58] Pooley, op. cit. p. 17.
[60] This line was subsequently built by the Japanese.
Chapter VIII

Japan and China during the war

The most urgent problem in China's relations with foreign powers is Japanese aggression. Originally Japan was less powerful than China, but after 1868 the Japanese rapidly learnt from us whatever we had to teach in the way of skillful homicide, and in 1894 they resolved to test their new armaments upon China, just as Bismarck tested his on Denmark. The Chinese Government preserved its traditional haughtiness, and appears to have been quite unaware of the defeat in store for it. The question at issue was Korea, over which both Powers claimed suzerainty. At that time there would have been no reason for an impartial neutral to take one side rather than the other. The Japanese were quickly and completely victorious, but were obliged to fight Russia before obtaining secure possession of Korea. The war with Russia (1904-5) was fought chiefly in Manchuria, which the Russians had gained as a reward for befriending China. Port Arthur and Southern Manchuria up to Mukden were acquired by the Japanese as a result of the Russo-Japanese war; the rest of Manchuria came under Japanese control as a result of Russia's collapse after the Great War.

The nominal sovereignty in Manchuria is still Chinese; the Chinese have the civil administration, an army, and the appointment of the Viceroy. But the Japanese also have troops in Manchuria; they have the railways, the industrial enterprises, and the complete economic and military control. The Chinese Viceroy could not remain in power a week if he were displeasing to the Japanese, which, however, he takes care not to be. (See Note A.) The same situation was being brought about in Shantung.

Shantung brings us to what Japan did in the Great War. In 1914, China could easily have been induced to join the Allies and to set to work to turn the Germans out of Kiao-Chow, but this did not suit the Japanese, who undertook the work themselves and insisted upon the Chinese remaining neutral (until 1917). Having captured Tsing-tau, they presented to the Chinese the famous Twenty-One Demands, which gave the Chinese Question its modern form. These demands, as originally presented in January 1915, consisted of five groups. The first dealt with Shantung, demanding that China should agree in advance to whatever terms Japan might ultimately make with Germany as regarded this Chinese province, that the Japanese should have the right to construct certain specified railways, and that certain ports (unspecified) should be opened to trade; also that no privileges in Shantung should be granted to any Power other than Japan. The second group concerns South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and demands what is in effect a protectorate, with control of railways, complete economic freedom for Japanese enterprise, and exclusion of all other foreign industrial enterprise. The third group gives Japan a monopoly of the mines and iron and steel works in a certain region of the Yangtze, where we claim a sphere of influence. The fourth group consists of a single demand, that China shall not cede any harbour, bay or island to any Power except Japan. The fifth group, which was the most serious, demanded that Japanese political, financial, and military advisers should be employed by the Chinese Government; that the police in important places should be administered by Chinese and Japanese jointly, and should be largely Japanese in personnel; that China should purchase from Japan at least 50 per cent. of her munitions, or obtain them from a Sino-Japanese arsenal to be established in China, controlled by Japanese experts and employing Japanese material; that Japan should have the right to construct certain railways in and near the Yangtze valley; that Japan should have industrial priority in Fukien (opposite Formosa); and finally that the Japanese should have the right of missionary propaganda in China, to spread the knowledge of their admirable ethics.

These demands involved, as is obvious, a complete loss of Chinese independence, the closing of important areas to the commerce and industry of Europe and America, and a special attack upon the British position in the Yangtze. We, however, were too busy with the war that we had no time to think of keeping ourselves alive. Although the demands constituted a grave menace to our trade, although the Far East was in an uproar about them, although America took drastic diplomatic action against them, Mr. Lloyd George never heard of them until they were explained to him by the Chinese Delegation at Versailles. He had no time to find out what
Japan wanted, but had time to conclude a secret agreement with Japan in February 1917, promising that whatever Japan wanted in Shantung we would support at the Peace Conference.[65] By the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan was bound to communicate the Twenty-one Demands to the British Government. In fact, Japan communicated the first four groups, but not the fifth and worst, thus definitely breaking the treaty.[66] but this also, one must suppose, Mr. Lloyd George only discovered by chance when he got to Versailles.

China negotiated with Japan about the Twenty-one Demands, and secured certain modifications, but was finally compelled to yield by an ultimatum. There was a modification as regards the Hanyehping mines on the Yangtze, presumably to please us; and the specially obnoxious fifth group was altered into an exchange of studiously vague Notes.[67] In this form, the demands were accepted by China on May 9, 1915. The United States immediately notified Japan that they could not recognize the agreement. At that time America was still neutral, and was therefore still able to do something to further the objects for which we were supposed to be fighting, such as protection of the weaker nations. In 1917, however, after America had entered the war for self-determination, it became necessary to placate Japan, and in November of that year the Ishii-Lansing Agreement was concluded, by which "the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly for the parts to which her possessions are contiguous." The rest of the agreement (which is long) consists of empty verbiage.[68]

I come now to the events leading up to China's entry into the war.[69] In this matter, the lead was taken by America so far as severing diplomatic relations was concerned, but passed to Japan as regards the declaration of war. It will be remembered that, when America broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, President Wilson called upon all neutrals to do likewise. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, United States Minister in Peking, proceeded to act with vigour in accordance with this policy. He induced China first, on February 9, 1917, to send a Note of expostulation to Germany on the subject of the submarine campaign; then, on March 14th, to break off diplomatic relations. The further step of declaring war was not taken until August 14th. The intrigues connected with these events deserve some study.

In view of the fact that the Japanese were among the Allies, the Chinese had not any strong tendency to take sides against Germany. The English, French and Russians had always desired the participation of China (for reasons which I shall explain presently), and there appears to have been some suggestion, in the early days of the war, that China should participate in return for our recognizing Yuan Shi-k'ai as Emperor. These suggestions, however, fell through owing to the opposition of Japan, based partly on hostility to Yuan Shi-k'ai, partly on the fear that China would be protected by the Allies if she became a belligerent. When, in November 1915, the British, French and Russian Ambassadors in Tokyo requested Japan to join in urging China to join the Allies, Viscount Ishii said that "Japan considered developments in China as of paramount interest to her, and she must keep a firm hand there. Japan could not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficient Chinese army such as would be required for her active participation in the war, nor could Japan fail to regard with uneasiness a liberation of the economic activities of 400,000,000 people."[70] Accordingly the proposal lapsed. It must be understood that throughout the war the Japanese were in a position to blackmail the Allies, because their sympathies were with Germany, they believed Germany would win, and they filled their newspapers with scurrilous attacks on the British, accusing them of cowardice and military incompetence.[71]

But when America severed diplomatic relations with Germany, the situation for China was changed. America was not bound to subservience to Japan, as we were; America was not one of the Allies; and America had always been China's best friend. Accordingly, the Chinese were willing to take the advice of America, and proceeded to sever diplomatic relations with Germany in March 1917. Dr. Reinsch was careful to make no promises to the Chinese, but of course he held out hopes. The American Government, at that time, could honestly hold out hopes, because it was ignorant of the secret treaties and agreements by which the Allies were bound. The Allies, however, can offer no such excuse for having urged China to take the further step of declaring war. Russia, France, and Great Britain had all sold China's rights to
secure the continued support of Japan.

In May 1916, the Japanese represented to the Russians that Germany was inviting Japan to make a separate peace. In July 1916, Russia and Japan concluded a secret treaty, subsequently published by the Bolsheviks. This treaty constituted a separate alliance, binding each to come to the assistance of the other in any war, and recognizing that "the vital interests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of China from the political domination of any third Power whatsoever, having hostile designs against Russia or Japan." The last article provided that "the present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to both of the High Contracting Parties."[72] That is to say, the treaty was not communicated to the other Allies, or even to Great Britain, in spite of Article 3 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which provides that "The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement," one of which objects was the preservation of equal opportunity for all Powers in China and of the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire.

On February 16, 1917, at the very time when America was urging China to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, we concluded an agreement with Japan containing the following words:—

His Britannic Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure to the request of the Japanese Government, for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being understood that the Japanese Government will, in the eventual peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to the German islands south of the equator.

The French attitude about Shantung, at the same time, is indicated by Notes which passed between France and Japan at Tokyo.[73] On February 19th, Baron Motono sent a communication to the French and Russian Ambassadors stating, among other things, that "the Imperial Japanese Government proposes to demand from Germany at the time of the peace negotiations, the surrender of the territorial rights and special interests Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islands belonging to her situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean." The French Ambassador, on March 2nd, replied as follows:—

The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give the Japanese Government its accord in regulating at the time of the Peace Negotiations questions vital to Japan concerning Shantung and the German islands on the Pacific north of the equator. It also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Japanese Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed before the war in this Chinese province and these islands.

M. Briand demands on the other hand that Japan give its support to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance. The consequences in China should be the following:

First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and consuls;
Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to leave Chinese territory;
Third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and the ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and Portugal;
Fourth, requisition of German commercial houses, established in China; forfeiting the rights of Germany in the concessions she possesses in certain ports of China.

The Russian reply to Baron Motono's Note to the French and Russian Ambassadors, dated March 5, 1917, was as follows:—

In reply to the Note of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the date of February 19th last, the Russian Embassy is charged with giving the Japanese Government the assurance that it can entirely count on the support of the Imperial Government of Russia with regard to its desiderata concerning the eventual surrender to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung and of the German Islands, occupied by the Japanese forces, in the Pacific Ocean to the north of the Equator.[74]

It will be observed that, unlike England and France, Russia demands no quid pro quo,
doubtless owing to the secret treaty concluded in the previous year.

After these agreements, Japan saw no further objection to China's participation in the war. The chief inducement held out to China was the hope of recovering Shantung; but as there was now no danger of this hope being realized, Japan was willing that America, in more or less honest ignorance, should unofficially use this hope for the persuasion of the Chinese. It is true that Japan had reason to fear America until the last days of the Peace Conference, but this fear was considerably diminished by the conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in November 1917.

Meanwhile Japan had discovered that the question of China's entry into the war could be used to increase internal strife in China, which has been one of the aims of Japanese policy ever since the beginning of the revolutionary movement.[75] If the Chinese had not been interfered with at this time, there was some prospect of their succeeding in establishing a stable democratic government. Yuan was dead, and his successor in the Presidency, Li Yuan Hung, was a genuine constitutionalist. He reassembled the Parliament which Yuan had dismissed, and the work of drafting a permanent constitution was resumed. The President was opposed to severing diplomatic relations, and, of course, still more to declaring war. The Prime Minister, Tuan Chih-jui, a militarist, was strongly in favour of war. He and his Cabinet persuaded a considerable majority of both Houses of the Chinese Parliament to side with them on the question of severing diplomatic relations, and the President, as in duty bound, gave way on this issue.

On the issue of declaring war, however, public opinion was different. It was President Wilson's summons to the neutrals to follow him in breaking off diplomatic relations that had given force to the earlier campaign; but on June 5th the American Minister, acting on instructions, presented a Note to the Chinese Government urging that the preservation of national unity was more important than entry into the war, and suggesting the desirability of preserving peace for the present. What had happened in the meantime was that the war issue, which might never have become acute but for President's Wilson's action, had been used by the Japanese to revive the conflict between North and South, and to instigate the Chinese militarists to unconstitutional action. Sun Yat Sen and most of the Southern politicians were opposed to the declaration of war; Sun's reasons were made known in an open letter to Mr. Lloyd George on March 7th. They were thoroughly sound.[76] The Cabinet, on May 1st, decided in favour of war, but by the Constitution a declaration of war required the consent of Parliament. The militarists attempted to coerce Parliament, which had a majority against war; but as this proved impossible, they brought military force to bear on the President to compel him to dissolve Parliament unconstitutionally. The bulk of the Members of Parliament retired to the South, where they continued to act as a Parliament and to regard themselves as the sole source of constitutional government. After these various illegalities, the military autocrats were still compelled to deal with one of their number, who, in July, effected a five days' restoration of the Manchu Emperor. The President resigned, and was succeeded by a person more agreeable to the militarists, who have henceforth governed in the North, sometimes without a Parliament, sometimes with a subservient unconstitutional Northern Parliament. Then at last they were free to declare war. It was thus that China entered the war for democracy and against militarism.

Of course China helped little, if at all, towards the winning of the war, but that was not what the Allies expected of her. The objects of the European Allies are disclosed in the French Note quoted above. We wished to confiscate German property in China, to expel Germans living in China, and to prevent, as far as possible, the revival of German trade in China after the war. The confiscation of German property was duly carried out—not only public property, but private property also, so that the Germans in China were suddenly reduced to beggary. Owing to the claims on shipping, the expulsion of the Germans had to wait till after the Armistice. They were sent home through the Tropics in overcrowded ships, sometimes with only 24 hours' notice; no degree of hardship was sufficient to secure exemption. The British authorities insisted on expelling delicate pregnant women, whom they officially knew to be very likely to die on the voyage. All this was done after the Armistice, for the sake of British trade. The kindly Chinese often took upon themselves to hide Germans, in hard cases, from
the merciless persecution of the Allies; otherwise, the miseries inflicted would have been much greater.

The confiscation of private property during the war and by the Treaty of Versailles was a new departure, showing that on this point all the belligerents agreed with the Bolsheviks. Dr. Reid places side by side two statements, one by President Wilson when asking Congress to agree to the Declaration of War: "We shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without passion, and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and fairplay we profess to be fighting for"; the other by Senator Hitchcock, when the war was over, after a day spent with President Wilson in learning the case for ratification of the Versailles Treaty: "Through the Treaty, we will yet get very much of importance.... In violation of all international law and treaties we have made disposal of a billion dollars of German-owned property here. The Treaty validates all that."[77] The European Allies secured very similar advantages from inducing China to enter the war for righteousness.

We have seen what England and France gained by the Chinese declaration of war. What Japan gained was somewhat different.

The Northern military faction, which controlled the Peking Government, was completely dependent upon Japan, and could do nothing to resist Japanese aggression. All the other Powers were fully occupied with the war, and had sold China to Japan in return for Japanese neutrality—for Japan can hardly be counted as a belligerent after the capture of Tsingtau in November 1914. The Southern Government and all the liberal elements in the North were against the clique which had seized the Central Government. In March 1918, military and naval agreements were concluded between China and Japan, of which the text, never officially published, is given by Millard.[78] By these agreements the Japanese were enabled, under pretence of military needs in Manchuria and Mongolia, to send troops into Chinese territory, to acquire control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently of Northern Manchuria, and generally to keep all Northern China at their mercy. In all this, the excuse of operations against the Bolsheviks was very convenient.

After this the Japanese went ahead gaily. During the year 1918, they placed loans in China to the extent of Yen 246,000,000,[79] i.e., about £25,000,000. China was engaged in civil war, and both sides were as willing as the European belligerents to sell freedom for the sake of victory. Unfortunately for Japan, the side on which Japan was fighting in the war proved suddenly victorious, and some portion of the energies of Europe and America became available for holding Japan in check. For various reasons, however, the effect of this did not show itself until after the Treaty of Versailles was concluded. During the peace negotiations, England and France, in virtue of secret agreements, were compelled to support Japan. President Wilson, as usual, sacrificed everything to his League of Nations, which the Japanese would not have joined unless they had been allowed to keep Shantung. The chapter on this subject in Mr. Lansing's account of the negotiations is one of the most interesting in his book.[80] By Article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles, "Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title, and privileges" in the province of Shantung.[81] Although President Wilson had consented to this gross violation of justice, America refused to ratify the Treaty, and was therefore free to raise the issue of Shantung at Washington. The Chinese delegates at Versailles resisted the clauses concerning Shantung to the last, and finally, encouraged by a vigorous agitation of Young China,[82] refused to sign the Treaty. They saw no reason why they should be robbed of a province as a reward for having joined the Allies. All the other Allies agreed to a proceeding exactly as iniquitous as it would have been if we had annexed Virginia as a reward to the Americans for having helped us in the war, or France had annexed Kent on a similar pretext.

Meanwhile, Young China had discovered that it could move Chinese public opinion on the anti-Japanese cry. The Government in Peking in 1919-20 was in the hands of the pro-Japanese An Fu party, but they were forcibly ejected, in the summer of 1920, largely owing to the influence of the Young China agitation on the soldiers stationed in Peking. The An Fu leaders took refuge in the Japanese Legation, and since then the Peking Government has ventured to be less subservient to Japan, hoping always for American support. Japan did everything possible to consolidate her position in Shantung, but always with the knowledge
that America might re-open the question at any time. As soon as the Washington Conference
was announced, Japan began feverishly negotiating with China, with a view to having the
question settled before the opening of the Conference. But the Chinese, very wisely, refused
the illusory concessions offered by Japan, and insisted on almost unconditional evacuation. At
Washington, both parties agreed to the joint mediation of England and America. The pressure
of American public opinion caused the American Administration to stand firm on the question
of Shantung, and I understand that the British delegation, on the whole, concurred with
America. Some concessions were made to Japan, but they will not amount to much if
American interest in Shantung lasts for another five years. On this subject, I shall have more
to say when I come to the Washington Conference.
There is a question with which the Washington Conference determined not to concern itself,
but which nevertheless is likely to prove of great importance in the Far East—I mean the
question of Russia. It was considered good form in diplomatic circles, until the Genoa
Conference, to pretend that there is no such country as Russia, but the Bolsheviks, with their
usual wickedness, have refused to fall in with this pretence. Their existence constitutes an
embarrassment to America, because in a quarrel with Japan the United States would
unavoidably find themselves in unwilling alliance with Russia. The conduct of Japan towards
Russia has been quite as bad as that of any other Power. At the time of the Czecho-Slovak
revolt, the Allies jointly occupied Vladivostok, but after a time all withdrew except the
Japanese. All Siberia east of Lake Baikal, including Vladivostok, now forms one State, the
Far Eastern Republic, with its capital at Chita. Against this Republic, which is practically
though not theoretically Bolshevik, the Japanese have launched a whole series of miniature
Kolchaks—Semenov, Horvath, Ungern, etc. These have all been defeated, but the Japanese
remain in military occupation of Vladivostok and a great part of the Maritime Province,
though they continually affirm their earnest wish to retire.
In the early days of the Bolshevik régime the Russians lost Northern Manchuria, which is now
controlled by Japan. A board consisting partly of Chinese and partly of reactionary Russians
forms the directorate of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which runs through Manchuria and
connects with the Siberian Railway. There is not through communication by rail between
Peking and Europe as in the days before 1914. This is an extreme annoyance to European
business men in the Far East, since it means that letters or journeys from Peking to London
take five or six weeks instead of a fortnight. They try to persuade themselves that the fault lies
with the Bolsheviks, but they are gradually realizing that the real cause is the reactionary
control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Meanwhile, various Americans are interesting
themselves in this railway and endeavouring to get it internationalized. Motives similar to
those which led to the Vanderlip concession are forcing friendship with Russia upon all
Americans who have Siberian interests. If Japan were engaged in a war with America, the
Bolsheviks would in all likelihood seize the opportunity to liberate Vladivostok and recover
Russia's former position in Manchuria. Already, according to The Times correspondent in
Peking, Outer Mongolia, a country about as large as England, France and Germany combined,
has been conquered by Bolshevik armies and propaganda.
The Bolsheviks have, of course, the enthusiastic sympathy of the younger Chinese students. If
they can weather their present troubles, they have a good chance of being accepted by all
vigorous progressive people in Asia as the liberators of Asia from the tyranny of the Great
Powers. As they were not invited to Washington, they are not a party to any of the agreements
reached there, and it may turn out that they will upset impartially the ambitions of Japan,
Great Britain and America.[83] For America, no less than other Powers, has ambitions,
though they are economic rather than territorial. If America is victorious in the Far East,
China will be Americanized, and though the shell of political freedom may remain, there will
be an economic and cultural bondage beneath it. Russia is not strong enough to dominate in
this way, but may become strong enough to secure some real freedom for China. This,
however, is as yet no more than a possibility. It is worth remembering, because everybody
chooses to forget it, and because, while Russia is treated as a pariah, no settlement of the Far
East can be stable. But what part Russia is going to play in the affairs of China it is as yet
impossible to say.
FOOTNOTES:
[63] On this subject George Gleason, What Shall I Think of Japan? pp. 174-5, says: "This paragraph concerns the iron and steel mills at the city of Hanyang, which, with Wuchang and Hangkow, form the Upper Yangtze commercial centre with a population of 1,500,000 people. The Hanyeping Company owns a large part of the Tayeh iron mines, eighty miles east of Hangkow, with which there are water and rail connections. The ore is 67 per cent. iron, fills the whole of a series of hills 500 feet high, and is sufficient to turn out 1,000,000 tons a year for 700 years. [Probably an overstatement.] Coal for the furnaces is obtained from Pinghsiang, 200 miles distant by water, where in 1913 five thousand miners dug 690,000 tons. Japanese have estimated that the vein is capable of producing yearly a million tons for at least five centuries....
"Thus did Japan attempt to enter and control a vital spot in the heart of China which for many years Great Britain has regarded as her special trade domain."
Mr. Gleason is an American, not an Englishman. The best account of this matter is given by Mr. Coleman, The Far East Unveiled, chaps. x.-xiv. See below, pp. 232-3.
[64] See letter from Mr. Eugene Chen, Japan Weekly Chronicle, October 20, 1921.
[65] The Notes embodying this agreement are quoted in Pooley, Japan's Foreign Policies, Allen & Unwin, 1920, pp. 141-2.
[66] On this subject, Baron Hayashi, now Japanese Ambassador to the United Kingdom, said to Mr. Coleman: "When Viscount Kato sent China a Note containing five groups, however, and then sent to England what purported to be a copy of his Note to China, and that copy only contained four of the groups and omitted the fifth altogether, which was directly a breach of the agreement contained in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, he did something which I can no more explain than you can. Outside of the question of probity involved, his action was unbelievably foolish" (The Far East Unveiled, p. 73).
[67] The demands in their original and revised forms, with the negotiations concerning them, are printed in Appendix B of Democracy and the Eastern Question, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919.
[68] The texts concerned in the various stages of the Shantung question are printed in S.G. Cheng's Modern China, Appendix ii, iii and ix. For text of Ishii-Lansing Agreement, see Gleason, op. cit. pp. 214-6.
[71] See Pooley, Japan's Foreign Policies, pp. 23 ff; Coleman, The Far East Unveiled, chap. v., and Millard, chap. iii.
[74] See Appendix III of Cheng's Modern China, which contains this note (p. 346) as well as the other "documents relative to the negotiations between Japan and the Allied Powers as to the
disposal of the German rights in respect of Shantung Province, and the South Sea Islands north of the Equator."

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The story of the steps leading up to China's declaration of war is admirably told in Reid, op. cit. pp. 88-109.

[76]
Port of the letter is quoted by Dr. Reid, p. 108.

[77]
Reid, op. cit. p. 161. Chap. vii. of this book, "Commercial Rivalries as affecting China," should be read by anyone who still thinks that the Allies stood for honesty or mercy or anything except money-grubbing.

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A list of these loans is given by Hollington K. Tong in an article on "China's Finances in 1918" in China in 1918, published early in 1919 by the Peking leader, pp. 61-2. The list and some of the comments appear also in Putnam Weale's The Truth about China and Japan.

[80]
Mr. Lansing's book, in so far as it deals with Japanese questions, is severely criticized from a Japanese point of view in Dr. Y. Soyeda's pamphlet "Shantung Question and Japanese Case," League of Nations Association of Japan, June 1921. I do not think Dr. Soyeda's arguments are likely to appeal to anyone who is not Japanese.

[81]
See the clauses concerning Shantung, in full, in Cheng's Modern China, Clarendon Press, pp. 360-1.

[82]
This agitation is well described in Mr. M.T.Z. Tyau's China Awakened (Macmillan, 1922) chap. ix., "The Student Movement."

[83]
"Soviet Russia has addressed to the Powers a protest against the discussion at the Washington Conference of the East China Railway, a question exclusively affecting China and Russia, and declares that it reserves for itself full liberty of action in order to compel due deference to the rights of the Russian labouring masses and to make demands consistent with those rights" (Daily Herald, December 22, 1921). This is the new-style imperialism. It was not the "Russian labouring masses," but the Chinese coolies, who built the railway. What Russia contributed was capital, but one is surprised to find the Bolsheviks considering that this confers rights upon themselves as heirs of the capitalists. [Russ2]
The Washington Conference

The Washington Conference, and the simultaneous conference, at Washington, between the Chinese and Japanese, have somewhat modified the Far Eastern situation. The general aspects of the new situation will be dealt with in the next chapter; for the present it is the actual decisions arrived at in Washington that concern us, as well as their effect upon the Japanese position in Siberia.

In the first place, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has apparently been brought to an end, as a result of the conclusion of the Four Power Pact between America, Great Britain, France and Japan. Within this general alliance of the exploiting Powers, there is a subordinate grouping of America and Great Britain against France and Japan, the former standing for international capitalism, the latter for national capitalism. The situation is not yet plain, because England and America disagree as regards Russia, and because America is not yet prepared to take part in the reconstruction of Europe; but in the Far East, at any rate, we seem to have decided to seek the friendship of America rather than of Japan. It may perhaps be hoped that this will make our Chinese policy more liberal than it has been. We have announced the restoration of Wei-hai-wei—a piece of generosity which would have been more impressive but for two facts: first, that Wei-hai-wei is completely useless to us, and secondly, that the lease had only two more years to run. By the terms of the lease, in fact, it should have been restored as soon as Russia lost Port Arthur, however many years it still had to run at that date.

One very important result of the Washington Conference is the agreement not to fortify islands in the Pacific, with certain specified exceptions. This agreement, if it is adhered to, will make war between America and Japan very difficult, unless we were allied with America. Without a naval base somewhere near Japan, America could hardly bring naval force to bear on the Japanese Navy. It had been the intention of the Navy Department to fortify Guam with a view to turning it into a first-class naval base. The fact that America has been willing to forgo this intention must be taken as evidence of a genuine desire to preserve the peace with Japan.

Various small concessions were made to China. There is to be a revision of the Customs Schedule to bring it to an effective five per cent. The foreign Post Offices are to be abolished, though the Japanese have insisted that a certain number of Japanese should be employed in the Chinese Post Office. They had the effrontery to pretend that they desired this for the sake of the efficiency of the postal service, though the Chinese post is excellent and the Japanese is notoriously one of the worst in the world. The chief use to which the Japanese have put their postal service in China has been the importation of morphia, as they have not allowed the Chinese Customs authorities to examine parcels sent through their Post Office. The development of the Japanese importation of morphia into China, as well as the growth of the poppy in Manchuria, where they have control, has been a very sinister feature of their penetration of China.[84]

Of course the Open Door, equality of opportunity, the independence and integrity of China, etc. etc., were reaffirmed at Washington; but these are mere empty phrases devoid of meaning.

From the Chinese point of view, the chief achievement at Washington was the Shantung Treaty. Ever since the expulsion by the Germans at the end of 1914, the Japanese had held Kiaochow Bay, which includes the port of Tsingtau; they had stationed troops along the whole extent of the Shantung Railway; and by the treaty following the Twenty-one Demands, they had preferential treatment as regards all industrial undertakings in Shantung. The railway belonged to them by right of conquest, and through it they acquired control of the whole province. When an excuse was needed for increasing the garrison, they supplied arms to brigands, and claimed that their intervention was necessary to suppress the resulting disorder. This state of affairs was legalized by the Treaty of Versailles, to which, however, America and China were not parties. The Washington Conference, therefore, supplied an opportunity of raising the question afresh.

At first, however, it seemed as if the Japanese would have things all their own way. The
Chinese wished to raise the question before the Conference, while the Japanese wished to settle it in direct negotiation with China. This point was important, because, ever since the Lansing-Ishii agreement, the Japanese have tried to get the Powers to recognize, in practice if not in theory, an informal Japanese Protectorate over China, as a first step towards which it was necessary to establish the principle that the Japanese should not be interfered with in their diplomatic dealings with China. The Conference agreed to the Japanese proposal that the Shantung question should not come before the Conference, but should be dealt with in direct negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese. The Japanese victory on this point, however, was not complete, because it was arranged that, in the event of a deadlock, Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour should mediate. A deadlock, of course, soon occurred, and it then appeared that the British were no longer prepared to back up the Japanese whole-heartedly, as in the old days. The American Administration, for the sake of peace, showed some disposition to urge the Chinese to give way. But American opinion was roused on the Shantung question, and it appeared that, unless a solution more or less satisfactory to China was reached, the Senate would probably refuse to ratify the various treaties which embodied the work of the Conference. Therefore, at the last moment, the Americans strongly urged Japan to give way, and we took the same line, though perhaps less strongly. The result was the conclusion of the Shantung Treaty between China and Japan.

By this Treaty, the Chinese recover everything in Shantung, except the private property of Japanese subjects, and certain restrictions as regards the railway. The railway was the great difficulty in the negotiations, since, so long as the Japanese could control that, they would have the province at their mercy. The Chinese offered to buy back the railway at once, having raised about half the money as a result of a patriotic movement among their merchants. This, however, the Japanese refused to agree to. What was finally done was that the Chinese were compelled to borrow the money from the Japanese Government to be repaid in fifteen years, with an option of repayment in five years. The railway was valued at 53,400,000 gold marks, plus the costs involved in repairs or improvements incurred by Japan, less deterioration; and it was to be handed over to China within nine months of the signature of the treaty. Until the purchase price, borrowed from Japan, is repaid, the Japanese retain a certain degree of control over the railway: a Japanese traffic manager is to be appointed, and two accountants, one Chinese and the other Japanese, under the control of a Chinese President.

It is clear that, on paper, this gives the Chinese everything five years hence. Whether things will work out so depends upon whether, five years hence, any Power is prepared to force Japan to keep her word. As both Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour strongly urged the Chinese to agree to this compromise, it must be assumed that America and Great Britain have some responsibility for seeing that it is properly carried out. In that case, we may perhaps expect that in the end China will acquire complete control of the Shantung railway.

On the whole, it must be said that China did better at Washington than might have been expected. As regards the larger aspects of the new international situation arising out of the Conference, I shall deal with them in the next chapter. But in our present connection it is necessary to consider certain Far Eastern questions not discussed at Washington, since the mere fact that they were not discussed gave them a new form.

The question of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was not raised at Washington. It may therefore be assumed that Japan's position there is secure until such time as the Chinese, or the Russians, or both together, are strong enough to challenge it. America, at any rate, will not raise the question unless friction occurs on some other issue. (See Appendix.)

The Siberian question also was not settled. Therefore Japan's ambitions in Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces will presumably remain unchecked except in so far as the Russians unaided are able to check them. There is a chronic state of semi-war between the Japanese and the Far Eastern Republic, and there seems no reason why it should end in any near future. The Japanese from time to time announce that they have decided to withdraw, but they simultaneously send fresh troops. A conference between them and the Chita Government has been taking place at Dairen, and from time to time announcements have appeared to the effect that an agreement has been reached or was about to be reached. But on April 16th (1922) the Japanese broke up the Conference. The Times of April 27th contains both the Japanese and
the Russian official accounts of this break up. The Japanese statement is given in The Times as follows:—
The Japanese Embassy communicates the text of a statement given out on April 20th by the Japanese Foreign Office on the Dairen Conference.
It begins by recalling that in response to the repeatedly expressed desire of the Chita Government, the Japanese Government decided to enter into negotiations. The first meeting took place on August 26th last year.
The Japanese demands included the non-enforcement of communist principles in the Republic against Japanese, the prohibition of Bolshevist propaganda, the abolition of menacing military establishments, the adoption of the principle of the open door in Siberia, and the removal of industrial restrictions on foreigners. Desiring speedily to conclude an agreement, so that the withdrawal of troops might be carried out as soon as possible, Japan met the wishes of Chita as far as practicable. Though, from the outset, Chita pressed for a speedy settlement of the Nicolaievsk affair, Japan eventually agreed to take up the Nicolaievsk affair immediately after the conclusion of the basis agreement. She further assured Chita that in settling the affair Japan had no intention of violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, and that the troops would be speedily withdrawn from Sakhalin after the settlement of the affair, and that Chita's wishes in regard to the transfer of property now in the custody of the Japanese authorities would be met.
The 11th Division of the troops in Siberia was originally to be relieved during April, but if the Dairen Conference had progressed satisfactorily, the troops, instead of being relieved, would have been sent home. Japan therefore intimated to Chita that should the basis agreement be concluded within a reasonable period these troops would be immediately withdrawn, and proposed the signature of the agreement by the middle of April, so that the preparations for the relief of the said division might be dispensed with. Thereupon Chita not only proposed the immediate despatch of Chita troops to Vladivostok without waiting for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, but urged that Japan should fix a time-limit for the complete withdrawal of all her troops.
Japan informed Chita that the withdrawal would be carried out within a short period after the conclusion of the detailed arrangements, giving a definite period as desired, and at the same time she proposed the signing of the agreement drawn up by Japan.
Whereas Japan thus throughout the negotiations maintained a sincere and conciliatory attitude, the Chita delegates entirely ignored the spirit in which she offered concessions and brought up one demand after another, thereby trying to gain time. Not only did they refuse to entertain the Japanese proposals, but declared that they would drop the negotiations and return to Chita immediately. The only conclusion from this attitude of the Chita Government is that they lacked a sincere effort to bring the negotiations to fruition, and the Japanese Government instructed its delegates to quit Dairen.
The Russian official account is given by The Times immediately below the above. It is as follows:—
On April 16th the Japanese broke up the Dairen Conference with the Far Eastern Republic. The Far Eastern Delegation left Dairen. Agreement was reached between the Japanese and Russian Delegations on March 30th on all points of the general treaty, but when the question of military evacuation was reached the Japanese Delegation proposed a formula permitting continued Japanese intervention.
Between March 30th and April 15th the Japanese dragged on the negotiations re military convention, reproaching the Far Eastern delegates for mistrusting the Japanese Government. The Russian Delegation declared that the general treaty would be signed only upon obtaining precise written guarantees of Japanese military evacuation.
On April 15th the Japanese Delegation presented an ultimatum demanding a reply from the Far Eastern representatives in half an hour as to whether they were willing to sign a general agreement with new Japanese conditions forbidding an increase in the Far Eastern Navy and retaining a Japanese military mission on Far Eastern territory. Re evacuation, the Japanese presented a Note promising evacuation if "not prevented by unforeseen circumstances." The Russian Delegation rejected this ultimatum. On April 16th the Japanese declared the Dairen
Conference broken up. The Japanese delegates left for Tokyo, and Japanese troops remain in the zone established by the agreement of March 29th. Readers will believe one or other of these official statements according to their prejudices, while those who wish to think themselves impartial will assume that the truth lies somewhere between the two. For my part, I believe the Russian statement. But even from the Japanese communiqué it is evident that what wrecked the Conference was Japanese unwillingness to evacuate Vladivostok and the Maritime Province; all that they were willing to give was a vague promise to evacuate some day, which would have had no more value than Mr. Gladstone's promise to evacuate Egypt.

It will be observed that the Conference went well for Chita until the Senate had ratified the Washington treaties. After that, the Japanese felt that they had a free hand in all Far Eastern matters not dealt with at Washington. The practical effect of the Washington decisions will naturally be to make the Japanese seek compensation, at the expense of the Far Eastern Republic, for what they have had to surrender in China. This result was to be expected, and was presumably foreseen by the assembled peacemakers.[85]

It will be seen that the Japanese policy involves hostility to Russia. This is no doubt one reason for the friendship between Japan and France. Another reason is that both are the champions of nationalistic capitalism, as against the international capitalism aimed at by Messrs. Morgan and Mr. Lloyd George, because France and Japan look to their armaments as the chief source of their income, while England and America look rather to their commerce and industry. It would be interesting to compute how much coal and iron France and Japan have acquired in recent years by means of their armies. England and America already possessed coal and iron; hence their different policy. An uninvited delegation from the Far Eastern Republic at Washington produced documents tending to show that France and Japan came there as secret allies. Although the authenticity of the documents was denied, most people, apparently, believed them to be genuine. In any case, it is to be expected that France and Japan will stand together, now that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has come to an end and the Anglo-French Entente has become anything but cordial. Thus it is to be feared that Washington and Genoa have sown the seeds of future wars—unless, by some miracle, the "civilized" nations should grow weary of suicide.

FOOTNOTES:
[84] See e.g. chap. viii. of Millard's Democracy and the Eastern Question.
[85] I ought perhaps to confess that I have a bias in favour of the Far Eastern Republic, owing to my friendship for their diplomatic mission which was in Peking while I was there. I never met a more high-minded set of men in any country. And although they were communists, and knew the views that I had expressed on Russia, they showed me great kindness. I do not think, however, that these courtesies have affected my view of the dispute between Chita and Tokyo.
Chapter X

Present forces and tendencies in the Far East

The Far Eastern situation is so complex that it is very difficult to guess what will be the ultimate outcome of the Washington Conference, and still more difficult to know what outcome we ought to desire. I will endeavour to set forth the various factors each in turn, not simplifying the issues, but rather aiming at producing a certain hesitancy which I regard as desirable in dealing with China. I shall consider successively the interests and desires of America, Japan, Russia and China, with an attempt, in each case, to gauge what parts of these various interests and desires are compatible with the welfare of mankind as a whole.[86]

I begin with America, as the leading spirit in the Conference and the dominant Power in the world. American public opinion is in favour of peace, and at the same time profoundly persuaded that America is wise and virtuous while all other Powers are foolish and wicked. The pessimistic half of this opinion I do not desire to dispute, but the optimistic half is more open to question. Apart from peace, American public opinion believes in commerce and industry, Protestant morality, athletics, hygiene, and hypocrisy, which may be taken as the main ingredients of American and English Kultur. Every American I met in the Far East, with one exception, was a missionary for American Kultur, whether nominally connected with Christian Missions or not. I ought to explain that when I speak of hypocrisy I do not mean the conscious hypocrisy practised by Japanese diplomats in their dealings with Western Powers, but that deeper, unconscious kind which forms the chief strength of the Anglo-Saxons. Everybody knows Labouchere's comment on Mr. Gladstone, that like other politicians he always had a card up his sleeve, but, unlike the others, he thought the Lord had put it there. This attitude, which has been characteristic of England, has been somewhat chastened among ourselves by the satire of men like Bernard Shaw; but in America it is still just as prevalent and self-confident as it was with us fifty years ago. There is much justification for such an attitude. Gladstonian England was more of a moral force than the England of the present day; and America is more of a moral force at this moment than any other Power (except Russia). But the development from Gladstone's moral fervour to the cynical imperialism of his successors is one which we can now see to be inevitable; and a similar development is bound to take place in the United States. Therefore, when we wish to estimate the desirability of extending the influence of the United States, we have to take account of this almost certain future loss of idealism.

Nor is idealism in itself always an unmixed blessing to its victims. It is apt to be incompatible with tolerance, with the practice of live-and-let-live, which alone can make the world endurable for its less pugnacious and energetic inhabitants. It is difficult for art or the contemplative outlook to exist in an atmosphere of bustling practical philanthropy, as difficult as it would be to write a book in the middle of a spring cleaning. The ideals which inspire a spring-cleaning are useful and valuable in their place, but when they are not enriched by any others they are apt to produce a rather bleak and uncomfortable sort of world.

All this may seem, at first sight, somewhat remote from the Washington Conference, but it is essential if we are to take a just view of the friction between America and Japan. I wish to admit at once that, hitherto, America has been the best friend of China, and Japan the worst enemy. It is also true that America is doing more than any other Power to promote peace in the world, while Japan would probably favour war if there were a good prospect of victory. On these grounds, I am glad to see our Government making friends with America and abandoning the militaristic Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But I do not wish this to be done in a spirit of hostility to Japan, or in a blind reliance upon the future good intentions of America. I shall therefore try to state Japan's case, although, for the present, I think it weaker than America's.

It should be observed, in the first place, that the present American policy, both in regard to China and in regard to naval armaments, while clearly good for the world, is quite as clearly in line with American interests. To take the naval question first: America, with a navy equal to our own, will be quite strong enough to make our Admiralty understand that it is out of the question to go to war with America, so that America will have as much control of the seas as
there is any point in having. The Americans are adamant about the Japanese Navy, but
very pliant about French submarines, which only threaten us. Control of the seas being
secured, limitation of naval armaments merely decreases the cost, and is an equal gain to all
parties, involving no sacrifice of American interests. To take next the question of China:
American ambitions in China are economic, and require only that the whole country should
be open to the commerce and industry of the United States. The policy of spheres of influence
is obviously less advantageous, to so rich and economically strong a country as America, than
the policy of the universal Open Door. We cannot therefore regard America's liberal policy as
regards China and naval armaments as any reason for expecting a liberal policy when it goes
against self-interest.

In fact, there is evidence that when American interests or prejudices are involved liberal and
humanitarian principles have no weight whatever. I will cite two instances: Panama tolls, and
Russian trade. In the matter of the Panama canal, America is bound by treaty not to
discriminate against our shipping; nevertheless a Bill has been passed by a two-thirds
majority of the House of Representatives, making a discrimination in favour of American
shipping. Even if the President ultimately vetoes it, its present position shows that at least
two-thirds of the House of Representatives share Bethmann-Hollweg's view of treaty
obligations. And as for trade with Russia, England led the way, while American hostility to
the Bolsheviks remained implacable, and to this day Gompers, in the name of American
labour, thunders against "shaking hands with murder." It cannot therefore be said that
America is always honourable or humanitarian or liberal. The evidence is that America adopts
these virtues when they suit national or rather financial interests, but fails to perceive their
applicability in other cases.

I could of course have given many other instances, but I content myself with one, because it
especially concerns China. I quote from an American weekly, The Freeman (November 23,
1921, p. 244):—

On November 1st, the Chinese Government failed to meet an obligation of $5,600,000, due
and payable to a large banking-house in Chicago. The State Department had facilitated the
negotiation of this loan in the first instance; and now, in fulfilment of the promise of
Governmental support in an emergency, an official cablegram was launched upon Peking,
with intimations that continued defalcation might have a most serious effect upon the
financial and political rating of the Chinese Republic. In the meantime, the American bankers
of the new international consortium had offered to advance to the Chinese Government an
amount which would cover the loan in default, together with other obligations already in
arrears, and still others which will fall due on December 1st; and this proposal had also
received the full and energetic support of the Department of State. That is to say, American
financiers and politicians were at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece;
having co-operated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they came forward handsomely in
the hour of trial with an offer to save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese
Government would only enter into relations with the consortium, and thus prepare the way for
the eventual establishment of an American financial protectorate.

It should be added that the Peking Government, after repeated negotiations, had decided not
to accept loans from the consortium on the terms on which they were offered. In my opinion,
there were very adequate grounds for this decision. As the same article in the Freeman
concludes:—

If this plan is put through, it will make the bankers of the consortium the virtual owners of
China; and among these bankers, those of the United States are the only ones who are
prepared to take full advantage of the situation.

There is some reason to think that, at the beginning of the Washington Conference, an attempt
was made by the consortium banks, with the connivance of the British but not of the
American Government, to establish, by means of the Conference, some measure of
international control over China. In the Japan Weekly Chronicle for November 17, 1921 (p.
725), in a telegram headed "International Control of China," I find it reported that America is
thought to be seeking to establish international control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the
Philadelphia Public Ledger: "We suspect the motives which led to the suggestion and we
thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterly oppose any Conference plan to offer China international aid." He adds: "International control will not do. China must be given time and opportunity to find herself. The world should not misinterpret or exaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now passing through." These are wise words, with which every true friend of China must agree. In the same issue of the Japan Weekly Chronicle—which, by the way, I consider the best weekly paper in the world—I find the following (p. 728):—

Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: "The international bankers have a scheme for the international control of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese Government refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the Morgan Company, should be paid out of it." Mr. Lamont, on hearing this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying: "Simpson's statement is unqualifiedly false. When this man Simpson talks about resisting the control of the international banks he is fantastic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the Conference result in such a solution as will furnish full opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny."

Sagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must be due to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had had nothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer and one of China's best friends as "this man Simpson."

I do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive, and I have not space here to set it all forth. But to any European radical Mr. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want control reads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to a Government which is on the verge of bankruptcy, must aim at control, for, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago Bank, it would be impossible to believe that Messrs. Morgan are so purely philanthropic as not to care whether they get any interest on their money or not, although emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as though this were the case, thereby greatly increasing the suspicions of the Chinese.

In the New Republic for November 30, 1921, there is an article by Mr. Brailsford entitled "A New Technique of Peace," which I fear is prophetic even if not wholly applicable at the moment when it was written. I expect to see, if the Americans are successful in the Far East, China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreign commerce and industry; a government which the West will consider good substituted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy; a gradually increasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, the chief of which is America; the development of a sweated proletariat; the spread of Christianity; the substitution of the American civilization for the Chinese; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such objets d'art as millionaires may think it worth while to buy; the gradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and one day, fifty or a hundred years hence, the massacre of every white man throughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secret society. All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is. It will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall be told that it is done in order that China may have "good" government. The definition of the word "good" is difficult, but the definition of "good government" is as easy as A.B.C.: it is government that yields fat dividends to capitalists.

The Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. They have a civilization superior to ours in all that makes for human happiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, if they are allowed a little time, will revivify China and produce something immeasurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism that we call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans will be able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soul of the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her salvation; all great nations need such a period, from time to time. When America went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought of intervening to insist on "good government," but fortunately abstained. Now-a-days, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americans recognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but are smitten with blindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them is that they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thank God that they are not as this publican.
So much by way of criticism by America; we come now to the defence of Japan.
Japan's relations with the Powers are not of her own seeking; all that Japan asked of the world
was to be let alone. This, however, did not suit the white nations, among whom America led
the way. It was a United States squadron under Commodore Perry that first made Japan aware
of Western aggressiveness. Very soon it became evident that there were only two ways of
dealing with the white man, either to submit to him, or to fight him with his own weapons.
Japan adopted the latter course, and developed a modern army trained by the Germans, a
modern navy modelled on the British, modern machinery derived from America, and modern
morals copied from the whole lot. Everybody except the British was horrified, and called the
Japanese "yellow monkeys." However, they began to be respected when they defeated Russia,
and after they had captured Tsing-tao and half-enslaved China they were admitted to equality
with the other Great Powers at Versailles. The consideration shown to them by the West is
due to their armaments alone; none of their other good qualities would have saved them from
being regarded as "niggers."
People who have never been outside Europe can hardly imagine the intensity of the colour
prejudice that white men develop when brought into contact with any different pigmentation.
I have seen Chinese of the highest education, men as cultured as (say) Dean Inge, treated by
greasy white men as if they were dirt, in a way in which, at home, no Duke would venture to
treat a crossing-sweeper. The Japanese are not treated in this way, because they have a
powerful army and navy. The fact that white men, as individuals, no longer dare to bully
individual Japanese, is important as a beginning of better relations towards the coloured races
in general. If the Japanese, by defeat in war, are prevented from retaining the status of a Great
Power, the coloured races in general will suffer, and the tottering insolence of the white man
will be re-established. Also the world will have lost the last chance of the survival of
civilizations of a different type from that of the industrial West.
The civilization of Japan, in its material aspect, is similar to that of the West, though
industrialism, as yet, is not very developed. But in its mental aspect it is utterly unlike the
West, particularly the Anglo-Saxon West. Worship of the Mikado, as an actually divine
being, is successfully taught in every village school, and provides the popular support for
nationalism. The nationalistic aims of Japan are not merely economic; they are also dynastic
and territorial in a mediæval way. The morality of the Japanese is not utilitarian, but intensely
idealistic. Filial piety is the basis, and includes patriotism, because the Mikado is the father of
his people. The Japanese outlook has the same kind of superstitious absence of realism that
one finds in thirteenth-century theories as to the relations of the Emperor and the Pope. But in
Europe the Emperor and the Pope were different people, and their quarrels promoted freedom
of thought; in Japan, since 1868, they are combined in one sacred person, and there are no
internal conflicts to produce doubt.
Japan, unlike China, is a religious country. The Chinese doubt a proposition until it is proved
to be true; the Japanese believe it until it is proved to be false. I do not know of any evidence
against the view that the Mikado is divine. Japanese religion is essentially nationalistic, like
that of the Jews in the Old Testament. Shinto, the State religion, has been in the main invented
since 1868,[88] and propagated by education in schools. (There was of course an old Shinto
religion, but most of what constitutes modern Shintoism is new.) It is not a religion which
aims at being universal, like Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam; it is a tribal religion, only
intended to appeal to the Japanese. Buddhism subsists side by side with it, and is believed by
the same people. It is customary to adopt Shinto rites for marriages and Buddhist rites for
funerals, because Buddhism is considered more suitable for mournful occasions. Although
Buddhism is a universal religion, its Japanese form is intensely national,[89] like the Church
of England. Many of its priests marry, and in some temples the priesthood is hereditary. Its
dignitaries remind one vividly of English Archdeacons.
The Japanese, even when they adopt industrial methods, do not lose their sense of beauty.
One hears complaints that their goods are shoddy, but they have a remarkable power of
adapting artistic taste to industrialism. If Japan were rich it might produce cities as beautiful
as Venice, by methods as modern as those of New York. Industrialism has hitherto brought
with it elsewhere a rising tide of ugliness, and any nation which can show us how to make this
The tide recedes deserves our gratitude.
The Japanese are earnest, passionate, strong-willed, amazingly hardworking, and capable of boundless sacrifice to an ideal. Most of them have the correlative defects: lack of humour, cruelty, intolerance, and incapacity for free thought. But these defects are by no means universal; one meets among them a certain number of men and women of quite extraordinary excellence. And there is in their civilization as a whole a degree of vigour and determination which commands the highest respect.

The growth of industrialism in Japan has brought with it the growth of Socialism and the Labour movement.[90] In China, the intellectuals are often theoretical Socialists, but in the absence of Labour organizations there is as yet little room for more than theory. In Japan, Trade Unionism has made considerable advances, and every variety of socialist and anarchist opinion is vigorously represented. In time, if Japan becomes increasingly industrial, Socialism may become a political force; as yet, I do not think it is. Japanese Socialists resemble those of other countries, in that they do not share the national superstitions. They are much persecuted by the Government, but not so much as Socialists in America—so at least I am informed by an American who is in a position to judge.

The real power is still in the hands of certain aristocratic families. By the constitution, the Ministers of War and Marine are directly responsible to the Mikado, not to the Diet or the Prime Minister. They therefore can and do persist in policies which are disliked by the Foreign Office. For example, if the Foreign Office were to promise the evacuation of Vladivostok, the War Office might nevertheless decide to keep the soldiers there, and there would be no constitutional remedy. Some part, at least, of what appears as Japanese bad faith is explicable in this way. There is of course a party which wishes to establish real Parliamentary government, but it is not likely to come into power unless the existing régime suffers some severe diplomatic humiliation. If the Washington Conference had compelled the evacuation of not only Shantung but also Vladivostok by diplomatic pressure, the effect on the internal government of Japan would probably have been excellent.

The Japanese are firmly persuaded that they have no friends, and that the Americana are their implacable foes. One gathers that the Government regards war with America as unavoidable in the long run. The argument would be that the economic imperialism of the United States will not tolerate the industrial development of a formidable rival in the Pacific, and that sooner or later the Japanese will be presented with the alternative of dying by starvation or on the battlefield. Then Bushido will come into play, and will lead to choice of the battlefield in preference to starvation. Admiral Sato[91] (the Japanese Bernhardi, as he is called) maintains that absence of Bushido in the Americans will lead to their defeat, and that their money-grubbing souls will be incapable of enduring the hardships and privations of a long war. This, of course, is romantic nonsense. Bushido is no use in modern war, and the Americans are quite as courageous and obstinate as the Japanese. A war might last ten years, but it would certainly end in the defeat of Japan.

One is constantly reminded of the situation between England and Germany in the years before 1914. The Germans wanted to acquire a colonial empire by means similar to those which we had employed; so do the Japanese. We considered such methods wicked when employed by foreigners; so do the Americans. The Germans developed their industries and roused our hostility by competition; the Japanese are similarly competing with America in Far Eastern markets. The Germans felt themselves encircled by our alliances, which we regarded as purely defensive; the Japanese, similarly, found themselves isolated at Washington (except for French sympathy) since the superior diplomatic skill of the Americans has brought us over to their side. The Germans at last, impelled by terrors largely of their own creation, challenged the whole world, and fell; it is very much to be feared that Japan may do likewise. The pros and cons are so familiar in the case of Germany that I need not elaborate them further, since the whole argument can be transferred bodily to the case of Japan. There is, however, this difference, that, while Germany aimed at hegemony of the whole world, the Japanese only aim at hegemony in Eastern Asia.

The conflict between America and Japan is superficially economic, but, as often happens, the economic rivalry is really a cloak for deeper passions. Japan still believes in the divine right
of kings; America believes in the divine right of commerce. I have sometimes tried to
persuade Americans that there may be nations which will not gain by an extension of their
foreign commerce, but I have always found the attempt futile. The Americans believe also
that their religion and morality and culture are far superior to those of the Far East. I regard
this as a delusion, though one shared by almost all Europeans. The Japanese, profoundly and
with all the strength of their being, long to preserve their own culture and to avoid becoming
like Europeans or Americans; and in this I think we ought to sympathize with them. The
colour prejudice is even more intense among Americans than among Europeans; the Japanese
are determined to prove that the yellow man may be the equal of the white man. In this, also,
justice and humanity are on the side of Japan. Thus on the deeper issues, which underlie the
economic and diplomatic conflict, my feelings go with the Japanese rather than with the
Americans.
Unfortunately, the Japanese are always putting themselves in the wrong through impatience
and contempt. They ought to have claimed for China the same consideration that they have
extorted towards themselves; then they could have become, what they constantly profess to
be, the champions of Asia against Europe. The Chinese are prone to gratitude, and would
have helped Japan loyally if Japan had been a true friend to them. But the Japanese despise
the Chinese more than the Europeans do; they do not want to destroy the belief in Eastern
inferiority, but only to be regarded as themselves belonging to the West. They have therefore
behaved so as to cause a well-deserved hatred of them in China. And this same behaviour has
made the best Americans as hostile to them as the worst. If America had had none but base
reasons for hostility to them, they would have found many champions in the United States; as
it is, they have practically none. It is not yet too late; it is still possible for them to win the
affection of China and the respect of the best Americans. To achieve this, they would have to
change their Chinese policy and adopt a more democratic constitution; but if they do not
achieve it, they will fall as Germany fell. And their fall will be a great misfortune for
mankind.
A war between America and Japan would be a very terrible thing in itself, and a still more
terrible thing in its consequences. It would destroy Japanese civilization, ensure the
subjugation of China to Western culture, and launch America upon a career of world-wide
militaristic imperialism. It is therefore, at all costs, to be avoided. If it is to be avoided, Japan
must become more liberal; and Japan will only become more liberal if the present régime is
discredited by failure. Therefore, in the interests of Japan no less than in the interests of
China, it would be well if Japan were forced, by the joint diplomatic pressure of England and
America, to disgorge, not only Shantung, but also all of Manchuria except Port Arthur and its
immediate neighbourhood. (I make this exception because I think nothing short of actual war
would lead the Japanese to abandon Port Arthur.) Our Alliance with Japan, since the end of
the Russo-Japanese war, has been an encouragement to Japan in all that she has done amiss.
Not that Japan has been worse than we have, but that certain kinds of crime are only permitted
to very great Powers, and have been committed by the Japanese at an earlier stage of their
career than prudence would warrant. Our Alliance has been a contributory cause of Japan's
mistakes, and the ending of the Alliance is a necessary condition of Japanese reform.
We come now to Russia's part in the Chinese problem. There is a tendency in Europe to
regard Russia as decrepit, but this is a delusion. True, millions are starving and industry is at a
standstill. But that does not mean what it would in a more highly organized country. Russia is
still able to steal a march on us in Persia and Afghanistan, and on the Japanese in Outer
Mongolia. Russia is still able to organize Bolshevik propaganda in every country in Asia. And
a great part of the effectiveness of this propaganda lies in its promise of liberation from
Europe. So far, in China proper, it has affected hardly anyone except the younger students, to
whom Bolshevism appeals as a method of developing industry without passing through the
stage of private capitalism. This appeal will doubtless diminish as the Bolsheviks are more
and more forced to revert to capitalism. Moreover, Bolshevism, as it has developed in Russia,
is quite peculiarly inapplicable to China, for the following reasons: (1) It requires a strong
centralized State, whereas China has a very weak State, and is tending more and more to
federalism instead of centralization; (2) Bolshevism requires a very great deal of government,
and more control of individual lives by the authorities than has ever been known before, whereas China has developed personal liberty to an extraordinary degree, and is the country of all others where the doctrines of anarchism seem to find successful practical application;

(3) Bolshevism dislikes private trading, which is the breath of life to all Chinese except the literati. For these reasons, it is not likely that Bolshevism as a creed will make much progress in China proper. But Bolshevism as a political force is not the same thing as Bolshevism as a creed. The arguments which proved successful with the Ameer of Afghanistan or the nomads of Mongolia were probably different from those employed in discussion with Mr. Lansbury. The Asiatic expansion of Bolshevik influence is not a distinctively Bolshevik phenomenon, but a continuation of traditional Russian policy, carried on by men who are more energetic, more intelligent, and less corrupt than the officials of the Tsar's régime, and who moreover, like the Americans, believe themselves to be engaged in the liberation of mankind, not in mere imperialistic expansion. This belief, of course, adds enormously to the vigour and success of Bolshevik imperialism, and gives an impulse to Asiatic expansion which is not likely to be soon spent, unless there is an actual restoration of the Tsarist régime under some new Kolchak dependent upon alien arms for his throne and his life.

It is therefore not at all unlikely, if the international situation develops in certain ways, that Russia may set to work to regain Manchuria, and to recover that influence over Peking which the control of Manchuria is bound to give to any foreign Power. It would probably be useless to attempt such an enterprise while Japan remains unembarrassed, but it would at once become feasible if Japan were at war with America or with Great Britain. There is therefore nothing improbable in the supposition that Russia may, within the next ten or twenty years, recover the position which she held in relation to China before the Russo-Japanese war. It must be remembered also that the Russians have an instinct for colonization, and have been trekking eastward for centuries. This tendency has been interrupted by the disasters of the last seven years, but is likely to assert itself again before long.

The hegemony of Russia in Asia would not, to my mind, be in any way regrettable. Russia would probably not be strong enough to tyrannize as much as the English, the Americans, or the Japanese would do. Moreover, the Russians are sufficiently Asiatic in outlook and character to be able to enter into relations of equality and mutual understanding with Asians, in a way which seems quite impossible for the English-speaking nations. And an Asiatic block, if it could be formed, would be strong for defence and weak for attack, which would make for peace. Therefore, on the whole, such a result, if it came about, would probably be desirable in the interests of mankind as a whole.

What, meanwhile, is China's interest? What would be ideally best for China would be to recover Manchuria and Shantung, and then be let alone. The anarchy in China might take a long time to subside, but in the end some system suited to China would be established. The artificial ending of Chinese anarchy by outside interference means the establishment of some system convenient for foreign trade and industry, but probably quite unfitted to the needs of the Chinese themselves. The English in the seventeenth century, the French in the eighteenth, the Americans in the nineteenth, and the Russians in our own day, have passed through years of anarchy and civil war, which were essential to their development, and could not have been curtailed by outside interference without grave detriment to the final solution. So it is with China. Western political ideas have swept away the old imperial system, but have not yet proved strong enough to put anything stable in its place. The problem of transforming China into a modern country is a difficult one, and foreigners ought to be willing to have some patience while the Chinese attempt its solution. They understand their own country, and we do not. If they are let alone, they will, in the end, find a solution suitable to their character, which we shall certainly not do. A solution slowly reached by themselves may be stable, whereas one prematurely imposed by outside Powers will be artificial and therefore unstable. There is, however, very little hope that the decisions reached by the Washington Conference will permanently benefit China, and a considerable chance that they may do quite the reverse. In Manchuria the status quo is to be maintained, while in Shantung the Japanese have made concessions, the value of which only time can show. The Four Powers—America, Great Britain, France, and Japan—have agreed to exploit China in combination, not competitively.
There is a consortium as regards loans, which will have the power of the purse and will therefore be the real Government of China. As the Americans are the only people who have much spare capital, they will control the consortium. As they consider their civilization the finest in the world, they will set to work to turn the Chinese into muscular Christians. As the financiers are the most splendid feature of the American civilization, China must be so governed as to enrich the financiers, who will in return establish colleges and hospitals and Y.M.C.A.'s throughout the length and breadth of the land, and employ agents to buy up the artistic treasures of China for sepulture in their mansions. Chinese intellect, like that of America, will be, directly or indirectly, in the pay of the Trust magnates, and therefore no effective voice will be, raised in favour of radical reform. The inauguration of this system will be welcomed even by some Socialists in the West as a great victory for peace and freedom. But it is impossible to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, or peace and freedom out of capitalism. The fourfold agreement between England, France, America and Japan is, perhaps, a safeguard of peace, but in so far as it brings peace nearer it puts freedom further off. It is the peace obtained when competing firms join in a combine, which is by no means always advantageous to those who have profited by the previous competition. It is quite possible to dominate China without infringing the principle of the Open Door. This principle merely ensures that the domination everywhere shall be American, because America is the strongest Power financially and commercially. It is to America's interest to secure, in China, certain things consistent with Chinese interests, and certain others inconsistent with them. The Americans, for the sake of commerce and good investments, would wish to see a stable government in China, an increase in the purchasing power of the people, and an absence of territorial aggression by other Powers. But they will not wish to see the Chinese strong enough to own and work their own railways or mines, and they will resent all attempts at economic independence, particularly when (as is to be expected) they take the form of State Socialism, or what Lenin calls State Capitalism. They will keep a dossier of every student educated in colleges under American control, and will probably see to it that those who profess Socialist or Radical opinions shall get no posts. They will insist upon the standard of hypocrisy which led them to hound out Gorky when he visited the United States. They will destroy beauty and substitute tidiness. In short, they will insist upon China becoming as like as possible to "God's own country," except that it will not be allowed to keep the wealth generated by its industries. The Chinese have it in them to give to the world a new contribution to civilization as valuable as that which they gave in the past. This would be prevented by the domination of the Americans, because they believe their own civilization to be perfect.

The ideal of capitalism, if it could be achieved, would be to destroy competition among capitalists by means of Trusts, but to keep alive competition among workers. To some extent Trade Unionism has succeeded in diminishing competition among wage-earners within the advanced industrial countries; but it has only intensified the conflict between workers of different races, particularly between the white and yellow races.[92] Under the existing economic system, the competition of cheap Asiatic labour in America, Canada or Australia might well be harmful to white labour in those countries. But under Socialism an influx of industrious, skilled workers in sparsely populated countries would be an obvious gain to everybody. Under Socialism, the immigration of any person who produces more than he or she consumes will be a gain to every other individual in the community, since it increases the wealth per head. But under capitalism, owing to competition for jobs, a worker who either produces much or consumes little is the natural enemy of the others; thus the system makes for inefficient work, and creates an opposition between the general interest and the individual interest of the wage-earner. The case of yellow labour in America and the British Dominions is one of the most unfortunate instances of the artificial conflicts of interest produced by the capitalist system. This whole question of Asiatic immigration, which is liable to cause trouble for centuries to come, can only be radically solved by Socialism, since Socialism alone can bring the private interests of workers in this matter into harmony with the interests of their nation and of the world.

The concentration of the world's capital in a few nations, which, by means of it, are able to
drain all other nations of their wealth, is obviously not a system by which permanent peace can be secured except through the complete subjection of the poorer nations. In the long run, China will see no reason to leave the profits of industry in the hands of foreigners. If, for the present, Russia is successfully starved into submission to foreign capital, Russia also will, when the time is ripe, attempt a new rebellion against the world-empire of finance. I cannot see, therefore, any establishment of a stable world-system as a result of the syndicate formed at Washington. On the contrary, we may expect that, when Asia has thoroughly assimilated our economic system, the Marxian class-war will break out in the form of a war between Asia and the West, with America as the protagonist of capitalism, and Russia as the champion of Asia and Socialism. In such a war, Asia would be fighting for freedom, but probably too late to preserve the distinctive civilizations which now make Asia valuable to the human family. Indeed, the war would probably be so devastating that no civilization of any sort would survive it.

To sum up: the real government of the world is in the hands of the big financiers, except on questions which rouse passionate public interest. No doubt the exclusion of Asians from America and the Dominions is due to popular pressure, and is against the interests of big finance. But not many questions rouse so much popular feeling, and among them only a few are sufficiently simple to be incapable of misrepresentation in the interests of the capitalists. Even in such a case as Asiatic immigration, it is the capitalist system which causes the anti-social interests of wage-earners and makes them illiberal. The existing system makes each man's individual interest opposed, in some vital point, to the interest of the whole. And what applies to individuals applies also to nations; under the existing economic system, a nation's interest is seldom the same as that of the world at large, and then only by accident. International peace might conceivably be secured under the present system, but only by a combination of the strong to exploit the weak. Such a combination is being attempted as the outcome of Washington; but it can only diminish, in the long run, the little freedom now enjoyed by the weaker nations. The essential evil of the present system, as Socialists have pointed out over and over again, is production for profit instead of for use. A man or a company or a nation produces goods, not in order to consume them, but in order to sell them. Hence arise competition and exploitation and all the evils, both in internal labour problems and in international relations. The development of Chinese commerce by capitalistic methods means an increase, for the Chinese, in the prices of the things they export, which are also the things they chiefly consume, and the artificial stimulation of new needs for foreign goods, which places China at the mercy of those who supply these goods, destroys the existing contentment, and generates a feverish pursuit of purely material ends. In a socialistic world, production will be regulated by the same authority which represents the needs of the consumers, and the whole business of competitive buying and selling will cease. Until then, it is possible to have peace by submission to exploitation, or some degree of freedom by continual war, but it is not possible to have both peace and freedom. The success of the present American policy may, for a time, secure peace, but will certainly not secure freedom for the weaker nations, such as Chinese. Only international Socialism can secure both; and owing to the stimulation of revolt by capitalist oppression, even peace alone can never be secure until international Socialism is established throughout the world.

FOOTNOTES:

[86] The interests of England, apart from the question of India, are roughly the same as those of America. Broadly speaking, British interests are allied with American finance, as against the pacifistic and agrarian tendencies of the Middle West.

[87] It is interesting to observe that, since the Washington Conference, the American Administration has used the naval ratio there agreed upon to induce Congress to consent to a larger expenditure on the navy than would otherwise have been sanctioned. Expenditure on the navy is unpopular in America, but by its parade of pacifism the Government has been enabled to extract the necessary money out of the pockets of reluctant taxpayers. See The Times' New York Correspondent's telegram in The Times of April 10, 1922; also April 17.
and 22.


[90] An excellent account of these is given in The Socialist and Labour Movement in Japan, by an American Sociologist, published by the Japan Chronicle.

[91] Author of a book called If Japan and America Fight.

[92] The attitude of white labour to that of Asia is illustrated by the following telegram which appeared in The Times for April 5, 1922, from its Melbourne correspondent: "A deputation of shipwrights and allied trades complained to Mr. Hughes, the Prime Minister, that four Commonwealth ships had been repaired at Antwerp instead of in Australia, and that two had been repaired in India by black labour receiving eight annas (8d.) a day. When the deputation reached the black labour allegation Mr. Hughes jumped from his chair and turned on his interviewers with, 'Black labour be damned. Go to blithering blazes. Don't talk to me about black labour.' Hurrying from the room, he pushed his way through the deputation...." I do not generally agree with Mr. Hughes, but on this occasion, deeply as I deplore his language, I find myself in agreement with his sentiments, assuming that the phrase "black labour be damned" is meant to confer a blessing. [Russ2]
Chinese and Western civilization contrasted

There is at present in China, as we have seen in previous chapters, a close contact between our civilization and that which is native to the Celestial Empire. It is still a doubtful question whether this contact will breed a new civilization better than either of its parents, or whether it will merely destroy the native culture and replace it by that of America. Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, mediaeval Europe from the Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. In many of these cases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the case of China, if we regard the Chinese as the pupils, this may be the case again. In fact, we have quite as much to learn from them as they from us, but there is far less chance of our learning it. If I treat the Chinese as our pupils, rather than vice versa, it is only because I fear we are unteachable.

I propose in this chapter to deal with the purely cultural aspects of the questions raised by the contact of China with the West. In the three following chapters, I shall deal with questions concerning the internal condition of China, returning finally, in a concluding chapter, to the hopes for the future which are permissible in the present difficult situation.

With the exception of Spain and America in the sixteenth century, I cannot think of any instance of two civilizations coming into contact after such a long period of separate development as has marked those of China and Europe. Considering this extraordinary separateness, it is surprising that mutual understanding between Europeans and Chinese is not more difficult. In order to make this point clear, it will be worth while to dwell for a moment on the historical origins of the two civilizations.

Western Europe and America have a practically homogeneous mental life, which I should trace to three sources: (1) Greek culture; (2) Jewish religion and ethics; (3) modern industrialism, which itself is an outcome of modern science. We may take Plato, the Old Testament, and Galileo as representing these three elements, which have remained singularly separable down to the present day. From the Greeks we derive literature and the arts, philosophy and pure mathematics; also the more urbane portions of our social outlook. From the Jews we derive fanatical belief, which its friends call "faith"; moral fervour, with the conception of sin; religious intolerance, and some part of our nationalism. From science, as applied in industrialism, we derive power and the sense of power, the belief that we are as gods, and may justly be, the arbiters of life and death for unscientific races. We derive also the empirical method, by which almost all real knowledge has been acquired. These three elements, I think, account for most of our mentality.

No one of these three elements has had any appreciable part in the development of China, except that Greece indirectly influenced Chinese painting, sculpture, and music.[93] China belongs, in the dawn of its history, to the great river empires, of which Egypt and Babylonia contributed to our origins, by the influence which they had upon the Greeks and Jews. Just as these civilizations were rendered possible by the rich alluvial soil of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, so the original civilization of China was rendered possible by the Yellow River. Even in the time of Confucius, the Chinese Empire did not stretch far either to south or north of the Yellow River. But in spite of this similarity in physical and economic circumstances, there was very little in common between the mental outlook of the Chinese and that of the Egyptians and Babylonians. Lao-Tze[94] and Confucius, who both belong to the sixth century B.C., have already the characteristics which we should regard as distinctive of the modern Chinese. People who attribute everything to economic causes would be hard put to it to account for the differences between the ancient Chinese and the ancient Egyptians and Babylonians. For my part, I have no alternative theory to offer. I do not think science can, at present, account wholly for national character. Climate and economic circumstances account for part, but not the whole. Probably a great deal depends upon the character of dominant individuals who happen to emerge at a formative period, such as Moses, Mahomet, and Confucius.

The oldest known Chinese sage is Lao-Tze, the founder of Taoism. "Lao Tze" is not really a
proper name, but means merely "the old philosopher." He was (according to tradition) an older contemporary of Confucius, and his philosophy is to my mind far more interesting. He held that every person, every animal, and every thing has a certain way or manner of behaving which is natural to him, or her, or it, and that we ought to conform to this way ourselves and encourage others to conform to it. "Tao" means "way," but used in a more or less mystical sense, as in the text: "I am the Way and the Truth and the Life." I think he fancied that death was due to departing from the "way," and that if we all lived strictly according to nature we should be immortal, like the heavenly bodies. In later times Taoism degenerated into mere magic, and was largely concerned with the search for the elixir of life. But I think the hope of escaping from death was an element in Taoist philosophy from the first.

Lao-Tze's book, or rather the book attributed to him, is very short, but his ideas were developed by his disciple Chuang-Tze, who is more interesting than his master. The philosophy which both advocated was one of freedom. They thought ill of government, and of all interferences with Nature. They complained of the hurry of modern life, which they contrasted with the calm existence of those whom they called "the pure men of old." There is a flavour of mysticism in the doctrine of the Tao, because in spite of the multiplicity of living things the Tao is in some sense one, so that if all live according to it there will be no strife in the world. But both sages have already the Chinese characteristics of humour, restraint, and under-statement. Their humour is illustrated by Chuang-Tze's account of Po-Lo who "understood the management of horses," and trained them till five out of every ten died.[95] Their restraint and under-statement are evident when they are compared with Western mystics. Both characteristics belong to all Chinese literature and art, and to the conversation of cultivated Chinese in the present day. All classes in China are fond of laughter, and never miss a chance of a joke. In the educated classes, the humour is sly and delicate, so that Europeans often fail to see it, which adds to the enjoyment of the Chinese. Their habit of under-statement is remarkable. I met one day in Peking a middle-aged man who told me he was academically interested in the theory of politics; being new to the country, I took his statement at its face value, but I afterwards discovered that he had been governor of a province, and had been for many years a very prominent politician. In Chinese poetry there is an apparent absence of passion which is due to the same practice of under-statement. They consider that a wise man should always remain calm, and though they have their passionate moments (being in fact a very excitable race), they do not wish to perpetuate them in art, because they think ill of them. Our romantic movement, which led people to like vehemence, has, so far as I know, no analogue in their literature. Their old music, some of which is very beautiful, makes so little noise that one can only just hear it. In art they aim at being exquisite, and in life at being reasonable. There is no admiration for the ruthless strong man, or for the unrestrained expression of passion. After the more blatant life of the West, one misses at first all the effects at which they are aiming; but gradually the beauty and dignity of their existence become visible, so that the foreigners who have lived longest in China are those who love the Chinese best.

The Taoists, though they survive as magicians, were entirely ousted from the favour of the educated classes by Confucianism. I must confess that I am unable to appreciate the merits of Confucius. His writings are largely occupied with trivial points of etiquette, and his main concern is to teach people how to behave correctly on various occasions. When one compares him, however, with the traditional religious teachers of some other ages and races, one must admit that he has great merits, even if they are mainly negative. His system, as developed by his followers, is one of pure ethics, without religious dogma; it has not given rise to a powerful priesthood, and it has not led to persecution. It certainly has succeeded in producing a whole nation possessed of exquisite manners and perfect courtesy. Nor is Chinese courtesy merely conventional; it is quite as reliable in situations for which no precedent has been provided. And it is not confined to one class; it exists even in the humblest coolie. It is humiliating to watch the brutal insolence of white men received by the Chinese with a quiet dignity which cannot demean itself to answer rudeness with rudeness. Europeans often regard this as weakness, but it is really strength, the strength by which the Chinese have hitherto conquered all their conquerors.
There is one, and only one, important foreign element in the traditional civilization of China, and that is Buddhism. Buddhism came to China from India in the early centuries of the Christian era, and acquired a definite place in the religion of the country. We, with the intolerant outlook which we have taken over from the Jews, imagine that if a man adopts one religion he cannot adopt another. The dogmas of Christianity and Mohammedanism, in their orthodox forms, are so framed that no man can accept both. But in China this incompatibility does not exist; a man may be both a Buddhist and a Confucian, because nothing in either is incompatible with the other. In Japan, similarly, most people are both Buddhists and Shintoists. Nevertheless there is a temperamental difference between Buddhism and Confucianism, which will cause any individual to lay stress on one or other even if he accepts both. Buddhism is a religion in the sense in which we understand the word. It has mystic doctrines and a way of salvation and a future life. It has a message to the world intended to cure the despair which it regards as natural to those who have no religious faith. It assumes an instinctive pessimism only to be cured by some gospel. Confucianism has nothing of all this. It assumes people fundamentally at peace with the world, wanting only instruction as to how to live, not encouragement to live at all. And its ethical instruction is not based upon any metaphysical or religious dogma; it is purely mundane. The result of the co-existence of these two religions in China has been that the more religious and contemplative natures turned to Buddhism, while the active administrative type was content with Confucianism, which was always the official teaching, in which candidates for the civil service were examined. The result is that for many ages the Government of China has been in the hands of literary sceptics, whose administration has been lacking in those qualities of energy and destructiveness which Western nations demand of their rulers. In fact, they have conformed very closely to the maxims of Chuang-Tze. The result has been that the population has been happy except where civil war brought misery; that subject nations have been allowed autonomy; and that foreign nations have had no need to fear China, in spite of its immense population and resources.

Comparing the civilization of China with that of Europe, one finds in China most of what was to be found in Greece, but nothing of the other two elements of our civilization, namely Judaism and science. China is practically destitute of religion, not only in the upper classes, but throughout the population. There is a very definite ethical code, but it is not fierce or persecuting, and does not contain the notion "sin." Except quite recently, through European influence, there has been no science and no industrialism.

What will be the outcome of the contact of this ancient civilization with the West? I am not thinking of the political or economic outcome, but of the effect on the Chinese mental outlook. It is difficult to dissociate the two questions altogether, because of course the cultural contact with the West must be affected by the nature of the political and economic contact. Nevertheless, I wish to consider the cultural question as far as I can in isolation.

There is, in China, a great eagerness to acquire Western learning, not simply in order to acquire national strength and be able to resist Western aggression, but because a very large number of people consider learning a good thing in itself. It is traditional in China to place a high value on knowledge, but in old days the knowledge sought was only of the classical literature. Nowadays it is generally realized that Western knowledge is more useful. Many students go every year to universities in Europe, and still more to America, to learn science or economics or law or political theory. These men, when they return to China, mostly become teachers or civil servants or journalists or politicians. They are rapidly modernizing the Chinese outlook, especially in the educated classes.

The traditional civilization of China had become unprogressive, and had ceased to produce much of value in the way of art and literature. This was not due, I think, to any decadence in the race, but merely to lack of new material. The influx of Western knowledge provides just the stimulus that was needed. Chinese students are able and extraordinarily keen. Higher education suffers from lack of funds and absence of libraries, but does not suffer from any lack of the finest human material. Although Chinese civilization has hitherto been deficient in science, it never contained anything hostile to science, and therefore the spread of scientific knowledge encounters no such obstacles as the Church put in its way in Europe. I have no
doubt that if the Chinese could get a stable government and sufficient funds, they would, within the next thirty years, begin to produce remarkable work in science. It is quite likely that they might outstrip us, because they come with fresh zest and with all the ardour of a renaissance. In fact, the enthusiasm for learning in Young China reminds one constantly of the renaissance spirit in fifteenth-century Italy.

It is very remarkable, as distinguishing the Chinese from the Japanese, that the things they wish to learn from us are not those that bring wealth or military strength, but rather those that have either an ethical and social value, or a purely intellectual interest. They are not by any means uncritical of our civilization. Some of them told me that they were less critical before 1914, but that the war made them think there must be imperfections in the Western manner of life. The habit of looking to the West for wisdom was, however, very strong, and some of the younger ones thought that Bolshevism could give what they were looking for. That hope also must be suffering disappointment, and before long they will realize that they must work out their own salvation by means of a new synthesis. The Japanese adopted our faults and kept their own, but it is possible to hope that the Chinese will make the opposite selection, keeping their own merits and adopting ours.

The distinctive merit of our civilization, I should say, is the scientific method; the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a just conception of the ends of life. It is these two that one must hope to see gradually uniting.

Lao-Tze describes the operation of Tao as "production without possession, action without self-assertion, development without domination." I think one could derive from these words a conception of the ends of life as reflective Chinese see them, and it must be admitted that they are very different from the ends which most white men set before themselves. Possession, self-assertion, domination, are eagerly sought, both nationally and individually. They have been erected into a philosophy by Nietzsche, and Nietzsche's disciples are not confined to Germany.

But, it will be said, you have been comparing Western practice with Chinese theory; if you had compared Western theory with Chinese practice, the balance would have come out quite differently. There is, of course, a great deal of truth in this. Possession, which is one of the three things that Lao-Tze wishes us to forego, is certainly dear to the heart of the average Chinaman. As a race, they are tenacious of money—not perhaps more so than the French, but certainly more than the English or the Americans. Their politics are corrupt, and their powerful men make money in disgraceful ways. All this it is impossible to deny.

Nevertheless, as regards the other two evils, self-assertion and domination, I notice a definite superiority to ourselves in Chinese practice. There is much less desire than among the white races to tyrannize over other people. The weakness of China internationally is quite as much due to this virtue as to the vices of corruption and so on which are usually assigned as the sole reason. If any nation in the world could ever be "too proud to fight," that nation would be China. The natural Chinese attitude is one of tolerance and friendliness, showing courtesy and expecting it in return. If the Chinese chose, they could be the most powerful nation in the world. But they only desire freedom, not domination. It is not improbable that other nations may compel them to fight for their freedom, and if so, they may lose their virtues and acquire a taste for empire. But at present, though they have been an imperial race for 2,000 years, their love of empire is extraordinarily slight.

Although there have been many wars in China, the natural outlook of the Chinese is very pacifistic. I do not know of any other country where a poet would have chosen, as Po-Chui did in one of the poems translated by Mr. Waley, called by him The Old Man with the Broken Arm, to make a hero of a recruit who maimed himself to escape military service. Their pacifism is rooted in their contemplative outlook, and in the fact that they do not desire to change whatever they see. They take a pleasure—as their pictures show—in observing characteristic manifestations of different kinds of life, and they have no wish to reduce everything to a preconceived pattern. They have not the ideal of progress which dominates the Western nations, and affords a rationalization of our active impulses. Progress is, of course, a very modern ideal even with us; it is part of what we owe to science and industrialism. The cultivated conservative Chinese of the present day talk exactly as their earliest sages write. If
one points out to them that this shows how little progress there has been, they will say: "Why seek progress when you already enjoy what is excellent?" At first, this point of view seems to a European unduly indolent; but gradually doubts as to one's own wisdom grow up, and one begins to think that much of what we call progress is only restless change, bringing us no nearer to any desirable goal.

It is interesting to contrast what the Chinese have sought in the West with what the West has sought in China. The Chinese in the West seek knowledge, in the hope—which I fear is usually vain—that knowledge may prove a gateway to wisdom. White men have gone to China with three motives: to fight, to make money, and to convert the Chinese to our religion. The last of these motives has the merit of being idealistic, and has inspired many heroic lives. But the soldier, the merchant, and the missionary are alike concerned to stamp our civilization upon the world; they are all three, in a certain sense, pugnacious. The Chinese have no wish to convert us to Confucianism; they say "religions are many, but reason is one," and with that they are content to let us go our way. They are good merchants, but their methods are quite different from those of European merchants in China, who are perpetually seeking concessions, monopolies, railways, and mines, and endeavouring to get their claims supported by gunboats. The Chinese are not, as a rule, good soldiers, because the causes for which they are asked to fight are not worth fighting for, and they know it. But that is only a proof of their reasonableness.

I think the tolerance of the Chinese is in excess of anything that Europeans can imagine from their experience at home. We imagine ourselves tolerant, because we are more so than our ancestors. But we still practise political and social persecution, and what is more, we are firmly persuaded that our civilization and our way of life are immeasurably better than any other, so that when we come across a nation like the Chinese, we are convinced that the kindest thing we can do to them is to make them like ourselves. I believe this to be a profound mistake. It seemed to me that the average Chinaman, even if he is miserably poor, is happier than the average Englishman, and is happier because the nation is built upon a more humane and civilized outlook than our own. Restlessness and pugnacity not only cause obvious evils, but fill our lives with discontent, incapacitate us for the enjoyment of beauty, and make us almost incapable of the contemplative virtues. In this respect we have grown rapidly worse during the last hundred years. I do not deny that the Chinese go too far in the other direction; but for that very reason I think contact between East and West is likely to be fruitful to both parties. They may learn from us the indispensable minimum of practical efficiency, and we may learn from them something of that contemplative wisdom which has enabled them to persist while all the other nations of antiquity have perished.

When I went to China, I went to teach; but every day that I stayed I thought less of what I had to teach them and more of what I had to learn from them. Among Europeans who had lived a long time in China, I found this attitude not uncommon; but among those whose stay is short, or who go only to make money, it is sadly rare. It is rare because the Chinese do not excel in the things we really value—military prowess and industrial enterprise. But those who value wisdom or beauty, or even the simple enjoyment of life, will find more of these things in China than in the distracted and turbulent West, and will be happy to live where such things are valued. I wish I could hope that China, in return for our scientific knowledge, may give us something of her large tolerance and contemplative peace of mind.

FOOTNOTES:
[94] With regard to Lao-Tze, the book which bears his name is of doubtful authenticity, and was probably compiled two or three centuries after his death. Cf. Giles, op. cit., Lecture V.
[95] Quoted in Chap. IV, pp. 82-3.
Chapter XII

The Chinese character

There is a theory among Occidentals that the Chinaman is inscrutable, full of secret thoughts, and impossible for us to understand. It may be that a greater experience of China would have brought me to share this opinion; but I could see nothing to support it during the time when I was working in that country. I talked to the Chinese as I should have talked to English people, and they answered me much as English people would have answered a Chinese whom they considered educated and not wholly unintelligent. I do not believe in the myth of the "Subtle Oriental"; I am convinced that in a game of mutual deception an Englishman or American can beat a Chinese nine times out of ten. But as many comparatively poor Chinese have dealings with rich white men, the game is often played only on one side. Then, no doubt, the white man is deceived and swindled; but not more than a Chinese mandarin would be in London.

One of the most remarkable things about the Chinese is their power of securing the affection of foreigners. Almost all Europeans like China, both those who come only as tourists and those who live there for many years. In spite of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, I can recall hardly a single Englishman in the Far East who liked the Japanese as well as the Chinese. Those who have lived long among them tend to acquire their outlook and their standards. New arrivals are struck by obvious evils: the beggars, the terrible poverty, the prevalence of disease, the anarchy and corruption in politics. Every energetic Westerner feels at first a strong desire to reform these evils, and of course they ought to be reformed.

But the Chinese, even those who are the victims of preventable misfortunes, show a vast passive indifference to the excitement of the foreigners; they wait for it to go off, like the effervescence of soda-water. And gradually strange hesitations creep into the mind of the bewildered traveller; after a period of indignation, he begins to doubt all the maxims he has hitherto accepted without question. Is it really wise to be always guarding against future misfortune? Is it prudent to lose all enjoyment of the present through thinking of the disasters that may come at some future date? Should our lives be passed in building a mansion that we shall never have leisure to inhabit?

The Chinese answer these questions in the negative, and therefore have to put up with poverty, disease, and anarchy. But, to compensate for these evils, they have retained, as industrial nations have not, the capacity for civilized enjoyment, for leisure and laughter, for pleasure in sunshine and philosophical discourse. The Chinese, of all classes, are more laughter-loving than any other race with which I am acquainted; they find amusement in everything, and a dispute can always be softened by a joke.

I remember one hot day when a party of us were crossing the hills in chairs—the way was rough and very steep, the work for the coolies very severe. At the highest point of our journey, we stopped for ten minutes to let the men rest. Instantly they all sat in a row, brought out their pipes, and began to laugh among themselves as if they had not a care in the world. In any country that had learned the virtue of forethought, they would have devoted the moments to complaining of the heat, in order to increase their tip. We, being Europeans, spent the time worrying whether the automobile would be waiting for us at the right place. Well-to-do Chinese would have started a discussion as to whether the universe moves in cycles or progresses by a rectilinear motion; or they might have set to work to consider whether the truly virtuous man shows complete self-abnegation, or may, on occasion, consider his own interest.

One comes across white men occasionally who suffer under the delusion that China is not a civilized country. Such men have quite forgotten what constitutes civilization. It is true that there are no trams in Peking, and that the electric light is poor. It is true that there are places full of beauty, which Europeans itch to make hideous by digging up coal. It is true that the educated Chinaman is better at writing poetry than at remembering the sort of facts which can be looked up in Whitaker's Almanac. A European, in recommending a place of residence, will tell you that it has a good train service; the best quality he can conceive in any place is that it should be easy to get away from. But a Chinaman will tell you nothing about the trains; if you ask, he will tell you wrong. What he tells you is that there is a palace built by an ancient
emperor, and a retreat in a lake for scholars weary of the world, founded by a famous poet of the Tang dynasty. It is this outlook that strikes the Westerner as barbaric.

The Chinese, from the highest to the lowest, have an imperturbable quiet dignity, which is usually not destroyed even by a European education. They are not self-assertive, either individually or nationally; their pride is too profound for self-assertion. They admit China's military weakness in comparison with foreign Powers, but they do not consider efficiency in homicide the most important quality in a man or a nation. I think that, at bottom, they almost all believe that China is the greatest nation in the world, and has the finest civilization. A Westerner cannot be expected to accept this view, because it is based on traditions utterly different from his own. But gradually one comes to feel that it is, at any rate, not an absurd view; that it is, in fact, the logical outcome of a self-consistent standard of values. The typical Westerner wishes to be the cause of as many changes as possible in his environment; the typical Chinaman wishes to enjoy as much and as delicately as possible. This difference is at the bottom of most of the contrast between China and the English-speaking world.

We in the West make a fetish of "progress," which is the ethical camouflage of the desire to be the cause of changes. If we are asked, for instance, whether machinery has really improved the world, the question strikes us as foolish: it has brought great changes and therefore great "progress." What we believe to be a love of progress is really, in nine cases out of ten, a love of power, an enjoyment of the feeling that by our fiat we can make things different. For the sake of this pleasure, a young American will work so hard that, by the time he has acquired his millions, he has become a victim of dyspepsia, compelled to live on toast and water, and to be a mere spectator of the feasts that he offers to his guests. But he consoles himself with the thought that he can control politics, and provoke or prevent wars as may suit his investments. It is this temperament that makes Western nations "progressive."

There are, of course, ambitious men in China, but they are less common than among ourselves. And their ambition takes a different form—not a better form, but one produced by the preference of enjoyment to power. It is a natural result of this preference that avarice is a widespread failing of the Chinese. Money brings the means of enjoyment, therefore money is passionately desired. With us, money is desired chiefly as a means to power; politicians, who can acquire power without much money, are often content to remain poor. In China, the tuchuns (military governors), who have the real power, almost always use it for the sole purpose of amassing a fortune. Their object is to escape to Japan at a suitable moment; with sufficient plunder to enable them to enjoy life quietly for the rest of their days. The fact that in escaping they lose power does not trouble them in the least. It is, of course, obvious that such politicians, who spread devastation only in the provinces committed to their care, are far less harmful to the world than our own, who ruin whole continents in order to win an election campaign.

The corruption and anarchy in Chinese politics do much less harm than one would be inclined to expect. But for the predatory desires of the Great Powers—especially Japan—the harm would be much less than is done by our own "efficient" Governments. Nine-tenths of the activities of a modern Government are harmful; therefore the worse they are performed, the better. In China, where the Government is lazy, corrupt, and stupid, there is a degree of individual liberty which has been wholly lost in the rest of the world.

The laws are just as bad as elsewhere; occasionally, under foreign pressure, a man is imprisoned for Bolshevist propaganda, just as he might be in England or America. But this is quite exceptional; as a rule, in practice, there is very little interference with free speech and a free Press.[96] The individual does not feel obliged to follow the herd, as he has in Europe since 1914, and in America since 1917. Men still think for themselves, and are not afraid to announce the conclusions at which they arrive. Individualism has perished in the West, but in China it survives, for good as well as for evil. Self-respect and personal dignity are possible for every coolie in China, to a degree which is, among ourselves, possible only for a few leading financiers.

The business of "saving face," which often strikes foreigners in China as ludicrous, is only the carrying-out of respect for personal dignity in the sphere of social manners. Everybody has "face," even the humblest beggar; there are humiliations that you must not inflict upon him, if
you are not to outrage the Chinese ethical code. If you speak to a Chinaman in a way that transgresses the code, he will laugh, because your words must be taken as spoken in jest if they are not to constitute an offence.

Once I thought that the students to whom I was lecturing were not as industrious as they might be, and I told them so in just the same words that I should have used to English students in the same circumstances. But I soon found I was making a mistake. They all laughed uneasily, which surprised me until I saw the reason. Chinese life, even among the most modernized, is far more polite than anything to which we are accustomed. This, of course, interferes with efficiency, and also (what is more serious) with sincerity and truth in personal relations. If I were Chinese, I should wish to see it mitigated. But to those who suffer from the brutalities of the West, Chinese urbnity is very restful. Whether on the balance it is better or worse than our frankness, I shall not venture to decide.

The Chinese remind one of the English in their love of compromise and in their habit of bowing to public opinion. Seldom is a conflict pushed to its ultimate brutal issue. The treatment of the Manchu Emperor may be taken as a case in point. When a Western country becomes a Republic, it is customary to cut off the head of the deposed monarch, or at least to cause him to fly the country. But the Chinese have left the Emperor his title, his beautiful palace, his troops of eunuchs, and an income of several million dollars a year. He is a boy of sixteen, living peaceably in the Forbidden City. Once, in the course of a civil war, he was nominally restored to power for a few days; but he was deposed again, without being in any way punished for the use to which he had been put.

Public opinion is a very real force in China, when it can be roused. It was, by all accounts, mainly responsible for the downfall of the An Fu party in the summer of 1920. This party was pro-Japanese and was accepting loans from Japan. Hatred of Japan is the strongest and most widespread of political passions in China, and it was stirred up by the students in fiery orations. The An Fu party had, at first, a great preponderance of military strength; but their soldiers melted away when they came to understand the cause for which they were expected to fight. In the end, the opponents of the An Fu party were able to enter Peking and change the Government almost without firing a shot.

The same influence of public opinion was decisive in the teachers' strike, which was on the point of being settled when I left Peking. The Government, which is always impecunious, owing to corruption, had left its teachers unpaid for many months. At last they struck to enforce payment, and went on a peaceful deputation to the Government, accompanied by many students. There was a clash with the soldiers and police, and many teachers and students were more or less severely wounded. This led to a terrific outcry, because the love of education in China is profound and widespread. The newspapers clamoured for revolution. The Government had just spent nine million dollars in corrupt payments to three Tuchuns who had descended upon the capital to extort blackmail. It could not find any colourable pretext for refusing the few hundred thousands required by the teachers, and it capitulated in panic. I do not think there is any Anglo-Saxon country where the interests of teachers would have roused the same degree of public feeling.

Nothing astonishes a European more in the Chinese than their patience. The educated Chinese are well aware of the foreign menace. They realize acutely what the Japanese have done in Manchuria and Shantung. They are aware that the English in Hong-Kong are doing their utmost to bring to naught the Canton attempt to introduce good government in the South. They know that all the Great Powers, without exception, look with greedy eyes upon the undeveloped resources of their country, especially its coal and iron. They have before them the example of Japan, which, by developing a brutal militarism, a cast-iron discipline, and a new reactionary religion, has succeeded in holding at bay the fierce lusts of "civilized" industrialists. Yet they neither copy Japan nor submit tamely to foreign domination. They think not in decades, but in centuries. They have been conquered before, first by the Tartars and then by the Manchus; but in both cases they absorbed their conquerors. Chinese civilization persisted, unchanged; and after a few generations the invaders became more Chinese than their subjects.

Manchuria is a rather empty country, with abundant room for colonization. The Japanese
assert that they need colonies for their surplus population, yet the Chinese immigrants into Manchuria exceed the Japanese a hundredfold. Whatever may be the temporary political status of Manchuria, it will remain a part of Chinese civilization, and can be recovered whenever Japan happens to be in difficulties. The Chinese derive such strength from their four hundred millions, the toughness of their national customs, their power of passive resistance, and their unrivalled national cohesiveness—in spite of the civil wars, which merely ruffle the surface—that they can afford to despise military methods, and to wait till the feverish energy of their oppressors shall have exhausted itself in internecine combats. China is much less a political entity than a civilization—the only one that has survived from ancient times. Since the days of Confucius, the Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Empires have perished; but China has persisted through a continuous evolution. There have been foreign influences—first Buddhism, and now Western science. But Buddhism did not turn the Chinese into Indians, and Western science will not turn them into Europeans. I have met men in China who knew as much of Western learning as any professor among ourselves; yet they had not been thrown off their balance, or lost touch with their own people. What is bad in the West—its brutality, its restlessness, its readiness to oppress the weak, its preoccupation with purely material aims—they see to be bad, and do not wish to adopt. What is good, especially its science, they do wish to adopt. The old indigenous culture of China has become rather dead; its art and literature are not what they were, and Confucius does not satisfy the spiritual needs of a modern man, even if he is Chinese. The Chinese who have had a European or American education realize that a new element, is needed to vitalize native traditions, and they look to our civilization to supply it. But they do not wish to construct a civilization just like ours; and it is precisely in this that the best hope lies. If they are not goaded into militarism, they may produce a genuinely new civilization, better than any that we in the West have been able to create.

So far, I have spoken chiefly of the good sides of the Chinese character; but of course China, like every other nation, has its bad sides also. It is disagreeable to me to speak of these, as I experienced so much courtesy and real kindness from the Chinese, that I should prefer to say only nice things about them. But for the sake of China, as well as for the sake of truth, it would be a mistake to conceal what is less admirable. I will only ask the reader to remember that, on the balance, I think the Chinese one of the best nations I have come across, and am prepared to draw up a graver indictment against every one of the Great Powers. Shortly before I left China, an eminent Chinese writer pressed me to say what I considered the chief defects of the Chinese. With some reluctance, I mentioned three: avarice, cowardice and callousness. Strange to say, my interlocutor, instead of getting angry, admitted the justice of my criticism, and proceeded to discuss possible remedies. This is a sample of the intellectual integrity which is one of China's greatest virtues. The callousness of the Chinese is bound to strike every Anglo-Saxon. They have none of that humanitarian impulse which leads us to devote one per cent. of our energy to mitigating the evils wrought by the other ninety-nine per cent. For instance, we have been forbidding the Austrians to join with Germany, to emigrate, or to obtain the raw materials of industry. Therefore the Viennese have starved, except those whom it has pleased us to keep alive from philanthropy. The Chinese would not have had the energy to starve the Viennese, or the philanthropy to keep some of them alive. While I was in China, millions were dying of famine; men sold their children into slavery for a few dollars, and killed them if this sum was unobtainable. Much was done by white men to relieve the famine, but very little by the Chinese, and that little vitiated by corruption. It must be said, however, that the efforts of the white men were more effective in soothing their own consciences than in helping the Chinese. So long as the present birth-rate and the present methods of agriculture persist, famines are bound to occur periodically; and those whom philanthropy keeps alive through one famine are only too likely to perish in the next.

Famines in China can be permanently cured only by better methods of agriculture combined with emigration or birth-control on a large scale. Educated Chinese realize this, and it makes them indifferent to efforts to keep the present victims alive. A great deal of Chinese callousness has a similar explanation, and is due to perception of the vastness of the problems
involved. But there remains a residue which cannot be so explained. If a dog is run over by an automobile and seriously hurt, nine out of ten passers-by will stop to laugh at the poor brute's howls. The spectacle of suffering does not of itself rouse any sympathetic pain in the average Chinaman; in fact, he seems to find it mildly agreeable. Their history, and their penal code before the revolution of 1911, show that they are by no means destitute of the impulse of active cruelty; but of this I did not myself come across any instances. And it must be said that active cruelty is practised by all the great nations, to an extent concealed from us only by our hypocrisy.

Cowardice is prima facie a fault of the Chinese; but I am not sure that they are really lacking in courage. It is true that, in battles between rival tuchuns, both sides run away, and victory rests with the side that first discovers the flight of the other. But this proves only that the Chinese soldier is a rational man. No cause of any importance is involved, and the armies consist of mere mercenaries. When there is a serious issue, as, for instance, in the Tai-Ping rebellion, the Chinese are said to fight well, particularly if they have good officers. Nevertheless, I do not think that, in comparison with the Anglo-Saxons, the French, or the Germans, the Chinese can be considered a courageous people, except in the matter of passive endurance. They will endure torture, and even death, for motives which men of more pugnacious races would find insufficient—for example, to conceal the hiding-place of stolen plunder. In spite of their comparative lack of active courage, they have less fear of death than we have, as is shown by their readiness to commit suicide.

Avarice is, I should say, the gravest defect of the Chinese. Life is hard, and money is not easily obtained. For the sake of money, all except a very few foreign-educated Chinese will be guilty of corruption. For the sake of a few pence, almost any coolie will run an imminent risk of death. The difficulty of combating Japan has arisen mainly from the fact that hardly any Chinese politician can resist Japanese bribes. I think this defect is probably due to the fact that, for many ages, an honest living has been hard to get: in which case it will be lessened as economic conditions improve. I doubt if it is any worse now in China than it was in Europe in the eighteenth century. I have not heard of any Chinese general more corrupt than Marlborough, or of any politician more corrupt than Cardinal Dubois. It is, therefore, quite likely that changed industrial conditions will make the Chinese as honest as we are—which is not saying much.

I have been speaking of the Chinese as they are in ordinary life, when they appear as men of active and sceptical intelligence, but of somewhat sluggish passions. There is, however, another side to them: they are capable of wild excitement, often of a collective kind. I saw little of this myself, but there can be no doubt of the fact. The Boxer rising was a case in point, and one which particularly affected Europeans. But their history is full of more or less analogous disturbances. It is this element in their character that makes them incapable, and makes it impossible even to guess at their future. One can imagine a section of them becoming fanatically Bolshevist, or anti-Japanese, or Christian, or devoted to some leader who would ultimately declare himself Emperor. I suppose it is this element in their character that makes them, in spite of their habitual caution, the most reckless gamblers in the world. And many emperors have lost their thrones through the force of romantic love, although romantic love is far more despised than it is in the West.

To sum up the Chinese character is not easy. Much of what strikes the foreigner is due merely to the fact that they have preserved an ancient civilization which is not industrial. All this is likely to pass away, under the pressure of the Japanese, and of European and American financiers. Their art is already perishing, and being replaced by crude imitations of second-rate European pictures. Most of the Chinese who have had a European education are quite incapable of seeing any beauty in native painting, and merely observe contemptuously that it does not obey the laws of perspective.

The obvious charm which the tourist finds in China cannot be preserved; it must perish at the touch of industrialism. But perhaps something may be preserved, something of the ethical qualities in which China is supreme, and which the modern world most desperately needs. Among these qualities I place first the pacific temper, which seeks to settle disputes on grounds of justice rather than by force. It remains to be seen whether the West will allow this
temper to persist, or will force it to give place, in self-defence, to a frantic militarism like that
to which Japan has been driven.

FOOTNOTES:

[96]
This vexes the foreigners, who are attempting to establish a very severe Press censorship in
Shanghai. See "The Shanghai Printed Matter Bye-Law." Hollington K. Tong, Review of the
Far East, April 16, 1922. [Russ2]

1922.01.13-14 Russell, Bertrand. The problem of China [ID D5122]. (13)
Chapter XIII

Higher education in China

China, like Italy and Greece, is frequently misjudged by persons of culture because they
regard it as a museum. The preservation of ancient beauty is very important, but no vigorous
forward-looking man is content to be a mere curator. The result is that the best people in
China tend to be Philistines as regards all that is pleasing to the European tourist. The
European in China, quite apart from interested motives, is apt to be ultra-conservative,
because he likes everything distinctive and non-European. But this is the attitude of an
outsider, of one who regards China as a country to be looked at rather than lived in, as a
country with a past rather than a future. Patriotic Chinese naturally do not view their country
in this way; they wish their country to acquire what is best in the modern world, not merely to
remain an interesting survival of a by-gone age, like Oxford or the Yellowstone Park. As the
first step to this end, they do all they can to promote higher education, and to increase the
number of Chinese who can use and appreciate Western knowledge without being the slaves
of Western follies. What is being done in this direction is very interesting, and one of the most
hopeful things happening in our not very cheerful epoch.

There is first the old traditional curriculum, the learning by rote of the classics without
explanation in early youth, followed by a more intelligent study in later years. This is exactly
like the traditional study of the classics in this country, as it existed, for example, in the
eighteenth century. Men over thirty, even if, in the end, they have secured a thoroughly
modern education, have almost all begun by learning reading and writing in old-fashioned
schools. Such schools still form the majority, and give most of the elementary education that
is given. Every child has to learn by heart every day some portion of the classical text, and
repeat it out loud in class. As they all repeat at the same time, the din is deafening. (In Peking
I lived next to one of these schools, so I can speak from experience.) The number of people
who are taught to read by these methods is considerable; in the large towns one finds that
even coolies can read as often as not. But writing (which is very difficult in Chinese) is a
much rarer accomplishment. Probably those who can both read and write form about five per
cent, of the population.

The establishment of normal schools for the training of teachers on modern lines, which grew
out of the edict of 1905 abolishing the old examination system and proclaiming the need of
educational reform, has done much, and will do much more, to transform and extend
elementary education. The following statistics showing the increase in the number of schools,
teachers, and students in China are taken from Mr. Tyau's China Awakened, p. 4:

1910 1914 1917 1919
Considering that the years concerned are years of revolution and civil war, it must be admitted that the progress shown by these figures is very remarkable.

There are schemes for universal elementary education, but so far, owing to the disturbed condition of the country and the lack of funds, it has been impossible to carry them out except in a few places on a small scale. They would, however, be soon carried out if there were a stable government.

The traditional classical education was, of course, not intended to be only elementary. The amount of Chinese literature is enormous, and the older texts are extremely difficult to understand. There is scope, within the tradition, for all the industry and erudition of the finest renaissance scholars. Learning of this sort has been respected in China for many ages. One meets old scholars of this type, to whose opinions, even in politics, it is customary to defer, although they have the innocence and unworldliness of the old-fashioned don. They remind one almost of the men whom Lamb describes in his essay on Oxford in the Vacation—learned, lovable, and sincere, but utterly lost in the modern world, basing their opinions of Socialism, for example, on what some eleventh-century philosopher said about it. The arguments for and against the type of higher education that they represent are exactly the same as those for and against a classical education in Europe, and one is driven to the same conclusion in both cases: that the existence of specialists having this type of knowledge is highly desirable, but that the ordinary curriculum for the average educated person should take more account of modern needs, and give more instruction in science, modern languages, and contemporary international relations. This is the view, so far as I could discover, of all reforming educationists in China.

The second kind of higher education in China is that initiated by the missionaries, and now almost entirely in the hands of the Americans. As everyone knows, America's position in Chinese education was acquired through the Boxer indemnity. Most of the Powers, at that time, if their own account is to be believed, demanded a sum representing only actual loss and damage, but the Americans, according to their critics, demanded (and obtained) a vastly larger sum, of which they generously devoted the surplus to educating Chinese students, both in China and at American universities. This course of action has abundantly justified itself, both politically and commercially; a larger and larger number of posts in China go to men who have come under American influence, and who have come to believe that America is the one true friend of China among the Great Powers.

One may take as typical of American work three institutions of which I saw a certain amount: Tsing-Hua College (about ten miles from Peking), the Peking Union Medical College (connected with the Rockefeller Hospital), and the so-called Peking University. Tsing-Hua College, delightfully situated at the foot of the Western hills, with a number of fine solid buildings, in a good American style, owes its existence entirely to the Boxer indemnity money. It has an atmosphere exactly like that of a small American university, and a (Chinese) President who is an almost perfect reproduction of the American College President. The teachers are partly American, partly Chinese educated in America, and there tends to be more and more of the latter. As one enters the gates, one becomes aware of the presence of every virtue usually absent in China: cleanliness, punctuality, exactitude, efficiency. I had not much opportunity to judge of the teaching, but whatever I saw made me think that the institution was thorough and good. One great merit, which belongs to American institutions generally, is that the students are made to learn English. Chinese differs so profoundly from European languages that even with the most skillful translations a student who knows only Chinese cannot understand European ideas; therefore the learning of some European language is essential, and English is far the most familiar and useful throughout the Far East. The students at Tsing-Hua College learn mathematics and science and philosophy, and broadly speaking, the more elementary parts of what is commonly taught in universities. Many of the best of them go afterwards to America, where they take a Doctor's degree. On returning to China they become teachers or civil servants. Undoubtedly they contribute
greatly to the improvement of their country in efficiency and honesty and technical
intelligence.

The Rockefeller Hospital is a large, conspicuous building, representing an interesting attempt
to combine something of Chinese beauty with European utilitarian requirements. The green
roofs are quite Chinese, but the walls and windows are European. The attempt is
praiseworthy, though perhaps not wholly successful. The hospital has all the most modern
scientific apparatus, but, with the monopolistic tendency of the Standard Oil Company, it
refuses to let its apparatus be of use to anyone not connected with the hospital. The Peking
Union Medical College teaches many things besides medicine—English literature, for
example—and apparently teaches them well. They are necessary in order to produce Chinese
physicians and surgeons who will reach the European level, because a good knowledge of
some European language is necessary for medicine as for other kinds of European learning.
And a sound knowledge of scientific medicine is, of course, of immense importance to China,
where there is no sort of sanitation and epidemics are frequent.

The so-called Peking University is an example of what the Chinese have to suffer on account
of extra-territoriality. The Chinese Government (so at least I was told) had already established
a university in Peking, fully equipped and staffed, and known as the Peking University. But
the Methodist missionaries decided to give the name "Peking University" to their schools, so
the already existing university had to alter its name to "Government University." The case is
exactly as if a collection of old-fashioned Chirmen had established themselves in London to
teach the doctrine of Confucius, and had been able to force London University to abandon its
name to them. However, I do not wish to raise the question of extra-territoriality, the more so
as I do not think it can be abandoned for some years to come, in spite of the abuses to which it
sometimes gives rise.

Returned students (i.e. students who have been at foreign universities) form a definite set in
China.[98] There is in Peking a "Returned Students' Club," a charming place. It is customary
among Europeans to speak ill of returned students, but for no good reason. There are
occasionally disagreements between different sections; in particular, those who have been
only to Japan are not regarded quite as equals by those who have been to Europe or America.
My impression was that America puts a more definite stamp upon a student than any other
country; certainly those returning from England are less Anglicized than those returning from
the United States are Americanized. To the Chiman who wishes to be modern and
up-to-date, skyscrapers and hustle seem romantic, because they are so unlike his home. The
old traditions which conservative Europeans value are such a mushroom growth compared to
those of China (where authentic descendants of Confucius abound) that it is useless to attempt
that way of impressing the Chinese. One is reminded of the conversation in Eothen between
the English country gentleman and the Pasha, in which the Pasha praises England to the
refrain: "Buzz, buzz, all by steam; whir, whir, all on wheels," while the Englishman keeps
saying: "Tell the Pasha that the British yeoman is still, thank God, the British yeoman."

Although the educational work of the Americans in China is on the whole admirable, nothing
directed by foreigners can adequately satisfy the needs of the country. The Chinese have a
civilization and a national temperament in many ways superior to those of white men. A few
Europeans ultimately discover this, but Americans never do. They remain always
missionaries—not of Christianity, though they often think that is what they are preaching, but
of Americanism. What is Americanism? "Clean living, clean thinking, and pep," I think an
American would reply. This means, in practice, the substitution of tidiness for art, cleanliness
for beauty, moralizing for philosophy, prostitutes for concubines (as being easier to conceal),
and a general air of being fearfully busy for the leisurely calm of the traditional Chinese.
Voltaire—that hardened old cynic—laid it down that the true ends of life are "aimer et
penser." Both are common in China, but neither is compatible with "pep." The American
influence, therefore, inevitably tends to eliminate both. If it prevailed it would, no doubt, by
means of hygiene, save the lives of many Chinamen, but would at the same time make them
not worth saving. It cannot therefore be regarded as wholly and altogether satisfactory.

The best Chinese educationists are aware of this, and have established schools and
universities which are modern but under Chinese direction. In these, a certain proportion of
the teachers are European or American, but the spirit of the teaching is not that of the Y.M.C.A. One can never rid oneself of the feeling that the education controlled by white men is not disinterested; it seems always designed, unconsciously in the main, to produce convenient tools for the capitalist penetration of China by the merchants and manufacturers of the nation concerned. Modern Chinese schools and universities are singularly different: they are not hotbeds of rabid nationalism as they would be in any other country, but institutions where the student is taught to think freely, and his thoughts are judged by their intelligence, not by their utility to exploiters. The outcome, among the best young men, is a really beautiful intellectual disinterestedness. The discussions which I used to have in my seminar (consisting of students belonging to the Peking Government University) could not have been surpassed anywhere for keenness, candour, and fearlessness. I had the same impression of the Science Society of Nanking, and of all similar bodies wherever I came across them. There is, among the young, a passionate desire to acquire Western knowledge, together with a vivid realization of Western vices. They wish to be scientific but not mechanical, industrial but not capitalistic. To a man they are Socialists, as are most of the best among their Chinese teachers. They respect the knowledge of Europeans, but quietly put aside their arrogance. For the present, the purely Chinese modern educational institutions, such as the Peking Government University, leave much to be desired from the point of view of instruction; there are no adequate libraries, the teaching of English is not sufficiently thorough, and there is not enough mental discipline. But these are the faults of youth, and are unimportant compared with the profoundly humanistic attitude to life which is formed in the students. Most of the faults may be traced to the lack of funds, because the Government—loved by the Powers on account of its weakness—has to part with all its funds to the military chieftains who fight each other and plunder the country, as in Europe—for China must be compared with Europe, not with any one of the petty States into which Europe is unhappily divided.

The students are not only full of public spirit themselves, but are a powerful force in arousing it throughout the nation. What they did in 1919, when Versailles awarded Shangtung to Japan, is well told by Mr. Tyau in his chapter on "The Student Movement." And what they did was not merely political. To quote Mr. Tyau (p. 146):—

Having aroused the nation, prevented the signature of the Versailles Treaty and assisted the merchants to enforce the Japanese boycott, the students then directed their energies to the enlightenment of their less educated brothers and sisters. For instance, by issuing publications, by popular lectures showing them the real situation, internally as well as externally; but especially by establishing free schools and maintaining them out of their own funds. No praise can be too high for such self-sacrifice, for the students generally also teach in these schools. The scheme is endorsed everywhere with the greatest enthusiasm, and in Peking alone it is estimated that fifty thousand children are benefited by such education. One thing which came as a surprise to me was to find that, as regards modern education under Chinese control, there is complete equality between men and women. The position of women in Peking Government University is better than at Cambridge. Women are admitted to examinations and degrees, and there are women teachers in the university. The Girls' Higher Normal School in Peking, where prospective women teachers are taught, is a most excellent and progressive institution, and the spirit of free inquiry among the girls would horrify most British head mistresses.

There is a movement in favour of co-education, especially in elementary education, because, owing to the inadequate supply of schools, the girls tend to be left out altogether unless they can go to the same school as the boys. The first time I met Professor and Mrs. Dewey was at a banquet in Chang-sha, given by the Tuchun. When the time came for after-dinner speeches, Mrs. Dewey told the Tuchun that his province must adopt co-education. He made a statesmanlike reply, saying that the matter should receive his best consideration, but he feared the time was not ripe in Hunan. However, it was clear that the matter was within the sphere of practical politics. At the time, being new to China and having imagined China a somewhat backward country, I was surprised. Later on I realized that reforms which we only talk about can be actually carried out in China.

Education controlled by missionaries or conservative white men cannot give what Young
China needs. After throwing off the native superstitions of centuries, it would be a dismal fiasco to take on the European superstitions which have been discarded here by all progressive people. It is only where progressive Chinese themselves are in control that there is scope for the renaissance spirit of the younger students, and for that free spirit of sceptical inquiry by which they are seeking to build a new civilization as splendid as their old civilization in its best days.

While I was in Peking, the Government teachers struck, not for higher pay, but for pay, because their salaries had not been paid for many months. Accompanied by some of the students, they went on a deputation to the Government, but were repulsed by soldiers and policemen, who clubbed them so severely that many had to be taken to hospital. The incident produced such universal fury that there was nearly a revolution, and the Government hastened to come to terms with the teachers with all possible speed. The modern teachers have behind them all that is virile, energetic, and public-spirited in China; the gang of bandits which controls the Government has behind it Japanese money and European intrigue. America occupies an intermediate position. One may say broadly that the old traditional education, with the military governors and the British and Japanese influence, stands for Conservatism; America and its commerce and its educational institutions stand for Liberalism; while the native modern education, practically though not theoretically, stands for Socialism. Incidentally, it alone stands for intellectual freedom.

The Chinese are a great nation, incapable of permanent suppression by foreigners. They will not consent to adopt our vices in order to acquire military strength; but they are willing to adopt our virtues in order to advance in wisdom. I think they are the only people in the world who quite genuinely believe that wisdom is more precious than rubies. That is why the West regards them as uncivilized.

FOOTNOTES:
[97] It should be said that one sees just as fine buildings in purely Chinese institutions, such as Peking Government University and Nanking Teachers’ Training College.
[98] Mr. Tyau (op. cit. p. 27) quotes from Who's Who of American Returned Students, a classification of the occupations of 596 Chinese who have returned from American universities. The larger items are: In education, 38 as administrators and 197 as teachers; in Government service, 129 in executive offices (there are also three members of Parliament and four judges); 95 engineers; 35 medical practitioners (including dentists); 60 in business; and 21 social and religious workers. It is estimated that the total number of Chinese holding university degrees in America is 1,700, and in Great Britain 400 (ib.). This disproportion is due to the more liberal policy of America in the matter of the Boxer indemnity. In 1916 there were 292 Chinese university students in Great Britain, and Mr. Tyau (p. 28) gives a classification of them by their subjects. The larger groups are: Medicine, 50; law and economics, 47; engineering, 42; mining, 22; natural science (including chemistry and geology, which are classified separately), 19.
Chapter XIV

Industrialism in China

China is as yet only slightly industrialized, but the industrial possibilities of the country are very great, and it may be taken as nearly certain that there will be a rapid development throughout the next few decades. China's future depends as much upon the manner of this development as upon any other single factor; and China's difficulties are very largely connected with the present industrial situation. I will therefore first briefly describe this situation, and then consider the possibilities of the near future.

We may take railways and mines as the foundation of a nation's industrial life. Let us therefore consider first the railways and then the mines, before going on to other matters. When railways were new, the Manchu Government, like the universities of Oxford and Cambridge (which it resembled in many ways), objected to them, and did all it could to keep them at a distance. In 1875 a short line was built by foreigners from Shanghai to Woosung, but the Central Government was so shocked that it caused it to be destroyed. In 1881 the first permanent railway was constructed, but not very much was accomplished until after the Japanese War of 1894-5. The Powers then thought that China was breaking up, and entered upon a scramble for concessions and spheres of influence. The Belgians built the important line from Peking to Hankow; the Americans obtained a concession for a Hankow-Canton railway, which, however, has only been constructed as far as Changsha. Russia built the Manchurian Railway, connecting Peking with the Siberian Railway and with Europe. Germany built the Shantung Railway, from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu. The French built a railway in the south. England sought to obtain a monopoly of the railways in the Yangtze valley. All these railways were to be owned by foreigners and managed by foreign officials of the respective countries which had obtained the concessions. The Boxer rising, however, made Europe aware that some caution was needed if the Chinese were not to be exasperated beyond endurance. After this, ownership of new railways was left to the Chinese Government, but with so much foreign control as to rob it of most of its value. By this time, Chinese public opinion had come to realize that there must be railways in China, and that the real problem was how to keep them under Chinese control. In 1908, the Tientsin-Pukow line and the Shanghai-Hangchow line were sanctioned, to be built by foreign loans, but with all the administrative control in the hands of the Chinese Government. At the same time, the Peking-Hankow line was bought back by the Government, and the Peking-Kalgan line was constructed by the Chinese without foreign financial assistance. Of the big main lines of China, this left not much foreign control outside the Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) and the Shantung Railway. The first of these is mainly under foreign control and must now be regarded as permanently lost, until such time as China becomes strong enough to defeat Japan in war; and the whole of Manchuria has come more or less under Japanese control. But the Shantung Railway, by the agreement reached at Washington, is to be bought back by China—five years hence, if all goes well. Thus, except in regions practically lost to China, the Chinese now have control of all their more important railways, or will have before long. This is a very hopeful feature of the situation, and a distinct credit to Chinese sagacity.

Putnam Weale (Mr. Lennox Simpson) strongly urges—quite rightly, as I think—the great importance of nationalizing all Chinese railways. At Washington recently, he helped to secure the Shantung Railway award, and to concentrate attention on the railway as the main issue. Writing early in 1919, he said:

The key to the proper control of China and the building-up of the new Republican State is the railway key.... The revolution of 1911, and the acceptance in principle of Western ideas of popular government, removed the danger of foreign provinces being carved out of the old Manchu Empire. There was, however, left behind a more subtle weapon. This weapon is the railway. Russia with her Manchurian Railway scheme taught Japan the new method. Japan, by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, not only inherited the richer half of the Manchurian railways, but was able to put into practice a new technique, based on a mixture of twisted economics, police control, and military garrisons. Out of this grew the latter-day highly developed railway-zone which, to all intents and purposes, creates a new type of foreign
enclave, subversive of the Chinese State. The especial evil to-day is that Japan has transferred from Manchuria to Shantung this new technique, which ... she will eventually extend into the very heart of intramural China ... and also into extramural Chihli and Inner Mongolia (thus outflanking Peking) unless she is summarily arrested. At all costs this must be stopped. The method of doing so is easy: It is to have it laid down categorically, and accepted by all the Powers, that henceforth all railways on Chinese soil are a vital portion of Chinese sovereignty and must be controlled directly from Peking by a National Railway Board; that stationmasters, personnel and police, must be Chinese citizens, technical foreign help being limited to a set standard; and that all railway concessions are henceforth to be considered simply as building concessions which must be handed over, section by section, as they are built, to the National Railway Board.

If the Shantung Railway Agreement is loyally carried out, this reform—as to whose importance I quite agree with Putnam Weale—will have been practically completed five years hence. But we must expect Japan to adopt every possible means of avoiding the carrying out of her promises, from instigating Chinese civil war to the murdering of Japanese employees by Japanese secret agents masquerading as Chinese. Therefore, until the Chinese actually have complete control of the Shantung Railway, we cannot feel confident that they will ever get it.

It must not be supposed that the Chinese run railways badly. The Kalgan Railway, which they built, is just as well built as those constructed by foreigners; and the lines under Chinese administration are admirably managed. I quote from Mr. Tyau[101] the following statistics, which refer to the year 1919: Government railways, in operation, 6027 kilometres; under construction, 383 kilometres; private and provincial railways, 773 kilometres; concessioned railways, 3,780 kilometres. Total, 10,963 kilometres, or 6,852 miles. (The concessioned railways are mainly those in Manchuria and Shantung, of which the first must be regarded as definitely lost to China, while the second is probably recovered. The problem of concessioned railways has therefore no longer the importance that it had, though, by detaching Manchuria, the foreign railway has shown its power for evil). As regards financial results, Mr. Tyau gives the following figures for the principal State railways in 1918:—

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Subsequent years, for which I have not the exact figures, have been less prosperous. I cannot discover any evidence of incompetence in Chinese railway administration. On the contrary, much has been done to overcome the evils due to the fact that the various lines were originally constructed by different Powers, each following its own customs, so that there was no uniformity, and goods trucks could not be moved from one line on to another. There is, however, urgent need of further railways, especially to open up the west and to connect Canton with Hankow, the profit of which would probably be enormous.

Mines are perhaps as important as railways, for if a country allows foreign control of its mineral resources it cannot build up either its industries or its munitions to the point where they will be independent of foreign favour. But the situation as regards mining is at present far from satisfactory. Mr. Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attaché at Peking, writing early in 1919, made the following statement as regards China's mineral resources:—

China is favoured with a wonderful wealth in coal and in a good supply of iron ore, two essentials to modern industrial development. To indicate how little China has developed its marvellous wealth in coal, this country imported, during 1917, 14,000,000 tons. It is estimated that China produces now 20,000,000 tons annually, but it is supposed to have richer resources in coal than has the United States which, in 1918, produced 650,000,000 tons. In iron ore it has been estimated that China has 400,000,000 tons suitable for furnace reaction, and an additional 300,000,000 tons which might be worked by native methods. During 1917, it is estimated that China's production of pig iron was 500,000 tons. The developments in the iron and steel industry in China are making rapid strides, and a few years hence it is expected that the production of pig iron and of finished steel will be several millions of tons annually. In antimony and tin China is also particularly rich, and considerable progress has taken place in the mining and smelting of these ores during the past few years. China should jealously safeguard its mineral wealth, so as to preserve it for the country's welfare.

The China Year Book for 1919 gives the total Chinese production of coal for 1914 as 6,315,735 tons, and of iron ore at 468,938 tons. Comparing these with Mr. Arnold's figures for 1917, namely 20,000,000 tons of coal and 500,000 tons of pig iron (not iron ore), it is evident that great progress was made during those three years, and there is every reason to think that at least the same rate of progress has been maintained. The main problem for China, however, is not rapid development, but national development. Japan is poor in minerals, and has set to work to acquire as much as possible of the mineral wealth of China. This is important to Japan, for two different reasons: first, that only industrial development can support the growing population, which cannot be induced to emigrate to Japanese possessions on the mainland; secondly, that steel is an indispensable requisite for imperialism.

The Chinese are proud of the Kiangnan dock and engineering works at Shanghai, which is a Government concern, and has proved its capacity for shipbuilding on modern lines. It built four ships of 10,000 tons each for the American Government. Mr. S.G. Cheng says:—

For the construction of these ships, materials were mostly supplied by China, except steel, which had to be shipped from America and Europe (the steel produced in China being so limited in quantity, that after a certain amount is exported to Japan by virtue of a previous contract, little is left for home consumption).

Considering how rich China is in iron ore, this state of affairs needs explanation. The explanation is valuable to anyone who wishes to understand modern politics. The China Year Book for 1919 (a work as little concerned with politics as Whitaker's Almanack) gives a list of the five principal iron mines in China, with some information about each. The first and most important are the Tayeh mines, worked by the Hanyehping Iron and Coal Co., Ltd., which, as the reader may remember, was the subject of the third group in the Twenty-one Demands. The total amount of ore in sight is estimated by the China Year Book at 50,000,000 tons, derived chiefly from two mines, in one of which the ore yields 65 per
cent. of iron, in the other 58 to 63 per cent. The output for 1916 is given as 603,732 tons (it has been greatly increased since then). The Year Book proceeds: "Japanese capital is invested in the Company, and by the agreement between China and Japan of May 1915 [after the ultimatum which enforced the revised Twenty-one Demands], the Chinese Government undertook not to convert the Company into a State-owned concern nor to compel it to borrow money from other than Japanese sources." It should be added that there is a Japanese accountant and a Japanese technical adviser, and that pig-iron and ore, up to a specified value, must be sold to the Imperial Japanese works at much below the market price, leaving a paltry residue for sale in the open market.[106]

The second item in the China Year Book's list is the Tungkuan Shan mines. All that is said about these is as follows: "Tungling district on the Yangtze, 55 miles above Wuhu, Anhui province. A concession to work these mines, granted to the London and China Syndicate (British) in 1904, was surrendered in 1910 for the sum of £52,000, and the mines were transferred to a Chinese Company to be formed for their exploitation." These mines, therefore, are in Chinese hands. I do not know what their capacity is supposed to be, and in view of the price at which they were sold, it cannot be very great. The capital of the Haneyepping Co. is $20,000,000, which is considerably more than £52,000. This was the only one of the five iron mines mentioned in the Year Book which was not in Japanese hands at the time when the Year Book was published.

Next comes the Taochung Iron Mine, Anhui province. "The concession which was granted to the Sino-Japanese Industrial Development Co. will be worked by the Orient Steel Manufacturing Co. The mine is said to contain 60,000,000 tons of ore, containing 65 per cent. of pure iron. The plan of operations provides for the production of pig iron at the rate of 170,000 tons a year, a steel mill with a capacity of 100,000 tons of steel ingots a year, and a casting and forging mill to produce 75,000 tons a year."

The fourth mine is at Chinlingchen, in Shantung, "worked in conjunction with the Hengshan Colliery by the railway." I presume it is to be sold back to China along with the railway. The fifth and last mine mentioned is the Penhsihu Mine, "one of the most promising mines in the nine mining areas in South Manchuria, where the Japanese are permitted by an exchange of Notes between the Chinese and Japanese Governments (May 25, 1915) to prospect for and operate mines. The seam of this mine extends from near Liaoyang to the neighbourhood of Penhsihu, and in size is pronounced equal to the Tayeh mine." It will be observed that this mine, also, was acquired by the Japanese as a result of the ultimatum enforcing the Twenty-one Demands. The Year Book adds: "The Japanese Navy is purchasing some of the Penhsihu output. Osaka ironworks placed an order for 15,000 tons in 1915 and the arsenal at Osaka in the same year accepted a tender for Penhsihu iron."

It will be seen from these facts that, as regards iron, the Chinese have allowed the Japanese to acquire a position of vantage from which they can only be ousted with great difficulty. Nevertheless, it is absolutely imperative that the Chinese should develop an iron and steel industry of their own on a large scale. If they do not, they cannot preserve their national independence, their own civilization, or any of the things that make them potentially of value to the world. It should be observed that the chief reason for which the Japanese desire Chinese iron is in order to be able to exploit and tyrannize over China. Confucius, I understand, says nothing about iron mines;[107] therefore the old-fashioned Chinese did not realize the importance of preserving them. Now that they are awake to the situation, it is almost too late. I shall come back later to the question of what can be done. For the present, let us continue our survey of facts.

It may be presumed that the population of China will always be mainly agricultural. Tea, silk, raw cotton, grain, the soya bean, etc., are crops in which China excels. In production of raw cotton, China is the third country in the world, India being the first and the United States the second. There is, of course, room for great progress in agriculture, but industry is vital if China is to preserve her national independence, and it is industry that is our present topic. To quote Mr. Tyau: "At the end of 1916 the number of factory hands was officially estimated at 560,000 and that of mine workers 406,000. Since then no official returns for the whole country have been published ... but perhaps a million each would be an approximate figure for
the present number of factory operatives and mine workers."[108] Of course, the hours are very long and the wages very low; Mr. Tyau mentions as specially modern and praiseworthy certain textile factories where the wages range from 15 to 45 cents a day.[109] (The cent varies in value, but is always somewhere between a farthing and a halfpenny.) No doubt as industry develops Socialism and labour unrest will also develop. If Mr. Tyau is to be taken as a sample of the modern Chinese governing classes, the policy of the Government towards Labour will be very illiberal. Mr. Tyau's outlook is that of an American capitalist, and shows the extent to which he has come under American influence, as well as that of conservative England (he is an LL.D. of London). Most of the Young Chinese I came across, however, were Socialists, and it may be hoped that the traditional Chinese dislike of uncompromising fierceness will make the Government less savage against Labour than the Governments of America and Japan.

There is room for the development of a great textile industry in China. There are a certain number of modern mills, and nothing but enterprise is needed to make the industry as great as that of Lancashire.

Shipbuilding has made a good beginning in Shanghai, and would probably develop rapidly if China had a flourishing iron and steel industry in native hands.

The total exports of native produce in 1919 were just under £200,000,000 (630,000,000 taels), and the total imports slightly larger. It is better, however, to consider such statistics in taels, because currency fluctuations make the results deceptive when reckoned in sterling. The tael is not a coin, but a certain weight of silver, and therefore its value fluctuates with the value of silver. The China Year Book gives imports and exports of Chinese produce for 1902 as 325 million taels and 214 million taels respectively; for 1911, as 482 and 377; for 1917, as 577 and 462; for 1920, as 762 and 541. (The corresponding figures in pounds sterling for 1911 are 64 millions and 50 millions; for 1917, 124 millions and 99,900,000.) It will thus be seen that, although the foreign trade of China is still small in proportion to population, it is increasing very fast. To a European it is always surprising to find how little the economic life of China is affected by such incidents as revolutions and civil wars.

Certain principles seem to emerge from a study of the Chinese railways and mines as needing to be adopted by the Chinese Government if national independence is to be preserved. As regards railways, nationalization is obviously desirable, even if it somewhat retards the building of new lines. Railways not in the hands of the Government will be controlled, in the end if not in the beginning, by foreigners, who will thus acquire a power over China which will be fatal to freedom. I think we may hope that the Chinese authorities now realize this, and will henceforth act upon it.

In regard to mines, development by the Chinese themselves is urgent, since undeveloped resources tempt the greed of the Great Powers, and development by foreigners makes it possible to keep China enslaved. It should therefore be enacted that, in future, no sale of mines or of any interest in mines to foreigners, and no loan from foreigners on the security of mines, will be recognized as legally valid. In view of extra-territoriality, it will be difficult to induce foreigners to accept such legislation, and Consular Courts will not readily admit its validity. But, as the example of extra-territoriality in Japan shows, such matters depend upon the national strength; if the Powers fear China, they will recognize the validity of Chinese legislation, but if not, not. In view of the need of rapid development of mining by Chinese, it would probably be unwise to nationalize all mines here and now. It would be better to provide every possible encouragement to genuinely Chinese private enterprise, and to offer the assistance of geological and mining experts, etc. The Government should, however, retain the right (a) to buy out any mining concern at a fair valuation; (b) to work minerals itself in cases where the private owners fail to do so, in spite of expert opinion in favour of their being worked. These powers should be widely exercised, and as soon as mining has reached the point compatible with national security, the mines should be all nationalized, except where, as at Tayeh, diplomatic agreements stand in the way. It is clear that the Tayeh mines must be recovered by China as soon as opportunity offers, but when or how that will be it is as yet impossible to say. Of course I have been assuming an orderly government established in China, but without that nothing vigorous can be done to repel foreign aggression. This is a
point to which, along with other general questions connected with the industrializing of China, I shall return in my last chapter.

It is said by Europeans who have business experience in China that the Chinese are not good at managing large joint-stock companies, such as modern industry requires. As everyone knows, they are proverbially honest in business, in spite of the corruption of their politics. But their successful businesses—so one gathers—do not usually extend beyond a single family; and even they are apt to come to grief sooner or later through nepotism. This is what Europeans say; I cannot speak from my own knowledge. But I am convinced that modern education is very quickly changing this state of affairs, which was connected with Confucianism and the family ethic. Many Chinese have been trained in business methods in America; there are Colleges of Commerce at Woosung and other places; and the patriotism of Young China has led men of the highest education to devote themselves to industrial development. The Chinese are no doubt, by temperament and tradition, more suited to commerce than to industry, but contact with the West is rapidly introducing new aptitudes and a new mentality. There is, therefore, every reason to expect, if political conditions are not too adverse, that the industrial development of China will proceed rapidly throughout the next few decades. It is of vital importance that that development should be controlled by the Chinese rather than by foreign nations. But that is part of the larger problem of the recovery of Chinese independence, with which I shall deal in my last chapter.

FOOTNOTES:

[99] For the history of Chinese railways, see Tyau, op. cit. pp. 183 ff.
[100] China in 1918. Published by the Peking Leader, pp. 45-6.
[102] China in 1918, p. 26. There is perhaps some mistake in the figures given for iron ore, as the Tayeh mines alone are estimated by some to contain 700,000,000 tons of iron ore. Coleman, op. cit. p. 51.
[103] Page 63. The 1922 Year Book gives 19,500,000 tons of coal production.
[105] Pages 74-5.
[107] It seems it would be inaccurate to maintain that there is nothing on the subject in the Gospels. An eminent American divine pointed out in print, as regards the advice against laying up treasure where moth and rust doth corrupt, that "moth and rust do not get at Mr. Rockefeller's oil wells, and thieves do not often break through and steal a railway. What Jesus condemned was hoarding wealth." See Upton Sinclair, The Profits of Religion, 1918, p. 175.
[109] Page 218. [Russ2]
Chapter XV
The outlook for China
In this chapter I propose to take, as far as I am able, the standpoint of a progressive and public-spirited Chinese, and consider what reforms, in what order, I should advocate in that case.
To begin with, it is clear that China must be saved by her own efforts, and cannot rely upon outside help. In the international situation, China has had both good and bad fortune. The Great War was unfortunate, because it gave Japan temporarily a free hand; the collapse of Tsarist Russia was fortunate, because it put an end to the secret alliance of Russians and Japanese; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate, because it compelled us to abet Japanese aggression even against our own economic interests; the friction between Japan and America was fortunate; but the agreement arrived at by the Washington Conference, though momentarily advantageous as regards Shantung, is likely, in the long run, to prove unfortunate, since it will make America less willing to oppose Japan. For reasons which I set forth in Chap. X., unless China becomes strong, either the collapse of Japan or her unquestioned ascendency in the Far East is almost certain to prove disastrous to China; and one or other of these is very likely to come about. All the Great Powers, without exception, have interests which are incompatible, in the long run, with China's welfare and with the best development of Chinese civilization. Therefore the Chinese must seek salvation in their own energy, not in the benevolence of any outside Power.
The problem is not merely one of political independence; a certain cultural independence is at least as important. I have tried to show in this book that the Chinese are, in certain ways, superior to us, and it would not be good either for them or for us if, in these ways, they had to descend to our level in order to preserve their existence as a nation. In this matter, however, a compromise is necessary. Unless they adopt some of our vices to some extent, we shall not respect them, and they will be increasingly oppressed by foreign nations. The object must be to keep this process within the narrowest limits compatible with safety.
First of all, a patriotic spirit is necessary—not, of course, the bigoted anti-foreign spirit of the Boxers, but the enlightened attitude which is willing to learn from other nations while not willing to allow them to dominate. This attitude has been generated among educated Chinese, and to a great extent in the merchant class, by the brutal tuition of Japan. The danger of patriotism is that, as soon as it has proved strong enough for successful defence, it is apt to turn to foreign aggression. China, by her resources and her population, is capable of being the greatest Power in the world after the United States. It is much to be feared that, in the process of becoming strong enough to preserve their independence, the Chinese may become strong enough to embark upon a career of imperialism. It cannot be too strongly urged that patriotism should be only defensive, not aggressive. But with this proviso, I think a spirit of patriotism is absolutely necessary to the regeneration of China. Independence is to be sought, not as an end in itself, but as a means towards a new blend of Western skill with the traditional Chinese virtues. If this end is not achieved, political independence will have little value.
The three chief requisites, I should say, are: (1) The establishment of an orderly Government; (2) industrial development under Chinese control; (3) The spread of education. All these aims will have to be pursued concurrently, but on the whole their urgency seems to me to come in the above order. We have already seen how large a part the State will have to take in building up industry, and how impossible this is while the political anarchy continues. Funds for education on a large scale are also unobtainable until there is good government. Therefore good government is the prerequisite of all other reforms. Industrialism and education are closely connected, and it would be difficult to decide the priority between them; but I have put industrialism first, because, unless it is developed very soon by the Chinese, foreigners will have acquired such a strong hold that it will be very difficult indeed to oust them. These reasons have decided me that our three problems ought to be taken in the above order.
1. The establishment of an orderly government.—At the moment of writing, the condition of China is as anarchic as it has ever been. A battle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is
imminent; the former is usually considered, though falsely according to some good authorities, the most reactionary force in China; Wu-Pei-Fu, though The Times calls him "the Liberal leader," may well prove no more satisfactory than "Liberal" leaders nearer home. It is of course possible that, if he wins, he may be true to his promises and convoke a Parliament for all China; but it is at least equally possible that he may not. In any case, to depend upon the favour of a successful general is as precarious as to depend upon the benevolence of a foreign Power. If the progressive elements are to win, they must become a strong organized force.

So far as I can discover, Chinese Constitutionalists are doing the best thing that is possible at the moment, namely, concerting a joint programme, involving the convoking of a Parliament and the cessation of military usurpation. Union is essential, even if it involves sacrifice of cherished beliefs on the part of some. Given a programme upon which all the Constitutionalists are united, they will acquire great weight in public opinion, which is very powerful in China. They may then be able, sooner or later, to offer a high constitutional position to some powerful general, on condition of his ceasing to depend upon mere military force. By this means they may be able to turn the scales in favour of the man they select, as the student agitation turned the scales in July 1920 in favour of Wu-Pei-Fu against the An Fu party. Such a policy can only be successful if it is combined with vigorous propaganda, both among the civilian population and among the soldiers, and if, as soon as peace is restored, work is found for disbanded soldiers and pay for those who are not disbanded. This raises the financial problem, which is very difficult, because foreign Powers will not lend except in return for some further sacrifice of the remnants of Chinese independence. (For reasons explained in Chap. X., I do not accept the statement by the American consortium bankers that a loan from them would not involve control over China's internal affairs. They may not mean control to be involved, but I am convinced that in fact it would be.) The only way out of this difficulty that I can see is to raise an internal loan by appealing to the patriotism of Chinese merchants. There is plenty of money in China, but, very naturally, rich Chinese will not lend to any of the brigands who now control the Government.

When the time comes to draft a permanent Constitution, I have no doubt that it will have to be federal, allowing a very large measure of autonomy to the provinces, and reserving for the Central Government few things except customs, army and navy, foreign relations and railways. Provincial feeling is strong, and it is now, I think, generally recognized that a mistake was made in 1912 in not allowing it more scope.

While a Constitution is being drafted, and even after it has been agreed upon, it will not be possible to rely upon the inherent prestige of Constitutionalism, or to leave public opinion without guidance. It will be necessary for the genuinely progressive people throughout the country to unite in a strongly disciplined society, arriving at collective decisions and enforcing support of those decisions upon all its members. This society will have to win the confidence of public opinion by a very rigid avoidance of corruption and political profiteering; the slightest failure of a member in this respect must be visited by expulsion. The society must make itself obviously the champion of the national interests as against all self-seekers, speculators and toadies to foreign Powers. It will thus become able authoritatively to commend or condemn politicians and to wield great influence over opinion, even in the army. There exists in Young China enough energy, patriotism and honesty to create such a society and to make it strong through the respect which it will command. But unless enlightened patriotism is organized in some such way, its power will not be equal to the political problems with which China is faced.

Sooner or later, the encroachments of foreign Powers upon the sovereign rights of China must be swept away. The Chinese must recover the Treaty Ports, control of the tariff, and so on; they must also free themselves from extra-territoriality. But all this can probably be done, as it was in Japan, without offending foreign Powers (except perhaps the Japanese). It would be a mistake to complicate the early stages of Chinese recovery by measures which would antagonize foreign Powers in general. Russia was in a stronger position for defence than China, yet Russia has suffered terribly from the universal hostility provoked by the Bolsheviks. Given good government and a development of China's resources, it will be
possible to obtain most of the needed concessions by purely diplomatic means; the rest can wait for a suitable opportunity.

2. Industrial development.—On this subject I have already written in Chap. XIV.; it is certain general aspects of the subject that I wish to consider now. For reasons already given, I hold that all railways ought to be in the hands of the State, and that all successful mines ought to be purchased by the State at a fair valuation, even if they are not State-owned from the first. Contracts with foreigners for loans ought to be carefully drawn so as to leave the control to China. There would not be much difficulty about this if China had a stable and orderly government; in that case, many foreign capitalists would be willing to lend on good security, without exacting any part in the management. Every possible diplomatic method should be employed to break down such a monopoly as the consortium seeks to acquire in the matter of loans.

Given good government, a large amount of State enterprise would be desirable in Chinese industry. There are many arguments for State Socialism, or rather what Lenin calls State Capitalism, in any country which is economically but not culturally backward. In the first place, it is easier for the State to borrow than for a private person; in the second place, it is easier for the State to engage and employ the foreign experts who are likely to be needed for some time to come; in the third place, it is easier for the State to make sure that vital industries do not come under the control of foreign Powers. What is perhaps more important than any of these considerations is that, by undertaking industrial enterprise from the first, the State can prevent the growth of many of the evils of private capitalism. If China can acquire a vigorous and honest State, it will be possible to develop Chinese industry without, at the same time, developing the overweening power of private capitalists by which the Western nations are now both oppressed and misled.

But if this is to be done successfully, it will require a great change in Chinese morals, a development of public spirit in place of the family ethic, a transference to the public service of that honesty which already exists in private business, and a degree of energy which is at present rare. I believe that Young China is capable of fulfilling these requisites, spurred on by patriotism; but it is important to realize that they are requisites, and that, without them, any system of State Socialism must fail.

For industrial development, it is important that the Chinese should learn to become technical experts and also to become skilled workers. I think more has been done towards the former of these needs than towards the latter. For the latter purpose, it would probably be wise to import skilled workmen—say from Germany—and cause them to give instruction to Chinese workmen in any new branch of industrial work that it might be desired to develop.

3. Education.—If China is to become a democracy, as most progressive Chinese hope, universal education is imperative. Where the bulk of the population cannot read, true democracy is impossible. Education is a good in itself, but is also essential for developing political consciousness, of which at present there is almost none in rural China. The Chinese themselves are well aware of this, but in the present state of the finances it is impossible to establish universal elementary education. Until it has been established for some time, China must be, in fact, if not in form, an oligarchy, because the uneducated masses cannot have any effective political opinion. Even given good government, it is doubtful whether the immense expense of educating such a vast population could be borne by the nation without a considerable industrial development. Such industrial development as already exists is mainly in the hands of foreigners, and its profits provide warships for the Japanese, or mansions and dinners for British and American millionaires. If its profits are to provide the funds for Chinese education, industry must be in Chinese hands. This is another reason why industrial development must probably precede any complete scheme of education.

For the present, even if the funds existed, there would not be sufficient teachers to provide a schoolmaster in every village. There is, however, such an enthusiasm for education in China that teachers are being trained as fast as is possible with such limited resources; indeed a great deal of devotion and public spirit is being shown by Chinese educators, whose salaries are usually many months in arrears.

Chinese control is, to my mind, as important in the matter of education as in the matter of
industry. For the present, it is still necessary to have foreign instructors in some subjects, though this necessity will soon cease. Foreign instructors, however, provided they are not too numerous, do no harm, any more than foreign experts in railways and mines. What does harm is foreign management. Chinese educated in mission schools, or in lay establishments controlled by foreigners, tend to become de-nationalized, and to have a slavish attitude towards Western civilization. This unfits them for taking a useful part in the national life, and tends to undermine their morals. Also, oddly enough, it makes them more conservative in purely Chinese matters than the young men and women who have had a modern education under Chinese auspices. Europeans in general are more conservative about China than the modern Chinese are, and they tend to convey their conservatism to their pupils. And of course their whole influence, unavoidably if involuntarily, militates against national self-respect in those whom they teach.

Those who desire to do research in some academic subject will, for some time to come, need a period of residence in some European or American university. But for the great majority of university students it is far better, if possible, to acquire their education in China. Returned students have, to a remarkable extent, the stamp of the country from which they have returned, particularly when that country is America. A society such as was foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, in which all really progressive Chinese should combine, would encounter difficulties, as things stand, from the divergencies in national bias between students returned from (say) Japan, America and Germany. Given time, this difficulty can be overcome by the increase in purely Chinese university education, but at present the difficulty would be serious.

To overcome this difficulty, two things are needed: inspiring leadership, and a clear conception of the kind of civilization to be aimed at. Leadership will have to be both intellectual and practical. As regards intellectual leadership, China is a country where writers have enormous influence, and a vigorous reformer possessed of literary skill could carry with him the great majority of Young China. Men with the requisite gifts exist in China; I might mention, as an example personally known to me, Dr. Hu Suh.[110] He has great learning, wide culture, remarkable energy, and a fearless passion for reform; his writings in the vernacular inspire enthusiasm among progressive Chinese. He is in favour of assimilating all that is good in Western culture, but by no means a slavish admirer of our ways.

The practical political leadership of such a society as I conceive to be needed would probably demand different gifts from those required in an intellectual leader. It is therefore likely that the two could not be combined in one man, but would need men as different as Lenin and Karl Marx.

The aim to be pursued is of importance, not only to China, but to the world. Out of the renaissance spirit now existing in China, it is possible, if foreign nations can be prevented from working havoc, to develop a new civilization better than any that the world has yet known. This is the aim which Young China should set before itself: the preservation of the urbanity and courtesy, the candour and the pacific temper, which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a knowledge of Western science and an application of it to the practical problems of China. Of such practical problems there are two kinds: one due to the internal condition of China, and the other to its international situation. In the former class come education, democracy, the diminution of poverty, hygiene and sanitation, and the prevention of famines. In the latter class come the establishment of a strong government, the development of industrialism, the revision of treaties and the recovery of the Treaty Ports (as to which Japan may serve as a model), and finally, the creation of an army sufficiently strong to defend the country against Japan. Both classes of problems demand Western science. But they do not demand the adoption of the Western philosophy of life.

If the Chinese were to adopt the Western philosophy of life, they would, as soon as they had made themselves safe against foreign aggression, embark upon aggression on their own account. They would repeat the campaigns of the Han and Tang dynasties in Central Asia, and perhaps emulate Kublai by the invasion of Japan. They would exploit their material resources with a view to producing a few bloated plutocrats at home and millions dying of hunger abroad. Such are the results which the West achieves by the application of science. If
China were led astray by the lure of brutal power, she might repel her enemies outwardly, but would have yielded to them inwardly. It is not unlikely that the great military nations of the modern world will bring about their own destruction by their inability to abstain from war, which will become, with every year that passes, more scientific and more devastating. If China joins in this madness, China will perish like the rest. But if Chinese reformers can have the moderation to stop when they have made China capable of self-defence, and to abstain from the further step of foreign conquest; if, when they have become safe at home, they can turn aside from the materialistic activities imposed by the Powers, and devote their freedom to science and art and the inauguration of a better economic system—then China will have played the part in the world for which she is fitted, and will have given to mankind as a whole new hope in the moment of greatest need. It is this hope that I wish to see inspiring Young China. This hope is realizable; and because it is realizable, China deserves a foremost place in the esteem of every lover of mankind.

FOOTNOTES:

[110]
An account of a portion of his work will be found in Tyau, op. cit. pp. 40 ff.
Appendix

While the above pages were going through the Press, some important developments have taken place in China. Wu-Pei-Fu has defeated Chang-tso-lin and made himself master of Peking. Chang has retreated towards Manchuria with a broken army, and proclaimed the independence of Manchuria. This might suit the Japanese very well, but it is hardly to be supposed that the other Powers would acquiesce. It is, therefore, not unlikely that Chang may lose Manchuria also, and cease to be a factor in Chinese politics.

For the moment, Wu-Pei-Fu controls the greater part of China, and his intentions become important. The British in China have, for some years, befriended him, and this fact colours all Press telegrams appearing in our newspapers. According to The Times, he has pronounced in favour of the reassembling of the old all-China Parliament, with a view to the restoration of constitutional government. This is a measure in which the South could concur, and if he really adheres to this intention he has it in his power to put an end to Chinese anarchy. The Times Peking correspondent, telegraphing on May 30, reports that "Wu-Pei-Fu declares that if the old Parliament will reassemble and work in national interests he will support it up to the limit, and fight any obstructionists."

On May 18, the same correspondent telegraphed that "Wu-Pei-Fu is lending his support to the unification movements, and has found common ground for action with Chen Chiung Ming," who is Sun's colleague at Canton and is engaged in civil war with Sun, who is imperialistic and wants to conquer all China for his government, said to be alone constitutional. The programme agreed upon between Wu and Chen Chiung Ming is given in the same telegram as follows:

Local self-government shall be established and magistrates shall be elected by the people; District police shall be created under District Boards subject to Central Provincial Boards; Civil governors shall be responsible to the Central Government, not to the Tuchuns; a national army shall be created, controlled and paid by the Central Government; Provincial police and gendarmerie, not the Tuchuns or the army, shall be responsible for peace and order in the provinces; the whole nation shall agree to recall the old Parliament and the restoration of the Provisional Constitution of the first year of the Republic; Taxes shall be collected by the Central Government, and only a stipulated sum shall be granted to each province for expenses, the balance to be forwarded to the Central Government as under the Ching dynasty; Afforestation shall be undertaken, industries established, highways built, and other measures taken to keep the people on the land.

This is an admirable programme, but it is impossible to know how much of it will ever be carried out.

Meanwhile, Sun Yat Sen is still at war with Wu-Pei-Fu. It has been stated in the British Press that there was an alliance between Sun and Chang, but it seems there was little more than a common hostility to Wu. Sun's friends maintain that he is a genuine Constitutionalist, and that Wu is not to be trusted, but Chen Chiung Ming has a better reputation than Sun among reformers. The British in China all praise Wu and hate Sun; the Americans all praise Sun and decry Wu. Sun undoubtedly has a past record of genuine patriotism, and there can be no doubt that the Canton Government has been the best in China. What appears in our newspapers on the subject is certainly designed to give a falsely unfavourable impression of Canton. For example, in The Times of May 15, a telegram appeared from Hong-Kong to the following effect:

I learn that the troops of Sun Yat Sen, President of South China, which are stated to be marching north from Canton, are a rabble. Many are without weapons and a large percentage of the uniforms are merely rags. There is no discipline, and gambling and opium-smoking are rife.

Nevertheless, on May 30, The Times had to confess that this army had won a brilliant victory, capturing "the most important stronghold in Kiangsi," together with 40 field guns and large quantities of munitions.

The situation must remain obscure until more detailed news has arrived by mail. It is to be hoped that the Canton Government, through the victory of Chen Chiung Ming, will come to terms with Wu-Pei-Fu, and will be strong enough to compel him to adhere to the terms. It is
to be hoped also that Chang's proclamation of the independence of Manchuria will not be seized upon by Japan as an excuse for a more complete absorption of that country. If Wu-Pei-Fu adheres to the declaration quoted above, there can be no patriotic reason why Canton should not co-operate with him; on the other hand, the military strength of Canton makes it more likely that Wu will find it prudent to adhere to his declaration. There is certainly a better chance than there was before the defeat of Chang for the unification of China and the ending of the Tuchuns' tyranny. But it is as yet no more than a chance, and the future is still problematical.
June 21, 1922.
Russell, Bertrand. The problem of China: Sekundärliteratur
1994
George C.H. Sun: Russell's book on China has a unique charm of its own which is presented in his characteristically lucid, brief and witty style and is highly suggestive, full of insight. Even when reread today, more than seventy years after its first appearance, it remains a rare classic, unsurpassed, in the field of China studies. The problem of China' is a book written with an unusual perspicuity, profound sympathy and a long range perspective into the cultural heritage of Chinese civilization, its future and that of the entire world. Much of what is said therein remains unchallenged, especially the non-topical parts. Many of the insightful prophecies made about the destiny of China have turned out to be true. His pessimistic view of the two alternatives China would be forced to take: militarism and/or communism, if the Western powers were not to relieve their pressure.

2007
Ding Zijiang: Russell advocated that China should (1) develop industry to halt the extreme poverty; (2) to establish an efficient and constitutional parliamentary government, with the support of a patriotic and world-minded populace, stop military usurpation and foreign control, and avoid excessive bureaucratic dictatorship; (3) build a new economic system which can be called 'State Socialism', or what Lenin called 'State Capitalism', because it is unsuitable to establish a pure or complete socialism in an undeveloped country such as China; (4) apply the Russian type of communism to China's present stage of economic development since its urgent problem was to increase production with rapid speed (although it could not prevail in Western Europe and was not an ideal system for world peace); and (5) follow the pacific and non-violent approaches in its reform.

The reconstruction of Chinese education should follow Russell's model: (1) education could help China avoid poverty and backwardness; (2) Chinese education should teach more science and technical skills, but not morals or ethical maxims about government derived from Western culture; (3) Chinese education should develop political consciousness among the people and avoid the foreign control that made Chinese students slavish toward Western civilization. The reconstruction of Chinese thought should follow Russell's philosophical approaches. Russell suggested: (1) new Chinese philosophy should be based on modern sciences, not on mysticism; (2) Chinese intellectuals should apply the methods of philosophical analysis and mathematical logic, instead of romantic synthesis; (3) China should give up the traditional Confucian and Daoist passive agricultural and family ethics and should instead develop public spirit, patriotism, or Western nationalism; and (4) China should have an antireligious movement, including Marxism as a form of religion, in addition to Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam.

Russell emphasized that Westerners should learn from the Chinese 'a just conception of ends of life'. He believed that the Chinese could not learn morals or ethical maxims about government from Western culture. For him, contact between East and West was likely to be fruitful to both parties. China could learn from the West the indispensable minimum of practical efficiency, and the West could learn from China the contemplative wisdom that has enabled it to persist.

In China, unlike the Western militant and aggressive attitude. Russell found a tranquil, pacific, humane, and tolerant attitude among the average people, in particular among those in the countryside. Moreover, most Chinese ethics and political philosophy preached an ideal life along these lines. He felt that the Chinese Daoist philosophy of Laozi and Zhuangzi was most compelling. Russell's advocacy for industrialization without losing the passive and pacific characters of the Chinese and their ethics developed in an agricultural society raised the question whether it was too difficult to realize. Whether the Daoist philosophy to 'reject knowledge' and 'return to follow nature' was compatible with the modern scientific attempt to seek knowledge endlessly and conquer nature was also an open question. [Russ41,Russ43,Russ2]
1922.01.31  Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell. 31 Sydney Street, 31 Jan. 1922.

Dearest O. … The other day Dora and I went to a Chinese feast given by the Chinese Students here. They made speeches full of delicate wit, in the style of 18th century France, with a mastery of English that quite amazed me. The Chinese Chargé d'Affaires said he had been asked to speak on Chinese Politics – he said the urgent questions were the General Election, economy and limitation of armaments – he spoke quite a long time, saying only things that might have been said in a political speech about England, and which yet were quite all right for China – when he sat down he had not committed himself to anything at all, but had suggested (without ever saying) that China's problems were worse than ours. The Chinese constantly remind me of Oscar Wilde in his first trial when he thought wit would pull one through anything, and found himself in the grip of a great machine that cared nothing for human values. I read of a Chinese General the other day, whose troops had ventured to resist a Japanese attack, so the Japanese insisted that he should apologize to their Consul. He replied that he had no uniform grand enough for such an august occasion, and therefore to his profound sorrow he must forego the pleasure of visiting a man for whom he had so high an esteem. When they nevertheless insisted, he called the same day on all the other Consuls, so that it appeared as if he were paying a mere visit of ceremony. Then all Japan raised a howl that he had insulted the Japanese nation. I would do anything in the world to help the Chinese, but it is difficult. They are like a nation of artists, with all their good and bad points. Imagine Gertler and [Augustus] John and Lytton set to govern the British Empire, and you will have some idea how China has been governed for 2000 years. Lytton is very like an old fashioned Chinaman, not at all like the modern westernized type.

I must stop. All my love. Your B. [Russ36]

1922.03.02  Letter from Xu Zhimo to Bertrand Russell. 2.3.1922.

Xu Zhimo decided to divorce his first wife and to marry Lin Huiyin. He must have been desirous of seeking advice from the Russells before he contacted his wife in Berlin.

"I wonder if I may have the happiness and privilege to book you to lunch or tea with me at the above address [55 Victoria Road, Cambridge] when you come to town this weekend [sic]. I do hope it will not be inconvenient for you to arrange. I can hardly express the anxiety with which I have been looking forward to meeting you again; I do miss you heartily. I think I can get Mr. [G. Lowes] Dickinson to be with us if you like. But I must confess my desire to monopolize your attention even for a rare short occasion and on that account should not regret omitting Mr. Dickinson's company, charming as it is. Selfishness, perhaps. But you will smile and forgive. I am confident."

Xu did not manage to see Russell again before 1925. [Russ45]
Many Americans not unnaturally think that the good record of America hitherto is a reason for expecting a good record in the future. I think those who take this point of view do not quite understand the new temptations to which America will henceforth be exposed. I know there is in America a great deal of what is called 'idealism'. But what are its manifestations? Prohibition certainly is due to 'idealism'. Now there are many good arguments in favour of prohibition, and I am not myself prepared to oppose it, but no student of modern psychology will suppose that these arguments were what persuaded the nation. Apart from the interests of those who make non-alcoholic drinks, and the hopes of employers that their men would work harder, it must have been the case that there were more people who found pleasure in preventing others from drinking than people who found pleasure in drinking themselves. Take another exhibition of 'idealism': the treatment of Maxim Gorky in the United States. I know there were journalistic reasons for inflaming opinion against him, but these could not have operated unless opinion were ready to be inflamed. In America divorce is easy; in Tsarist Russia it was almost impossible. Consequently the law had not sanctioned a union far more stable than many American marriages; therefore Gorky was 'immoral' and must be hounded out of the country. Again: the Bible says 'Thou shalt not steal', but Socialists believe that civilization can only be preserved by confiscation of private property. Therefore they are immoral men, who must not be allowed to sit in a Legislature to which they have been duly elected, and whose heads may be bashed in by loyal mobs who invade their houses. Sacco and Vanzetti are accused of a murder, and there is no conclusive evidence that they committed it; but their political opinions are undesirable, so that no one is interested in the mere question of fact: Did they, or did they not, commit the murder? The moral reprobation of these men on account of their opinions is, no doubt, another case of 'idealism'. So far, 'idealism' may be identified with love of persecution. If I were concerned to analyse its unconscious psychological sources, I should say that this form of it results from a conflict between the Christian duty of loving one's neighbour and the natural man's impulse to torture him. A reconciliation is effected by the theory that one's neighbour is a 'sinner', who must be punished in order to be purified. People cling to the conception of 'sin', because otherwise they would have no moral justification for inflicting pain. 'Idealism', in this form, is moral reprobation as a pretext for torture. I do not suggest that America is the only country where there is 'idealism'. All the belligerents were full of it during the war, and is still rampant everywhere. But it is only in America, and to a lesser extent in England, that it still deceives the people who are trying to think out the problem of creating a happier world. Is it not clear that a happier world will not be generated by hatred, even if the objects of hatred are 'sinners'? Do any Christians, I wonder, ever read the Gospels?

'Idealism' has, however, a wider scope than persecution. It may be defined generically as the practice of proclaiming moral motives for our actions. After America's entry into the war, President Wilson became idealistic in our former sense; before that, when he was 'too proud to fight', he was idealistic in a wider sense. The objection to proclaiming moral motives for one's actions is twofold: first, that no one else believes what one says; and secondly, that one does believe it oneself. I have no doubt that many Americans believe in the unselfishness of America's motives, first for neutrality and then for belligerency. People who are not Americans, however, cannot be persuaded to adopt this view. They think that America intervened at the exact moment most favourable for American interests, and that America would not have become either so rich or so powerful as she is if she had intervened sooner or had remained neutral to the end. They do not blame America for this, but they are somewhat irritated when they find that Americans will not admit it, but claim to be made of nobler stuff than the rest of humanity.

I suppose few things have done more to disgust Americans with the Old World than the secret treaties. I am not, of course, a defender of the secret treaties, but I think it is worth while to understand how a man like Lord Grey came to agree to them. I took and still take the view that the issues in the war were unimportant, that it did not matter which side won (though a
draw would have been best), and that the most important thing was that the war should end quickly. This was not the view of the belligerents. The British Government took the view—to which America was converted in the end—that the defeat of Germany was vital. We could not defeat Germany without the help of nations having no direct interest in the struggle, and we could not get their help without buying it. By the time America came in, we had built up such a strong alliance that America's strength turned the scale; but it must be admitted that America profited by our sins. Our people did not know of the secret treaties; the sins were only those of the Government. And when President Wilson declared in the Senate that he did not know of the secret treaties, the American Government showed that it shared the guilt.

I come now to China. It is in China that American policy has been seen at its best. America alone has not sought concessions, has returned the balance of the Boxer indemnity, has stood for the Open Door, and has championed the independence and integrity of China. All these things are admirable, but they show wisdom rather than unselfishness; they are all strictly consonant with American interests. The Washington Conference has provided a good deal of rather painful evidence that the interests of China receive little consideration when they are opposed to those of America. Up to the present (January 26), it is doubtful whether anything effective is going to be done about Shantung, but that may be excused on the ground of Japanese obduracy. The more serious matter is the American attempt to secure international control of China by means of the Consortium. China is in financial difficulties, partly owing to the anarchy which has been carefully fomented by Japan, partly owing to the withholding of the Customs Revenue by the British Inspector-General of Customs. The London 'Times' of 14 January says:

It is curious to reflect that this country [China] could be rendered completely solvent and the Government provided with a substantial income almost by a stroke of the foreigner's pen, while without that stroke there must be bankruptcy pure and simple. Despite constant civil war and political chaos, the Customs Revenue consistently grows, and last year exceeded all records by £1,000,000. The increased duties sanctioned by the Washington Conference will provide sufficient revenue to liquidate the whole foreign and domestic floating debt in a very few years, leaving the splendid salt surplus unencumbered for the Government. The difficulty is not to provide money, but to find a Government to which to entrust it. Yet the 'Times' foams at the mouth when the Chinese say they would like to recover control of their own customs. As a consequence of foreign control the Chinese Government has failed to meet an obligation of $5,500,000 due to a Chicago bank. The resulting action of America is set forth in 'The Freeman' for November 25 (p. 244), as follows: American financiers and politicians were at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece; having cooperated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they came forward handsomely in the hour of trial with an offer to save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese Government would only enter into relations with the Consortium, and thus prepare the way for the eventual establishment of an American financial protectorate.

In the 'Japan Weekly Chronicle' for November 17 (p. 725), in a telegram headed 'International Control of China', I find it reported that America is thought to be seeking to establish international control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the Philadelphia 'Public Ledger': 'We suspect the motives which led to the suggestion and we thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterly oppose any conference-plan to offer China international aid.' He adds: 'International control will not do. China must be given time and opportunity to find herself. The world should not misinterpret or exaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now passing through.' These are wise words, with which every true friend of China must agree. In the same issue of the 'Japan Weekly Chronicle'—which, by the way, I consider one of the best weekly papers in the world—I find the following (p. 728):

Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: 'The international bankers have a scheme for the international control of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese Government refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the Morgan Company, should be paid out of it.' Mr. Lamont, on hearing this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying: 'Simpson's statement is unqualifiedly false. When
this man Simpson talks about resisting the control of the international banks he is fantastic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the conference result in such a solution as will furnish full opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny.' Sagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must be due to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had had nothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer and one of China’s best friends as ‘this man Simpson’. I do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive, and I have not space here to set it all forth, but to any European radical Air. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want control reads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to a Government which, if it is let alone, will go bankrupt, must aim at control, for, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago bank, it would be impossible to believe that Messrs. Morgan and Company are so purely philanthropic as not to care whether they get any interest on their money or not, although emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as though this were the case.

While I was in China recently, the consortium, which is theoretically international but practically American, offered a loan to China on condition that China made certain internal reforms. China rejected the offer, rightly as I thought, since it involved international control. Shortly before my departure from Peking, Mr. Crane, who had just ceased to be American Minister to China, was reported in the 'Peking Leader' (a paper owned by Chinese but edited by an American) to have stated in an interview that he was in favour of international control of China. I mentioned this interview in a farewell address. To my amazement, there was an uproar among the very Americans who had advocated the Consortium. The editor of the 'Peking Leader', in whose paper the interview had appeared, seemed astonished that I could have believed it to be genuine, and made difficulties about permitting my address to be reprinted. I left China immediately afterwards, and do not know what subsequently occurred, except that the Peking Leader published an editorial criticizing my work as a professor. All this shows the curious confusion of mind which enables people to advocate a loan on condition of internal changes, and yet to imagine themselves opposed to international control.

In the 'New Republic' for November 30, there is an article by Mr. Brailsford entitled 'A New Technique of Peace', which sets forth an analysis with which I find myself in complete agreement. If the Conference is successful, I expect to see China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreign commerce and industry; a government such as the West will consider good substituted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy; a gradually increasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, the chief of which is America; the development of a sweated Chinese proletariat; the spread of Christianity; the substitution of the American civilization for the Chinese; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such objets d’art as millionaires may think it worth while to buy; the gradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and one day, fifty or a hundred years hence, the massacre of every white man throughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secret society. All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is. It will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall be told that it is done in order that China may have 'good' government. The definition of the word 'good' government is as easy as A.B.C.: it is government that yields fat dividends to capitalists. The Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. They have a civilization superior to ours in all that makes for human happiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, if they are allowed a little time, will revivify China and produce something immeasurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism that we call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans will be able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soul of the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her salvation; all great nations need such a period from time to time. When America went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought of intervening to insist on 'good government', but fortunately abstained. Nowadays, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americans recognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but many of
them are smitten with blindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them is that they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thank God that they are not as this publican.

I hope no reader will think that my outlook is that of a cynic. Whoever will read the third Book of Spinoza's Ethics will find there a view of human nature identical with my own; whoever will read the fourth and fifth Books will see how little cynicism this view implies. The two qualities which I consider superlatively important are love of truth and love of our neighbour. I find love of truth obscured in America by commercialism, of which pragmatism is the philosophical expression; and love of our neighbor kept in fetters by Puritan morality.

Faults at least as bad as those of America exist in all countries; but America seems as yet somewhat more lacking than some other countries as regards a self-critical minority. This minority exists; and there is notable proof that it is not silent. I fear that some of the things I have said may cause irritation, but that is not their purpose; I wish only to promote mutual understanding. I wish also, if I can, to do something to save China from a slavery more complete than any that Japan could impose. [Russ6]

1922.03.09 Russell, Bertrand. China's entanglements. In : Foreign affairs ; vol. 3, no 9 (March 1922). Review of Reid, Gilbert. China, captive or free ? (London : G. Allen & Unwin, 1922). Among all the many recent books on the Far East there are extraordinarily few that are tolerably free from national bias. The British bias is familiar to readers of Mr. J.O.R Bland and The Times. In Chinese internal affairs it is reactionary, sneering at Young China, exalting the virtues of the old-fashioned mandarins, and desiring to uphold the traditional family ethics. At bottom, this attitude is usually, though not always, inspired by the fear of seeing China become strong enough to stand alone. It goes with an admiration for Japan, which takes the form of assurances that Japan's misdeeds have been due to a small military clique and will soon be ended by the victory of some imaginary Liberal Party in Japanese politics. There is, of course, a Liberal Party as regards home affairs, but in foreign affairs all Japanese are united except the small band of Socialists and Labour leaders. The American bias is different from the British, and politically less noxious. Almost all Americans are friendly to Young China and inclined to side with Canton as against Peking. They have no doubt that it would be for China's good to be developed commercially and industrially, and they do not wish to see this done by Japan alone. So far I think we ought to agree with them. But their dislike of Japan makes them hardly just to that country, and their fanatical belief in capitalistic enterprise makes them perhaps blind to the dangers of international exploitation.

Dr. Reid is that rare exception, a truly just man. The faults of Japan are told, but not exaggerated; the faults of America are not passed over. One of the most interesting portions of his book deals with the injury done to China by the Allied and Associated Powers when they induced China to participate in the war. In inducing a severance of diplomatic relations, America took the lead; in inducing the declaration of war, Japan was foremost. The intrigues and faction fights required to bring about the result caused the failure of parliamentary government and of the all-but successful attempts to unite North and South. No one supposed that the participation of China would help to win the war; the sole object of the European Allies, especially Great Britain, was to capture German trade and German property, both public and private. This laudable object was achieved. After the armistice, the Germans in China were sent home at twenty-four hours' notice, in crowded ships through the tropics, with confiscation of everything belonging to them except their clothes. This policy was mainly British. The British were inexorable, even in the case of delicate women holding medical certificates to the effect that they would probably die on the voyage; but the Chinese often managed to hide away their German friends until passions had cooled. I know of nothing in the whole war so sordidly and inhumanly money-grubbing as our behaviour in China in 1918. Although Dr. Reid is a Doctor of Divinity, his book compels the conclusion that Christian nations are more degradedly cruel than the heathen Chinese. From the opium war onward, our record is one of shame and infamy. [Russ6]
1922.03.19-22 [Russell, Bertrand. *Sketches of modern China*]. Chi Fu yi. [ID D28291].

Chi Fu added his own reflection at the end of his translation:
Now western culture comes to China everyday. We have invited many famous people to lecture in China. Even if [foreigners] have ideas about reforming China, these are just ideas. They cannot carry out reform for us. One who is not familiar with the history, customs, and human relationships [of China] may not have ideas that are feasible. Mr. Russell understands that, and that is why he does not approve of foreigners trying to reform China. [Russ44]

1922.10.16 Bertrand Russell speaks on "Young China" to the Political Union of the University College Cardiff. [Russ6]

1922.11.11 [Russell, Bertrand. *Zhongguo wen ti*]. Ed. by Sun Fuyuan. [ID D28292].

Sun Fuyuan added a commentary in Chen bao fu juan ; 11. Nov. (1922) : The national characters of various peoples naturally have merits and defects at the same time. But Russell, using the opportunity of praising the Chinese, criticized the British severely. Nowadays most Chinese are mentally unstable, ecstatic when praised and enraged at criticism. Such a temperament is preserved from children and barbarians, because the [Chinese] national character has not had the opportunity to develop and grow, due to thousands of years of political turmoil. Russell's attitude of being 'heavy in criticizing oneself and light in criticizing others', therefore, is exactly the medicine we need. At another, and most important level, it is not that we have not seen a few Westerners praising China, such as [John O.P.] Bland and his like. But they only praise China's old personalities and old systems. Just as Russell says, their preise hides a malicious motive, which is to make us sacrifice modern life and preserve the bizarre and the ancient for them to amuse themselves and play with. That is why they like us to have an emperor, like us to wear the queue, like us to have bound feet, like us to be confined in the cage of the old moral system to suffer, while they stand outside the cage and shout bravo. While Russell praises a few of the merits of our inherent national character, most of which I think are gone, he pays special attention to our new movement. Whether the Chinese nation has hope for rejuvenation depends on whether the new movement succeeds. [Russ44]
1922.12.03  Xu, Zhimo. *Luosu yì Zhongguo* [ID D28381]. [Bertrand Russell and China].

Gaylord Kai Loh Leung: Referring to Russell's book *The problem of China* Xu Zhimo declared in his essay that 'Russell had sincere feelings for, deep understanding of and absolute sympathy for us', and 'This book by Russell marks a milestone in the course of cultural exchange between East and West. Russell is a man who truly understands and values Chinese culture; what he says are correct views originating from sympathy'. Xu admired Russell's condemnation of Japan and other western powers whose encroachment on China, driven by rapacity and stupidity, might have disastrous effects on one of the world's best cultures. But Xu had some mild criticism of Russell but he was generous in his praise of Russell. It is just natural that Xu Zhimo, a starry-eyed idealist, should feel inspired when reveling in the realm of Bertrand Russell's social and political ideals. The English philosopher's attack on hypocrisy; on capitalism and commercialism; his promotion of an international government for the maintenance of world peace; his defence of creative impulse; his love for mankind and for civilization; and his integrity, bravery and candour, would have appealed powerfully to Xu who was by nature inclined to emotionalism, freedom and justice. The imprisonment [1918] of Russell by the British government would only have excited his admiration for the dauntless fighter of independent thought.

Bertrand Russell sent Xu Zhimo his publication *The problem of China* and asked him to propagate in China the ideas expounded in the book.

Xu Zhimo:

"Russell, however, does not fully understand the evolution of the Chinese culture and life to its present form. In the first place, he fails to gauge the influence of Confucius. He frankly admits in his book that he is not well-disposed towards Confucius who insisted on excessive formalities. In the second place, he presumes that the strength of China has much to do with Lao Tzu and Chuang tzu.

Russell is the highest crystallization of reason in modern age. His logic and mathematics apart, there is a burning passion in him. Coupled with his bravery in his fearless fight against convention, he is truly a great personality to be emulated, a unique figure of all times." [Russ45]

1922.12.03  Xu, Zhimo. [Review of Bertrand Russell's "The problem of China"]. [ID D28402].

This book by Russell has really established a milestone in the course of Chinese-Western cultural exchange and convergence. He is a man who truly understands and loves Chinese culture... Some people here may say that [Russell] is reacting to European civilization and his admiration of China is emotional, exaggerating everything beyond facts; that he cannot understand China since he stayed here for such a short period of time. Yes, he is reacting; but what he is disgusted with is not all things European, which would be captious, but the evils produced by industrial civilization and the capitalist system. His admiration of China is not due to China's being the opposite of Europe, but is a real faith resulting from a combination of penetrating reason, sincere feelings, and awareness and recognition of the life itself behind all civilizations and cultures. I dare to say this because I myself have been there. I too used to wonder whether he was reacting emotionally, using the East to let out his own frustration [with the West]. But in contrast to the life of the Indians and the Chinese that I have seen during and after my return journey this time, I see the hypocrisy, the indecency, and the precariousness of life in Europe and America, and I cannot but believe the sincerity of Russell's feelings. We must never think we naturally have the correct view of China simply because we were born and are living in China.

Xu Zhimo remarked that Russell's concern about China's possible tendency towards militarism was unfounded and that Russell did not fully grasp Chinese culture and Chinese life, for he mistakenly attributed China's virtues to Daoism, while the peaceful, easy-going temperament of the Chinese actually came from Confucianism. In spite of himself, therefore, Xu was showing that after all he knew China better than Russell did. [Russ4]

1922.12.20  Bertrand Russell attends a meeting of Chinese students at Connaught Rooms in London. [Russ6]
Xu, Zhimo. *Luosu you lai shuo hua le* [Artikel über Leisure and mechanism von Bertrand Russell]. [ID D28403].

Bertrand Russell himself also said that his ideas were not novelties. But however commonplace a principle may be, if the society as a whole could recognize its importance and seriously put it into practice, then astonishing effect could be achieved.

In the final analysis, the current industrialism, mechanism, system of competition and the mentality associated with superstition engendered by those phenomena are enemy of our ideal society and obstacles to a national life. Now as far as China is concerned, the only hope is an early awakening by her leaders who could, by virtue of their positions, set example to resist the temptations from without and reverse the suicidal trend. Otherwise, the future will be bleak and full of traps.

Every time I read Russell's writings or recollect his voice and facial expressions, I think of New York City, especially the fifty-eight-storied Woolworth Building. Russell's thought and views resemble the summer evening on the sea – there are flashes of lightning like golden snakes, sharply and coldly streaking amidst the dark purple clouds. They appear and disappear before your eyes and above your head.

Isn't a skyscraper dangerous? Just half a thunderbolt is enough to pulverize the entire building; it could shake and terrify the woods and lawns along the Hudson river! But no! Despite the flash of lightning, the thunderbolt never comes. The building still towers high in the clouds. The golden lightning only illuminates its loftiness and adds to its lustre. [Russ45]

Before his visit to China Mr. Russell had been in Russia. While journeying on the Volga he realized how 'profound is the disease in our Western mentality'—a mentality which even then the Bolsheviks were trying to force upon an essentially Asiatic population. The disease springs from excess of energy and its rationalizations. 'Our industrialism, our militarism, our love of progress, our missionary zeal, our imperialism, our passion for dominating and organizing, all spring from a superflux of the itch for activity'. The company on the Volga boat was 'noisy, quarrelsome, full of facile theories, with glib explanations of everything'. Yet one of the company lay at death's door, and 'all around us lay a great silence, strong as death, unfathomable as the heavens. It seemed that none had the leisure to hear the silence, yet it called to me so insistently that I grew deaf to the harangues of propagandists and the information of the well-informed'.

One night while the vocal and futile arguing was going on, the boat stopped and Mr. Russell went ashore, and in the silence found on the sand a strange assemblage of human beings... The flickering names lighted up gnarled, bearded faces of wild men; strong, patient, primitive women, and children as slow and sedate as their parents... To me they seemed to typify the very soul of Russia, unexpressive, inactive from despair, unheeded by the little set of westernizers who make up all the parties of progress or reaction... Something of the patient silence communicated to me, something lonely and unspoken remained in my heart all through the comfortable familiar intellectual talk. And at last the I began to feel that all politics are inspired by a grinning devil, teaching the energetic and quick-witted to torture submissive populations for the profit of pocket or power or theory... From time to time I heard sad songs or the hunting music of the balalaika; but the sound mingled with the great silence of the steppes, and left me with a terrible questioning pain in which Occidental hopefulness grew pale. It was in this mood that I set out for China to seek a new hope.

The passage gives more than the background of Mr. Russell's experience in China of which this book is a fruit. It is a symbol of the Problem of China, which in Mr. Russell's treatment becomes the problem of our Western civilization. The noisy, doctrinaire assertive, cocksure, propagandizing set of passengers is Western mentality going headlong to destruction. China is the brooding silence of nature, calm—indolent perhaps, but still tranquil in soul—tolerant, possessed of an unbroken instinctive sympathy with nature and power to draw consolation and happiness from simple things, content with death as with life because free from the corroding egotism of the West.

The book, of course, is more than an expatiation on this philosophic theme. It is a remarkably clear and condensed account of the historical forces and factors which have led up to the present situation in the Far East together with an analysis of the present situation. The report supplements his personal experience with a judicious and discriminating use of secondary sources. As a result, the book is to me the most enlightening, as a matter of information and comment, of all the many works which have been recently written to put Western readers in touch with the issues of the Far East. It is extraordinarily well done; so well done in fact that only those who by some personal experience recognize the difficulties which have been overcome, will perceive how well it is done.

But those who extract information from the book will miss its chief significance if they do not find on almost every page the haunting refrain of the note sounded in the passage quoted. Through 'industrialism and the high pressure at which most of us live' we have lost that 'instinctive happiness and joy of living' which China has retained. 'Our prosperity can be obtained only by wide-spread oppression and exploitation of weaker nations, while the Chinese are not strong enough to injure other countries, and they secure whatever they enjoy by means of their own merits and exertions alone... By valuing progress and efficiency we have secured power and wealth; by ignoring them Chinese, until we brought disturbance, secured upon the whole peaceable existence and a life full of enjoyment... Chinese have discovered, and have practised for many centuries a way of life which, if it could be adopted by all the world, would make all the world happy. We Europeans have not. Our way of life demands strife, exploitation, restless change, discontent and destruction. 'And America, it should be added, is Europe at its worst because it is Europe at its peak of energy, efficiency,
and proselytizing intolerance, plus a complacent and impenetrable self-righteousness which in
Europe is beginning to crumble. America presents the acme of the mechanistic outlook,'something which exists equally in imperialism, Bolshevism and the Y.M.C.A... the habit of
regarding mankind as raw material, to be molded by our scientific manipulation into whatever
form may happen to suit our fancy... the cultivation of will at the expense of perception'. It is
belief in government, in a life against nature, in the desirability of conversion to one's own
point of view and creed that Chinese culture has escaped. Discriminating Chinese would
probably be the first to admit that Mr. Russell has idealized their civilization, slighted its
defects and exaggerated its excellences. China tends to become an angel of light to show up
the darkness of Western civilization. Chinese virtues are made a whip of scorpions with
which to lash the backs of complacent Westerners. I do not regard this fact, however, as a
serious defect. For my own experience in China convinces me that Mr. Russell has justly
stated the direction in which Chinese excellence exists, even though, in his soul's revulsion
against the stupidities of the West, he has overstated its degree of attainment. And I do not
find it in me to differ with Mr. Russell as to the extent and urgency of the need in the West to
pause and to learn from the Orient. A ground of complaint lies elsewhere, I think. His method
permits Mr. Russell to make a lucid exposition of the external, or political and economic,
problem of China—with a lucidity which, emerging in an obscure world, must always be
close, as it is with Mr. Russell, to irony. For, of course, it is precisely the restless predatory
energy of the Occident which in itself and as communicated to Japan has created the present
political industrial problems of China. With biting precision and his accustomed artistry of
selection and elimination Mr. Russell has depicted this situation to all who still have eyes to
see.

But the internal and deeper problem of China, that of the transformation of its own culture
and institutions, Mr. Russell hardly seems to touch. He mentions indeed some of the bad
consequences of their family system, the lack of science in their tradition, their callousness.
But he appears content to dismiss them with the remark that they have not brought in their
train consequences as tragic as the defects of the Western mind have brought to the Western
world. This may be quite true; and for who is chiefly interested in the West perhaps it
suffices. I cannot see however that it throws much light upon the problem of Chin as that
exists for the Chinese. A sense of the deepest problem of China as it exists in the
consciousness of thoughtful Chinese is what one misses in Mr. Russell's pages. As a good
European he is perhaps chiefly interested in European culture and what Europe has to learn
from Asia; in comparison the stupendous and marvellous problem of the intrinsic remaking of
the oldest, thickest, and most extensive civilization of the world does not attract his attention.
It would be churlish to quarrel with Mr. Russell for what he has not done, in the view of what
he has done so well. But the world still needs, although probably no one but a Chinese can
give it to the world, a picture of the most wonderful drama now enacting anywhere in the
world, and, I sometimes think, the most wonderful as well as the most difficult to bring to
conclusion of any that human history has yet witnessed. Contact with the West has induced in
China a ferment of reawakening, a true Renaissance. I rarely met a Chinese who, with all his
sense of the unjust and cruel problems which the exploiting, aggressive West had forced upon
China, who with all his sense of the evils of Western materialism, nationalism, and egotistic
individualism, was without a grateful recognition of an awakening due to Western
influence—an awakening which seemed necessary to prevent further decay of what was good
in old culture as well as necessary to a new and richer life. The ultimate 'Problem of China'
corns, it seems to me, the question of what is to win in the present turmoil of change: the
harsh and destructive impact of the West, or the internal re-creation of Chinese culture
inspired by intercourse with the West. [DewJ45]

The Boxer Indemnity Bill, now in Committee, provides that what remains unpaid of the Boxer Indemnity shall be spent on purposes to the mutual advantage of Great Britain & China. It does not state that these purposes are to be educational. In the opinion of all who know China (except solely as a field for capitalist exploitation), it is of the utmost importance that an Amendment should be adopted specifying Chinese education as the sole purpose to which the money should be devoted. The following are the chief ground in favour of such an Amendment:

1. That this would be the expenditure most useful to China.
2. That no other course would produce a good effect on influential Chinese opinion.
3. That the interests of Great Britain, which are to be considered, can only be secured by winning the good will of the Chinese.
4. That any other course would contrast altogether too unfavourably with the action of America, which long ago devoted all that remained of the American share of the Boxer indemnity to Chinese education.
5. That the arguments alleged in favour of other courses all have a corrupt motive, i.e. are designed for the purpose of securing private profit through Government action.

For these reasons, it is profoundly desirable that Labour Members of Parliament should take action to secure the necessary Amendment before it is too late.

The China Indemnity Bill, in its present form, provides that the remainder of the Boxer Indemnity shall be applied to 'purposes, educational or other', which are mutually beneficial to Great Britain and China.

Sir Walter de Frece proposed in Committee that the words 'connected with education' should be substituted for 'educational or other'.

It is much to be hoped that the House of Commons will carry this Amendment on the Report stage. Certain interests are opposed to the Amendment for reasons with which Labour can have no sympathy. The Government thinks it necessary to placate these interests, but maintains that the Committee to be appointed will be free to decide in favour of education only. The Committee, however, is appointed by Parliament, and one third of its members are to retire every two years; there is therefore no guarantee against its domination by private interests in the future.

The Bill in its present form opens the door to corruption, is not calculated to please Chinese public opinion, displays Great Britain as less enlightened than American and Japan, and therefore fails altogether to achieve its nominal objects. The Labour Party ought to make at least an attempt to prevent the possibility of the misapplication of public money to purposes of private enrichment. This will be secured by the Insertion of the words 'connected with education' in Clause 1, after the word 'purposes'. [Russ9]
The first necessity in this Chinese crisis is to be clear about the facts, which have, as usual, been distorted by the Press, the telegraph agencies, and the Government. The Professor of the National University of Peking have issued a statement in which they have endeavoured to counteract these distortions; so has the Chinese Information Bureau; so have various American missionaries. These accounts are universally believed, and have the effect of rousing humanitarian sentiment against Great Britain. But in England almost the whole Press boycotts the truth.

The trouble began with a strike in a Japanese mill in Shanghai. One of the strikers was shot by the Japanese. [The fuller information given in our leader of last week (i.e., 2 killed, 13 wounded) is, we believe, correct. Ed. New Leader]. Some Chinese students paraded the streets as a protest against this unjustifiable homicide. The students were, as the Professor states, 'armed with nothing more than pamphlets and handbills'. Many of them were arrested by the British police, whereupon the remainder marched to the police station to demand the release of their comrades. Terrified by this unarmed mob of boys and girls, the British authorities ordered the police to fire upon them, killing six and seriously wounding over forty. As the students continued to demonstrate, the police continued to kill them for six days, until 70 were killed and 300 wounded. To justify their action, the British asserted that the mob was armed and advanced with cries of 'kill the foreigner'. If such cries were uttered, it must have been by 'agents provocateur'.

The students who demonstrated were the kind of young men and young women of whom I saw a great deal when in China – eager, enthusiastic, idealistic, unable to believe that justice, however clear, is powerless against brute force. Chinese students are like the best of our sons and daughters, but slightly more naïve as regards the wickedness of the world. Confucius taught that human nature is naturally good, and one of the difficulties of our missionaries has been that they cannot get the Chinese to accept the doctrine of original sin. In this task they are receiving valuable assistance from the British police.

The rest of the Chinese population of Shanghai has resented this massacre, and has been engaged in a gradually growing strike. There is also a beginning of a boycott of British and Japanese goods throughout China. There have been simultaneous disturbances in other places in China. The navies of the world have assembled in Shanghai harbor so as to be ready to shoot more boys and girls.

To understand the situation it is necessary to say a word about the government of Shanghai. Shanghai is a city comparable in size to London, divided into three parts: the Chinese City, the French concession, and the International concession. The last, where the trouble has occurred, is governed by the capitalists exclusively: there is not the faintest hint of democracy. The capitalists are mainly British and Japanese, with a fair sprinkling of Americans. The British police are Sikhs (except the officers), who play the same part as the Cossacks played in Tsarist Russia. Whenever the capitalists of Shanghai get into trouble, warships of all 'civilised' countries hasten to their assistance, as in the present instance.

Where Young Life is Cheap

The right of the foreigners in Shanghai is the right of conquest – the same right that the Germans had in Belgium from 1914 to 1918. They arrived there in the first instance as a result of the Opium War of 1842. There is no justification whatever for their presence, except that the Chines are not a match for the foreigners in military and naval power.

Shanghai is an important industrial centre, and the labour conditions are quite as bad as they were in England 100 years ago. Young children work twelve hours a day for seven days in the week; sometimes they fall asleep at their work, and roll into the unfenced machinery and are killed. Other children are employed in making matches. They get phosphorous poisoning, and most of them die young. There was a proposal before the Shanghai Municipal Council to introduce some slight regulation of child labour (at present there is none). This came forward during the first days of the present trouble, but fell through because there was no quorum – fortunately, according to the 'Times', as it might have encouraged the strikers. The conditions of adult workers are such as these facts would lead us to expect. They work from 12 to 13½
hours a day, and their wages vary from 16s. to 30s. a month. It is to prevent any improvement in these conditions that we are shooting unarmed boys and girls – usually in the back.

The Capitalist Mind

The issue which has been raised has two aspects; one industrial, the other national, though it is impossible to keep the two quite separate. As regards the industrial aspect, we have the singular fact that in the Treaty Ports the workers have no voice in the government, which is an undisguised tyranny of the rich. Naturally, they use their power as they always do when they have it: to extort wealth out of the blood and tears of their victims. I do not pretend that Chinese capitalists would be more humane than those who are Christians or Japanese; a capitalist, of whatever country, will be as cruel as is compatible with saving his skin, often more so. But Chinese capitalists would not long be able to call overwhelming military and naval force to their assistance. Left to themselves, the Chinese would develop industrialism very slowly, and would learn to control it by democracy to the extent that it is controlled in the West.

If we do not desire an irresistible growth of anti-foreign feeling in China, we must radically alter our ways. It would be a good thing if the authorities were to discourage white men from beating coolies whenever they are out of temper. They never beat Japanese coolies, however angry they may be; the sole reason is that Japan has a powerful army and navy. It would be a good thing to introduce factory legislation on Western lines. It would be a good thing if white men were to practice ordinary courtesy towards the Chinese. But none of these things will be done so long as the foreigners living in the Treaty Ports have the government exclusively in their own hands. We shall not, of course, evacuate the Treaty Ports except as the result of superior force, which the Chinese are likely to display within the next twenty years. But if we wish to delay the militarisation of China as long as possible, we shall be wise to control the foreign residents in Treaty Ports, and compel them to conform to those laws of elementary humanity which have been forced upon capitalists at home. This would, of course, be in the interests of British workers, who suffer by the competition of ill-paid labour. It would not be in the interests of British capitalists, who mean to invest their money abroad, starve out the British workers, and convert England into a country of parks and pheasant preserves.

Assuming that foreigners do not radically alter their policy towards China, it is easy to predict what must happen. Nationalist feeling will grow more and more inflamed, Feng or some other will put himself at the head of it, and with the help of the Soviet Union every Englishman, Frenchman and American in China will be driven into the sea.

Administering 'Justice'

At present, the movements which are taking place are not properly described as 'anti-foreign'. There are Labour movements, aiming at less intolerable conditions. There is the Young China movement, which wants to recover some degree of national independence. But these movements are not inspired by any hatred of individual foreigners. We are told that whatever crimes our countrymen may have committed in Shanghai, we must support them for fear they should be murdered. This is as yet a groundless fear. No policeman employed by Europeans, and only one European has been killed. But if the Europeans persist in claiming the right to shoot innocent Chinese whenever they feel so disposed, they must expect that, sooner or later, the Chinese will begin to think of retaliation. All the British in China who have not actively protested against recent occurrences are morally guilty of murder. They cannot be hanged, because the administration of 'justice' is in their hands. But if, ultimately, they provoke reprisals, which I profoundly hope will not be the case, they cannot be regarded as innocent victims. They have forced themselves, at the point of the bayonet, upon a country which did not want them, and they have used their military strength solely to grow rich by incredibly cruel exploitation.

There has been, ever since the November Revolution in Russia, a curious intertwining of the struggle between Capital and Labour on the one hand, and the struggle between West and East on the other. Russia was formerly dominated by foreign capitalists, and reed herself by an incredibly painful process. India and China are still where Russia was formerly. Western Labour cannot obtain full emancipation while it remains an accomplice in the profitable
exploitation of the East by those who are its enemies at home. To talk of Bolshevik propaganda is nonsense; it is Western Governments and capitalists who have done the propaganda for the Bolsheviks. It is they who have persuaded young China that no spark of justice or humanity is to be expected from Western nations. Unless our democracies take hold of the Asiatic question, and insist upon seeing it handled according to Socialist principles, not according to the maxims of a ruthless capitalist imperialism, there is no hope for the white man in Asia, and no way of avoiding a clash which will be more terrible than any that mankind has yet known. [Russ297]
1925.07.10 Russell, Bertrand. Deliver China from her bondage: peace or shame for Britain?

What has been happening recently in China appears to have taken our governing classes by surprise. 'The Times' on July 3 began a leading article with the words: 'something quite new is happening in China'. Those who have taken the trouble to study modern China are not in any degree surprised by recent events.

The British in China are broadly of three classes, traders, officials and missionaries. Of these the traders are the worst and most ignorant, the missionaries the most humane and the best informed. But all three classes, for varying reasons, have a conservative bias. Traders and officials regret the Manchu Empire, because it was weak externally, but strong enough internally to enforce obedience to concessions made to foreigners. Missionaries cannot be expected to like the fact that Young China, largely from patriotic motives, is becoming more and more anti-Christian. Nevertheless, the missionaries have shown themselves far more liberal in the present crisis, than the traders and officials. This is largely because they have a real contact with the Chinese, and because their activities consist in persuading, not in coercing. The contempt for Young China among the other sections of Anglo-Chinese is astonishing.

Recent events are a continuation of the movement which had a spectacular beginning with the Revolution of 1911, and has since had several notable effects on Chinese politics. It was Young China which caused the Chinese Government not to sign the Versailles Treaty, because that Treaty handed Shantung to Japan, as a reward to the Chinese for their participation in the war. It was Young China which caused the overthrow of the An-Fu (Pro-Japanese) Party in 1920, the method being propaganda by students among the soldiers. It was Young China which stirred up the movement which ended with the restoration of Shantung to China.

Nevertheless, the British in China have continued to speak of Young China with contempt, and to treat with disdain every Chinese who has received and education on Western lines. If our officials could have spared a little time from polo and bridge, they would have discovered the un-wisdom of this attitude. But the upper-class Briton is encased in idleness and superciliousness. With a little sympathy and a little industry we could avoid disaster in Asia; but there seems no hope that either will be forthcoming so long as we continue to believe that our public schools produce heaven-sent rulers, who must be allowed to rule 'inferior' races. Mixed with a wholly groundless contempt, both in India and China, is an ever-present fear, which must always exist where a small governing aristocracy oppresses a large population, and especially where the aristocracy is of an alien race. The shooting in Shanghai was obviously unwise from the standpoint of British imperialism; so was the shooting in Canton. In both cases, terror caused the officials in charge to lose their heads. When they had killed so many Chinese as to rouse resentment throughout the country, they set up the plea of 'British women and children in danger'. On this plea it is urged that we must go on with the bad work. Any suggestion that the Chinese have a point of view is treated as treachery. The Archdeacon of Hong Kong was rated by Sir John Jordan as if he had been a naughty boy, because he was reported (apparently inaccurately) to have said that the Chinese students had a serious grievance. Very instructive is the letter sent by the British Consul-General to the Government of Canton the day before the shooting at Shameen (the European quarter of Canton). I quote from the 'Times' of June 25:

I learn from sources which I have every reason to believe trustworthy that in the course of a patriotic demonstration, arranged for to-morrow, the student element intend to make martyrs of themselves by attacking the bridges leading to Shameen… Any attempt to penetrate into the British Concession of Shameen will be resisted by force of arms… I write in this serious strain so that it may not be said hereafter that brutal Imperialist rifles wantonly massacred unoffending Chinese youth.

Nevertheless the Europeans were accused of firing first, not by the Chinese merely, but by the Canton Christian College. In this country we have not been allowed to see their statement, although it has apparently been published in America. So at least one gathers from the 'Times' of June 27, whose Hong Kong correspondent says that the Vice-President subsequently
withdrew his signature. This shows that the truth is doubtful, but British readers are not allowed to know the evidence on the side of the Chinese.

Evidently the British Government, from the standpoint of British interests, is behaving with the utmost unwisdom both in India and in China. Neither the officials on the spot nor the Cabinet at home seem able to adapt themselves to the post-war situation in Asia. In the Near East, the Treaty of Sèvres and the opposition to Turkish nationalism was a costly blunder, now universally admitted. In Persia, everything we thought we had gained by the war has been lost to America or Russia. Japan has been alienated by our policy since the Washington Conference, and especially by the Singapore base. In India and China, the war was regarded as proving the moral bankruptcy of European civilization, and the prestige of the white man was destroyed. Amritsar, and its counterparts in China, have failed to restore belief in our moral superiority.

If we are to avoid a conflict, almost sure to end in defeat, there is nothing for it but to abate our Imperial pride and treat with Indians and Chinese on equal terms. The late Mr. Das made a conciliatory overture, to which we have made no response, and it seems that we shall persist in this ungraciousness. This is madness. The methods of Clive and Warren Hastings are not suited to our age, but our Conservatives have learned nothing during the last one hundred and fifty years. Race pride and caste pride are greater obstacles to friendly relations with Asian than are the economic motives of exploitation. Very soon we shall have no chance to exploit either India or China, unless we learn to treat both countries with less haughtiness.

It is remarkable, and very serious from a British point of view, that the present agitation in China is directed especially against the British. Although the trouble began in a Japanese mill, the Governmental action that has been taken has been mainly British; the Japanese, since the Washington Conference, have been becoming increasingly liberal, and have not shown themselves anxious to take stringent action in China. With Japan neutral and Russia hostile, the British have no chance of succeeding in a high-handed policy towards China. After giving an example of brutality, they will have to retire covered with shame — unless, at this late date, wiser counsels should prevail.

So much for the folly of our Government's policy. But even if this policy could be successful, it would still deserve the severest condemnation. Take first the industrial issue. It is pretended by official apologists that the British mills are better than others, and that British employers are longing to introduce humane Factory Acts, but cannot get the Chinese to agree. But, as Mr. C.R. Buxton points out in the 'Times' (July 3), the very largest number of children under twelve employed in any one mill in Shanghai are employed in a British mill. The produce of the Shanghai mills competes with Lancashire, and the bad industrial conditions are diametrically opposed to the interests of British Labour.

A have been taken to task for stating that young China regards the industrial issue as important. I repeat, with the utmost emphasis, that it is regarded as of the utmost importance. The great majority of Chinese students are Socialists, and are keenly alive to the evils of capitalism. They do not talk freely to those whom they regard as representatives or agents of foreign Capitalism, and these men often remain ignorant of the real views of their pupils. But in China opposition to Capitalism is naturally bound up with opposition to foreign domination, since it is the foreigner who is forcing capitalist exploitation upon the Chinese. To treat Chinese nationalism as a crime is both ridiculous and short-sighted. For the last hundred years China has been weak, and white men have profited by her weakness to inflict intolerable humiliations. But China's weakness was merely governmental; the people are vigorous, industrious, patient and more numerous than those of any other country; moreover, they possess abundance of raw materials. They have therefore every non-political element of strength. The one thing hitherto lacking is being supplied by foreign oppression.

China is demanding only what every independent country possesses already; the Japanese at one time suffered the same disabilities, but secured their rights by creating a strong army and navy. Is this the only argument to which our Government will listen? If so, it is likely before long to be forthcoming. Russia has freed herself from economic bondage to the West; China inevitably will do, and will at the same time acquire full political liberty. With Russia and
China pointing the way, India will find a method of emancipation from British rule. It is just that these things should happen, and it is the interests of mankind; moreover, whether we oppose them or not, they will happen. Would it not be better to help them to take place peacefully, rather than to offer a resistance which must be costly, shameful, and in the end futile? [Russ300]

1925.07.18 Russell, Bertrand. *Fair play for the Chinese* [ID D28421].
[This very distinguished man of science spent some time in China; he writes about it not only with special sympathy, but with special knowledge.]
I hope your readers are not yet tired of the Chinese question. As I have often pointed out before, the truth about any Chinese occurrence cannot be ascertained until the mail arrives; telegraphic news is always propaganda. Who could have guessed, from what was telegraphed about the Shanghai shooting, that 30 British missionaries had published a protest, saying among other things: - 'We desire to express our intense regret that these incidents should have occurred. We should go further. We recognize that the serious situation evoked is largely due to underlying racial animosities. We, as Britons. Admit that we have a large share of blame in the matter'.
To issue this statement must have required great courage – more than can be realized by anyone who has never lived in a small British community among oppressed population.
The Chinese Information Bureau has issued valuable corrections of British misstatements; but even when its facts are drawn from the China Year Book (a British enterprise) they are regarded as biased ex parte pleading. For instance, attempts are made to give the impression that the International Settlement in Shanghai is mainly inhabited by non-Chinese. The facts are that the foreign population of the Settlement is 23,307 and the Chinese population 763,401. (The total population of Shanghai is close on two millions).
The foreigners alone have a vote for the Shanghai Municipal Council, which behaves as if it were a sovereign State, and has recently refused to acknowledge even the authority of the Diplomatic Body. It has nine members – six British, two Americans, and one Japanese. This explains why the Chinese hold the British specially responsible in Shanghai.
The American Government is anxious to use the Conference which was promised at Washington in 1921 for the purpose of seeking remedies for this state of affairs. The British Government wants to get the Conference indefinitely postponed, or, if America insists upon its being held, to have it confined to the one question of tariff revision.
Two Demands:
Two quite practicable demands should be made by our Government:
(1) The holding of an impartial judicial inquiry into the Shanghai shooting.
On this matter the British action is condemned, not only by the unanimous opinion of China, but by many British missionaries, practically all foreign missionaries, the diplomatic body, and the unanimous verdict of the non-British world. Our Government should undertake that, if an partial tribunal condemns the action of any Shanghai officials, he shall be punished.
(2) The holding of the Conference demanded by America, with the right to investigate the whole question of the position of foreigners in China.
Generally we ought to give it to be understood that we shall adapt our Chinese policy to that of America, which has been far more liberal than ours. This would also have the effect of improving our relations with America. Our heaven-sent diplomats are too ignorant to know how serious is the bad effect which such incidents have upon the attitude of Americans towards us.
India is the key to most of our crimes in China. We wish to keep up the white man's prestige, and imagine that that can best be done by wanton homicide. But modern China is not that of the Manchu Emperors, and our methods are out of date. [Russ296]
Russell, Bertrand. *British policy in China* [ID D28328].

The Chinese situation becomes, from the British point of view, more grave every day. In the present article, I shall deal only with immediate issues and immediate palliatives; ultimate solutions are impossible in the present atmosphere.

The gravity of the situation is made evident by a long leader in the 'Times' of July 11th, apparently expressing the views of the Foreign Office. We are told in this article that we must not mind dissociating ourselves from the other Powers concerned by adopting a more vigorous policy, and that 'there is nothing in international affairs so immediately important as this menace in China'. Also that 'it has become obviously necessary to assure our naval strength in the Pacific, since the Chinese crisis is only a prelude to further complications in which British interests in the Pacific are vitally concerned. The present state of affairs in the Far East has an intimate connection with the discussion of the cruiser programme'. These words must be taken to mean that our Government contemplates fighting China and Russia simultaneously without securing any allies. I wish to suggest certain reasons for regarding this as an undesirable policy, from the standpoint of British interests; also to point out the measures we must adopt if we wish to preserve our China trade.

First: any action in China which is to have any prospect of success must be international: the Consortium Powers, Great Britain, France, America, and Japan, must be united. If we take isolated action at the present moment, America and France will stand aloof, as their official acts already prove. Japan is likely to be actively hostile, since any increase in the influence of a white Power in China is against Japan's vital interests. Before the Washington Conference, we might have appealed to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; since that date, we have attempted to replace it by an Anglo-American Entente. To secure this end, we funded the debt to American and created the Irish Free State. Our Government seems, however, to have failed to realize that a non-imperialist policy in China was another requisite of American friendship. An Japanese friendship has, of course, been rendered impossible by Singapore. Indeed, since the evacuation of Vladivostock, the Japanese have shown an increasing tendency to co-operation with the Soviet Government in Chinese affairs. Considering that the present trouble arose from out attempt to protect Japanese employers from the just fury of their employees, Japan's recent aloofness has been remarkable.

The Soviet Government, meanwhile, is prepared to support Chinese resistance with all its strength. In these circumstances, any action we may take in China must fail. Chinese anarchy is an asset to China, since the occupation of Peking would not compel the Chinese to negotiate, and any treaty concluded by the Peking Government might be repudiated in the Province. We cannot conquer China, and we cannot compel the Chinese to trade with us. Force, therefore, offers no solution of our difficulties.

But if we are not to use force, we must try to understand the issues, and to see them as they appear both to the Chinese and to other white Power. Here there are two questions which must be kept separate: first, the narrow and definite question of the Shanghai shooting; secondly, the general question of what the Chinese regard as their grievances under the Treaties.

With regard to the Shanghai shooting, some of the facts are still in debate, others are now generally admitted. The following facts are not in dispute: the crowd outside the police station was unarmed; no notice was given of the intention to fire upon them; the order to fire was given in English, and therefore not understood by most of the crowd; the firing began ten seconds after the order was given; many of those who were hit were shot in the back, showing that they were trying to disperse, but were not given time to do so. Other crowds were fired upon during the next six days. Altogether about seventy people were killed, with a proportionate number of wounded. Every non-British person, and almost every British missionary, who has spoken about the affair has pronounced that the British authorities were not justified in their action. For example, Dr. J.W. Cline, formerly head of the missionary college at Soochow, who saw the whole thing, says: 'I was not expecting to see the police fire, was shocked when they did fire, and have been sorry about it ever since'. According to the French and Japanese newspapers, the commission of the diplomatic body which inquired into the matter recommended that the American Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council
should be dismissed ('Times', July 11th). The incident aroused unprecedented indignation throughout China, and united all parties in that usually disunited country – not only the partisans of the Bolsheviks, but even the most conservative sections. The strength of popular feeling is shown by the fact that Chang Tso-lin dare not act, though his rival Feng is profiting by the situation.

It seems obvious that, if we are to recover any reputation for just dealing, not only with the Chinese, but with the rest of the world, we must agree to have this whole incident investigated by an impartial judicial tribunal, and to act upon its findings. A mistake was committed by an official in a state of nerves – at least this is the view of everybody except the British. If this view proves on investigation to be correct, the official in question ought not to be supported by the Government if it is not to become an accomplice. This is so evident that I cannot understand why British public opinion has not forced our Government to act in the only reasonable way.

The cry of Bolshevism has been very much overdone. Such influence as the Bolsheviks possess in China is not due to their communism, for very few Chinese are communists in the economic sense, and the country is obviously unsuited for such a régime. The influence of the Bolsheviks throughout Asia is due to the fact that they appear (rightly or wrongly) as champions against Western oppression. The Chinese indignation at the Shanghai shooting was natural and spontaneous, and had nothing to do with Bolshevism.

But, we say, why is the indignation directed specially against us ? Are not other Powers also responsible ! The answer is that the International Settlement in Shanghai is, in fact, governed by the British. The governing body is the Municipal Council, elected by the foreign ratepayers. (The Chinese are allowed to pay rates, but do not thereby acquire a vote). The Municipal Council consists of six British, two Americans, and one Japanese ; the Secretary, who has the executive power, is also British. Thus the responsibility for what happens in the International Settlement rests with the British.

Those who wish to see how the matter appears to eminent Chinese intellectuals who are by no means Bolsheviks should obtain a little pamphlet called 'China's case', published by the Union of Chinese Associations in Great Britain, and written by four of the leading men in the Chinese academic world – men as learned, as widely travelled, as worthy of scientific respect, as any to be found in England. (I speak from personal knowledge). To attribute what they say to Bolshevik influence is as absurd as it would be to attribute Mr. Keynes's 'Economic Consequences of the Peace' to that cause.

On the wider issues, such as extra-territoriality, it is not necessary to come to any precipitate decision. At the Washington Conference it was arranged there should be a Conference to consider tariff revision, &c. ; the American Government is urging that this Conference must be no longer delayed, and many people have suggested that its scope should be widened. To both these proposals our Government ought to agree. And, speaking broadly, it ought to adapt its Chinese policy to that of America, and to state with emphasis that it means to do so. The policy of America in China has always been more liberal than that of the European Powers. If we are to retain any position in China, it has become necessary for us to adopt the principles which have guided the American Government. And this course would also greatly improve our relations with America.

Finally, I wish to say a word about the extreme gravity of the issue. A war with Russia about China, which is apparently in contemplation, would be strongly opposed by organized Labour in this country, and would almost infallibly lead to defeat. In our difficulties Indian nationalism would see its opportunity. The Empire would collapse in disgrace, and a large part of our population would die of hunger, probably after making an attempt at revolution. The present Government fails to realize that our position in the world is not what it was before the war. Being no longer so strong as we were, it has become important for us to avoid such injustice and tyranny as will rouse the disgust of the civilized world. These are motives of self-interest. Of the further motives which must appeal to every person possessed of the faintest feeling of honour or humanity I say nothing. [Russ303]
Russell, Bertrand. *China asserts herself: Imperialism in a quandary* [ID D28424].

The Canton Government's embargo upon British and Japanese shipping has come as a surprise, and neither the friends nor the enemies of China in this country seem to know what line to take. The friends of China are disposed to think that the Cantonese have made a mistake, but this view is hardly borne out by the perplexities of China's enemies, as illustrated by the comments of the Conservative Press and the inaction of the British Government. It is evident that the Canton Government thinks the moment propitious for bringing to an end a long series of affronts inflicted by Hong-Kong. But in order to understand the situation, it is necessary to bear in mind a few historical facts, which are not widely known in this country. Hong-Kong was acquired by the British in 1841 as a result of the Opium War of 1840. It was at the time a barren island, but we made of it a great city, with dockyards, naval arsenal, and the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank. For some reason which I have never understood, we think the Chinese ought to be grateful to us on this account. The population of Hong-Kong is over 600,000, and its trade, before the recent troubles, was about £200 millions per annum. There is a Government opium monopoly. Child-slavers in the colony was abolished in 1922, as a result of an agitation; a British naval officer was recalled because his wife took part in the protest.

**Corruption Frustrated.**

Some distance up the river from Hong-Kong stands Canton; their geographical relations are like those of London and the Isle of Sheppey. The population of Canton (which is the capital of the province of Kwangtung) is about 1,300,000. There is a small foreign concession, called Shameen; the remainder of the city is purely Chinese. There is a railway from Canton to Kowloon (on the mainland close to Hong-Kong), but there is no railway from Canton into the interior, although one has long been projected.

The prosperity of Hong-Kong has always depended upon failure to develop Canton. If Canton had docks suitable for large ocean-going vessels, commerce would have no need to use Hong-Kong. This would be still more the case if railway communications were developed. It has, therefore, naturally been our policy to embarrass Canton, and to hamper its development unless under British auspices. For a moment, complete success seemed within our grasp.

Immediately after the war, we negotiated with the corrupt militarists who then controlled Canton, a concession known as the Cassel Agreement, which would have given us a virtual monopoly of the railways and mines in the province of Kwangtung. But in 1920, before this Agreement could be ratified, Sun Yat-Sen acquired control of Canton, and very properly refused to ratify. This was the initial cause of our hostility to him. Sun Yat-Sen's Government, and the present Government, which is its legitimate successor, have never been recognized by the Powers. On this ground, the present action of Canton is regarded as piracy, not war, so that anybody supporting it can be hanged as a common criminal. Non-recognition is very serious for any Chinese Government, because the foreigners collect the customs and the salt tax, which form the bulk of the normal revenue, and the proceeds are not handed over to a Government which the Powers dislike. Ever since Sun Yat-Sen's acquisition of power in Canton, the proceeds of these taxes in the South have been kept on deposit in the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank, to be handed over as soon as there is a government bad enough to win our approval.

Official apologists, of course, pretend that they are guided solely by legal considerations in giving or withholding recognition from various Chinese Governments, but this is quite untrue. Mr. Henry K. Norton, formerly a Professor at Tsing-hua College, as the result of a prolonged and careful study, came to the conclusion that the Canton Government was the only one in China that could validly claim to be legal.

**Rival Governments**

The Revolution of 1911, led by Sun Yat-Sen, led to the overthrow of the monarchy and the election of a Parliament. The majority in the Parliament belonged to the progressive Kuo-min-tang Party, and opposed Yuan Shi-kai's attempts to make himself autocrat. He, therefore, illegally dissolved the Parliament. He was greatly admired by the British, and his autocracy was unquestioningly recognized as the legal government of China. It is from his usurpation that subsequent Peking governments have derived their claim to legality. But
Parliament refused to regard itself as dissolved, and the partisans of the Kuo-min-tang refuge at Canton. After various vicissitudes they established themselves under the leadership of Sun Yat-Sen in 1920. Their claim to legality is therefore at least as good as that of Peking. The Canton government has been liberal and mildly socialistic; force of circumstances has driven it to seek the alliance of the Bolsheviks. Among these circumstances, not the least effectual has been the hostility of Hong-Kong. A Fascist militia was organized at Canton among the conservative plutocracy, with the help of a Chinese employed by the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank; its purpose was to overthrow Sun Yat-Sen. A European ship full of arms arrived at Canton, with its cargo consigned to these Fascisti; we were furious when the Canton Government prevented the arms from being delivered.

Checkmate
We might have succeeded in establishing a Government of corrupt reactionary militarists at Canton, but for two circumstances. The first of these was the attitude of America. Decent Americans who know China hate us for our brutality. Other Americans hate us as trade rivals. Both combine in wishing to develop Canton at the expense of Hong-Kong. While I was in China, Messrs. Morgan, the bankers, sent a representative to China on behalf of the Consortium, and he spent a considerable part of his time in Canton. What he did there I do not know, but perhaps readers can guess. The other circumstance which stood in our way was the sudden defection of Feng, the Christian General, who turned Bolshevik and carried the Peking Government with him, thus removing the ground of quarrel between North and South. At this juncture, when everything was going against British imperialist designs, the British in control of the Municipal Council in Shanghai shot down a number of unarmed students without warning. The Municipal Council claimed to be an independent Power, and refused to submit to the report of the inquiry instituted by the Diplomatic Body; their independence, however did not go so far as to abstain from demanding to be protected by all the navies of the world. From Shameen, the European quarter of Canton, a large number of Chinese were shot down, in self-defence, so we say; but the American missionaries on the spot reported otherwise. The strike in Hong-Kong connected with these incidents has been so complete as to paralyse trade entirely; it is estimated that our traders in Hong-Kong are losing £400,000 a day.

Our Government and our reactionaries are completely nonplussed. If we fight China, we must also fight Russia; our Tories would like nothing better, but they know that Labour would not tolerate such a thing, and that therefore they must be defeated, as they were when they supported Denikin and Wrangel. Moreover, they are not, as then, supported by the other Powers. The French have no interest in the quarrel; the Americans are definitely hostile to us, both for idealistic reasons and for reasons of self-interest. The Japanese, at first sight, seem to be involved on our side, but there are reasons why they should act independently. Since we terminated the Alliance and started to make a great naval base at Singapore, they have no reason to love us. They naturally dislike our position in Hong-Kong, and they are rivals for the China trade. Moreover, since the Washington Conference, they have been driven by fear of isolation into a more friendly policy towards Russia and China. We cannot therefore count upon them to help us in our dirty work. No wonder our Government is puzzled; no wonder our reactionary Press screams in impotent fury.

A Simple Remedy
There is one line of action which has not occurred to any of them, although it would put an end to the whole trouble in a week. The line of action I mean is the adoption of friendliness, common justice, and common honesty. Let us accept the report of the diplomatic inquiry into the Shanghai shooting, and act upon it; let us cease to foment civil war at Canton, and loyally accept the existing Canton Government as at least the de facto authority, to which its quota of the Customs revenue should be given; let us concert with America proposals for the gradual abolition of extra-territoriality, say by subjecting Europeans, for a time, to European judges appointed by and responsible to the Chinese Government. Let us not leave our policy to be decided by Admirals on the spot, as we are doing at present. At least so it appears from the sinister statement. ('Times', Aug. 20) that Vice-Admiral Sir Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair 'would take such steps as he thought fit for the protection of British shipping without first
We must instruct correspondents of important newspapers not to write, as the 'Times' Peking correspondent did in the issue of August 20, 'extremists are endeavouring by misrepresentation to establish the view in Europe and America that the Treaties operate only to the advantage of foreigners and are oppressive to China. So it might be said of all the nursery rules imposed upon children by their elders'. The Chinese are not children, and it is not the practice in nurseries to shoot children in the back with rifle bullets. Our rich men must learn to treat the Chinese justly and as equals, or must put up with losing their money. I fear they will find the second alternative the less painful of the two. [Russ299]

Xu, Zhimo. *Wu suo zhi dao de kang qiao*. [My impressions of Cambridge]. [ID D28287]. I went to England with a view to studying under Bertrand Russell. I paid my steamer ticket to cross the Atlantic, setting my mind on doing some serious study under 'the Voltaire of the 20th-century'. To my surprise, things had changed upon my arrival : he had been dismissed from Cambridge partly because of his pacifism during the War and partly because of his divorce. He was originally a fellow of Trinity College, but then this fellowship was also stripped. After his return to England from China, he and his wife settled down in London, earning their living by writing. As a result, my original intention of studying under him fell through. [Russ45]

Xu, Zhimo. *Luosu yu you zhi jiao yu*. [Artikel über On education von Bertrand Russell.] [ID D28405]. It was the first time John saw the sea. He was scared and cried when he was told to enter the water. This angered our philosopher. 'What ! Russell's son afraid of something ?! Russell's son scared of seeing something ?! Impossible !' The Russell couple simply ignored the screaming of their child, who was still under three years of age, and dumped him into the water. They did it once and again, despite the child's crying. Well, after a few days, the child would insist on playing in the water without your telling him… The parents in the East certainly will not do that, will they ? I know that. But the spirit of courage, valour and fearlessness is the root of all virtues and foundation of character. We have to be very strict about it. We can tolerate many things, but not cowardice and fear. If you didn't help a child to overcome this obstacle early, you may ruin the rest of his life. Whenever Russell mentioned the word 'courage', his voice became exceptionally grave ; his eyes sparkled with an extraordinary light. Courage seemed to be the first tenet of his religion, the only credential of a human being.

'On education' is an extremely brilliant book for character training. After reading it the sensible parents will be more interested in educating their children and the knowledge-hungry parents will be greatly benefited. Believe me, this book is an inextinguishable light. The family that has obtained it will be free from the misery of darkness.

Reply from Xu Zhimo to Ou-yang Lan's *Luosu yu you zhi jiao yu zhi yi yu da wen*. [In : Chen bao fu kan ; 19. Mai (1926)]. Xu's story provoked some protest from a couple of Chinese education specialists and in defending Russell presented the following opinion :

I cannot guarantee that we all sympathize with Russell's passion to uphold courage and denounce cowardice, but truly, if you consider other aspects of character as secondary and your greatest expecion of your child is his being good-tempered, being able to produce sweet smiles and to greet others politely, you differ widely from Russell. Concerning this, I must admit that my obsession is pretty deep. I prefer not having a child if I should have a cowardly one. There is nothing more shameful in the world than being cowardly. [Russ45]
Russell, Bertrand. *What is happening in China?* [ID D28427].

"In many ways the Chinese are the most civilised nation in the world, and it is infinitely shameful that we should make it our business to teach them lessons in barbarity." This is how Bertrand Russell sums up his conclusions on the present situation in China. He suggests a policy for the Labour Party which might bring great benefits both to China and this country.

To understand what has been happening in China is difficult for the ordinary man, and impossible for officials who have had long experience of that country as it used to be. Probably no country except Russia has changed so much during the present century. The changes have been visible for a number of years to those who had a sympathetic knowledge of young China, but have only recently become obvious to men who, like almost all British officials and merchants, regarded young China with contempt. A few words of history are necessary to explain the situation.

**The Powers take sides.**

The Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Manchu Dynasty and established, nominally, a democratic Republic. This was mainly the work of Sun Yat-sen. But Yuan She-kai, the 'strong man' favoured by the British, controlled the Northern troops, and only agreed to support the Republicans on condition of being made the first President. He governed unconstitutionally, and, without success, to make himself Emperor. When he died, there was no longer any legal Government, and his Generals quarrelled, as they have continued to do down to the present day. Naturally the great Powers took sides in these disputes. Wu Pei-fu (at present more or less in eclipse) was the British favourite; Chang Tso-lin, in Manchuria, is the henchman of Japan; Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian General, is the favourite of the Soviet Government and the military champion of Chinese nationalism. Of course, the actions of the Powers have made the ending of Chinese anarchy more difficult.

In Canton, which was controlled by Sun Yat-sen from 1920 till his death, there is a more Radical Government than in the North. This Government has been increasingly hated by Hongkong, partly because of its Labour sympathies, partly because the development of Canton as a port is capable of ruining Hongkong. At present the relations between Hongkong and Canton are only just short of war. The massacre last June at Shameen (the foreign quarter of Canton) was even more brutal and destructive than the Shanghai massacre, but obtained less publicity, because British propaganda had a firmer hold over the sources of information.

It has come as a surprise to the British in China to find that it is more difficult than it used to be to suppress the demand for justice towards China. The Japanese appear to have been quicker to learn this lesson. During the war they were the worst oppressors of China, but since the Washington Conference they have shown themselves much more conciliatory. Although the trouble in Shanghai started with a labour dispute in a Japanese mill, during which a Chinese working man was brutally murdered, the work of suppression was mainly undertaken by the British, who have come in for the largest share of odium in consequence.

The American Government, in all its dealings with China, has behaved with enlightened self-interest and was the best friend of China until the rise of the Soviet Republic. Now Russia is the main external supporter of Chinese nationalism, in spite of the fact that this movement is genuinely nationalistic, not Bolshevik.

**An Educational Awakening.**

The causes of the increased resistance of China to foreign oppression are several, of which three are specially important. I put first the spread of modern education. For 2,000 years the Chinese have been governed by their most highly educated men; now these men have imbibed Western knowledge without acquiring a respect for Western practice. The injustice of the old treaties (especially that of 1842, following the Opium War) is now obvious to every educated Chinese. Under these treaties, foreigners are not subject to Chinese laws or Chinese justice; the Treaty Ports are practically sovereign States, where foreign merchants control almost all the external commerce of China, and allow the Chinese no voice in the Government; the Customs Tariff is fixed by treaty and the Customs Revenue is collected by foreigners, as is also the Salt Tax; foreign warships assemble at Shanghai, and foreign gun-boats anchor hundreds of miles up the Yangze, in the very heart of the country. No foreign loan can be concluded except through the Consortium, a group of privileged banks,
British, French, American and Japanese. These conditions make the nominal independence of China a mockery, and naturally men who understand the sources of power and the way in which power is used for economic exploitation resent the enslavement of their country to foreign nations which they see no reason to respect. The leaders in the nationalist movement of the past months have been the professors of the National University of Peking, where the education is modern, but where there is no European control. Students have had a profound influence by propaganda among merchants, wage-earners, and even soldiers; their influence has exceeded anything that Europeans could have foreseen, because, in China, learning is respected.

The second cause of the revolt of China against foreign domination was the war and the Treaty of Versailles. The Japanese conquered from the Germans the province of Shantung, which contains about thirty million inhabitants, and the birth-place of Confucius. When, in 1917, the Allies were engaged in inducing China to join in the war, the Americans held out hopes that Shantung would be restored to China at the Peace, while England, France and Tsarist Russia concluded secret treaties with Japan, promising that Shantung should remain Japanese. When this came out, and was embodied in the Treaty of Versailles, because President Wilson considered Shantung less important than Fiume, it did not increase the respect of China for the morality of Europe. And the mere fact of the war made the Chinese feel that Western civilisation was not such a fine thing as its missionaries pretended. The third cause of the new attitude in China is the ferment produced by the spectacle of Russia—not so much by Bolshevik propaganda as by the knowledge that Russia had succeeded in throwing off the financial dominion of the West and was prepared to help other Asiatic nations to do likewise. This is a fact of immense importance throughout Asia, against which the British Foreign Office is powerless. It is not for their Communism, but for their championship of economic independence, that the Bolsheviks are admired in China. And for this they deserve the admiration they receive.

The amount of Communism in China is infinitesimal, if Communism means the adoption of a certain economic doctrine. China is a country of peasants, handicraftsmen and merchants; a country accustomed to an extraordinarily small amount of central government. In such a country Communism is technically and psychologically quite impossible. But the influence of the Bolsheviks throughout Asia is in no way due to their Communist doctrine. It is due to the fact that they have taken the side of Asia as against Europe and that they have succeeded, at the cost of terrible suffering, in emancipating themselves from the financial domination of the West. The prestige of white men in Asia depended upon their acting in unison against men with any different pigmentation. The war and the Bolshevik revolution put an end to this co-operation which cannot possibly be revived until the relations between Russia and the West are radically changed. But although differences of economic doctrine underlie the conflict between Russia and the West, it is agreement in politics, not in economics, that leads to friendship between Russia and China. The hostility of the Soviet Government to Chang Tso-lin is really an example of this friendship, since Chang Tso-lin is a tool of the foreign oppressors of China.

*The Weapon of the Boycott.*

As a result of these causes, the educated minority in China, to whom the nation is accustomed to look for leadership, have adopted an attitude which is new in the history of the country. They are not anti-foreign, like the Boxers; they recognise that China, like Japan, must learn from the West. But they desire that degree of national independence which is possessed by European nations. They see that, by different roads, Japan, Russia, and Turkey have emancipated themselves, and they wish China to do likewise. The method of resistance by force of arms is not feasible, partly because of the anarchy, partly because the Chinese are not a warlike people. This may change in time, but for the present the method of the boycott is the natural one to adopt. As against Hongkong, this method has been practised with extraordinary success; the British in that city would have starved but for a loan of millions from the home Government. Canton has been entirely justified from the point of view of self-defence. Hongkong stirred up Fascist rebellions in Canton, an employee of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank being prominent among the Fascisti. The Europeans in Shameen, led by the
British, brutally massacred a large number of Chinese engaged in a peaceful demonstration outside the limits of the Foreign Concession. Of what has been done in the way of secret intrigue, it is difficult to get reliable evidence; but of the stream of propaganda against Canton, all the telegrams from Hongkong in our newspapers are indubitable proof. The Chinese are now demanding tariff autonomy (virtually conceded), abolition of extra-territoriality, and a drastic modification of the régime in the Treaty Ports. Germans, Austrians, and Russians have lost their extra-territorial rights as a consequence of the war; thus in effect the nations concerned are Great Britain, America, France, and Japan. The interests of France are less than those of the other three. America has always taken up a liberal attitude towards China, and Japan has thought it prudent to do so since her set-back at the Washington Conference in 1921. Consequently the odium of defending the old injustices has fallen mainly upon the British Government. The matter has been most grossly mishandled from the point of view of British interests. The massacres at Shanghai and Shameen were bound to rouse fury throughout China, but if our Government had promptly and publicly acceded to the demand for punishment of the culprits, the indignation could not have extended to the British nation in general. As it is, our China trade (particularly in the South) has suffered because we preferred massacre to money. We brought on the boycott because we were not willing to forego the pleasure of firing upon unarmed crowds.

The Danger to Peace.

It is too late now for mild palliative measures. The Chinese are roused, and are quite capable of securing their objects by passive resistance, even supposing the anarchy continues. The situation is, of course, very dangerous from the standpoint of world peace. The recent dispute between the Soviet Government and Chang Tso-lin about the Chinese Eastern Railway might have led to a clash between Russia and Japan if either Power had failed to show moderation. The Governor of Hongkong has stated that his Government is prepared to take drastic steps to put an end to the Canton boycott of Hongkong. This, if it means anything, means action which must be resented by the Soviet Government. If the British Government were not afraid of effective resistance on the part of British labour, we should before now have found ourselves involved in a war in China against the Chinese and Russians combined; in such a conflict not a shred of right would have been on our side.

It is true, of course, that much of the European oppression in China is justified by treaties. These treaties, however, were concluded as the result of aggressive wars, and the Manchu Government, which signed them, was wholly ignorant of the modern world. To attempt to hold modern China to these old treaties is like demanding of a grown-up man that he shall be crippled for life by a contract made with a moneylender while he was a minor. In this case the Courts recognise the invalidity of the contract; but in international affairs there is no analogous mechanism. Nevertheless, China is now in a position to demand radical changes in the old treaties. The only question is whether we are to resist up to the last moment, and yield to nothing— but the threat of ruin, or whether we are to concede willingly and cheerfully what is obviously just. If we do the latter, the new regime can begin with friendly feeling on the part of China; if the former, every other nation will be preferred to us. It is obvious to every sane man that justice and self-interest are on the same side; but this is not the opinion of anybody in the Government or the Foreign Office.

A Policy for Labour.

The policy of the Labour Party should be clear in these circumstances. Tariff autonomy, demanded by the Chinese at the Tariff Conference now sitting, seems likely to be carried; this is an important step. But this is a very different thing from autonomy in the collection of the customs. At present the Inspector-General of Customs (who has to be British) is appointed by the Chinese Government, and himself appoints all the other Customs officials and controls the funds. This system cannot easily be altered, as the Customs revenue is largely pledged to pay the interest on various loans. A closely similar situation exists as regards the Salt Tax. Again, there are difficulties as regards the Treaty Ports. Shanghai, in particular, is a European city of fabulous wealth, not in any degree subject to Chinese control; it may be doubted whether there would be anything like so much wealth if autonomy were abrogated. So long as China has no stable Government, such arguments must be allowed a certain weight. It will
therefore be necessary, for a time, to adopt measures designed to ease the transition, and such measures will have to be adopted by agreement among the Powers concerned. Take the case of the International Settlement in Shanghai, where the difficulties have been most acute. To begin with, the immense majority of its inhabitants are Chinese, but no Chinese has a vote for the Municipal Council. This is an injustice which should be remedied immediately. In the second place, all legal disputes, whether civil or criminal, between Chinese and foreigners are tried by foreigners, naturally with results which bear little relation to justice. If, here and now, it were decided that they should all be tried by Chinese, there would be equally little justice. The proper course would be to have both Chinese and foreign judges in all cases where both Chinese and foreigners are involved, until such time as the Chinese have a sufficient body of trained jurists to be able to do the work efficiently themselves. Another matter which might be conceded at once is respect for Chinese territorial waters: no warships of foreign navies should approach the coasts of China, still less sail up the rivers, except at the invitation of the Chinese Government. At present foreigners can (and do) massacre Chinese with impunity, but if one foreigner is killed, the Chinese are made to pay an exorbitant indemnity and very likely forced to yield economic or political concessions. Another point should be concerned with loans; the Governments of the Powers should agree that henceforth they will not act as debt-collectors for their nationals. At present, the British taxpayer has to pay for the expense of enforcing payment due to such wealthy corporations as the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank this is absurd as well as unjust. There is thus a great deal which could be done at once, and the British Government ought to take the lead in urging that it should be done; the other Powers would almost certainly concur.

There are larger matters, however, which cannot be done in a day, though they will have to be done at the earliest possible moment. The chief are the abolition of extra-territoriality and the retrocession of the Treaty Ports. It is nearly certain that the Chinese will soon be in a position to exhort these concessions by force, and it would be obviously wiser to initiate negotiations with a view to making them voluntarily. It is naked capitalism that stands in the way, and there can be no ultimate and complete cure except a socialistic control over economic adventure in distant countries. It is to be hoped that, when we next have a Labour Government in this country, it will take steps to ascertain what is happening in distant parts of the world. Of course, merchants and officials hang together, and so long as a Labour Government is content to rely upon official sources of information it will never know anything except what capitalists wish it to know. The late Government made the mistake of assuming intelligent loyalty in public servants towards policies which they neither liked nor understood. Those who take Socialism seriously will not expect to see it established by the work of its enemies.

Conclusion.

To sum up: China is at the moment still in the state of anarchy into which it fell after the death of Yuan Shi-kai, but there are signs that this anarchy will be ended as a result of the Nationalist movement, since soldiers are increasingly unwilling to fight for unpatriotic Generals. The potential strength of China is so great that a very small amount of enthusiasm and organisation would suffice to drive the foreigners into the sea. The amount of good done by foreigners in China is infinitesimal in comparison with the amount of harm, and so long as their special privileges are preserved, this will continue to be the case. The Chinese realise this, and are determined to extort justice. In their demand for justice they are vigorously supported by the Soviet Government, which has played so far an almost wholly beneficent part in China. Other foreign Governments would be acting both justly and wisely if they were to show the utmost readiness to make concessions. At the same time, the financial interests which have grown up under our protection and with the guarantee of our support, are so vast that, in a capitalist world, the British Government can hardly be expected to abandon them suddenly. We could do certain things at once: concede an equal voice in the Government of the Treaty Ports to the Chinese living in them; abandon the practice of introducing warships into Chinese territorial waters without the consent of the Chinese Government; recognise the Government of Canton and cease to intrigue against it or prevent it from acquiring its share of the Customs revenue; grant tariff autonomy; and associate Chinese with foreign jurists in all litigation between Chinese and foreigners. We ought also to
express our willingness to cede the Treaty Ports and abandon extra-territoriality at an early date, by methods to be agreed upon between China and the Powers. And, above all, we ought to give up the practice of making Governments the debt-collectors for their nationals. China is undergoing a most remarkable intellectual renaissance, which is disliked and despised by almost all the British in China. The result is already beginning to appear in the political sphere, and will become increasingly evident in the near future. In many ways the Chinese are the most civilised nation in the world, and it is infinitely shameful that we should make it our business to teach them lessons in barbarism. [Russ302]
Russell, Bertrand. The foreign wolf in the Chinese sheepfold: what will happen to him when
the sheep learn their lesson? Review of Gilbert, Rodney. What's wrong with China. London:
J. Murray, 1926. [Extract].
The present reviewer can perhaps hardly be expected to be quite impartial towards Mr.
Rodney Gilbert's book, in view of the author's attitude to those who are friendly to China, as
exemplified in the statement:
'China's future has been much more seriously prejudiced by the ideas imported and peddled
by such persons as Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Tagore and Karakhan, than by all opium,
morphia, heroin, cocaine and hashish imported or produced in China during the past three
centuries'.
Would anyone suppose from this passage that Tagore could scarcely get a hearing in China
because his meetings were systematically interrupted by Karakhan's political allies? The
Communists stand for the Westernising of China, Tagore stand for the preservation of the
traditional Orient; either is an intelligible policy, but obviously they have nothing in
common.
Not The Last Word
Even their resistance to the West is of two quite different kinds—in the one case cultural, in
the other economic and military. Is the belief that Western Capitalism does not represent the
last word in wisdom and virtue.
The author, though an American, disapproves violently of what he regards as the milksop
sentimentalism of his country's policy in China, and wants the white nations (except Russia)
for join in a military conquest, to be followed by 'good government'—i.e., encouragement of
exploitation. He endeavours to prove by history that the Chinese have never prospered except
under a foreign despotism. If he were Chinese, he could prove the same thesis about
England...
Those Fatal Fogs
... So Mr. Gilbert might have written if he had been Chinese—not more inaccurately than he
has in fact written. He is an outcome of the 'Nordic' propaganda in the United States, which
has dominated recent immigration policy in that country. He holds that everything good is
Teutonic, and everything Asiatic (including Christianity) is bad.
At the same time, he hates most in China the Chinese who have become Europeanised, and
prefers those who are totally destitute of Western knowledge—presumably because they are
easier to exploit. He makes no secret of his Nietzschean morality:
"In China we are regarded with much the same feelings as a group of polite and sociable
wolves would be in a flock of sheep. The sheep have no natural inclination to bite one
another, so they can hard together in perfect confidence, but the wolf on his good behavior is
always restraining his natural inclination to snap at a fellow or eat a lamb; so, however well
the wolves behave, the sheep are never at their ease when exchanging compliments with
them."
Are we content to remain wolves? Mr. Gilbert says yes: 'Because of our ancestry and our
instincts we should be more inclined to admire the well-behaved wolf than the browsing
sheep'. The thesis of his book is that the wolf should cease to be 'well-behaved'. At the present
moment, the West, under British leadership, is taking his advice, and America, alarmed by the
Bolshevik bogy, is more inclined than ever before to fall into line with European imperialism.
The Chinese nationalists are being defeated by our henchman, Wu Pei-fu.
But the sheep are learning to imitate the wolves, and when they have driven Mr. Gilbert and
his friends into the sea, they will presumably have earned his respect. [Russ301]
Xu Zhimo visited Bertrand Russell during his tour of Europe and stayed in Carn Vole, Porthcurno, Penzance, Cornwall for two days in July 1925. Russell's house, a light grey square structure of three stories, is surrounded by a low wall. There is a verandah jutting out from the back of the house; its two pillars are yellow in colour, serving in a way as a remembrance of China… They were going to set up a small structure which would resemble a Chinese pavilion. At the time, I wrote for them a Chinese inscription bearing – I can't remember with certainty – either the characters 'Listening to wind' or 'Facing the wind'. When Russell drove an old car to Penzance station to meet me that day, I almost couldn't recognize him. Every inch a countryman! His straw hat had holes, and his jacket was torn. If he did wear a necktie that day, it would be like a straw dangling in front of his chest. His shoes, needless to say, were twins with Charley Chaplin's. He held a smoking pipe whose dark brown colour blended well with his skin. But how sharp, how intense and how bright his eyes were. The exterior of a rustic could not conceal the intelligence of a philosopher!

It was Sunday that day… He started with an epigram thus, 'Sunday is the only common tenet shared by both Christians and the trade unionists…' I asked why he and his wife had come to the tip of the south for a recluse's life. Russell said first he wanted to concentrate on writing and second, more importantly, he had to look after the moral education of their kids. I spent two days there. Listening to Russell is like watching German firecrackers – all sorts of dazzling wonders cracking in the sky in a most amazing way, one group after another and clusters after clusters. You cannot help being amazed, astounded and delighted. But I am not going to recall his talks. The difficulty would be something like wishing to depict the silvery sparks in the sky. [Russ45]
Never since 1900 has the position of foreigners in China been so critical as at the present moment. But in recalling the Boxer movement I am not suggesting a parallel; quite the contrary. What is important for Europeans to realize is the profound gulf which separates the Chinese nationalists of the present day from the misguided reactionaries of twenty-six years ago. The Boxers represented the least civilized and least enlightened elements in their country; they stood solely for the preservation of ancient tradition. On the other hand, the Kuo Min Tang, the modern nationalist party, consists of the most modern and Westernized people in China—people who have assimilated, not the slave morality which Europeans have tried to inculcate in the East, but the doctrines of freedom and self-respect which they have tried to keep for home consumption. No unprejudiced person can doubt that the Kuo Min Tang represents all that is best in China, both morally and intellectually; that is why our Foreign Office is itching to destroy it.

One word about the situation. In Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin is seizing the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was built by Chinese labour and Tsarist capital, and is therefore claimed by the Soviet Government. Not very far to the north of Peking is the intact army of Feng, the northern champion of Chinese nationalism, who was driven from Peking by the combined forces of Chang Tso-lin, the protegé of Japan, and Wu Pei-fu, the champion of British interests in the Yangtze. On the Yangtze, at is most crucial point, the Cantonese nationalist army, marching from the south, has occupied the twin cities of Hankow and Hanyang—including Wu's great arsenal in the latter, but not the foreign concession in the former. Farther up the Yangtze, one of Wu's lieutenants has turned against us, seized some British ships and come into collision with British gunboats. In the neighbourhood of Hankow, the nationalists are said to be firing upon all foreign ships indiscriminately, including those of America; whether this is fact or propaganda it is not yet possible to know. Wu Pei-fu, for the moment at least, is impotent; Chang Tso-lin is held in check, both by Russia to the north and by Feng in the south. In these circumstances, it is doubtful whether Chinese armies can be found to fight our battles for us.

There is at this moment a serious possibility that China may be united under the joint leadership of Feng and the Cantonese. Public opinion enthusiastically supports them—not only that of the students, as our newspapers pretend, but also that of the 'solid middle class'. It is true that the 'students', i.e., the men and women who have had a modern education, both old and young—are the most active and energetic of the champions of Chinese freedom, but they have won over almost all who are politically conscious among the Chinese. They even influence the soldiers in the mercenary armies, and make it difficult for Generals who are tools of the foreigner to rely upon their troops. That is in part the explanation of the successes of the Cantonese armies.

Hankow and Hanyang are practically one city, about the size of Glasgow, on the northern bank of the Yangtze. Together with Wuchang, opposite them on the southern bank, they constitute the centre of China, where the river, running from west to east, crosses the north-and-south route from Peking to Canton. This is the key position, industrially, commercially, and strategically. Hence our dismay at the success of the Cantonese. The Cantonese are called 'Reds' in our propaganda Press. They are less 'Red' than Mr. MacDonald; perhaps about as 'Red' as Mr. Lloyd George. But they are willing to accept help from Red Russia in the 'sort of war' that we have been waging against them from Hongkong, just as Chang Tso-lin, whom we regard as a pattern of virtue, has always accepted help from White Russia. The Cantonese wish to establish an orderly democratic government in China, and to restore Chinese independence, which we destroyed by the Opium War and its successors.

The extent to which China has been deprived of independence is not always realized. Let us illustrate it by an analogy. Suppose the Germans had won the war, and had compelled us to sign a treaty giving them the City of London, control of the railway from London to Harwich, the right to garrisons at Reading and Oxford as 'Treaty Ports', the exclusive admiration of the business quarters in Glasgow, Liverpool, Southampton, with a score of other ports, and the right to determine import duties, collect the customs, and hand over the proceeds only to such
Governments as they approved of, and to decide all disputes between Germans and British by German Courts. This would represent fairly accurately the state of affairs which Europe and Japan have created in China. I think that even the present Cabinet and Foreign Office would be found among the patriots if that were the condition of England.

But sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander. The Chinese are ‘wicked’ when they demand the abrogation of the unequal treaties. For a long time, in fact, ever since the present British Government came into power, our Foreign Office has wished to intervene in China, but has been restrained by fear of America. It is hoped, however, that America will be brought to consent to intervention by means of the propaganda which represents Chinese nationalists as Bolsheviks. In many respects Americans are liberal, but where the Reds are concerned they see red. It is therefore possible that they may be induced at least to tolerate our intervention. This will, of course, further embitter our relations with Russia, leading, not improbably, to open war with the Soviet Government.

Whatever may be the immediate outcome, it may be taken as certain that we shall be defeated in the end, with the loss of the whole of our political and commercial advantages in China. From the standpoint of British interests, opposition to Chinese nationalism is madness. It has already ruined Hongkong and seriously damaged our China trade elsewhere. And the more we persist, the more we shall lose.

If we were fighting for a great cause, the prospect of loss might be faced with heroism. But the exact opposite is the case: we are fighting against everything progressive, upright, and intelligent in China, in favour of everything ignorant, reactionary and corrupt. We are fighting to keep civilization under in a great nation, in order that it may be the easier to exploit. We are fighting for the right to shoot down young unarmed students when they protest against the killing of Chinese workers by Japanese capitalists in labour disputes. We are fighting to prolong anarchy and civil war among self-seeking militarists dependent upon foreign support. We are fighting to preserve everything that is bad and to prevent the growth of everything that is good. This, alas, is our position throughout Asia. This is the sacred cause which we pursue with a pig-headed obstinacy that must, before long, bring ruin and national disaster upon us. Both as a patriot and as an internationalist, I view the situation with feelings little short of despair.

What can be done about it? The Labour Party might make an emphatic gesture to dissociate itself from reckless imperialism. It is painful to have to acknowledge that during the Labour Government the Colonial Office and the India Office were little better than at other times, though the Foreign Office was distinctly better until the permanent officials broke loose. The Labour Party ought to declare emphatically that, in the present disturbed state of affairs, no British naval vessels should navigate the Yangtze or take part in hostile acts against Canton. It should declare that the time has come to revise the unequal treaties. It should emphatically express sympathy with the Kuo Min Tang, which is fighting the battle of Labour in China. And, last but not least, it should make it clear that it will not be a party to any hostilities against the U.S.S.R. which may grow out of the Chinese tangle.

Looking further ahead, the Labour Party should resolve that, when next Labour is in office, it shall not depend upon officials and capitalists for its information about such countries as Mexico and China. So long as it remains in this dependence all its information will be biased, and it will be led to pursue a policy diametrically opposed to its professed objects. The attitude of the Labour Government towards Mexico (where Labour is in power) was such as to serve the oil interests, but was quite against the interests of humanity. So it will be again if we continue to depend upon reactionaries for our information.

The continuity of foreign policy, which, I regret to say, has received some support from nominal adherents of the Labour Party, is a Satanic principle, which no humane person can tolerate for a moment. Our foreign policy, from the days of Henry VIII to the present moment, has been abominable: it has had one uniform principle, that of causing dissensions among others, in order that they might weaken each other for our benefit. This is called the Balance of Power.

The Labour Party has, on paper, the most admirable principles in international affairs, but it
allows itself to be deceived by not realizing the cunning and wickedness of the forces opposed to it, more particularly of those whose opposition is concealed and surreptitious. If our international ideals are to be effective, we shall have to be less gentle and trustful towards those whose ideals are different. I do not mean that we should persecute them; I mean only that we should not leave them in key positions of influence and power. If I were Prime Minister, I should give a long holiday on full pay to many of our diplomatic service and of the higher permanent officials in the Foreign Office and the India Office. Until we do this, everything that we attempt will be sabotaged.

Meanwhile we have to face the cry of 'British lives in danger'. Will our mandarins never understand the cry of 'Chinese lives in danger' which went up after the Shanghai massacre, committed at a time when no British lives were in danger? If the British in China are in danger, let us announce that we are prepared to withdraw them, and the danger will cease. So long as the British arrogate to themselves the right to shoot Chinese at sight they cannot expect that the Chinese will respect their right to life. 'This animal is wicked; it defends itself when attacked'. [Russ298]

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Lu Xun schreibt: "L'Anglais Bertrand Russell et le Français Romain Rolland s'opposaient à la guerre et tout le monde les a admirés, mais en fait c'est une chance que leurs paroles n'aient pas été suivies d'effet, car l'Allemagne aurait conquis l'Angleterre et la France. En fait, à moins de réaliser dans le même temps le pacifisme en Allemagne aussi, c'était chose nulle et non avenue. C'est pour la même raison qu'on n'a pu mettre en acte la théorie de non-résistance de Tolstoï. Comme il était opposé à ce qu'on rendit le mal pour le mal, il proposait de ne pas suivre les ordres du tsar: s'il entrôlait des conscrits, qu'on refusât de partir soldat et de faire la guerre, s'il ordonnait aux policiers de faire des arrestations, que les policiers refusent d'arrêter, s'il ordonnait au bourreau de faire des exécutions, que les bourreaux refusent d'exécuter, que tous en comme cessent d'obéir aux ordres du tsar et lui-même finirait par perdre le goût d'en donner, il perdrait toute ambition et le monde connaîtrait une grande paix. Mais il suffisait qu'une petite partie de ces gens lui obéissent pour que ce beau mécanisme ne fonctionne plus." [Rol5]

1927

Russell, Bertrand. Preface. In: T'ang, Leang-li [Tang, Liangli]. China in revolt [ID D28456]. Recent events in China have shown the extraordinary extent to which our Foreign Office has been misled as to the present state of public opinion in that country. Relying upon information from Anglo-Chinese, who associate almost exclusively with Europeans, and are completely ignorant of the change that has come over China in recent years, our Government has refused, until too late, to make concessions in response to the just indignation of the Chinese in the matter of the Shanghai massacre, or to abate in any degree the unscrupulous hostility displayed by Hongkong towards Canton. The immediate result has been an immense injury to British trade in China; the ultimate result is likely unless there is a complete change in our official attitude, to be a complete collapse of British interests in China. Those who wish to understand the point of view of the modern Chinese – who are coming, more and more, to control the policy of their country – cannot do better than read Mr. T'ang's book. They will find an indictment of Western policy, and more particularly of the policy of Great Britain, which is as painful as it is irrefutable. Hitherto we have treated China with the injustice and brutality which invariably fall to the lot of the weak among nations; but the indignation aroused is at length putting an end to weakness, and enabling China to insist upon being treated as an equal. The sooner this is realized, the less disastrous it will be for ourselves. Mr. Tang is therefore doing a service to Great Britain as well as to his own country in endeavouring to bring the facts to the notice of those who are not totally blind to the significance of contemporary movements. [TangL1]
Sir, It becomes increasingly difficult to read with patience your commentaries and warnings on the present situation in China. Is it not time that all people of humane ideals and aims were frankly told that the dispatch of the large forces that have gone to China is not only likely but probably intended, to provoke a war between us and the Chinese, in which there would not be a shadow of right or justification on our side, nor any possible final issue but shameful and deserved defeat, involving the almost complete loss of our already fast diminishing trade with the Chinese. In these circumstances all those who do not demand the immediate recall of all British forces from China, and the recognition of Cantonese rights in all provinces where the Cantonese Government has jurisdiction, are doing a grave disservice, not only to the English people, but also to the misguided British merchants out in China, who still hope to extend their trade at the bayonet point as they did at the time of the opium wars.

Not long since you were urging the Government to explain the Wanhsien incident. No English explanation has been given; and now you speak of the necessity of large forces in order to avoid a 'repetition of the Wanhsien fiasco'. In what did the fiasco consist – in the fact that not more than one thousand Chinese were killed, and not more than one thousand Chinese houses destroyed? Surely Mr. Chen's 'rodomontade' on Imperialism has a considerable 'bearing on the existing situation', when he is faced by the dispatch of more troops by a Power which has not hesitated to bombard without compensation or apology an open unfortified town. This act is against the laws of warfare, even where we at war with the Chinese.

The lives and persons of British nationals are in no danger. Persons of other nationality are walking about and doing business freely. It must be admitted, of course, that they have not seen fit to take part in the recent shooting of Chinese as we have done. But it is time that the six thousand odd British in Shanghai faced the situation like the British gentlemen they claim to be. They are free to return to England, or to move northward if they do not like the Cantonese regime.

The Cantonese are the accepted and functioning Government now of nine provinces, practically all the South and West of China. The treaty rights, about which we generously offer to 'negotiate', were force on China by war. No self-respecting Chinese Government could continue to accept them, and our trade and prestige in China stand to gain by their immediate abandonment. There is nothing outrageous or 'impossible' in the whole of the Cantonese demands. They are modern people, ready for peace and trade. They have not taken, nor will they take, unless bitterly provoked, the life of any foreigner not engaged in war with them. In fact they are a model of sweet reasonableness, in comparison with what the English would be like, had Chinese gunboats sailed up the Thames for a lark and bombarded Reading and Oxford.

Unless this Government is severely handled, telegraph agencies will soon be busy manufacturing 'riots in Shanghai', and the British troops privily engaged in the Chinese civil war, on the side of the North against Canton.

[Mr. and Mrs. Russell appear to have written their letter before Sir Austen Chamberlain spoke at Birmingham last Saturday. After reading his speech, would they still suggest that the Shanghai Defence Force is 'probably intended to provoke a war between us and the Chinese'? Ed., Nation. [Russ295]
In all the long history of British blunders it would be difficult to parallel the present governmental policy in regard to China for immoral ineptitude. I say governmental policy, for the nation is emphatically not behind the Government as yet. One supposes that it will in time be influenced by means of a suitable diet of atrocities. It will be taught to believe that the Chinese eat corpses and mutilate children, and those who ask for evidence of these practices will be put in jail. As yet, however, feeling against China is confined to the Die-Hard section of the Conservative Party, and the Conservative Party, though a majority of Parliament, was a minority in the nation even in the 'Red Letter' election.

Labor, with the exception of a few leaders who have been hobbled, is vigorously and determinedly opposed to the policy of sending troops, and is demanding their recall in spite of discouragement from their own headquarters. Labor quite understands that what our Government dislikes about the Chinese Nationalists is their policy of favoring trade unionism and aiming at an increase in wages. Enormous and enthusiastic meetings are being held in every part of the country demanding the recall of the expeditionary force. Even the Liberals, taking their cue from Lloyd George, are exceedingly critical of the Government's action. From the mere standpoint of British interests what has been done is so foolish that nothing but a lust for blood could have made anyone suppose it wise. The concessions which our foreign Office has offered to the Nationalist Government go beyond anything that would have been required to secure agreement if no forces had been dispatches. But because these forces are on their way, Mr. Chen rightly refuses to negotiate until this threat is withdrawn. The forces are being sent nominally to protect the International Settlement, but the Japanese, whose diplomacy is never caught napping, have intimated that they will not permit the troops to land in a region, where their rights are the same as ours, and where their citizens are not finding the need of armed protection. If the troops land on pure Chinese territory, this of course will be in itself an act of war, and will give legal validity to the protest of Dr. Wellington Koo on behalf of the Peking Government, which relies upon the Nine-Power Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

This protest and the dismissal of Sir Francis Aglen as Inspector General of the Maritime Customs Admiration are the first signs of the one good result to be expected of British folly, namely, the reunion of North and South in resistance to foreign aggression. It is to be expected that the reactionary generals, whom in spite of their illegals and extortions the British Government is attempting to keep in power, will be abandoned by their own troops unless they make peace with the Nationalists. The British in China, absorbed as they are in ridge and polo, have not noticed that China has become a political nation, and have not stopped to reflect upon the asset which their policy affords to the Kuomintang in its party strife with Chinese conservatism. They have a curious inability to understand what sort of conduct people like and what sort they dislike. I listened the other night to an hour's address given to the Society for the Study of International Affairs, by a British diplomat lately returned from China, in the course of which he professed to explain why the British are not popular in China. He never even mentioned the massacres of Shanghai, Shameen, and Wanhsien, and when afterwards I asked him the reason for his omission he said that he did not consider they had been an important factor. The British in China are apparently unable to realize that Chinese civilians take no pleasure in being shot down treacherously without warning. Psychology is not taught at our English public schools or at Oxford.

The situation is of course one of the utmost gravity, for if once the troops land at Shanghai it is difficult to see how war can be avoided, unless by American or Japanese intervention, either of which our Government would presumably regard as an unfriendly act, though it would be welcomed by every sane man in Great Britain. If war breaks out it will entail the complete militarization of China and a prolonged struggle leading to the immediate cessation of the British-China trade, and an ultimate humiliation, even in a military sense, for though it may be easy to defeat Chinese armies it will be absolutely impossible to maintain control of China or any portion of it not within reach of naval guns.

The men to whom our Government is listening recall with pride our exploits in the Opium
War, and point to the trade advantages thereby secured. They do not seem to realize that the republic of 1927 is different from the tottering Manchu empire of 1840. I could hardly have believed in the existence of such anachronistic ideas among persons with large interests in China had I not myself heard them expressed by such persons in debate. Nor is the issue confined to China. Our Government contemplates breaking off diplomatic relations with Russia, and there is reason to think that the Poles are being incited to repeat their war of 1920. Our attempt to suppress China will of course have repercussions in India, and will increase the unrest in that country. In Great Britain itself a large proportion of those who fought in the Great War are determined never to fight again, whatever the issue. China is distant, and cannot be made to seem truly menacing. The nation will not therefore throw itself into a struggle in the Far East with the wholeheartedness which it showed during the Great War. Unless our Government quickly comes to its senses, I foresee the loss of our Indian Empire and the accession to power in this country of a Labor Party with a very different temper from that of our Government of 1924. For the world at large the insanity of our present Government is likely to be a boon, but for England it is a disaster of the first magnitude. [Russ257]
Immediate future of China is very doubtful, though it is certain that in the long run the nationalists will achieve complete independence for their country. To an Occidental reader, misled by the propaganda which is being telegraphed from China, it may well seem as if that country were in a state of mere chaotic turmoil. That, however, is not the case, any more than it was in America in the years 1861-65 when the fate of slavery was being decided by force. But in order to understand the situation a few facts about Chinese history are necessary.

The Manchus, a warlike northern tribe of foreign conquerors, acquired Peking and the empire in 1644, but during the 15th century they fell gradually in disrepute, partly because they could not oppose a successful resistance to the foreigners (especially English and French), partly because of their extreme difficulty in coping with the Taiping rebellion, which cost as many lives as the Great War cost to all the belligerents together. The Boxer rising of 1900 was a blind outburst of anti-foreign conservatism, in which the most ignorant elements made a last frantic attempt to preserve the old order. The Empress Dowager, having finally sided with the Boxers, shared the disgrace of their fall.

The next move came from the South, which has long been the most progressive part of China. Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, a new movement grew up, patriotic but progressive, anti-Manchu but not anti-foreign, and aiming at the regeneration of China by the adoption of Western ideas and institutions. In the Revolution of 1911, this party triumphed, the Manchu fell and China became (at least nominally) a democratic parliamentary republic, with Sun Yat-sen as first President.

Unfortunately, the price of victory was the placating of Yuan Shi-kai, Commander-in-Chief of the northern armies, who demanded and obtained the retirement of Sun Yat-sen in his favor. He soon quarreled with the Parliament and took to governing by military force. After his death in 1916, his lieutenants quarreled with each other and started the confused personal struggles between militarists which have continued ever since. In these struggles the military leaders have been guilty of every kind of depredation and violence; moreover they have shown themselves willing to sacrifice the interests of their country in order to obtain assistance from foreigners. Foreigners (other than Americans) have continued in public to bewail the anarchy in China, while nevertheless some among them have kept it alive by timely surreptitious assistance to this or that Chinese general.

Meanwhile in the South the progressive democratic movement continued. After various vicissitudes, Sun Yat-sen was in 1920, declared President of the Republic of Canton, though at first the authority of his government extended no further than the one province of Kwantung. The British from the first bitterly opposed him, both because the development of Canton might injure the shipping interests of Honkong, and because in that part labor troubles developed as a result of the ferment produced by the pro-labor attitude of the Canton government.

After years of struggle, during which Honkong was nearly ruined by the Chinese boycott, the British had to give way so far as the relations of Honkong and Canton were concerned. But this experience made the British authorities more than ever desirous of preventing any increase in the area controlled by the Canton government, and thus led them into a general opposition to all that is liberal and progressive in China – an opposition as short-sighted as it is wicked.

Since the Washington Conference, only one Power has shown any sympathy with the best elements in China, or any understanding of China’s needs. That one Power is Soviet Russia. America, from fear of Bolshevism, has hesitated to support the South, and while refraining from doing harm, has not taken any initiative in doing good. The restoration of Shantung to China as a result of the Washington Conference was a service of great importance for which the Chinese have to thank America; but since that event active assistance has been left to the Russians.

Organization and propaganda have been largely directed by Borodin, a man who has had an adventurous career in many countries. From Spain he went to Mexico where he helped to bring about the present admirable regime. From Mexico, as a Mexican, he entered the United
States; thence he went to Glasgow, where he called himself Mr. Brown and took part in all
the most advanced labor movements. The British Parliament deported him to Russia, and the
Russian government sent him to help the Cantonese. No doubt his energy and skill in
propaganda have contributed to their spectacular success in acquiring control of nearly all
China south of the Yangtze, together with the great city of Hankow on its northern bank.
It must not be supposed that the contest is really one between North and South, though that is
its genealogical form. In the North, as in the South, public opinion is on the side of the
Cantonese; no one is on the side of the northern generals except themselves and the
foreigners. Propaganda has repeatedly succeeded in winning their troops to the side of the
South and this, more than military prowess, has been the cause of the southern victories. It
follows that if the Cantonese can win they can establish a stable popular government and
unify China.
The Cantonese are not anti-foreign, in the sense in which the Boxers were. They are on the
best possible terms with the Russians and are willing to be friends with any foreigners who
will respect China's claims to independence. They are not communists and there is no chance
to China becoming communist: The alliance with Russia is only political. But their outlook
on all domestic questions is completely enlightened. They do everything in their power to
improve the status and remuneration of labor. They favor education on western lines. There is
nothing in the programme that can be objected to by any decent person or approved by the
present British government.
From the British imperialist point of view the struggle in China is part of the secular struggle
between England and Russia for control of Asia. For ten years, from 1907 to 1917, this
struggle was suspended to deal with the Germans; but at the Bolshevik Revolution it broke
out again, without waiting for the end of the war. Although the catchwords are new, the
contest is essentially the old context between two imperialisms; and it is noteworthy that, in
spite of losses in the West, the Russian Empire is larger now than before the war. But
whereas, before the war Russia stood for reaction, now throughout Asia, Russia stands for
progress and for everything that enlightened Asians desire. Consequently England has been
led by imperialistic motives into support of everything old, reactionary and corrupt, and into
opposition to everything that represents new growth.
In the long run there can be no doubt whatever that the Chinese Nationalists will win and will
achieve for their country the same independence of the West as is enjoyed by Japan. But it is
impossible to foretell the immediate future. As I write, the British government is sending
powerful natal forces to China, presumably for the protection of Shanghai. British interests in
Shanghai are so important that they will certainly not be surrendered without a first-class
struggle. And Shanghai, unlike Hankow, can easily be held from the sea.
Whether it is possible to compel the Chinese to trade with us by shouting down a sufficient
number of them, remains to be seen; so far, the results of this policy have not been
encouraging from a business point of view.
The Labor Party is doing its utmost to rouse public opinion against the government policy and
it is still possible that it will succeed in preventing a war which would be as disastrous as it
would be immoral. But the present British Government – which, I am happy to say, represents
a minority of the votes cast at the last election – appears to be as blind to the true national
interest as it is to considerations of decency and humanity. Fortunately, it has lost whatever
popularity it once possessed and is likely to be swept away next year in a wave of indignation.
Will that be too late to redress the evil that will have been wrought in China? No man can
say. [Russ256]

1928
Xu Zhimo saw Russell again in September 1928.

I have found the Philosopher [Bertrand Russell] as pungently witty and relently [sic]
humoruous as ever. They are out here, once again, looking after the moral welfare of their two
kids. We have had a jolly good time together since last evening. Since I was only to stay
overnight we were very jealous of the little while we had with each other, so we sat up
chatting last evening till, before we were aware, it was almost 2 a.m. [Russ45]
I have been wanting to write something about Bertrand Russell for a long time. He will be 60 years old next May. I very much wanted to write a big, thick book about his thought by way of congratulation. What I have here instead, is sort of a foreword to that project. It is only an expression of my personal interest in Russell. But actually if you stop to think about, what other criteria is there for truth but that of interest, or rather beauty. What is life for, if not for the expression, the fulfillment of interest ? But whether my interests will find an echo among readers is beyond my ability to predict.

When asked what do you like best and would have liked to be Russell answered : 'I would have liked to know physics best and be a physicist'. 'What are you most afraid of ?' 'I fear most becoming a boring companion to my friends'. 'When was the happiest and the most unhappy time in your life ?' "The unhappiest was the time of my birth. The happiest will probably be when I die'. 'What do you like most and least about yourself ?' What I like the most about myself is that many people like me. What I dislike is that I hate myself'. [Russ8]

Bertrand Russell was classifying his manuscripts and correspondence in the fifties or sixties. He attached the following note to Xu Zhimo's letters :

Mr. Hsü [Xu] was a highly cultivated Chinese undergraduate, a poet both in English and Chinese. He was taught Chinese classical literature by a man who had never been washed, even at birth. When this man died, Mr. Hsu, who was the local landowner, was asked whether the body should be washed. 'No', he replied, 'bury him whole'. Unfortunately, Mr. Hsü [Xu] was killed on his way home to China. [Russ45]
Bertrand Russell's divorce is none of my business. On the other hand, my thoughts on Bertrand Russell's divorce are none of his business. The short item of news that appeared in The China Press about two months ago made me think a great deal. In fact, it made me think furiously. To those acquainted with the liberal views of marriage taken both by Bertrand and Dora Russell, which to my mind, would make marriage considerably easier, the news must have come as a surprise. In fact, the situation is a little invested with humour, as the personal distresses of all great men are invested with humour. This sort of humour is of the best, for it comes from the Defeat of Theories. The cosmic engine grinds on, taking its toll among prince and pauper, and from the shop-keeper to the modern sage, and shows us up as a couple of human mortals that must eternally flounder along. For life is victorious over human philosophy.

Perhaps, if the news is true, the divorce mustn't be taken as a defeat of Bertrand Russell, but only as a defeat of marriage. Perhaps Bertrand Russell is greater than the institution of marriage. For if Russell's marriage was a failure, he was, and is, in good company. All great men's marriage are failures. You say, what about Tolstoy and Goethe? That is very well; but I was thinking of the great sages of the past – Buddha, Confucius, Jesus and Mohammed. Jesus never married, so that proves nothing, unless it be taken as a practical comment on marriage on his part. Buddha, as we are told in The light of Asia, literally walked over the graceful sleeping body of his beautiful wife and became the first monk. It makes me wonder what he must have gone through. It seems to me that all these great men and sages are half crazy people: the common feelings of pain and suffering, of pity for the beggar, of the little annoyances in marriage and the great 'ennui' of life, which to the common man are no sooner felt than forgotten, must have struck their more highly sensitized souls with the power of an exaggerated illusion. From this exaggerated illusion, usually a religion was created. In fact, all founders of a special favorite theory, like Freud, Karl Marx and D.H. Lawrence, must have suffered from a type of mental myopia or astigmatism, which enables them to 'carry it through to its logical conclusion' and beyond all limits of reasonableness. To come back – Confucius and Mencius divorced their wives, and Mohammed took to concubines. All their marriages were failures. Only Socrates, that old Greek with a large measure of common sense, stood his marriage as well as any middle-class John Smith. We are told that, after being scolded by his wife and when he was leaving his house, his wife poured a pail of cold water over his head, he merely muttered, 'After the storm, the rain!' In other words, he had very robust, healthy nerves; he stood marriage with the same physical courage as he stood cold, hardship and physical fatigue, for which he had extraordinary powers, and he faced his wife with the same moral courage with which he faced the cup of hemlock at the end of his seventy years. Socrates had that secret of happiness which is the essences of Chinese culture: Endure and conquer.

Why didn't Russell do it, and why didn't Confucius do it? Confucius had the same humour and the same common sense as Socrates. But we have no sufficient evidence to determine whether Confucius divorced his wife or his wife divorced him. My conviction is that his wife merely ran away. Turn up Chapter Ten of The Analects, and you will understand why it must be so. Any woman who could stand Confucius as husband could stand the Spanish Inquisitions. 'He did not talk at dinner table, and did not talk in bed.' Many wives who face the back of their husband's morning paper every breakfast must know what that first part means; for the second part, they can only imagine. Then he was extremely fastidious about the matching of colours in his dress. 'A fur gown of black sheep should be matched with a black material, a fur gown of white deer should be matched with a black material, a fur gown of white deer should be matched with white material, and a fur gown of fox should be matched with chocolate material.' Like all great men, he had original personal habits. 'He must have the right sleeve of his working gown made shorter' than the left sleeve, and he 'insisted on changing into a sleeping gown, which was longer by half than his body'. All these were practical hygienic innovations, but to the wife of Confucius, who was just a conventional woman, they might have just seemed like sheer nonsense. Equally fastidious was he with his food. 'Rice could never be too white, and mince meat could never be too fine', and who bore...
the burden except the wife in the kitchen? The ten conditions under which Confucius refused to eat must have hanged over the mind of his wife at the kitchen like the sword of Damocles, and eventually caused her to make up her mind one fine morning. It was quite within reason, for instance, that 'when fish was not fresh, and meat was bad-smelling, he would not eat; when the colour was bad, he would not eat; when the flavor was bad, he would not eat'. But when 'he would not eat because a dish was overdone or underdone', was the wife of Confucius to stand over the boiling pot like a guard over a nationally well-known gangster, at the risk of seeing her man starve for another fine half day? The article that he would not eat 'when a thing was not in season' meant extra time and caution at buying in the market. But when 'he would not eat, when the meat was not cut into perfect squares, and he would not ear, when it was not served with its proper sauce', the idea of running away must have already dawned in her mind. The worm was turning. And when, for one reason or another, she could not get up a proper meal, but could ask her son, Li, to run across and get some bacon and some wine to humour him and be through with the darned meal, she might still consent to stay. As it happened, she learned that 'he would not take wine that was not home-brewed or pickled meat that was bought from the streets', so what could the wife do except pack up and go away? That last scene with Confucius, in which she delivered her mind of Confucius, is waiting for some great playwright to write up as the climax of a modern feminist drama. Greater, infinitely greater, than Dora's speech in leaving the Doll's House.

This instance of Confucius is given to illustrate the kind of problems that lie back of marriage and its failures. Two beings, biologically dissimilar, and actually leading two lives, are constrained to lead one. The response to surroundings must necessarily be dissimilar, and only an old couple, with a fundamental respect and liking for each other, and willing to give and take, can, with the exercise of vigilant common sense, toleration and subtle understanding, ever make a go of it. When this condition fails, the marriage breaks, and for it there is no remedy. The East, which regard the family as a social affair and the basis of society, take to concubinage, keeping the family as a social unit intact, while the West, which regard marriage as an individual, sentimental and romantic affair (sic!) go for divorce. Now the East are copying the West, but whoever believes that divorce is a true solution? It is merely as we say in Chinese, 'a solution of no solution', like concubinage itself. There is no such thing as fairness or equality, for it is invariably the woman who suffers. The question is under which system she suffers more. Under the old system, when the man gets tired of his wife and takes his favorite home as concubine, the wife still retains her high position in the family, surrounded by her children, and holding at least a theoretic supremacy over the concubine. Above all, her personal position in the family is kept, and her home is not broken up. In the West, the woman sues for divorce, gets her alimony and goes away to live alone, or re-marry, or become a social lioness. In China, where women have not the spirit of independence of their western sisters, the situation is quite different. It has sometimes seemed to me that the old wife who is cast away to live a solitary life, with her home broken and her position as matriarch lost, is an infinitely pathetic spectacle. In olden days, when a maiden was, by the force of circumstances, involved with a married man, she was, if she was really in love with him, willing to go to his home as his concubine and serve the wife with respect and honour. Now driving one another out in the name of monogamy seems to be the modern fashionable way. It is the so-called emancipated, civilized way. In this battle against their own sex, the young must win out against the old. But if the women prefer it that way, let them have it, since it is they who are primarily affected by it. In any case, there is a happy and an unhappy woman in it. The problem is so new and yet so old. There is no such thing as fairness and equality. I hear Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks are estranged. I am interested not in what Doug thinks, but in what Mary thinks about this internecine war of the fair sex. If Mary were a good Chinese girl, she would let Doug take his concubine, watch how his passion cools after a time, and retain her lordship over Doug. Doug would then have plenty of time to learn what is love and some day come to his senses. Again, this is their own business, but again my thoughts are my own.
Letter from Bertrand Russell to Reginald Bridgeman. 23 Juni 1935.

Dear Bridgeman,

Thank you for your letter of June 20. I feel strongly that there ought to be in England such a society as 'les Amis du people Chinois', and think you should, if possible, have, as that society has, a committee with no definite political bias. I cannot, however, sign the draft letter you enclosed, unless certain alterations are made in it... I cannot understand your policy, if you keep clause 6. The Chinese cannot resist Japan without foreign help, and any foreign help must take the form of 'interference in the internal struggle of the Chinese people'. And how can you, at one and the same time, blame Nanking for giving way to Japan, and tell Nanking that, however they may resist Japan, we won't raise a finger to help them? I suppose your view is that, if none of the Western Powers interfere, Russia will be able to keep the Chinese Communists from being defeated by Nanking; that is to say, you want Russia alone to 'interfere in the internal struggle of the Chinese people'. This is a natural view for a Communist, but not for any one else.

For my part, I lost the desire to befriend the Chinese Government in 1927; it then became apparent that internal dissensions would continue to make China powerless, and the brutalities of the suppression of the Communists disgusted me. Now, however, Japan is so dangerous that I wish something could be done. Nothing can be done without American readiness to fight, and America is not at present prepared for war. When America is seriously willing to fight, perhaps something may be achieved without fighting; till then, Japan can't be stopped unless as part of a world war in which Japan would be allied with Germany.

Yours sincerely,
Bertrand Russell. [Russ36]

1938

Lu, Xun. Lu Xun quan ji (1938).

But there are two more types. One, those who regard the Chinese as an inferior race deserving to remain so, and therefore deliberately praise the old things of China. Two, those who want peoples to be different so as to increase their interest in travel, seeing the queue in China, wooden sandals in Japan, bamboo hats in Korea; if clothes were the same, it would be no fun, and therefore oppose the Europeanization of Asia. Both the types are despicable. As for Bertrand Russell, who praised the Chinese because he saw sedan-chair carries smiling around the West Lake, perhaps he meant something else. But if the sedan-chair carriers were able not to smile at their passengers, China would have long ago ceased to be what it is today. [Russ44]

1942

Zhang, Shenfu. Luosu : xian dai sheng cun zu wei da de zhe xue jia. [Bertrand Russell, the greatest philosopher alive in the Modern age]. [ID D28407].

Russell, the great scholar of enlightenment realism is the most well-known modern thinker in the world of Western philosophy. Russell's works have been translated into more foreign languages than that of any philosopher alive today. Russell's philosophy is complex and cannot be explained in a few simple terms. The source of his original contribution must be traced to his masterwork, the Principia mathematica, which opened up a new page in both mathematical logic and philosophy. Russell has often said, and I always agreed with him: 'No problem in philosophy can be truly solved unless there is a breakthrough in mathematical logic'. Currently Russell is working on an autobiography that is eagerly awaited by readers all over the world. His thought, like his personal demeanour, is thoroughly revolutionary. He is capable of evoking intense admiration. This can be seen in the powerful loyalties he has generated among the women who have shared his life. Since Russell is a powerful and attractive personality, he has been, naturally, envied, and even hated by some people. His commitment to science and democracy have not always received a supportive response. Some people hate him, just because others love him too much, especially women. [Russ6]
Bertrand Russell is the greatest philosopher of mathematical logic. He is a veteran soldier of
the new enlightenment tradition that has brought science to the study of human nature. Every
new philosophy has its own methodology. Russell's pathbreaking method is that of logical
analysis. If you want to truly understand Russell's philosophy, you have to understand the
tradition of British empiricism out of which Russell emerges. His goal was to set mathematics
on a firm foundation of logical proof. In this he succeeded admirably. [Russ6]

Dr. [John] Dewey and I were once in the town of Changsha during an eclipse of the moon :
following immemorial custom, blind men were beating gongs to fritter the heavenly dog,
whose attempt to swallow the moon is the cause of eclipses. Throughout thousands of years,
this practice of beating gongs has never failed to be successful ; every eclipse has come to an
end after a sufficient prolongation of the din. This illustration shows that our generalization
must not use merely the method of agreement, but also the method of difference. [Russ80]

It was due to Bertrand Russell that young minds began to get interested in principles of social
reconstruction, which roused them against both religion and imperialism, is highly inaccurate.
First, the exploration of the question of social reconstruction was the major theme of the May
Fourth Period, and Russell was invited to China in part because his social philosophy
responded to the questions the Chinese were already asking. Second, Chinese antipathy
toward religion long antedated Russell's visit. (The Boxer Rebellion in 1900 was in part an
anti-Christian movement; and anti-Confucianism, to the extent that Confucianism may be
called a religion, was part of the fabric of the May Fourth Movement.) And third, hostility
toward imperialism was as old as nineteenth-century gun-boat diplomacy and was
exacerbated further by events of the early twentieth century, including particularly the results
of the Versailles Peace Settlement of 1919. The Chinese did not need Russell to stimulate
their ire against imperialism. [Russ10]

Ed. by Paul Arthur Schilpp. (Evanstone : Northwestern University, 1944). (The library of
China did one thing for me that the East is apt to do for Europeans who study it with sensitive
sympathy : it taught me to think in long stretches of time, and not to be reduced to despair by
the badness of the present. Throughout the increasing gloom of the past twenty years, this
habit has helped to make the world less unendurable than it would otherwise have been.
There was much that I found admirable in the Chinese tradition, but it was obvious that none
of this could survive the onslaughts by Western and Japanese rapacity. I fully expect to see
China transformed into a modern industrial state as fierce and militaristic as the powers that it
was compelled to resist. I expected that in due course there would be in the world only three
first class powers – America, Russia and China – and that the new China would possess none
of the merits of the old. These expectations (in 1920) are now being fulfilled. [Russ41,Russ80]

1948 Feng, Yu-lan [Feng, Youlan]. *A short history of Chinese philosophy* [ID D10068].
Feng Youlan pointed out that what John Dewey and Bertrand Russell mainly lectured about in
China was their own philosophy : "This gave their hearers the impression that the traditional
philosophical systems had all been superseded and discarded. With little knowledge of the
history of Western philosophy, the great majority of audiences failed to see the significance of
their theories. One cannot understand a philosophy unless at the same time he understands the
earlier traditions that it either approves or refutes. So these two philosophers, though well
received by many, were understood by few. Their visit to China, nevertheless, opened new
intellectual horizons for most of the students at that time. In this respect, their stay had great
cultural and educational value. [Russ43]
Bertrand Russell: "I love the Chinese but it is obvious that the resistance to hostile militarism must destroy much of what is best in their civilization. They seem to have no alternative except to be conquered or to adopt many of the vices of their enemies." [Russ41]


The oldest known Chinese sage is Laotzu, the founder of Taoism... Laotzu describes the operation of Tao as 'creation without possession, action without self-assertion, development without domination'. I think one could derive from these words a conception of the ends of life as the reflective Chinese see them, and it must be admitted that they are very different from the ends which the white men have set before themselves. Possession, self-assertion, domination, are eagerly sought, both nationally and individually… Comparing the civilization of China with that of Europe, one finds in China most of what was to be found in Greece, but nothing of the other two elements of our civilization, namely Judaism and science… What will be the outcome of the contact of this ancient civilization with the West? The Japanese adopted our faults and kept their own, but it is possible to hope that the Chinese will make the opposite selection, keeping their own merits and adopting ours… The distinctive merit of our civilization. I should say, is the scientific method; the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a just conception of the ends of life. It is these two that one must hope to gradually uniting. [Russ80, Russ41]


In November 1962 Russell was similarly involved in mediating the border dispute between China and India in Kashmir. In numerous telegrams to Nehru and Zhou Enlai, Russell urged a cease-fire and withdrawal so that negotiation and arbitration could settle the conflict. He also urged President Sukarno of Indonesia and U Thant to help mediate. In this situation India, which as a neutral nation, had so often pleaded for peaceful relations, seemed to be overcome by war hysteria, and thus Russell found that the nation for which he had the most sympathy again was being the most unreasonable. This time Zhou Enlai exercised wisdom and thanked Russell for his peacemaking efforts.

Letter from Bertrand Russell to Zhang Shenfu. 17. Sept. 1962

It was very rewarding for me to receive your thoughtful and kind letter. I am enclosing to you a copy of a programme given to me on the occasion of my ninetieth birthday, which I value and should wish you to have. I am also sending you a copy of my History of the world in epitome which I hope you will like. I should very much like to see you again to discuss all that has happened in the years since we last met. Naturally, those who write about one have their own particular Weltanschauung [sic], which affects their vision of oneself. I am not publishing my autobiography until after my death, because there is so much that affects contemporary events, and because there is much that I am hoping to add to it. The danger of nuclear war is overwhelming and terrifying, and I feel that I must do anything I am able to prevent it. I hope that you will write again, because it was a source of pleasure for me to hear from you. [Russ8]
Dear Mr. Nehru, Our recent correspondence concerning our mutual hopes for peace in this
dangerous world makes me conscious that in this time of trial for India you will with for her
friends to be visible and outspoken. A count myself as a life-time friend of India and an
admirer of your own efforts for peace. It is out of such feelings that I write to you now.
The tragic deterioration of relations between India and China holds the most grave
forebodings as I am sure you are deeply aware. I feel a sense of urgency because the general
outbreak of fullscale war between India and China can not but lead to a world conflagration. I
know and painfully understand the difficult choices you face. Events, however, should they
advance further in this direction, will permit no return. Should this occur India's vital interests
will not be served but irrevocably harmed. Should China be expansionist to the point of
wishing such a conflict, every step should be taken to make such policy difficult to sustain.
Should she be uncertain as to whether her claims out to be pressed at such cost and danger,
every possibility of permitting this consciousness to reach the level of policy should be
pursued. I feel that the offer of Chou En-Lai for cease-fire, even if at terms which entail
sacrifice, should be accepted if only to enable talks to begin and fighting to cease… Should
Chou En-Lai become so unreasoning as to discard any willingness to end fighting what can be
in store other than great war between one-third of the world's people ? We know that general
nuclear war will be soon upon us if this takes place… [Russ36]

1962.11.16  Letter from Zhou Enlai to Bertrand Russell. 16.11.1962. [Extract].
The Chinese attacks on the border with India were in self-defence and that it is hoped that
Bertrand Russell can use his influence to promote a peaceful settlement.
Zhou Enlai appeals for Russell to use his influence to promote a peaceful settlement of the
Sino-Indian boundary question.
Zhou Enlai comments that so long as there is a ray of hope China will continue to work
towards a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute. He also urges Russell to use
his 'distinguished influence to promote a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary
question.
Zhou Enlai tells Russell that the Chinese government will continue to strive 'for a peaceful
settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question'. He hopes Russell will use his distinguished
influence to promote a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. [MML]

Zhou Enlai states that the Chinese government hopes that the Indian government will be
willing to change its past attitude and sincerely settle the Sino-Indian boundary question
through friendly negotiations.
Zhou Enlai hopes that Russell will continue to use his distinguished influence to urge the
Indian Government to respond positively to the Chinese governments.
Zhou Enlai welcomes Russell's support of the Chinese cease-fire proposal. He notes that the
Indian government has repeatedly rejected any Chinese proposals, and hopes that the Indian
government will be willing to change its past attitude and sincerely settle the Sino-Indian
boundary question through friendly negotiations. [MML]
Private & Confidential

Dear Mr. Nehru, Thank you for your letter of December 20. I find it extremely painful to be in any degree of disagreement with you. As for the material which caused my doubts, I had long interviews in London with your Deputy High Commissioner and, also, with the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires. It was quite impossible for me to know which of them, if either, was giving an accurate account of the matter. The only conclusions to which I was able to come from my talks with them supplemented by all the information that I could get hold of from the documents they each gave me as well as from other sources was that each side had a case and that it should be left to expert impartial examination to decide as to the justice of the rival claims.

Apart from the rights and wrongs of the original dispute, the Chinese unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal seemed to me a generous action showing a real desire for Peace. I thought that India should have given a more welcoming response to their gesture. I think, further, that the questions of who was the first aggressor and of which of two provisional lines should be adopted during negotiations, are less important than the grave dangers involved in a long war, and both India and China will be gravely to blame if they insist upon this or that provisional line as a condition for negotiations.

I have been alarmed by your public mention of a 'long war'. Such a war would be infinitely dangerous and can only be justified by considerations of 'honour' and 'prestige'. Whipping up of nationalist war-like feeling by professed disciples of Gandhi inevitably throws doubt upon the sincerity of Indian professions in past years.

It is very kind of you to offer to send me the correspondence between your Government and that of China, and, if you do so, I shall read it with the utmost care.

Yours sincerely, Bertrand Russell. [Russ36]


Zhou Enlai expresses China's view on the border dispute with India. China wants an amicable settlement of its boundary questions through peaceful negotiations on the basis of equality. [MML]

Dear Mr. Chou En-Lai, I have read with interest your statements concerning the Colombo proposals and I am heartened that your Government accepts them in principle. I am anxious, however, about the difference in interpretation placed upon the proposals by Mr. Nehru and yourself.

I believe that the unilateral cease-fire of your Government and the withdrawal of your forces indicates clearly the sincerity of your desire for an understanding with the Indian Government on the border question. The fact that your forces are now substantially behind the positions of September 8th, 1962, which Mr. Nehru has said earlier were the circumstances necessary for his willingness to enter talks, speaks again of Chinese sincerity.

You will appreciate, therefore, that in writing to you now I do so with awareness of your efforts to solve this dispute and with sympathy for them. I believe that the issue separating your Government and that of Mr. Nehru from beginning bilateral negotiations consists of the disposition of Indian troops in the Eastern sector and of Indian civil check-points in the Western sector. I understand that China feels that the withdrawal of her troops to twenty kilometres behind the McMahon Line should not herald the advance of Indian forces into the vacated area. I also understand that China objects to Indian civil check-points in the Western sector from which Chinese troops have withdrawn.

Would it not be possible to have the consistent principle apply wherein the civil authorities of both China and India could set up check-points in the vacated areas of all sectors without regard to the final determination of any part of the boundary? Final determination would wait upon bilateral negotiations between India and China.

Would it not further be possible for Madame Bandaranaike to appeal for talks to begin immediately on the ground that the differences now separating China and India, as regards the conditions for talks, are so slight as hardly to justify continued dispute? You will understand how anxious I am that talks begin as soon as possible and in the best possible spirit and it may be that a suggestion from Madame Bandaranaike would facilitate the immediate commencement of them. I assure you I have sympathy for your efforts to settle this dispute amicably and that I shall continue to seek to facilitate this to whatever extent I am able.

There is a particular point about which I should wish to seek your advice. I should be happy and anxious to have a first hand account of the Chinese feelings and Chinese advances. If it would be possible for you to invite two of my representatives to come to China, so that I might have this opportunity. I should be in your great debt. I should dearly with to come myself, but age prevents this. I hope you will not mind my asking this of you.

With my warm good wishes and respect, Yours sincerely, Bertrand Russell. [Russ36]
Dear Madame Bandaranaike,
I am very grateful for your kind letter with which I am in complete agreement. I appreciate very much your unrelenting efforts to bring about a settlement between India and China and feel honoured that I should be able to assist.
I was interested to learn that Mr. Chou En-Lai has indicated that he is ready to start talks either in Peking or in New Delhi at any time. I realized that China had been calling for negotiations, but not the extent to which the position they maintained conformed to the entirety of the Colombo proposals.
I am most anxious to pursue your suggestion of a further appeal to Mr. Nehru. May I ask if it would be possible for you to receive two personal representatives from me for the purpose of discussing with them how most effectively to conduct this appeal and to further the work for a settlement in the Sino-Indian dispute. It is my hope that after their discussion with you they could proceed on my behalf to New Delhi to meet with Mr. Nehru and to convey to him the appeal from me that you mention. I feel that it is in Mr. Nehru's hands to permit peace between India and China or to create, at best, a Cold War as between those two countries, the onset of a disastrous arms race, the involvement of South East Asia in the military consequences of such a contest, the intrusion of the Cold War Powers, and an end to Asian neutralism...
With my warm good wishes and respect, Yours sincerely Bertrand Russell. [Russ36]

1963.06.05  Letter from Zhou Enlai to Bertrand Russell. 5.6.1963. [Zusammenfassung].
Zhou Enlai makes reference to the fact that China has successively taken a series of important measures on its own initiative in order to promote Sino-Indian negotiations. Zhou Enlai would warmly welcome Russell's personal visit to China, if health condition permits it. He comments that he would welcome the visit by Russell's representatives, and gives an outline of the steps China has taken towards securing a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. He also points out to Russell that facts about Tibet contained in unarmed victory are inconsistent with the historical facts.
He said he had been reading a summary of 'Unarmed Victory' in Chinese. (This was presumably prepared specially for him : no Chinese translation was ever published). He seemed quite pleased with the book, which at the time was one of the few Western documents which attempted to put China's case sympathetically, though Russell made no bones about his detestation of Chinese communism or his immense respect for Nehru and the Indian policy of non-alignment. Zhou thought, that Russell had made mistakes about Tibet, the McMahon Line, and China's foreign policy. (He sent the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires to Wales to put him right). He also dismissed the differences between India and China over the Colombo proposals as unimportant matters could be resolved in negotiations. [Russ36,MML]

Dear Premier Chou En-lai,

I am grateful to you for your instructive and generous letter to me, and I value the opportunity to send my personal associates to China. I have been deeply impressed by the initiatives that your Government has taken with a view to bringing about a settlement of the dispute between China and India, and by the fact that you have done more than has been asked of your Government by the Colombo Powers with respect to the withdrawal of your troops in the Central and Eastern Sectors, although you were not obliged to do so by the recommendations of the Colombo Powers. I further understand that China has, in addition to releasing all military personnel, returned all captured military equipment to the Government of India. These steps, and the repeated guarantee on the part of China that negotiations between the two countries may be conducted without any assumptions as to where boundary lines and troop positions are to be placed, have impressed me with the entire sincerity of your Government in its desire to settle this dispute.

I agree with you when you say that the Indian Government has failed to provide one initiative or conciliatory gesture such as might allow a friendly atmosphere and the onset of serious negotiations. I recognize, also that there is every reason to suspect the sincerity of India’s professed willingness to negotiate. I suggest, however, that, assuming all this to be the case, it would be in China's interests to accept the Indian interpretation of the proposals. There would be two advantages in this course: first, that it would probe the sincerity of India's professed willingness to negotiate; and second, that, if India proved insincere and refused to negotiate, even the habitual practice of misrepresentation by the West would not be able to conceal from world opinion that China is eager for peace, and India is not. I suggest that these considerations should outweigh your justifiable objection to Indian civilian officials in Aksai Chin. It seems to me that it would not be 'appeasement' or 'weakness' should China say that, unreasonable as it is for India to presume to suggest that there could be pre-conditions for negotiations, China is prepared to allow these civilian posts so that India will have no further stated grounds to use as pretexts for failing to begin negotiations.

I have persistently urged India to begin negotiations, first on the basis of your proposals of October 24th, then on the basis of your interpretation of the Colombo proposals. I have written to Prime Ministers Nehru and Bandaranaike and to U Thant in this sense. I have appealed to all those Indians with whom I have had association during many years. You will understand, therefore, that I have not sought to persuade only China to make concessions or have at any point envisaged impairing the position of your Government or your people. Should China state that the considers India's demands to be unreasonable in the extreme but, nonetheless, as a test of India's sincerity, will permit a certain number of Indian civilian posts in the area north of the line from which Chinese troops have withdrawn 20 kilometres in the Western Sector, there would be nothing India could do except agree to negotiate or accept exposure before the world.

I am well aware of the difficulties which were imposed upon the conflict between China and India through the intrusion of the United States and Britain. It is clear to me that they are encouraging India to arm to the teeth and to harbor long-term hostilities toward China. It is largely because of this that I urge you to remove the last obstacle to negotiations. This, to my mind, is the course of strength and is not appeasement or unlimited concession. It seems to me that, should China remove every vestige of nominal Indian objections to beginning negotiations, China would both force India to come to the Conference table and release many forces within India which could then agitate for peace and understanding and agreement. Although the Colombo proposals as interpreted are weighted to India's advantage, they are, as all the participating members have pointed out, recommendations, and have only the force of suggested arrangements such as to facilitate negotiations. You yourself have pointed this out to me. It seems to me, therefore, that it would be possible for China to accede to such interpretations as India unreasonably insists upon, so that the danger of provocations or of foreign intervention or of a deteriorating situation may be avoided.

I am grateful for your frankness in putting to me your view in China and Tibet, and I am taking care to study them and also your Government's position on the overall question of
peace and war.
With good wishes and high regard, Yours sincerely, Bertrand Russell [Russ36]

1963.07.21 Letter from Zhou Enlai to Bertrand Russell. 5.6.1963. [Extract].
Zhou Enlai states that the Chinese and Indian armed forces have disengaged and the border situation has eased. [MML]

Dear Premier Chou,

My representatives have given to me a full account of their discussions with Prime Minister Nehru, Prime Minister Bandaranaike and yourself. I have been deeply interested in their reports and find myself fully informed of the discussions which occurred. They have also given to me a detailed description of their impressions of the development and advance in China since 1949.

I consider the new posture of Mr. Nehru, advanced in his talks with my associates, to be very important. It is my hope that he will, as you request, confirm in writing that which he said to my associates and which he asked them to convey to you.

I entirely endorse the suggestion they made to Mr. Nehru which prompted his response. I consider all those initiatives undertaken by you previously to be admirable, particularly as they occurred without such assurances in advance as are now obtainable from Mr. Nehru with respect to the hoped-for negotiations. I also have place hope in your earlier statements concerning your determination to remove any obstacles in the way of genuine negotiations. As I explained in the letter carried by my colleagues, concessions designed to probe finally the sincerity of Indian willingness to settle the dispute seemed to me to be desirable for the sake of normal relations and an end to the threat of conflict. All the more reason why the 'no man's land' formula gains in importance for the guarantee of negotiations which consider the overall issue.

I remain hopeful that Mr. Nehru's response will be communicated to you and that you will, accordingly, find a way to remove such obstacles as may remain in the way of negotiations.

Your representative's words to me in London that China, for her part, was prepared to forego her right to civilian posts in the area east of the line of actual control in Aksai Chin vacated by Chinese forces were important. He had further said that for China the important issue in this connection was that it was not allowable for Indian civil posts to enter the area. Consequently, the 'no man's land' connection seemed entirely reasonable and, in fact, implied by China's own weighting of the issue: namely, that while the self-denial concerning her own civil posts was conceivable, the advent of those of India was not.

I approve of all that my representatives said on my behalf and consider them to have reflected my own feelings accurately and well. It is a disappointment to me that there should have been certain disagreements over minor matters with them. This is particularly so because during the past year my access to facts which made more clear and correct the attitude of your government with respect to the border conflict was made possible because of their efforts on my behalf. I need not tell you of the difficulty to form an accurate picture about China when restricted to information available in the West. I wish you to know that our concern for fair play with respect to China was greatly aided by the efforts of all my colleagues and I certainly endorse their endeavor on this occasion of their mission on my behalf.

I should regret that the important matter of settlement between China and India were clouded by any irrelevant issue and, therefore, desire not to express myself on other and smaller matters. I hope you will accept my sincere appreciation for your kind gifts and the opportunity given Mr. Schoenman and Mr. Pottle to see China and to act on my behalf.

With my good wishes and respect, Yours sincerely, Bertrand Russell. [Russ36]
Dear Mr. President,
The Vietnam crisis is one which concerns not only the citizens of the United States and of
Vietnam but all human beings, since the lives of all are at stake. The American Government is
hesitating (so it appears) as to whether the war should be extended to North Vietnam and to
China. The war against China, if it is not nuclear, is likely to drag on inconclusively for years.
It is likely that the Russians will patch up their differences with China and come to its
assistance. Indeed, they have already said that they will come to the assistance of North
Vietnam. It will soon become evident, in that case, that neither side can defeat the other
except by employing nuclear weapons. In the heat of battle, each side will consider such
employment essential. The result will be the extermination of the human race… [Russ36]

Zhou Enlai agrees with Russell's condemnation of U.S. imperialism for its criminal
aggression in Vietnam.
Zhou Enlai agrees with Russell that the chief threat to world peace is U.S. imperialism. He
also comments that the struggle against U.S. imperialism is at present the key to the cause of
the people of the world defending peace. [MML]

Zhou Enlai thanks for the confidence and support Russell have shown in the Chinese
government and people.
Zhou Enlai praises Russell's noble efforts in opposing U.S. imperialist policies of
aggression. [MML]
1979 Interview: Zhang Shenfu and Vera Schwarcz about Bertrand Russell.
Zhang Shenfu: I believe I understand Russell. Maybe I am the only one in China who really does. Russell himself did not understand Confucius. But, in fact his thought is very close to Confucius. I see this similarity even if nobody else does. Even if Russell were to deny it. My philosophy brings them together. I am like a bridge (qiao liang), you might say. Among all philosophers I have read, and there have been so many, those two are the ones I respect and admire the most.
I did not invite Russell to China – Liang Qichao did. I did not translate his public lectures. Zhao Yuanren, an American-educated young man, did. I did not even translate Russell's lecture notes. A member of the New Tide Society, Sun Fuyuan did. I was not even involved in the founding of the Chinese 'Russell Society' in 1921. I had already gone to France. Your friend does not tell my story but that of others who stayed on in China after I left. I did something else, something maybe more important. I translated Russell's philosophy. I introduced him to Chinese readers as an important modern thinker. I think I set the stage for informed appreciation.
I was the first to translate most of Russell's key texts into Chinese. Others followed with longer books, more technical works. But I introduced all the key phrases, all the key themes. I was the first to notice and to emphasize what was new in Russell's thought. For example, I was the first to emphasize the concept of philosophy as 'the science of the possible' – though I am not sure where this concept appears in Russell's works. I was also the first to translate and interpret the logical concept of 'guilun' – from the English 'falsification' – which is fundamental for all of logical analysis. I also translated the concept of 'analysis' very differently from all others. I used the Chinese term 'jie xi' instead of the more commonly used 'fen xi'. Why, you wonder? Because I believe 'jie xi' is more logical. It also sounds more new somehow. 'Fen xi' suggests something being cut up. Scattered, severed – as if by one blow. 'Jie xi', by contrast is not so simple. How is it more complex, you ask? I feel that there are many more steps involved in 'jie xi'. When something is subjected to logical analysis, it is a slow, systematic operation. 'Fen xi' was widely accepted as a synonym for 'analysis' when I began my work on Russell. But I did not think it conveys the full implications of Russell's thought. It was too simple. So I made an innovation through translation. Maybe this is my most important contribution to clarifying Russell's work in twentieth-century China.
But Russell, you see, ended up so one-sided in his philosophical outlook. His philosophy is useful in seeing only discrete parts of a problem. I wanted to think about the whole. In many ways Russell was biased. He opposed materialism. But materialism and idealism are just two sides of the same coin. Materialism does not see the heart (or 'mind', xin) while idealism fails to appreciate outward realities. My own philosophy seeks for a more comprehensive view of experience, for a more thorough realism, for an expansive objectivity. So I went back to certain ideas in Chinese philosophy – especially to the Confucian notions of 'ren' (tolerance, humanism) and 'zhong' (the unprejudiced golden mean). [Russ8]

Du Renzhi's extensive review of Bertrand Russell's career in philosophy, his political activities, and his ideas about society fails to mention that Russell ever went to China in 1920-1921. Russell's book 'Bolshevism' is dismissed as 'reactionary', and although it is recognized that he also criticized the capitalist system, he is still considered a supporter of it, a philosopher who was never able to rise above his class background (except on the issue of individual freedom). Philosophically, Russell is termed a 'subjective idealist' (as opposed to 'materialist'), and on social questions he is called a 'capitalist class libertarian'. [Russ10]
In this book Mr. Russell uses the example of the painter to talk about how an artist becomes interested in the appearance of things. By contrast, the practical person wants to know what things are really like. The philosopher, in turn, is moved by an even more profound desire to know the inner quality (ben ti) of things. According to Russell, philosophy is not the process through which one finds concrete, definite answers to this or that question. Unlike the physicist, the philosopher studies the questions themselves. Philosophical questions broaden our conception of reality. They enrich our inner feelings and imagination and diminish arbitrary self-righteousness. Arbitrary self-righteousness, Russell wrote, is difficult to undo. More difficult than acquiring Reason. Still, this is the most important object of philosophy. It is concerned with nothing less than the universe as a whole. The subject is so great that it must, by necessity, stretch our minds as well. To put it simply, it is possible for us to strive to obtain truth – a truth that is part of the great objective truth of the universe. [Russ8]

To be a great philosopher, a person must be creative. He must have something original to say about the human condition and have a noble purpose in philosophizing. Russell did not fail to meet all of these criteria. Tu sum op Russell's live : he was not only a great philosopher, but also a theorist of education. He also fought for justice and peace. He was tireless in his appeal to critical reason and in the fight against Fascism. His great achievements in mathematical logic have transformed the entire philosophical world. Thus I write this article to show my admiration and respect for Russell.

1914, when I entered Beida's undergraduate school, the library finally opened a reading room. Books in Western languages were placed on bookshelves along the walls. But the shelves were locked up most of the time. Still, I came often. Because of my frequent appearances, I became very familiar and friendly with the librarian. So, I was allowed to read whatever I wanted from the locked shelves. There were very few books in the reading room at the time. Other than a few texts on engineering, there was almost nothing that I did not read. One day, I found a very interesting book, published in the US in 1914. The title was 'Our knowledge of the external world' written by Bertrand Russell. From the first time I read it, I sensed that it was full of new meaning for me. Then, I read it two more times growing more interested in its author, Bertrand Russell.

Russell's speeches were easy to understand, fluent, humorous and inspiring. When analyzing a problem, Russell explained the problem in simple terms. His reasoning powers were penetrating, but not without irony. But it was not a hurting sort of irony. To me, his voice sounded like spring water from a sacred mountain. It cools and clams. It also leaves one with a chilly, alert, pleasant sensation. [Russ8]
Bertrand Russell decided to reprint this book unaltered in 1966, even though, as he said at the
time, hardly anything else had 'remained unchanged during the intervening forty-three years' since it was first published in 1922. The present edition is very slightly different from that of 1966, in that it includes a postscript, originally published in an earlier reissue of the book in 1926. Then, 800 unsold copies from 1922 had their appendix removed and index reset, with the postscript substituted in the space that was created by these changes.

The postscript is notable for Russell's acid summary of British policy:
"The British view is still that China needs a central Government strong enough to suppress internal anarchy, but weak enough to be always obliged to yield to foreign pressure."

In those far off days, Britain was still a major world power, and the centre of a huge empire. This was the context in which Russell could write that
"The concentration of the world's capital in a few nations, which, by means of it, are able to drain all other nations of their wealth, is obviously not a system by which permanent peace can be secured except through the complete subjection of the poorer nations… The real government of the world is in the hands of the big financiers, except on questions which rouse passionate public interest. No doubt the exclusion of Asians from America and the Dominions is due to popular pressure, and is against the interests of big finance. But not many questions rouse do much popular feeling, and among them only a few are sufficiently simple to be incapable of misrepresentation in the interests of the capitalist. Even in such a case as Asiatic immigration, it is the capitalist system which causes the anti-social interests of wage-earners and makes them illiberal. The existing system makes each man's individual interest opposed, in some vital point, to the interest of the whole. And what applies to individuals applies also to nations; under the existing economic system, a nation's interest is seldom the same as that of the world at large, and then only by accident. International peace might conceivably be secured under the present system, but only by a combination of the strong to exploit the weak."

These conclusions were born in upon Russell during his extended visit to China, when he lectured at the University of Peking. There he debated with Chen Tu-Tsu, the founder of the Chinese Communist Party. Among his audience was Mao Tse-Tung, then a young student. Here is what Mao wrote about the event:
"In his lecture at Changsha, Russell… took a position in favour of communism but against the dictatorship of the workers and peasants. He said that one should employ the method of education to change the consciousness of the propertied classes, and that in this way it would not be necessary to limit freedom or to have recourse to war and bloody revolution… My objections to Russell's viewpoint can be stated in a few words: 'This is all very well as a theory, but it is unfeasible in practice'. Education requires (1) money, (2) people, and (3) instruments. In today's world, money is entirely in the hands of the capitalists or slaves of capitalists. In today's world, the schools and the press, the two most important instruments of education, are entirely under capitalist control. In short, education in today's world is capitalist education. If we teach capitalism to children, these children, when they grow up, will in turn teach capitalism to a second generation of children. Education thus remains in the hands of the capitalists. Then the capitalists have 'parliaments' to pass laws protecting the capitalists and handicap the proletariat; they have governments to apply these laws and to enforce the advantages and the prohibitions that they contain; they have 'armies' and 'police' to defend the well-being of the capitalists and to repress the demands of the proletariat; they have 'banks' to serve as repositories in the circulation of their wealth; they have 'factories', which are the instruments by which they monopolize the production of goods. Thus, if the communists do not seize political power, they will not be able to find any refuge in this world; how, under such circumstances, could they take charge of education? Thus, the capitalists will continue to control education and to praise their capitalism to the skies, so that the number of converts to the proletariat's communist propaganda will diminish from day to day.
Consequently, I believe that the method of education is unfeasible… What I have just said constitutes the first argument. The second argument is that, based on the principle of mental habits and on my observation of human history, I am of the opinion that one absolutely cannot expect the capitalists to become converted to communism... If one wishes to use the power of education to transform them, then since one cannot obtain control of the whole or even an important part of the two instruments of education — schools and the press — even if one has a mouth and a tongue and one or two schools and newspapers as means of propaganda… this is really not enough to change the mentality of the adherents of capitalism even slightly ; how then can one hope that the latter will repent and turn toward the good ? So much from a psychological standpoint. From a historical standpoint… one observes that no despot imperialist and militarist throughout history has ever been known to leave the stage of history of his own free will without being overthrown by the people. Napoleon I proclaimed himself emperor and failed ; then there was Napoleon III. Yuan Shih-K'ai failed ; then, alas, there was Tuan Chi-jui… From what I have just said based on both psychological and a historical standpoint, it can be seen that capitalism cannot be overthrown by the force of a few feeble efforts in the domain of education. This is the second argument. There is yet a third argument, most assuredly a very important argument, even more important in reality. If we use peaceful means to attain the goal of communism, when will we finally achieve it ? Let us assume that a century will be required, a century marked by the unceasing groans of the proletariat. What position shall we adopt in the face of this situation ? The proletariat is many times more numerous than the bourgeoisie ; if we assume that the proletariat constitutes two-thirds of humanity, then one billion of the earth's one billion five hundred million inhabitants are proletarians (I fear that the figure is even higher) who during this century will be cruelly exploited by the remaining third of capitalists. How can we bear this ? Furthermore, since the proletariat has already become conscious of the fact that it, too, should possess wealth, and of the fact that its sufferings are unnecessary, the proletarians are discontented, and a demand for communism has arisen and has already become a fact. This fact confronts us, we cannot make it disappear, when we become conscious of it we wish to act. This is why, in my opinion, the Russian revolution, as well as the radical communists in every country, will daily grow more powerful and numerous and more tightly organized. This is the natural result. This is the third argument…

There is a further point pertaining to my doubts about anarchism. My argument pertains not merely to the impossibility of a society without power or organization. I should like to mention only the difficulties in the way of the establishment of such form of society and of its final attainment… For all the reasons just stated, my present viewpoint on absolute liberalism, anarchism, and even democracy is that these things are fine in theory, but not feasible in practice…"

III

Mao's letters never came to Russell's attention. I found them shortly after he died, in a collection which had been published by Stuart Schram. I was thus able to draw attention to them in a memorial collection which honoured the Russell Centenary, two years later. At that time, Mao was still wielding almost absolute power in the People's Republic of China, which he and his Party had created, unifying the country and subjecting it to powerful central control. No doubt, had he been reminded of these earlier judgements on Russell, he would have thought that they were self-evidently justified. Had he not, in 1949, brought the Communist Party into power ? Had not that victory been a feat of arms, by the Red Army moulded in the shape of his own doctrines ? Had he not then called up, in 1966, a further insurgency to prevent any thought of restoration, and oppose bureaucracy ? And had not the Great Cultural Revolution registered an apparently complete success in its struggle against 'capitalist roaders', and indeed all others who took a different view of Chinese development ? And yet, within months of Mao's death, his Cultural Revolution was repudiated, and some of its more eminent proponents in the 'Gang of Four' were on trial. The principal capitalist roader, Deng Xiaoping, was soon to become paramount leader, and China was to embark on a feverish programme of foreign investment. Multinational corporations were to become welcome. Hong Kong and Taiwanese developers built massive and luxurious hotels all over
the country from which oases great entrepreneurs could journey forth, foraging for profit. For one night's stay in these palaces, they might pay the equivalent of a peasant's annual income. Not only was all the hated apparatus feared by Mao soon to be introduced, but much of it was to be celebrated by baroque embellishment and exaggeration. Western newspapers no longer reported on youthful insurgents waving little red books, but instead described the dreadful scenes at the Shenzen Stock Exchange, when people were crushed underfoot in the rush to subscribe to new issues.

In 1993, Chinese capitalism is developing with enormous verve and dynamism, under the benign encouragement of the Chinese Communist Party, which maintains a political regime of stringent authoritarianism. A Chinese trade union leader in Tientsin assured me that Western apprehensions concerning his members were entirely false: "They think our workers will soon demand much higher wages and better conditions", he said. "But they do not understand that labour will remain cheap in China for very many generations, because we have hundreds of millions of rural people who will accept work in the towns for very modest rewards." Modest though they may be, such rewards are still much greater than the customary earnings of poor peasants, so that the new policy is not unpopular. Indeed, the Politbureau may draw some relief from this result of controlled capitalism, with which it seems able to co-exist in comfort. For its part, Capital does not seem incommmoded by the undoubted cruelties which maintain autocratic rule in China. After all, order rules. The framework of commerce is stable. One's money does not evaporate in inflation or turmoil. Everyone knows his or her place, even if he or she might wish it to be different.

Russian capitalism is an altogether feebler growth, but the Communist Party in its old form has ceased to exist there. Thus the world resumes something closer to the condition that was familiar to Bertrand Russell at the beginning of this convulsive century, against which Mao launched his ragged and heroic legions.

Russell would have drawn small comfort from this, since he was no admirer of the power structure against which both he and Mao Tse-Tung were, each in his own way, in rebellion. Neither brute force, nor sophisticated pleading, have produced the results which optimists awaited.

Yet the conflicts between rich and poor, the polarities between capitalist power centres and peripheral zones of famine, all endure. It is still too soon to put these ghostly voices behind us, if we seek a more human outcome from the world's traumas. [Russ2]

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到自由之路 [WC]


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1945 Shi Youzhong verlässt die Yanjing-Universität und wird Professor an der University of Washington. [XiaoG1]

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"Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake, and let us consider how a man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connexion with that part of the world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity."
"In China if a lady's foot is so large as to be fit to walk upon, she is regarded as a monster of ugliness." [SmiA3:S. 119, 179]

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The improvements in agriculture and manufactures seem likewise to have been of very great antiquity in the provinces of Bengal, in the East Indies, and in some of the eastern provinces of China, though the great extent of this antiquity is not authenticated by any histories of whose authority we, in this part of the world, are well assured. In Bengal, the Ganges, and several other great rivers, form a great number of navigable canals, in the same manner as the Nile does in Egypt. In the eastern provinces of China, too, several great rivers form, by their different branches, a multitude of canals, and, by communicating with one another, afford an inland navigation much more extensive than that either of the Nile or the Ganges, or, perhaps, than both of them put together. It is remarkable, that neither the ancient Egyptians, nor the Indians, nor the Chinese, encouraged foreign commerce, but seem all to have derived their great opulence from this inland navigation...

Half an ounce of silver at Canton in China may command a greater quantity both of labour and of the necessaries and conveniencies of life, than an ounce at London. A commodity, therefore, which sells for half an ounce of silver at Canton, may there be really dearer, of more real importance to the man who possesses it there, than a commodity which sells for an ounce at London is to the man who possesses it at London. If a London merchant, however, can buy at Canton, for half an ounce of silver, a commodity which he can afterwards sell at London for an ounce, he gains a hundred per cent. by the bargain, just as much as if an ounce of silver was at London exactly of the same value as at Canton. It is of no importance to him that half an ounce of silver at Canton would have given him the command of more labour, and of a greater quantity of the necessaries and conveniencies of life than an ounce can do at London. An ounce at London will always give him the command of double the quantity of all these, which half an ounce could have done there, and this is precisely what he wants...

China has been long one of the richest, that is, one of the most fertile, best cultivated, most industrious, and most populous, countries in the world. It seems, however, to have been long stationary. Marco Polo, who visited it more than five hundred years ago, describes its cultivation, industry, and populousness, almost in the same terms in which they are described by travellers in the present times. It had, perhaps, even long before his time, acquired that full complement of riches which the nature of its laws and institutions permits it to acquire. The accounts of all travellers, inconsistent in many other respects, agree in the low wages of labour, and in the difficulty which a labourer finds in bringing up a family in China. If by digging the ground a whole day he can get what will purchase a small quantity of rice in the evening, he is contented. The condition of artificers is, if possible, still worse. Instead of waiting indolently in their work-houses for the calls of their customers, as in Europe, they are continually running about the streets with the tools of their respective trades, offering their services, and, as it were, begging employment. The poverty of the lower ranks of people in China far surpasses that of the most beggarly nations in Europe. In the neighbourhood of Canton, many hundred, it is commonly said, many thousand families have no habitation on the land, but live constantly in little fishing-boats upon the rivers and canals. The subsistence which they find there is so scanty, that they are eager to fish up the nastiest garbage thrown overboard from any European ship. Any carrion, the carcase of a dead dog or cat, for example, though half putrid and stinking, is as welcome to them as the most wholesome food to the people of other countries. Marriage is encouraged in China, not by the profitableness of children, but by the liberty of destroying them. In all great towns, several are every night exposed in the street, or drowned like puppies in the water. The performance of this horrid office is even said to be the avowed business by which some people earn their subsistence...

China, however, though it may, perhaps, stand still, does not seem to go backwards. Its towns are nowhere deserted by their inhabitants. The lands which had once been cultivated, are nowhere neglected. The same, or very nearly the same, annual labour, must, therefore, continue to be performed, and the funds destined for maintaining it must not, consequently, be sensibly diminished. The lowest class of labourers, therefore, notwithstanding their scanty subsistence, must some way or another make shift to continue their race so far as to keep up their usual numbers...

China seems to have been long stationary, and had, probably, long ago acquired that full complement of riches which is consistent with the nature of its laws and institutions. But this
complement may be much inferior to what, with other laws and institutions, the nature of its soil, climate, and situation, might admit of. A country which neglects or despises foreign commerce, and which admits the vessel of foreign nations into one or two of its ports only, cannot transact the same quantity of business which it might do with different laws and institutions. In a country, too, where, though the rich, or the owners of large capitals, enjoy a good deal of security, the poor, or the owners of small capitals, enjoy scarce any, but are liable, under the pretence of justice, to be pillaged and plundered at any time by the inferior mandarins, the quantity of stock employed in all the different branches of business transacted within it, can never be equal to what the nature and extent of that business might admit. In every different branch, the oppression of the poor must establish the monopoly of the rich, who, by engrossing the whole trade to themselves, will be able to make very large profits. Twelve per cent. accordingly, is said to be the common interest of money in China, and the ordinary profits of stock must be sufficient to afford this large interest...

China is a much richer country than any part of Europe, and the difference between the price of subsistence in China and in Europe is very great. Rice in China is much cheaper than wheat is anywhere in Europe...

The difference between the money price of labour in China and in Europe, is still greater than that between the money price of subsistence; because the real recompence of labour is higher in Europe than in China, the greater part of Europe being in an improving state, while China seems to be standing still...

The East India trade of the Swedes and Danes began in the course of the present century. Even the Muscovites now trade regularly with China, by a sort of caravans which go over land through Siberia and Tartary to Pekin...

The consumption of the porcelain of China, of the spiceries of the Moluccas, of the piece goods of Bengal, and of innumerable other articles, has increased very nearly in a like proportion. The tonnage, accordingly, of all the European shipping employed in the East India trade, at any one time during the last century, was not, perhaps, much greater than that of the English East India company before the late reduction of their shipping.

But in the East Indies, particularly in China and Indostan, the value of the precious metals, when the Europeans first began to trade to those countries, was much higher than in Europe; and it still continues to be so...

The retinue of a grandee in China or Indostan accordingly is, by all accounts, much more numerous and splendid than that of the richest subjects in Europe...

But in the East Indies, particularly in China and Indostan, the value of the precious metals, when the Europeans first began to trade to those countries, was much higher than in Europe; and it still continues to be so. In rice countries, which generally yield two, sometimes three crops in the year, each of them more plentiful than any common crop of corn, the abundance of food must be much greater than in any corn country of equal extent. Such countries are accordingly much more populous. In them, too, the rich, having a greater superabundance of food to dispose of beyond what they themselves can consume, have the means of purchasing a much greater quantity of the labour of other people. The retinue of a grandee in China or Indostan accordingly is, by all accounts, much more numerous and splendid than that of the richest subjects in Europe.

The same superabundance of food, of which they have the disposal, enables them to give a greater quantity of it for all those singular and rare productions which nature furnishes but in very small quantities; such as the precious metals and the precious stones, the great objects of the competition of the rich. Though the mines, therefore, which supplied the Indian market, had been as abundant as those which supplied the European, such commodities would naturally exchange for a greater quantity of food in India than in Europe. But the mines which supplied the Indian market with the precious metals seem to have been a good deal less abundant, and those which supplied it with the precious stones a good deal more so, than the mines which supplied the European. The precious metals, therefore, would naturally exchange in India for a somewhat greater quantity of the precious stones, and for a much greater quantity of food than in Europe. The money price of diamonds, the greatest of all superfluities, would be somewhat lower, and that of food, the first of all necessaries, a great deal lower in the one country than in the other. But
the real price of labour, the real quantity of the necessaries of life which is given to the labourer, it has already been observed, is lower both in China and Indostan, the two great markets of India, than it is through the greater part of Europe. The wages of the labourer will there purchase a smaller quantity of food: and as the money price of food is much lower in India than in Europe, the money price of labour is there lower upon a double account; upon account both of the small quantity of food which it will purchase, and of the low price of that food. But in countries of equal art and industry, the money price of the greater part of manufactures will be in proportion to the money price of labour; and in manufacturing art and industry, China and Indostan, though inferior, seem not to be much inferior to any part of Europe. The money price of the greater part of manufactures, therefore, will naturally be much lower in those great empires than it is anywhere in Europe. Through the greater part of Europe, too, the expense of land-carriage increases very much both the real and nominal price of most manufactures. It costs more labour, and therefore more money, to bring first the materials, and afterwards the complete manufacture to market. In China and Indostan, the extent and variety of inland navigations save the greater part of this labour, and consequently of this money, and thereby reduce still lower both the real and the nominal price of the greater part of their manufactures. Upon all these accounts, the precious metals are a commodity which it always has been, and still continues to be, extremely advantageous to carry from Europe to India. There is scarce any commodity which brings a better price there; or which, in proportion to the quantity of labour and commodities which it costs in Europe, will purchase or command a greater quantity of labour and commodities in India. It is more advantageous, too, to carry silver thither than gold; because in China, and the greater part of the other markets of India, the proportion between fine silver and fine gold is but as ten, or at most as twelve to one; whereas in Europe it is as fourteen or fifteen to one. In China, and the greater part of the other markets of India, ten, or at most twelve ounces of silver, will purchase an ounce of gold; in Europe, it requires from fourteen to fifteen ounces. In the cargoes, therefore, of the greater part of European ships which sail to India, silver has generally been one of the most valuable articles. It is the most valuable article in the Acapulco ships which sail to Manilla. The silver of the new continent seems, in this manner, to be one of the principal commodities by which the commerce between the two extremities of the old one is carried on; and it is by means of it, in a great measure, that those distant parts of the world are connected with one another.

In China, a country much richer than any part of Europe, the value of the precious metals is much higher than in any part of Europe...

The course of human prosperity, indeed, seems scarce ever to have been of so long continuance as to enable any great country to acquire capital sufficient for all those three purposes; unless, perhaps, we give credit to the wonderful accounts of the wealth and cultivation of China, of those of ancient Egypt, and of the ancient state of Indostan. Even those three countries, the wealthiest, according to all accounts, that ever were in the world, are chiefly renowned for their superiority in agriculture and manufactures. They do not appear to have been eminent for foreign trade. The ancient Egyptians had a superstitious antipathy to the sea; a superstition nearly of the same kind prevails among the Indians; and the Chinese have never excelled in foreign commerce. The greater part of the surplus produce of all those three countries seems to have been always exported by foreigners, who gave in exchange for it something else, for which they found a demand there, frequently gold and silver...

But the countries which Columbus discovered, either in this or in any of his subsequent voyages, had no resemblance to those which he had gone in quest of. Instead of the wealth, cultivation, and populousness of China and Indostan, he found, in St. Domingo, and in all the other parts of the new world which he ever visited, nothing but a country quite covered with wood, uncultivated, and inhabited only by some tribes of naked and miserable savages. He was not very willing, however, to believe that they were not the same with some of the countries described by Marco Polo, the first European who had visited, or at least had left behind him any description of China or the East Indies; and a very slight resemblance, such as that which he found between the name of Cibao, a mountain in St. Domingo, and that of Cipange, mentioned by Marco Polo, was frequently sufficient to make him return to this
favourite prepossession, though contrary to the clearest evidence...
The policy of China favours agriculture more than all other employments. In China, the condition of a labourer is said to be as much superior to that of an artificer, as in most parts of Europe that of an artificer is to that of a labourer. In China, the great ambition of every man is to get possession of a little bit of land, either in property or in lease; and leases are there said to be granted upon very moderate terms, and to be sufficiently secured to the lessees. The Chinese have little respect for foreign trade. Your beggarly commerce! was the language in which the mandarins of Pekin used to talk to Mr. De Lange, the Russian envoy, concerning it {See the Journal of Mr. De Lange, in Bell's Travels, vol. ii. p. 258, 276, 293.}. Except with Japan, the Chinese carry on, themselves, and in their own bottoms, little or no foreign trade; and it is only into one or two ports of their kingdom that they even admit the ships of foreign nations. Foreign trade, therefore, is, in China, every way confined within a much narrower circle than that to which it would naturally extend itself, if more freedom was allowed to it, either in their own ships, or in those of foreign nations. Manufactures, as in a small bulk they frequently contain a great value, and can upon that account be transported at less expense from one country to another than most parts of rude produce, are, in almost all countries, the principal support of foreign trade. In countries, besides, less extensive, and less favourably circumstanced for inferior commerce than China, they generally require the support of foreign trade. Without an extensive foreign market, they could not well flourish, either in countries so moderately extensive as to afford but a narrow home market, or in countries where the communication between one province and another was so difficult, as to render it impossible for the goods of any particular place to enjoy the whole of that home market which the country could afford. The perfection of manufacturing industry, it must be remembered, depends altogether upon the division of labour; and the degree to which the division of labour can be introduced into any manufacture, is necessarily regulated, it has already been shewn, by the extent of the market. But the great extent of the empire of China, the vast multitude of its inhabitants, the variety of climate, and consequently of productions in its different provinces, and the easy communication by means of water-carriage between the greater part of them, render the home market of that country of so great extent, as to be alone sufficient to support very great manufactures, and to admit of very considerable subdivisions of labour. The home market of China is, perhaps, in extent, not much inferior to the market of all the different countries of Europe put together. A more extensive foreign trade, however, which to this great home market added the foreign market of all the rest of the world, especially if any considerable part of this trade was carried on in Chinese ships, could scarce fail to increase very much the manufactures of China, and to improve very much the productive powers of its manufacturing industry. By a more extensive navigation, the Chinese would naturally learn the art of using and constructing, themselves, all the different machines made use of in other countries, as well as the other improvements of art and industry which are practised in all the different parts of the world. Upon their present plan, they have little opportunity of improving themselves by the example of any other nation, except that of the Japanese...

In China, and in several other governments of Asia, the executive power charges itself both with the reparation of the high-roads, and with the maintenance of the navigable canals. In the instructions which are given to the governor of each province, those objects, it is said, are constantly recommended to him, and the judgment which the court forms of his conduct is very much regulated by the attention which he appears to have paid to this part of his instructions. This branch of public police, accordingly, is said to be very much attended to in all those countries, but particularly in China, where the high-roads, and still more the navigable canals, it is pretended, exceed very much every thing of the same kind which is known in Europe...

In China, the principal revenue of the sovereign consists in a tenth part of the produce of all the lands of the empire. This tenth part, however, is estimated so very moderately, that, in many provinces, it is said not to exceed a thirtieth part of the ordinary produce...

Some part of the public revenue of China, however, is said to be paid in this manner. The mandarins and other tax-gatherers will, no doubt, find their advantage in continuing the practice of a payment, which is so much more liable to abuse than any payment in money.
If raw silk could be imported from China and Indostan, duty-free, the silk manufacturers in England could greatly undersell those of both France and Italy. There would be no occasion to prohibit the importation of foreign silks and velvets...

The improvements in agriculture and manufactures seem likewise to have been of very great antiquity in the provinces of Bengal, in the East Indies, and in some of the eastern provinces of China, though the great extent of this antiquity is not authenticated by any histories of whose authority we, in this part of the world, are well assured. In Bengal, the Ganges, and several other great rivers, form a great number of navigable canals, in the same manner as the Nile does in Egypt. In the eastern provinces of China, too, several great rivers form, by their different branches, a multitude of canals, and, by communicating with one another, afford an inland navigation much more extensive than that either of the Nile or the Ganges, or, perhaps, than both of them put together. It is remarkable, that neither the ancient Egyptians, nor the Indians, nor the Chinese, encouraged foreign commerce, but seem all to have derived their great opulence from this inland navigation...

Sekundärliteratur
Colin Mackerras: Adam Smith enjoys on extremely high reputation for his enormous and innovative contribution to the history of ideas on economics and social evolution. His Wealth of nations is his most famous work and the classic of laissez-faire economics. In it he argues, among a large range of other historical, social, and economic ideas, that free competition is the key to economic and social advance.

Smith's view of China was positive in some ways, but not in others. He admired its fertility and size, and did not see it as declining. On the other hand, he was fiercely condemnatory of the fact that it never seemed to change, and that ordinary people were prepared to put up with poverty without trying to better their condition.

Smith admired much about China's economy, its extensive internal trade and communications, and its variety of manufactures. On the other hand, his ideas on free competition made him extremely suspicious of China's lack of international trade, which he believed had held the country back in a range of ways, and would likely continue to do so.

Smith's emphasis on trade highlights one of the reasons for the deterioration in the Western view of China: the desire for trade with China.
Georges-Marie Schmutz : Adam Smith est le père fondateur de plusieurs sciences sociales ; ses réflexions sur la société chinoise ont acquis quelque notoriété dans l'histoire des écrits occidentaux, non pas parce qu'elles sont abondantes, mais parce qu'il est un grand penseur. Smith's application générale de An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations est identique à celle de Montesquieu, à savoir que la Chine, bien que riche, c'est-à-dire socialement très avancée, est privée d'éléments dynamiques ; elle est donc moins 'admirable' économiquement, politiquement et socialement que certains rapports essaient de la faire croire aux Européens. Par ce scepticisme, Montesquieu et Smith se distinguaient des autres penseurs du XVIIIe siècle, en particulier des jésuites et des physiocrates qui tendaient à privilégier des visions angéliques de la Chine.

Smith plaçait la Chine au sommet de la hiérarchie des nations. Il la considérait comme une des nations les plus riches ; la plupart des mentions concernent son opulence : la Chine se présente comme beaucoup plus riche que n'importe quelle partie de l'Europe, riche comme une nation ancienne, comme l'ancien Indoustan, le Japon et les Indes orientales. La Chine récolte trois fois par an ce qui explique l'étendue de sa richesse, visible par la densité de sa population, l'ampleur du commerce intérieur, la division extensive du travail, la qualité et le prix des marchandises et des transports. Pour Smith, la Chine est donc bien une société avancée, une société ayant dépassé, et de loin, les structures minimales d'organisation sociale.

Smith, s'intéressant au comportement des nations, recherche la nature et les causes de cette richesse. Elle résulte selon lui de l'organisation de la société orchestrée en fonction des intérêts impériaux. La richesse agricole, manufacturière et commerciale, explique-t-il, profite au souverain. Il en extrait les impôts à raison d'un dixième des récoltes. Le souverain soutient ces conditions pour lui bénéfiques. Les mandarins qui perçoivent partiellement les impôts sous forme de marchandises – ce qui leur permet d'extraire des parts substantielles pour eux-mêmes – s'accommodent aussi de ce système. En Chine, la richesse de la société – indicatrice de sa nature – est orchestrée par le souverain et dépend donc d'une organisation hiérarchique.

L'organisation de la société civile, en Chine, ne dépend pas de lois divines, mais d'un cadre plus limité, celui imposé par les membres hiérarchiquement les plus haut placés dans la société, l'empereur, les mandarins et les pères. La richesse de la Chine est fondée sur des relations orientées vers les aînés, relations caractérisées par le culte des ancêtres. La richesse en soi n'est pas un indicateur déterminant. Ce qu'il faut voir, dit Smith, c'est la composition de cette richesse ; là, la capacité de s'étendre et de progresser est encore plus importante. Comme Smith n'est pas tant intéressé par les nations en elles-mêmes, mais plutôt aux types de richesse acquise par les diverses nations – leur structure sociale particulière – il trouve que la Chine est seulement riche en agriculture et en manufacture, qu'elle est seulement riche à l'intérieur, et qu'elle est entourée de nations sauvages, barbares et par conséquent pauvres. Les grands de la Chine sont beaucoup plus riches que les plus riches Européens ; cela veut dire que la Chine est riche mais avec une énorme population de pauvres et que les travailleurs y sont mal rétribués. La raison trouvée par Smith pour rendre compte de cette situation concerne les rapports de la Chine avec les autres nations. La Chine est richement qu'elle néglige le commerce extérieur. Si elle voulait bien s'ouvrir au commerce international, dit-il, elle deviendrait rapidement beaucoup plus riche et sa richesse serait plus saine. Dans les circonstances présentes, la Chine est incapable de rapides progrès.

La société chinoise est conçue comme privée de cet agencement unique des rapports, fondé sur la loi naturelle des avantages sociaux. Au lieu de cela, la Chine est vue comme gouvernée par un ordre hiérarchique, soutenue par une morale de vénération envers les aînés et arrangées en groupes familiaux. La famille occupe une place central dans la société chinoise, dans la mesure où elle absorbe toutes les relations, ne laissant aucune place au développement de relations constructives au-dehors. La famille occupe tout l'espace social. C'est une institution admirable, mais incapable de donner naissance aux mécanismes de la transformation sociale. L'omniprésence de la famille rend impossible la confrontation des individus, et donc l'adoption d'un comportement particulier, celui décrit dans la théorie des sentiments moraux, permettant le
développement de la transformation de la société.
Le résultat de ces trois premières caractéristiques est naturellement la continuité, pour laquelle Smith proposa un nouveau terme, celui d'état stationnaire, incapable de s'améliorer, mais très capable de se maintenir.
Cette nation agricole ne s'ouvre pas au commerce avec l'étranger, elle est incapable de prendre en charge elle-même son commerce extérieur, que le souverain ne protège pas, méprise et sous-estime. Pour ces raisons, la Chine ne s'améliore pas, elle a attaïnt, il y a déjà longtemps, l'expansion maximale que ses lois et ses institutions rendent possible.
Les références à la Chine forment une image de la Chine qui nourrit la tradition sociologique en train de se former. La nature d'une société est produite en inversant la démarche classique es philosophes sociaux. C'est de la richesse compare la plus récente que découle la nature la plus ancienne de la société. Dans la démarche classique, on part de l'histoire, de la tradition, et de là on établit le rang. Dans la démarche moderne, on part de l'observation, du présent, et à partir de ce présent observé, on interprète la société, on redéfinit son histoire.
Dans l'analyse de la Chine par Smith, les catégories que nous privilégions dans cette recherche sont nettement moins visibles, à cause de son approche particulière. Smith réduit la Chine aux dimensions d'un exemple quantifiable.
Ashley Eva Millar: Smith described how a rich state is more likely to be attacked. The government must either mandate regular military drills for its populace or establish a standing army in order to effectively defend itself. China's failures on this front and the lessons they offered were nearly unanimously recognized.

The second duty of the sovereign, according to Smith, was to protect members of society by establishing 'an exact administration of justice'. Interest in this theme can be divided into two areas. The first area centre on protecting the integrity of the justice system and reducing corruption in government. China's system of government, based on an ancient philosophy, offered a wealth of information on this topic. There was a great deal of agreement between sinophiles and sinophobes on the Chinese model of regulation and the protections provided by the Chinese system of governance. The second area of interest was the relationship between security of property and civil society. Less information was available on Chinese property rights, likely because of the differences in the Chinese system and because of incommensurabilities in the conceptualization of property rights. When Enlightenment philosophers did address Chinese property rights it was in the context of having agriculture as the basis of society and the level of debate reflected Europe's broader engagement with the Chinese model of political economy.

In the Wealth of nations Smith addressed physiocratic arguments by contrasting agricultural systems to mercantile or commercial systems. Like Quesnay, Smith also relied on Poivre for his discussion of Chinese property rights, which he directly connected to its agricultural system. According to Poivre, those who buy a field or receive it by inheritance become the 'lord and master' of that land – a clear attack on feudalism. Poivre concluded his book by imploring the kings of Europe to follow the example of China, where the 'lands are as free as the people ; no feudal services, and no fines of alienation'. Smith followed Poivre in arguing that in 'China, the great ambition of every man is to get possession of some little bit of land, either in property or in lease ; and leases are there said to be granted upon very moderate terms, and to be sufficiently secured to the lessees'. Smith believed that the precedence of agriculture explained China's stationary status. 'Upon their present plan they have little opportunity of improving themselves by the example of any other nation : except that of the Japanese. Thus, Smith is in agreement with the Physiocrats on the description of the Chinese system but not on the implications of the model. The fact that there was debate and discussion reflects the openness of the European approach to evidence from the Chinese system, especially relative to the assumptions of superiority that would come to characterize debate in the nineteenth century.

The third expense and duty of the sovereign, according to Smith, was 'that of erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those public works' that are advantageous to society but do not offer enough profit to induce private agents. Smith divided this duty into two main parts: the first involved facilitating and promoting commerce; and the second was education. Most Enlightenment observers agreed that China had a well-developed public infrastructure, particularly with regard to its canal system. Smith directly referenced China in his discussion of this topic, but again deemed it to be a unique case because of its land-based economy from which Europe could not use any lessons.

Drawing on Jesuit sources, Smith noted the importance of public works, such as canals and highways in China. Though he stated that this was the case in several governments of Asia, it was seen to be particularly so in China. Smith drew largely from the primary sources, which highlighted the importance of fulfilling administrative duties in executing public works in China.

Smith's explanation for the importance of public infrastructure in China reflects his assessment of varying paths of development, for he again emphasized the unique nature of China's political economy. Describing why the Chinese government had the incentive to invest in public works, Smith connected the nature of its agricultural system first to taxation and subsequently to public works. It is natural for Chinese emperors to support agriculture, he argued, as their yearly revenue depends on it. Because the government revenue is collected from the land, the executive has the incentive to maintain the high roads and navigable canals in order to facilitate the marketing of produce. Smith contrasted this interpretation to Europe.
where sovereigns might draw the greater part of their revenue from the produce of the land is 'neither so immediate, nor so evident'. For this reason, European sovereigns have less interest in investing into roads and canals to facilitate the marketing of produce. This argument again shows how Smith dismissed aspects of the Chinese state by deeming them non-replicable in a European context because these qualities stemmed from China's unique characteristics. Smith's argument should, therefore, not be seen simply as an evaluation of the Chinese state. Enlightenment scholars viewed the government's provision of infrastructure in China as very successful. However, their discourse did not suggest the replication of similar models in Europe, as they were seen as contingent on China's unique land-based economy.

Adam Smith carefully considered where the funds for the main expenses of government should be derived from. This topic was of the utmost importance, for without sufficient revenues and their proper management, the aforementioned duties of government could not be fulfilled. There was general agreement between Europeans who visited China and Enlightenment thinkers as to the efficiency of the Chinese fiscal system. The high level of revenue the state collected, combined with low rates of taxation for individuals and the consistency and efficiency with which taxes were collected, earned almost unanimous praise from European writers. China's large population and agricultural base were portrayed as unique and inimitable.

Smith explained how the sovereigns of China, as well as those from ancient Egypt and the kingdoms of India, have 'always derived the whole, or by far the most considerable part, of their revenue from some sort of land-tax or land-rent'. He described the one-tenth tax in China and also noted that in some parts of the empire it is only one-thirtieth. Smith compared this to tax rates elsewhere, demonstrating the low tax burden on Chinese peasants. While he believed this system worked well in China, he cautioned that payment in kind rather than in money is more liable to manipulation and fraud. He warned that the 'Mandarins and other tax-gatherers will, no doubt, find their advantage in continuing the practice of a payment which will, no doubt, find their advantage in continuing the practice of a payment which is so much more liable to abuse than any payment in money'. Smith articulated the fundamental differences of the Chinese tax system, based on an agricultural economy that collected a portion of its taxes in kind, in comparison to Europe's increasingly money-based political economies.
Adam Smith in Beijing [ID D27091].


2008

Enthüllung der Statue von Adam Smith auf dem Campus der Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in Chengdu. [Int]

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"On remembering how large a share the resulting ancestor-worship had in regulating life among the people who, in be Nile valley, first reached a high civilization - on remembering that the ancient Peruvians were subject to a rigid social system rooted in an ancestor worship so elaborate that the living might truly be called slaves of the dead - on remembering that in China too, there has been, and still continues, a kindred worship generating kindred restraints; we shall perceive, in the fear of the dead a social factor which is, at first, not less important, if indeed is not more important, than the fear of the living."

1903  
The journal *Hu bei xue sheng jie*, no 2 (1903) emphasized that 'only if we continue to explore the ideas and teachings of scholars such as Rousseau, Montesquieu, Darwin, and Spencer can China hope to have a student population, an academia that is in step with the tides of change, so that it may seek and find a new plan for national salvation and avoid being mired forever in darkness'. [Mon28]

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Thilly, Frank (1865-1934) : Professor of Philosophy, University of Missouri, Princeton University, Cornell University

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1920 Mao, Dun. *Nicai de xue shuo* [ID D18302].


Wir müssen uns noch im klaren darüber sein, dass es sich nur um eine Lehre bzw. um ein Werkzeug handelt, das uns zur Verbesserung des Lebens, zum Suchen nach Wahrheit verhelfen kann. Wir versuchen aus seiner Lehre etwas Nützliches zu gewinnen, lassen sein Unnützliches im Stich, ja wir vergessen es gänzlich.


Yu Longfa: Anlässlich der Diskussion um Verantwortungsprobleme des vergangenen Krieges scheint Mao Dun eine neue Bewertung von Nietzsche besonders notwendig, um ein 'neues China' zu begründen und zugleich die damit verbundene Kulturbewegung weiter zu fördern. Mao Duns Nietzsche-Rezeption ist keine wissenschaftliche Studie über die Lehre Nietzsches. Er konnte kein Deutsch und war deshalb auf englischsprachige Sekundärliteratur angewiesen. Er hat eine Teilübersetzung von Zarathurstra: *Thus spoke Zarathustra* gelesen, sowie Beyond good and evil und Genealogy of morals.


Mao Duns Vermittlung von Nietzsches Lehre führte in damaliger Zeit zur Popularisierung von Nietzsches Denken einerseits und zu neuen Begriffen andererseits, die extreme Gedanken der damaligen Intellektuellen widerspiegeln.
Raoul David Findeisen: Mao Dun betont, dass Nietzsche ein Elfenbeinturmdasein geführt habe und deshalb ihm gegenüber Vorsicht geboten sei, denn 'er habe keine Ahnung, unter welchen Bedingungen das gewöhnliche Volk lebt'. Mao setzt sich mit dem konfuzianischen Wertesystem auseinander und fordert, sich der 'Umwertung' zu bedienen, um 'die alte Moral zu zerstören'. Der Wert der Tradition müsse 'neu festgesetzt' werden. Er bezeichnet den 'Übermenschen' als einen 'fortschrittlichen Menschen'. Zwar betont er, das Ideal des Übermenschen sei die wichtigste Forderung in Nietzsches Ethik, doch wie durchschlagend sein darwinistisches Vorverständnis war und wie sehr er den Übermenschen als zulässigerer biologisches Phänomen verstand, wird deutlich wenn er ihn charakterisiert: "Der Übermensch steht zum jetzigen Menschen im gleichen Verhältnis wie der jetzige Mensch zum Affen". Mao Dun betont den Wert von Nietzsches Moralkritik, lehnt aber dessen Ableitungen, die er mit "Die Herren werden stärker und die Sklaven schwächer" wiedergibt, entschieden ab, weil sie sich mit den elementarsten Forderungen der Demokratie und des Sozialismus nicht vereinbaren ließen.

Aus einem aufklärerischen Erziehungsbegriff heraus, sieht Mao Dun die vorrangige Bedeutung von Nietzsches Ikonoklasmus darin, 'das Volk aufzurütteln', dessen 'Sklavenmoral' er darauf zurückführt, dass es 'in Unwissenheit gehalten wurde, damit es dem Kaiser gehorcht'.


Mao Duns zentrale Thesen lauten: Seid unabhängig und nicht unterwürfig, seid fortschrittlich und nicht konservativ, seid kämpferisch und zieht euch nicht zurück, seid utilitaristisch und nicht formalistisch, seid wissenschaftlich und phantasiert nicht. [Yu1:S. 74-81, 91,Find2:S. 23-28]

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解释学现象学与宗教哲学：世俗哲学与宗教信仰的对话 [WC]

**Whitehead, Alfred North** (Ramsgate, Kent 1861-1947 Cambridge, Mass.) : Englischer Philosoph, Mathematiker ; Senior Lecturer University College London and Imperial College London ; Professor of Philosophy Harvard University

*Biographie*
1911-1933 Alfred North Whitehead and China: Sekundärliteratur

1965
Fang Dongmei [Fang Thomé]: The so-called freedom is to create incessantly. Both in man and in nature there is always something new and progressive which indicates the realities of both man and nature. The whole universe exhibits novelty and wonder all the time and everywhere, and there seems to be a high order to which it abides. So let's borrow the words from Whitehead, nature in essence is a 'creative advance'.

Yu Yih-hsien: Fang's philosophy is closely allied with Bergson's vitalism and Whitehead's philosophy of organism and is against materialistic mechanism.
(WhiA1)

1971
Wu, Joseph S.: Whitehead has offered not merely a synthesis within the Western tradition, but also attempted to include the cultural contributions of the East. Contemporary Chinese philosophers have respected Whitehead as one of the greatest speculative philosophers in the Western world. Romantic poetry has taught Whitehead that an adequate concept of nature can never be divorced from aesthetic values. This has led him into the saying that philosophy is akin to poetry. This is perhaps one of the major reasons that he is so respected by contemporary Chinese thinkers.
(WhiA28)
Tong Lik Kuen [Tang Liquan]: Whitehead once admitted that his philosophy seemed closer to the Indian, or Chinese, way of thought than to the Western-Asiatic, or European, way of thinking. For Whitehead Being, the field of all existence, is in essence a field of creative activity. Creativity, not God, is the ultimate metaphysical principle. In Whitehead's cosmology God is the principle of concretion, functioning both as the reservoir of potentiality and as the coordinator of achievement, so the Tao of Heaven and Earth in the I Ching is what determines the field order of I, being the 'way' (tao) of its creative operations. Just as in Whitehead the variable and the permanent textures of Being are equally essential to the field character of Creativity, so in the I China I includes in its meaning both the changing (p'ien i) and the unchangeable (pu i).

Lying at the heart of Whitehead's ontology and cosmology is the idea of 'organic synthesis', which replaces both the Aristotelian primary substance and the concept of matter in scientific materialism. In so far as Whitehead is concerned, organic synthesis, which defines the real essence of Creativity, is basically what the field theory of Being is all about.

What are the ultimate principles or root-conditions of contextuality upon which organic synthesis depends? Whitehead's answer is basically contained in this five-fold analysis:

1. Pure potentiality, which consists of the multiplicity of 'eternal objects' (the Platonic Forms) given in the 'primordial nature' of God, may be called the root-condition of character.
2. The Extensive Continuum, which forms the general system of relatedness of all eternal objects, may be called the root-condition of character.
3. Real Potentiality, belonging to the 'actual world' of past actual entities which in consummation are received into the 'consequent nature' of God, may be called the root-condition of heritage.
4. God, conceived both as the reservoir of potentiality (pure and real) and as the co-ordinator of achievement (through synthesis of his primordial and consequent natures), may be called the root-condition of concretion.
5. Actuality, which belongs to the 'living acts' of Creativity arising from the compulsion of power (what is the meaning of 'substance' for Whitehead) in the actual world, may be called the root-condition of agency.

According to Whitehead, objective or physical time has its origin in the temporalization of Creativity, that is, in the creative advance of actual entities.

The Whiteheadian idea of the extensive region finds its counterpart in the I Ching in the idea of 'wei' or 'position'. Just as in Whitehead the extensive region has a temporal as well as a spatial aspect, so 'wei' in the I Ching includes both the meaning of 'shih' or time and the meaning of 'fang wei' or 'wei' in the narrow sense, that is, spatial location or direction.
Cheng Chung-ying: After becoming familiar with Whitehead's philosophy, particularly as embodied in Whitehead's book Process and Reality, many Chinese philosophers have made the suggestion that Whitehead's philosophy resembles Chinese philosophy to a great measure and therefore is highly comparable to Chinese philosophy. What the Chinese philosophers have in mind when they assess the resemblance between Chinese philosophy and Whitehead's philosophy is that Whitehead had developed a system based upon the fundamental notion of reality as a process of change which has always been the fundamental notion of Chinese philosophy, beginning with the I ching. Whitehead, even though he explicitly defines speculative philosophy as the attempt to frame a 'coherent, logical, necessary system of ideas' to 'interpret experience', his metaphysics of organism as a system of ideas should possess ontological significance of agency and efficacy and should form an important ingredient for the constitution of the world and life. Both, Whitehead's philosophy and Chinese philosophy have more than conceptual resemblance: both would agree that philosophy is real, not merely conceptual. The resemblance between Chinese philosophy and Whitehead's philosophy is not a matter of static comparison, but a matter of dynamic interaction.

Whitehead's position seems to approximate to the position which the great Neo-Confucianists from Chou Tun-I to Chu Hsi generally held. Specifically, Whitehead can be understood as reaching a position represented in the well-known Discourse on the Diagram of the Great Ultimate (T'ai Chi T'u Shuo) as developed by Chou Tun-I and generally accepted by Chu Hsi and other Neo-Confucianists. The organic unity among the Neo-Confucian categories we do not seem to find in Whitehead's system of creativity. It appears that all the Whiteheadian categories are given in confunction and there is no specific effort explicitly to demonstrate or to assess their interdependence.

(WhiA30)
Julia Ching: Whitehead has developed his thinking somewhat in opposition to that of Thomas Aquinas. It is not incorrect to assert that Chu Hsi shares common ground with both, Aquinas and Whitehead, agreeing, with the former, that God is in some respects above change, while also insisting, with the latter, that God is immersed in change itself. A comparative study of Chu Hsi and Whitehead is especially appropriate and useful for several reasons. Whitehead was personally conscious of possible resemblances between his philosophy and that of China or East Asia – of which Chu remains an important representative. Chu Hsi and Whitehead shared a common interest in the world of nature – the starting-point in their respective philosophies. Each is a systematic thinker, proceeding from where he is in the direction of a totality, consciously constructing a metaphysical doctrine as a manner of inheriting critically from the entire legacy of tradition and of opening new horizons to the future. Each evolves a philosophy which bears striking resemblances in structure and content to that of the other.

The final summary of Whitehead’s philosophical views on God and the World is especially presented in a series of antitheses in each of which a shift of meaning converts the opposition into a contrast. The intended effect is the emphasis on relational significance rather than underlying substance. And this is the effect of the ideographic Chinese language, where the absence of a proper copula has made of metaphorical suggestiveness a substitute for equations, thus enforcing what is known as the logic of correlative duality, in which the dialectical opposition of terms has been put to maximum use.

Chu Hsi’s metaphysical model – as given in his commentaries on Chou Tun-yi’s Diagram of the Great Ultimate – is much less determinate, and therefore much more ambiguous, than Whitehead’s. Where both man make use of a paradoxical language, Chu Hsi’s remains much more symbolic, by its reference to a Diagram which is itself a symbolical structure, and Whitehead’s tends to be more rationalistic, by its reference to ideas taken from modern physics, and by its concern for making God simultaneously a supreme exemplification of most of its principles as well as a supreme exception from some of its principles. In this sense, Chu Hsi appears to represent a great degree of logical coherence than Whitehead. Chu Hsi’s metaphysical choice is similar to Whitehead’s. He has rejected the anthropomorphic image of the deity as this is given in classical Chinese religion.

(WhiA32)
Tong Lik Kuen [Tang, Liquan] : Whitehead was profoundly impressed by the English Romantic poets – especially Wordsworth and Shelley. These nature-intoxicated Romantics wrote at a time when there was in Western Europe a general appreciation of – and indeed admiration for – Chinese culture : its humanistic philosophy, its reasonableness in the form of government, its naturalism in the arts (including gardening) and poetry. And if Whitehead's philosophy was in fact influenced by Romantic poetry in its ultimate intuitions, some historical connection between Whitehead and Chinese thought might indeed be established. Chinese philosophy has always been closely tied to poetry, to the language of the heart and feelings. The fact that both Chinese philosophers and Whitehead held fast to the notion of life as essentially an emotional activity can be clearly seen in their conception of mind or 'hsin' – in their emphasis on the non-cognitive over the cognitive and on the intuitive over the intellectual-conceptual. It is noteworthy that there is no elaborate theory of consciousness in either Whitehead or Chinese philosophy, with a consequent lack of epistemological or phenomenological interests so characteristic of the Western philosophical tradition – especially in the modern period.

Whiteadian emphasis on the 'aesthetic moment' or the vital here-and-now as the ultimate facts of Life is in perfect agreement with the spirit of Chinese philosophy which, in contrast to the eternalistic outlook of Indian and Western metaphysics, is always a philosophy of the Present. For both Whitehead and Chinese philosophy, the eternal, which consists in the infinite wealth of potentials graded in relevance to the world and thus forming the primordial nature of God or 'T'ai-Chi'. Both Whitehead's God and the Chinese 'T'ai Chi' refer to the field character of Nature responsible for the shifting character of 'sheng' or creativity.

In both Whitehead and Chinese metaphysics, the providential character of God or Heaven-and-Earth is often described symbolically in various images or metaphors. In so far as Chinese metaphysics is concerned, the most prevalent symbolism is that of parental care. The most outstanding imagery in Whitehead's conception of God is that of 'the poet of the world'. The conception of God and World as interdependent co-creators of Life which Whitehead shares with Chinese philosophy certainly runs counter to the prevalent Western conception in which the God-World relation is marked by a one-sided dependence.

Both Chinese philosophy and Whitehead recognize the importance of polarities in an adequate understanding of Nature. In fact, the uniqueness of the Chinese and Whiteheadian world-views is best seen in the way polarities are conceived in them, that is, dialectically through the field concept.

From the Chinese philosophical standpoint, Whitehead's character-centered philosophy is neither sufficient nor adequate. It is not sufficient because his theory of character is too general : it fails to do justice to the uniqueness and complexity of human character. And it is inadequate because it fundamentally lacks the existential orientation : it fails to recognize the proper relationship between theory and practice, between the vision of character and its real-life achievement.

From the Whiteheadian standpoint, the preeminently symbolic approach of the I Ching with its characteristic vagueness and ambiguity of expression, must seem lacking in intellectual rigor, judged by the standard of rationalist thinking.

The key to understanding Whitehead really lies in the ambivalence and tensions of intuition and intellect, of the poetic and the logical-mathematical, of character and nature, of the aspectative and the entitative modes of thought, of one and many, of God and World, and a host of other pairs of polar opposites whose creative synthesis constitutes strategically the goal of his speculative endeavor. In comparing Whitehead to Chinese philosophy, we need to bring about a dialectic contrast with respect to each major pair of opposites.

(WhiA32)
1979

King, Winston L.: Basic presuppositions of (Western) Whiteheadianism and (Eastern) Hua-yen philosophers: It is obvious that Western organicism will always take care that individuality be preserved. While the most overt form of this in the West has been the humanistic personal version, science too has had its own special variety in terms of precise quantifications and a generally atomistic viewpoint. Whitehead is very critical of this; his organic emphasis is precisely a critique of such atomism. Yet his strong insistence on the independence and individuality of the basic building blocks of the universe, actual entities, is also notable. With him, therefore, it is a matter of providing for the reality of individuals within the larger order and as integrally related to other entities, but not so integrated as to lose their reality and integrity in any sort of Greater Reality, including the Universe and God. The Hua-yen (Eastern) bias is somewhat different. It would be almost accurate to say that the trust here is to save the System at the expense of the individual, the Whole at the expense of the parts. To be sure, Buddhism rejects a substantive Absolute, and warns against substantializing Emptiness. Nonetheless, there is the same Indian-Brahmanical tendency to look with suspicion upon the particularity of time-space existence, and to distrust the perceptions of the personal individuality found therein. Human individuality in the long run is a misfortune; it feeds on a diet of particulars, attributing ultimate significance to them—from which flows all human misery.

Comparison between Whiteheadian and Hua-yen immanentalism: it will be useful to distinguish four levels of immanence and to inquire as to the degree of acceptance and incorporation of this in the two systems of thought: a) immanence as influence, b) immanence as organic inclusion, c) immanence as partial identity, d) immanence as complete identity.

(WhiA56)

1979

Charles Hartshorne: The aspect of social order of which Confucius gives a special version for a particular society is taken into account by Whitehead when he says that order and love complement each other, love relating to individuals, taken one by one, and order to the need for pattern and predictability in social life. Mo Zhu's absolute ideal is included in what Whitehead calls 'peace' (in the chapter on that topic in Adventures of Ideas), as is Lao Tzu's sense of unity with the principle of all things. The technicalities of Whitehead's thought are not to be closely matched by anything in Chinese philosophy, whether that of Lao Tzu, Mao Tsetung, or some thinker between these two. The technicalities in question are responses to issues that arise sharply only in a culture that takes seriously and develops intensively mathematical knowledge, pure and applied, and in which theological issues are also carefully discussed.

(WhiA33)

1979

Fu Charles Wei-hsun: From the Chinese point of view, Whitehead's metaphysical language is not entirely liberated from the onto-theological fixation of language, thought, and reality. The Chinese conception of metaphysical language as a multi-functional and multi-dimensional enrichment and depending of everyday natural language can help us resolve the problem of Whitehead's metaphysical language.

(WhiA34)
1980
David Yu: The philosophical affinity between Whitehead and Chu Hsi has been an intriguing question for students of comparative philosophy ever since Joseph Needham referred to Chu Hsi's Neo-Confucianism as philosophy of organism bearing notable similarities with Whitehead's metaphysics. [Needham, Joseph. Science and civilization in China. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957). Vol. 2: History of scientific thought]. Is a comparative study between these two men justifiable? My answer to this is positive for two reasons: 1. A common process tradition. There have been agreements among some Chinese and Western philosophers since the turn of the century that Chinese philosophy emphasizes changes and relations in its apprehension of reality and truth. This philosophical tradition is more akin to the organistic tradition of Leibniz, James, and Whitehead than to the 'substance' tradition as represented by Descartes, Locke and Hume. 2. Continuing interest of scholars. There have been some initial comparative works between Whitehead and Chinese/Asian philosophy in more recent years in the West which reflects a growth in quality and quantity. This can be taken as a sign that expository and critical works between Whitehead and Chinese/Asian philosophy can be pursued. (WhiA35)

1989
Yu Yih-hsien: In his works, Chen Shih-chuan argues that the philosophical elements in the Yi jing are consonant with that of Whitehead's philosophy of organism. According to Chen, the authors of the Yi jing and Whitehead share the same view that all real existence is natural and self-creative; it acts in accordance with natural order and leaves no room for supernatural intervention. Chen enumerates four instances of consonance between Hua Yan Buddhists and Whitehead's philosophy. First of all, the Hua Yan Buddhists and Whitehead both regard real existence as 'event', not as 'matter' or 'fact', which arises from the multiplicity and complexity of the universe in accordance with the principle of dependent-origination, nor in accordance with mechanical law. Whitehead's doctrine of the ingression of eternal objects into actual entities is very close to Hua Yan's teaching of the 'non-impediment between eternal principles (li) and transient events (shi)'. The Whiteheadian God is very close to Huan Yan's Buddha, since their characteristics indicate a pantheistic nature. Hua Yan's teaching of 'organic non-impediment' is close to Whitehead's doctrine of prehensions. They both argue for interrelatedness among things and against all kinds of mutual exclusive dualism. (WhiA1)

1998
Jim P. Behuniak: If Confucius considered the Odes to behave like 'propositions' this sheds some light on his ethical and aesthetic thinking. It indicates that the introduction of verse was not intended to be morally instructive but rather emotionally evocative, and that emotion was admired as an effective ethical stimulus. I suggest that such stimulation of 'feeling' in the early Confucian tradition may have some affinity to aspects of Whitehead's thought. (WhiA36)

1998
Jang Wang Shik: Whitehead's cosmology can shed some light on the clarification of Buddhist cosmology, but also Buddhist cosmology can become a more appropriate type of cosmology with the help of Whitehead's cosmology. (WhiA53)

1998
Gu Linyu: One of the unique contribution of Whitehead's process metaphysics is its potential tendency to develop an integrated view of time and emotion, which can be improved by appropriating the moralistic dimension on time and harmonization in Chinese 'Yi' philosophy. (WhiA37)
1998
Brook Ziporyn: The similarities between Whitehead's process philosophy and the Chinese Buddhist schools of Tiantai and Huayan have often been noted. Li Rizhang calls Whitehead's philosophy a 'western version of the doctrine of dependent co-arising and emptiness'. These two Buddhist schools and Whitehead agree, he says, on the following points: the denial of simple location, the denial of the independence of objects, and the denial of the absolute division of subject and object. More essentially, both assert that every object is 'in a sense everywhere at once'. But then he points out what he considers the two greatest differences, for there are two points found in Whitehead which, he feels, have no corresponding notion in the Chinese Buddhist schools: Whitehead's notion of God and his idea of 'eternal objects'.

(WhiA3/WhiA55)

2001
Joseph Grange: Both, Whitehead and the Lotus Sutra refuse to grant dualistic thinking any metaphysical ultimacy. They condemn it for its abstractness and the way in which it saps intelligence of the strength needed to embrace the full range of our worldly experience. The Lotus Sutra offers the doctrine of 'sunyata' as the cure for dualism and its ailments. Whitehead offers a novel existential category that he terms 'contrast'.

(WhiA39)

2001
Steve Odin: Whitehead's organic process cosmology based on the principle of 'universal relativity', the Hua-yen principle of 'interpenetration between part and whole', and the Lotus Sutra principle of 'three thousand worlds in each thought-instant'.

(WhiA40)

2001
Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki: In Whitehead's thought, as in Buddhist thought, all existence is interdependent. For Whitehead, each momentary bit of existence is a process of integrating feelings of the past with some sense of what the future can be. To Whiteheadian eyes, there are illumining similarities between the Sutra and a process vision of the world. These parallels do not necessarily signify commensurate ways of thinking, for each rests within a context of radically different sensitivities built up within divergent cultures.

(WhiA41)
2001
Chen Shih-chuan: Whitehead's conception of 'creativity' is deficient from the standpoint of
the Book of changes that takes 'creativity' as the fundamental function of the universe.
Whitehead classifies 'creativity' together with the notions of 'many' and 'one' to the category
of the ultimate. It is the ultimate truth behind individual facts of all creatures, while all
creatures remain with it. In Whitehead's metaphysical system God assumes the highest
position as 'the unconditioned conceptual valuation of eternal objects' and the introducer of
order ad novelty. Got is not only the provider of the initial aims from which an actual
occasion starts its self-creation, but also the aboriginal condition of creativity. 'Creativity' as
'the universal of universals' eventually does not create at all.
From the standpoint of the Book of changes a philosophy of organism could have a
metaphysical system without appealing for God's help.
In his later writings Whitehead has suggested that language is the very factor that determines
human civilization, 'human civilization is an outgrowth of language, and language is the
product of advancing civilization. The metaphysical principles recorded in the Book of
changes were conveyed by a system of diagrams that were appended in later years with a
language full of metaphors and cosmological and axiological significance.
In his nature philosophy Whitehead fuses together time and space into a spatio-temporal
continuum. In terms of events both space and time are the essential constituents. While in the
Book of changes the 'Ch'ien' (time), and 'K'un) (space) are concrete existence of heave and
earth, and they are the manifestations of the function of creativity as well.
Whitehead has once said, 'The universe is an ocean of feeling'. This is exactly what the Book
of changes tried to tell us.
In contrast with Whitehead's speculative cosmology, the Book of changes provides a creative
cosmology with both the anthropomorphic flavor and the naturalistic temper.
(WhiA42)

2002
Cheng Chung-yi ng: In a certain way, Whitehead followed Leibniz in constructing a system
of metaphysical understanding in the same spirit of using a new logic and a new perspective
on life and world derived from deep self-reflection and wide observation and knowledge of
the world. Leibniz enjoyed his clear and logical vision of reason of existence in his essential
monadology, whereas Whitehead was happily assertive of his grand system of the creative
process of reality in his systematic concrescence theory. Both frameworks celebrate reason
and speak of feelings, but it is Whitehead who came to make 'feelings' (positive prehensions
of actual occasions), not reason, a universal principle ; in the Whiteheadian paradigm, it is in
actual interchange and assimilation, not just conceptually, but physically, that the creation of
actual entities (concrescence) take place. The crucial difference between Leibniz and
Whitehead is this : Leibniz maintains a God of creation that can be regarded as transcendent,
though world-inclining, whereas Whitehead discards such a principle of transcendence and
regards God as a thorough-going principle of immanence, or immanence and transcendence in
unity. In the light of Zhu Xi's system, one can see how Leibniz has primarily focused on the
function of 'li', and thus developed a li-metaphysics of objects, whereas Whitehead has
primarily focused on the function of 'qi', and thus developed a qi-metaphysics of actual
entities.
(WhiA43)
Gu Linyu: Whitehead supposes that the process of experience is a creative harmony within which a mutual movement of dipolar forces (both physical and mental) takes place. The implications of the yin yang theory in the Yi jing can be used to reconcile the Whiteheadian harmony of dipolar processes with the harmony of tai ji (Great Primal Beginning) formed by yin and yang forces. In yi thinking, the world is a trinity of heaven, earth, and man, and it is led by the mutual transformation of yin and yang, in order to gain a harmonized end in which man and the world are inseparable. Both Whitehead and the Yi jing agree that our primary experience lies in the mutual correspondence between dipolar powers and the attainment of a harmony of two opposites. Whitehead's understanding of the world of process as one dominated by the transmission of feelings. In Whitehead's description, the world is a state of emotion flux, which he terms 'feelings'. These feelings make up the really real things of the universe, which are termed actual occasions.

According to Whitehead, god supplies an initial aim that lures and guides the development of actual occasions. God's impact on the world of actual occasions is neither transcendent nor impersonal - rather, it is immanent and personal. For Whitehead, God creates the world and the world creates God; God transcends the world and the world transcends God. For Whitehead, God is immanent in the world rather than above and beyond it. For Chan/Zen Buddhism, there is a fundamental goodness in the world that can be touched and experienced through right practice and right living. There also exist a fundamental agreement between Whitehead and yi Chan insofar as both postulate that a fundamental polarity exercises power throughout the cosmos: for Whitehead, it is the physical and mental dimensions of experience; for Yi Chan, it is the yin yang methodology sourced from the Yi jing. Whitehead's God retains a transcendent dimension called the primordial nature, which harbors eternally all potentials for goodness. For Chan/Zen Buddhism, the Buddha is the nature of our own self.
Cheng, Chung-ying: Whitehead has provided his own framework of accommodating all religions against a background of understanding and a new interpretation of being and human being. But I like to interpret his purpose in terms of three levels of understanding of pluralism as follows: 1. See the theoretical and practical differences of existing religions such as Christianity and Buddhism. 2. See the theoretical and/or practical complementarity of different religions in light of an underlying philosophy of being and becoming. 3. See all religions (including both present and future religions) as off-springs of a comprehensive philosophy of being and becoming and the related understanding of humanity and the world.

For the Yijing Onto-Cosmology the sense of time and the sense of temporal process are important for creativity is creativity in time and real in time and thus is related to the sense of becoming and transformation. The quality of harmonization in time is also a feature of Whitehead as we can see in the following quotation from Whitehead: "The doctrine of the philosophy of organism is that, however far the sphere of efficient causation be pushed in the determination of components of a concrescence – its data, its emotions, its appreciations, its purpose, its phases of subjective aim – beyond the determination of these components there always remain the final reaction of the self-creative unity of the universe."

According to Whitehead, every actual being is a potential for every becoming of another actual being. In other words, any item of actuality is to be formed or concrescends from all actual and potential items in a process of becoming. The most clear statement from Whitehead is found in the following: "The principle states that it belongs to the nature of being that it is a potential for every becoming. Thus all things are to be conceived as qualifications of actual occasions."

All major existing world religions could be found to share an ontology of God as the creative force as made explicit the Yijing-Whitehead ontology of process and change, and their assertions about the creativity of God as a creator could also be interpreted and given a meaning in the Yijing-Whitehead system of understanding.

We could identify the religions sides of Confucianism and Daoism apart from their philosophical sides just as we need also make efforts to identify the philosophical sides of Christian theology and the Buddhist theology apart from their religious sides. I believe that this is precisely what Whitehead has intended to do and his process philosophy of organism could be said to embody his vision of a complementarily well-differentiated integration of Christianity and Buddhism as two major religions of the world, respectively representing the East and the West.

(WhiA57)
Nicholas F. Gier: Whitehead nonetheless follows later Confucians in extending relationality to all parts of the cosmos. Like the Confucians, Whitehead does not sacrifice rationality because of his emphasis on relationality. The neo-Confucians are just as cosmologically focused as Whitehead, so such a venture would distract from our attempts to construct a more personalist process ethics of virtue. Whitehead's ontology is both rational and social like the Confucians. Whitehead and the Confucians have strikingly similar notions about the fusion of subjectivity and objectivity – the fusion of the inner and the outer. When we contrast the process self of Whitehead and Confucius to the substantial self, we immediately see the psychological and philosophical advantages of the former.

Neither the Confucian nor Whiteheadian view require us to put care of the self before care of others.

The fact that evil happens even to good people is a challenge to all ethical theories, and the Chinese and Whitehead offer the same innovative solution. They both conceive of evil as basically discord and a lack of harmony.

Whitehead's principle that if a thing is actual then it has some value precludes any separation of reality into the valuable and the valueless. He therefore joins the ancient consensus about the unity of being, goodness, and beauty. The Confucian concept of sincerity (cheng) proves to be a productive point of entry for a comparative analysis of these issues. When Confucians attribute sincerity to Heaven, which to them is essentially impersonal Providence, they mean that Heaven will always be true to itself. Heaven is not specifically moral and neither does any Confucian thinker say that its value is aesthetic. Whitehead is much more explicit: he holds that truth applies only to conformation to appearances, while beauty is 'realized in actual occasions which are the completely real things in the universe'. For Whitehead all order is ultimately aesthetic order.

In Confucius and Whitehead, the expanded soul does not limit itself to a fraternity of propertied males; rather, it extends into the world of large. For them the goal of morality is the attainment of universal peace and love, the latter virtue most clearly laid out. For Confucius and Whitehead this extension is cosmic in scope.

Whitehead's distinction between the closed and open person finds an instructive parallel in the Confucian 'small or inferior person' and the 'junzi'. The latter thinks of virtue while the former thinks of possession and profit; the 'junzi' seeks the Way and not a mere living; and the 'junzi' brings the good things of others to completion but the inferior man does just the opposite. Like Whitehead's person of 'great experience', the 'junzi' is expansive and other-regarding while the inferio person is self-regarding and restrictive.

Neither Whitehead's God nor Confucian Heaven is a being with sense perception, so Whitehead would agree with Mencius that 'Heaven sees as my people see; Heaven hears as my people hear'. Whether the Confucians also agree with Whitehead that God knows the future only as it is actualized in human history and nature is not clear. The most significant difference between Whitehead's God and Confucian Heaven is that the latter is strictly nontheological. The Confucian Heaven is constant and sincere, the latter meaning 'being true to itself'. Heaven's constancy can be eminently applied to Whitehead's God as well.

Confucian, Aristotelian, and Whiteheadian ethics always aim at a personal mean that is a creative choice for each individual. Virtue ethics is emulative – using the sage or God as a model for virtue – whereas rule ethics is based on simple conformity and obedience.

(WhiA45)
Gu Linyu : Whitehead seems very much in appreciation of the Chinese idea of the two forces 'yin' and 'yang' embracing each other in a primal oneness. In order to offer a more detailed canvass, Whitehead constructs a categorial scheme to articulate the process thereby opposites relate to each other. He sees reality as a world of 'feelings' that express various modes of process. Whitehead's philosophy also shares another profound dimension of Chan thought, namely, that all things in the world are made up to feelings (qing). For Chan, to preserve pure feelings is to keep disturbances away and therefore lessen the illusions that beset our visions. (WhiA48)

John B. Cobb : Whitehead was critical of the modern world, and his followers pursue and extend that critique. But he wanted not just to tear down the ideas of the modern world, but also to replace them with more adequate ideas. His ideas are part of the movement of constructive postmodernism. Since Whitehead's understanding of reality is so close to that of traditional Chinese thought, the comments above about Whitehead's ability to act as a bridge between traditional ideas and the contemporary world are relevant. Whiteheadian thought could bring some traditional ideas to bear on contemporary problems. (WhiA3)

David Ray Griffin : Whiteheadian process philosophy emphasizes the idea that organism are internally related to their environments, with human beings as the chief exemplification of this universal characteristic. Whitehead's philosophy leads to a bpolitical ethic that is cosmopolitan as well as communitarian. His philosophy provides the basis for a constructive postmodern political ethic. China is in a unique position to help overcome the world's self-destructive anarchy by taking a leadership role in the movement for global democracy. China's cultural heritage does not contain an imperialistic ideology. China is now in position to take a leadership role in determining the shape of human civilization as a whole. China has had abundant first-hand experience of the destructiveness of imperialism. China's indigenous religious-moral traditions have always been intimately related to political leadership. Whitehead's philosophy, by incorporating traditional Chinese values, could provide Chinese citizens interested in promoting global democracy with a framework for relating these values to modern and postmodern modes of thought. The affinity between Whitehead's philosophy of organism and Chinese thought has received considerable discussion. His philosophy, like Chinese thought, 'makes process ultimate', whereas the other type of thought 'makes fact ultimate', there is much more that is implicit in this point. Whitehead reveals his affinity with Chinese thought, it is based on the idea that a truly civilized people emphasizes 'the aesthetic and end of all action'. Whitehead sees the 'creation of the world' as 'the victory of persuasion over force'. (WhiA3)
Fan Meijun; Ronald Phipps: Chinese traditional thought and Whitehead's process thinking are alike in many ways. It is possible to integrate Chinese culture and the deeper Western cultures and philosophic process modes of thought found in strains of Western intellectual traditions. Whitehead's hope was that such integration would enrich and deepen that which is best in both traditions. According to Whitehead, process is conceived on the basis of mandates of movement and change. Chinese traditional philosophers observed the universe in fundamentally the same way as Whitehead. They also thought that process, development, movement, and change are omnipresent in all things.

Whitehead considered that appreciation of the relation of the whole and the part is central to understanding reality. According to his thought, it is impossible to understand human experience without referring to relations of relations and classes of relations or classes of classes of relations. The essential sense of community in Chinese traditional aesthetics is both intra-species and inter-species, both mental and material. The traditional sense of wholeness in Chinese aesthetics is mirrored in Whitehead's process thought which emphasizes 1) Harmony, 2) The broad beyond with the infinite background of being, and 3) The profound interdependencies inherent in all existence.

Chinese culture and aesthetics call for relation of compatibility, stimulation, and growth. Harmony-seeking expresses the Chinese traditional ideals of eternal peace and heavenly beauty. In the Whiteheadian terminology, actual entities must exist, function, and develop within open environments that promote mutual realization of the positive potentials of all beings, which are in community with one another. The ideal of harmonious community has given Chinese traditional arts a large and far-reaching influence in world culture. Chinese aesthetics seeks harmony of being. The mission of art is to represent this harmony and realize it in life. Such a mission is in conformity with the Whiteheadian thought that the very perception of beauty derives from the perception of conformal and harmonious integration of the positive potentials inherent in the perception of events comprising the world: 'The perfection of Beauty is defined as being the perfection of Harmony' [Adventures of ideas].

Whitehead's sense of the vital importance of the beyond vividly finds a parallel expression to the same sense in Chinese aesthetics as he writes: 'In the future, if human natures loses its most precious quality, it is robbed of its sense of things beyond, unexplored and yet insistent'. Like Whitehead, Chinese traditional aestheticians have never liked to talk about individuals without considering community. The talk about individuals in a community, as individuals could exist and grow up only in a community.

There are numerous and profound ideas common to process thought and the traditional arts of China. Whitehead himself said that his philosophy has a strong kinship with Eastern philosophy. Hence he hoped to stimulate unity between Western culture and Eastern culture.

Michel Weber: Whitehead's philosophical development has reached its acme with Process and reality: the move from a concept of creation to the concept of creativity is fundamental and is intrinsically pregnant with the concept of co-creation. Assessing the proximity between Whiteheadian and Taoist philosophies requires the questioning of the possible similarity between the co-creation advocated by the former and the eventfulness of the later. Process and reality renounces the mono-principal and adopts a bi-principal ontology so characteristic of Chinese thought: remember that Process and reality does not advocate dualism but operationalizes two 'archai' that are both independent and interdependent. There are not many signs to indicate that Whitehead had a deep, direct acquaintance with Indian, Chinese or Japanese thought. But Whitehead had various opportunities to meet Buddhist-inclined scholars (William Ernest Hocking and Joseph Needham). Although he might have been interested in the peculiarities of Buddhist logic, the field developed only later. In the Dialogues he confers about China with Walter B. Cannon and later refers to Confucius.
2005
Xie Xenyu: Whitehead recognized 'non-sensuous perception' in his experience, in which he conceived a subject in terms of actual entity. In explaining his metaphysics, Whitehead treats the concept of actual entity as the fundamental concept.
(WhiA3)

2005
Wang Zhihe: The postmodern dimension of Whitehead's philosophy, can be helpful for both the West and China to overcome the dominant closed mentalities such as the 'imperialistic attitude' and Yelangism. The postmodern dimension of Whitehead's philosophy lies partially in the fact that he never regards his own philosophy as a final truth. Furthermore, in his emphasis on complexity, and in reminding us of avoiding the 'narrowness inherent in all finite systems', he underscored his empathy for postmodern thinking. Whitehead's postmodern philosophy paves the way for appreciating and affirming openness to other cultures, ever radically different ideas and insights. It provides a new forum from which Chinese philosophy can creatively engage in solving the core issue we face today with its own thought resources. Facing the powerful worldview and modern way of thinking, postmodern thinkers not only need to form coalitions with others, but also need to take advantage of traditional thought resources from different traditions and cultures.
(WhiA3)

2005
Han Zhen: The universe in Whitehead's thought is an infinite, open, dynamic, and becoming process, full of diversity, creativity, and life. As part of such a universe, human society contains all these characters. Conceiving the universe in term of process, Whitehead perceives adventure as a fundamental theme in his cosmology. It follows that human civilization is a creative process with abundant potentiality.
(WhiA3)

2005
Zhang Nini: Whitehead in his Science and the modern world offers some analyses into the modern concept of nature. He points out that the notion of simple location is the key principle in the modern concept of nature. Whitehead felt a similarity between 'rationalized faith' in the Medieval Ages and 'reason based upon faith' in 17th and 18th centuries. He was not satisfied with the mechanist concept of nature in modern science. In Whitehead's scheme, space and time mean not only limitation but also prehension. That is, material in spatial-temporary location should be thought as a thing containing in itself infinite components, gathering in inter-relation and constituting as a grasped unity. Every thing is a unity of a prehension. Nature in Whitehead's thought is the nature of an organic whole, which is possessed of innate vitality and needn't get any laws from alien force.
(WhiA3)

2005
Dirck Vorenkamp: As interest in Huayan thought among Western scholars has grown over the last few decades, a number of individuals have noted similarities between Whitehead's ideas of reality as a process of arising actual occasions and Huayan doctrines concerning the independent arising of dharmas. Whitehead's view requires temporal asymmetry such that the present arises as a creative advance toward an open future. In contrast, Huayan is well known for advocating a symmetrical view of reality, and the Huayan view of time, it has been argued, is no exception.
(WhiA51)
Yu Yih-hsien: In Whitehead's view, in the history of human civilization there were two rational religions, Buddhism and Christianity, which exercised great influence on many peoples' religious life, though their influence may now be in decay. These two world religions have their separate sets of dogmas and give different answers to the questions of human suffering and evil. Buddhism finds evil arising from the very nature of physical and emotional experience, and the wisdom which it inculcates is meant to release us from such experience. This is to lay the foundation of its doctrines on a general speculation of human experience. Whitehead keenly observes that Buddhism is a religion developed from metaphysical doctrines, that is, Buddha's teachings, whereas Christianity is a religion based on religious facts from which its metaphysical doctrine is derived. He has not only an insight into the very essence of the Eastern Asiatic thought, but also the essence of rational religion. For the Confucians or the Buddhists, there had never been a supernatural, personal God in their religious experience. Their spiritual pursuit was directed to seek a harmonious relationship to men and nature, to universal principles of humanity, as well as to the aesthetic order of the universe. Whitehead suggests there are three main renderings of the concept of God. First is the Eastern Asiatic concept of an impersonal order to which the world conforms, which offers a doctrine of immanence with regard to the reality of a supreme being.

Whitehead was not a sinologist and his understanding of Chinese thought was spare and inseparable from that of Buddhism and Indian thought, he still has a great insight into the essence of Chinese thinking. He makes his philosophy attractive to Chinese philosophers and opens a channel for East and West dialogues.

Whitehead did not take serious consideration of Chinese thought in spite of his casual mentioning of it. The formidable difficulty of Whitehead's philosophy also made it impervious to most of the Chinese philosophers. For Whitehead, the Oriental thought of India and China gives an alternative to the metaphysical exposition of reality, which makes 'creativity' the ultimate instead of substantial God or brutal facts. Though he never came to understand the Yi jing and its philosophical implications, he has precisely characterized this essence of Chinese thinking and set up a most promising agenda for the dialogues of East and West. As Whitehead has shown his interest in Chinese thought at a time when Chinese culture was at its low ebb and discarded by most of the Chinese intellects, for those who sought to restore traditional Chinese culture and national confidence Whitehead's philosophy lent them a friendly hand.

(WhiA1)
Wen Haiming: In reconstructing a proper understanding of Chinese cosmology, Whitehead's process theory on creativity helps, and vice versa, and Chinese perspectives in turn present that things and events are contextually creative as human beings are cocreative with the cosmos they are located. For Chinese philosophy, the cosmos is a process of 'creatio in situ', which is transformational: It is not that one thing comes after another, but one thing becomes another. From Whitehead's viewpoint, the cosmos is the continuity of many actual beings, each of which is an expression of the whole. The major task of Whiteheadian cosmology is to elucidate the meaning of the 'Manyness'. Cosmology, for Whitehead, uncovers the contextual creativity between One and Many, which is another term for the common understanding on flux of myriad things. This defines a creative process of a novel unity which becomes 'One' in negating its past 'Many' occasions. Whitehead holds that things and events happen together with one another in an actual context. It is creativity that makes the One actualize its potentiality to become plurality; likewise, in this contextual process of diversification, the Many is synthesized into One in creativity. For Whitehead, 'becoming' contains that the Many contextually creat the One, which is itself novel. The Whiteheadian cosmos is self-creative and everything is coexistent and interrelated to each other.

The Whiteheadian idea of creativity supports a cosmological view on change. Whitehead holds that creativity is a process in which Many become One, and are increased by One. From this perspective, the Chinese cosmological creativity might be rendered through mutually creative process, which is contextual in the sense that Many and One are different ways of looking at things, beings, and entities.

Like Whitehead, the Daodejing and the Yijing allege that both experience and the world are mutually creative in an unceasing process. The cosmological dao in Chinese philosophy, if interpreted through Whiteheadian sense, does not creat myriad individual things, but functions underdeterminately to become novel actualities – that is, any determinate being.

For Chinese thought, the genuine creative force is yinyang correlativity which conveys the significance of 'creatio in situ'. Whitehead describes how the feelings of plurality integrate into a continual oneness, and he has to use paradoxical language. Whitehead's metaphysical language not only indicates that the one cannot be separated from many, but also expresses a manifestation of a holistic underterminacy that metaphysicians cannot avoid. Like Whiteheadian indeterminacy, the common phenomenon of the Chinese idea of interterminacy is the duplication of key metaphysical terms.

For both Chinese and Whiteheadian cosmology, creativity makes the One transform into Many, and the Many into One. In other words, the world creates through mutual transformation. It concludes that contextual creativity is the key to understanding how One transforms into 'Many', and how the Many transform while maintaining plurality. Chinese philosophy tends to carry out mutual creativity from the perspective of continuous process of the yin and yang; whereas Whitehead begins his analysis from the perspective of eternal entities, actualities, and God. Though there is a difference between Whiteheadian and Chinese cosmological rendering of the relationship between One and Many, there are many mutually informative and entailing enlightenment when taking Whiteheadian version of creativity to rethink the contextual creativity in Chinese cosmology.

(WhiA58)
Yang Li; Wen Hengfu: The research on Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism have started since 1920' in China. During 85 years, we can recognize four periods of our research on Whitehead's theory. From 1920' to 1940', it was the beginning as well as an important time that Chinese scholars did their study of Philosophy of Organism. Then, the next 30 years, from 1950' to 1980', was a 'depressing' period for this study. However, there was an increasing attention to Whitehead' study since 1990’. Especially, the research and application of Philosophy of Organism were most conducted in Education area. In the latest 10 years, the research is getting more on the comparison between Whitehead and Chinese and other philosophies. The scholars in science area have taken less participation in the research of Philosophy of Organism, which has influenced on the understanding of Whitehead's theory. As we concern, it is a great need to expand his theory to larger areas which definitely will benefit for both scientific discovery and the development of human civilization.

Among philosophers of 20th century, Whitehead is unique one, not only because he is a both mathematician and logician, but a scientific philosophy. He is independent of all philosophy but adopting Oriental philosophical thoughts.


1911-1933
Whitehead, Alfred North. Works.
1911

Meanwhile from the earliest epoch (2634 B.C.) the Chinese had utilized the characteristic property of the compass needle, but do not seem to have connected it with any theoretical ideas. The really profound changes in human life all have their ultimate origin in knowledge pursued for its own sake. The use of the compass was not introduced into Europe till the end of the twelfth century A.D., more than 3000 years after its first use in China.

1917
https://archive.org/stream/organisationofth00whit/organisationofth00whit_djvu.txt.
At the present time — interrupted for the moment by the war — a great revolution in the art of painting is in progress throughout the world. Its centres are Paris and Italy and London and Munich, and its origin in the far east, in China and Japan…

https://archive.org/details/enquiryconcernpr00whitrich.
When Dr Johnson surveyed mankind from China to Peru, he did it from Pump Court in London at a certain date…

1920
The series may start with any arbitrarily assumed duration of any temporal extension, but in descending the series the temporal extension progressively contracts and the successive durations are packed one within the other like the nest of boxes of a Chinese toy… Such a set, as you will remember, has the properties of the Chinese toy which is a nest of boxes, one within the other, with the difference that the toy has a smallest box, while the abstractive class has neither a smallest event nor does it converge to a limiting event which is not a member of the set.
When Christianity had established itself throughout the Roman Empire and its neighbourhood, there were before the world two main rational religions, Buddhism and Christianity. There were, of course, many rivals to both of them in their respective regions; but if we have regard to clarity of idea, generality of thought, moral respectability, survival power, and width of extension over the world, then for their combination of all these qualities these religions stood out beyond their competitors. Later their position was challenged by the Mahometans. But even today, the two Catholic religions of civilization are Christianity and Buddhism, and if we are to judge by the comparison of their position now with what it has been both of them are in decay. They have lost their ancient hold upon the world…

Both the great religions, Christianity and Buddhism, have their separate set of dogmas which deal with this great question. It is in respect to the problem of evil that one great divergence between them exists. Buddhism finds evil essential in the very nature of the world of physical and emotional experience. The wisdom which it inculcates is, therefore, so to conduct life as to gain a release from the individual personality which is the vehicle for such experience. The Gospel which it preaches is the method by which this release can be obtained…

One metaphysical fact about the nature of things which is presupposes is that this release is not to be obtained by mere physical death. Buddhism is the most colossal example in history of applied metaphysics…

Christianity took the opposite road. It has always been a religion seeking a metaphysic, in contrast to Buddhism which is a metaphysic generating a religion…

It is difficult to develop Buddhism, because Buddhism starts with a clear metaphysical notion and with the doctrines which flow from it…

The Buddha left a tremendous doctrine. The historical facts about him are subsidiary to the doctrine…

Christianity, like Buddhism, preaches a doctrine of escape. It proclaims a doctrine life is placed on a finer level. It overcomes evil with good. Buddhism makes itself probable by referring to its metaphysical theory. Christianity makes itself probable by referring to supreme religious moments in history. Thus in respect to this crucial question of evil, Buddhism and Christianity are in entirely different attitudes in respect to dogmas. Buddhism starts with the elucidatory dogmas; Christianity starts with the elucidatory facts…

Buddhism and Christianity find their origins respectively in two inspired moments of history: the life of the Buddha, and the life of Christ. The Buddha gave his doctrine to enlighten the world. Christ gave his life. It is for Christians to discern the doctrine. Perhaps in the end the most valuable part of the doctrine of the Buddha is its interpretation of his life…

The divergence in the expression of dogmas is most clearly shown in the two traditions of Buddhism and Christianity…

There are close analogies between the two religions. In both there is, in some sense, a saviour Christ in the one, and the Buddha in the other…

To put it briefly, Buddhism, on the whole, discouraged the sense of active personality, whereas Christianity encourages it…

If Europe, after the Greek period, had been subject to the Buddhist religion, the change of philosophical climate would have been in the other direction…

Thus, according to prevalent Western notions, the moral aims of Buddhism are directed to altering the first principles of metaphysics…

The absolute idealism, so influential in Europe and America during the last third of the nineteenth century, and still powerful notwithstanding the reaction from it, was undoubtedly a reaction towards Buddhistic metaphysics on the part of the Western mentality…

The decay of Christianity and Buddhism, as determinative influences in modern thought, is partly due to the fact that each religion has unduly sheltered itself from the other…
So to-day it is not France which goes to heaven, but individual Frenchmen; and it is not China
which attains nirvana, but Chinamen…
In India and China the growth of a world-consciousness was different in its details, but in its
essence depended on the same factors. Individuals were disengaged from their immediate
social setting in ways which promoted thought…
Throughout India and China religions thought, so far as it has been interpreted in precise
form, disclaims the intuition of any ultimate personality substantial to the universe. This is
true for Confucian philosophy. There may be personal embodiments, but the substratum is
impersonal…

1926
Press, 1926).
http://books.google.ch/books?hl=de&id=L6kZPLbCrScC&q=china#v=snippet&q=china&f=false.

There have been great civilisations in which the peculiar balance of mind required for science
has only fitfully appeared and has produced the feeblest result. For example, the more we
know of Chinese art, of Chinese literature, and of the Chinese philosophy of life, the more we
admire the heights to which that civilization attained. For thousands of years, there have been
in China acute and learned men patiently devoting their lives to study. Having regard to the
span of time, and to the population concerned, China forms the largest volume of civilization
which the world has seen. There is no reason to doubt the intrinsic capacity of individual
Chinamen for the pursuit of science. And yet Chinese science is practically negligible. There
is no reason to believe that China if left to itself would have ever produced any progress in
science…

We quickly find that the Western peoples exhibit on a colossal scale a peculiarity which is
popularly supposed to be more especially characteristic of the Chinese. Surprise is often
expressed that a Chinaman can be of two religions, a Confucian for some occasions and a
Buddhist for other occasions. Whether this is true of China I do not know; nor do I knew
whether, if true, these two attitudes are really inconsistent…

1929
1929). [Louis Clark Vanuxem Foundation Lectures delivered at Princeton University, 1929].
The ascription of the modern phase of the speculative Reason wholly to the Greeks, is an
exaggeration. The great Asiatic civilizations, Indian and Chinese, also produced variants of
the same method…

1929
Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and reality : an essay in ecomology. (Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press, 1929). [Gifford lectures delivered in the University of Edinburg
1927-1928].
In monistic philoso-
phies, Spinoza's or absolute idealism, this ultimate is God, who is also
equivalently termed 'The Absolute.' In such monistic schemes, the ulti-
mate is illegitimately allowed a final, 'eminent' reality, beyond that ascribed to any of its
accidents. In this general position the philosophy of organism seems to approximate more to
some strains of Indian, or Chinese, thought, than to western Asiatic, or European, thought…
1933


The mystical religion which most whole-heartedly adopts this attitude is Buddhism.

A recourse to observation at once discloses the importance of the doctrine of Malthus. China and India both afford examples of societies which illustrate his law.

Now India and China are instances of civilized societies which for a long period in their later history maintained themselves with arrested technology and with fixed geographical location.

The history of civilization in the Old World is the history of the internal development of the four continental regions fringing Asia, namely China, India, the Near East, and Europe.

China and India survived, with populations blighted by hopeless poverty.

European life began to approach the standards of the Near East and of China so far as concerned technology and general commercial activities.

For the purpose of understanding how it happened that European life escaped the restrictions which finally bound China, India, and The Near East, it is important to recapture the attitude towards Commerce prevalent in various epochs.

It must be remembered that China and Bagdad, at the height of their prosperity, exhibited forms of human life in many ways more gracious than our own.

There is ample evidence of active Commerce in China and the Near East in ancient times.

Three thousand years ago the importance of credit would have been no news either in Mesopotamia or in China. Also there was foreign trade beyond the boundaries of the Near East. There are evidences of ocean-borne trade between India and Egypt, perhaps even between China and Egypt, with Ceylon as an intermediary. Also Central Asia was nearing its last phase of prosperity before it faded out into desert. It seems to have provided the route for a flourishing overland trade between China and the Near East.

Modern Europe and America have derived their civilization from the races whose countries border the Eastern Mediterranean. In the earlier chapters, Greece and Palestine were the regions providing the initial formulations of the ideas concerning the essence of human nature. When we examine the history of science, to these two countries we must add Egypt.

These three countries are the direct ancestors of our modern civilization. Of course there is a long tale of civilization behind them, Mesopotamia, Crete, Phoenicia, and India, China, also contributed.

Columbus never reached China. But he discovered America.

The details of these codes are relative to the social circumstances of the immediate environment – life at a certain date on ‘the fertile fringe’ of the Arabian desert, life on the lower slopes of the Himalayan Mountains, life on the plains of China, or on the plains of India, life on the delta of some great river.

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